PART I

Surveying the Terrain

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 CHAPTER 1

Philosophy and Mind

The philosophy of mind is relatively a new discipline and yet it is considered by some as
currently the first philosophy, or the most fundamental branch of philosophy, in analytic
philosophy or the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. 1 This chapter takes a look at how
this discipline develops into a distinct branch of philosophy and why it is presently considered
by some as the first philosophy of the analytic tradition. In addition, this chapter also
examines the main issues discussed in this discipline. The discussion of these issues serves as
a preview of what will be discussed in the succeeding chapters.

1. The Rise of a New Discipline

It is quite ironic that while it is with our mind or our mental states and processes that we have
the most direct and immediate access we still know very little about how they work. Yet the
mind forms an important part of what defines who we are as humans and as individual
persons, for it is essentially in reference to our mind that we distinguish ourselves from the
rest of nature. As a species, we often distinguish from the other species in terms of our general
mental capacities, foremost of which are our capacities for rational thinking and voluntary
choices; while as individual persons, we often distinguish ourselves from our fellow humans,
in addition to our physical differences, in terms of our memories, beliefs, attitudes, and
desires. Understanding the nature of our mind is necessary if we are to fully understand
ourselves and our place in nature. It is thus no wonder that the nature of the mind, what the
mind really is and how it works, is a perennial concern of philosophy.

Previously, however, the philosophical investigations done on the nature of the mind
were merely supplementary to those done on some other philosophical concerns that were
deemed central in certain branches of philosophy. Consequently, these investigations were
limited to those that can shed light on these other philosophical concerns. Most notable of
these branches of philosophy are epistemology, whose main concern is the justification and
validity of knowledge claims, metaphysics, whose main concern is the nature of reality, ethics,
whose main concern is the foundations of morality or the nature of moral judgments.

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Analytic Philosophy is often contrasted with Continental Philosophy. The former is the dominant
philosophical tradition in America and England, while the latter is the dominant philosophical tradition in
Germany and France. Generally speaking, analytic philosophy is identified with the study of logic, the
philosophy of language, and presently with the philosophy of mind and allies itself more with the sciencesboth
formal and natural; while continental philosophy is identified with the study of existentialism, phenomenology,
hermeneutics, and postmodern philosophy and allies itself more with the humanities.

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 In epistemology, the nature of the mind is investigated in relation to issues concerning
knowledge, such as knowledge of the existence of material objects, knowledge of the
existence of abstract entities like the so-called universals, and the possibility of universal and
objective forms of knowledge. In this connection, the questions raised about the mind concern
the following: the different kinds of ideas that the mind has and how these ideas relate to
entities in the external world, whether the mind has innate or a priori ideas or ideas not
derived from sense experiences or whether the mind only has a posteriori ideas or ideas
derived from sense experiences, whether the mind has built-in structures that mediate its
perception and conception of the world, and whether the mind has the capacity for
abstractionreferring to the process whereby the mind separates what is common among
different ideas.

In metaphysics, the nature of the mind is investigated in relation to the question on

what constitutes reality or the world. Some of the particular issues tackled in this regard are
the following: whether reality is wholly physical (that is, only physical entities truly exist),
wholly metaphysical (that is, only metaphysical or abstract entities such as minds truly exist),
or a combination of the physical and the metaphysical; how many minds truly existwhether
there are many minds that are independent of one another or there is only one grand mind;
whether there exists a perfect mind who is responsible for the intricate design of the world;
and whether the whole of reality is just a construct of the mind or only some of it.

And in the area of ethics, the nature of the mind is involved in dealing with questions
like whether the foundations of morality lie in reason or in passions (or sentiments), whether
it is the will or some conscious experiences such as pleasures and pains, empathy, care, or
certain desirable psychological habits (the mental virtues) that should be the appropriate basis
of moral judgments, and whether there are free choices or not. The area of ethics overlaps
with the specialized area of the philosophy of action, where the nature of the mind is involved
in questions like whether intentions as mental states are necessary to account for what makes
certain actions intentional, how beliefs and desires figure in the attribution of (moral) agency
and (moral) accountability, and how is weakness of the will possible.

It is only quite recently that the nature of the mind has become the central concern of a
particular branch of philosophy; namely, the philosophy of mind. If previously inquiries into
the nature of the mind were only meant to shed light on some other philosophical concerns, in
this new discipline, such inquiries are the main focus. Consequently, such inquiries are not
anymore just limited to those that will serve the purposes of the other branches of philosophy.
Areas about the nature of the mind that were not investigated or were not given much
importance before are now being investigated or are given the importance that they deserve.
But more importantly, in analytic philosophy the relative position of significance between the
investigations done the nature of the mind and those done in the other branches has been
reversed; for although relatively still new as a philosophical discipline, the philosophy of
mind is already regarded by some as the current first philosophy of analytic philosophy (see
Searle1999b, 2075). This means that the philosophy of mind is at present regarded as the most
fundamental branch of philosophy, and hence serves as the starting point of the investigations
done in the other branches, at least within analytic philosophy. Now how did this come about?
What led to this development? In what follows, we shall attempt to answer these questions.

