1. Serg's Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., G.R. No.

137705 (August 22, 2000) Case

Digest

Real Properties

PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI) filed a complaint for a sum of money with an application of writ of
replevin. The judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machinery and
equipment to PCI.

Serg filed a motion for special protective order praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer the
enforcement of the writ of replevin contending that the machines were not proper subjects of the writ
because they are in fact real property defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code.

ART. 415. The following are immovable property:

xxx

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works;

xxx

PCI opposed the motion on the ground that Section 12.1 of their Lease Agreement clearly provided that
the machines were to be considered as personal property.

2.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the
PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to
or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or attached in any
manner to what is permanent.

Issue:

Whether the machinery are considered a real or personal property.

Held:

The machinery are considered personal property.

The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as
personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.
Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of
any material fact found therein.

Hence, Serg is estopped from denying the characterization of the machinery as personal property, which
are proper subjects of Writ of Seizure.
 2. Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076 (January 13, 2009) Case Digest

Personal Property

Facts:

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) filed a complaint for theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code against Baynet Co., Ltd. (Baynet) for stealing its business. PLDT alleged that Baynet
offered phone cards to people in Japan to call their friends and relatives in the Philippines using PLDT's
facilities and equipment.

Issue:

Whether or not the PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services is a personal property
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

Held:

No, PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services is not a personal property under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code.

Personal property under the Revised Penal Code covers both tangible and intangible properties but
must be considered with the word "take" in the law. There is "taking" of personal property, and theft is
consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires possession of personal property even if for a short
time; or if such property is under the dominion and control of the thief. The statutory definition of
"taking" clearly indicates that not all personal properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The
general rule is that only movable properties, which have physical or material existence and susceptible
of occupation by another are proper subjects of theft. Movable properties under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code should be distinguished from the rights or interest to which they relate to. While
the rights or interests are properties, they are not considered personal properties under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code.

PLDT's business is intangible and cannot be taken by another and not the proper subjects of theft
because they are without form or substance.
3. FELS ENERGY, INC. V THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS and THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF
BATANGAS

G.R. No. 168557 February 16, 2007

FACTS

Two consolidated cases were filed by FELS Energy, Inc. (FELS) and National Power Corporation (NPC),
respectively.

NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over diesel engine power barges moored at
Batangas. The contract, denominated as an Energy Conversion Agreement, was for a period of five years
wherein, NPC shall be responsible for the payment of:

(a) all taxes, import duties, fees, charges and other levies imposed by the National Government

(b) all real estate taxes and assessments, rates and other charges in respect of the Power Barges

Subsequently, Polar Energy, Inc. assigned its rights under the Agreement to FELS. Thereafter, FELS
received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges. The assessed tax, which likewise
covered those due for 1994, amounted to P56,184,088.40 per annum. FELS referred the matter to NPC,
reminding it of its obligation under the Agreement to pay all real estate taxes. It then gave NPC the full
power and authority to represent it in any conference regarding the real property assessment of the
Provincial Assessor.

NPC sought reconsideration of the Provincial Assessors decision to assess real property taxes on the
power barges. However, the motion was denied. The Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) ruled
that the power plant facilities, while they may be classified as movable or personal property, are
nevertheless considered real property for taxation purposes because they are installed at a specific
location with a character of permanency.

FELS appealed the LBAAs ruling to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). The CBAA rendered
a Decision finding the power barges exempt from real property tax.

It was later reversed by the cbaa upon reconsideration and affirmed by the CA

ISSUE

Whether power barges, which are floating and movable, are personal properties and therefore, not
subject to real property tax.

RULING

No. Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that "[d]ocks and structures which, though floating,
are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast" are
considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by
destination, being in the nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an
industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to
meet the needs of said industry or work.

The findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner of the taxable properties is petitioner FELS is the
entity being taxed by the local government. As stipulated under the Agreement:

OWNERSHIP OF POWER BARGES. POLAR shall own the Power Barges and all the fixtures, fittings,
machinery and equipment on the Site used in connection with the Power Barges which have been
supplied by it at its own cost. POLAR shall operate, manage and maintain the Power Barges for the
purpose of converting Fuel of NAPOCOR into electricity.

It follows then that FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes by invoking its
exemption in Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160,

the law states that the machinery must be actually, directly and exclusively used by the government
owned or controlled corporation;

The agreement POLAR undertakes that until the end of the Lease Period, it will operate the Power
Barges to convert such Fuel into electricity. Therefore, FELS shall be liable for the realty taxes and not
the NPC who is not actually, directly and exclusively using the same. It is a basic rule that obligations
arising from a contract have the force of law between the parties

CONCLUSION

Petitions are DENIED.

