CANON 16
ARROYO-POSIDIO vs.ATTY. VITAN,
[A.C. No. 6051 April 2, 2007]
FACTS: Complainant Celia Arroyo-Posidio prayed for the
disbarment of respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan on account
of deceit, fraud, dishonesty and commission of acts in
violation of the lawyers oath.
She engaged the services of respondent in Special Proceeding
No. C-525, entitled "Testate Estate of deceased Nicolasa S. de
Guzman Arroyo," filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City. Complainant paid respondent legal fees in the
amount of P20,000.00. However, on June 6, 1990,
respondent withdrew his appearance as counsel in the said
case, thus complainant engaged the services of another
lawyer.
On August 1996, respondent contacted complainant and
showed her documents consisting of tax declarations of
properties purportedly forming part of the estate of Nicolasa
S. de Guzman-Arroyo, but were not included in the Inventory
of Properties for distribution in Special Proceeding No. C-525.
He convinced complainant to file another case to recover her
share in the alleged undeclared properties and demanded
P100,000.00 as legal fees therefor. After several months,
however, respondent failed to institute any action.
Complainant decided to forego the filing of the case and
asked for the return of the P100,000.00, but respondent
refused despite repeated demands.
Complainant filed an action for sum of money and damages
against respondent and the MTC rendered a decision in favor
of the complainant ordering respondent to pay P100,000 to
the plaintiff plus interest.
Respondent issued a check in the amount of P120,000 but
upon presentment for payment, the check was dishonored
for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. Hence, this administrative
complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or
property of his client that may come to his possession. He is a
trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of
his client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose such as for the registration of a deed with
the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the
transfer of title over real property under the name of his
client if not utilized, must be returned immediately to his
client upon demand therefor. The lawyers failure to return
the money of his client upon demand gave rise to a
presumption that he has misappropriated said money in
violation of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by a
lawyer [of] funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross
violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.
Respondent must likewise be reminded that a lawyer should,
at all times, comply with what the court lawfully requires. It
bears stressing that the judgment against him in Civil Case
No. 7130 has long become final and executory. However, up
to this date, he has failed to comply with the order to pay
complainant the amount of P100,000.00 as well as interest
and attorneys fees. His refusal to comply with the said order
constitutes a willful disobedience to the courts lawful orders.
Needless to say, the act of issuing a bouncing check further
compounded respondents infractions. Time and again, we
have held that the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without
sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes willful
dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public
confidence in law and lawyers. Such conduct indicates the
respondents unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed
on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence
and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
It is clear from the foregoing that respondent fell short of the
exacting moral and ethical standards imposed on members of
the legal profession. Respondents refusal to return
complainants money upon demand, his failure to comply
with the lawful orders of the trial court, as well as the
issuance of a bouncing check, reveal his failure to live up to
his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of his
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It cannot be overemphasized that membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. Whenever it is made to appear that
an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence
of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty
of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave
him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw
the privilege.
The Court believes that a penalty of suspension is called for
under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Parias vs Paquinto,
[AC 6297, 7/13/2004]
FACTS: Complainant hired the services of the respondent to
annul her marriage to Danilo Soriano. Complainant gave the
respondent a diskette containing a narration of what
happened between her and her estranged husband.
Complainant also gave respondent money as part of the
acceptance fee and the filing fee for the case. Inquiring on
the status of her case respondent told the complainant that
their first hearing was postponed to a later date.
Unconvinced complainant went RTC-Manila branch to inquire
on the status of her case. Such to her surprise, there was no
such case filed in court. Respondent promised to return what
the complainant gave. However, the amount was only given
after complainant filed for a disbarment case with the IBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violation of
Rule 16.01.
RULING: Yes
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the
Code) provides that:
A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the
clients cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file
the case must immediately be returned to the client on
demand. Paguinto returned the money only after Parias filed
this administrative case for disbarment.
Paguinto should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity to
the cause of his client. When a lawyer accepts a case, his
acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses
the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the
case. The lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in
the prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and
to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the
pursuit or defense of the case.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his
case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake
the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is
not true to his oath as a lawyer. Hence, a lawyer must accept
only as much cases as he can efficiently handle, otherwise his
clients interests will suffer. It is not enough that a lawyer
possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter. He
must also give adequate attention to his legal work.
The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost
learning and ability in handling his cases. A license to practice
law is a guarantee by the courts to the public that the
licensee possesses sufficient skill, knowledge and diligence to
manage their cases. The legal profession demands from a
lawyer the vigilance and attention expected of a good father
of a family.
REYES vs. ATTY. MAGLAYA
[243 SCRA 214]
FACTS: Complainant and administrative complaint Atty.
Leopoldo Maglaya. He alleged the following:
1. That complainant endorsed to the respondent, all
pertinent papers regarding the anomalous and fraudulent
actuations of one Angelica Offemaria an alleged president
and General Manager of the Bicol Veterans Handicrafts
Enterprises, Inc., in which complainant was defrauded of
P31,863.30, for the purpose of filing the necessary criminal
action against said Angelica Offemaria and for the recovery of
the aforesaid amount.
2. That the respondent agreed to handle the case, and asked
for the amount of P1,500.00, as his fee.
3. That once having received the documents and the check
for P1,500.00, complainant has heard from respondent,
although said complainant has been calling said respondent
almost daily, to inquire as to the status of the case he has
endorsed.
4. At the request of complainant, another letter was
addressed to the respondent demanding the return of the
P1,500.00, within 5 days from receipt thereof, but
respondent failed to return the aforesaid amount up to the
present, although he received the letter of demand.
5. That, however, due to respondent's inaction in the case
endorsed to him by the complainant for a period of more
than 4 months; his failure to return all the documentary
evidence entrusted to him, and his failure to return the
amount he received, the case against Offemaria has not yet
been commenced up to the present.
Respondent averred that at the time of the endorsement of
said case, complainant Reyes merely had xerox copies of his
documents as the originals were in the possession of one
Agent Urmatan of the Criminal Investigation Service ("CIS") of
the Philippine Constabulary where complainant first had his
case investigated.
Respondent Maglaya also stated that the amount of
P1,500.00 which he received from complainant, was not only
for his fees but also for expenses incurred in retrieving
complainant's records from the CIS. Furthermore,
respondent submitted that "complainant has no cause of
action, except the return of P1,500.00 which respondent
agreed to if only to show complainant that respondent
cannot profit at the former's expense despite time and
money spent on his case.
In his Reply, complainant Reyes insisted that the amount of
P1,500.00 was for respondent's fee in the filing of the
criminal action against Angelica Offemaria and not for
expenses in retrieving the records from the CIS. He also
pointed out that respondent was not candid with this Court
when he alleged that he did not receive the record or file of
the complainant. As a matter of fact, his receipt of the
complete file of complainant against Angelica Offemaria from
the PC-CIS is evidenced by a receipt in respondent's own
handwriting as early as 20 July 1979. Thus, considering that
respondent had with him the complete file of complainant
obtained by respondent from the PC-CIS as early as 20 July
1979, and yet had not instituted the desired criminal action
against said Angelica Offemaria more than 3 months later,
complainant was impelled in a letter to demand from
respondent the return of the documents and the amount of
P1,500.00. Hence, complainant contended that such inaction
was indicative of respondent's negligence in handling the
case of his client.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
RULINGS: Yes. The Court is in full accord with the findings
and recommendation of the IBP that respondent by his
admissions has sufficiently demonstrated conduct showing
his unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize
the attorney-client relationship. By his unexplained failure to
return the amount of P1,500.00 demanded by com-plainant-
client receipt of which he had acknowledged and which he
had agreed to return at the earliest possible opportunity, he
failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer.
He has in particular disregarded Canon 16, Rule 16.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which requires that a
lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand x x x. His inexcusable act of
withholding money belonging to his client warrants the
imposition of disciplinary sanction.
The Court also finds that respondent has not exercised the
diligence required of lawyers in the handling of their clients
cases. He failed to act upon complainants case for a period
of more than 3 months from the time the complete file of
complainant against Angelica Offemaria was endorsed to him
by Atty. Abando of the PC-CIS. To make matters worse,
respondent failed to respond to complainants inquiries
regarding the status of his case, a duty which was incumbent
upon him.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby SUSPENDS ATTY. LEOPOLDO
T. MAGLAYA from the practice of law for a period of 1 year
from notice hereof, with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more
severely.
MENESES V MACALINO
[AC NO. 6651,FEBRUARY 27, 2006]
FACTS: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Eduardo
P. Meneses (complainant) against Atty. Rodolfo
P. Macalino (respondent) for violation of the lawyers oath.
Complainant alleged that sometime in March 1993,
respondent offered his legal services to complainant to help
secure the release of complainants car from the Bureau of
Customs. Respondent proposed to handle the case for a
package deal of P60,000. Complainant agreed and initially
gave respondentP10,000 for processing of the papers. In
June 1993, respondent asked for P30,000 to expedite the
release of the car. In both instances, respondent did not issue
a receipt but promised to furnish complainant with a receipt
from the Bureau of Customs. Since then, respondent failed to
give complainant an update on the matter.
Complainant repeatedly went to respondents house to
inquire on the status of the release of the car. Complainant
was always told that respondent was not around and to just
return another day. This went on for more than a year. In
April 1994, complainant went to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to file a complaint for estafa against
respondent. The NBI set the complaint for investigation on 27
April 1994. Respondent wrote a letter to the NBI dated 26
April 1994, requesting for postponement of the investigation
to 12 May 1994. Respondent stated in his letter that he
would settle the matter amicably with complainant and
return the P40,000. Respondent failed to appear for the
investigation scheduled on 12 May 1994. Respondent failed
to appear on the succeeding hearings despite several request
and subpoenas sent.
ISSUE:Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:The IBP Board of Governors issued CBD Resolution
No. XVI-2004- 414 (IBP Resolution) dated 7 October
2004 adopting with modification
Commissioner Funas Report and Recommendation
(Report) finding respondent guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of
one year suspension from the practice of law.
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 16,
Rule 16.01, Rule 16.03, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code). Respondent failed to
inform and to respond to inquiries of the complainant
regarding the status of the case. Respondents failure to
communicate with complainant was an unjustified denial of
complainants right to be fully informed of the status of the
case. Respondent failed to account and return the money he
received from complainant. When a lawyer receives money
from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound
to render an accounting to the client showing that the money
was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the
lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the
lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.
Respondents unjustified withholding of money belonging to
the complainant warrants the imposition of disciplinary
action. Respondent failed to file an answer and attend the
hearings before the IBP. Respondents attitude demonstrates
a character which stains the nobility of the legal profession.
The Court finds the penalty recommended by the IBP to
suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year
well-taken. Respondent is ORDERED TO RETURN to
complainant, within 30 days from notice of this decision, the
full amount of P20,000 with interest at 12% per annum from
the date of promulgation of this decision until full payment.
Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof
of payment of the amount within 15 days from payment.
BARCENAS VS. ATTY. ALVERO
[A.C. NO. 8159 APRIL 23, 2010]
FACTS: On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee
Rodolfo San Antonio, entrusted to Atty. Alvero the amount of
P300,000, which the latter was supposed to give to a certain
Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of his deceased father as
tenant of a ricefield located in Barangay San Benito, Victoria,
Laguna. The receipt of the money was evidenced by an
acknowledgment receipt dated May 7, 2004. In the said
receipt, Atty. Alvero said that he would deposit the money in
court because Amanda Gasta refused to accept the same.
Later, Barcenas found out that Atty. Alvero was losing a lot of
money in cockfights. To check if the money they gave Atty.
Alvero was still intact, Barcenas pretended to borrow
P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 and promised to return the
amount when needed or as soon as the case was set for
hearing. However, Atty. Alvero allegedly replied, Akala nyo
ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na?