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 It shall be observed that in the various historical periods of philosophy, one branch of
philosophy manages to become the first philosophy. During the ancient and medieval periods,
metaphysics was regarded as the first philosophy. Here, the key to the answers to the
philosophical questions about the good life, the just society, knowledge, and others was
believed to lie in resolving the more fundamental problem on the nature of reality or of what
ultimately exists in the world. Consequently, the philosophical investigations of the ancient
and medieval philosophers were focused on defining reality. The Pre-Socratics, for instance,
sought to define reality in terms of some basic element or elements from which everything
else is derived by virtue of some processes. Plato sought it in terms of the unchanging abstract
models of concrete things perceived in the physical world, the so-called eternal forms; while
Aristotle sought it in terms of certain fundamental distinctions, foremost of which are the
distinctions among kinds of causes, between substances and accidents, and between potency
and act. The medieval philosophers, on the other hand, focused on the type of metaphysics
assumed in Christian theology; as such, their philosophical investigations were primarily
geared towards justifying the reality of God, angels, immortal souls, and human free-will,
among others.

In the modern period, epistemology replaced metaphysics as the first philosophy.

Philosophers during this period somehow realized that the question on how we know is prior
to the question on what there is. Among others, this realization arose from the observation that
how we conceive reality to be is largely shaped by our conceptual apparatus or by the
conditions that make knowing possible. The so-called system-builders in this period, from
Descartes to Kant, thus all began their philosophizing with an inquiry into the conditions that
make knowing possible. Though they differed in their conclusions, they, however, were one in
making epistemology as the starting point of philosophizing. More specifically, while these
modern philosophers identified sense-experience and reason as the general conditions that
make knowing possible, they, however, they took issues on which of these two conditions of
knowledge is more primary or fundamentalor, as it were, which is the slave to which.
Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz argued that it is reason and thus their camp has been called
rationalism. On the other hand, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume argued that it is sense-experience
and thus their camp has been called empiricism. Kant tried to reconcile the opposing two
camps, showing that both conditions are equally fundamental, and thus his philosophy has
been called critical.

But during the early part of the contemporary period (around the 20 th century),
epistemology gave way to the philosophy of language as the first philosophy in the analytic
tradition. I said that the philosophy of language was the center of philosophy for most of the
20th century. Indeed, as I remarked, during the first three quarters of the 20th century, the
philosophy of language was taken to be first philosophy, writes John Searle (1999b, 2076).
Here the basic philosophical question shifts from How do you know? to What do you
mean? The clarification of the meanings of the words used in philosophizing, such as
know, exists, reality, good, and others, was then thought to be the key in resolving
most, if not all, problems in philosophy. The assumption was that at the root of every
philosophical problem are some forms of linguistic confusions; as such, to solve these
problems is to eliminate these confusions. With the rise of the philosophy of language as a

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branch of philosophy, which studies the general features of language such as truth and
meaning, a certain method of doing philosophy, or better yet, of resolving (or dissolving)
philosophical issues, called linguistic analysis, developed. Consequently, the kind of
philosophy that utilizes this method has been called linguistic philosophy. Incidentally,
linguistic analysis, along with logical analysis (the analysis of the logical structure of
linguistic expressions in contrast to their grammatical structure), is an essential part of the
methodologies that define the analytic philosophical tradition.

Historically speaking, this turning point from epistemology to the philosophy of

language, dubbed by Richard Rorty (1992) as the linguistic turn, formally started with
Gottlob Freges critique of psychologism (also known as intuitionism) in the philosophy of
mathematicswhich regards the rules of mathematics as laws of the mind or as derived
from the structure of the mind. Frege found this view highly problematic for it is liable to lead
to subjectivism and thus will put mathematics on shaky foundations. For mathematics to have
firm foundations is for these foundations to be objective and universal. On the other hand,
Frege likewise couldnt accept the alternative of formalism, another school of thought in the
philosophy of mathematics which regards the rules of mathematics as mere conventional rules
comparable to the rules of games most notably the game of chess. If psychologism would
make the rules of mathematics subjective, formalism would make them arbitrary, which, from
the viewpoint of Frege, equally puts mathematics on shaky foundations.

