14th Meeting Case Digest

PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAWS Notes & Digest
RAMON L. LABO, Jr. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROBERTO

ORTEGA
PONENTE: BIDIN, J.:
DOCTRINE: One of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be

a citizen of the Philippines.
NATURE: Petition for Certiorari
FACTS: Ramon Labo, Jr., believing that he is a Filipino citizen launched his
candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the 1992 elections. Petitioner Ortega,
on other hand, also filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office.
Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Comelec,
on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein
that he is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Comelec decided in favor
of Ortega.
ISSUE/S: 1) Whether or not Labo is a Filipino citizen and therefore qualified

to run for Mayor; 2) Whether Ortega having the next highest number of votes
is entitled to be proclaimed Mayor upon Labo’s disqualification.
HELD: Petition DISMISSED. 1) No. Labo was disqualified as a candidate for

being an alien. His election does not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for
holding public office.
Labo merely applied for repatriation and such application unless officially
approved does not amount to repatriation. One of the qualifications of an
elective official is that he must be a citizen of the Philippines. The fact that he
was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.
2) No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle

petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to
proclamation as the Mayor. While Ortega may have garnered the second
highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he
was not the choice of the sovereign will. Sound policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676)
Separate Opinions
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: concurring and dissenting

It is my view that since Mayor Labo never validly acquired Australian

citizenship, he never lost his Philippine citizenship. Labo's taking an oath as
citizen of a foreign country was based on his marriage to a citizen of that
country. It turns out, however, that Labo's marriage was bigamous and void
because his Australian wife had an existing valid marriage when she tied the
knot with him. Not being married to her, Labo could not become an
Australian. Not being qualified to become an Australian citizen, his oath of
allegiance to that country was meaningless act. It should not deprive him of
his Philippine citizenship. I cannot believe that Mayor Labo gave up his
citizenship in order to acquire a stateless status.
In deciding cases involving citizenship, the presumptions should be in favor of

its retention and against its loss. We apply this principle to cases involving
civil liberties. We should also apply it to a sincere invocation of Philippine
citizenship. We should not lightly strip a person of his natural born status but
should accord to him every possible interpretation consistent with the
exercise of a right that was vested in him from birth.
In view of the foregoing, the PETITION is GRANTED.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

CIRILO ROY MONTEJO
PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.:
DOCTRINE: Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a

given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary
or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
FACTS: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the

position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for
the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. He contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the
evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy.
Mrs. Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing

the entry "seven" months to "since childhood", however, the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Leyte informed her that the deadline for the filing of
the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. COMELEC sustained
Montejo.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of

the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the elections
HELD: Yes. COMELEC Resolution is SET ASIDE. Residence means domicile in

election laws. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to
his or her disqualification. Mrs. Marcos merely committed an honest mistake
in her certificate of candidacy. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of
a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
The facts clearly established that Mrs. Marcos never abandoned her domicile.
Separate Opinion
PONENTE: PUNO, J., concurring:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban,

Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in
Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school
and thereafter worked there.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile
became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court
may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad
unless in the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage

to former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban
domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause
her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave
the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the
right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in
which case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged.
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on
September 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on petitioner's Batac
domicile. In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should
continue clinging to the anachronistic common law that demeans women,
especially married women.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is

fixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is
properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode,
or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present
intention of making it his permanent home. It is classified into domicile of
origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicile
of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or
of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth.
The records clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional
one-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the
Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the PCGG which
sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her
necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila.
In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of
candidacy her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she
went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate 2 and resided
with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until
August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her
sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It was in the same
month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her previous
registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995.
From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning
period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for
the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The
fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner
transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan,
Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of
1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It appearing that both
Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of
Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in the
constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily
complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no
longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was
before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but
exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In
returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of
which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated
by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to
her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile
in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or

not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words,
the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in all
situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And
this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with
the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in
Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum
period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is,
domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The
first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the
second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio
motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,
3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the
domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile
by operation of law subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by

operation of law, not only international or American but of our own
enactment, she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos
Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as
a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952
(sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile
at the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were
no indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin.
Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the
provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her
legal domicile automatically reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis
supplied).
Mrs. Marcos having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954
and not having automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot
legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is a
part continued since her birth up to the present.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either
Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law
sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later,
President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that
domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own
intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that
of the wife arising from marriage. Under the governing law then, Article 110
of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile
of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows:
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the

death of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the
legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by
law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's
death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last
domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change. Or, on the death
of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived,
but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at
the time of his death. Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin
but her power to acquire her own domicile.
ANTONIO BENGSON III v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ
PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.:
DOCTRINE: There are two ways of acquiring Filipino citizenship :By birth –
natural born citizens; Naturalization – Naturalized citizens (those who become
Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under the Commonwealth
Act no. 473. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Filipino citizens who
have lost their citizenship may reacquire it by naturalization, repatriation or
by direct act of Congress.
FACTS: Teodoro Cruz was born a Filipino in Tarlac on April 27, 1960. On
November 5, 1985 he enlisted in the US Marine Corps without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines. He took an oath of allegiance to the US and
as a consequence he lost his Filipino Citizenship because under the

Commonwealth Act no. 63 a Filipino may lose his citizenship by rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
Any doubts as to his citizenship at the time was settled by his naturalization
as a US citizen on June 5, 1990.May 17, 1994 he reacquired his citizenship
through repatriation under RA 2630.
In the 1995 local elections, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor
declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. Thereafter, Cruz ran for
Congress, this time declaring himself as natural-born. He was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in 1998 and his
opponent was Bengson.
Bengson filed a case Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with HRET claiming Cruz,
not being a natural-born citizen by the contention that Article IV, Sec 2 of the
Constitution defines natural-born citizens as “citizens from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship, was not
eligible to be member of the House.
Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretation of the phrase

“from birth” in Art IV, Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner argues that
“from birth” means starting from a definite point and must be continuous,
constant and without interruption.
Respondent contends that “from birth” refers to the innate, inherent and
inborn characteristic of being a “natural-born.”
ISSUE/S: 1) Whether Cruz, a natural born Filipino who became an American

citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship via Repatriation, so that he is qualified to be a member
of the House of Representatives; 2) Whether the HRET committed serious
error and grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
ruling in favor of Cruz as natural-born citizen
HELD: 1) YES. Cruz is a natural-born citizen and is therefore qualified to be a

member of the House of Representatives. There are two ways of acquiring
Filipino citizenship :By birth – natural born citizens; Naturalization –
Naturalized citizens (those who become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under the Commonwealth Act no. 473. To be
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. Filipino citizens who have lost their
citizenship may reacquire it by naturalization, repatriation or by direct act of
Congress.
a. Naturalization – mode for acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine

citizenship.
b. Repatriation – available for those who have lost their citizenship due
to desertion of the armed forces, service in the armed forces of the
allied forces in WWII, service in the armed forces of the US at any other
time, marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien, and political and

economic necessity.
Cruz recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen because of his

repatriation.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation

simply consists of taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said
oath with the Local Civil Registry
The 1987 Constitution does not provide a separate category for persons who
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquires it because they
are either natural born or naturalized depending on the reason for the loss of
their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for
reacquisition.
Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in

order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
2) NO. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the “sole
judge” of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House. Court’s jurisdiction is merely to check WON there has
been grave abuse; absent such showing, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power.
Separate Opinion:
PONENTE: Sandoval-Gutierrez
Natural-born citizens are so by virtue of birth without performing any acts.

To repatriate, Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again become
a Filipino citizen. Therefore, he does not reacquire natural-born citizenship.
The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the
requirement of being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified
over the years, more stringent; and the decision of HRET in the case at bar
reverses the historical trend and clear intendment of the Constitution, a
matter which can only be accomplished through constitutional amendment;
clearly, HRET has acted with grave abuse of discretion.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO v. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.:
DOCTRINE: Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be

subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
FACTS: Both Mercado and Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the
City of Makati in 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III.
Manzano got the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was
suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain
Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not an alien. COMELEC 2nd
Division granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen
and, under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. COMELEC
en banc reversed the 2nd Division.
ISSUE/S: Whether under our laws, Manzano is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.
HELD: No. In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the

Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin

even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A.
No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring
to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
Manzano by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino

citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country;
that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear
true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines,

when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR.
PONENTE: FRANCISCO, J.:
DOCTRINE: The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And
obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment
when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted
indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
FACTS: Rodriguez and Marquez both ran for the gubernatorial post of
Quezon Province in the 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed
duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory Marquez
alleged that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his
disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code
(R.A. 7160). COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s petition.
In the 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the
same position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez'
candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based
principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice."
This time the COMELEC sustained Marquez. At any rate, Rodriguez again
emerge as the victorious candidate in the which prompted Marquez to file
urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation which the COMELEC
granted. Nonetheless the Provincial Board of Canvassers still proceeded with
the proclamation.
The Court ordered COMELEC to designate a Commissioner or a ranking

official of the COMELEC to receive and evaluate such legally admissible
evidence as Rodriguez may be minded to present to establish petitioner's
contention that he does not fall within the legal concept of a "fugitive from
justice.” In its report entitled "'EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S
EVALUATION" it declared that Rodriguez NOT a "fugitive from justice" as
defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-
degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated Resolution. In arriving
at this new conclusion, the COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material
element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent
in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived
in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was
instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).
ISSUE/S: Whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice", the determination of

which, as we have directed the COMELEC on two (2) occasions (in the
MARQUEZ Decision and in the Court's October 24, 1995 Resolution), must
conform to how such term has been defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ
Decision.
HELD: No. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And
obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment
when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted
indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Rodriguez' case just
cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines
from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of
Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June 26 of 1995, 4 preceded the filing of
the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of
the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by
almost five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known
about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as
there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction —
to speak of yet at such time. The very essence of being a "fugitive from
justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found
in the circumstances of Rodriguez.
JUAN G. FRIVALDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.:
DOCTRINE: The citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to

be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been
elected.
NATURE: Special civil action for certiorari and preliminary injunction
FACTS: Lee sought the disqualification of Frivaldo to run for governor of

Sorsogon for being an alien. When Frivaldo got the highest number of votes,
Lee asked the COMELEC to proclaim him instead of Frivaldo since he got the
next highest number of votes. Accordingly, Lee was proclaimed
Frivaldo alleged that he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the

Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed
with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted". As such, when COMELEC order was released and received by
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more
legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the
alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,
the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of governor.
ISSUE/S: 1) Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it
seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and
to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so,
from when? 2) Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of
Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or
hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
HELD: 1) Yes. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must
consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective

public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other
than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another
nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very
day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials)
began -- he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold
such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities
thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already
qualified to govern his native Sorsogon.
The repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his

application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled
exceptions 40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or
REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also
provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. It
provides a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born
Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725
such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and
cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they
could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified
procedure of repatriation.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo
deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects
there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his
repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent
prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect,
and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of
applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who
may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American
citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This
should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it
is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to
prevail.
Any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be

deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated --
i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous
registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.
2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot

govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of
the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government

Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he
is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been
elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the
present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at
any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly
granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or
curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political
status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of
having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his
means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given
retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the
pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality.
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino
citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have
been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of
citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The
foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the
citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run
for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous
rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and
decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN

and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PONENTE: BELLOSILLO, J.:
DOCTRINE: The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies

that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the
succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or
appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but
until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision
is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if
there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present
incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even
though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
NATURE: Review of Sandiganbayan Decision
FACTS: Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal
complaints against Lecaroz father and son arising from the refusal of the two
officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative.
Lecaroz father and son, were convicted by the Sandiganbayan of 13 counts of
estafa through falsification of public documents. They now seek a review of
their conviction as they insist on their innocence.
ISSUES: 1) WON Red had validly and effectively assumed the office of KB
Federation President by virtue of his oath taken before then Assemblywoman
Reyes; 2) WON the tenure of accused Lenlie as president of the KB and his
coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB had accordingly
expired; If yes - WON Lenlie could no longer occupy the office despite the
vacancy therein, in a holdover capacity; 3) WON under Sec. 2 of the Freedom
Constitution and pursuant to the provisions of the pertinent Ministry of
Interior and Local Governments (MILG) interpretative circulars, accused Lenlie
was legally entitled and even mandated to continue in office in a holdover
capacity; if not – WON accused Lenlie acted in good faith and committed
merely an error of judgment, without malice and criminal intent; 4) WON the
accused had committed the crime of falsification within the contemplation of
Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and in not holding that the crime of
estafa of which they had been convicted required criminal intent and malice
as essential elements
HELD: Petition is meritorious. 1) NO. Red had not validly and effectively
assumed the office of KB Federation President by virtue of his oath taken
before then Assemblywoman Reyes on 27 September 1985. Under the
provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, members of the then
Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths. It was only
after the effectivity of RA No. 6733 that members of both Houses of Congress
were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer oaths.
Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Red before a
member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer
oaths, was invalid and amounted to no oath at all.
2) The tenure of accused Lenlie as president of the KB and his coterminous

term of office as KB representative to the SB had expired. However, Lenlie
could occupy the office as president of the KB and his coterminous term of
office as KB representative to the SB in a holdover capacity. The concept of
holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed
term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually
provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall
remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been
elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not
become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor
elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over
until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the
term fixed by law. It is thus clear in the present case that since Red never
qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie remained KB representative to the
Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de jure
officer, or at least a de facto officer entitled to receive the salaries and all the
emoluments appertaining to the position.
3) The pertinent provisions of the Freedom Constitution and the

implementing MILG Circulars confirmed the right of incumbent KB Federation
Presidents to hold and maintain their positions until duly replaced either by
the President herself or by the Interior Ministry.
4) Prudence and good faith impelled Mayor Lecaroz to take the necessary
steps to verify the legitimacy of Red's appointment to the Sanggunian.
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR

SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR
GUMANGAN CALILUNG v. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in
his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice
PONENTE: QUISUMBING, J.:
DOCTRINE: RA No. 9225 is constitutional. It does not recognize dual

allegiance.
NATURE: Original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure.
FACTS: Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then

Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement
laws governing citizenship. It seeks to enjoin respondent from implementing
RA NO. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens
Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose
Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." It

contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." The said law
provides for the loss of Philippine citizenship upon acquisition of foreign
citizenship; the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance; derivative citizenship; and the corresponding civil and political
rights and liabilities of those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship
under the Act. Pertinently, the Act provides under Section 5 on Civil and
Political Rights and Liabilities:
xxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce
their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
xxx
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
xxx
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional because Section
2 and 3 of the act taken together allows dual allegiance and not dual citizen
HELD: RA No. 9225 is constitutional. Excerpts of the legislative record, it is

clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is: To do
away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries; To allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country.
The Court also held what the RA No. 9225 does not recognize dual allegiance.
By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
renounces his foreign citizenship.
Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of
dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or
not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens
to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a

policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact
the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the
framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status
of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization.
Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it
would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule
on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. Neither can we subscribe to the
proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado v.
Manzano had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance.
That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but
merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
DELA CRUZ v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
PONENTE: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J:
DOCTRINE: While petitioners are not among those officers mandated by law
to sit as members of the NHA Board, they are “alternates” of the said
officers, “whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principals”.
NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC
FACTS: On Feb. 22, 1991 in SC declared EO 284 unconstitutional insofar as it

allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants, to hold other offices,
in addition to their primary offices and to receive compensation.
COA issued Memorandum 97-038 directing all unit heads/ auditors/ team
leaders of the national government agencies and GOCCs which have effected
payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet
secretaries, their deputies and assistants, and their representatives in
violation of the rule on multiple positions to: a)Immediately cause
disallowance of such additional compensation or remuneration given to and
received by the concerned officials; b)Effect the refund of the same from
February 22, 1991 until the present.
Accordingly, NHA Resident Auditor Salvador J. Vasquez issued Notice of

Disallowance No. 97-011-061 disallowing in audit the payment of
representation allowances and per diems of “Cabinet members who were the
ex-officio members of the NHA BOD and//or their respective alternates who
actually received the payments.”
NHA Board of Directors from 1991-1996, appealed the notice of disallowance,

grounds:
1.) The prohibition against multiple positions does not apply to appointive
officials
2.) NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Asst. Secretaries
COA denied their appeal, because petitioners were holding the position as
representatives of cabinet members who are constitutionally prohibited from
holding any other office during their tenure.
ISSUE/S:
HELD: COA AFFIRMED. “P.D. 757 Creating the National Housing Authority
Section 7. BOD – The authority shall be governed by a BOD, which shall be

composed of:
1.) The Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication,

2.) the Director-General of NEDA,
3.) the Secretary of Finance,
4.) the Secretary of Labor,
5.) The Secretary of Industry,
6.) The Executive Secretary,
7.) The General Manager of the Authority.
From among these members, the President will appoint a chairman.
The members of the Board may have their respective alternates who shall be
the officials next in rank to them and whose acts shall be considered the acts
of their principals with the right to receive their benefit: Provided, that in the
absence of the Chairman, the Board shall elect a temporary presiding officer,
xxx.”
ABETO V. GARCESA
PONENTE: Davide, Jr, J.:
DOCTRINE: Justification of helping the poor and the downtrodden does not
absolve a public officer from administrative liability for the violation of
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
NATURE: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the SC. Malfeasance in Office.
FACTS: Manuel Garcesa, stenographic reporter, RTC, Bacolod, is charged

with misrepresenting himself as full – fledged lawyer, and giving assistance in
the filing and prosecution of some labor cases.
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) dismissed the charges, informing Garcesa

of the Revised Civil Service Rule and SC Memorandum Circular No. 5
prohibiting government employees from engaging in any private business,

vocation or profession without permit from the Court.
Upon re-evaluation, DCA recommended reprimand for engaging in a limited

law practice.
ISSU/S: Whether Garcesa is liable for unauthorized practice of law.
HELD: He could not be liable for unauthorized practice of law for there is no
convincing evidence that he misrepresented himself as a lawyer.
However, he is guilty for “moonlighting,” as “representative” in those cases,

which amounts to malfeasance in office.
Manuel Garcesa is REPRIMANDED with warning that commission of similar

acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
RABE V. FLORES
PER CURIAM
DOCTRINE: The requirement for public officers, in general, to divest

themselves of business interests upon assumption of a public office is
prompted by the need to avoid conflict of interests, and in the absence of
any showing that a business interest will result in a conflict of interest,
divestment of the same is unnecessary.
NATURE: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the SC.
FACTS: On August 18, 1995, Narita Rabe, filed an Administrative Complaint

against Delsa M. Flores, Interpreter III, RTC, Panabo, Davao, for: 1) Conduct
Unbecoming of a Government Employee; 2) Acts Prejudicial to the Interest of
the Service; 3)Abuse of Authority
Rabe claimed that Mrs. Flores took advantage of her position by claiming a
stall at the extension of the public market when she is not a member of the
client’s association awarded with the stalls pursuant to the decision of the
court of Oct. 30, 1991.1
Flores also destroyed the stall of 1 client & brought the materials to the
police station.
The RTC absolved Flores but required her to explain:
(a.) why she obtained a certification dated June 18, 1991 issued by Atty.
Victor R. Ginete, Clerk of Court, same court, that she started performing
her duties as [an] interpreter on May 16, 1991 when according to a
certification dated June 17, 1991 issued by Mr. Jose B. Avenido, Municipal
Treasurer, she was employed in the office of the Municipal Assessor
as Assessment Clerk I since February 1, 1990 to June 3, 1991 with her
last salary being paid by said office on June 3, 1991; and
1
In Complainant Rabe's separate affidavit, she made the following allegations:
xxx xxx xxx
That on August 14, 1995 at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Mrs. Delsa Flores, a Court Interpreter at
the Regional Trial Court of Panabo, Davao, went to the stall I occupied and while there, she made several
defamatory utterances against me in a very menacing, arrogant and threatening manner and in the
visayan dialect, as follows: Putang ina mo ka, akoa nin pwesto, wala kay ulaw, wala kay batasan,
mangingilog ug pwesto
That Mrs. Flores attempted to inflict injury upon me by scratching my face but I was able to evade and
with the timely intervention of Mr. Espiridion Vivas;
That Mrs. Flores made the foregoing remarks and other remarks of the same import for several times in a
very loud voice while walking to and fro;
That Mrs. Flores challenged me to a fist fight and destroyed the stall I occupied by removing the wooden
fence and the GI sheets with the help of her husband; loaded the materials on a motor vehicle and brought
them to the police station of Panabo;
That Mrs. Flores committed the aforementioned acts during office hours and in such conduct unbecoming
a government employee;
xxx xxx xxx

(b.) she took her oath of office before Judge Mariano C. Tupas only on June
17, 1991, why she did not report said business interest in her sworn
statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, Disclosure of Business
Interests and Financial Connections, and Identification of Relatives in the
Government Service for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994;
(c.) why she has not divested herself of her interest in said business within
sixty [60] days from her assumption into office; and
(d.) why she has indicated in her DTR's for August 1995 that she worked
on August 15-18, 21, 23-25 and 28-31 and for September, 1995 that she
worked for all its twenty one [21] working days when her Contract of
Lease with the Municipal Government of Panabo for the market stall in its
Section 7 clearly states that she has to personally conduct her business
and be present at the stall otherwise the same would be canceled as per
its Section 13.
Her explanation:
(a.) That she has really been reporting to the court even earlier in order to
familiarize herself with her duties, and assumed office on May 16, 1991 in
compliance with Court Directive.
She admits that she had received from the municipality (LGU) a salary
despite her transfer to the judiciary.
She claims that she intended to refund the amount, but the salary from the
SC was 3-4 months delayed.
(1.) alleges that the certification of Municipal Treasurer is inaccurate

because it was on January 25, 1990 that she was appointed as
Assessment Clerk I.
(2.) She allegedly took her oath on June 17, 1991, simply because it was
on that date that she received a copy of her oath form.
(b.) She claims that she "was never engaged in business during said period
although I had a stall in the market."
(c.) She alleges that her contract of lease with the Municipal Government
of Panabo was never implemented as it became the subject of a law suit.
(d.) She avers that her Daily Time Record indicated that she held office on
those dates because she did.
The Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
OCA found Flores guilty of:

1. dishonesty and
2. failure to report her business interest, and recommended that the penalty
of dismissal be imposed on her.
ISSUE: Whether Flores should be dismissed?
HELD: Yes. The Court finds that the report and recommendation of the OCA
is in accord with the evidence and the law.
We hold the explanation of respondent unsatisfactory. Respondent's

misconduct is evident from the records.
(a.) Respondent's conduct is plain dishonesty.
She knew that she was no longer entitled to a salary from the municipal
government, but she took it just the same. She returned the amount only
upon receipt of the Court Resolution dated January 17, 1996, or more than
five [5] years later.
She failed to explain why she was certified to be connected with the
Municipal Government, notwithstanding her assumption of office in the RTC
To the mind of the Court, respondent's inability to explain this discrepancy is

consistent with her failure to satisfactorily explain why she knowingly
received and kept a salary she was not entitled to.
Worse, it may be indicative of a conscious design to hold two positions at the

same time.
Her overriding need for money from the municipal government, aggravated
by the alleged delay in the processing of her initial salary from the Court,
does not justify receipt of a salary not due her.
In Macario Flores vs. Nonilon Caniya, Deputy Sheriff, RTC, Imus, Cavite, this
Court ruled that a sheriff who failed to issue an official receipt for the money
entrusted to him for the purpose of satisfying a judgment debt, "had really
wanted to misappropriate the said amount."
Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Personnel in the judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner as to

be beyond reproach and suspicion, and free from any appearance of
impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their
official duties but also in their everyday life.
Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E. O. No. 292:

Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, the
penalty for dishonesty is dismissal, even for the first offense.
Accordingly, for respondent's dishonesty in receiving and keeping what she

was not lawfully entitled to, this Court has the duty to impose on her the
penalty prescribed by law: dismissal.
(b.) Flores is also guilty of failure to perform her legal obligation to disclose
her business interests.
She admitted that she "had a stall in the market."
OCA found that she had been receiving rental payments from one Rodolfo
Luay (no business permit) for the use of the market stall.
Republic Act No. 6713, Section 8 provides that it is the "obligation" of an

employee to submit a sworn statement, as the "public has a right to know"
the employee's assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business
interest. Such non-disclosure is punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
five [5] years, or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand [P5,000.00] Pesos, or
both. But even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against the offender,
the offender can be dismissed from the service if the violation is proven.
(c.) She has not divested herself of her interest in said business within
sixty [60] days from her assumption into office.
The penalty for non-disclosure of business interests and non-divestment is

the same.
We do not find her administratively liable, however, for failure to divest

herself of the said interest.
The requirement for public officers, in general, to divest themselves of

business interests upon assumption of a public office is prompted by the
need to avoid conflict of interests.2
In the absence of any showing that a business interest will result in a conflict
of interest, divestment of the same is unnecessary. In the present case, it
seems a bit far-fetched to imagine that there is a conflict of interest because
an Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court has a stall in the market.
A court, generally, is not engaged in the regulation of public market, nor does
it concern itself with the activities thereof.
While respondent may not be compelled to divest herself of her business

interest, she had the legal obligation of divulging it.
2
Section 9 of R. A. 6713 provides: "A public official or employees shall avoid conflicts of interest at all
times. When a conflict of interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any private business enterprise
within thirty [30] days from his assumption of office and or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest
within sixty [60] days from such assumption."
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC. V. ELMA
PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.:
DOCTRINE: Public officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary,

Undersecretary , or Assistant Secretary are not covered by the constitutional
prohibition , nor is the Solicitor General affected thereby.
NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC. Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus.
FACTS: On 30 October 1998, respondent Elma was appointed and took his
oath of office as Chairman of the PCGG. Thereafter, on 11 January 1999,
during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, respondent Elma was appointed CPLC.
He took his oath of office as CPLC the following day, but he waived any
remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
Petitioners, citing the case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

alleged that respondent Elma’s concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman
and CPLC contravenes Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-
B of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners also maintained that respondent Elma
was holding incompatible offices.
Relying on the Resolution of the same case, respondents allege that:
a) the strict prohibition against holding multiple positions provided under

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies only to heads of
executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it
does not cover other public officials given the rank of Secretary,
Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary;
b) it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should be

applied in their case.
This provision, according to the respondents, would allow a public officer to

hold multiple positions if
(1) the law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and
(2) the primary functions of either position allows such concurrent

appointment;
c) since there exists a close relation between the two positions and there is
no incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position
would allow respondent Elma’s concurrent appointments to both positions;
and
d) the appointment of the CPLC among incumbent public officials is an

accepted practice.
In 2001, the appointees of former President Joseph Estrada were replaced by

the appointees of the incumbent president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
ISSUE/S: 1) WON Respondent Magdangal B. Elma’s concurrent appointments

as PCGG Chairman and CPLC is unconstitutional for being the violative of the
proscription against multiple offices imposed by Section 13, Article VII and
Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution; 2) Who are deemed
covered by the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution?
HELD: 1) YES. In harmonizing Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2,
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the Court held in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary that
(a) all elective and appointive public officials and employees are allowed to
hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when
such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions (Section
7, Article IX-B); but
(b) the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution
itself (Section 13, Article VII).
Test in determining WON incompatibility exists between two offices: WON

one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the
right to interfere with the other (People v. Green)
Definition/Requisites of Incompatibility: Incompatibility between two offices,

is an inconsistency in the functions of the two.
The force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from the nature
and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to be held by
the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in
the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of
one, toward the incumbent of the other.
What is not incompatibile: Where one office is not subordinate to the other,
nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent and
repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law declares that
the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other.
Here, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG

Chairman and the CPLC.
The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice
on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies
and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments and
agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees.
The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive Department.
Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the
CPLC. In such cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be raised.
This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition
against holding incompatible offices.
2) The persons cited in the constitutional provision are the “Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.”
These terms must be given their common and general acceptation as

referring to the heads of the executive departments, their undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries. Public officials given the rank equivalent to a
Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary are not covered by the
prohibition, nor is the Solicitor General affected thereby.
The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a
secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may
have the same rank as the latter positions. However, despite the non-
applicability of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
respondent Elma, he remains covered by the general prohibition
under Section 7, Article IX-B and his appointments must still comply
with the standard of compatibility of officers laid down therein;
failing which, his appointments are hereby pronounced in violation
of the Constitution.
As held in Civil Liberties, there are only two exceptions to the rule
against multiple offices:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or
(2) posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of said officials’ office.
Further qualification to the exceptions: Additional duties must not only

be closely related to, but must be required by the official’s primary functions.
Moreover, the additional post must be exercised in an ex-officio capacity,
which “denotes an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of
office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by
the office.” It will not suffice that no additional compensation.
DEBULGADO V. CSC
PONENTE: Feliciano, J.:
DOCTRINE: A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure.
NATURE: PETITION for certiorari to review an order of the CSC.

FACTS: Victoria, a career service officer of 32 years was promoted by her

husband, the Mayor Debulgado as General Service Officer on Oct. 1, 1982.
CSC revoked the appointment on the ground of nepotism.
ISSUE/S: Whether a promotional appointment is covered by the prohibition

against nepotism?
HELD: Yes. CSC had authority & duty to revoke the approved appointment.
All appointments include “promotional” not just “original”.
EO 292 Revised Administrative Code of 1987

Book V.
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. – The State shall insure and promote the
Constitutional mandate that appointments in the Civil Service shall be made
only according to merit and fitness; xxx.
Section 59. Nepotism.

(2) The ff are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism:
a.) persons employed in a confidential capacity;

b.) teachers;
c.) physicians; and
d.) members of the AFP:
Provided, however, that in each particular instance full report of such

appointment shall be made to the Commission.
The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable in the case
of a member of any family who, after his or her appointment to any position
in an office or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same office or
bureau, in which event the employment or retention therein of both husband
and wife may be allowed.
(3) In order to give immediate effect to these provisions, cases of previous

appointments which are in contravention t=hereof shall be corrected by
transfer and pending such transfer, no promotion or salary increase shall be
allowed in favor of the relative/s who were appointed in violation of these
provisions.
Omnibus Implementing Rules

Rule XVIII
Section 6. (essentially the same)
Section 9. xxx xxx xxx an appointment may be void from the beginning due
to xxx or because it was issued in violation of law.
The prohibition was cast in comprehensive and unqualified terms. The

exceptions appears to be a closed one.
SC also cited Laurel V. CSC, wherein the confidentially posted brother was
“designated” into the position of Provincial Administrator, which the Court
struck down on ground of nepotism, what cannot be done directly, cannot be
done indirectly.
A void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DACOYCOY
PONENTE: Pardo, J.:
DOCTRINE: The prohibition against nepotism is a comprehensive one.
NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
FACTS: Dacoycoy, Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts

and Trade, Northern Samar was charged with nepotism for the appointments
of his 2 sons: Rito – as driver and Ped – as utility worker.
CSC held him guilty. CA reversed, it was Mr. Daclag who recommended and
appointed Rito and Ped.
ISSUE/S: Whether there was nepotism.
HELD: There was nepotism. To constitute violation of the law, there are 4
situations covered, if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the
3rd degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the ff.:
1.) Appointing authority;
2.) Recommending authority;
3.) Chief of the bureau of office;
4.) Person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee
Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency
of its personnel.
The prohibition against nepotism is a comprehensive one.

PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG MAYNILA V. IAC
PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr, J.:
DOCTRINE: The power to appoint is in essence discretionary, but it should

be exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest
and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the
employees under special laws or valid agreements, and provided further that
such prerogatives are not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive,
vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice or spite.
NATURE: PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the IAC
FACTS: Dr. Hernani Esteban was the Vice President for Academic Affairs of
the Philippine College of Commerce, due to streamlining, his position was
abolished. PLM President Dr. Consuelo Blanco invited him to be ad interim
temporary appointed as Vice-President for Administration on June 28, 1973.
This appointment was renewed to last until June 30, 1975, with the approval
of the Board of Regents. Dr. Esteban was not recommended for permanent
appointment despite his 2 & ½ years of service at PLM.
On August 1, 1975, PLM President appointed him “Ad Interim” as Professor III
and designated him as Director of the Institute of Continuing Education and
Community Service.
On August 7, 1975, PLM President terminated Dr. Esteban’s appointment as

Vice President for Administration effective July 31, 1975.
Civil Service Commission ruled that, the temporary appointment extended to

Dr. Esteban may be terminated at any time with or without cause. However,
upon MFR, CSC reversed and certified Dr. Esteban for appointment under
permanent status. Upon PLM’s MFR, CSC ruled that the certification does not
mean it is ordering PLM to reinstate (more confusing than clarifying) As a de
facto officer, Dr. Esteban was entitled to be paid the salary of that position..
On June 6, 1978, PD 1409 was issued creating the Merits System Board
CSC ruled that the appointment is permanent, because PLM refused and
denied the existence of Board Resolution 485 of the BOR approving the
appointment of Dr. Esteban, and ordered his immediate reinstatement. When
the best evidence of which the case in its nature is susceptible and withholds
it, the fair presumption is that the evidence is withheld for some sinister
motive and that its production would thwart his evil or fraudulent purpose.
RTC reversed, saying that the appointment was invalid, and Dr. Esteban was
merely a de facto officer.
IAC reversed the RTC, and also ordered payment of full back salaries.
ISSUE/S: Whether the appointment of Dr. Esteban is temporary or

permanent?
HELD: Permanent. The confusion is from the term “ad interim”
The term refers to the manner in which the appointments were made, it is
done by the President of PLM in the meantime while the BOR is unable to act.
The list of permanent personnel submitted to CSC by the president of PLM
included Dr. Esteban’s name and was recognized by CSC in its 1 st
indorsement dated April 18, 1975.
The power to appoint is in essence discretionary, but it should be exercised
in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the
purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or valid agreements, and provided further that such prerogatives
are not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton
manner, or out of malice or spite.
LUEGO V. CSC
PONENTE: Cruz, J.:
DOCTRINE: A permanent appointment is protected by the Constitution.
NATURE: Petition to review the resolution of the COMELEC
FACTS: Luego was appointed Administrative Officer II in the Office of the City
Mayor in Cebu City. The appointment was described as "permanent" but the
Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary," subject to the final

action taken in the protest filed by Tuozo and another employee.
The Civil Service Commission later found Tuozo bettter qualified than Luego
and directed that Tuozo replace Luego as Administrative Officer II.
The private respondent was so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the new
mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent
appointment, is now before the court to question that order and the private
respondent's title.
ISSUE/S: Whether the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent

appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the
appointee
HELD: No. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the
kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its
authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in
the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law.
When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was
therefore protected by Constitution.
The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right
to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to
reverse him and call it temporary.
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by

the officer, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law.
If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there
are others better qualified who should have been preferred. Thus, unlike the
Commission on Appointments, the Civil Service Commission is limited only to
the non-discretionary authority of determining whether or not the person
appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law.
This political detachment will be impaired if the security of tenure clause in

the Constitution is emasculated and appointments in the Civil Service are
revoked and changed at will to suit the motivations and even the fancies of
whatever party may be in power.
REGIS V. OSMENA
PONENTE: Davide, Jr., J:
DOCTRINE: Temporary and provisional appointments are not synonymous

with each other.
NATURE: APPEAL from the decision of the CFI Cebu
FACTS: On Jan. 18, 1958 Regis was appointed by Mayor Duterte as “driver,
Motorized Division of the Cebu Police Department” and the CSC approved his
appointment “provisionally”. The requirement that he passed the Civil
Service Exams was met by him. Subsequent Mayor Osmena, Jr. replaced him
with a non-civil service eligible. RTC held that the appointment to Regis was
temporary and can be revoked anytime.
ISSUE/S: WON the Regis can be removed without cause?
HELD: Dismissal was illegal and he should be reinstated, backwages limited

to 5 yrs. Difference of provisional appointment v. temporary appointment
RA 2260 Civil Service Law

Section 24.
(a.) Provisional Appointments. – A provisional appointment may be issued
upon prior authorization of the Commissioner in accordance with the
provisions of the Act and the rules and standards promulgated in
pursuance thereto to a person who has not qualified in an appropriate
examination but who otherwise meets the requirements for appointment
to a regular position in the competitive service, whenever a vacancy
occurs and the filling thereof is necessary in the interest of the service
and there is no appropriate register of eligibles at the time of
appointment.
(b.) Temporary Appointment. – a person may receive a temporary

appointment to a position needed only for a limited period not exceeding
6 months, provided that a preference in filling such position be given to
persons on appropriate eligible lists.
Festejo V. Barreras (1969)

Provisional – certain work be done or functions be performed by a regular
employee, only there is no one with appropriate eligibility, who can be
appointed to do it, hence any other eligible may be appointed to perform
such work or functions in the meanwhile that a suitable eligible does not
qualify for the position.
V.
Temporary – occasional work or job to be done which is expected to be
finished in not more than 6 months
Ata, et. al. V. Namocatcat, et. al. (1972)

Temporary – without definite tenure, dependent upon the pleasure of the
appointing power
A provisional appointment can only be terminated 30 days after the receipt

by the appointing power of a list of eligibles from the CSC.
RA 6040 (1969)
Section 18
All provisional appointments made or appointments approved by the CSC
under Section 24 (c) of RA 2260 prior to the approval o f this act shall
automatically be permanent under the provisions of Section 24 (b) thereof as
amended by this act, subject to the provisions of Section 16 (h) of said Act as
herein amended.
ALCHACOSO V. MACARAIG (WILL SUPRA)
PONENTE: Cruz, J.:
DOCTRINE: A permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who

meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed.
NATURE: Petition for prohibition and mandamus to review the decision of the
Executive Secretary.
FACTS: Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the POEA. In compliance

with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines to "all
Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads,"
and other government officials, he filed a courtesy resignation which was
accepted. Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the
Deputy Administrator as officer-in-charge. However, he protested his
replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office because his
resignation was not voluntary and made under duress.
Jose N. Sarmiento was then appointed Administrator of the POEA. Achacoso is

requesting for the Court to annul the appointment of Sarmiento and to
prohibit the respondents from preventing the petitioner from discharging his
duties as Administrator of the POEA.
He mainly argues that being a member of the Career Service of the Civil
Service, he ought to enjoy security of tenure.
The Solicitor General concedes that while the office of POEA Administrator is
a career executive service position, Achacoso himself is not a career
executive service official.
He offered a certification from the Civil Service Commission to show that the
Achacoso did not possess the necessary qualifications when he was
appointed Administrator of the POEA in 1987.
ISSUE/S: Whether Achacoso was validly terminated as POEA Administrator
HELD: Yes. The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent

a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to
discharge the same pending the selection of a permanent or another
appointee. In these circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by a
method of terminating official relations known in the law of public officers as
expiration of the term. The acting appointee is separated precisely because
his term has expired. Expiration of the term is not covered by the
constitutional provision on security of tenure.
A permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed."
Since the petitioner was not a career executive service eligible at the time of
his appointment, his permanent employment was under the condition that he
"shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service examination
and that he shall not be promoted to a higher rank until he qualifies in such
examination." Not having taken that examination, he could not claim that his
appointment was permanent and guaranteed him security of tenure in his
position.
Achacoso was not able to meet all the qualifications. At best, his
appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it
could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and "at a
moment's notice," conformably to established jurisprudence.
MAROHOMBSAR V. ALONTO
PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr., J.:

DOCTRINE: A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is essentially

temporary and revocable in character and the holder of such appointment
may be removed anytime even without hearing or cause.
NATURE: PETITION to review the order of President of the Mindanao State

University
FACTS: Dr. Emily M. Marohombsar was the Vice-President for External

Studies. She has been a career official for over 27 yrs.
On March 22, 1988, the MSU President Ahmad E. Alonto, Jr. appointed her as
Officer In Charge of the Office of the Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs
(OVCAA) of the MSU Marawi Campus.
On January 2, 1989, the Office of the Vice-President for External Affairs was
merged with the OVCAA.
The Board of Regents of the MSU, on May 16, 1989 approved her
appointment as Acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs, issuing
Resolution No. 59, Series of 1989:
“A. DESIGNATIONS
A.1. Major Designations
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
9.) Special Order No. 10-P, S. 1989 designating Prof. Emily M. Marohombsar
as Acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs, MSU Marawi Campus, with an
honorarium in accordiance with the approved policies of the University,
subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations, effective January 2,
1989 and shall remain in force until revoked or amended by competent
authority.”
The MSU President wanted to transfer Dr. Marohombsar as Vice-President for

Academic Affairs, an administrative position under the his Administrative
Staff.
Dr. Marohombsar refused.
MSU President designated Professor Macacuna Moslem to replace Dr.

Marohombsar, but Professor Moslem did not accept.
On May 28, 1990, the MSU President issued Special Order No. 158-P
designating Professor Corazon Batara as Officer In Charge of the OVCAA.
ISSUE/S: Whether Prof. Marahombsar can be removed from office without

cause?
HELD: No. The intent to make Dr. Marohombsar serve at the pleasure of MSU
president is obvious. Marohombsar shall remain as the lawful occupant in a
permanent capacity until the end of her 3 year term or her tenure is
otherwise lawfully terminated. The maneuvers of the MSU President cannot
be characterized as bona fide.
The MSU President gave an indefinite period of appointment to Dr.