Subsequently, Barcenas discovered that Atty. Alvero did not
deposit the money in court, but instead converted and used
the same for his personal needs. Despite repeated demands
to return the money, Atty. Alvero refused. Hence, Barcenas
filed a case with the IBP. Atty. Alvero stressed that there was
no lawyer-client relationship between him and Barcenas. He,
however, insisted that the lawyer-client relationship between
him and San Antonio still subsisted as his service was never
severed by the latter. He further emphasized that he had not
breached the trust of his client, since he had, in fact,
manifested his willingness to return the said amount as long
as his lawyer-client relationship with San Antonio subsisted.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING: Yes. Atty. Alvero breached 1.01 of Canon 1 and
Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
CANON 1.
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESS.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16.
A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by
him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of
his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have
a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the
Rules of Court.
There is a clear breach of lawyer-client relations. When a
lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose,
the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose.
And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose,
the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.
These, Atty. Alvero failed to do. Jurisprudence dictates that a
lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of
his client in the course of his professional employment shall
deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due, or
(b) upon demand. In the instant case, respondent failed to
account for and return the P300,000.00 despite
complainant's repeated demands.
Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed
no attorney-client relationship between him and
Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-client
relationship existed between them, case law has it that an
attorney may be removed, or otherwise disciplined, not only
for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for
gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer upon him
Atty. Alveros failure to immediately account for
and return the money when due and upon demand violated
the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity
and moral soundness, and warranted the imposition of
disciplinary action. It gave rise to the presumption that he
converted the money for his own use, and this act
constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. They
constitute gross misconduct and gross unethical behavior for
which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
WHEREFORE, Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated
July 17, 2008 of the IBP-CBD Board of Governors, which
found respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero GUILTY of gross
misconduct, is AFFIRMED. He is hereby SUSPENDED for a
period of two (2) years from the practice of law, effective
upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC. vs. ATTY. MIJARES III,
[November 20, 2009, 605 SCRA 693]
FACTS: This disbarment case is about the need for a lawyer to
account for funds entrusted to him by his client. Complainant
Arellano University, Inc. engaged the services of respondent
Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar, to secure a
certificate of title covering a dried up portion of the Estero de
San Miguel that the University had been occupying. In
its complaint for disbarment, complainant alleged that it
gave respondent all the documents the latter needed to
accomplish his work and was given P500,000.00 on top of his
attorneys fees, supposedly to cover the expenses for
"facilitation and processing."
Respondent informed the University that he already
completed Phase I of the titling of the property, meaning
that he succeeded in getting the Metro Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) to approve it. The
University requested respondent for copies of the MMDA
approval but he unjustifiably failed to comply despite
repeated demands. When he made himself scarce, the
University was prompted to withdraw all the cases it had
entrusted to him and demand the return of the P500,000.00
it gave him. The University eventually terminated
respondents services.
The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be
disbarred, however the IBP Board of Governors modified it to
indefinite suspension.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of misappropriating the
P500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted to him
for use in facilitating and processing the titling of a property
that it claimed.
RULING: YES. The Court is not inclined to let him off with the
penalty of indefinite suspension which is another way of
saying he can resume his practice after a time if he returns
the money and makes a promise to shape up.
Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance
the interests of his client such that he must promptly account
for whatever money or property his client may have
entrusted to him. As a mere trustee of said money or
property, he must hold them separate from that of his own
and make sure that they are used for their intended purpose.
If not used, he must return the money or property
immediately to his client upon demand, otherwise the lawyer
shall be presumed to have misappropriated the same in
violation of the trust reposed on him. A lawyers conversion
of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional
ethics. WHEREFORE, Atty. Mijares was held with indefinite
suspension.
IGUALVS. ATTY. JAVIER
[A.C. NO. CBD-174. MARCH 7, 1996]
FACTS: This case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by
complainant with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
initiate disbarment proceedings against the respondent, for
malpractice, deceit, dishonesty, and gross misconduct in his
office as attorney and/or for violation of his lawyers oath.
Respondent was accused of having unlawfully withheld and
misappropriated complaints money in the amount of
P7,000.00, allegedly paid by way of acceptance fee for a
matter which respondent never performed any work on.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Yes. We note that respondent not only unjustifiably
refused to return the complainants money upon demand, but
he stubbornly persisted in clinging to what was not his and to
which he absolutely had no right. Such lack of delicadeza and
absence of integrity was further highlighted by respondents
half-baked excuses, hoary pretenses and blatant lies in his
testimony before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
represented by Commissioner Roxas. The sad thing is, he was
not fooling anyone at all. He only ended up making a fool of
himself in the process.
Respondent, like all other members of the Bar, was and is
expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following
Canons, viz:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.
CANON 16- A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.
CANON 20 - A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable
fees.
for the relationship between an attorney and his client is
highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and
good faith.
It goes without saying that respondent, by his deceitful
actuations constituting violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, must be subjected to disciplinary measures for
his own good, as well as for the good of the entire
membership of the Bar as a whole.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, and consistent with
the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
respondent ROLANDO S. JAVIER is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) MONTH, effective
upon notice hereof, and ORDERED to restitute to the
complainant the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P7,000.00) within thirty (30) days from notice. Let copies of
this Decision be spread upon his record in the Bar Confidants
Office and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
CANON 17
TAHAW VS. VITAN
[A.C. NO. 6441, 10/21/2004]
FACTS:Victoria Tahaw (Tahaw), the complainant, secured the
services of respondent Atty. Jeremias Vitan (Vitan) for filing
appropriate action for a partition of a real property located
in Makati City delivering to respondent 4 checks amounting
to P30,000.00. Upon verification to check if a case has
been filed for and in her behalf, she was issued a certification
by the Clerk of Court in Makati that no such case was
filed prompting Tahaw to write the respondent informing
him that she was terminating his services as counsel and
demanded the refund of the P30,000.00 to which Vitan failed
to return prompting to file a complaint of disbarment or
suspension with IBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the non filing of a case constitute a
remiss in the lawyers responsibilities which can be penalized
by disbarment or suspension with the IBP.
HELD: The Court agreed with the recommendation of the IBP
that respondent has been remiss in his responsibilities. He
is found guilty of violation of Canons 7 and 17 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for his failure to file the
necessary pleading for his clients case and for the failure to
return and immediately deliver the funds of his
client advanced for the purpose of filing the said case, upon
demand, and even after his commitment with the IBP to do
so.Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him. The trust and confidence of clients require in a lawyer
a high standard and appreciation of his duty to
them. Nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of the legal profession.The respondent was suspended for six
months with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same and similar acts shall be dealt with more severely
CANON 18
BARBUCO VS BELTRAN [A.C. NO. 5092. AUGUST 11, 2004]
FACTS:
Lucila S. Barbuco filed a Sworn Complaint against Atty.
Raymundo N. Beltran for malpractice of law, negligence and
dishonesty.
Complainant, through her son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the
services of respondent for the purpose of filing an appeal
before the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 21, in the case entitled,
Alexander Bermido, Plaintiff versus Lucila Barbuco,
Defendant. On August 6, 1998, complainant, through Benito
B. Sy, gave respondent the total sum of P3,500.00 for
payment of the docket fees.
Complainants appeal, was dismissed by the Court of Appeals
in a Resolution dated September 25, 1998 for failure to file
Appellants Brief. Complainant found out that her appeal had
been dismissed only on June 4, 1999, when her son went to
the Court of Appeals to verify the status of the case.
When asked to comment on the charges filed against him,
respondent Beltran averred that the docket fees were paid
on time and that on September 22, 1998, he filed the
Appellants Brief with the Court of Appeals. However, the
appeal was dismissed. On October 19, 1998, respondent filed
a motion for reconsideration, on the ground that he received
the notice to file brief on June 25, 1998; however, on June
26, 1998, he met a vehicular accident which physically
incapacitated him for several days; and that as a result of the
accident, he suffered head injuries which caused him to lose
track of deadlines for the filing of pleadings. On March 9,
1999, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied on the
ground that the brief for defendant-appellant was filed forty-
three (43) days late.
On November 22, 1999, the complaint against respondent
Beltran was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents failure to file appellants
brief warrants sanctions
RULING: YES. Respondents conduct relative to the belated
filing of the Appellants Brief falls below the standards
exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to
their clients cause. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers states that A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the
best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file
brief within the period certainly constitutes inexcusable
negligence, more so if the delay of FORTY THREE (43) days
resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.
The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident
and suffered physical injuries as a result thereof cannot serve
to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering
that he was a member of a law firm composed of not just one
lawyer. As such, respondent could have asked any of his
partners in the law office to file the Appellants Brief for him
or, at least, to file a Motion for Extension of Time to file the
said pleading.
The failure to timely file a pleading is by itself inexcusable
negligence on the part of respondent. Complainants liability
is further compounded by his failure to maintain an open line
of communication with his client, in violation of the
provisions of Rule 18.04, which reads: A lawyer shall keep the
client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the clients request for
information. Respondents series of inadvertence prejudiced
the case of the complainant.
A lawyers fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be
ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected
of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect the
interest of his client within the bounds of the law. The Code
of Professional Responsibility dictates that a lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence and he should
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran is found guilty of
negligence and malpractice and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective
immediately.
SUSAN CUIZON vs. ATTY. RODOLFO MACALINO
[A.C. No. 4334; July 7, 2004]
FACTS: The legal services of respondent ATTY. RODOLFO
MACALINO was Sought by the complainant in behalf of her
husband AntolinCuizon who was convicted for Violation of
Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. When the spouses had no
sufficient means to pay the legal fees, the respondent
suggested that he be given possession of complainants
Mitsubishi car, which was delivered to the respondent. Later
respondent offered to buy the car for P85,000.00 for which
he paid a down payment of P24,000.00. After the sale of the
car, respondent failed to attend to the case of AntolinCuizon,
so Antolins wife filed a case against him.
The respondent failed to comply with the following orders of
the court, to wit:
1. The respondent was required to comment on the
Complaint lodged against him as early as December 5, 1994.
2. The respondent was ordered to show cause why he should
not be meted with disciplinary action or declared in
contempt for failure to comply with the order of the court, to
comment on complaint.
3. Respondent paid the Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) fine
imposed on him for failure to comply with the previous
orders, however he failed to fully comply with the order of
the court.
4. The Supreme Court issued a resolution increasing the
imposed fine on respondent in the amount of P500.00 to
P1,000.00 and again the order requiring the respondent to
file his comment was reiterated. However, the cashier of the
Disbursement and Collection Division issued a certification
that the imposed fine has not been paid by the respondent.
5. Respondent again committed another infraction of the law
by issuing a check against a closed account
In the Resolution dated July 27, 1998, the Court resolved to
consider the Resolution of December 10, 1997 finding the
respondent guilty of contempt of court and ordering his
imprisonment until he complies with the previous orders of
the court.
The Investigating Commissioner forthwith filed her Report
and Recommendation finding the respondent unfit to remain
a member of the Bar and recommending that he be
disbarred. The Investigating Commissioner conducted further
investigation and submitted her Report and
Recommendation dated November 16, 1999 stating that the
respondent failed to appear during the two scheduled
hearings.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent be disbarred.
HELD: Yes. The fact that the respondent went into hiding in
order to avoid service upon him of the warrant of arrest
issued by the Court exacerbates his offense. His repeated
failure to comply with the Courts Resolutions requiring him
to file his Comment on the Complaint should also be taken
into account. By his repeated cavalier conduct, the
respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the
authority of the Court.
The foregoing acts of the respondent constitute gross
misconduct which renders him unfit to discharge the duties
of his office and unworthy of the trust and confidence
reposed on him as an officer of the court. His disbarment is
consequently warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Rodolfo Macalino is hereby
DISBARRED.
VILLARIASA-RIESENBECK VS ABARRIENTOS
[AC NO.6238, NOV. 4, 2004]
FACTS: Complainant hired respondent in a case she had
elevated to CA. The case was decided against her, so she
asked respondent to prepare for a motion for
reconsideration and paid him P5,000. She also paid
respondent another P5,000 thinking that the case might be
elevated to the SC.
Respondent issued receipt with the words: Partial Payment
for Preparation of Motion for Reconsideration & eventually
Petition for Review to the Supreme Court in the first receipt.