Dissatisfied with both psychologism and formalism, Frege found the proper grounding
of mathematics in logic, in that the rules of mathematics are reducible to the laws of logic.
Consequently, this view, which was also shared and argued for by Bertrand Russell, has been
called logicism. Now since the rules of logic are embedded in language, to show how
mathematical rules are derived from the rules of logic, Frege must first show what these rules
of logic are as embedded in language. The structure of language governed by the rules of
logic, eventually called the logical structure of language, needed to be contrasted with the
structure of language governed by the rules of grammar, called the grammatical structure of
language. And it is in the course of his investigations on the logical structure of language that
the discipline the philosophy of language (in the analytic tradition) was born. Thus it said that
Freges philosophy of language is an offshoot of his philosophy of mathematics. Michael
Dummett (1981, 670), the leading contemporary scholar on Frege, though, explains that Frege
would rather call his views on language as constituting a theory of meaning than a philosophy
of language because Frege was disposed to use the word language as meaning only natural
language, and, he had a poor opinion of natural language, and thought it much of a
hindrance as a help to correct logical analysis. In any case, Dummett (1981, 683)
considers Frege as the father of linguistic philosophy: Frege can thus be considered the
father of linguistic philosophy, where this phrase is to be taken, not as referring to that
temporary deviation known as the philosophy of ordinary language, but as denoting all
philosophy which sees the key to the analysis of concepts as consisting in the study of the
means of their expression.

The philosophy of language, as it originally developed from Freges investigations on

the foundations of mathematics, was essentially tied up with logic, for here language is
analyzed in terms of its logical structure. Later on, however, the discipline also became

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preoccupied with language in its everyday use. Consequently, the philosophy of language was
divided into two schools of thought; namely, the ideal-language philosophy and the ordinary-
language philosophy. The ideal-language philosophy refers to the type of philosophy of
language practiced by Frege, Russell, the Early Wittgenstein (the Ludwig Wittgenstein of the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus), and the logical positivists. As the logical structure of
language is contained in language in its representative or descriptive function, the ideal-
language philosophy is concerned with explaining the conditions for the meaningfulness of
linguistic expressions that purport to refer to objects or states of affairs in the world. Foremost
of these linguistic expressions are proper names, predicate expressions, and propositions.
Freges sense-reference theory of meaning, Russells theory of definite descriptions,
Wittgensteins picture theory of meaning, and the logical positivists verificationist theory of
meaning were all meant to explain such conditions.

On the other hand, the ordinary language philosophy refers to the type of philosophy
of language practiced by G. E. Moore, the Later Wittgenstein (the Ludwig Wittgenstein of the
Philosophical Investigations), J. L. Austin, and John Searle. In contrast to the ideal-language
philosophy, the ordinary-language philosophy investigated language in its variety of functions
as performed in ordinary contexts. If Frege is credited for having started the ideal-language
philosophy, it is G. E. Moore who is credited for having started the ordinary-language
philosophy. Moores insistence that for a philosophical thesis to be meaningful it should be
translatable into the views of common sense set the direction. But it was Wittgensteins use
theory of meaning that became the most influential view, followed by the more systematic
Speech Act theory of J. L. Austin and John Searle.

At the present, however, the philosophy of language is no longer at the center of

philosophizing, for such spot is now occupied by the philosophy of mind. As John Searle
(1999b, 2075) writes:

A very curious thing has happened in the past two or three decadesthe philosophy of
mind has moved to the center of philosophy. Several other important branches of
philosophy, such as epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of action and even the
philosophy of language, are now treated as dependent on, and in some cases even as
branches of, the philosophy of mind. Whereas fifty years ago the philosophy of
language was considered first philosophy, now it is the philosophy of mind.

Searle identifies two major reasons for this transition. One concerns the realization that issues
in the philosophy of language are somehow dependent on issues involving the nature of the
mind. The other concerns the need for philosophy to respond to the claims of emerging
sciences of the mind that are grounded in the latest technologythe computer technology.

The realization that the philosophy of mind is more fundamental than the philosophy
of language is occasioned in turn by two prior realizations. The first is the realization that a
complete account of linguistic concepts would not be possible without making references to
mental concepts. This is most pronounced in the speech act theory of Austin and Searle,
where mental states serve as the sincerity conditions of speech acts. For instance, one has only
uttered a proposition in saying something if at the time of saying it one has a belief in mind.

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And the second is the realization that the intentionality of language (referring to the
relatedness to language to the world or of linguistic expressions to objects and states of affairs
in the world) is not inherent to language but is derived from or is just imposed on language by
the inherent intentionality of the mind (referring to the relatedness of the mind to the world or
of mental states to objects and states of affairs in the world). Words by themselves do not refer
to anything in the world; they only begin to refer to something in the world when they are
used to express mental states that necessarily refer to something in the world such as beliefs
and desires. While human agreement or conventions are required for words to relate to the
world it is not so in the case of the relation of mental states to the world. Beliefs and desires,
for instance, are about the world whether we like it or not. We simply cannot have these
mental states without them being about something in the world. This is the sense in which the
intentionality of mental states is inherent while that of language is merely derived from the
intentionality of mental states. Consequently, one only gets a clearer understanding of the
intentionality of language if one understands the intentionality of the mind.