4. MARCELO R. SORIANO V. SPOUSES RICARDO and ROSALINA GALIT

G.R. No. 156295. September 23, 2003

FACTS

Respondent Ricardo Galit contracted a loan from petitioner Marcelo Soriano, in the total sum of
P480,000.00, evidenced by four promissory notes. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over
a parcel of land. After he failed to pay his obligation, Soriano filed a complaint for sum of money against
him with the Regional Trial Court.

Respondents, the Spouses Ricardo and Rosalina Galit, failed to file their answer. Hence, upon motion of
Marcelo Soriano, the trial court declared the spouses in default and proceeded to receive evidence for
petitioner Soriano ex parte.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner Soriano, against the defendant ordering the latter to
pay. It became final and executory. Accordingly, the trial court issued a writ of execution in due course,
by virtue of which, Deputy Sheriff Renato E. Robles levied on the following real properties of the Galit
spouses:

1. A parcel of land

2. STORE/HOUSE CONSTRUCTED made of strong materials

3. BODEGA made of strong materials

At the sale of the above-enumerated properties at public auction, petitioner was the highest and only
bidder. Accordingly, Deputy Sheriff Robles issued a Certificate of Sale of Execution of Real Property

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the inclusion of the parcel
of land covered among the list of real properties in the writ of possession. Respondents argued that said
property was not among those sold on execution by Deputy Sheriff Renato E. Robles as reflected in the
Certificate of Sale on Execution of Real Property.

Court of Appeals granted the instant petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Certificate of Sale on execution of real property is null and void and subsequently
the writ of possession.

RULING

Yes. Petitioner dwells on the general proposition that since the certificate of sale is a public document, it
enjoys the presumption of regularity and all entries therein are presumed to be done in the
performance of regular functions.

There are actually two copies of the Certificate of Sale on Execution of Real Properties issued namely: (a)
copy which is on file with the deputy sheriff; and (b) copy registered with the Registry of Deeds. The
object of scrutiny, however, is not the copy of the Certificate of Sale on Execution of Real Properties
issued by the deputy sheriff but the copy thereof subsequently registered by petitioner with the Registry
of Deeds which included an entry on the dorsal portion of the first page thereof describing a parcel of
land not found in the Certificate of Sale of Real Properties on file with the sheriff.

Thus, it has been held that while a public document like a notarized deed of sale is vested with the
presumption of regularity, this is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. It must be pointed out in
this regard that the issuance of a Certificate of Sale is an end result of judicial foreclosure where
statutory requirements are strictly adhered to; where even the slightest deviations therefrom will
invalidate the proceeding and the sale. Among these requirements is an explicit enumeration and
correct description of what properties are to be sold stated in the notice.

The argument that the land on which the buildings levied upon in execution is necessarily included is,
likewise, tenuous.

The foregoing provision of the Civil Code enumerates land and buildings separately. This can only mean
that a building is, by itself, considered immovable. Thus, it has been held that

. . . while it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the
improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on
which it has been built. Such mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage for the building would still
be considered immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land.

In this case, considering that what was sold by virtue of the writ of execution issued by the trial court
was merely the storehouse and bodega constructed on the parcel of land, which by themselves are real
properties of respondents spouses, the same should be regarded as separate and distinct from the
conveyance of the lot on which they stand.
5. Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 15560 (July 20, 3006) Case Digest

Public Dominion

Facts:

MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the taxable
years 1992 to 2001. MIAAs real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The City of
Paraaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands
and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands
and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.

MIAA filed a petition sought to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying
against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.

The City of Paraaque contended that Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew
the tax exemption privileges of government-owned and-controlled corporations upon the effectivity
of the Local Government Code. Thus, MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax.

MIAA argued that Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax
itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public
advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.

Issue:

Whether or not the City of Paraaque can impose real tax, levy against and auction for public sale the
Airport Lands and Buildings.

Held:

MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA
are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. No
one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, are owned by the State. The
term ports includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port
constructed by the State.

Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public
dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and
Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic
travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the
public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The
charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public
dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one intended for
public use.

The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot
be the subject of an auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to
levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential
public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and
auction sale. This will happen if the City of Paraaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the
600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.
6. FAJARDO VS. FREEDOM TO BUILD

March 28, 2013 ~ vbdiaz

Eliseo Fajardo Jr., vs Freedom to Build Inc.