The second receipt, on its face, bears the words Balance
Remaining: P5,000.00 to be paid upon submission of the
Petition for Review to the Supreme Court.
Respondent, who anticipated a denial of the motion, asked
her to get certified true copies of the Court of Appeals
adverse decision. But after she had given him the copies of
the decision, respondent failed to apprise her about the
status of her case. Fearful that the period to appeal might
lapse, she and her husband, Johannes, visited respondent
several times to ask if a resolution on the motion had already
arrived.
When she heard that a resolution had arrived, respondent
told her that a copy of a Resolution denying the motion had
already arrived. Respondent also said that a Motion for
Extension of Time to File the Petition had also been filed with
the Supreme Court.
She returned to respondents law to ask for a copy of the
Resolution and to follow up on the petition, however,
respondent astounded her with the truth that the period to
file the petition had already expired. Respondent confessed
that he received the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration. She burst into tears because she knew that
because of respondent, she had lost all her hopes concerning
the case. Thus, complainant filed the present complaint.
Respondent said, in his defense, that he tried to reach
complainant but despite the messages they left for her,
complainant never showed up. He blamed her for coming
late, and told her that even if she came on time, he would tell
her to look for another lawyer, as he was convinced that
filing the petition was futile. He asserted that his sole
obligation to complainant was only to file the Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violation of
Canon 18.
RULING: Yes. From the tenor of the words in the issued
receipt, which respondent himself had written, clearly shows
the respondents obligations concerning complainants case.
That respondent was supposed to elevate complainants case
is consistent with the fact during the pendency of the Motion
for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, respondent
instructed complainant to secure certified true copies of the
adverse decision to be attached to the petition. Not only is
his action proof that he was obliged to elevate complainants
case, his action is also proof he considered her cause
meritorious. Respondents present claim that he apprised
complainant from the very start that further appeal or
petition would be unmeritorious is, therefore, clearly a ruse.
Respondent alleges that complainant could not be reached in
time for him to withdraw his services while allowing
complainant sufficient time to hire other counsel. We note,
however, that respondent never attempted to write
complainant to apprise her that he had already received the
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. Sending a letter to
her by registered mail would have been the simplest thing he
could have done to protect himself from liability if it were
true that complainant could not be found in time.
As clearly stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Canon 18. A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.
Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Respondent should be reminded that once a lawyer agrees to
take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause. The lawyer must serve the client with competence and
diligence, and champion the clients cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care, and devotion. Otherwise stated, the lawyer
owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of the clients rights, and the
exertion of the lawyers utmost learning and ability to the end
that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the
rules of law legally applied. This simply means that the client
is entitled to the benefit of any remedy and defense that is
authorized by law and may expect the lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense. Until the lawyers withdrawal is
properly done, the lawyer is expected to do his or her best
for the interest of the client.
CANON 19
FERNANDO MARTIN PENA vs. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO
[A.C. No. 7298 June 25, 2007]
FACTS: Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio appeared as legal counsel for
Grace C. Hufana in an illegal dismissal case before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against
complainant Fernando Martin Pena. Hufana is praying for
claim for separation pay, but Pena rejected the claim as
baseless.
Thereafter, Aparicio sent Pena a letter reiterating his client's
claim for separation pay. Through his letter, he threatened
complainant that should Pena fail to pay the amounts they
propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger
amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple
charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and
cancellation of business license to operate due to violations
of laws.
ISSUE: WON Aparicio violated Canon 19 (and 19.01) of the
CPR, enjoining every lawyer to represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of the law?
HELD: Yes. Under Canon 19, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or
cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure
leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their
own cases against the lawyer's client.
Rule 19.01. A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means
to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage
in any case or proceeding."
In the case at bar, the threats are not only unethical for
violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.
Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats
of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public
prints,obtaining of value from a person as a condition of
refraining from making an accusation against him, or
disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his
prejudice." The letter in this case contains more than just a
simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file
retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing
to do with his client's claim for separation pay. Indeed, letters
of this nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
It was not respondent's intention to point out complainant's
violations of the law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the
letter even contains an implied promise to "keep silent"
about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on
the date indicated.
DECISION: While the writing of the letter went beyond ethical
standards, we hold that disbarment is too severe a penalty to
be imposed on respondent, considering that he wrote the
same out of his overzealousness to protect his client's
interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is
reprimand.
MILLARE V MONTERO
FACTS: (RC Note: The first part of the case is pointless. It just
wants to impress on you that Atty. Montero used procedure
to circumvent the administration of justice) Pacfica Millare,
the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable
judgment against Elsa Co. The case was for ejectment filed
with the MTC. The judgment of the MTC became final and
executory on November 1986. Numerous
appeals/complaints/petitions were filed to frustrate the
execution of the MTC judgment. The summary of which is in
page 8. There is no need to know what they are though.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Monteros acts are justified.
HELD: No. Montero should be suspended for one year, as
recommended by the IBP which found him guilty of
malpractice. Judging from the number of actions filed,
Montero is also guilty of forum shopping. By having willfully
and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to
get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed,
respondents violated the duty of a member of the Bar to
institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses
as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws.
Montero has made a mockery of the judicial process. And
disregarded the canons in intentionally frustrating the rights
of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was
rendered: thus abused procedural rules to defeat the ends of
substantial justice.
ALEX ONG vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
[Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002]
FACTS: The complainant received a demand-letter from the
respondent as legal counsel of one Nemesia Garganian
claiming for the support of the alleged child of the
complainant with the latter. A few days thereafter, the
respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno
(Agaw), an emissary of the complainant. In this letter, the
respondent listed down the alleged additional financial
demands of Ms. Garganian against the complainant and
discussed the courses of action that he would take against
the complainant should the latter fail to comply with his
obligation to support Ms. Garganian and her son.
It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganians son was
the complainants brother and that the complainant merely
assumed his brothers obligation to appease Ms. Garganian
who was threatening to sue them. The complainant then did
not comply with the demands against him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint with the
Office of the City Fiscal (now Prosecutors Office) of
Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim,
and one Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail Trade
Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal
complaint against the complainant, Lim, Ong and Adela
Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases
against the complainant before the Bureau of Domestic
Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and
the Office of the Solicitor General. According to the
complainant, these cases were subsequently denied due
course and dismissed by the aforesaid government agencies.
The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present
case for disbarment. The records show that the respondent
offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him
any information against the complainant just so he would
have a leverage in his actions against the latter. The
complainant branded the respondents tactics as highly
immoral, unprofessional and unethical,
constitutingmalpractice of law and conduct gravely
unbecoming of a lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice of
law and conduct unbecoming of lawyer.
RULING: YES. The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It mandates
lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the
bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that a
lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
We find the respondents action to be malicious as the cases
he instituted against the complainant did not have any
bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms.
Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has violated the
proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is
inexcusable. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the
rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding and he shall not do any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act
with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and
nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be
disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity. Public confidence in law and
lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should
act and comport himself in such a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is
hereby declared guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five
(5) months and sternly warned that a repetition of the same
or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
CANON 21
SUNTAY VS. SUNTAY GR NO. 132524
FACTS: Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent
Isabels Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate
of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The
decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of
Isabel. Isabels father Emilio, had predeceased his mother
Cristina.
The marriage of Isabels parents had previously been
decalred by the CFI as null and void. Federico anchors his
oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC,
that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation
as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied
Federicos Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for
certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the
dispositive portion of the the decision declaring the marriage
of Isabels parents null and void be upheld. 2006 requiring Atty. Paras to show cause why he should not
ISSUE: In case of conflict between the body of the decision
and the dispostive portion thereof, which should prevail?
Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabels parents a case
of a void or voidable marriage?Whether or not Isabel is an
legitimate child?
HELD: Petition dismissed. Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that
in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws,
it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon
courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive
portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be
declared null and void, the body had shown that the legal
basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect
at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a
marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the
body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be
reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court.
The fundamental distinction between void and voidable
marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have
taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect
to property relations of the spouses are provided for under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages
who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the
parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid
and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final
judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.
Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it
had never been entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being
totally wiped out.The status of children born in voidable
marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree
of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children
conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also
called natural children by legal fiction.
In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the
second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which
provides that children conceived of voidable marriages
before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate.
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
YAP-PARAS VS. PARAS [A.C NO. 4947 JUNE 7, 2007]
FACTS: Petitioner-movant filed a verified Petition praying for
the disbarment of her estranged husband respondent
Atty.Justo J. Paras alleging acts of deceit, malpractice, grave
misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation of oath as
alawyer committed by the latter. The Court issued a
Resolution finding Atty. Paras guilty of committing a
falsehood inviolation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus, the Court resolved to
suspend Atty.Paras from the practice of law for a period of
one year, with a warning that commission of the same or
similar offensein the future will result in the imposition of a
more severe penalty.
Thereafter, Atty. Paras filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied for lack of merit but during its
pendency,complainant-movant filed with the Court the
instant Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, alleging
thereunder, inter alia, that Atty. Paras violated the
suspension order earlier issued by the Court with his
continued practice of law.
After more than a year, Atty. Paras filed with the Court a
Manifestation, stating that he had completely and
faithfullyserved his one year suspension from the practice of
law from August 25, 2005, the day after he received the
denialresolution on his motion for reconsideration, to August
24, 2006.
The Court issued another Resolution dated November27,
beheld in contempt of court for such failure and to comply
with the said resolution within ten days from receipt.
Consequently, a Comment on Motion for Contempt and
Explanation on Failure to Timely File Required Comment
wasfiled by Atty. Paras denying all the allegations in
petitioner-movants Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment.
He likewiseclaimed that he had never done nor made any
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice, nor undermine or
put to naught or violate any of the pertinent causes
enumerated in Section 3,Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.
RULING: No. We find no sufficient basis to support
petitioner-movants allegation that Atty. Paras violated the
Courtssuspension order, what with the fact that Atty. Paras
himself took the initiative to inform the lower courts of his
one- year suspension from law practice.
It is clear, however, that all lawyers are expected to recognize
the authority of the Supreme Court and obey its lawful
processes and orders. Despite errors which one may impute
on the orders of the Court, these must be respected,
especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves
officers of the courts. It is well to emphasize again that a
resolution of the Supreme Court is not be construed as a
mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately or selectively. Court orders are to be respected
not because the justices or judges who issue them should be
respected, but because of the respect and consideration that
should be e0tended to the 3udicial branch of the
government. This isabsolutely essential if our government is
to be a government of laws and not of men.
The Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in the
instant case, as well petitioner-movants counsels, to
avoidfurther squabbles and unnecessary filing of
administrative cases against each other. An examination of
the records revealsa pervasive atmosphere of animosity
between Atty. Paras and petitioners counsels as evidenced by
the number of administrative cases between them. It is well
to stress that mutual bickerings and unjustified
recriminations betweenattorneys detract from the dignity of
the legal profession and will not receive sympathy from this
Court. Lawyers shouldtreat each other with courtesy,
fairness, candor and civility.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment
is DENIED. However, Atty. Justo Paras is hereby
REPRIMANDED for his failure to observe the respect due the
Court in not promptly complying with this Courts resolution,
with WARNING that a more drastic punishment will be
imposed upon him for a repetition of the same act. SO
ORDERED.
CALUB VS SULLER [AC NO. 1474]
FACTS: In the morning of January 20, 1975, while
complainant was away, respondent Atty. Suller went to the
complainant's abode supposedly to borrow a blade.
Complainants wife let him in because he was a friend of the
family and that they were neighbors. Atty. Suller then began
touching her in different parts of her body. When she
protested, respondent threatened her and forced her to have
sexual intercourse with him. At that moment, complainant
returned
home to get money to pay for real estate taxes. When the
complainant entered the house, he saw his wife and
respondent having sexual intercourse on the bed. She was
kicking respondent with one foot while the latter pressed on
her arms and other leg, preventing her from defending
herself.