On the other hand, the philosophy of mind also arises from the need of the times. It is
philosophys response to the task of evaluating the claims of emerging sciences of the mind,
which are grounded in computer technology. This in a way is not something new in
philosophy. Philosophy of science, for instance, arises from the need to clarify the foundations
of the natural sciences; and philosophy of mathematics arises from the need to clarify the
foundations of the formal or mathematical sciences. But while the natural and mathematical
sciences are already established scientific disciplines, the so-called sciences of the mind are
not yet, and so the philosophy of the mind evaluates their foundations rather than just mere
clarify themwhether or not a science of the mind is really possible.

Two powerful emerging sciences of the mind are cognitive science and artificial
intelligence. Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary approach to a scientific study of the
mind, involving the findings and methods of psychology, linguistics, computer science,
philosophy, anthropology, and neuroscience. Artificial intelligence, on the other hand, is a
branch of computer science whose research is devoted to the construction of intelligent
machines. What cognitive science and artificial intelligence have in common is their
utilization of the computer technology in their investigations. The use of the concept of
computer in understanding the mind has resulted in a powerful theory of the mind called the
computational theory of mind or computationalism for short. Consequently, these
investigations have resulted in claims that fall within the compass of philosophy, the two
critical of which are the claims that the human mind is just a sophisticated type of computer
and that it is possible for machines to have minds. These two claims certainly have bearings
on the issues of freedom and morality, to say the least. These issues have a long history in the
area of philosophy and now here are these emerging sciences making bold claims on these
issues. It is but proper that philosophy responds to these claims.

We can infer from our discussion above that the reasons behind the development of the
philosophy of mind into a distinct branch of philosophy are the same reasons that put it at the
center of contemporary analytic philosophy. As our present period is dominated by the
computer technology, philosophizing about how this technology bears on our human nature is
bound to be a task of supreme significance.

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2. The Central Issues

The philosophy of mind is thus a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind. But
what is it about the nature of the mind that the philosophy of mind is interested in? This
question calls for a clarification of the scope of the discipline. Another way of putting this
question is: What are the central issues in the philosophy of mind? A practical way to deal
with this is to examine the kind of questions that philosophers of mind themselves raise or
deal with. There are a multitude of these questions, so let us just examine a representative
number of these questions. Thus:

(1) Does the term mind refer to a particular entityjust like to what is normally
called the soulmerely to a class of states and processes that share certain
unique properties like being conscious?
(2) How are mental states different from non-mental states?
(3) Are mental states nothing but the physical states of the brain or the dispositions of
the body to behave in certain ways?
(4) Are environmental factors such as natural conditions and social conventions
necessary in identifying the type of mental states that we have?
(5) Is it really the case that our mental states have the power to cause behaviors or the
physical movements of the body?
(6) Can mental states independently of the physical states of the body?
(7) Can computers also have mental states?
(8) Do human minds work like computers?

There are three general types of questions that can be gleaned from these questions.
The first type involves questions (1) and (3), which are both concerned with the type of
existence that the mind is believed to possess. Question (1) inquires into whether the mind
exists as a particular entity or as a class of states and processes of a certain kind. Question (3)
inquires into whether the existence of mental states (the states of the mind) is different from
or is identical with the existence of the physical states of the brain or of the behavioral
dispositions of the body. We can call this type of questions the ontological questions. The
second type involves questions (2) and (4), which are both concerned with the identity of
mental states and processes. Question (2) asks how mental states and processes are
distinguished from non-mental states and processes, while question (4) asks how mental states
are distinguished from one another in light of whether environmental factors contribute to
such distinction. We can call this type of questions the identity questions. And the third type
involves questions (5) and (6), which are both concerned with the relation of the mind to the
body or of mental states to the physical states of the body. Question (5) is a question about the
causal relation of the mind to the body, while question (6) is a question about the relation of
the existence of the mind to the existence of the body. We can call this type of questions the
relational questions (or the mind-body relation questions).

Now what about questions (7) and (8)? The do not seem to clearly fall under any of
the types of questions that we have identified. Yes, but this is because they involve all types of
questions. The answers to these questions will have to assume certain views about the type of

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existence that the mind has, the type of identity that it has, and the type of relation that it has
to the body. Question (7), incidentally, also indicates that the mind that is investigated in the
philosophy of mind is not limited to the human mind, though it proves to be the primary
focus. Aside from human minds, the philosophy of mind also investigates possible non-human
minds, such those allegedly possessed by computing machines and animals.