Marohombsar.
Code of Governance of the MSU

Article 4.
Section 40.5
Paragraph
22. Designation of any Dean, Director, or Department Cahirman in acting
capacity or any Officer-in-Charge for any of these positions, for a period of
less than 1 yar, such designation being made without additional
compensation for the position designated except the honorarium attached to
said position; PROVIDED, that the President shall report the designation in the
next regular meeting after which the designation shall be null and void unless
otherwise renewed.
RA 1387, MSU Charter:

Section 6. The BOR shall have the ff. powers and duties, in addition to its
general powers of administration and the exercise of the power of the
corporation;
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
(e) To appoint, on the recommendation of the President of the University,

professor, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University.
The permanent nature of the administrative position is not detracted by the

permanent nature of her appointment as Professor VI.
There is no showing that the interest of the service will be served by forcing
Dr. Marohombsar to accept the appointment under MSU President’s
Administrative Staff.
DECS Secretary Isidro D. Carino opined that MSU president cannot remove
Dr. Marohombsar without approval of the BOR (wala in this case), and the
special order cannot revoke the designation as Acting Vice Chancellor.
The action of the MSU President issuing the assailed SP 158-P to the BOR
after the Court issued a TRO is in contempt of court. Court gave him lighter
penalty of “admonition.”
A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is essentially temporary and

revocable in character and the holder of such appointment may be removed
anytime even without hearing or cause.
However, there are circumstances which rule against the routine or blind
application of the principle.
The essence of an acting appointment is its temporary nature. It is a stop gap

measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until a permanent
appointment is extended or a new appointee is chosen.
The nature of an acting appointment limits not only the claims fo the
appointee to a lengthy tenure but also fenies the authority of the appointing
power.
A public officer appointed in an acting capacity cannot claim that the

appointment shall in time ripen into a permanent one.
However, neither can the appointing power use the principle of temporary
appointments to evadce or avoid the security of tenure primciple in the
Constitution and the Civil Service Law.
The head of an office cannot arbitrarily convert permanent positions to

primarily confidential items so that he can more freely fire or rehire
subordinates at his personal discretion.
An ad interim appointment is one made during the time when the

appointing or confirming body is not in session and there is an existing clear
and present urgency aused by an impending obstruction or paralyzation of
the functions assigned to the office if no immediate appointment is made.
SINON V. CSC
PONENTE: Campos, Jr., J.:
DOCTRINE:
NATURE: PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the CSC
FACTS:
Prior to the reorganization:
• Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF)
Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO) in Region II, Cagayan – Juana Banan
• Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)

Fisheries Extension Specialist (FES) II – Eliseo Sinon
Department of Agriculture (DA) reorganized the MAF with the issuance of EO

116 on Jan. 30, 1987.
The evaluation of employees list prepared by the Placement Committee

excluded Banan.
She filed an appeal with DA Reorganizations Appeals Board (DARAB) for re-
evaluation, the next list (Resolution 97) excluded Sinon.
CSC affirmed the DARAB’s findings.
ISSUE/S: Whether the Committee’s findings are subject to DARAB re-

evaluation.
HELD: Yes. The Placement Committee3’s findings is subject to the re-

evaluation of the DARAB.
The RAB was specially created by the Circular of the Office of the President
and conferred with authority to review appeals and complaints of officials and
employees affected by the reorganization.
The decision of RAB has the imprimatur of the Secretary of that agency and is
controlling in matters of appointment. In fact, the DARAB findings here had
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture’s approval affixed.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. CA
PONENTE: Kapunan, J.:
3
RA 6656
SECTION 6. xxx Placement Committee xxx to assist the appointing authority in the judicious selection ad
placement of personnel xxx
DOCTRINE: A permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary

appointment.
FACTS: Tito Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the Governor of

Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza.
He was promoted Assistant Provincial Warden by Governor Felix Alfelor, Sr.

but he had no civil service eligibility, so he was extended only a temporary
appointment.
When he passed the civil service exams, Governor Alfelor approved the
change in the employment status of Dato, but the CSC did not favorably act
not yet knowing that he passed the civil service exams, subsequently they
affirmed (after the criminal charges were filed), to retroact to 1974.
In 1976, Governor Alfelor suspended Dato after criminal charges were filed
against Dato for conniving and/ or consenting to evasion of sentence of some
detention prisoners who escaped from confinement.
Dato was acquitted of the charges and requested reinstatement and back
wages.
RTC held for Dato. CA Affirmed.
ISSUE/S: Whether Dato was permanent on time of suspension.
HELD: No. The fact that he passed the supervising security guard
examination subsequent to his temporary appointment did not ipso facto
convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one.
What is required is a new appointment, since a permanent appointment is

not a continuation of the temporary appointment. These are 2 distinct acts of
the appointing authority.
GLORIA V. DE GUZMAN
PONENTE: Herossima, Jr., J.:
DOCTRINE: Civil Service eligibility is not the only factor, others:

performance, degree of education, work experience, seniority, whether the
applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the appointing power.
Appointment is discretionary on the part of the appointing power.
NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC. Certiorari.
FACTS: Respondent employees of the Philippine Air Force College of

Aeronotics (PAFCA) were issued only temporary appointments because at the
time of their appointments they lacked the appropriate civil service
eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the necessary qualification standards
of their respective positions.
Cerillo was issued 1 yr temporary assignment as Board Secretary II of PAFCA,

now PSCA. She was relieved as Board Secretary, ground: loss of confidence.
She was subsequently designated as “Coordinator for Extension Services”
RA 7605 converted PAFCA into Philippine State College of Aeronotics (PSCA).
The Officer-In-Charge of PSCA Col. Loleng informed respondents that they

shall be deemed separated upon the the expiration of their temporary
appointments.
Employees filed a case for reinstatement with backwages in the RTC. Judge
De Guzman, Jr. decided in their favor.
ISSUE/S: Whether Cerillo is entitled to reinstatement.
HELD: No. Cerillo is not entitled to reinstatement. Aside from the

appointment is temporary, the position is not provided for in the PSCA
plantilla.
Cerillo’s subsequent passing the civil service exams after the termination of
her employment does not give her the right to compel petitioners to
reappoint her.
Civil Service eligibility is not the only factor, others: performance, degree of
education, work experience, seniority, whether the applicant enjoys the
confidence and trust of the appointing power.
Appointment is discretionary on the part of the appointing power.
MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
PONENTE: Carpio, J.:
DOCTRINE: An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because

it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President
once the appointee has qualified into office.
NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC. Prohibition.
FACTS: On Feb. 2, 1999 COMELEC appointed Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag as

“Acting Director IV” of the Education and Information Department (EID).
The Chairperson renewed the appointment in a “temporary” capacity.

Commissioner Javier renewed again in a “temporary” capacity.
In 2001, PGMA appointed, ad interim, 7 yrs term:

a.) Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman
b.) Borra
c.) Tuason, as COMELEC Commissioners
COA did not act on the appointments.
Benipayo issued a Memorandum reassigning Matibag to the Law Department

and designating Cinco as OIC of the EID.
Commissioner Sadain objected to the reassignment of Matibag. Grounds:

1. Did not consult her;
2. Prohibition on transfer and detail of employees during election period
January 2 – June 13, 2001;
Note: elections May 14, 2001
“Omnibus Election Code

Section 261. Prohibited Acts. – The ff. shall be guilty of an election offense
xxx xxx xxx
(h.) transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. Any public official
who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or
employee in the civil service including public school teachers, within the
election period except upon prior approval of the Commission.”
ISSUE/S: Matibag questions:

1.) the appointments of PGMA,
2.) their reappointments
3.) her reassignment, and
4.) Legality of Disbursements to respondents
HELD: 1.) Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman.
The ad interim appointments to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not constitute

temporary or acting appointments prohibited by
1987 Constitution
ARTICLE IX-C
Section 1.
Paragraph 2
(my comment: di ba revoked na ang appointment nila cuz Congress

adjourned without COA acting on the appointment, several times? Apparently
not kasi long recess due to elections… )
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes

effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office.
The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the COA does not alter its
permanent character.
The Constitution4 itself makes ad interim appointment permanent, making it

effective until:
1.) disapproved by COA or
2.) the next adjournment of Congress, without the COA acting on his
appointment.
4
ARTICLE VII
SECTION 16.
Ad interim appointments take effect at once. Purpose: avoid interruptions in

vital government services that otherwise would result from prolonged
vacancies in government offices, including the 3 constitutional commissions.
2.) The reappointments are valid pursuant to
RULES OF THE COA

Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the
President. – Nominations or Appointments submitted by the President of the
Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of the session of
Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless new nominations or
appointments are made, shall not again be considered by the Commission.
The ad interim appointments in this case are by-passed because the COA
failed to organize and did not decide upon the merits of the appointments.
The president may renew.
What the Constitution prohibits is the reappointment of “disapproved”

appointments.
When there will be “no reappointments” all with confirmation of the COA:
1. when the appointee serves his full 7 year term;
2. when the appointee serves a part of his term, then resigns before his 7
yr term ends;
3. where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of
someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the
unexpired term;
4. where the appointee has previously served a term of less than 7 yrs,
under the truncated term of 5 or 3 years - and a vacancy arises from
death or resignation.
The ad interim appointments are for a fixed term expiring February 2, 2008.
There is no approval by the COA yet.
The reason for the prohibition is to insure that no member of the Commission
will serve for more than 7 years, or for more than his term. (if less than 7
yrs).
3.) The transfer of Matibag is valid.
1st: her appointment was temporary, and can be withdrawn at will by the
appointing authority and “at a moment’s notice”
2nd: she is not a Career Executive Service (CES) Officer, required by the
position of Director IV
3rd: COMELEC en banc via Resolution 3300 approved transfers and

reassignments of personnel by the COMELEC Chairman, the official
authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC Personnel.
4.) Being de jure officers, the salaries are properly paid to them.
ERASMO V. HOME INSURANCE & GUARANTY CORP.
PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J.:
DOCTRINE: A person who is issued a temporary appointment does not enjoy

security of tenure.
FACTS: Erasmo was promoted but issued a temporary appointment as Vice

President of Technical Service / Guaranty and Credit Insurance Group
(TS/GCIG) of the Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation (HIGC).
The appointment was temporary because she lacked the career executive
service eligibility necessary.
She was charged with:

1.) Neglect of duty
2.) Incompetence in the performance of her official duties
3.) Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
4.) Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any
transaction requiring the approval of her office.
She was terminated, even though the charges were dismissed.
CSC resolution: she was not entitled to reinstatement. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S: Whether Erasmo is entitled to reinstatement.
HELD: A person who is issued a temporary appointment does not enjoy

security of tenure.
She cited the Palmera V. CSC case, wherein Palmera accepted a contractual
appointment but had no intention to abandon his permanent position and
security of tenure, having worked for the government for 34 years, was
getting on in years and could not afford to face an uncertain future without a
regular and steady income.
Palmera is not applicable because even though Erasmo formerly held a

permanent appointment, she accepted the temporary appointment with
understanding of the implications, and that she does not have the CES
eligibility required.
PADILLA V. CSC
PONENTE: Corona, J.:
DOCTRINE: Voluntary resignation results in the abdication of all present and

future rights accorded to an employee and in the severance of all work-
related ties between the employer and the employee.
FACTS: Padilla was promoted as Labor Development Assistant in 1983, but

her appointment was disapproved because she failed to meet the eligibility
requirement.
She resigned in 1985, and took the career service examination (professional
level), passed and re-applied. She was given casual positions, and then in
1990 no longer given any.
Note: she refused a permanent position of Clerk II (also her post before
promotion) because she wanted a higher position (like the 1 she lost).
CSC dismissed her claim. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S: Whether DOLE was obliged to give her a permanent position, upon
Padilla’s attainment of the required civil service eligibility.
HELD: Voluntary resignation results in the abdication of all present and

future rights accorded to an employee and in the severance of all work-
related ties between the employer and the employee.
PD 807 Civil Service Law of 1975

Section 24
(d) Any person who has been permanently appointed to a position in the
career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been
separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same level for
which he is qualified.
When she returned to work for DOLE, it was not a continuation of her
previous service, but the start of a new work slate.
Her right to due process was not violated, she was a casual employee aware
of her date of termination.
CIVL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DE LA CRUZ
PONENTE: Corona, J.:
DOCTRINE: Every particular job has:

1. formal – age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars
attended, etc. and
2. informal qualifications – resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy,
initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best interest
of the service.
Even if the law stated “&”,the Court held that he has “substantially complied”
3 yrs & 8mos
FACTS: Saturnino dela Cruz is an employee of DOTC, Air Transportation

Office, he was a Check Pilot II.
He was promoted to the position: Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of

the Aviation Safety Division.
His promotion was assailed by Calamba, saying he did not meet the 4 yr
managerial & supervisory qualification for the position.
CSC-NCR upheld the protest and recalled the approval of the appointment of
Dela Cruz.
Upon appeal of the ATO Director Gilo, CSC reversed itself and approved the
appointment. (decision of the CSC kept changing)
CA approved the appointment. He has the required qualifications “planning,

organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air
safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking
of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools.
HELD: The requirement is 4 yrs of work in managerial position AND/OR

supervisory position.
“or” – either the 1st clause or 2nd clause may be applied.
Dela Cruz had excellent credentials and a “proven excellent performance.”
Every particular job has:

3. formal – age, number of academic units in a certain course, seminars
attended, etc. and
4. informal qualifications – resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy,
initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best interest
of the service.
Even if the law stated “&”,the Court held that he has “substantially complied”
3 yrs & 8mos
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. ENGR. DARANGINA

PONENTE: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.:
DOCTRINE: With the expiration of his term upon his replacement, trhere is
no longer any remaining term to be served.
FACTS: Engineer Darangina was a development management officer V in the

Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA). He was extended a temporary promotional
appointment as Director III, Plans and Policy Services. CSC approved the
temporary appointment.
New OMA Executive Director terminated the appointment, ground: Not Career
Executive Service Eligible.
CSC diaprroved the appointment of the replacement who was also not
eligible, and granted that the Darangina should be paid backwages until the
expiration of his 1 yr temporary appointment.
CA reinstated Darangina.
ISSUE/S: Whether Darangina should be reinstated.
HELD: CA REVERSED. Petition GRANTED. No reinstatement & back wages,

only salary from appointment until termination. With the expiration of his
term upon his replacement, trhere is no longer any remaining term to be
served.
Administrative Code of 1987

Book V Title I Subtitle A Chapter 5
Section 27. Employment Status. – Appointment in the career service shall be

permanent or temporary.
(1) Permanent Status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person
who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with
the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof.
(2) Temporary Appointment. In the absence of eligible persons and it
becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temp
appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements
for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil
service eligibility: Provided, that such temporary appointment shall not
exceed 12 mos., but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified
civil service eligible becomes available.
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA V. SEN. JOVITO R. SALONGA
PONENTE: Padilla, J.:
DOCTRINE: The appointment is made solely by the President without need

of the confirmation (or rejection) by the COA.
FACTS: On August 27, 1987, President Aquino designated Mary Concepcion

Bautista as “Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights.
On Dec. 17, 1988, the President extended to her a permanent appointment,

subject to her submission of her Oath of Office to the CSC & Office of the
President, which she submitted.
The Secretary of COA requested Bautista to submit certain info and

documents required in its rules in connection with the confirmation of her
appointment as Chairman of CHR.
Bautista replied that COA has no jurisdiction to review her appointment,

because the position does not fall under the 1st group, on the 1st sentence of
ART. VII SEC 16.
COA disapproved the ad interim appointment of Atty. Bautista for refusal to

submit to their jurisdiction.
Pending the resolution of the case in the SC, President Aquino appointed
PCHR Commissioner Hesiquio R. Mallillin as “Acting Chairman of the CHR.”
COA contends that the President has the prerogative to voluntarily submit
such appointment to the COA for confirmation, even if not required, which
they claim the President did by extending to Bautista another “ad interim”
appointment on Jan. 14, 1989 and submitting it to COA for confirmation.
ISSUE/S: Whether the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the

Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an “independent office” created by the
1987 Constitution, is to be made with or without the confirmation of the COA.
HELD: Petition GRANTED. Bautista is the duly appointed Chairman of

CHR. The appointment is made solely by the President without need of the
confirmation (or rejection) by the COA. SC cited Sarmiento III V. Mison, on the
4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on

Human Rights fall within the 2nd sentence of ART. VII SEC 16,
or in the 3rd group.
EO 163 (May 5, 1987)

Section 2.
(c) The Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be
appointed by the President for a term of 7yrs without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor.
Marbury V. Madison, C.J. Marshall “Having made the permanent appointment,

the President’s power over the office is terminated in all cases, where by law
the officer is not removable by him.
The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the
absolute, unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it.”
The Mischief in the Contention of COA is the suggestion that the President
may time to time move power boundaries differently from where they are
placed in the Constitution.
Neither the Executive nor the Legislative (COA) can create power where the
consti confers none.
In addition there was no vacancy to which an appointment can be made on

Jan. 14, 1989.
NOTES:
Tenure in Office v. Term of office -
Article XIII
Section 17
(2) the term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members
of the CHR shall be provided by law
Ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the

President to make.
EO 163-A, June 30, 1987, providing that the tenure of the Chairman and
Members of the CHR shall be at the pleasure of the president is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
CHR is an independent body, constitutionalized to be insulated from political

intereference.
Of course Bautista may be removed, but only for cause, with her right to
due process (i. Notice; ii. Hearing) properly safeguarded. (as in NASECO V.
NLRC)
The process to remove Bautista would be to file charges against her with the
Ombudsman.
If the Ombudsman finds a prima facie case against her, the corresponding
information/s can be field with the Sandiganbayan, which may in turn order
her suspension from office while the case/s are pending.
CORPUZ V. CA
PONENTE: Davide, Jr., J.:

DOCTRINE: Where the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee

has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and
the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once.
FACTS: Former Chairman of the MTRCB appointed Atty. Corpuz in July 18,
1986, and others and submitted their appointments to the CSC which was
approved.
Corpuz’s position: Attorney V, Legal Counsel-Prosecutor and Investigation

Services (Supervising Legal Staff Officer).
Subsequently the MTRCB issued Resolution 8-1-91 declaring the

appointments of administrative and subordinate employees by the past and
present Chairmen of the MTRCB null and void for being in violation of
PD 876-A
Section 5
&
PD 1986
Section 165,
which requires that the appointments should be submitted to the Board for
approval prior to its submission to the CSC.
On July 14, 1992 Henrietta S. Mendez became the new MTRCB Chairman and
resolved to recommend to the MTRCB the approval of the appointments,
except of Corpuz and 7 others.
The CSC granted the MTRCB authority to fill up positions vacated due to
appointments not submitted to MTRCB for approval.
However, the CSC also ruled in favor of Corpuz, saying that he has acquired
security of tenure, because the action for revocation or recall should have
been brought to the CSC within a reasonable period of time;
and that the appointments signed by the Chairman of the MTRCB Manuel
Morato (then) are presumed to have been made after complying with all the
legal requirements, including the Board approval, whether express or implied.
CA reversed the CSC ruling in favor of Corpuz.
5
Section 16. Organization Patterns; Personnel. – The Board shall determine its organizational
structure and staffing pattern.
It shall have the power to suspend or dismiss for cause any employee and/ or approve or disapprove the
appointment, transfer or detail of employees.
It shall appoint the Secretary of the Board who shall be the official custodian of the records of the meetings
of the Board and who shall perform such other duties and functions as directed by the Board.
Note: Corpuz is no longer seeking reinstatement, but for continuity of his

government service from the time he was illegally dismissed from the MTRCB
on June 30, 1993 until his permanent employment in the Office of the
Ombudsman on August 22, 1994, plus back salaries & other benefits.
ISSUE/S: Whether Corpuz is entitled to back salaries.
HELD: There are 2 stages in the process of appointing MRTCB personnel,

other than its secretary (whose appointment is by the Board itself alone):
(a.) Recommendation by the Chairman which is accomplished by the signing
of the appointment paper which is among his powers under Section 5 (d)6;
(b.) Approval or disapproval by the MTRCB of the appointment.
It is long settled in the law for public offices and officers that where the power
of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon, no
further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the
appointment, the commission, may issue at once.
Where however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer or body is

required, the commission can issue or the appointment may be complete
only when such assent or confirmation is obtained.
In either case, the appointment becomes complete when the last act required
of the appointing power is performed.
Until the process is completed, the appointee can claim no vested right in the
office nor invoke security of tenure.
The years of service tendered cannot substitute for the want of consent of
another body required by law to complete the appointment.
A pub officer or employee who assumed office under an incomplete

appointment is only a de facto officer for the duration of his occupancy of the
office for the reason that he assumed office under color of a known
appointment which is void by reason of some defect or irregularity in its
exercise.
6
Exercise such other powers and functions and perform such duties as are not specifically lodged in the
BOARD.
SARMIENTO III V. MISON
DOCTRINE: The President shall have the power to make appointments

during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC. Prohibition
FACTS: Taxpayers, lawyers, members if the IBP and professors of

Constitutional law seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from
performing functions of the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs & Guillermo Carague, Secretary of the Department of Budget, from
effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments.
ARTICLE VII – EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose

appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
There are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1 Group: heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution7;
• This group is clearly appointed with the consent of the COA

• Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination,
• And if the nomination is confirmed by the COA,
• The President appoints
ISSUE/S: Whether the President acted within her constitutional authority and
power in appointing Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs,
without submitting his nomination to the COA for confirmation.
HELD: The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without
submitting his nomination to the COA for confirmation.
1. Constitutional and Statutory Construction Rules
2. Historical Background
• In the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required

the consent (confirmation) of the COA
• This power of confirmation transformed the COA, many times into a
venue of “horse-trading” and similar malpractices
• In the 1973 Constitution, the absolute power of appointment was

placed in the President, with hardly any checks
7
“Other officers” are:
1. Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council (ART. VIII, SECTION 8, PAR. 2)
2. Chairman and Commissioners of the CSC (ART IX-B, SECTION 1, PAR. 2)
3. Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC (ART IX-C, SECTION 1, PAR. 2)
4. Chairman and Commissioners of the COA (ART IX-D, SECTION 1, PAR. 2)
5. Members of the Regional Consultative Commission (ART. X, SECTION 18)
 The framers of the 1987 Constitution struck a middle ground by

requiring the consent of the COA for the 1st group and
 Leaving to the President without such confirmation the
appointments of the other officers
3. Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine the intention

of the framers of the 1987 Constitution & of the people adopting it
• In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were 2
major changes proposed and approved:
1.) the removal of the “heads of bureaus” from the requirement of

confirmation by COA;
2.) the exclusion of appointments of positions referring to the 2nd-3rd

groups of appointees, from the requirement of confirmation by the
COA
• 4th group, notice: in the president, “alone”.
• The clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is
that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the 1st
sentence of section 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by
the COA.
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character.
Limitations on or qualifications to such power should be strictly construed

against them.
The President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of

the Bureau of Customs.
PD 34 (Oct. 27, 1972) amended RA 1937 : Tariff and Customs Code of

the Philippines (June 22, 1957)
Section 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau. – The Bureau of Customs shall
have 1 chief and 1 asst. chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner
and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual
compensation in accordance with the rates prescribed by existing laws. The
Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed
by the President of the Philippines.
Even if RA 1937 and PD 34 were made under the 1935 Constitution, they
should now be read in light of the 1987 Constitution.
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ, dissenting:
Argues that the provision must be viewed in its entirety.
There was too much focus on the first sentence of the provision only, and did
not give weight on the following sentences, which is crucial considering that
the position in question here falls under the second sentence.
The records of the Constitutional Commission are merely extrinsic aids and
are at best persuasive only and not conclusive.
Strictly interpreting the third sentence may create an absurdity for it gives
Congress the discretion of not creating a law that would give the President
the power to appoint those who are lower in rank. An absurdity arises when
those in a lower position require the approval of the COA while those who are
higher in position would not.
CALDERON V. CARALE
DOCTRINE: Confirmation by the COA is required only for presidential

appointees mentioned in the 1st sentence of SECTION 16, ART. VII
NATURE: PETITION for prohibition to review the constitutionality and legality

of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Commissioners of
the NLRC
FACTS: In March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law) amended PD 442:

Labor Code (Article 215)
Section 13. xxx

The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the COA.
Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees fo the sector
which nominated the predecessor.
The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by
the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, & shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations.
Pursuant to RA 6715, President Aquino issued permanent appointments to

the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public,
workers and employers sectors.
Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon Issued Administrative Order 161, series of

1989 designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed
commissioners.
ISSUE/S: May Congress, by law, require confirmation by the COA of

presidential appointments to government officers additional to those
expressly mentioned in the 1st sentence of SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII of the
1987 Constitution?
HELD: No. Petition DISMISSED.
To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the COA of the

appointments of the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC, it is
unconstitutional because:
1.) It amends by legislation, the 1st sentence of SEC. 16, ART VII of the Consti
by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the COA;
2.) It amends by legislation, the 2nd sentence of SEC. 16, ART VII of the
Constitution by imposing confirmation by the COA on appointments which
are otherwise entrusted only to the President.
The Court cited cases
Endencia and Jugo V. David (1953), the legislature cannot pass any
declaratory act of what the law was before its passage; cannot validate an
unconstitutional law.
• Congress taxed salaries of judicial officers
• Violative of “non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers”
1. Confirmation by the COA is required only for presidential appointees

mentioned in the 1st sentence of SECTION 16, ART. VII
Like:
Teresita Quintos Deles, et. al. V. The Commission on Constitutional
Commissions, et. al. (1989), - sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives by express provision of Section 8, ART. XVIII of the
Constitution
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other

government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
Like:
Mary Concepcion Bautista V. Salonga – the Chairman and Members of the
Commission of Human Rights (2nd group)
Sarmiento III V. Mison, - the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs

(bureau head) (falls upon 3rd group)
• when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for

appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for
such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. (2nd group)
SEPARATE OPINIONS
GUTIERREZ, JR., concurring:

- Joined Justice Cruz in a dissent in Sarmiento III v. Mison. Reiterated his
dissent in Bautista v. Salonga. Still believes that the majority was wrong in
the Sarmiento and Bautista cases, but thought it was time to finally accept
the majority opinion as the Court's ruling on the matter and one which
everybody should respect. There will be no end to litigation if, everytime a
high government official is appointed without confirmation by the CoA,
another petition is filed with this Court.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Reiterated his dissent in Sarmiento v. Mison, and calling for re-examination,
instead of being automatically re-affirmed simply because of its original
adoption. Does not believe that SC should persist in error on the ground
merely of adherence to judicial precedent, however unsound.
legis interpretado legis vim obtinent – the interpretation placed upon the
writted law by a competent court has the force of law.
DE CASTRO v. JBC
PONENTE: Bersamin, J.:
DOCTRINE: Ban on appointments during elections excludes the

appointments in the judiciary.
NATURE:
FACTS: The legal debate takes its root from the anticipated compulsory
retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. Under the Constitution, the
President is mandated to fill any vacancy in the Supreme Court within ninety
(90) days from its occurrence from the list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for every vacancy.
In view of this forthcoming vacancy, the JBC, on January 18, 2010, meeting en
banc, resolved to commence the nomination process and subsequently
announce the opening for application or recommendation for the position of
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Renato C. Corona,

Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr., and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura were
automatically considered for the position. Others either applied or were
nominated.
The JBC proceeded to the next step by publishing the names of the
candidates in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star. In the said
publications, the public was asked to file their sworn complaints, written
report or opposition, if any, against the candidates not later than February
22. 2010.
The looming vacancy in the highest court of the land became an instant
headline. The issue as to whether the incumbent president may appoint the
next chief justice despite the constitutional ban on appointments two months
before the election elicited conflicting opinions and triggered an intense
debate among legal luminaries. Wary of the possibility of having judiciary
completely beholden to the incumbent, the public had never been more
vigilant.
Prompted by prudence, the JBC opted to defer its decision as to whom to

send its list of nominees. From such prudence, however, sprawled several
petitions to the Supreme Court asking the JBC either to submit its list of
nominees to the current president or to prohibit the Council from continuing
with the selection process and transmitting the names of the candidate to the
ultimate appointing power.
Dealing essentially with the same legal questions, the petitions were
consolidated. The JBC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) were
directed by the Supreme Court to comment.
ISSUE/S:
1) In view of Article VII, Section 15, which prohibits the president from
making appointments two months before the election, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will endanger public service or public safety, may
the incumbent president make appointments to the judiciary, including
that for the position of Chief Justice upon the retirement of incumbent
Chief Justice Reynato Puno, pursuant to Article VIII Section 4(1) of the
constitution?
2) May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the

President?
HELD: 1) Yes. Appointments in the judiciary is not covered by the

appointment ban during elections. 2) No. Despite the clear existence of a
duty on the part of the JBC, as enjoined in the Constitution, the element of
neglect to perform such duty was neither present at the time of the filing nor
at the time of the resolution of the petitions.
1. Constitution was meticulously drafted, styled, and arranged to

give effect to the principle of separation of powers. Placed
under Article VII which is devoted to the Executive branch, the Court
argued that the prohibition on midnight appointments was intended to
apply to executive appointments only. The fact that prohibition was not
mentioned in Article VIII of the constitution reveals that it was not
meant to cover appointments to the Judiciary.
2. Intent of the framers as can be gleaned from the records. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, as quoted in
Valenzuela, do not support the Court’s ruling therein. The records
disclosed the express intent of the framers “to enshrine in the
Constitution a command to the president to fill up any vacancy therein
within 90 days from its occurrence.” The use of the word shall means
that such command is imperative or mandatory. The implication is that
the prohibition in Art VII, Section 15 would not apply to appointments
made in pursuance of such mandate. The non-applicability of the
prohibition was “confirmed by Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it
met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors
about the “constitutionality of xxx appointments” to the Court of
Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections.”
3. The Rationale of Art VII, Section 15 and the Creation of the
Judicial and Bar Council. Citing Valenzuela, the court pointed out
that Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution has a broader
scope than the ruling in Aytona vs Castillo. It contemplates not only
midnight appointments – those made obviously for partisan reasons as
shown by their number and the time of their making – but also
appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the
outcome of the Presidential election.
4. The argument that there will still be 45 days left, of the 90 days
provided in the Constitution, for the succeeding president, upon
assumption of office, to appoint the next chief justice ignores the

need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in
the Supreme Court.”
5. Affirming Valenzuela will undermine “the intent of the
Constitution of ensuring the independence of the judicial
department from the executive and legislative departments”
Should the next chief justice be appointed by the next president,
whoever the latter might appoint might become beholden to him
thereby compromising judicial independence. The same risk, the
ponencia explains, is not present should the incumbent president
appoint the next chief justice. This is precisely because the incumbent
president’s term would have ended by the 30th of June.
6. Contention that there is no need for the President to appoint
the next Chief Justice because the Judiciary Act of 1948 allows
the assumption of an acting Chief Justice is contrary to the
intent of the framers of the present Constitution. The Court
further pointed out the Judiciary Act of 1948 was promulgated under a
different context. At the time of its enactment, the appointment of the
Chief Justice was still subject to the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. The provision allowing an acting Chief Justice to take
over responds to situations where, due to delays in confirmation, the
new chief justice has not yet been appointed.
7. In order for mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be present:
(a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must
be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is
mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the
performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is
ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Dissent
1. Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in

arriving at a constitutional construction. Constitutional
draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving at a constitutional
construction. (Anak Mindanao Party-List Group vs. Executive Secretary)
While it can be conceded that the allocation of the articles in the
Constitution was consciously adopted in recognition of the principle of
separation of powers, Carpio-Morales argued that the equation does
not end there. The present constitution is likewise a system of checks
and balances. “That the power of judicial appointment was lodged in
the President is a recognized measure of limitation on the power of the
judiciary, which measure, however, is counterbalanced by the election
ban due to the need to insulate the judiciary from the political climate
of presidential elections.”
2. The establishment of the JBC is not sufficient to curtail the
evils of midnight appointments in the judiciary. The
comprehensive ban on midnight appointments was drafted precisely
because “the JBC is not enough to safeguard or insulate judicial
appointments from politicization.” Carpio-Morales concluded “that the
second ratiocination in the ponencia could thus not remove an added

constitutional safeguard by pretending to have examined and
concluded that the establishment of the JBC had eliminated all
encompassing forms of political maneuverings during elections.”
3. All rules of statutory construction revolt against the
interpretation arrived at by the ponencia. All rules of statutory
construction revolt against the interpretation arrived at by the
ponencia. The general rule as provided in Article VII, Section 15 is
clear. The exception is likewise clearly stated in the same provision.
“There is no clear circumstance that would indicate that the
enumeration in the exception was not intended to be exclusive. The
fact that Section 15 was couched in negative language reinforces the
exclusivity of the exception.”
4. The 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court is
suspended during the ban on midnight appointments.The ban
on midnight appointments makes it legally impossible for the President
to comply with the mandate of Article VIII, Section 4(1) thereby
releasing her from the obligation. “The 90-day period to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court is deemed suspended during the period
of the ban which takes effect only once in 6 years.”
5. The Supreme Court can function effectively during the
midnight appointments ban without an appointed Chief
Justice. The ponencia’s interpretation of the proviso “Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” as
pertaining only to the period within which the President should appoint
is absurd as it takes the application and nomination stages in isolation
from the whole appointment process. The filling of the vacancy only
involves the President, and the JBC was not considered when the
period was increased from 60 days to 90 days. The sense of the
Concom is the exact opposite. The flaw in the reasoning is made more
evident when the vacancy occurs by virtue of death of a member of
the Court. In that instance, the JBC could never anticipate the
vacancy, and could never submit a list to the President before the 90-
day period. It is “ironic for the ponencia to recognize that the President
may need as much as 90 days of reflection in appointing a member of
the Court, and yet abhor the idea of an acting Chief Justice in the
interregnum as provided for by law, confirmed by tradition, and settled
by jurisprudence to be an internal matter.”
DOMINADOR R. AYTONA v.ANDRES V. CASTILLO
PONENTE: BENGZON, C.J.:
DOCTRINE: Ban on appointments during elections includes appointments in

the judiciary.
FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Carlos P. Garcia, who was still President that
time, made last minute appointments while the Commission on Appointments
was not in session. Said last minute appointment included Dominador R.
Aytona, who was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. The
latter took oath on the same day.
At noon on December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal

assumed office. He issued Administrative Order No. 2 on December 31, 1961
recalling, withdrawing and canceling all ad interim appointments made by
President Garcia after December 13, 1961, which was the date when
Macapagal was proclaimed President by the Congress. He then appointed
Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and the latter
qualified immediately.
On January 2, 1962, both exercised the powers of their office. However,

Aytona was prevented from holding office the following day and thus
instituted a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Castillo’s right to exercise
the powers of the Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims that he was
validly appointed and had qualified for the post, therefore making Castillo’s
appointment void. Castillo then contended that Aytona’s appointment had
already been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President
Macapagal.
ISSUE/S: Whether President Diosdado Macapagal had power to issue the

order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by President
Carlos P. Garcia even after the appointees had already qualified.
HELD: Case Dismissed. Upon the ground of separation of powers, the court
resolved that it must decline and refuse jurisdiction in disregarding the
Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, canceling such “midnight” or “last-
minute” appointments.
In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.

Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional
Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabananatuan
City, respectively.
PONENTE: NARVASA, C.J.:
DOCTRINE: Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of

appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for
partisan considerations.
NATURE:
FACTS: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as were

appointed as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and
of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. Their appointment was
subjected to constitutional question in light of the appointment ban in the

forthcoming presidential elections.
Now, in view of the general prohibition in the first-quoted provision, how is

the requirement of filling in the Court within ninety days to be construed?
One interpretation that immediately suggests itself is that Section 4 (1),
Article VIII is a general provision while Section 15, Article VII is a particular
one; that is to say, normally, when there are no presidential elections —
which after all, occur only every six years — Section 4 (1), Article VIII shall
apply: vacancies in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days; but
when (as now) there are presidential elections, the prohibition in Section 15,
Article VII comes into play: the President shall not make any appointments.
The reason for said prohibition, according to Fr. J. Bernas, S.J., an authority on
Constitutional Law and himself a member of the Constitutional Commission,
is "(i)n order not to tie the hands of the incoming President through midnight
appointments." Another interpretation is that put forth in the Minutes of the
JBC meeting of March 9, 1998.
ISSUE/S: 1) Whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed

by Section 15, Article VII of the, Constitution, the President is nonetheless
required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of
Article VIII. 2) whether he can make appointments to the judiciary during the
period of the ban in the interest of public service.
HELD: Appointments declared void. 1) NO. Article VII of the Constitution —

"(t)wo months immediatey before the next presidential elections and up to
the end his term" — the President is neither required to make appointments
to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII
simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts
within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of
Article VII. It is not noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes
into effect only once every six years.
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those
made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The
first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a
Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared elections
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.: 8
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. — (1) Any person who gives, offer or
promises money or anything of value gives or promises any office or
employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make
an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to
any person, association, corporation, entity, or community in order to induce
anyone or the public in general to vote for or against any candidate or
withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the
nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection
process of a political party.
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or

giving salary increases. — During the period of forty-five days before a
regular election and thirty days before a regular election and thirty days
before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a
government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or
hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or casual, or
creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the
Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is
satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of
the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a
manner that may influence the election.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist
of the so-called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, 9 it was held
that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President,
President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became
no more than a "caretaker" administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the
transfer of authority to the incoming President." Said the Court:
The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to

afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the
need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may
undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night
and the planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the
inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by
the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of
fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration
of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
2) As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to

important positions which have to be made even after the proclamations of a
new President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as
to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the
need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications," 10 can be
made by the outgoing President. Accordingly, several appointments made by
President Garcia, which were shown to have been well considered, were
upheld.
LAPINID V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
PONENTE: CRUZ, J.:
DOCTRINE: Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court

cannot compel.
NATURE:
FACTS: Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the
position of Terminal Supervisor. This appointment was protested by Junsay,
who contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any
other comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto.
Complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest, Junsay went to the
Civil Service Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the same
grounds he had earlier raised before the PPA.
In a resolution, the Commission held that Junsay had a preferential right to

the position and ordered that he be
appointed thereto.
ISSUE/S: WON the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a

permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified
than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by
the latter.
HELD: NO, the CSC was not authorized to do so. The Civil Service
Commission has no power of appointment except over its own personnel.
Neither does it have the authority to review the appointments made by other
offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required
qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum
statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing
authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It cannot disallow an
appointment because it believes another person is better qualified and much
less can it direct the appointment of its own choice.
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel.
While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the subject of
mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee taking into account the
totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his
personality is the prerogative of the appointing authority.
This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the appointing authority.

It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no power to
review under the Constitution and the applicable laws.
JUCO V. NLRC
PONENTE:. Hermosisima, Jr., J.:

DOCTRINE: The Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over employees

of GOCC which has no original charter.
NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC. Certiorari
FACTS: Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of the National

Housing Corporation (NHC) from Nov. 16, 1970 - May 14, 1975. He was
separated from service for having been implicated in theft and/or
malversation of public funds. Upon his complaint for illegal dismissal LA
dismissed ground: no jurisdiction. NLRC reversed. On Jan. 1985, SC held that
NLRC lacked jurisdiction. CSC held no jurisdiction, because NHC has no
original charter. Thus Salas filed again with the NLRC.
On May 21, 1990 the LA held that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as the
criminal case was purely fabricated. The LA also held that the case is not
barred by prescription because it was dependent on the decision of the CSC.
NLRC reversed the LA on ground of lack of jurisdiction again.
ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the case? NLRC or CSC?
HELD: NLRC has jurisdiction. It should not have dismissed the complaint.
NHC was organized in 1959 in accordance with EO 399 “Uniform Charter of
Gov’t Corp.” created under Act 1459 the former Corporation law. NLRC
reversed. LA decision of May 21, 1990 Reinstated.
ARTICLE IX – B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
In National Service Corp (NASECO) V. NLRC (1988)

• the 1987 Consti provision was applied because it was the law in place at
the time of the decision.
• The new phrase “with original charter” means that GOCC refer to
corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations
organized under the Corporation Code.
• The SC held that the employees of NASECO are under the jurisdiction of
the NLRC.
Trade Union of the Philippines & Allied Services (TUPAS) V. NHC (1989)
• NHC is now within the jurisdiction of the DOLE, it being a GOCC without an
original charter.
• The employees of the NHC (now NHA) have the right to form unions or
employees organizations, and there is no impediment to holding of a
certification election
• Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE & INVESTIGATION BUREAU V. CA
PONENTE: Purisima, J.:
DOCTRINE: The Civil Service is comprehensive in score. It embraces all

officers and employees of the government, its branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities. Even employees in GOCCs with original charters are
covered thereby.
FACTS: On Oct. 13, 1988, CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas required the
Secretary of Finance to submit to the CSC all appointments in the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB).
Commissioner of EIIB Jose T. Almonte replied with a request for confirmation

of EIIB’s exemption from CSC rules and regulations with respect to
appointments and other personnel actions. Basis for exemption: PD 14588 &
LOI 719. CSC denied Almonte’s request & reiterated its order in Resolution 89-
400.
CSC cited Almonte guilty of indirect contempt. CA affirmed CSC and denied
Almonte’s Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE: WON EIIB is embraced by the Civil Service?
8
Application of WAPCO and Civil Service Rules — Personnel of the FDIIB shall be exempted from
WAPCO and Civil Service Rules and Regulations relative to appointments and other personnel actions:
Provided, That they shall be entitled to the benefits and privileges accorded to government employees . . .
9
LOI No. 71, the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 1458, reads:
10. It is further directed that personnel of the BII shall be exempt from OCPC and Civil Service Rules and
Regulations relative to appointments and other personnel actions; Provided, That they shall be entitled to
the benefits accorded to government employees . . .
HELD: Yes. EIIB is a government agency under the Department of Finance as

provided by The 1987 Administrative Code, Book IV. The Executive Branch,
Title II. Finance, Chapter IV. BUREAUS
Section 17. Therefore EIIB is within the ambit of the Civil Service Law.
Petition DENIED. CA AFFIRMED.
The Civil Service is comprehensive in score. It embraces all officers and

employees of the government, its branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities. Even employees in GOCCs with original charters are
covered thereby.
The Exemptions are only relative to appointments and other personnel

actions, but not from the Civil Service Law or Civil Service Rules &
Regulations relative to any other matter.
Almonte claims that being a member of the “intelligence community” and the
personnel are occupying jobs highly confidential in nature that EIIB should
not be required to submit the names of its personnel to the CSC.
The NBI is also a member of the “intelligence community” but submits to the
CSC in the appointments of all NBI personnel.
CHUA V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
DOCTRINE: Positions in the Civil Service can be classified as Career and

Non-career.
NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the decision of the
CSC.
FACTS: Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the

bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988
providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization.
The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at
least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the
date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of
this Act.
Lydia Chua, believing herself covered by the “Early Retirement Law” 1. a full
time employee, 2. with a permanent status of Personnel Assistant, and 3. has
rendered 15 yrs of service, filed an application on Jan. 30, 1989 to avail of the
benefits of the Program with the National Irrigation Administration (NIA),
which denied it.
She was offered separation benefits equivalent to ½ month pay for every
year of service commencing from 1980.
The CSC dismissed her appeal, grounds:

1. her employment is co-terminus with the project per appointment papers
kept by the Administrative Service in the head office of the NIA;
2. she is not a regular or career employee of the NIA, not even qualified
under GSIS law;
3. the purpose of RA 6683 is to reorganize & streamline government
functions
ISSUE/S: Whether the denial by NIA and CSC of Chua’s application for early
retirement is valid.
HELD: Petition GRANTED. REMANDED to CSC for a FAVORABLE DISPOSITION

of Chua’s application for early retirement benefits under RA 6683.
The denial by NIA and CSC of Chua’s application for early retirement benefits
under RA 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as she had filed
an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is
entitled to the benefits of such law.
Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in 4 successive projects during a span of
15 yrs. In Fegurin, et. al. V. NLRC, et.. al., workers who were hired and re-
hired were considered regular and permanent employees.
The Labor Code, Article 280: deems an employment regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is

classified as:
1. permanent - one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the
position to which appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in
pursuance thereof;
2. temporary - In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes

necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment
should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil
service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not
exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a
qualified civil service eligible becomes available.
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification

in an appropriate examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in

nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges
and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or
research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit
systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary,

Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by
the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
President.
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service,
who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service
Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which
shall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not
fall under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:

. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit
and fitness utilized for the career service; and
(2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is

coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for
which purpose employment was made.
Included in the non-career service are:

1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their

positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal
confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms

of office and their personal or confidential staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the

government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a
specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in
the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period,
which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes
the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum
of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel.
There is another type of non-career employee:

Casual — where and when employment is not permanent but
occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v.
Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil.
945)
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign-assisted projects is

considered co-terminus, for the duration of the project.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes
the status of a co-terminous employee —
(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the

service is characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that
which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the

following:
a) co-terminous with the project — When the appointment is co-existent with
the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made
or subject to the availability of funds for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority — when appointment is co-

existent with the tenure of the appointing authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent — when appointment is co-existent with

the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the
services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically
abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3

years" — the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof,
the position is deemed abolished.
Felwa V. Salas, equal protection clause applies to persons or things

identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject
of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where:
(1.) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2.) these are germane to the purpose of the law
(3.) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;
(4.) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
Applying the criteria, the Early Retirement Law would be violative of the
Equal Protection Clause if the SC sustains the denial to a class of government
employees similarly situated to those covered.
Expressio unius est exclusion alterius or casus omissus pro omisso habendus
est – a person omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally - should not be the applicable maxim in this case; but
the doctrine of necessary implication – what is implied in a statute is as much
a part thereof as that which is expressed; & Ex necessitate legis – every
statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental
power, right or primilege;
& in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus – the greater includes the lesser.
Note that pending in Congress is a House Bill to extend the Early Retirement
Law, and also the coverage includes contractual employees already which
was admittedly overlooked before.
A co-terminus employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and

emergency employees.
A co-terminus or project employee should be included in the coverage of the

Early Retirement Law, as long as:
1.) they file their application prior to the expiration of their term;
2.) comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose –
Memorandum Circular No. 14 Series of 1990 implementing RA 6850 requires

as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of
7yrs of government service which need not be continuous, in the career or
non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,
seasonal, contractual or co-terminus, including military and polic service, as
evaluated and confirmed by the CSC.
A similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in RA 6683 of co-

terminus personnel who survive the test of time.
CUEVAS V. BACAL
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.:

DOCTRINE: A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the
position cannot be appointed to it in the 1st place, or, only in an acting
capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles.
FACTS: Atty. Josefina G. Bacal passed the Career Executive Service

Examinations in 1989. On July 28, 1994, she was conferred CES eligibility and
appointed Regional Director of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO).On Jan 5,
1995, President Ramos appointed her to the rank of CESO III. On Nov. 5,
1997, she was designated by the Secretary of Justice as Acting Chief Public
Attorney. On Feb. 5, 1998 her appointment was confirmed by President
Ramos. She took her oath and assumed office. On July 1, 1998, President
Estrada appointed Carina J. Demaisip as Chief Public Defendor, and appointed
Atty. Bacal as Regional Director, Public Defendor’s Office.
Atty. Bacal filed a petition for quo warranto questioning her replacement.
CA ruled in her favor, saying that there was diminution of rank and salary.
ISSUE/S: Whether the transfer of Bacal to the position of Regional Director of

the PAO, which was made without her consent, amounts to a removal without
cause?
HELD: No. Bacal who holds a CES Rank III was properly appointed by the
appointing authority to the position of Regional Director, a position which has
a corresponding CES Rank Level III.
FIRST: Bacal is only a CESO III. As respondent does not have the rank
appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that
position cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no security of
tenure in respect of that position.
The Certifications issued in her favor from the Secretary of DBM, & Executive
Directors of the CES Board clearly indicate that Atty. Bacal is a CESO III.
The position of Chief Public Attorney with salary grade 30, requires a CES
Rank Level I.
Achacoso V. Macaraig is reiterated “a permanent appointment can be issued

only to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he
is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. xxx
His appointment could be regarded as only temporary. And being so, it could
be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority “at a moment’s notice”
conformably to established jurisprudence.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not
possess the required qualifications.
Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in
turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it.
A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position
cannot be appointed to it in the 1st place, or, only in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligibles.
The appointment cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so

designated.”
SECOND: Security of tenure in the Career Executive Service (CES) is

acquired with respect to “rank” and not to “position.” The appointment
depends on: 1. level of managerial responsibility, 2. performance
The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend
to particular positions to which they may be appointed – a concept applicable
only to 1st and 2nd level employees in the Civil Service – but to the rank to
which they are appointed by the President.
Bacal was not subsequently appointed to the rank of CESO I based on her
performance as Chief Public Attorney as required by the rules of the CES
Board.
Appointment to the appropriate rank confers security of tenure.
THIRD: A CESO can be assigned from 1 CES position to another & from 1
department, bureau or office to another.
The rule is that, unless an employee is appointed to a particular office or

station, he can claim no security of tenure in respect of any office.
FOURTH: J. Puno makes much of the fact that Demaisip is not a CES eligible.
For the same reason that the temporary appointment made to Bacal is valid
under the IRP, PART III, CHAPTER 1, ARTICLE IV, PAR 5, So is the appointment
to Demaisip. There is no claim that the appointment to Demaisip is
permanent.
In a quo warranto proceeding the person suing must show that he has a clear
right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another.
Since Bacal herself is not qualified, she has no personality to sue that
Demaisip is not qualified.
PAGCOR V. RILLORAZA
PONENTE: De Leon, Jr., J:
DOCTRINE: Whether primarily confidential, policy determining, or highly

technical, the exemption provided in the Charter pertains to exemption from
competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil
service. Such employees are still protected by the mantle of security of
tenure.
FACTS: On Nov. 5, 1997, administrative charges for dishonesty, grave

misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and loss of
confidence were brought against several employees of PAGCOR. When Carlos
P. Rilloraza, a casino operations manager of PAGCOR reported for his 6am-
2pm shift on October 9, 1997, During his shift a small-time financier/player
GAM Rene Quito was able to encash P5M worth of checks without
authorization: from the Senior Branch Manager (SBM) or the Branch Manager
for Operations (BMO)
and the COM Carlos Gonzales who facilitated the checks was not on duty
then. (He was on 10pm-6am duty)
a.) He facilitated the encashment of 1 of the checks, worth P500K.
b.) He failed to stop a top-ranking officer BM Richard Syhongpan from placing

bets over and above the allowable limit of P5K/deal.
c.) He failed to stop Syhongpan from playing in the big tables, and
d.) He allowed Syhongpan to play beyong the allowable time limit of 6am.
On Dec. 2, 1997, PAGCOR dismissed Rilloraza & several others.
Rilloraza appealed.
CSC modified the penalty into 1month & 1 day suspension, finding Rilloraza
guilty only of Simple Neglect of Duty. CA affirmed the CSC, ordering PAGCOR
to reinstate Rilloraza with backwages.
ISSUE/S: Whether 1) Rilloraza is a confidential employee, hence he may be

removed upon the cessation of confidence in him, and such would not
amount to removal but only to expiration of his term; 2) PAGCOR is exempt
from Civil Service Law, rules and regulations by virtue of PD 1869
“Consolidating & Amending PD Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399 & 1632,
Relative to the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR, July 11, 1983”
Section 16. Exemption. – All positions in the Corp, whether technical,

administrative, professional or managerial are exempt from the provisions of
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and shall be governed only by
the personnel management policies set by the BOD.
All employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as

“Confidential” appointee.
HELD:
1.) He is not a primarily confidential employee, even though his position is
above rank and file.
Rilloraza’s duties and responsibilities call for a great measure of ability &
dependability, and can hardly be characterized as routinary for he is required
to exercise supervisory, recommendatory and disciplinary powers with a wide
latitude of authority.
However, his position lacks the amplitude of confidence reposed by the

appointing power as to qualify his position as highly confidential.
He reports to the Branch Manager / Branch Manager for Operations (Metro

Manila) and not to higher echelons.
CSC was correct, Rilloraza only liable for simple neglect of duty, and in finding
“good faith” as a mitigating circumstance in imposing only the minimum
penalty to him.
There is no evidence to sustain the charge of dishonesty, misconduct or

conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public.
He acted as a prudent and reasonable man in the situation.
2.) No. Considerations vary as to make a position primarily confidential.
J. Regalado’s discourse in CSC V. Salas, 3 important points:
1st: the classification of a particular position as

a.) Primarily confidential
b.) Policy-determining
c.) Highly technical
amounts to no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not
conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position.
2nd: whether primarily confidential, policy determining, or highly technical,

the exemption provided in the Charter pertains to exemption from
competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil
service.
Such employees are still protected by the mantle of security of tenure.
3rd: Section 16, PD 1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as
primarily confidential is not absolutely binding on the courts.
AQUINO V. CSC
PONENTE: Medialdea, J.:
DOCTRINE: The appointing authority cannot revoke an appointment on

mere ground that the protestant is more qualified.
NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CSC
FACTS: Victor A. Aquino was holding the position of Clerk II, Division City of
Schools of San Pablo City. On Feb. 16, 1984, he was designated as Property
Inspector and In-Charge of the Supply Office performing duties and
responsibilities of Supply Office I. Upon retirement of the Supply Officer I,
DECS Regional Director Saturnino R. Magturo designated Aquino as OIC of the
Division Supply Office.
On Septermber 19, 1986, the Division Superintendent Milagros Tagle issued

a promotional appointment to Leonarda D. De La Paz as Supply Officer I in
the DECS Dvision of San Pablo City. Civil Service approved her appointment
as permanent “provided that there is no pending administrative case against
the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment, nor any decision
by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the
appointment.”
Aquino questioned the appointment of de la Paz.
DECS Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing sustained the protest and revoked

the appointment of de la Paz,appointing Aquino instead. The Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) also upheld the appointment of Aquino as Supply
Officer I.
The CSC reversed the DECS Sec & MSPB, restoring de la Paz to her position
as Supply Officer I. Ground: Security of Tenure had already attached to de la
Paz. (CONSTI ART IX-B, SEC 2. PAR 3)
ISSUE/S: Whether the appointing authority can revoke appointment on the

ground that another is more qualified.
HELD: The appointing authority cannot revoke the appointment to de la Paz

on mere ground that the protestant is more qualified.
PD 807: Civil Service Law, Section 19. provides the “for cause” grounds, Par.
6.
(1.) That the appointee is not qualified
(2.) That the appointee is not the next in rank
(3.) In case of appointment by transfer, reinstatement, or by original

appointment, that the protestant is not satisfied with the written
special reason/s given by the appointing authority
In addition the appointment of Aquino was tainted with irregularity, with

undue haste, and is not valid because an appointment to an office which is
not vacant is null and void.
CSC Resolution No. 83-343 prohibits the issuance of an appointment to the

protestant, if the protest case is not yet finally resolved.
DE LOS SANTOS V. MALLARE
PONENTE: Tuason, J.:
DOCTRINE: It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of
those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover the
cause must be related to and affect the administration of the office, and must
be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights
and interests of the public.”
NATURE: ORIGINAL ACTION in the SC. Quo Warranto
FACTS: Eduardo de los Santos was appointed to the office of city engineer
for the City of Baguio on July 16, 1946 by the President. This was confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments.
On July 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment to

the same office by the President..
De los Santos was transferred by the Undersecretary of the Department of

Public Works and Communications to report to the Bureau of Public Works for
another assignment.
Revised Administrative Code, Chapter 61. City of Baguio, Section 2545.

authorizes the Governor General (President) to remove at pleasure any of the
officers enumerated therein, one of whom is the city engineer.
ISSUE/S: Is the RAC still in force?

HELD: No. It is incompatible with the Constitution, Article XII, Section 4 “No
officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended,
except for cause as provided by law.”
“for cause” - “it means for reasons which the law & sound public policy
recognized as sufficient to warrant removal, that is, legal cause, and not
merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may
deem sufficient.
It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested
with the power of removal, or without any cause.
Moreover the cause must be related to and affect the administration of the
office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly
affecting the rights and interests of the public.”
Section 1. A Civil Service embracing all branches of the Gov’t shall be

provided by law.
Appointments to the civil service, except (a b c)
Shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined as far as

practicable by competitive examination.”
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, dissenting:
Noted that private respondent's appointment on 19 September 1986 was

approved as permanent by the Civil Service Regional Office IV subject to
certain conditions, namely, "(1) that there is no pending administrative case
against the appointee; (2) no pending protest against the appointment, (3)
nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the
approval of (the) appointment."
Petitioner was thus appointed in place of private respondent whose

appointment was deemed revoked. That was a decision by competent
authority adversely affecting the approval of private respondent's
appointment.
Conditions Nos. 2 and 3 having supervened, namely, the timely protest and
the decision by competent authority adversely affecting it private respondent
could not have assumed the contested position under a completed
appointment.
Consequently, private respondent had acquired no legal right to security of

tenure that would have entitled her to removal only "for cause.
On the contrary, it was petitioner who was issued a permanent appointment

by the DECS Regional Director on 11 August 1987, effective on 26 October
1987 when petitioner assumed the duties and functions of the position.
That appointment was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office IV on 27

October 1987, without any qualifications or conditions.
In resolving private respondent's appeal to it, the CSC had substituted its own
choice for that of the appointing authority.
The general rule, therefore, must apply: the discretion exercised by the
appointing power, in extending an appointment to a given position to one of
two employees possessing the requisite minimum qualifications for the
position, will not generally be interfered with and must be sustained.
The CSC has no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it
believes that another employee is better qualified for that would constitute
an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority
(Mantala v. Salvador citing Luego v. CSC; Central Bank v. CSC; and Santiago,
Jr. v. CSC).
There is no "restoration" as private respondent's appointment never attained

permanency by reason of the conditions that effectively hindered it from
acquiring that status. Thus, there was no completed appointment much less
any security of tenure to speak of that would have entitled private
respondent to the protection of the law against unjust removal.
TRIA V. SANTO TOMAS
DOCTRINE: The effects of characterizing a position as “primarily

confidential” are two-fold: firstly, such characterization renders inapplicable
the ordinary requirement of filling up a position in the Civil Service on the
basis of merit and fitness as determined by competitive examinations; and
secondly, while the 1987 Constitution does not exempt such positions from
the operation of the principle set out in Article IX(B) §2(3) of the Constitution
that “no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law,” the “cause provided by law”
includes “loss of confidence.”
NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the CSC
FACTS: Rogelio A. Tria has been employed with the Bureau of Intelligence
and Investigation (later renamed Finance Ministry Intelligence Bureau
["FMIB"]), now known as the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
[EIIB"] of the Department of Finance, Region 5, Legaspi City, as a
Management and Audit Analyst I, a position expressly described in the letter
of appointment as "confidential."
On 27 September 1984, petitioner wrote a confidential report to the FMIB

Deputy Commissioner detailing the nonfeasance of a FMIB lawyer assigned to
Region 5. Petitioner's report recommended the lawyer's replacement "with a
competent and able lawyer to handle the cases brought to his attention."
He later submitted another confidential report, concerning the FMIB Region 5

Director, this time addressed to the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the
President.
Petitioner later filed an application for vacation leave for 100 working days,
seeking to take advantage of a Civil Service Circular which allows employees
who propose to seek interim employment abroad, to go on prolonged leave of
absence without pay without being considered separated from the service.
When petitioner was already in Manila attending to the processing of his

travel papers, a Memorandum was sent to him in Legaspi City from the FMIB
Central Office in Quezon City by respondent Assistant FMIB Commissioner,
referring to the confidential report sent out directly to the Office of the
President, and requiring him to submit an explanation.
Since petitioner had failed to receive and hence to respond to the above
Memorandum, another Memorandum was issued, reminding petitioner of his
duty to submit the required written explanation.
The Memorandum also informed him that his application for sick [should have
been vacation] leave. has been disapproved pursuant to §the Civil Service
Rule which provides that 'Leave of absence for any reason other than serious
illness must be contingent upon the needs of the service.'
He was directed to report for work thereat within ten (10) working days from
the date of this Memorandum otherwise, this office will be constrained to
drop you from the rolls of FMIB for prolonged unauthorized absence and non-
compliance with office rules and regulations."
As petitioner had already left the country, he was unable to comply with the
express directives of the second Memorandum. He was therefore considered
to be on absence without official leave (AWOL).
Respondent EIIB Commissioner to issue Letter Order No. 06-87 informing

petitioner of the termination of his services retroactive to "1 November 1986
for continuous absence without official leave and for loss of confidence." The
cause were:
(1) having gone on an extended unauthorized leave of absence;
(2) having bypassed official channels in transmitting a report concerning
alleged misfeasance or non-feasance on the part of a superior officer of the
EIIB directly to the Office of the President through the Deputy Executive
Secretary, rather than through the respondent EIIB Commissioner.
It was upon his return to the country sometime in May 1987 that petitioner
came to know of the abovementioned Letter-Order and of the two
Memoranda. Petitioner asked for reinstatement, stating that his application
for vacation leave had been approved by his immediate chief and the
personnel officer.
He also explained that his letter to the Office of the President was done in
good faith.
Reinstatement was, however, denied by respondent Rabina.
Petitioner's request for payment of the cash equivalent of his accrued leave
credits corresponding to a total of 179 days was also denied on the ground
that §6 of the Civil Service rules and laws provides that the removal for cause
of an official or employee shall carry with it forfeiture of . . . other benefits
arising from his employment.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with prayer for reinstatement and
backwages before respondent CSC, which was denied, on the ground that the
grant of petitioner's application for vacation leave, notwithstanding the
accumulation of sufficient leave credits, was discretionary on the part of the
approving official.
Petitioner’s request for reconsideration was denied. came to this Court on the
present Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether petitioner Tria’s particular position of “Management and Audit
Analyst I” is a “primarily confidential” position so as to render him removable
upon, or the expiration of his term of office concurrent with, “loss of
confidence” on the part of the appointing power who, as already noted, was
the then Commissioner of the FMIB.
2) Whether there was legal cause provided by law for his dismissal from the
service.
HELD: Petition GRANTED. Letter-Order No. 06-87 of public respondent EIIB

Commissioner, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Public respondents are
hereby ORDERED to reinstate forthwith petitioner to his former position, or to
a position of equivalent rank and compensation, and to pay him the
backwages, allowances and other benefits lawfully due him counted from
May 1987, when he returned to the country from his leave of absence, until
actual reinstatement, less one month's backwages. No costs.
1) NO. Petitioner challenges his dismissal as being arbitrary. The propriety of

petitioner’s alleged unlawful dismissal boils down to the question of whether
an employee holding a position considered as “primarily confidential” may be
dismissed on grounds of “loss of confidence” by the appointing authority on
the basis of the employee’s having gone on unauthorized leave of absence
and of his having filed a confidential report on one of his superiors directly
with the Office of the President.
The effects of characterizing a position as “primarily confidential” are two-

fold: firstly, such characterization renders inapplicable the ordinary
requirement of filling up a position in the Civil Service on the basis of merit
and fitness as determined by competitive examinations; and secondly, while
the 1987 Constitution does not exempt such positions from the operation of
the principle set out in Article IX(B) §2(3) of the Constitution that “no officer
or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law,” the “cause provided by law” includes “loss of
confidence.”
Their termination can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence because
in that case their cessation from office involves no removal but the expiration
of their term of office.
The positions which this Court has in the past characterized as “primarily
confidential” include: private secretaries of public functionaries; a security
officer assigned as bodyguard of the person of a public officer and
responsible for taking security measures for the safety of such official; City
Legal Officer of Davao City vis-à-vis the Davao City Mayor; Provincial Attorney
or Iloilo Province vis-à-vis the Governor of Iloilo Province.
It is also instructive to refer to some of the positions which the Court has
refused to designate as “primarily confidential”: members of the Customs
Police Force or Port Patrol; Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central
Bank, in charge of the Export Department; Senior Executive Assistant; Clerk I
and Supervising Clerk I and stenographer in the Office of the President.
There thus appears nothing to suggest that petitioner’s position was “highly”
or even “primarily confidential” in nature.
The fact that petitioner may, sometimes, handle “confidential matters” or
papers which are confidential in nature, does not suffice to characterize their
positions as primarily confidential.
2) NO. The constitutional prohibition against suspension or dismissal of an
officer or employee of the Civil Service "except for cause provided by law" is
a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process.
Procedural due process requires that suspension or dismissal come, as a

general rule, only after notice and hearing.
The Court considers that, under the circumstances of this case the
subsequent investigation constituted substantial compliance with the
demands of procedural due process.
Substantive due process requires, among other things, that an officer or
employee of the Civil Service be suspended or dismissed only "for cause."
The phrase "for cause" in connection with removals of public officers has
acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the law and
sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal
cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of
discretion may deem sufficient.
It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested
with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover the cause must
relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to
something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of
the public." (Mallare)
It must be noted that his immediate superiors were the persons in the best
position to ascertain whether his presence in the Regional office during the
period covered by his application for leave without pay was really demanded
by imperious exigencies of the service.
The real and efficient cause of his dismissal from the service was the fact that
he had bypassed official channels in rendering the confidential report
addressed to the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President,
concerning the then Regional Director of FMIB, Region 5.
That act of petitioner did not constitute lawful cause for his dismissal from
the service.
Petitioner sent his confidential (privileged communication) report to an office
having overall administrative supervision and control over the FMIB (i.e., the
Office of the President); the report was not, in other words, sent either to the
media or to an office or agency having no administrative jurisdiction over the

public official or office complained of. Petitioner's act did not constitute
serious misconduct but rather, on the contrary, was an act of personal and
civic courage by which petitioner exhibited his loyalty to the FMIB as an
institution and ultimately to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.
LAUREL V VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
PONENTE: Davide, Jr., J.:
DOCTRINE: A private citizen who does not claim any better right to the
position file a verified complaint with the CSC to denounce a violation by the
appointing authority of the Civil Service Law and Rules.
NATURE: PETITION to review a resolution of the CSC
FACTS: Jose C. Laurel V is the Provincial Governor of Batangas, and he

appointed his brother Benjamin Laurel as Senior Executive Assistant in the
Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the
personal and confidential staff of an elective official.
The position of Provincial Administrator became vacant due to the resignation

of Mr. Felimon C. Salcedo III, and Governor Laurel designated his brother as
Acting Provincial Administrator, to continue until the appointment of a regular
Provincial Administrator, since allegedly there was none qualified at that
time.
He issued his brother a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer, a

“primarily confidential” position.
Sangalang, a private citizen wrote to CSC to bring to its attention the

“appointment” of Benjamin Laurel by his Governor brother.
Acting Provincial Attorney of Batangas, Jose A. Oliveros answered that the

Governor did not violate the prohibition on nepotism because the positions
the brother was appointed were “confidential in nature” and with respect to
the position of “Provincial Administrator” the brother was merely
“designated”.
He also answered that there was no violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act because the the representation allowance of an “Acting
Provincial Administrator” is “strictly on reimbursement basis.”
CSC in Resolution 83-358 revoked the designation of Benjamin Laurel as

Acting Provincial Administrator, on the ground of nepotism, “what cannot be
done directly cannot be done indirectly.”
RA 2260, Section 24, (f) no person appointed to a position in the non-

competitive service (now noon-career) shall perform duties properly
belonging to any position in the competitive service (now career service).
The position of Provincial Administrator is a career position under RA 5185

Section 4.
ISSUES:
1. Is the position of Provincial Administrator primarily confidential?
2. Does the rule on nepotism apply to “designation”?