January 23, 1975: A criminal complaint was filed against the
respondent (CFI, Agoo, La Union)
June 3, 1975: Complainant filed with the SC the instant
complaint for disbarment against the respondent.
1975-1978: SG conducted hearings
1991: The investigation for the case was transferred to the
Committee on Bar Discipline, IBP.
1993: The Board of Governors, IBP issued a resolution
recommending that the respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of 1 year.
ISSUE: WON the SC should follow the recommendation of the
Board of Governors, IBP and only suspend Atty. Suller for a
year
HELD: NO. Abraham A. Suller is DISBARRED from the practice
of law. The record discloses that the Court of First Instance
acquitted respondent Suller for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Such acquittal,
however, is not determinative of this administrative case.
The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint,
particularly that of the complainant suffice to show that
respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in having
carnal knowledge of his neighbor's wife without her consent
in her very home.
"A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and
good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court."
In this case, we find that suspension for one year
recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not
sufficient punishment for the immoral act of respondent. The
rape of his neighbor's wife constituted serious moral
depravity even if his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape. he privilege to
practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and, equally
important, morally.
BENGCOVS BERNARDO [A.C. NO. 6368, JUNE 13, 2012]
FACTS: That sometime on or about the period from April 15,
1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Respondent)
with the help and in connivance and collusion with a certain
Andres Magat wilfully and illegally committed fraudulent act
with intent to defraud herein complainants Fidela G. Bengco
and Teresita N. Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful
words to the effect that he would expedite the titling of the
land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who
are the acquaintance of complainants herein and they
convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will finance and
deliver to him the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance
money he would expedite the titling of the subject land and
further by means of other similar deceit like misrepresenting
himself as lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective
buyer of the subject land, and he is the one handling William
Gatchalians business transaction and that he has contracts
at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which
representation he well knew were false, fraudulent and were
only made to induce the complainant[s] to give and deliver
the said amount ([P]495,000.00) and once in possession of
said amount, wilfully, unlawfully and illegally
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount
to his personal use and benefit and despite demand upon
him to return the said amount, he failed and refused to do
so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice, conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar and Violation of Duties and
Oath as a lawyer.
In the said disbarment case, the respondent requested
multiple times to extend his period to answer but when
finally, a mandatory conference was called by the
Commissioner, the respondent never showed up.
Simultaneous with the disbarment case was a criminal case
filed in court for Estafa, which ended with the conviction of
the respondent and Mr.Magat.
Respondent contends that the action against him has already
prescribed because the alleged act was committed on 1997
and the action was only filed in 2004.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bernardo is liable for the acts
committed
RULING: Yes. The respondentsdefense of prescription is
untenable. The Court has held that administrative cases
against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable
time from the commission of the offending act to the
institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the
administrative culpability of a lawyer.
Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he
himself pleaded for several extensions of time to file the
same, the respondent failed to appear during the mandatory
conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the
respondent is considered as an officer of the court who is
called upon to obey and respect court processes. Such acts of
the respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront
on the courts authority which can not be countenanced.
It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the
administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system,
they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined
whether in their professional or in their private capacity for
any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and
good demeanor.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital
that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon
notice hereof.
Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to
RETURN the amount of P200,000.00 to FidelaBengco and
TeresitaBengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of this
Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof
to the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant within
TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN WARNING that
failure to do so shall merit him the additional penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
ELPIDIO P. TIONG vs. ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO
[A.C. No. 4428; December 12, 2011]
FACTS: Atty. George Florendo has been serving as the lawyer
of spouses Elpidio and Ma. Elena Tiong. Elpidio, a US citizen is
often times away. For two years, he suspected that his wife
and Atty. Florendo were having an affair. Finally in 1995, he
was able to listen to a telephone conversation where he
heard Atty. Florendo mention amorous words to Ma. Elena.
Atty. Florendo confronted the two and both eventually
admitted to their illicit relationship. Atty. Florendo and Ma.
Elena then executed and signed an affidavit, which was later
notarized, stating that they admit of their illicit relationship;
that they are seeking the forgiveness of their respective
spouse. Elpidio forgave Florendo and Ma. Elena. But
nevertheless, Elpidio filed a disbarment case against
Florendo.
Florendo said he can no longer be sanctioned because he was
already pardoned.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Florendo can be administratively
sanctioned even if he was pardoned by complainant.
HELD: Yes. A petition for suspension or disbarment of a
lawyer is a sui generis case.
This class of cases is meant to protect the public and the
courts of undesirable members of the legal profession. As
such, pardon by the offended party of the act complained of
does not operate to offset the ground for disbarment or
suspension. Florendos act of having an affair with his clients
wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his
utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his
profession. He violated the trust reposed upon him by his
client (Canon 17, Code of Professional Responsibility). His
illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful
and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an
attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his office for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office,
grossly immoral conduct, among others. It cannot be also
said, as he claims, that their relationship is merely a moment
of indiscretion considering that their affair went on for more
than two years. Florendo was suspended for 6 months.
ANACTA VS RESURRECCION [AC NO. 9074, 8/14/12]
FACTS: Complainant engaged the services of respondent to
file on her behalf a petition for annulment of marriage for
which she paid respondent P 42,000.00.
A month later, respondent presented to the complainant a
supposed copy of a Petition for Annulment of Marriage which
bore the stamped receipt of the RTC, as well as its docket
number. However, from then on, complainant did not hear
from respondent or receive any notice from the trial court
relative to the said petition. This prompted her to make
inquiries with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC. To
her surprise and dismay, she discovered that no petition for
annulment was ever filed before the said court. She then
terminated the services of respondent and prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Eduardo D. Resurreccion.
The IBP required the respondent to submit his answer to the
complaint within 15 days from notice. However, respondent
did not heed said directive. He also failed to show in the date
set for hearing, thus, the Investigating Commissioner deemed
respondent to have waived the filing of an answer; noted
complainants motion to declare respondent in default; and
gave the complainant 10 days from notice within which to
file her verified position paper, after which the case shall be
deemed submitted for resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct, deceit and malpractice.
RULING: Yes. The SC find the confluence of the evidence
submitted by the complainant to have clearly, convincingly
and satisfactorily shown that indeed the respondent has
authored this reprehensible act. Respondent committed
deceitful and dishonest acts by misrepresenting that he had
already filed a petition for annulment on behalf of the
complainant and pocketing the amount of P42,000.00. He
even went to the extent of presenting to the complainant a
supposed copy of the petition duly filed with the court. After
he was found out, he made himself scarce. He ignored all
communications sent to him by the complainant.
After the disbarment complaint was filed, he failed to file his
answer despite due notice. He totally disregarded the
proceedings before the IBP despite receipt of summons. "The
act of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the
hearings set by the Investigating Commission, despite due
notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings.
The natural instinct of man impels him to resist an
unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It is
totally against our human nature to just remain reticent and
say nothing in the face of false accusations. Hence, silence in
such cases is almost always construed as implied admission
of the truth thereof.
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
respondent may either be disbarred or suspended for
committing deceitful and dishonest acts. Thus:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is thus clear from the foregoing provision that in any of the
following circumstances, to wit: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice;
(3) gross misconduct; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation
of the lawyer's oath; (7) wilful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; or (8) corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so; the Court is vested with the authority and
discretion to impose either the extreme penalty of
disbarment or mere suspension. Certainly, the Court is not
placed in a straitjacket as regards the penalty to be imposed.
There is no ironclad rule that disbarment must immediately
follow upon a finding of deceit or gross misconduct. The
Court is not mandated to automatically impose the extreme
penalty of disbarment. It is allowed by law to exercise its
discretion either to disbar or just suspend the erring lawyer
based on its appreciation of the facts and circumstances of
the case.
YU VS. ATTY. PALAA [JULY 14, 2008]
FACTS:
Mr. Mark Anthony U. Uy who introduced himself as the
Division Manager of Wealth Marketing and General Services
Corporation engaged in spot currency trading.
Mr. Uy persuaded the complainants to invest a minimum
amount of P100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent. Wealth
Marketings promises were false and fraudulent, and that
the checks earlier issued were dishonored for the reason
account closed. It had already ceased its operation and a
new corporation was formed named Ur-Link Corporation
which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations of the
former.
As Wealth Marketings Chairman of the Board of Directors,
respondent assured the complainants that Ur-Link would
assume the obligations of the former company. Respondent
signed an Agreement to that effect which, again, turned out
to be another ploy to further deceive the investors.
complainants lodged a criminal complaint for syndicated
estafa against the respondent and his co-accused.
Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent
went into hiding and has been successful in defying the law,
to this date.
In an Order dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar
Discipline required respondent to submit his Answer to the
complaint but the latter failed to comply. Respondent was
thereafter declared in default and the case was heard ex
parte.
Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred
from the practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Uy should be disbarred?
HELD:Yes. Lawyers as instruments in the administration of
justice are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency
but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing. They may be disciplined whether in their
professional or in their private capacity for any conduct that
is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that
administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of criminal cases.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or
for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x
Power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution
for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.
The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent
is facing an administrative case, for he had been previously
suspended from the practice of law in Samala v. Palaa and
Sps. Amador and Rosita Tejada v. Palaa. In Samala,
respondent also played an important role in a corporation
known as First Imperial Resources Incorporated, being its
legal officer.
Respondent meted the penalty of suspension for 3 years with
a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would
be dealt with more severely.
The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid
service upon him of the warrant of arrest issued by the court
(where his criminal case is pending) exacerbates his offense.
Finally, we note that respondents case is further highlighted
by his lack of regard for the charges brought against him. His
disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross, blatant and
unpardonable disrespect of the Court. The contumacious
behaviour of respondent in the instant case which grossly
degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition
of a much graver penalty --- disbarment.
PHILUX VS NLRC [G.R. NO. 151854; SEPTEMBER 3, 2008]
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Procedure of the Decision dated January
11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62735
dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by
herein petitioners Philux, Inc. and Max Kienle. The petition
for certiorari assailed the dismissal by the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) of the petitioners appeal of the
earlier Labor Arbiters decision declaring herein private
respondent Patricia Perjes to have been illegally dismissed
and directing the petitioners to reinstate her and pay her
backwages. Hence, according to the petitioners, the claims of
the private respondent have no basis at all. The deductions
made against her salary were authorized. She was not
required to work continuously for 9 hours and the
management had no control as regards the duration of her
break time. The management likewise decided to transfer
the private respondent to its Megamall showroom so that
she could be supervised by other Philux employees, unlike in
the South Mall where most of the time she was alone. The
move by the petitioner was purposely made to avert
recurrence of losses. On the contrary, the private
respondents willful disobedience constitutes a valid ground
for termination of her employment.
Petitioners contend that the CA committed serious error by
inflexibly applying a stringent interpretation of a mere
procedural rule such as the posting of an appeal bond within
the ten (10)-day period provided by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent acted in accordance with
the rules of law dismissing the previous petition.
RULING: The petition has no merit. It is settled that the right
to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but
merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
applicable law. Hence, a party who seeks to avail of the same
must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing which
the right to appeal is invariably lost. By explicit provision of
law, an appeal from rulings of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC
must be perfected within ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof; otherwise the same shall become final and
executory. In case of a judgment involving a monetary award,
the appeal shall be perfected only upon (1) payment of the
required appeal fee, (2) posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company and (3) filing of a
memorandum of appeal. The mere filing of a notice of appeal
without complying with the other requisites mentioned shall
not stop the running of the period for perfection of appeal.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even
mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique.
The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel
is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is
deprived of his day in court, in which case the remedy then is
to reopen the case and allow the party who was denied his
day in court to adduce his evidence.
The petitioners assert as well that their subsequent posting
of the bond on September 25, 2000 constituted good faith on
their part to comply with the requirement for perfecting an
appeal under Article 223 of the Labor Code and the NLRC
Rules of Procedure. Petitioners assertion is untenable.
Evidently then, the posting of a bond is mandatory, and the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.