Accordingly, these three general types of questions constitute the three central issues
in the philosophy of mind. And thus what the philosophy of mind investigates about the
nature of the mind is the type of existence that it has, its distinguishing or defining features,
and its relation to the body. In what follows we shall elaborate on these issues and examine
how they are related to one another.

2.1. The Nature of the Minds Existence

The first central issue asks the question: What is the nature of the minds existence?
Technically speaking, this question inquires into the ontological status of the mind, and hence
questions relating to this can be called ontological questions. The following are examples of
questions falling under this type of questions. Does the mind exist as a particular entity or as a
class of phenomena bounded by some common properties? How many minds truly exist? Is
the existence of the human mind nothing but the existence of the brain, or is it something
other than the existence of the brain? If it is something other than the brain, is it still
something physical or not? If it is something still physical, how is it different from the
physical existence of the brain?

One may suppose that the question Is there really a mind? is a prior question than
the question about the nature of the minds existence. But it isnt really the case for before we
can argue about the existence or non-existence of minds we need to be clear first on the kind
of existence that we are or are not attributing to minds. For saying that minds exist or do not
exist already assumes a certain understanding of what is it for minds to exist. Suppose a
person subscribes to the idea that the mind is nothing but the brain, and then we ask him
whether there really is a mind. If he answers in the positive it is because he finds it obvious
that there are brains, but if he answers in the negative it is because he thinks there are no such
things as minds understood as something like souls which are believed to be entities
independent of our bodies. The simple assertion or denial of the existence of the mind is
confusing if one is not clear at the outset which among the various conceptions of how the
mind exists one is asserting or denying.

There are, however, two general kinds of existence under which any conception of
how the mind exists can be classified; namely, physical existence and metaphysical (or
abstract) existence. By physical existence we mean the kind of existence that lends itself to
empirical observation and quantitative measurements, or generally to the methods of the
natural sciences; while by metaphysical existence we mean the kind of existence that does
not. Accordingly, to say that the mind exists or does not exist is make a position on whether
the mind exists physically or metaphysically. Usually, however, to say that the mind does not
exist is to deny the metaphysical existence attributed to the mind.

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 Actually, in addition to physical and metaphysical types of existence, there is another
type of existence that philosophers talk about, namely, psychological or mental existence,
which somewhat lies in the middle of the physical and the metaphysical types of existence.
This type of existence, together with the two others, constitutes what some philosophers have
called the three realms of existence, (see, for instance, Frege 1994), whose differences and
similarities are as follows. An entity that exists physically, such as a physical object, or
metaphysically, such as God, is believed to go on existing even though there is nobody
conscious of it. The case, however, is different as regards mental existence for such type of
existence is dependent on consciousness. Meaning to say, an entity that exists mentally or
psychologically exists only in so far as there is a subject that is conscious of it. For instance, a
belief exists only in so far it is a belief of someone. Incidentally, an entity having a mental
existence is also regarded as having a subjective or a first-person ontology, in contrast to an
entity having either physical or metaphysical existence which is also regarded as having an
objective or a third-person ontology. Consequently, whereas physical existence is observable,
is subject to change, and is independent of consciousness while metaphysical existence is not
observable, is not subject to change, and is independent of consciousness, mental existence,
on the other hand, is not observable (like metaphysical existence but unlike physical
existence), is subject to change (like physical existence but unlike metaphysical existence),
and is dependent on consciousness (unlike physical and metaphysical types of existence).

There were occasions in the history of philosophy wherein mental existence was
opposed to both physical and metaphysical types of existence. For instance, Franz Brentano
(1973, 88), in order to resolve the puzzle concerning the fact that some mental states remain
directed at some objects even though such objects do not really exist outside consciousness,
argued that all objects of consciousness actually only have mental existence. On this view, if I
believe, for instance, that Santa Claus exists and there is no Santa Claus in the external world,
my belief nonetheless remains to be about Santa Claus because Santa Claus exists as a
concept in my mind. This view encountered criticisms, most especially from Brentanos own
student, Edmund Husserl (see Mabaquiao 2005, 2008). For one, while such view can account
for our mental states about fictional entities such as centaurs and unicorns, it cannot account
for our mental sates about real entities in the world. For instance, if I intend to marry person
A, it is not my concept or mental image of person A that I intend to marry but the real entity
or human person that is referred to by person A.