G. R. No. 134692 August 1, 2000

Facts: Freedom to Build Inc., an owner-developer and seller of low-cost housing sold to petitioner-
spouses a house and lot in the De La Costa Homes, in Barangka, Marikina, Metro Manila. The Contract to
sell executed between the parties, contained a Restrictive Covenant providing certain prohibitions, to
wit:

Easements. For the good of the entire community, the homeowner must observe a two-meter
easement in front. No structure of any kind (store, garage, bodega, etc.) may be built on the front
easement.

Upward expansion. A second storey is not prohibited. But the second storey expansion must be placed
above the back portion of the house and should not extend forward beyond the apex of the original
building.

Front expansion: 2nd Storey: No unit may be extended in the front beyond the line as designed and
implemented by the developer in the 60 sq. m. unit. In other words, the 2nd floor expansion, in front, is
6 meters back from the front property line and 4 meters back from the front wall of the house, just as
provided in the 60 sq. m. units.

The above restrictions were also contained in Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-115384 covering the lot
issued in the name of petitioner-spouses.

The controversy arose when the petitioners despite repeated demand from the respondent, extended
the roof of their house to the property line and expanded the second floor of their house to a point
directly above the original front wall. Respondent filed before the RTC an action to demolish the
unauthorized structures.

The RTC rendered a judgment against the petitioner ordering them to immediately demolish and
remove the extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the limitations imposed by the
Restrictive Covenant, otherwise the Branch Sheriff of this Court will execute the this decision at the
expense of the defendants.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the for the lack of a specific provision, prescribing the penalty of the demolition in
the Restrictive Covenant in the event of the breach thereof, the prayer of the respondent to demolish
the structure should fail.

Ruling:
The Court held that the argument of the petitioner-spouses has no merit; Article 1168 of the New Civil
Code states that: When the obligation consists in not doing and the obligor does what has been
forbidden him, it shall be undone at his expense.

This Court is not unaware of its ruling in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation,
which has merely adjudged the payment of damages in lieu of demolition. In the aforementioned case,
however, the elaborate mathematical formula for the determination of compensatory damages which
takes into account the current construction cost index during the immediately preceding 5 years based
on the weighted average of wholesale price and wage indices of the National Census and Statistics
Office and the Bureau of Labor Statistics is explicitly provided for in the Deed of Restrictions entered into
by the parties. This unique and peculiar circumstance, among other strong justifications therein
mentioned, is not extant in the case at bar.

In sum, the Court holds that since the extension constructed exceeds the floor area limits of the
Restrictive Covenant, petitioner spouses can be required to demolish the structure to the extent that it
exceeds the prescribed floor area limits.

Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
7. PROGRAMME INCORPORATED, V PROVINCEOF BATAAN

FACTS: BASECO is the owner of Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge, both located in Mariveles, Bataan. In
1986, BASECO granted petitioner a contract of lease over Piazza Hotel at a monthly rental of P6,500 for
three years, subject to renewal by mutual agreement of the parties. After the expiration of the three-
year lease period, petitioner was allowed to continue operating the hotel on monthly extensions of the
lease. In 1989, however, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued a
sequestration order against BASECO pursuant to Executive Order No. 1 of former President Corazon C.
Aquino. Among the properties provisionally seized and taken over was the lot on which Piazza Hotel
stood. On July, 1989, however, Piazza Hotel was sold at a public auction for non-payment of taxes to
respondent Province of Bataan. The title of the property was transferred to respondent. BASECOs
Transfer Certificate of Title was cancelled and a new one was issued to the Province of Bataan. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of respondent.CA affirmed the trial courts ruling.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is a possessor in good faith of the Piazza Hotel and Mariveles Lodge

HELD: The benefits granted to a possessor in good faith cannot be maintained by the lessee against the
lessor because, such benefits are intended to apply only to a case where one builds or sows or plants on
land which he believes himself to have a claim of title and not to lands wherein ones only interest is
that of a tenant under a rental contract, otherwise, it would always be in the power of a tenant to
improve his landlord out of his property. Besides, as between lessor and lessee, the Code applies specific
provisions designed to cover their rights. Hence, the lessee cannot claim reimbursement, as a matter of
right, for useful improvements he has made on the property, nor can he assert a right of retention until
reimbursed. His only remedy is to remove the improvement if the lessor does not choose to pay its
value; but the court cannot give him the right to buy the land. Petitioners assertion that Piazza Hotel
was constructed "at (its) expense" found no support in the records. Neither did any document or
testimony prove this claim. At best, what was confirmed was that petitioner managed and operated the
hotel. There was no evidence that petitioner was the one which spent for the construction or renovation
of the property. And since petitioners alleged expenditures were never proven, it could not even seek
reimbursement of one-half of the value of the improvements upon termination of the lease under
Article 1678 of the Civil Code.
8. G.R. NO. 170923 JANUARY 20, 2009SULO SA NAYON, INC. VS NAYONG PILIPINOFOUNDATION