Here, the negligence and/or ignorance of the rules of
petitioners former counsel are not sufficient justification for
their failure to comply with the posting of the bond within
the reglementary period. Neither can petitioners
subsequent but belated posting of the bond be considered as
substantial compliance warranting the relaxation of the rules
in the interest of justice.
ADVINCULA VS. ATTY. MACABATA
[A.C. NO. 7204; MARCH 7, 2007]
FACTS: The case is a disbarment case against respondent on
the ground of gross immorality. It was alleged that sometime
in December 2004, complainant seek for legal advice from
petitioner regarding her collectibles from a travel company.
Respondent sent Demand Letter and sometime in February
2005, they met at Zensho Restaurant to discuss the
possibility of filing complaint against the travel company
because the latter failed to settle the accounts. That after
that said meeting, the respondent "held her arm and kissed
her on the cheek while embracing her very tightly."
The two met again to finalize the draft for the complaint and
while on their way home after the said meeting, the
respondent suddenly stopped the car and things went out of
hand. Thus she decided to refer the case to another lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent committed acts are
grossly immoral which would warrant the disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
RULING: The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.
xxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The SC held that lawyers are expected to abide the tenets of
morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but all
throughout their legal career as lawyers belong to an
exclusive and honored fraternity. Lawyers are called upon to
safeguard the integrity of the legal profession and should
adhere to the unwaveringly to the highest standard of
morality. The respondent admitted to the act of kissing the
complainant on the lips as evidenced as well of his asking for
apology from complainant in his text message. Regardless of
the fact that the respondent admitted that he kissed the
complainant but the Court held that this was not
accompanied by malice because the respondent immediately
asked for forgiveness after sensing the annoyance of the
respondent after texting him. Thus the Court held that this is
not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible which will
warrant disbarment or suspension. But the Court
reprimanded respondent to be more prudent and cautious.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is
hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby
REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his
dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more
severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of
the same or similar offense in the future.
BARRIOS VS. MARTINEZ
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Francisco Martinez was convicted
for violation of BP. blg. 22. Complainant Michael Barrios filed
an action for disbarment against the respondent for having
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and submitted
Courts Resolution and Entry of Judgement related to BP case.
The respondent was requested to file comments in several
occasions but fail to comply until the court declared the
respondent guilty of contempt dated February and ordered
his imprisonment until he complied with aforesaid resolution.
April , the respondent was arrested by NBI but was
subsequently released after having shown proof of
compliance with the resolutions of February and April by
remitting the amount of P, and submitting his long overdue
Comment. On September , a certain Robert Visbal of the
Provincial Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a
letter to the First Division Clerk of Court alleging that
respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa
case before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, as he
offered his legal sevice to the victims of the Doa Paz tragedy
in and failed to remit compensation for the intended victims,
for which the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar, Branch
rendered a decision against him, his appeal thereto having
been dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was guilty of crime
involving moral turpitude
HELD: Yes. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It
involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society
in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Respondent lawyers propensity to disregard or ignore orders
of the Honorable Supreme Court for which he was fined
twice, arrested and imprisoned reflects an utter lack of good
moral character Respondents conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude estafa and/or violation of BP Blg. clearly
shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice
and therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against
him. Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is was DISBARRED and his
name was ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WILKIE VS. LIMOS [A.C. NO. 7505, OCTOBER 24, 2008]
FACTS: Complainant alleged that on 2 April 2003, he engaged
the services of respondent regarding his intention of
adopting his wifes nephew, ReynalAlsaenTaltalen.
Complainant has given his full trust and confidence on
respondent. Notwithstanding their lawyer and client
relationship, on March 30, 2003, respondent borrowed
money from complainant in the amount of P250,000.00. The
loan agreement was evidenced by a Contract of Loan with a
stipulation of interest in the amount of 24% per annum and
that respondent will issue two (2) post dated checks
representing the principal amount of P250,000.00 and the
interest in the amount of P60,000.00.When the checks
became due, complainant deposited the same to his account
at Equitable PCI Bank but to his surprise and dismay, the
checks were returned as they were drawn against insufficient
funds. Despite demands made, respondent failed to pay her
obligation.
Complainant decided to engage the services of a counsel who
also made a formal demand to respondent but to no avail.
Criminal complaints were filed against respondent before
Branch 2, Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando City, La
Union.Complainant has also withdrawn the adoption case
from respondent who did not do anything regarding the case
despite the lapse of almost a year.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Limos should be suspended from
the practice of law.
RULING: Yes. The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the
issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system.
They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to
their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that
reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1
and Rule 1.01 of which explicitly states:
CANON 1-- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of
the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so.
The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not
hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we
will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end.
We reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a
privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character,
not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.Sadly, herein
respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of
her as a vanguard of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar E. Limos is
SUSPENDED FOR THREE MONTHS from the practice of law
with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will
merit a more severe penalty. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.
SORIANO vs DIZON [AC No. 6792]
FACTS: Atty Manuel Dizon was driving under the influence of
alcohol along Abanao St. in Baguio city when a taxi overtook
him. Enraged, Dizon tailed the taxi, pulled it over and berated
and threatened Roberto Soriano, the taxi driver. To stop the
aggression, Soriano opened his door which caused Dizon to
fall to the pavement. Soriano tried to help Dizon up but had
to punch Dizon because he was going to punch him. Soriano
prevented another attempt by Dizon to hit him. Dizon went
back to his car to get his gun, the handle wrapped in
handkerchief. Dizon shot Soriano who was then picking up
Dizons eyeglasses to return it to him. After shooting Soriano,
Dizon sped off with his car and left him to die on the street.
The bullet hit Soriano in the neck and lacerated his carotid
artery. According to the doctors who treated Soriano, he
would have easily died if not for the timely medical
assistance. Nevertheless,the left side of Sorianos body was
paralyzed, leaving him unable to drive anymore.A complaint
for Frustrated Homicide was filed against Dizon by Soriano.
Dizon was eventually found guilty but was allowed probation.
One of the conditions of the probation is the payment of the
civil liabilities. Four years after the judgment was rendered,
Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligation to Soriano.A
Complain-Affidavit for disbarment was filed by Soriano
before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Dizon was declared in
default and an ex-parte hearing was held. The Commissioner
of the CBD recommended to the IBP the disbarment of Dizon
for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. The IBP adopted
the recommendation of the Commissioner and sent its
resolution to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not his guilt to the crime committed
warrant disbarment.
HELD: Yes. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a
lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of
good moral character. In the instant case, respondent has
been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final
judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has
already been established and is no longer open to question,
the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows:
1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral
turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is
done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. He was disbarred and ordered that his name be
stricken in the Roll of Attorneys.
GONZAGA VS VILLANUEVA [A.C. NO. 1954. JULY 23, 2004]
FACTS: Immediately after the the murder of the
complainants parents and while their sister who was
wounded, was confined at the Makati Medical Center.
Respondent Atty. Eugenio Villanueva, Jr., came to the Makati
Medical Center, ostensibly to condole with them.
Representing himself to be a relative, the respondent
volunteered his assistance in the criminal investigation by
accompanying the complainants to the Makati Police
Department. Feeling grateful, the complainants decided to
formally request the formers services as legal counsel in the
criminal case.On 1 August 1977, the respondent came and
handed them a half-page piece of paper for their signatures
and told them that it was his authority to appear in the
criminal case. Without scrutinizing the contents of the half-
page paper and trusting respondents integrity, the
complainants hurriedly signed the piece of paper so they
could continue to arrange for the misa requiem.
The complainants hired the services of Atty. William Mirano
to institute in court the intestate proceedings on the estate
of their deceased parents. The respondent filed a similar
petition without complainants knowledge and consent and
despite knowledge of the filing of the petition by Atty.
Mirano. The petition contained egregious errors particularly
on the ages and residences of the heirs. It was signed and
verified by the respondent himself. Not one of the heirs
signed the petition.
The complainants then confronted the respondent and to
their shock, surprise, and disbelief, the respondent showed
them the authority dated 1 August 1977. With grave abuse of
their trust and confidence, he caused the insertion on the
half-page piece of paper his authority to represent them in
the intestate proceedings. The document was purportedly
notarized by Atty. Crisanto P. Realubin even if they never
appeared before him.
At first, the respondent blamed his secretary for making the
insertion. However, when the story sounded incredible, he
declared that as a smart lawyer he thought of things ahead of
time .In order not to embarrass the respondent, the
complainants made it clear to the former that his authority in
the intestate case would only be to help their counsel of
record secure the order appointing them as co-special
administrators. Despite such appointment and the
termination of his authority to represent them, the
respondent stubbornly insisted in appearing in the intestate
proceedings. This compelled the complainants to file a
motion for the termination of his services in the intestate
court.
In his Answer, the respondent declared that he represented
the complainants in the criminal case of their parents and in
the intestate proceedings by virtue of an oral authority which
was put in writing on 1 August 1977. He denied complainants
allegation of being an ambulance chaser.
In a Report and Recommendation dated 9 September 2003,
the IBP Investigating concluded that the respondent
employed deceit to cause complainants to sign the authority
dated 1 August 1977. In addition, the respondents continued
appearance in the intestate court in spite of the express
revocation of his authority to appear therein is unbecoming a
member of the Bar.
ISSUE:Whether or not the respondent employed deceit in
obtaining the signatures of the complainants on the
document giving him authority to file the petition for the
administration of the intestate estate of their deceased
parents
Whether or not respondents continued appearance in the
intestate proceedings after the appointment of the
complainants as special co-administrators was improper.
RULING: This Court resolves both issues in the affirmative.
The failure of the complainants to examine the document
closely is justified by the following attending circumstances:
(1) it was presented to them for their signing at the church
when they were busy preparing for the misa requiem; (2)
they were still emotionally shocked by the brutal killing of
their parents two days earlier; (4) they were busy with the
investigation of the murder; (5) they had to attend to the
wake activities of their deceased parents; and (6) finally, they
trusted that the respondent would reflect in the document
their agreement that he would represent them only in the
criminal case.
Even after the appointment of the complainants as co-
administrators and the termination by them of respondents
services, the respondent continued to appear in the intestate
proceedings.
It must be pointed out that the relation of attorney-client
may be terminated by (1) the act of the client; (2) the act of
the attorney; (3) the death of the client; (4) the death of the
attorney; or (5) the accomplishment of the purpose for which
it was created. Ordinarily, the attorney-client relation is
ended by the completion of the specific task for which the
attorney was employed. In this case, the attorney-client
relationship between the complainants and the respondent
was terminated by the complainants upon their appointment
as special co-administrators of the estate of their deceased
parents.
Notably, the difference between the revocation of the
authority by the act of the client and by the act of the
attorney is that the first may be done at any time with or
without cause, whereas the second can be made only with
the clients written consent or for justified cause.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of
his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious
deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are
deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly
immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to the practice of law; willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt
or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in
nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically
any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his
professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no
time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only
conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are
likewise essential demands for his continued membership
therein.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to SUSPEND respondent
Atty. Eugenio V. Villanueva, Jr., from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months effective upon service on him of a
copy of this Resolution, with a WARNING that a repetition of
the same acts subject of the complaint in this case or of
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
VARGAS vs IGNES [A.C. No. 8096; July 5, 2010]
FACTS: Apr 16, 2007- Atty. Michael Ignes was hired by
Koronadal Water District (KWD) as private legal counsel for
one year. The Office of Govt. Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and
Commission on Audit (COA) consented.
Dec. 28, 2006- Dela Pena (DP) Board filed a case to annul the
appointment of two directors who will allegedly connive with
Director Allan Yapchockun who is against the present Board
of Directors.
Jan. 18, 2007- DP Board appointed respondents Atty. Rodolfo
U. Viajar, Jr. And Atty. Buentipo Mann as private counsels for
all cases of KWD and its Board of Directors, under Atty.
Igness supervision
Feb. 9 and 19, 2007 - Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. And Atty.
Buentipo Mann filed cases KWD represented by Gen.