In current discussions in the philosophy of mind, however, mental existence is

accommodated by or is subsumed under either of the two other types of existence. The reason
is as follows. Physical and metaphysical types of existence are mutually exclusive in that
saying that the mind exists physically one necessarily rejects the view that the mind exists
metaphysically, and vice-versa. Mental existence, however, is not mutually exclusive with
either physical or metaphysical types of existence for in saying that the mind exists mentally
one does not necessarily reject the view that the mind exists physically or metaphysically. It is
possible that the mind exists mentally while at the same time existing also as either physically
or metaphysically. As we shall see in the next chapter, most views that attribute a
metaphysical existence to minds taken as entities or substances, such as the view of Descartes,
attribute a mental existence to mental states; while some views that attribute a physical
existence to minds, the so-called physical realiststhose that believe mental states are higher-

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level physical states, likewise attribute a mental existence to mental states. What happens
actually is that mental existence has been regarded more as a distinguishing feature of mental
states, which broadly corresponds to what has been called the subjective quality of mental
states; and hence discussion of which more appropriately falls under the second central issue
concerning the nature of the mind, which we shall deal with in a little while.

Consequently, in the classification of the views on the nature of mind in terms of the
nature of the minds existence, it is only the physical and metaphysical types of existence that
are considered. Views that claim that the existence of the mind is physical are classified as
materialist views (or sometimes as physicalist views), while those that claim that it is
metaphysical as metaphysical views. But, as we shall see in the succeeding chapter, there are
variations of these two general views in light of the different ways in which the mind can be
said to exist physically or metaphysically.

2.2. The Defining Features of the Mind

The second central issue asks the question: What are the distinguishing or defining features of
the mind? Another way of putting this is: What accounts for the identity of minds? There are
two levels on which this question is raised: the general and the particular. On the general
level, the question inquires into what differentiates mental phenomena (mental states and
processes) from non-mental ones. For instance, it investigates what distinguishes beliefs and
pains from the rising and setting of the sun. On the other hand, on the particular level, the
question inquires into what differentiates mental phenomena from one another. It investigates,
for example, what differentiates beliefs from pains, or a belief that p from a belief that q and a
desire the p? On the general level, the problem is how to define mentality; while on the
particular level, the problem is how to individuate mental phenomena. The former searches
for the marks of the mental, while the latter searches for the criteria of mental individuation.

There are three fundamental marks of the mental that philosophers of mind talk about.
The first is consciousness, which generally refers to awareness. Mental phenomena are
necessarily conscious phenomena, either actually (or occurrently) or potentially. To have a
belief and to be in pain, for instance, is to be conscious of this belief and pain. Conscious
phenomena, however, can be actual, as in the case of the beliefs and pains that we are at the
moment conscious of, or potential, as in the case of our beliefs and pains (emotional pains)
that we are at the moment not conscious of but which in principle we can be conscious of if
we so decide to bring them into our consciousness. The second is subjective quality of mental
phenomena or the so-called qualia, which refers to the particular way in which a subject
experiences his or her mental states. For instance, the experience of a certain pain, say that of
a toothache, always comes with a certain quality that is subjective to the one experiencing it.
We generally say it is painful or that it hurts, but the way it is painful to one person may be
different from the way it is painful to another person. In this light, there is always something it
is like for a person to have mental states, say to experience pains or to see sunsets. And the
third is intentionality, which refers to the directedness or aboutness of mental states. For
instance, a belief is always a belief about something. If one believes, there must be something
that he believes in or believes that. Two important qualifications here are that only some
mental states, the so-called propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires, are intentional and

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that these propositional attitudes are intentional in an inherent and not in a derivative way. In
light of these properties, phenomena that are conscious, subjectively qualitative, and
intentional are regarded as mental, while those that are not as non-mental.

As regards the criteria of mental individuation, philosophers of mind speak of the

quality and content of mental states. Some mental states are individuated in terms of quality
alone, for they do not have contents (this is just another way of saying that they are not
intentional). The various kinds of pain, for instance, are individuated in terms of the quality of
the hurting sensation that goes with having a certain pain. Some mental states, however, are
individuated in terms of both quality and content for they do possess both features. These
mental states are the so-called propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, and others). Here the
quality refers to the kind of attitude that one has towards the content of a propositional
attitude while the content is what the propositional attitude is aboutwhich in principle is
expressible in the form of a proposition. Accordingly, a belief that p and a belief that q have
the same quality but different contents while a belief that p and a desire that p have the same
content but different qualities. The controversy in this discussion lies in the contents of these
propositional attitudes. The issue is whether these contents are wide, that is, their
individuation must necessarily consider external factors (such as natural conditions and social
environments), or narrow, that is, their individuation is purely an internal thing and hence
does not consider external factors.

These propertiesthe defining and individuating features of the mind, as we shall see
in Chapter 3, are critical in debates among philosophers of mind for they constitute the bases
of arguments that are used to defend or reject a certain view regarding the nature of the mind.