FACTS: In 1975, respondent leased a portion of the Nayong Pilipino Complex, to petitioner Sulo sa
Nayon, Inc. for the construction and operation of a hotel building, to be known as the Philippine Village
Hotel. The lease was for an initial period of 21 years, or until May 1996. It is renewable for a period of
25years under the same terms and conditions upon due notice in writing to respondent of the intention
to renew. In 1995, petitioners sent respondent a letter notifying the latter of their intention to renew
the contract for another. July of the same year, parties agreed to the renewal of the contract for
another 25 years, or until 2021. Under the new agreement, petitioner PVHI was bound to pay the
monthly rentals beginning January 2001, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their monthly rental.
Respondent repeatedly demanded petitioners to pay the arrears and vacate the premises. MeTC
rendered its decision in favor of respondent RTC which modified the ruling of the MeTC.CA which held
that the RTC erroneously applied the rules on accession, as found in Articles448 and 546 of the Civil
Code

ISSUE: WON Sulo sa Nayon as builders have acted in good faith in order for Art. 448 in relation to
Art.546 of the Civil Code may apply with respect to their rights over improvements.

HELD: Article 448 is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one builds, plants, or sows on
land in which he believes himself to have a claim of title and not to lands where the only interest of the
builder, planter or sower is that of a holder, such as a tenant. In the case at bar, petitioners have no
adverse claim or title to the land. In fact, as lessees, they recognize that the respondent is the owner of
the land. What petitioners insist is that because of the improvements, which are of substantial value,
which they have introduced on the leased premises with the permission of respondent, they should be
considered builders in good faith who have the right to retain possession of the property until
reimbursement by respondent. We affirm the ruling of the CA that introduction of valuable
improvements on the leased premises does not give the petitioners the right of retention and
reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder in good faith. Otherwise, such a situation would
allow the lessee to easily "improve" the lessor out of its property. We reiterate the doctrine that a
lessee is neither a builder in good faith nor in bad faith that would call for the application of Articles
448and 546 of the Civil Code. His rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code.
9. ADLAWAN V. ADLAWAN- Co-ownership & Ejectment

FACTS:

A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of (petitioner)
Arnelito Adlawan. He is the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is claiming that he is the
sole heir. He then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to himself and out of generosity allowed
the siblings of his father to occupy the property provided that they vacate when asked. Time came when
he demanded that they vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment suit against them.

His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming that
the said lot was registered in their parents name and they had been living in the said house and lot since
birth. The only reason why the said house and lot was transferred in Dominadors name was when their
parents were in need of money for renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to obtain a
loan and since Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they executed a simulated
deed of sale in favor of Dominador.

The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelitos filiation and the settlement of the estate are
conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. And since Dominador was survived by his wife,
Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to
turn over the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of execution which was
opposed by the nephew and nieces of Graciana who claim that they have a share in the lot.

The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are co-heirs
thus he cannot eject them from the property via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit

HELD:

NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir of Dominador.
Since he was survived was his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became co-owners of the lot.
Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity thus making them co-owners as
well.

Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the co-
owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o
necessity of joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs because it is presumed to be instituted for the benefit
of all BUT if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.

Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his repudiation of the
ownership of the other heirs, the instant petition should be dismissed.
10. LEONOR B. CRUZ,Petitioner, v.TEOFILA M. CATAPANG,Respondent

G.R. No. 164110, 2008 February 12, Quisumbing, L.A. J., (Second Division)

Co-owners cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-
ownership.

Petitioners Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of aparcel of land covering an
area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas. Sometime in 1992,
Teofila Catapang, with the consent of NormaMaligaya as one of the aforementioned co-owners, built a
house on a lot adjacent to thesubject parcel of land. The house built by Catapang intruded on a portion
of the co-owned property. In September 1995, Cruz learned about the intrusion and made several
demands for Catapang to demolish and vacate the part of the structure encroaching upon their
property. However, Catapang refused and disregarded the demands of Cruz.Cruz then filed a complaint
for forcible entry against Catapang before the MCTC of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of
Cruz, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to justify defendants
construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in question. On appeal, the RTC
affirmed the decision of the MCTC. Catapang filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the RTCs decision and ruled in favor of her. The Court of Appeals held that there is no cause of
action for forcible entry in this case because respondents entry into the property, considering the
consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through strategy or
stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry. Thus, the case went to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the consent given by one of the co-owners is sufficient to warrant the dismissal of a
complaint for forcible entry.