3. May a private citizen who does not claim any better right to the
position file a verified complaint with the CSC to denounce a violation
by the appointing authority of the Civil Service Law and Rules?
HELD & RATIO:

1. No, it is a Career Service position embraced under Section 4 of PD 807.
The Manual of Position Descriptions also require high qualifications and

definition of duties.
It is characterized by:
(a) Entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as much as
practicable by competitive examinations or based on highly
technical qualifications
(b) Opportunity for advancement to higher career positions
(c) Security of tenure
It is an open career position, for appointment to it requires prior

qualification in an appropriate examination. It falls within the 2 nd major
level of positions in the career service.
PD 807
SECTION 7. Classes of Positions in the Career Service. – (a) Classes
of positions in the career service appointment to which requires
examinations shall be grouped into 3 major levels as follows:
xxx
(2.) the 2nd level shall include professional, technical and scientific
positions which involve professional, technical or scientific work in a non-
supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least 4 years of college
work up to Division Chief level; xxx.
In Pinero, et. al. V. Hechanova, et. al. “since the enactment of RA 2260:
the 1959 Civil Service Act, it is the nature of the position which finally
determines whether a position is:
a.) primarily confidential,
b.) policy determining or
c.) highly technical.
Plus Governor is bound by estoppels, he himself admitted it was a career

position.
NCC Article 1431 through estoppels an admission or representation is

rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Not being a confidential position it is subject to the rule on nepotism.

2. Yes.
The rule on nepotism does not distinguish between appointment and
designation, if it does it would be toothless.
the manner of filling up the vacancy is only either by

a.) Permanent appointment or
b.) Temporary appointment,
The designation in this case is done to fill up the position temporarily.
Designation is also defined as “an appointment or assignment to a

particular office” (Citing: Borromeo V. Mariano, Binamira V. Garuccho)
3. Yes, CSC - role as the central personnel agency to set standards and to
enforce the laws and rules governing the selection, utilization, training
nad discipline of civil servants, with the power and function to administer
and enforce the constitutional & statutory provisions on the merit system.
PD 807
Section 37 expressly allows a private citizen to directly file with the CSC a
complaint against a government official or employee
This gives teeth to the constitutional exhortation that a public office is a

public trust and public off/ees must at all time sbe accountable to the
people.
The vigilance of the citizenry is vital in a democracy.
GRINO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
PONENTE: Gancayco, J.:
DOCTRINE:
NATURE: PETITION for review a decision of the CSC
FACTS: Acting Governor of Iloilo, Tirador appointed:

1.) Teotimo Arandela as Provincial Attorney
2.) Cirilo Gelvezon was promoted to Senior Legal Officer
3.) Teodolfo Dato-on &
4.) Nelson Geduspan were appointed as Legal Officer II.
New Governor Simplicio Grino terminated their services due to loss of

trust and confidence, basis: an article that appeared in Panay News. The
Merit Systems Board held that the terminations were illegal and ordered
reinstatement with back pay. CSC affirmed.
ISSUE/S:
1.) Is the position Provincial Attorney confidential or career positions?
2.) What about the subordinate positions?
HELD: Arandela is ordered to vacate his position. However, CSC is AFFIRMED

with regard to: Gelvezon, Dato-on and Geduspan who are to be reinstated.
1.) Confidential, cited Cadiente V. Santos
RA 5185
Section 19. Creation of Positions of Provincial Attorney and
City Legal Officer. – To enable the provincial and city governors to
avail themselves of the full time and trusted services of legal
officers, the positions of provincial attorney and city legal officer may
be created and such officials shall be appointed in such manner as is
provided for under Sec 4 of this Act.
For this purpose the functions hitherto performed by the provincial and
city fiscals in serving as legal advisor and legal officer for civil cases of
the provinces and city shall be transferred to the provincial attorney
and city legal officer, respectively.
The attorney-client relationship is strictly personal because it involves

mutual trust and confidence of the highest degree, irrespective of
whether the client is a private person or a government functionary.
2.) No, because these subordinate positions are highly technical in

character, career positions dependent on the skill of the legal staff to
be hired.
The legal staff are subordinate positions under the administrative

supervision and control of the Provincial Attorney, and are remote in
relationship from the appointing authority.
They are entitled to security of tenure.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. SALAS
PONENTE: Regalado, J.:
DOCTRINE: In reversing the decision of the CSC, the CA opined that the
provisions of Section 16, PD 1869 may no longer be applied in the case at bar
because the same is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section
2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS: On October 7, 1989, Rafael M. Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR

Chairman as Internal Security Staff Member (ISS) and assigned to the Casino
at the Manila Pavilion Hotel.
ISS members do not directly report to the Office of the Chairman, and is
subject to the control and supervision of an Area Supervisor who only
implements the directives of the Branch Chief Security Officer.
The BOD of PAGCOR terminated him on Dec. 3, 1991 grounds: loss of

confidence.
Salas was allegedly engaged in proxy betting – in affidavits of 2 customers,

claiming to have been used as gunners.
CA reversed finding that Salas is not a confidential employee and cannot be

dismissed on that ground, applying the “proximily rule” enunciated in
Case 63: Grino V. CSC & Case 60: De los Santos V. Mallare10.
CA also held that PD 1869 Section 16 has been repealed by Section 2 (1),
Article IX-B of the Consti.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether Salas is a confidential employee?
2. Whether the Pinero doctrine11 is still applicable?
HELD:
10
Every appointment implies confidence, but more more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the
occupant of a position that is primarily confidential.
The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office,
but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State.
11
In Pinero, et. al. V. Hechanova, et. al. “since the enactment of RA 2260: the 1959 Civil Service Act, it is the
nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is:
c.) highly technical.
Senator Tanada: “in the 1st instance, it is the appointing power that determines the nature of the position.
In case of conflict, then it is the Court that determines whether the position is primarily confidential or
not.”
- Employees occupying various positions in the Port Patrol Division of the Bureau of Customs, which
is part of the Customs police force, is not in itself sufficient indication that there positions are
primarily confidential.
1. No.
Salas’ position is the lowest in the chain of command. His job description is
ordinary, routinary and quotidian in character. His pay is only P2,200 per
month.
He does not enjoy that “primarily close intimacy” which characterizes a

confidential employee.
Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority,
the element of trust between them is no longer predominant.
Citing Case Tria V. Sto. Tomas, “the fact that sometimes, private respondent
may handle ordinarily confidential matters or papers which are somewhat
confidential in nature does not suffice to characterize his position as primarily
confidential.”
2. Yes.
PD 1869 can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in
cases of conflict.
1986 Constitutional Commission Records

The primary purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in providing for
the declaration of a position as
c.) highly technical
is to exempt these categories from competitive examinations as a means for
determining merit and fitness.
It must be stressed further that these positions are covered by the security of
tenure, although they are considered non-competitive only in the sense that
appointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive examinations for
purposes of determining merit and fitness.
CSC Resolution 91-830 does not make PAGCOR employees confidential,

merely reiterates exemption from civil service eligibility requirement.
In reversing the decision of the CSC, the CA opined that the provisions of
Section 16, PD 1869 may no longer be applied in the case at bar because the
same is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2 (1), Article
IX-B of the 1987 COnsti.
This is not completely correct. On this point, we approve the more logical
interpretation advanced by the CSC to the effect that “Section 16 of PD 1869
insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of the Civil
Service Law & Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the
1987 Consti & EO 292: Administrative Code of 1987.
However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section
16 which provides that “All employees of the casinos and related services
shall be classified as “Confidential” appointees.” While such executive
declaration emanated merely from the provisions of
Implementing Rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959

Rule XX
Section 2
The power to declare a position as:

c.) highly technical,
as defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in
EO 292: Administrative Code of 1987

Book V. Civil Service Commission
Section 12. The Commission shall have the ff powers and functions: xxx
(9). Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarily
confidential, highly technical or policy determining.
This later enactment only serves to bolster the validity of the categorization
made under Section 16 PD 1869.
Be that as it may, such classification is not absolute and all-encompassing.
Prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1959, there were
2 recognized instances when a position may be declared primarily

confidential:
1: when the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil

Service, has declared the position to be primarily confidential;
2: in the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the functions of

the office, there exists “close intimacy” between the appointing power
which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment of freedom
from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of
the State.
RA 2260: Civil Service Act (June 19, 1959)

Section 5. “The non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of
positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive or
unclassified service or those which are policy determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical in nature.”12
12
General Rules Implementing PD 807: Civil Service Rules
Section 1. “appointments to the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations.”
SEPARATE OPINIONS
VITUG, J ., concurring:
- Highlighted the phrase, "without prejudice to the filing of administrative
charges against (Salas) if warranted," found in the dispositive portion of the
decision of the appellate court. It would seem to me that the adverse findings
arrived at by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR which the Board of
Directors relied upon to terminate the services of Salas on ground of loss of
confidence could well be constitutive of the administrative infractions that
the appellate court must have had in mind.
The case should be remanded to the CSC to specifically meet head-on

PAGCOR's foregoing findings and to thereby fully ventilate, as well as pass
upon, the appeal to it (CSC) on the basis with an opportunity for a hearing
adequately accorded to Salas.
TARROSA V. SINGSON
PONENTE: Quiason, J.:

DOCTRINE: Quo warranto as a special civil action can only be commenced

by the Solicitor General or by a person claiming to be entitled to a public
office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another.
NATURE: Original Action in the SC.
FACTS: Tarrosa as “taxpayer” files a petition for prohibition, questioning the

appointment of Singson by Ramos as Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
The petition is based on Sec 6 of RA7653, which established the BSP as the
Central Money Authority of the Philippines. The said provision stated that the
appointment of the Governor should be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
ISSUE/S: Whether the action may prosper.
HELD: NO. The action is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it

seeks the ouster of Singson and alleges the latter is unlawfully holding or
exercising the office. A quo warranto proceeding may only be commenced
by the Sol-Gen or “a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or
position unlawfully held or exercised by another”.
It is obvious that the instant petition was improvidently brought. To uphold

the position would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to courts ,
thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation
of the governmental machinery.
Obiter: For the information of all concerned, in Calderon v. Carale, the Court
ruled that Congress by law cannot expand the confirmation powers of the
CoA and require confirmation for positions not expressly mentioned in Art VII,
Sec 16 of the Constitution.
MENDOZA V. ALLAS AND OLORES
PONENTE: Puno, J.:
DOCTRINE: The rule that a judgment against a public officer in regard to a

public right binds his successor in office is not applicable in quo warranto
cases. The writ of quo warranto is never directed to an officer as such, but
always against the person.
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS: Mendoza worked in the Bureau of Customs as “Director III”. He was

temporarily designated as Acting District Collector in Cagayan de Oro. Allas
was appointed as “Acting Director III” by President Ramos so Mendoza was
terminated. He filed a petition for quo warranto against Allas and won in the
RTC. While the action was pending in the CA, Allas was promoted and Olores
now occupied the position so CA denied the Motion for Execution.
ISSUE/S: Whether the CA can execute the judgment.
HELD: NO. Quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person

to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to
enjoy the privilege. The action may be commenced by the Sol-Gen or the
fiscal or by an individual who claims to be entitled.
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer with regard to a

public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not
applicable to quo warranto cases , The judgment does not bind the
respondent's successor even if the latter may trace his title to the same
source. This follows from the nature of the writ itself. It is never directed to an
officer as such, but always against the person — to determine whether he
is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise
any function of the office. In the case at bar, the petition was solely against
Allas.
ROMUALDEZ-YAP v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
DOCTRINE: An action for quo warranto should be brought within 1 year

after ouster from office, the failure to institute the same within the
reglementary period constitutes more than a sufficient basis for its
dismissal since it is not proper that the title to a public office be subject to
continued uncertainty.
NATURE: Special Civil Action for Certiorari
FACTS: Petitioner started working with PNB in 1972 as special assistant .

After several promotions she was appointed Senior Vice President.
In 1986, E.O. No. 80 was approved restructuring PNB. Pursuant to said EO the
division where petitioner belonged was abolished. Petitioner was then notified
of her separation from service.
CSC affirmed this decision.
ISSUE/S: 1) Whether there was bad faith in her dismissal using the test
articulated in Dario v. Mison ; 2) Whether RA 6656 may be invoked; 3)
Whether there was erroneous application of the 1 year prescriptive period for
quo warranto proceedings
HELD: 1) There was no bad faith. PNB’s reorganization was by virtue of a

valid law. It was due to the critical financial situation of the bank. The
abolition of petitioner’s department was a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
2) RA 6656 cannot also be invoked since it took effect after PNB’s

reorganization had already been implemented. Assuming arguendo,
petitioner did not have sufficient qualifications to be retained.
3) No. It was correctly applied. Since the action of petitioner was really quo
warranto. A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action for
quo warranto. The petitioner therein must show a clear legal right to the
office allegedly held unlawfully by another.
An action for quo warranto should be brought within 1 year after ouster
from office, the failure to institute the same within the reglementary
period constitutes more than a sufficient basis for its dismissal since it is
not proper that the title to a public office be subject to continued uncertainty.
An exception to this prescriptive period lies only if the failure to file the action
can be attributed to the acts of a responsible government officer and not of
the dismissed employee (Cristobal vs Melchor).
BAYBAY WATER DISTRICT V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
DOCTRINE: The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public

officers does not estop the Government from making a subsequent correction
of such errors – practice, without more, no matter how long continued,
cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law.
NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION IN THE SC. Certiorari. (R64).
FACTS: The Resident Auditor (Leyte) of the BWD disallowed payments of per
diems in excess of those authorized by the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) and PD 198, RATA (representation and transportation
allowance) and rice allowances granted to the members of the board of
directors of the BWD, as well as duplication of claims for cash gifts as part of
the Christmas bonus of the general manager and traveling allowance of the
officers of the BWD.
The petitioners here – members of the board, other similarly situated officers
and Board Members of BWD who had approved the release of these benefits,
were served with notices of disallowance. Petitioners’ request for
reconsideration was denied.
The CoA Regional Office at Tacloban City affirmed the findings of the
Resident Auditor. The CoA also affirmed. Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE/S:1) Whether the term “compensation” in P. D. No. 198, §13, as

amended by P. D. No. 768 and P. D. No. 1479 does not include the allowances
and per diems which had been disallowed in this case, considering §2(i) of P.
D. No. 1146 as amended by RA 8291, which provides that “compensation”
means “the basic pay or salary by an employee, pursuant to his
employment/appointment, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay,
allowances and any other emoluments received in addition to the basic pay
which are not integrated into the basic pay under existing laws.”
2) Whether the prohibition in PD 198, §13 against the grant of additional

compensation to board members must be deemed repealed by virtue of §22
of R. A. No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, which
took effect on July 1, 1989.
* If yes to 1 and 2, then the members of the board of directors of water

districts are entitled to receive benefits in addition to those authorized to be
paid pursuant to their charter and the guidelines of the LWUA after the
effectivity of R. A. No. 6758
3) Whether the disallowance of duplication of claims of transportation

allowance of various BWD employees, as well as the grant of RATA, rice
allowance, and excessive per diems to members of the board of directors of
BWD, would impair vested rights, violate any rule against diminution of
benefits, and undermine the management prerogative of water districts; and
HELD: 1) NO. The definitions of the term “compensation” in the statutes

relied on by petitioners are for limited purposes only and cannot be deemed
to comprehend such other purposes not specifically included in the
provisions thereof.
Words and phrases in a statute must be given their natural, ordinary, and
commonly-accepted meaning, due regard being given to the context in which
the words and phrases are used.
The provision petitioners cite as basis refers to the basis for the computation
of employer and employee contributions to the GSIS as well as the benefits to
which such employees are entitled. In the same manner, under §32 of the
NIRC, “compensation” includes fees, salaries, wages, commissions, and
similar items for purposes of recognizing taxable income.
The definitions of the term “compensation” in these statutes are for limited
purposes only and cannot be deemed to comprehend such other purposes
not specifically included in the provisions thereof.
Under P. D. No. 198, §13, per diem is precisely intended to be the

compensation of members of board of directors of water districts.
By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by

limiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, and, in the same
paragraph, providing “No director shall receive other compensation” than the
amount provided for per diems, the law quite clearly indicates that directors
of water districts are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by
law and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form.
2) NO. The Salary Standardization Law does not apply to petitioners because
directors of water districts are in fact limited to policy-making and are
prohibited from the management of the districts, as provided by §18 thereof.
R. A. No. 6758, §4 specifically provides that the Salary Standardization Law

applies to “positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now
existing or hereafter created in the government, including GOCCs and GFIs.”
The Salary Standardization Law adopts a Position Classification System

classifying positions into four main categories, namely: professional
supervisory, professional non-supervisory, sub-professional supervisory, and
sub-professional non-supervisory, and the rules and regulations for its
implementation.
A review of the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law will reveal that
the Salary Standardization Law does not apply to petitioners because
directors of water districts are in fact limited to policy-making and are
prohibited from the management of the districts.
The fact that §12 and §17 of the Salary Standardization Law speak of
allowances as “benefits” paid in addition to the salaries incumbents are
presently receiving makes it clear that the law does not refer to the
compensation of board of directors of water districts as these directors do not
receive salaries but per diems for their compensation.
3) NO. The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public

officers does not estop the Government from making a subsequent correction
of such errors – practice, without more, no matter how long continued, cannot
give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law.
Management prerogative refers to the right of an employer to regulate all

aspects of employment, such as the freedom to prescribe work assignments,
working methods, processes to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of
employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and
recall of work. Clearly, the existence of such right presupposes the existence
of an employer-employee relationship.
As to the BWD board of directors: The BWD board of directors are not
employees of BWD. As already noted, their function, as defined by P. D. No.
198, is limited to policy-making.
Moreover, as also noted before, the right of directors of water districts to the
payment of compensation is expressly provided for in PD 198, thus pre-
empting the exercise of any discretion by the water districts.
As to the officers and employees of BWD: The terms and conditions of

employment of government employees are governed by law.
Thus, the exercise of management prerogative by government corporations

are limited by the provisions of the laws applicable to them.
The cash gift granted to the general manager as part of his Christmas bonus
was in excess of that authorized by R. A. No. 6686.
It cannot be justified by the exercise of management prerogative as it is

contrary to law.
The disallowance of the duplication of claims for transportation allowance

does not fall under management prerogative as this does not pertain to the
power of management to determine the terms and conditions of employment
but pertains to whether or not the claims are properly accounted for.
RODRIGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.
DOCTRINE: The exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does

not mean the automatic dismissal of the complaint against them – the
preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the investigation
conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct from each other.
FACTS: The Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by petitioner Mayor

Rodrigo, entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction, represented
by Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Cabolan for the sum of
P486,386.18.
Petitioner MPDC Mejica prepared an Accomplishment Report stating that the

said project was 97.5% accomplished. This report was supposedly approved
by mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu.
Based on said report, payment of P452,825.53 was effected by the Municipal

Treasurer Facundo, to Philwood Construction. Later, petitioners received a
Notice of Disallowance from the Provincial Auditor for the amount of
P160,910.46 who found that as per CoA evaluation, only 60% of the project
(equivalent to only P291,915.07) was actually accomplished.
The Provincial Auditor did not act on petitioners’ request for lifting and
reinspection. Thereafter, the Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for
estafa before the Ombudsman against the Mayor, the MPDC, the Treasurer,
as well as the President/General Manager, and Project Engineer, respectively,
of Philwood Construction.
The Acting Ombudsman approved the filing of an information against

petitioners for violation of §3 (e) of RA 30196 [The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act] before the Sandiganbayan.
While the complaint was pending at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution

moved to suspend petitioners pendente lite. Petitioners opposed the motion
on the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over them.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petitioners and
ordered the suspension of petitioners pendente lite.
ISSUE/S: 1) WON the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in

filing the information against petitioners, or the Sandiganbayan in allowing
the litigation of the criminal information for conspiracy in violating §3(e) of
the Anti-Graft Act (RA 3019) when the notice of disallowance still pends with
the provincial auditor under petitioner' protest supported by certificate of
completion and acceptance of the required element
2) WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction

HELD: 1) NO. Disallowance v. Suspension: At this point, it may be useful to

distinguish between a disallowance and a suspension.
A disallowance is the disapproval of a credit or credits to an

account/accountable officer's accountability due to non-compliance with law
or regulations, either in whole or in part.
Thus, the auditor may disallow an expenditure/transaction which is unlawful

or improper.
A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of action to debit/credit

the account/accountable officer's accountability pending compliance with
certain requirements.
A notice of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which could

otherwise have been settled except for some requirements, like lack of
supporting documents or certain signatures.
It is also issued on transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of which the

auditor doubts but which he may later allow after satisfactory or valid
justification is submitted by the parties concerned.
The suspension shall become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is
"not satisfactorily explained within ninety-day period within which the
accountable officer may answer the charge of suspension may nevertheless
be extended by the Commission or the auditor for "good cause shown."
The exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does not mean the
automatic dismissal of the complaint against them – the preliminary
investigation, after all, is independent from the investigation conducted by
the CoA, their purposes distinct from each other.
The preliminary investigation involves the determination of the fact of the

commission of a crime; the audit investigation relates to the administrative
aspect of the expenditure of public funds.
Misinterpretation of §44.6.4., which provides for the Auditor's Responsibility

re Evaluation of Disallowance:
(1) petitioners were not charged with suspension but disallowance.
(2) the "written explanation" referred to in said §is "for the purpose of lifting
the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day
period prior to its conversion into a disallowance," not for contesting a
disallowance, as petitioners wrongfully assert. Hence, §44.6.4., finds no
application in this case.
§56 imposes upon the Provincial Auditor the duty to file a complaint before
the Ombudsman when, from the evidence obtained during the audit, he is
convinced that "criminal prosecution is warranted."
The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the opposition to the notice of
disallowance and the motion for re-inspection pending in his office before he
institutes such complaint so long as there are sufficient grounds to support
the same.
The right to due process of the respondents to the complaint, insofar as the
criminal aspect of the case is concerned, is not impaired by such institution.
The respondents will still have the opportunity to confront the accusations
contained in the complaint during the preliminary investigation.
2) YES. The Municipal Mayor is assigned a Salary Grade of 27 under RA 6758

(the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989), which includes in
the list Municipal Mayor as under Salary Grade 27.
The Supreme Court further held that having been charged with violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act Mayor Rodrigo is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a., of P.D No. 1606,
as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which provides that the
Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by officials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade “27″ and higher.
The Supreme Court held that with regards to Mayor Rodrigo’s co-accused, by
virtue of Section 4 a., of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, are also subject to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Grade is a means of grouping positions "sufficiently equivalent as to level

of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the
work" so that that may be lumped together in "one range of basic
compensation."
Salary Grades is "the numerical place on the Salary Schedule representing

multiple steps or rates which is assigned to a class.
An official's salary is determined by the Grade accorded his position, and

ultimately by the nature of his position - the level of difficulty and
responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work.
As a consequence of the amendment of §4 of PD 1606 by the passage of §2

of RA 7975, the Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in
cases involving violations of RA 3019, as amended, and Chapter II, §2, Title
VII of the RPC.
It retains only cases where the accused are those specifically enumerated in
the amendment and, generally, national and local officials classified as Grade
"27" and higher under RA 6758.
Moreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public

officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by
the prescribed penalty.
It is enough that these are committed by those public officials and employees
enumerated in subsection, §4 above.
However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal
cases filed pursuant to or in connection with enumerate Eos related to the
PCGG and the recovery of Marcos wealth.
These amendments intended to ease the dockets of the Sandiganbayan and

to allow the Anti-Graft Court to focus its efforts on the trial of those occupying
higher positions in government, the proverbial "big fish."
The present structure is also intended to benefit these official of lower rank,
especially those residing outside Metro Manila, charged with crimes related to
their office, who can ill-afford the expenses of a trial in Metro Manila.
To distinguish the "big fish" from the "small fry," Congress deemed the 27th
Grade as the demarcation between those who should come under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and those within the regular courts.
Although some positions of Grade 27 and above are stated by name in §4 a.,
the position of Municipal Mayor is not among them. Nevertheless, Congress
provided a catchall in §4 a. (5), thus: All other national and local officials
classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
At present, Volume III of the 1997 edition of the Index of Occupational

Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades, which was prepared by the DBM
pursuant to RA 6758 (An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and
Position Classification System in the Government and Other Purposes.
RA 6758 lists positions under Salary Grade 27, including the position of
"Municipal Mayor I".
§2 of RA 6758 declares it the policy of the State "to provide equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive
differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of
the positions."
To give life to this policy, Congress adopted the Grade system.
The Grade is a means of grouping positions "sufficiently equivalent as to level

of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the
work" so that that may be lumped together in "one range of basic
compensation."
Congress, under §8 of RA 6758, fixed the Salary Grades, which is defined as

"the numerical place on the Salary Schedule representing multiple steps or
rates which is assigned to a class."
RA 6758 provided for the salaries of officials holding constitutional positions

(the President, Vice-President, President of the Senate and Senators, Speaker
and Members of the House of Representatives, Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, Chairman of the Constitutional Commission
and its Members).
Congress delegated the task of fixing Salary Grades to the DBM. Pursuant to
such authority, the DBM drafted the 1989 Index of Occupational Services,
Position Titles and Salary Grades, later revised in 1997. In both versions, the
position of Municipal Mayor was assigned a Salary Grade 27.
- A local government official's actual salary may be less than what the Salary
Schedule under §7 prescribes, depending on the class and financial capability
of his or her respective LGU. This circumstance, however, has no bearing on
such official's Grade.
TEJADA V. DOMINGO
PONENTE: DAVIDE, J.:
DOCTRINE: An office is a public charge or employment, an employment on

behalf of the government in any station or public trust, not merely transient,
occasional or incidental.

FACTS: Petitioners Roseo U. Tejada and Radito C. Ching are senior clerks of
the COA assigned to the auditing units of the PNB and Central Bank,
respectively. Before the effectivity of RA 6758, Tejada's gross monthly
compensation was P3,673.20, which includes basic salary, COLA, bank equity
pay, longevity pay, amelioration pay and meal allowance.
Ching's was P3,134.00, which includes, basic salary, COLA, bank equity pay
and amelioration pay.
Only the basic salary and the COLA, in the total sum of P2,323.00, were due
each of them as senior clerks in the COA.
The other benefits were voluntarily given to them by the PNB and the CB,
respectively.
The passage of PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code of the Philippines), as

reiterated by EO 19, implemented a new policy to instill institution loyalty --
direct payment by COA of the salaries and other benefits, incorporated in the
national government budget and to be sourced from the contributions from
the GOCCs.
It did away with the direct receipt of compensation from the GOCCs and the
requirement of a common position and compensation plan, which was both
chaotic and unjust.
The contributions from the GOCCs are limited to the cost of audit services
which are based on the actual cost of the audit function in the corporation
concerned plus a reasonable rate to cover overhead expenses.
The allowances and fringe benefits granted by the GOCCs to the COA
personnel assigned to the former's auditing units shall be directly defrayed
by COA from its own appropriations.
Pursuant to §18 of RA 6758 providing for standardized salary rates,

respondent ordered for the deletion from the COA Centralized or Special
Payroll their allowances, fringe benefits and other emoluments.
Petitioners sent a former letter-request asking for reconsideration, be

restored, or at least considered in the determination of their respective
compensation rates as of July 1, 1989, so that they will not suffer any salary
deduction when the standardized salary rates are finally implemented.
Respondent denied and as a consequence, each of the petitioners presently

receive the reduced salary of P2,323.00.
Petitioners here contend that: (a) Secs. 12 and 17 of RA 6758 authorize their
continued receipt of the extra allowances from the GOCCs. (b) Since, in
respect to GOCCs and GFIs, the law does not seem to make a distinction
between an incumbent therein who is an organic personnel thereof and an
incumbent who is a COA personnel assigned to their auditing units,
petitioners must, for purposes of §17, be considered "incumbents" of the PNB

and the CB.
They appeal to the rule on statutory construction that where the law does not
make any distinction, no distinction should be made.
ISSUE/S: Whether under RA 6758 COA personnel may still be allowed to

receive from any government agency, local or national, including GOCCs and
GFIs, other allowances, emoluments and fringe benefits over and above their
legally set salaries and allowances as COA employees.
HELD: NO. Petitioner’s contention that Secs. 12 and 17 of RA 6758 authorize

their continued receipt of the extra allowances from the GOCCs to which they
are assigned are patently untenable.
§12 refers to the regular allowances and compensation which an

instrumentality, entity or agency of the government grants to its organic
personnel.
In the case of COA personnel, such allowances and compensation cannot

include allowances, fringe benefits or extra emoluments, such as those
claimed by petitioners, which are granted by GOCCs or GFIs. §18 of the Act
itself bans the COA personnel from receiving them even as it also prohibits
GOCCs and GFIs from granting such benefits to personnel of other
government instrumentalities, entities or agencies assigned to them to
perform the regular functions of their mother units.
It would have been absurd and illogical for the law to impose the prohibition
and at the same time mandate its integration in the standardized salary rates
of the personnel of the COA.
The DBM Secretary has certified that "other than those authorized/mandated
by law, the allowances, fringe benefits and other emoluments that were
directly received by COA personnel from the various GOCCs, including GFIs,
to which they are assigned, were not provided under the regular
appropriations of the Commission in the General Appropriations Act of 1989
and 1990."
They were not so provided because there was no legal basis therefor.
The questioned law is clear enough. Frankly, its interpretation is not even
called for. Under §17, the additional compensation or fringe benefits and
other emoluments referred to therein are those granted by the mother or
parent unit to the incumbents thereof, i.e., the organic personnel, which
include benefits absorbed from LGUs.
As correctly observed by respondent, the law does not mention benefits

absorbed from GOCCs or GFIs, as these were prohibited from granting them
to non-organic personnel.
A distinction is not in order for the meaning of incumbent is not doubtful nor
susceptible of more than one interpretation.
An incumbent is a person who is in present possession of an office; one who

is legally authorized to discharge the duties of an office. Insofar as petitioners
are concerned, they are incumbents of the position to which they have been
appointed senior clerks of the COA and not of the PNB or the CB to which
they are merely temporarily assigned.
SANTOS V. CA
PONENTE: DAVIDE, JR., J.:
DOCTRINE: For the purpose of computing or determining petitioner’s

separation pay under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7294, his years of
service in the Judiciary should be excluded and his separation pay should be
solely confined to his services in the Metropolitan Manila Authority.
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS: On 1 April 1992, petitioner optionally retired under RA 910 from the
Judiciary as Judge of the MeTC of Quezon City after having served since 18
January 1983. He received his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire
years in the government service; and five years thereafter he has been
regularly receiving a monthly pension.
On 2 December 1993, petitioner re-entered the government service. He was

appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. His
appointment was approved by the CSC (CSC).
On 1 March 1995, Congress enacted RA 7924, which reorganized the MMA

and renamed it as Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).
The MMDA issued Resolution No. 16, series of 1996, which, inter
alia, authorized the payment of separation benefits to the officials and
employees of the former MMA who would be separated as a result of the
implementation of RA 7924.
Petitioner opted to be separated from the service. MMDA then issued a

Memorandum to petitioner informing him that he would be entitled to
“separation benefits equivalent to one and one-fourth (1¼) monthly salary for
every year of service as provided under §11 of the MMDA Law.”
Petitioner submitted a Position Paper wherein he asserted that all the years
of his government service, including those years in the Judiciary, should be
credited in the computation of his separation benefits under RA 7924.
The CSC-NCR handed down an opinion that the payment of petitioner’s

separation pay cannot be subject to the prohibition against the double
compensation in cases when officers and employees who were previously
granted said benefits are rehired or reemployed in another government
Agency or Office. MR denied.
The CSC promulgated Resolution No. 97-4266 affirmed. MR denied. CA

affirmed.
ISSUE/S: Whether petitioner’s separation pay under §11 of RA 7924 should

be limited to the number of years of his service in the Metropolitan Manila
Authority (MMA) only, excluding his years of service as judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City for which he has already been
given retirement gratuity and pension
HELD: YES. First, §11 of RA 7924 on the grant of separation pay at the rate of
“one and one-fourth (1¼) months of salary for every year of service” allows
the grant of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby
the separation pay can be based only on the length of service in the MMA.
The displacement amounted to an abolition of the office or position of the

displaced employees, such as that of petitioner.
The rule is settled that Congress may abolish public offices.
Such a power is a consequent prerogative of its power to create public

offices.
However, the power to abolish is subject to the condition that it be exercised

in good faith.
The separation partook of the nature of a disturbance of compensation;

hence, the separation pay must relate only to the employment thus affected.
Second, if petitioner were convinced that that §11 does not allow the tacking
in of his previous government service, he he could have opted to apply
for retirement benefits under the third paragraph of §11, which provides that
“if qualified for retirement under existing retirement laws, said employee
may opt to receive the benefits thereunder.”
Third, petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of §8 of

Article IX-B of the Constitution, which provides that "Pensions or gratuities
shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.”
This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can
continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another
government position to which another compensation is attached.
To credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his

separation pay under RA 7924 notwithstanding the fact that he had received
or has been receiving the retirement benefits under RA 910, as amended,
would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same
services, i.e., his services as MeTC Judge.
Such would run counter to the policy of this Court against double
compensation for exactly the same services, in violation of the first
paragraph of §8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which reads: “No elective
or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law…”
§11 of RA 7924 does not specifically authorize payment of additional

compensation for years of government service outside of the MMA.
PANIS v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
PONENTE: Quiason, J.:
DOCTRINE: The "next in rank" rule specifically applies only in cases of

promotion. In other words, one who is "next in rank" to a vacancy is given
preferential consideration for promotion to the vacant position, but it does
not necessarily follow that he alone and no one else can be appointed. There
is no vested right granted the next in rank nor a ministerial duty imposed on
the appointing authority to promote the holder to the vacant position.

FACTS: Petitioner was employed as Administrative Officer of the Hospital,

while private respondent was Administrative Officer of the City Health
Department detailed at the said hospital.
The Mayor appointed private respondent to the position of Assistant Chief of

Hospital for Administration of CCMC. Petitioner, a candidate for the said
position, promptly protested the appointment before the Regional Office of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC Regional Office, however,
indorsed the matter to the Office of the City Mayor, which in turn referred it
to the Office of the City Attorney.
The City Attorney dismissed petitioner's protest and upheld the appointment
of private respondent. This dismissal was affirmed by the CSC Regional Office
and later on appeal, by respondent CSC. Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner contends that the appointment of private respondent was made in

violation of law, existing civil service rules and established jurisprudence
because (1) the position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration was
not legally created; (2) assuming that it was, there was no qualification
standard nor valid screening procedure; and (3) the seniority and next-in-
rank rules were disregarded.
ISSUE/S: WON the appointment was valid.
HELD: YES. The position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration is

the very same position of Hospital Administrator created by Ordinance No.
1216. The Office of Hospital Administrator was not extinguished, but the
designation thereof merely corrected to reflect the proper classification of the
position under existing rules. The Office of Assistant Chief of Hospital for
Administration therefore was created and existed in accordance with law.
The determination who among the qualified candidates should be preferred

belongs to the appointing authority. The Mayor of Cebu City, in the instant
case, chose to appoint private respondent.
In other words, one who is "next in rank" to a vacancy is given preferential

consideration for promotion to the vacant position, but it does not necessarily
follow that he alone and no one else can be appointed. There is no vested
right granted the next in rank nor a ministerial duty imposed on the
appointing authority to promote the holder to the vacant position.
An appointment, whether to a vacancy or to a newly created position, is

essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested. Once a
candidate possesses the minimum qualities required by law, sufficient
discretion, if not plenary, is granted to the appointing authority. It is
markworthy that private respondent was detailed at the CCMC primarily to
help in upgrading the level of performance of the said hospital.
DIVINAGRACIA v. STO. TOMAS
PONENTE: Bellosillo, J.:

DOCTRINE: Transfer shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the

interest of public service, in which case, the employee concerned shall be
informed of the reasons therefor.

FACTS: Private respondent was the Budget Officer of Pili for almost eight (8)
years from August 1980 until her transfer in July, 1988. Nacario appeared to
be satisfied with her work and felt fulfilled as Budget Officer until Mayor Prila
appointed her MPDC to fill up the position, which was not even vacant at that
time. It was only seven (7) days after Nacario's appointment when Mayor
Prila informed Mancita that her services were being terminated.
ISSUE/S: Whether the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. Transfer shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the
interest of public service, in which case, the employee concerned shall be
informed of the reasons therefor. If the employee believes that there is no
justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the commission.
(emphasis supplied)
According to Nacario she never applied or sought appointment by transfer to
the position of MPDC since she even had no prior knowledge of her
appointment. 28 She assumed the new position only in order to comply with
the move of Mayor Prila to supposedly "reorganize" the municipal
government of Pili. Nacario did not question her transfer because she revered
the mayor and did not in any way intend to displease him.
The submissive attitude displayed by private respondent towards her transfer

is understandable. Although Nacario was not informed of the reasons therefor
she did not complain to the mayor or appeal her case to the CSC if in fact the
same was not made in the interest of public service. For it is not common
among local officials, even those permanent appointees who are more
secured and protected in their tenurial right, to oppose or question the
incumbent local executive on his policies and decisions no matter how
improper they may seem.
Simply put, Mayor Prila was so determined in terminating Mancita that he

conveniently pre-arranged her replacement by Nacario. Although Nacario
continued to discharge her duties, this did not discourage her from trying to
regain her former position. Undaunted, she applied with the Office of the
Budget Secretary for the position of Budget Officer upon learning that it was
placed under the Department of Budget and Management. She was not
however successful.
Clearly then, the unconsented lateral transfer of Nacario from the Budget
Office to the Office of MPDC was arbitrary for it amounted to removal without
cause hence, invalid as it is anathema to security of tenure. When Nacario
was extended a permanent appointment on 1 August 1980 and she assumed
the position, she acquired a legal, not merely an equitable, right to the
position. Such right to security of tenure is protected not only by statute, but
also by the Constitution 32 and cannot be taken away from her either by
removal, transfer or by revocation of appointment, except for cause, and
after prior notice.
The guarantee of security of tenure is an important object of the civil service

system because it affords a faithful employee permanence of employment, at
least for the period prescribed by law, and frees the employee from the fear
of political and personal prejudicial reprisal.
SANTIAGO JR. V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
PONENTE: Melencio-Herrera, J.:
DOCTRINE: One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration

for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he
and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to
the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to
promote such person to the next higher position.
FACTS: CSC revoked the promotional appointment of petitioner from

Collector of Customs I to Collector of Customs III and directing instead the
appointment of private respondent to the same position.
When petitioner was promoted, respondent filed a protest with the MSPB.
MSPB upheld petitioner’s promotional appointment on the grounds, among
others, that: (1) the next-in-rank rule is no longer mandatory; (2) the
protestee is competent and qualified for the position and such fact was not
questioned by the protestant; and (3) existing law and jurisprudence give
wide latitude of discretion to the appointing authority provided there is no
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or fraud.
Respondent appealed to the Board then overturned its earlier decision.
The Commission ruled that although both SANTIAGO and JOSE are qualified
for the position of Customs Collector III, JOSE has far better qualifications in
terms of educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars
and training courses taken, and holding as he does by permanent
appointment a position which is higher in rank and salary range.
ISSUE/S: Whether the revocation of petitioner’s appointment was valid.
HELD: No. There is "no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the (Civil
Service Law) that persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in
appointment. What it does provide is that they would be among the first to be
considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by
promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of
appointment."
One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion

to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one
else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder
nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such
person to the next higher position.
The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a

wide latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the position. To apply
the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the
appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualified
and eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative of
choice of the one he deems fit for appointment
ABILA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
DOCTRINE: A vacant position in the Civil Service may be filled by promotion,

transfer of present employees, reinstatement and re-employment or
appointment of outsiders who have the necessary eligibility. The next-in-rank
rule invoked by respondent Commission to justify its choice of respondent
Eleria over petitioner Abila, applies only where a vacancy is filled by
promotion, a process which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer to another
position higher either in rank or salary.
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed after Admin Officer retired. Private

respondentfiled a protest with the MSPB. The same was dismissed. Upon
appeal, MSPB reversed. It found that both petitioner Abila and private
respondent Eleria met the minimum eligibility and education requirements for
Administrative Officer IV, but ruled that respondent Eleria had the edge in
terms of rank and experience as an Administrative Officer. The Board also
held that respondent Eleria was holding a position next in rank to that of the
vacancy, which circumstance, according to the Board, under Section 4 of the
Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 83-343, gave her "promotional
priority" over petitioner.
ISSUE/S: Whether the respondent Commission has authority to substitute its

own judgment for that of the official authorized by law to make an
appointment to the government service, in the matter of weighing an
appointee's qualifications and fitness for a position, after it has been shown
that the appointee possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed for the
position.
HELD: No. CSC has no such authority, the power of appointment, which is
essentially discretionary, being vested by law in the head of the office
concerned. The head of the office is the person on the spot. He occupies the
ideal vantage point from which to identify and designate the individual who
can best fill the post and discharge its functions in the government agency he
heads. The choice of an appointee from among those who possess the
required qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for
considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of service
which can best be made by the head of the office concerned, the person
most familiar with the organizational structure and environmental
circumstances within which the appointee must function.
The Court notes that a vacant position in the Civil Service may be filled by
promotion, transfer of present employees, reinstatement and re-employment
or appointment of outsiders who have the necessary eligibility. The next-in-
rank rule invoked by respondent Commission to justify its choice of
respondent Eleria over petitioner Abila, applies only where a vacancy is filled
by promotion, a process which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer to
another position higher either in rank or salary. A promotion involves a
situation quite different from the situation in the case at bar where the
appointment of petitioner Abila was effected through lateral transfer from a
position in one department of the city government to a position of greater
responsibility in another department of the same government.
The Court further notes that even if the vacancy here had been filled by
promotion rather than by lateral transfer, the concept of "next in rank" does
not import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that the person next in
rank must be appointed to the vacancy. What Section 19 (3) of P.D. No. 807,
the Civil Service Law, provides is that if a vacancy is filled by a promotion, the
person holding the position next in rank thereto "shall be considered for
promotion."
MEDENILLA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
DOCTRINE: The Civil Service Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment. It is not within its prerogative to revoke an appointee on the
ground that substituting its judgment for that of the appointing power,
another person has better qualifications for the job.
NATURE: Petition seeking the annulment of the resolutions issued by the

CSC
FACTS: Petitioner was a contractual employee of the DPWH occupying the

position of Public Relations Officer II. A reorganization ensued within the
DPWH and all the positions therein were abolished. A revised staffing pattern
together with the guidelines on the selection and placement of personnel was
issued. This included the contested position of Supervising Human Resource
Development Officer to which position petitioner was appointed. Respondents
lodged a protest before the DPWH task force on reorganization contesting the
appointment of the petitioner to the position. CSC revoked appointment.
ISSUE/S: Whether there is merit in the protest.
HELD: No. While the appointing authority is given the wide latitude of
discretion, to sustain the appointment of Medenilla may give the appointing
power unnecessary opportunities to act capriciously and thus thwart the
natural and reasonable expectation of the officer next-in-rank to any vacant
position, to be promoted to it.
We have already ruled on several occasions that when the appointee is

qualified, the Civil Service Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment. It is not within its prerogative to revoke an appointee on the
ground that substituting its judgment for that of the appointing power,
another person has better qualifications for the job.
Once the function is discharged, the participation of the Civil Service

Commission in the appointment process ceases. The only purpose of
attestation is to determine whether the appointee possesses the requisite
civil service eligibility, no more than that is left for the Civil Service
Commission to do. The rationale of this doctrine is that the power of
appointment is essentially discretionary. The discretion to be granted to the
appointing authority, if not plenary must at least be sufficient.
LUSTERIO v. IAC
PONENTE: DAVIDE, JR., J.:

DOCTRINE: Appointing authority had the discretion to determine who of

those qualified should be appointed to the contested position.