2.3. The Minds Relation with the Body

The third central issue asks the question: How is the mind related to the body? This issue,
which is technically known as the mind-body problem, has an ontological and a causal facet.
In its ontological facet, the mind-body relation is investigated to resolve issues concerning the
existence of the mind; while in its causal facet, it is investigated to resolve issues concerning
the mental powers of the mind. We shall refer to the former as the ontological mind-body
problem while to latter as the causal mind-body problem.

There are four fundamental questions raised by philosophers of mind to resolve the
ontological mind-body problem. These questions can be presented simply as inquires into
how mental phenomena relate to some physical phenomena (understood here as phenomena
connected to the body, which usually involve the physical states, processes, and properties of
the brain). The first is whether mental phenomena can be reduced to or can be shown to be
nothing but some physical phenomena. If this can be done then mental phenomena conceived
as something other than physical phenomena do not really exist. The second is whether
mental phenomena emerge from some physical phenomena. The point here is to show that
while mental phenomena are caused by some physical phenomena, mental phenomena are
still different in some fundamental way from these physical phenomena. The third is whether
mental phenomena supervene on (or depend on) some physical phenomena. This is meant to
establish, among others, that mental phenomena cannot exist independently of some physical

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phenomena. Depending on the kind of supervening relation between mental phenomena and
some physical phenomena, logical (based on logical laws) or nomological (based on natural
laws), the supervening relation between mental phenomena and some physical phenomena
can lead to the rejection of some other views on the ontological mind-body problem,
especially the one that claims that mental phenomena can be reduced to some physical
phenomena. And the fourth is whether mental phenomena are realized by the functional or
causal organization of some physical phenomena. One critical import of this is whether
mental phenomena can be had by physical systems other than the human brain, most notably
computing machines. For if it is the functional organization of some physical phenomena that
is responsible for the existence of mental phenomena and not the physical phenomena
themselves, then any physical system (or any physical phenomena arranged to perform certain
functions) that has the appropriate functional organization to realize mental phenomena can
have mental phenomena.

On the other hand, the alternative ways of resolving the causal mind-body problem
can be shown to arise from which among the various types of causal relation are accepted or
rejected. These various types of causal relation correspond to the four possible directions of
causal relation between the mind and the body, or more particularly, among mental and bodily
events (assumed to transpire in the same entity or person); namely, (1) mind to mind, where
one mental event causes another mental event, e.g. a belief causing a desire; (2) body to body,
where one bodily event causes another bodily event, e.g. damage of skin tissue causing
bleeding of the skin; (3) mind to body, where a mental event causes a bodily event, e.g. a
desire causing a physical movement; and (4) body to mind, where a bodily event causes a
mental event, e.g. damage of skin tissue causing the feeling of pain. The solutions to the
causal mind-body problem range from affirming all types of causal mind-body relations, to
affirming some and reject some of them, to rejecting all of them. A critical consideration here
is whether some of these causal mind-body relations, in particular the mind to body and the
mind to mind, is deterministic or voluntary. A big difference exists between a view that
accepts all causal mind-body relations but claims that some of these causal relations are
voluntary and a view that accepts all causal mind-body relations but claims that all such
relations are deterministic.

2.4. Some Other Issues

In his book Mind (2004, 9-40), John Searle lists twelve philosophical problems concerning the
mind resulting from Descartes view on the mind. Descartes regards the mind as a
metaphysical substance that is qualitatively different from matter, in that while the mind is
conscious and is not extended in space, matter is unconscious and is extended in space.
Consequently, while the movements of matter follow deterministic laws, the movements of
the mind do not. And despite its difference with matter, the mind is able to causally influence
the movements of the body in a voluntary manner. The philosophical problems that have
arisen from this view, according to Searle, are: (1) the mind-body problem, (2) the problem of
other minds, (3) the problem of skepticism about the external world, (4) the analysis of
perception, (5) the problem of free will, (6) the self and personal identity, (7) whether animals
have minds, (8) the problem of sleep, (9) the problem of intentionality, (10) mental causation
and epiphenomenalism, (11) the unconscious, and (12) psychological and social explanation.

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In what follows, let us see how these problems will fit in the three central issues on the
philosophy of mind that we have identified.

The problem of mental causation investigates whether the mind has causal powers
whether mental states are able to causally influence the movements of the body, while
epiphenomenalism is a view that rejects these causal powers of the mind. Both mental
causation and epiphenomenalism concern mind-body relation; as such these topics fall under
the mind-body problem.

The problems of other minds, of whether animals have minds, of skepticism about the
external world, and of perception are issues undoubtedly touch on the nature of the mind, but
their primary motivation is to resolve issues concerning knowledge and not to resolve issues
concerning the nature of the mind. In this light, they are more appropriately dealt with in area
of epistemology. As primarily epistemological issues, they only touch on the nature of the
mind in so far as it sheds light on epistemological issues. However, if our question is focused
on what is it about the nature of the mind or consciousness such that these epistemological
problems arise, then our question falls under either the problem of the nature of the minds
existence or the problem of the minds identity or both. Only if taken in light of this question
that these primarily epistemological issues become special topics in the philosophy of mind.