DECISION:

No, Co-owners cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-
ownership. In this case, the act of Norma Maligaya is tantamount to devoting the property to her
exclusive use. Under Article 491 of the Civil Code, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of
the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. The Court ruled that it would necessarily
follow that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly give consent
to the making of an alteration by another person, such as Catapang in this case, in the thing owned in
common. In addition, Article 486 of the same Code states each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way
as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according
to their rights. The Court ruled that, to give consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-
owned property would be to injure the interest of the co-ownership and would prevent other co-owners
from using the property in accordance with their rights. In this case, the consent of only one co-owner ill
not warrants the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the respondent Catapang. The
consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of her other co-owners did not grant
Catapang any right to enter and even build upon the co-owned property. According to the Supreme
Court, the respondent Catapangs act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma
Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a
strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property.

As such, respondents acts constitute forcible entry.

The petition was GRANTED.

11. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v CA G.R. No. 124699 July 31, 2003

FACTS:

The respondents in this case were the heirs of Magdaleno Valdez Sr., who purchased an unregistered
parcel of land located in Cebu from Feliciana Santillan (seller). The land was possessed by decedent who
had also paid taxes thereon. The heirs subsequently inherited the land. However, a sugar company,
Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. was able to obtain title to Lot No. 954, the narrow lot where the railroad
tracks (existent even prior to the sale to decedent) lay. The lot was likewise declared for tax purposes
under the name of the company. The heirs filed a complaint for Compensation and/or Recovery of
Possession of the lot claiming that Bomedco was granted by the seller of the lot a railroad right of way
for a period of 30 years which had expired sometime in 1959 but that the heirs allowed Bomedco to
continue using the land because one of them was then an employee of the company. Bomedco, on the
other hand, claimed that it was the owner and possessor of the registered lot when it bought the lot
from seller in 1929 and that the heirs were already barred by prescription and laches because of

Bomedcos open and continuous possession of the property for more than

50 years. The trial court rejected the evidence presented by Bomedco (as it was only a Xerox copy of an
unsigned deed of Sale) but ruled that Bomedco had already acquired ownership of the property through
acquisitive prescription because it possessed the property in good faith for more than10 years. This was
reversed by the Court of Appeals which ruled that Bomedco only acquired an easement of right of way
by unopposed and continuous use of the land, but not ownership.

ISSUE:

1) whether Bomedco had indeed acquired ownership of the land throughextraordinary acquisitive
prescription?

2) Whether easement was continuous and thus Bomedco hadacquired title over the use of the land?

RATIO/HELD:

1. No. Bomedco only had a right of easement over the land as shown bytax receipts wherein it declared,
for several years, the property to be acentral railroad right of way or sugar railroad right of way
when it could have declared it to be industrial land as it did for the years 1975 and 1985. Instead of
indicating ownership of the lot, these receipts showed that all petitioners had been possession by virtue
of the right of way granted to it. X x x A person cannot have an easement on his own land, since all of
the uses of an easement are fully comprehended in his general right of ownership.

An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of another,
by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do something on his
property, for the benefit of another thing or person. It exists only when the servient and dominant
estates belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on
the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission
that the property belongs to another.

Having held the property by virtue of an easement, Bomedco cannot now assert that its occupancy
since 1929 was in the concept of an owner. Neither can it declare that the 30- year period of
extraordinary prescription started from that year. Moreover, the mere expiration of the period of
easement in 1959 did not convert petitioners possession into an adverse one. Mere material possession
of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such
possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner.

2. An easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of
man, like the easement of drainage and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the
act of man, like the easement of right of way.

x x x an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because the right is exercised only if
and when a train operated by a person passes over anothers property.

A party is deemed to acquire title over the use of the land if:

a) It had subsequently entered into a contractual right of way with the heirs for the continued use of the
land under the principles of voluntary easements, or

b) it had filed a case against the heirs for conferment on it of a legal easement of right of way (see orig
case for the requirements)The point is, bomedco did not exercise any of the abovementioned options in
order for it to acquire title over the railroad right of way.