Manager Eleanor Pimentel-Gomba vs Efren V Cabucay and
KWD vs. Rey J. Vargas
Feb. 16, 2007 The OGCC approved retainership contract of
Atty. Benjamin Cunanan as new legal counsel of KWD and
stated that the retainership contract of Ignes had expired on
Jan. 14, 2007
March 2, 2007- OGCC addressed Eleanor P. Gombas
insistence that the retainership contract of Atty. Ignes will
expire on April 17, 2007. The OGCC stated that as stipulated,
the KWD or OGCC may terminate the contract anytime
without need of judicial action; that OGCCs grant of
authority to private counsels is a privilege withdrawable
under justifiable circumstances; and that the termination of
Atty. Igness contract was justified by the fact that the Local
Water Utilities Administration had confirmed the Yaphockun
board as the new Board of Directors of KWD and that said
board had terminated Atty. Igness services and requested to
hire another counsel.
Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD without
legal authority, complainants filed a disbarment complaint
against the respondents before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline
Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge
against Atty. Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit. The
Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Ignes had valid
authority as counsel of KWD for one (1) year, from April 2006
to April 2007, and he was unaware of the pre-termination of
his contract when he filed pleadings
IBP Board of Governors reversed the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissed the case for lack of
merit.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors erred in
dismissing the case.
2. Whether or not the respondents liable for appearing as
attorneys for a party to a case without authority to do so.
HELD: 1. Yes, the IBP Board of Governors erred in dismissing
the case
2. Yes, the respondents are administratively liable.
Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of the Admin Code of
1987 says that the OGCC shall act as the principal law office
of all Government Owned and Controlled Corporations
(GOCCs); Sec. 3 of Memo Circular No. 9: in exceptional cases,
the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor
General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case
may be, and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be
secured before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer
or law firm.
Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had no valid authority to
appear as collaborating counsels of KWD in SCA Case No. 50-
24 and Civil Case No. 1799. Nothing in the records shows
that Atty. Nadua was engaged by KWD as collaborating
counsel.
In the case of Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann, their appointment
as collaborating counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009
has no approval from the OGCC and COA.
In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of
KWD without authority, after his authority as its counsel had
expired. True, the OGCC and COA approved his retainership
contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if
we assume as true that he was not notified of the pre-
termination of his contract, the records still disprove his
claim that he stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007.
In a Jan. 28, 2008 case, Atty. Ignes portrayed that his
appearance was merely as counsel of Ms. Gomba. He
indicted himself, however, when he said that Ms. Gomba
represents KWD per the case title. In fact, the extremely
urgent motion sought the return of the facilities of KWD to its
Arellano Office. Clearly, Atty. Ignes filed and argued a motion
with the interest of KWD in mind. The notice of appeal in the
case further validates that Atty. Ignes still appeared as
counsel of KWD after his authority as counsel had expired.
The following circumstances show that respondents willfully
and deliberately appeared as counsels of KWD without
authority: (1) respondents have admitted the existence of
Memorandum Circular No. 9 and professed that they are
aware of the ruling in Phividec, thus they know the
indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire private
counsel and that for non-compliance with the requirements
set by Memorandum Circular No. 9, the private counsel
would have no authority to file a case in behalf of a GOCC.
Still, respondents acted as counsels of KWD without
complying with what the rule requires. They signed
pleadings as counsels of KWD. They presented themselves
voluntarily, on their own volition, as counsels of KWD even if
they had no valid authority to do so; (2) despite the question
on respondents authority as counsels of KWD which was
raised in the Jan. 28, 2008 cases, respondents still filed the
supplemental complaint in the case on March 9, 2007. And
despite the pendency of this case before the IBP, Atty. Ignes
had to be reminded by the RTC that he needs OGCC authority
to file an intended motion for reconsideration in behalf of
KWD.
Their willful appearance as counsels of KWD without
authority to do so is a valid ground to impose disciplinary
action against them. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-335 passed on July 17, 2008 by the
IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 07-1953 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
Respondents Attys. Michael A. Ignes, Leonard Buentipo
Mann, Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr., and John Rangal D. Nadua are
found GUILTY of willfully appearing as attorneys for a party to
a case without authority to do so and FINED P5,000 each,
payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice of this
Resolution. They are STERNLY WARNED that a similar offense
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
REINSTATEMENT/READMISSION
Topic: Reinstatement/Readmission; Objective and criterion
for reinstatement.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE
TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA
B.M. NO. 793JULY 30, 2004
FACTS: In a Letter dated August 20, 1996 the District Court of
Guam informed this Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam. He
was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for
misconduct, as he acquired his client's property as payment
for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence
obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client's
case.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar
in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as
an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension
in this realm, provided the foreign court's action is by reason
of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a
violation of the lawyer's oath.
The case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation report and
recommendation. In its decision, the Superior Court of Guam
stated that Maquera was the counsel of a certain Castro.
Benavente the creditor of Castro, obtained a judgement
against Castro, thus Castros property was to be sold at a
public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente.
However, Castro retains the right of redemption.
In consideration of Maqueras legal services, Castro entered
into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right
of redemption in favor of the latter. On January 8, 1988,
Maquera exercised Castro's right of redemption by paying
Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt.
Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred
in his name. And after, sold the property to C.S. Chang and
C.C. Chang for Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars
(US$320,000.00).
The Guam Bar Ethics Committee filed a Petition in the
Superior Court of Guam praying that Maquera be sanctioned
for violations of Rules 1.5 and 1.8(a) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its
Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an
unreasonably high fee for his services. The Committee
further alleged that Maquera himself admitted his failure to
comply with the requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model
Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction
with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest
adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms
governing the lawyer's acquisition of such interest are fair
and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and
understood by the client and reduced in writing.
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam,
the IBP concluded that although the said court found
Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to
establish that Maquera committed a breach of ethics in the
Philippines."However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him
indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member
of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll
of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised
Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maquera, who was suspended from
the practice of law in Guam, be suspended as member of the
Philippine Bar on the same ground of his suspension in
Guam.
RULING: Yes. The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a
lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign
jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution
dated February 13, 1992, which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine
Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the
ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis supplied).
Maqueras acts in Guam are also valid grounds for his
suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines. Such
acts are violative of a lawyers sworn duty to act with fidelity
toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which
states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him;
and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The
requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a
continuing requirement to maintain ones goods standing in
the legal profession.
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Courts judgment
ordering Maqueras suspension from the practice of law in
Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or
disbarment in the Philippines. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his
suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the
foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. Likewise, the
judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes
prima facie evidence of Maqueras unethical acts as a lawyer.
More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given
the opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial
and documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation
to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent
lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against
him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part
of the respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled
investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex
parte.
In this case, since Maquera has not yet been able to adduce
evidence on his behalf, he is required to SHOW CAUSE why
he should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts which
gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings against him in the
Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent suspension in
said jurisdiction.
DUMADAG VS. LUMAYA [334 SCRA 513]
FACTS: On the basis of an administrative complaint for
Unethical Practices, Conflict of Interest and Disloyalty To
Clients filed by complainant against respondent praying that
the corresponding disciplinary action be imposed on the
latter.
The OSG submitted a Report finding respondent culpable for
infidelity and disloyalty to his client, negligence of duty,
unethical practices and violation of his lawyers oath. As
penalty, the OSG recommended that after due hearing,
"respondent be suspended from the practice of law for not
less than 5 years." Thereafter, in a Resolution the Court
found that respondent made a "clear breach of the canons of
professional responsibility" and suspended respondent
indefinitely from the practice of law. A "Petition For
Reinvestigation and Reconsideration," was subsequently
denied by the Court per its Resolution.
The records show that respondent sent a letter stressing that
he was not seeking a reconsideration of the denial of his
petition for reinvestigation, respondent averred in sum that
he was a "not very healthy" 62 year old who merely wanted
to know how long he would stay suspended and if he was
disqualified to be issued a commission as a notary public
considering that his commission was not renewed.
Respondent filed a Manifestation where he prayed that the
Court issue a resolution or decision on his averments that:
1. he has been suspended from the practice of law and
denied a notarial commission for more than 1 year already;
2. for lack of practicing lawyers and notaries public in the
Municipality of Baganga, Davao Oriental
3. more than 50% of the pending civil and criminal cases
were cases handled by the respondent and these cases are
still pending resolution especially due to the lack of lawyers
in the municipality
4. there is no regular judge in Baganga after the retirement of
Judge Verano and many detained accused are in jail without
hope for an early resolution of their cases coupled with the
fact that respondent is still under suspension and they
cannot hire "exorbitant" lawyers;
5. he has been advised to secure petitions to be signed by all
Barangay Chairmen in the 18 Barangays of the municipality,
the 74 Chapters of the GKK, all NGOs, other religious and
civic organizations and to submit them to the Supreme Court
to request the Court to lift his indefinite suspension so that
he may help those who are actually helpless and so that he
may be issued a notarial commission in order to help those
who need notarial assistance without fear of being charged
beyond their capacity to pay;
6. the filing of the Manifestation is for the purpose of
requesting the Court to provide him with advice as to
whether the filing of a petition was necessary to lift the order
of his indefinite suspension as well as the issuance of a
notarial commission.
In a Report and Recommendation, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended the lifting of the indefinite
suspension of respondent. The Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, respondent who
turned 71 years old last October 25, 1999, once again
implores and at the same time chides the Court for
slumbering on acting upon the IBP Resolution to lift his
indefinite suspension, although he still insists on his
innocence.
The insolence of respondents remonstrations that the Court
has been sleeping on its job in acting upon his case not only
underscores his callous disregard of the myriad
administrative and judicial travails the Court has to contend
with as the Tribunal of Last Resort, among them, the chronic
problem of an overflowing docket of which his case is but
one additional aggravation; it also betrays his absolute lack of
appreciation and disrespect for the efforts and measures
undertaken by the Court to cope with these concerns.
Needless to state, such presumptuousness is only too
deserving of rebuke.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Court is bound by the findings of
the IBP in the decision of lifting respondents indefinite
suspension?
RULING: No. Respondent must know that the Court is neither
bound by the findings of the IBP nor, much less, obliged to
accept the same as a matter of course because as the
Tribunal which has the final say on the proper sanctions to be
imposed on errant members of both bench and bar, the
Court has the prerogative of making its own findings and
rendering judgment on the basis thereof rather than that of
the IBP, OSG, or any lower court to whom an administrative
complaint has been referred to for investigation and report.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession,
has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority
to discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden
duty as well x x x That is why respect and fidelity to the Court
is demanded of its members.
MANIAGO VS. ATTY. DE DIOS
[AC NO. 7472 MARCH 30, 2010]
FACTS: Complainant seeks for a disbarment case against
respondent, Atty. Lourdes de Dios, for engaging in the
practice of law despite having been suspended by the Court.
The petitioner alleged that she filed a criminal case against a
certain Hiroshi Miyata, which was then represented by the
respondent. Petitioner then discovered from an RTC staff
that the respondent had an outstanding suspension order
from the Supreme Court since 2001.
In her response, respondent explained that though it is true
that an administrative case was indeed filed against her
where she meted a penalty of six months suspension.
However, she already served such suspension immediately
after the receipt of the Courts resolution on May
November 2001; that she formally informed the Court that
she was resuming his practice of law, which she actually did.
A problem arose when then Judge Farrales erroneously
issued a derivative in 2007 ordering respondent to desist
from the practice of law and revoked her notarial
commission for 2 years. Respondent files a Motion for
Clarification which gave the impression that respondent is
not yet allowed to resume in her practice of law. The Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA), after evaluation,
recommended the lifting of the order of suspension, allowing
the respondent to resume from her practice of law, even
despite the fact of neglecting to submit the required
certifications that respondent has already served her
desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents resumption from the
practice of law is valid despite her failure to submit required
certifications and passing through OBC for evaluation.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court resolved this foregoing case
based from the following guidelines after a finding that
respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of
law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
Unless the Court explicitly states that decision is immediately
executory, respondent has 15 days to file for a motion for
reconsideration. Denial of such will render decision final and
executory; upon expiration of the period of suspension,
respondent shall file a sworn statement with the Court,
through the OBC, stating that he or she has desisted from the
practice of law.
Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local
Chapter of the IBP and Executive Judge where case is
pending; the sworn statement shall be considered as proof of
respondents compliance with the order of suspension; any
finding of report contrary to the statement made by lawyer
under oath shall be ground for the imposition of a more
severe punishment or disbarment.
It must be also noted that the practice of law is not a right
but a mere privilege and as such, must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyers public responsibilities.
Hence, the Court notes the Report and Recommendation of
the OBC, to issue a resolution allowing the resumption from
the practice of law of the respondent.
CARLOS REYES VS. ATTY. JEREMIAS VITAN
[A.C. NO.5835 APR 15, 2005]
FACTS: Carlos Reyes availed of the services of Atty. Vitan to
file the appropriate complaint against certain individuals who
failed to comply with a court order for partition of properties
in his favor. It was alleged that after having received 17,000,
Atty. Vitan did not act on his case. Hence, he filed an
administrative case for disbarment against the said lawyer
for gross negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vitan violated the Canon of
Professional Responsibility in failing to file the required
complaint for his client
RULING: Yes, Atty. Vitan is liable for gross negligence. Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall serve his clients with competence and diligence.
Specifically, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render them liable. n this case, the act of receiving
money as acceptance fee for legal services but subsequently
failing to render such services is a clear violation of the
abovementioned rule. However, the Court held that the
recommended penalty by the IBP of two years suspension is
too harsh. Jurisprudence shows that lighter sanctions have
been imposed for the same violations.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is hereby
declared guilty of violation of Canon 18 of the CPR and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective upon notice of this Decision. He is ordered
to return to complainant within five (5) days from notice the
sum of P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the
date of the promulgation of this Decision until the full
amount shall have been returned.
RICHARDS VS. PASOY
[A.C. NO. 2655, OCTOBER 11,2010]
FACTS: Respondent Asoy received from Complainant
Richards, his client, compensation to handle his case in the
trial court, but the same was dismissed for lack of interest
and failure to prosecute. Asoy abandoned his client in
violation of his contract ignoring the most elementary
principles of professional ethics. Furthermore, Asoy ignored
the processes of this Court and it was only after he was
suspended from the practice of law of that he surfaced. On
July 9, 1987,the Court resolved to DISBAR him and order him
to reimburse Richards the sum of P16,300within 30days from
notice.
On November 11, 1987, the Court received a letter dated
November 3, 1987, complained that respondent had not
reimbursed him the P16,300. Hence, the Court issued a
resolution requiring Asoy to show cause why he failed to
reimburse, however, Asoy still failed to comply. Complainant
filed another letter informing the Court that Asoy still failed
to comply with the order of reimbursement. Thirteen years
after the promulgation, Asoy filed a Petition for readmission
to the practice of law stating, among other things, that
on January 2, 1996 or about nine years after his
disbarment and directive to reimbursement complainant
made, he effected payment of P16,300via consignation with
the Courts Office of the Cashier. The Court denied the
petition for lack of merit.
On August 2, 2010, Asoy filed another petition for
Reinstatement to the Bar stating that he effected
payment of P16, 300 before the Office of the
Cashier of the Supreme Court as complainant could no
longer be found or located; that he had already suffered and
agonized shortcomings; and that as positive evidence of his
repentance and rehabilitation he attached testimonials of
credible institutions and personalities.
ISSUE: Whether or not Asoy violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD: Yes. Respondent Asoy violated Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Canon 10 states that A lawyer
owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Respondent denigrated the dignity of his calling by displaying
a lack of candor towards this Court. By taking his sweet time
to effect reimbursement and through consignation with this
Court at thathe sent out a strong message that the legal
processes and orders of this Court could be treated with
disdain or impunity. Respondents consignation could not
even be deemed compliance with the Courts directive to
reimburse because the Court does not represent the
complainant; the latters address was readily
ascertainable had respondent wished to communicate
with the complainant for the purpose of making amends.
Hence, respondents petition for reinstatements in the Roll of
Attorneys is DENIED.
NOTARIAL PRACTICE
ESPINOSA V. ATTY. OMANA
[A.C. NO. 9081, OCTOBER 12, 2011]
FACTS: Spouses Espinosa and Marantal charged Atty. Omana
with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, andvgross
misconduct in office. On Nov. 1997, Espinosa and his wife
sought Omanas legal advice on whether they could legally
live separately and dissolve their marriage. Omana then
prepared a document entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay
(contract).The spouses, fully convinced of the validity of the
contract started implementing its terms and conditions.
However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their
children and took possession of most of the property
theyacquired during their union.Espinosa sought the advice
of his friend, co-complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who
informed him that the contract executed by Omana was not
valid. They hired a lawyer to file a complaint against Omana
before the IBP. Omanaalleged that her signature was a
forgery and that one of her office staff did it. She even
presented a letter of apology from her staff, Arlene,
acknowledging that she notarized the document without
Omanas knowledge.
Espinosa later submitted a KaragdagangSalaysay stating
that Omaa arrived at his residence together with a girl
whom he later recognized as the person who notarized the
contract. He further stated that Omaa was not in her office
when the contract was notarized. The Decision of the
Commission on Bar Discipline: Espinosas desistance did not
put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that
Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibilitywhich provides that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaa had failed to
exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as
a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the
law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of
Omaawho first claimed that it was her part-time staff who
notarized the contract but then later claimed that it was her
former maid who notarized it. Respondent truly signed the
questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship,
thereby revealing much more her propensity to lie and make
deceit, which she is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction or
disbarment. The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be
suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two
years as a notary public. Omana filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was denied.
ISSUES: Whether or notOmaa violated the Canon of
Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal
and EspinosasKasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.
RULING: YES. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial
dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval isvoid. The Court has also ruled that a notary public
should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage andthe
family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and
extrajudicially dissolving the conjugalpartnership, which is
exactly what Omaa did in this case. We cannot accept
Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff who
notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that
Omaa herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true
that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it
only showed Omaas negligence in doing her notarial
duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally
responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he
could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the
blame on his secretaries or any member of her staff.
We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and
notarizing a void document, Omaa violated Rule1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall not engage inunlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Omaa knew fully well that
the Kasunduan NgPaghihiwalay has no legal effect and is
against public policy. Therefore, Omaa may be suspended
from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Court suspended Atty. Omana from the
practice of law for 1 year and revoked her notarial
commission, if still existing, and suspend her as a notary
public for 2 years.
TAN TIONG BIO VS. GONZALES
FACTS: Central Syndicate (syndicate for short) a corporation,
sent a letter to the Collector of Internal Revenue advising the
latter that (1) it purchased from Dee Hong Lue the surplus
properties which the said Dee Hong Lue had bought from the
Foreign Liquidation Commission (2) that it assumed Dee
Hong Lue's obligation and would pay a portion of the sales
tax on said surplus goods (3) it was paying P43,750.00 in
behalf of Dee Hong Lue as deposit to answer for the payment
of said sales tax.The syndicate again wrote the Collector
requesting a refund for the purchase price of goods obtained
from Dee Hong Lue was adjusted and reduced. The CIR
investigated the matter and the Collector decided that the
Central Syndicate was the importer and original seller of the
surplus goods in question and, therefore, the one liable to
pay the sales tax. The Collector denied the request of the
syndicate for the refund. The Central Syndicate elevated the
case to the Court of Tax Appeals. The Collector filed a motion
requiring the syndicate to file a bond to guarantee the
payment of the tax assessed against it.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS DECISION: (1)Denied Collectors
motion. On the ground that cannot be legally done it
appearing that the syndicate is already a non-existing entity
due to the expiration of its corporate existence (2) dismissing
syndicates appeal primarily on the ground that the Central
Syndicate has no personality to maintain the action
then pending before it. From this order the syndicate
appealed to the Supreme Court wherein it intimated that the
appeal should not be dismissed because it could be
substituted by its successors-in-interest. The syndicate was
later substituted by its officers and directors (petitioners
herein). Court of Tax Appeals proceeded to hear the case.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS DECISION: Petitioners ordered to
pay jointly and severally, to the Collector of Internal Revenue
deficiency sales tax and surcharge on the surplus goods
purchased by them from the Foreign Liquidation
Commission. Petitioners filed appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the sales tax in question can be enforced against
the corporations successors -in-interest who are the
present petitioners since the Central Syndicate has already
been dissolved because of the expiration of its corporate
existence.
HELD: YES. The creditor of a dissolved corporation may follow
its assets once they passed into the hands of the
stockholders. Net profit of the corporation (from the sale of
the surplus goods) and was distributed among
the stockholders when the corporation liquidated and
distributed its assets immediately after the sale of the said
surplus goods. Petitioners are therefore the beneficiaries of
the defunct corporation and as such should be held liable to
pay the taxes in question. The dissolution of a corporation
does not extinguish the debts due or owing to it because a
creditor of a dissolved corporation may follow its assets, as in
the nature of a trust fund, into the hands of its stockholders.
With reference to the effect of dissolution upon taxes due
from a corporation, "that the hands of the government
cannot, of course, collect taxes from a defunct corporation, it
loses thereby none of its rights to assess taxes which had
been due from the corporation, and to collect them from
persons, who by reason of transactions with the corporation,
hold property against which the tax can be enforced and that
the legal death of the corporation no more prevents such
action than would the physical death of an individual prevent
the government from assessing taxes against him and
collecting them from his administrator, who holds the
property which the decedent had formerly possessed
UY VS SAO
[A.C. NO. 6505, SEPTEMBER 11, 2008]
FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by complainant Jessica
C. Uy against respondent Atty. Emmanuel P. Sao for allegedly
notarizing several documents despite the expiration of his
commission.
Respondent was the counsel for a certain Pablo Burgos, an
intervenor in a civil case for Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage. In the course of the proceedings, respondent
introduced before the trial court, certain documents,
including a Deed of Absolute Sale which he notarized on
December 7, 2001 under Doc. No. 376, Page No. 73, Book No.
V, Series of 2001.
It appeared, however, in a letter dated February 9, 2004 of
Atty. Blanche Astilla-Salino, Clerk of Court VI, that no notarial
commission was issued to respondent for the years 2000-
2001 and 2001-2002. Hence, the instant administrative case.
Respondent, for his part, admitted that he was not issued a
notarial commission during the aforesaid period; yet, he
performed notarial works. He, however, explained that he
applied, through a representative, for a notarial commission
in the year 1998 and was commissioned as such from 1998 to
1999.In 2000, he applied for the renewal of his commission,
again through an office aide, who later informed him that his
application was approved. By virtue of said representation,
respondent resumed his notarial work; only to find out later
that he was not given a new commission. He exerted earnest
efforts in locating the whereabouts of the office aide but to
no avail. Having acted on the mistaken belief that he still had
his notarial commission, respondent pleaded that he be
excused and given clemency for this fiasco and be allowed to
correct and make amends.
On September 1, 2005, IBP Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and recommendation
finding sufficient proof to warrant disciplinary action against
the respondent. Notarizing documents after the lawyers
commission as notary public had expired is malpractice and
gross misconduct. Respondents explanation that he was
made to believe by his agent that his commission has been
filed and approved cannot be accepted for to rule otherwise
will be to enable irresponsible lawyers to avoid disciplinary
action by simply attributing the problem to his aide/secretary
or employee
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents acts warrant sanctions
RULING: The practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar
is a privilege burdened with conditions.
The bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer
brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. To this end, a member of the legal fraternity should
refrain from doing any act which might lessen, in any degree,
the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the legal profession.
Apropos to the case at bar, it has been emphatically
stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified and authorized may
act as notaries public. It must be underscored that the act of
notarization by a notary public converts a private document
into a public document making it admissible in evidence
without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is,
by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this
reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Emmanuel P.