The notion of free will is something that is discussed in several branches of

philosophy depending on what other philosophical issues it is investigated with. It is
discussed, for instance, in ethics in conjunction with the problem of what gives moral worth to
an action (Kant, for instance, regards free will as one of the postulates of morality) and the
problem of determining moral agency and responsibility. In the philosophy of mind, the
notion of free will is discussed under the mind-body problem, more specifically on whether
mental states causally influence bodily movements in a voluntary or deterministic way.

The problem concerning the self and personal identity is like the problem of free-will
in that it can be a concern of several branches of philosophy. It can be an ontological problem
if our concern is the ontological status of the self, such as whether it refers to a single entity
(as Descartes would have it) or simply to a bundle of experiences (as Hume would have it). It
can be an epistemological problem if our concern is the justification of the belief in a
persisting self amidst the changes that it undergoes across time. It can be an ethical issue if
our concern is how the self is related to moral agency and moral responsibility. It can even be
an existentialist issue if our concern is how the self can be authentic in its dealings with other
people. In the philosophy of mind, the notion of the self or personal identity can be discussed
in relation to the identity of the mind, on whether it is essential to the nature of human
consciousness to have a sense of self or personal identity.

The problem concerning psychological and social explanation, as Searle understands

it, refers to the problem concerning the status of the social sciences in relation to the natural
sciences. Searle (2004, 32), in this regard, asks: Why have the methods of the natural
sciences not had the kind of payoff in the study of human behavior and human social relations
that they have had in the physical sciences? If what is inquired into here is the difference in
the methodology between the social and the natural sciences, this problem is more of a

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problem in the philosophy of science or in the philosophy of the social sciences. But if what is
investigated is what is it about the human mind such that explanations that necessarily involve
it or that need to make references to it, as in the case of psychological and social explanations,
seem to differ significantly from the explanations of the physical science which do not need to
make references to it, then this can be a problem in the philosophy of mind for it concerns
either the nature of the minds existence or the identity of mind or both.

Finally, the problems of sleep, the unconscious, and intentionality all fall under the
problem of the identity of minds, for all these have something to do with defining mentality.
On the one hand, the phenomena of sleep and the unconscious are problems raised against the
view that consciousness is the defining feature of mentality. If having a mind is being
conscious then what about moments of sleep, do our minds cease to be minds in such
moments? And if we define a mental state as a conscious state, what about unconscious states
which we normally also consider as mental states such as our beliefs and desires that we are at
the moment not conscious of? On the other hand, intentionality is advanced as one of the
defining features of mentality. Accordingly, some of our mental states, such as beliefs and
desires, are inherently intentional for they cant be helped but be directed at or be about some
states of affairs.

Searle considers all these twelve problems as examples of problems in the philosophy
of mind. There is no denying the fact that they are all philosophical problems involving the
mind; but as our discussion has shown, except for the mind-body problem which is one of the
central issues in the philosophy of mind, either some of these problems are clearly special
topics under any of the three central issues we have earlier identified or some of them are
special topics under any of these three central issues only if taken in a certain way. In any
case, the three central issues in the philosophy of mind that we have indentified hold. In
discussing the issues falling under the three central issues in the philosophy of mind in
subsequent chapters, we shall limit our discussion on those topics that clearly fall under these
three central issues. This means that we will no longer touch on problems like the problem of
other minds, animal consciousness, psychological and social explanation, sleep, personal
identity, and others.

3. Concluding Remarks

As the mind is an essential feature of our humanity and how we relate and cope with our
environment, the nature of the mind will always be one of the main concerns of philosophy.
We have seen that the nature of the mind that is investigated in the philosophy of mind
concerns the minds existence, identity, and relation to the body. These three features are
interrelated in that a certain view on one of these features will necessarily lead to a certain
view on the other features. The minds existence, though, seems to be prior to the other two in
the sense that the existence of the mind must be settled first before we can meaningfully speak
of the minds identity and relation to the body. For instance, if it is believed that the mind
exists metaphysically in the manner conceived by Descartes, then it is meaningful to
investigate what are the features unique to the mind and how the mind interacts with the body
while remaining independent to it. But if it is believed that the mind is nothing but the brain,
then there will be no mental identity and mind-body relation to speak of.

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 The next three chapters will be devoted to these three central issues. Chapter II
discusses the issue on the minds existence, Chapter III on the minds identity, and Chapter IV
on the minds relation with the body. These three chapters together constitute a general survey
of the various philosophical theories that have been conceived in addressing these three
central issues.

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