Sao is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months. In addition, his present notarial
commission, if any, is HEREBY REVOKED, and he is
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a
period of two (2) years. He is further WARNED that any
similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
DELA CRUZ vs ATTY. DIMAANO, JR.
A.C. No. 7781 September 12, 2008
FACTS: In their complaint for disbarment against respondent,
complainants alleged that on July 16, 2004, respondent
notarized a document denominated as Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate with Waiver of Rights purportedly
executed by them and their sister, Zenaida V.L. Navarro.
According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful
statements in the acknowledgment portion of the notarized
document when he made it appear, among other things, that
complainants "personally came and appeared before him"
and that they affixed their signatures on the document in his
presence.
In the process, complainants added, respondent effectively
enabled their sister, Navarro, to assume full ownership of
their deceased parents' property in and sell the same to the
Department of Public Works and Highways.
The respondent however argued that "he notarized the
document in good faith relying on the representation and
assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the signatures and the
community tax certificates appearing in the document were
true and correct." Navarro would not, according to
respondent, lie to him having known, and being neighbors of,
each other for 30 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be penalized for
committing violations of his duties as a notary public.
HELD: YES. It bears reiterating that notaries public should
refrain from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a
document unless the persons who signed it are the same
individuals who executed and personally appeared before
the notaries public to attest to the truth of what are stated
therein, for under Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 or the
Notarial Law, an instrument or document shall be considered
authentic if the acknowledgment is made in accordance with
the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary
public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to
take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him
and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so
state.
Notaries public are required by the Notarial Law to certify
that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and
presented before the notaries public the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and
to enter its number, place, and date of issue as part of
certification.4 Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice5 now requires a party to the instrument to present
competent evidence of identity. Sec. 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.-The phrase
"competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification
of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an
official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the
individual, such as but not limited to, passport, drivers
license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National
Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID,
voters ID, Barangay certification, Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS)
card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seamans book,
alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of
registration, government office ID, certificate from the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons
(NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and Development
certification [as amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated
February 19, 2008]; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy
to the instrument, document or transaction who is personally
known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is
privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each
personally knows the individual and shows to the notary
public documentary identification.
Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to
discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties
being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.
It must be remembered that notarization is not a routinary,
meaningless act, for notarization converts a private
document to a public instrument, making it admissible in
evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution. A notarized document is by
law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason
that notaries public must observe the basic requirements in
notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public on notarized documents will be eroded.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law, the notarial
commission of respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr., if still
existing, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years
and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision,
with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act
shall be dealt with more severely.
LINCO VS LACEBAL, AC NO. 7241, OCT. 17, 2011
FACTS:Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late
Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), and is the registered owner
of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 259001. She alleged that complainant, a notary
public, notarized a deed of donation allegedly executed by
her husband in favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor.
The notarial acknowledgment thereof also stated that Atty.
Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee,
allegedly personally appeared before respondent on July 30,
2003, despite the fact that complainants husband died on
July 29, 2003.
Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation,
the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City cancelled TCT No.
259001 on March 28, 20054 and issued a new TCT No.
292515 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco.
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She
claimed that respondent's reprehensible act in connivance
with Toledo was not only violative of her and her children's
rights but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack of
honesty and candor is unbecoming of a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In his Answer, respondent admitted having notarized and
acknowledged a deed of donation a day after Atty. Linco
died. That the day before Atty. Linco passed away, he was
informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss
something with him. During his visit, Atty. Linco appeared to
be physically weak and sickly, but was articulate and in full
control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of
donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation
and asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in
his presence along with the witnesses.
However, respondent explained that since he had no idea
that he would be notarizing a document, he did not bring his
notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told Toledo
to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at
their convenience so that he could formally notarize and
acknowledge the same.
On July 30, 2003, Toledo went to his law office and informed
him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003.
Respondent was then asked to notarize the deed of
donation. Respondent admitted to have consented as he
found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he
notarized the subject deed of donation, which was actually
signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.
The IBP-CBD held that since the deed of donation was
notarized only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died,
the acknowledgement portion of the said deed of donation
where respondent acknowledged that Atty. Linco personally
came and appeared before me is false. This act of respondent
is also violative of the Attorney's Oath to obey the laws and
do no falsehood.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the
Notarial Law.
RULING: Yes. There is no question as to respondent's guilt.
The records sufficiently established that Atty. Linco was
already dead when respondent notarized the deed of
donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted
that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized
the deed of donation. We take note that respondent
notarized the document after the lapse of more than 20 days
from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to notarize
the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the
time he last saw Atty. Linco should have put him on guard
and deterred him from proceeding with the notarization of
the deed of donation.
However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial
procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of a
colleague. The fact that respondent previously appeared
before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the
deed of donation, considering the affiant's absence on the
very day the document was notarized. In the notarial
acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent
attested that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared
before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could
not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the
latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false
statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.
We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect
of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or
jurat is sacrosanct. Respondent should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein.
JUDICIAL ETHICS
RAMIREZ vs. HON. CORPUZ-MACANDOG
[A.M. No. R-351-RTJ September 26, 1986]
FACTS: A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed by
Deputy Sheriff Abraham L. Ramirez of the RTC of Caloocan
City to secure his release from the Caloocan City jail. Ramirez
was ordered arrested by respondent judge for direct
contempt of court consisting in his alleged disobedience to
the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining him from
demolishing the improvements of the intervenors in said
case.
Deputy Sheriff Ramirez had previously been directed by
Judge Socorro Tirona-Liwag of the same court in an order to
demolish the improvements of the defendants in Civil Cases
Nos. C-7380, C-7361, C-7362, C-7363, C-7364, C-7839, C-7841
and C-7842. Said defendants are the intervenors in Civil Case
No. 8682 on whose motion respondent judge issued the
preliminary injunction.
The immediate execution of the order of arrest was effected
thru a handwritten note of respondent judge addressed to
then superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig.
Gen. Alfredo Lim. Upon orders of the Court, however, Deputy
Sheriff Ramirez was released from jail. Thereafter, the court
resolved to treat the petition as an administrative case and to
require respondent judge to comment thereon.
Respondent judge denied having acted arbitrarily or
capriciously in causing the arrest of Ramirez. She justified the
arrest as a means of preserving substantial justice so that any
decision rendered in Civil Case No. 8682 may not be rendered
moot and academic and as a curative measure to preserve
the greater interest of social justice. The handwritten note,
on the other hand, was explained as a means to preserve the
integrity of courts of justice in the enforcement of valid and
lawful orders. She added that the writ of preliminary
injunction was issued by her in the exercise of her original
jurisdiction, while the Order was issued by Judge Liwag in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which the latter should not
have done as she should have remanded the case to the
court of origin for execution.
ISSUES: Whether or not the decisions rendered by
respondent Judge Macandog showed her to be mentally and
morally unfit to remain in her office?
RULINGS: Yes. Judges are required to observe due care in the
performance of their official duties. They are likewise
charged with the knowledge of internal rules and procedures,
especially those which relate to the scope of their authority.
They are dutybound to observe and abide by these rules and
procedures, designed, as they are, primarily to ensure the
orderly administration of justice. Thus, confronted with a
serious challenge to one's authority, an ordinary prudent
man would perceive the reasonableness, if not the wisdom,
of the suggestion/request that the question at hand be
referred to this Court.
The hasty and reckless attitude of respondent judge in taking
cognizance of and deciding Civil Case No. 12172 despite the
strong objection against her authority and the reasonable
request for referral of the question to this Court, constitutes
misconduct in office warranting disciplinary sanction.
Anent respondent's averment that she was granted authority
by the Court to take cognizance of all kinds of cases in Branch
CXXI, suffice it to say that the same was revoked by the
implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act on
January 17, 1983.
Respondent Judge Macandog has shown herself to be
mentally and morally unfit to remain in her office. Her
removal must perforce be effected.
In view of the disclosure by respondent that the decision in
Civil Case No. C-9831 was rendered under undue pressure
and influence, the party aggrieved thereby may take such
remedial steps as may be warranted.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog is
hereby ordered dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits and pay, and with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities.
SABITSANA JR. VS VILLAMOR
RTJ 90-474OCTOBER 4, 1991
FACTS: It was discovered that there were 87 cases undecided
by respondent judge beyond the 90-day reglementary
period. The dismal state of the Courthouse of the respondent
judge which was described as bereft of any dignity as a court
of law has been noted. Judge Villamor however shifts the
blame on his clerk of court, Atty. Jocobo who he claims was
inefficient in the management of the court records. Also, in
the case of theft by Lipango, Villamor designated Judge Pitao
as acting judge of the MCTC. Villamor warned Pitao to acquit
Lipango because the case was being backed up by someone
powerful. He did this by sending a letter to Pitao through
Lipangos wife. However, Pitao still convicted Lipango
because the evidence of guilt was strong. When Pitao was
away for some conference, he found out that Villamor
revoked his designation and appointed another as judge of
the MCTC. And finally, when the case was elevated to the
RTC where Villamor was assigned he acquitted Lipango.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge violated any of
the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
HELD: Villamor violated Canon3 and Canon2 A judge sits not
only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but
that his responsibilities include being an effective manager of
the Court and its personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, provides: A judge should diligently
discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain
professional competence in court management, and facilitate
the performance of the administrative functions of other
judges and court personnel. Also, under Rule 3.09 is that: A
judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and
require at all times the observance of high standards of
public service and fidelity. Cardinal is the rule that a Judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating
that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another
Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the
bench in-pending suits with the end in view of influencing the
course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the
independence of the judiciary but also undermines the
people's faith in its integrity and impartiality
HURTADO VS JUDALENA
[G.R. NO. L-40603 JULY 13, 1978]
FACTS: Isabel G. Judalena had sold a portion, containing an
area of 75 square meters of her parcel of land to Palmarin Q.
Hurtado, with the condition that the latter shall cause a
subdivision survey of the portion sold in order to segregate
said portion from the bigger portion, after which the said
Palmarin Hurtado shall construct a concrete fence between
the two lots. Hurtado, however, violated their agreement.
Pursuant to this, Judalena prayed for a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain Hurtado.
Respondent Judge Arsenio Gonong, his close relationship
with Judalena (In the case at bar, it is not denied that the
respondent judge is the brother of the respondent Isabel G.
Judalena and their close relationship notwithstanding, and
despite the prohibition mentioned above, the respondent
judge took cognizance of the case and issued the
controversial order directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, after which he inhibited himself from
sitting on the case for the same reasons.) notwithstanding,
and despite the prohibition imposed by Section 1, Rule 137 of
the Revised Rules of Court, issued an order, ex-
parte. directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Respondent judge issued an order voluntarily disqualifying
himself from hearing the case in view of his close relationship
with the plaintiff therein and directed the transmittal of the
records of the case to the incumbent Executive Judge for
proper assignment to the other judges of the court.
Hurtado filed a motion for the dissolution of the writ of
preliminary injunction in order to preserve the status quo
until the designation of another judge to try the case, with a
prayer that the respondent judge hear the motion to give
him an opportunity to rectify the mistake error he had
committed in taking cognizance of the case and in
granting, ex-parte, the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.
Respondent judge, however, denied the motion.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Gonong acted unlike of a judge
RULING: Yes. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of
Court enumerates without ambiguity the cases in which any
judge or judicial officer is disqualified from acting as such.
The said section, in no uncertain terms, expressly prohibits a
judge or judicial officer from sitting in a case where he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguity
or affinity. This is mandatory.
Section 1, Rule 137 provides; "Section 1. Disqualification of
judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court whithin his ruling
or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record. "A judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above."
In the case at bar, it is not denied that the respondent judge
is the brother of the respondent Isabel G. Judalena and their
close relationship notwithstanding, and despite the
prohibition mentioned above, the respondent judge took
cognizance of the case and issued the controversial order
directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
after which he inhibited himself from sitting on the case for
the same reasons. Such action, to our mind, is reprehensible
as it erodes the all important confidence in the impartiality of
the judiciary.