FACTS: Plaintiff protested the appointment of private respondent to Supply
Officer. Protest was denied.
Upon appeal, CSC reversed and revoked appointment. However, when it went
to the TC, the trial court ruled that (a) pursuant to Section 19(3) of P.D. No.
807 (The Civil Service Decree) and the Rules on Personnel Actions and
Policies promulgated by the Civil Service Commission on 20 November 1975
on next-in-rank positions, the position of Supervisory Fiscal Clerk previously
occupied by private respondent, is immediately next to the contested
position in the organizational chart of the Division of Quezon for the
Administrative Staff. Upon the other hand, petitioner, prior to his
appointment to the contested position, was Supply Officer I in Lucban
National High School in Lucban, Quezon; consequently, he does not belong to
the organizational unit where the vacancy exists. Circular No. 5, Series of
1963 of the then Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports provides that "for
reasons of equity and morale, fully qualified employees within the
organizational unit, all circumstances being equal, should have first call upon
promotional opportunities," (b) Moreover, Palomar is a college graduate with
a degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce with three units in Master of
Arts; he has participated and completed in service training courses along
supply and property management; held the positions of Clerk-Helper, Clerk-
Typist, Clerk I, Fiscal Clerk III and Supervising Fiscal Clerk; performed the
duties of a Supply Officer III since his appointment in April 1977 until October
1979 with a latest performance rating of very satisfactory; and a first grade
civil service eligibility. He thus meets all the requirements for appointment to
the contested position. (c) Finally, the appointment of petitioner, made
pursuant to the decision of then Presidential Executive Assistant, Hon. Jacobo
Clave, as recommended by the Civil Service Commission, is not in accordance
with law, for as noted, the Chairman of the Commission at the time of the
recommendation was Honorable Clave himself. Pursuant then to Anzaldo vs.
Clave, G.R. No. 54597, 119 SCRA 353, Palomar was denied due process.
Petitioner appealed but IAC dismissed his appeal from TC.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner and private respondent meet the

minimum requirements for the position of Supply Officer III.
HELD: No. Even if We grant for the sake of argument that petitioner is also
qualified, the appointing authority had the discretion to determine who of
those qualified should be appointed to the contested position. Per the settled
doctrine adverted to above, the Merit Systems Board, the Civil Service
Commission and the Office of the President, through Presidential Executive
Assistant Jacobo Clave, committed an error, amounting to grave abuse of
discretion, when they rescinded the appointment of the private respondent
and directed the appointing authority to appoint the petitioner. More
specifically, the only act these bodies were authorized to do, if they were
convinced otherwise, was to disapprove the appointment of private
respondent. They cannot have gone any further to encroach on the discretion
of the appointing authority to appoint another who is qualified. This is
practically analogous to a situation where two or more aspirants are qualified
for a vacant position and the Commission finds them to be so.
That recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it
from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the petitioner's
appointment.
PEOPLE V. REYES
PONENTE: Puno, J.:
DOCTRINE: The transfer of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of

the appointing authority. If the transfer or detail of a government officer or
employee be done to promote efficiency in the government service, then it
will not be penalized.
NATURE: Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
FACTS: Ebio was transferred to the Office of the Deputy of Collector of

Customs. He filed a letter-complaint with the COMELEC for his transfer
claiming that it was prohibited because of the COMELEC ban. Upon
investigation, COMELEC charged respondent Maniego of a violation of the
election on transfer. Maniego moved to quash the information. TC granted.
ISSUE/S: Whether the transfer during election period ipso facto is an election
offense.
HELD: No. Section 261(h) of BP 881 does not per se outlaw the transfer of a
government officer or employee during the election period. The transfer of a
public officer or employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority. If the
transfer or detail of a government officer or employee be done to promote
efficiency in the government service, then it will not be penalized. In the case
at bench, respondent transferred Ebio before the promulgation of necessary
rules on how to get approval on transfer or detail were issued by COMELEC. It
cannot be said that Section 261(h) of BP 881 was already enforceable before
the effectivity of these rules.
VINZONS-CHATO v. NATIVIDAD
PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J.:
DOCTRINE: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to assign or

reassign internal revenue officers and employees of the BIR as the exigencies
of service may require, without demotion in rank and salary in accordance
with Civil Service Rules and Regulation.

FACTS: On December 10, 1993, petitioner Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, citing the "exigencies of the revenue service," issued Revenue
Travel Assignment Order No. 80-93 (RTAO 80-93), directing ninety revenue
district officers to report to new assignments in the redesignated and
renumbered revenue district offices nationwide. Private respondent Salvador
Nori Blas was ordered to report to Revenue District No. 14 in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan. In turn, petitioner Solon B. Alcantara was ordered to report to Blas'
former post in San Fernando, Pampanga, now known as Revenue District No.
21.
Blas’ Contention
All that he asserts is his constitutional right to protection from a demotion not
for cause, and without his consent under the guise of a "transfer in the
exigencies of the service". He contends that his transfer constitutes a
demotion because, in effect, his span of control in terms of jurisdiction and
personnel has been considerably diminished. He claims that he has earned,
through hard work, as evidenced by his service record, the position at San
Fernando, Pampanga which has a larger staff and revenue capacity and is
much closer to Manila.
Chato’s Contention
1. Private respondent did not have any vested right to his station in San
Fernando, Pampanga since he was only designated to the post and not
appointed thereto. Neither did private respondent show any right to be
exempted from the reorganization.
2. Neither was the transfer a demotion, since there was no reduction in

duties, responsibilities, status, rank, or salary.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON there is a reduction in duties and responsibilities
2. WON there was a demotion and dislocation on the part of the plaintiff when
the public defendant Chato issued Revenue Travel Assignment Order (RTAO)
No. 80-93.
HELD: (NONE)
1. Blas’ transfer to the Tuguegarao revenue district did not really entail any
diminution in rank, salary, status and responsibilities. Private respondent's
claim that the Tuguegarao revenue district is smaller than that in San
Fernando, Pampanga has no basis because, as already noted, the
classification of RDOs' into Class A-1, A, B, C and D has been abolished and
all RDO's are now considered to be of the same class.
2. Blas’ transfer is part of a nationwide reshuffle or reassignment of revenue

district officers designed to improve revenue collection. His new assignment
should therefore be considered by him a challenge to his leadership as
revenue district officer rather than a demotion or a penalty.
3. Private respondent failed to show patent illegality in the action of the

Commissioner constituting violation of his right to security of tenure. To
sustain his contention that his transfer constitutes a demotion simply
because the new assignment is not to his liking would be to subordinate
government projects.
VINZONS-CHATO v. ZENOROSA
PONENTE: Buena, J.:
DOCTRINE: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to assign or

with Civil Service Rules and Regulation.
FACTS: Vinzons-Chato, issued Revenue Travel Assignment Order which

reassigned respondents from Assistant Revenue District Officer to Assistant
Division Chief, and assigned in her place, as Assistant Regional District Officer
of RDO No. 34 was Jacinto T. Marcelo.
Respondent filed an injunction to restrain petitioner Marcelo from assuming

the post of Assistant Regional District Officer of RDO No. 34.
According to private respondent, petitioner Chato, in a clear act of spite,

whim, and vindictiveness against a subordinate employee who dared to
question petitioners' unlawful acts, issued the now questioned RTAO 8-95.
Acting on the petition, the trial court issued a TRO.
Private respondent on November 10, 1998, she claims that she was
compelled to use her accumulated leave credits amounting to over 350
working days in order to resist the order of petitioner Chato. Thus, she prays
for the nullification of the unlawful orders of Petitioner Chato so that private
respondent's accumulated leave credits will be restored.
ISSUE/S: Whether the TC erred in issuing a TRO.
HELD: Yes. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is authorized to assign or

with Civil Service Rules and Regulation. The primary reason why private
respondent refuses to comply with RTAO 8-95 was because she took it as an
act of vindictiveness and reprisal on the part of the Commissioner,
consequent to her filing a complaint against the assigned RDO of RDO No. 34
Isidoro Tecson, Jr. (now deceased), on the basis of a prior assignment order
issued by the Commissioner. Nowhere in the assignment order, RTAO 8-95,
can it be gleaned that the reassignment was for the purpose of harassing
private respondent. In fact, private respondent was not the only one
reassigned to a new post.
There is no merit in the argument of private respondent that she will be

demoted by her transfer
We therefore find that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed writ of preliminary injunction.
CRISTOBAL v. MELCHOR
PONENTE: Munoz Palma, J.:
DOCTRINE:
NATURE: Petition seeking the annulment of the resolutions issued by the

CSC
FACTS: Petitioner was formerly employed as a private secretary in the
President's Private Office, Malacañang, Manila, having been appointed to that
position on July 1, 1961 Then Executive Secretary Amelito R. Mutuc, by
means of a letter dated January 1, 1962, informed the plaintiff that his
services as private secretary in the President's Private Office were
"terminated effective today."
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Appellant Cristobal his right to seek judicial relief
for not having filed his complaint within the one-year period provided for in
Section 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court
HELD: No. (a) Jose Cristobal consistently pressed for a reconsideration of his
separation from the service; (b) he was give n assurance that would be
recalled at the opportune time; and (c) that he sudden termination of his
employment without cause after eight years of service in the government is
contrary to law following the ruling Ingles vs, Mutuc which inures to the
benefit of Cristobal who is similarly situated as the plaintiffs in said case and
who merely desisted from joining the suit because of the assurance given
him that he would be recalled to the service - with all these factors, We
repeat, there is justification for not applying existing jurisprudence to his
case.
This Court, applying the principle of equity, need not be bound to a rigid
application of the law, but rather its action should conform to the conditions
or exigencies to a given problem or situation in order to grant a relief that will
serve the ends of justice.
SABELLO v. DECS
PONENTE: Gancayco, J.:

DOCTRINE: The absolute disqualification from office or ineligibility from

public office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code
and that pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Although such pardon
restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entitle him to automatic
reinstatement.
FACTS: Petitioner, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also
the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of the Division of
Gingoog City. She, together with the barrio captain, were charged of the
violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to suffer a sentence
of one year and disqualification to hold public office. The herein petitioner
appealed his case to the Court of appeals, Manila. The Court of appeals
modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount being involved. The
herein petitioner, being financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to
proceed to the highest court of the land.
Finally, the herein petitioner was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the

President of the Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to 'full civil and
political rights.' With this instrument on hand, the herein petitioner applied
for reinstatement to the government service, only to be reinstated to the
wrong position of a mere classroom teacher and not to his former position as
Elementary School Principal I.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his former

position.
HELD: Yes. In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., this Court held that the absolute
disqualification from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed under the penal code and that pardon frees the
individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all
his civil rights. Although such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it
does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for
reappointment to said office.
In the present case after his absolute pardon, petitioner was reinstated to the
service as a classroom teacher by the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports.
As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank,
justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position of
Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom teacher.
However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from September 1,
1971 to November 23, 1982 since in Monsanto 4 this Court said he is not
entitled to automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was lawfully separated from
the government service upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although his
reinstatement had been duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to
backwages. Such right is afforded only to those who have been illegally
dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted

of the charge against them.
In the same light, the Court cannot decree that his government service be
made continuous from September 10, 1948 to the present when it is not. At
any rate when he reaches the compulsory age of retirement, he shall get the
appropriate retirement benefits as an Elementary School Principal I and not
as a mere classroom teacher.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN
PONENTE: Fernan, C.J.:
DOCTRINE: In line with the government's crusade to restore absolute

honesty in public service, this Office adopts, as a juridical guide that
acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground
for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his
salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite.
NATURE: Petition to review resolution of the Deputy Executive Secretary

FACTS: Petitioner (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other
accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents
and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were
further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum
of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay
the costs proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently

affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said
motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then
President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21,
1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer

requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant. Petitioner's basic theory is that the general
rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was
extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in
this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her
employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have
been terminated or forfeited. In other words, without that final judgment of
conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach and the
status of her employment remained "suspended." More importantly, when
pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal
because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President has
declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has accordingly dismissed
the same. 4
ISSUE/S: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former
position without need of a new appointment.
HELD: No. In line with the government's crusade to restore absolute honesty
in public service, this Office adopts, as a juridical guide that acquittal, not
absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for
reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his
salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite. In fact, in such a situation, the former public official
must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former position.
It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the complex

crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced to
imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional
as minimum, to ten years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. The
penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal penalty. Temporary
absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or employment,
such disqualification to last during the term of the sentence.
CABAGNOT v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
PONENTE: Romero, J.:
DOCTRINE: The CSC, as the central personnel agency, has the obligation to
implement and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure
and due process.
NATURE: Petition seeks the reversal of CSC Resolutions

FACTS: A new organizational structure and staffing pattern of the provincial
government of Aklan was approved by the Joint Commission on Local
Government Personnel Administration.
The reorganization provided three hundred sixty four (364) regular plantilla
positions from the previous three hundred thirty nine (339) with the Office of
the Governor allocated one hundred forty four (144) from the previous sixty
(60) positions.
Petitioner herein, issued a Memorandum inviting all provincial officials and

employees to apply for any of the authorized positions in the new staffing
pattern for the evaluation and assessment of the Provincial Placement
Committee.
21 supposedly aggrieved employees jointly appealed to petitioner pursuant

to Section 18 of the Rules on Government Reorganization issued by the Civil
Service Commission and Sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 12 of Republic Act 6656
(1988) entitled An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Officers and
Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization. They
prayed that they be appointed to the positions they applied for to which they
are eligible, having the required educational background, training and
experience. They likewise sent petitioner individual letters reiterating their
qualifications and praying for reconsideration of their new appointments to
positions lower in rank than their positions prior to the reorganization.
Petitioner denied their plea.
Upon appeal, CSC found that irregularities attended the election of the two
members representing the first and second level personnel to the Placement
Committee based on the affidavit executed by one Nida E. Melgarejo and the
letter appeal of some thirty-seven (37) employees of the provincial
government of Aklan. Furthermore, it found petitioner to have violated Sec. 7
of the Rules on Reorgnization and Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. of 1988
providing preference for appointment of employees holding permanent
positions considering that private respondents who were all holding
permanent appointments to regular items prior to the reorganization were
proposed to positions much lower than their former items despite the fact
that their old items were carried over in the new staffing pattern. The
Commission found no reason for displacing the services of private
respondents primarily because there are eighty-four (84) additional positions
for the Office of the Governor alone.
The CSC found that sixteen (16) of the seventeen (17) private respondents
were demoted because of the wide disparity between the former positions
held by them and the positions to which they were proposed by petitioner.
ISSUE/S: Whether CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating

the dismissed employees.
HELD: Yes. With respect to the sixteen private respondents, respondent

Commission committed no grave abuse of discretion in ordering that they be
"immediately appointed and restored to their positions or positions of
comparable or equivalent rank without loss of seniority rights with back
salaries reckoned from dates they should properly have been appointed
thereto effective the date of the reorganization of said province."
It is within the power of public respondent to order the reinstatement of

government employees who have been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as the
central personnel agency, has the obligation to implement and safeguard the
constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due process. In the present
case, the issuance by the CSC of the questioned resolutions, for the reasons
clearly explained therein, is indubitably in the performance of its
constitutional task of protecting and strengthening the civil service.
However, with respect to private respondent Oczon, we hold that respondent

Commission did commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering his
reinstatement with back salary, considering that he was not terminated as a
result of the reorganization.
REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS
PONENTE: Melencio-Herrera, J.:

DOCTRINE: A "detail" is the movement from one Department or Agency to

another which is temporary in nature whereas a "re-assignment" is the
movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the
same Department or Agency.
NATURE: Petition for Review on certiorari
FACTS: Without proper authorization, respondent returned to his former

position as Assistant Director which prompted petitioner to issue two (2)
Memoranda: The first was addressed to the CYRC Staff advising that
Respondent Lopez would not be considered an active member of the Staff
until he first secured the proper authorization for his transfer. The other was
addressed to Lopez himself requesting him to submit an official order
terminating his "detail."
Respondent insisted on the validity of his resumption of office stating that "no
one can be detailed for more than three (3) months without the written
consent of the employee concerned" and that "detailed assignment beyond
six (6) months has to be approved by the CSC and the Office of the
President." He also admonished Petitioner Corpuz to recall and/or rectify her
memoranda.
Petitioner withheld a portion of respondent’s salary on the ground that

respondent’s attendance is not considered official.
On 1 April 1985, Respondent Lopez filed a Petition for mandamus with

Damages against Petitioner Corpuz, Minister Laya, and the Chief,
Administrative Services, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135 of
Makati, Metro Manila.
ISSUE/S: (1) whether or not Petitioner Corpuz was justified in refusing to

take official cognizance of Respondent Lopez's attendance as Assistant
Director at the CYRC and in withholding his salaries corresponding to the
period; and (2) whether or not she can be held liable in damages for such
acts.
HELD: 1) Yes. It will be recalled that Respondent Lopez returned to the CYRC
at his own instance without any authorization from higher authorities.
Petitioner Corpuz as CYRC Director, officially advised him to secure that
clearance, but he adamantly refused to obey a directive from his immediate
superior. Under the circumstances, Petitioner Corpuz as head of the office,
was left with no alternative but to withhold recognition of his attendance at
the CYRC. To maintain discipline in the office, and in the interests of the
service, she could do no less.
Indeed, a "detail" is the movement from one Department or Agency to

another which is temporary in nature whereas a "re-assignment" is the
movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the
same Department or Agency.
Respondent brought upon himself the withholding of his salaries. When he

reported back to the CYRC on 18 February 1985 he did so at his own instance
without prior authorization. He was advised to secure such clearance on 21

February 1985 but he refused. The directive to obtain the same was
reiterated on 27 February 1985 by Petitioner Corpuz. Instead of complying,
he addressed a letter on 6 March 1985 to the Deputy Minister requesting
clarification.
TEOTICO v. AGDA
PONENTE: Davide, Jr. J.:
DOCTRINE: Not having been appointed to any specific station, he could be

tranferred or assigned to any other place by the head of office where in the
opinion of the latter his services may be utilized more effectively.
NATURE: Original petition for certiorari and prohibition,
FACTS: Lanuza "temporarily re-assigned" Agda, "in the interest of the

service," at the main office of the Administrator to perform special functions
which may be assigned to him, and one Mr. Epitacio Lanuza, Jr., Assistant
Fiber Regional Administrator, was designated Officer in Charge of FIDA
Region I.
Agda prepared for filing with the CSC an Urgent Petition To Stop
Implementation and Nullify Special Order No. 219, s. '87, alleging therein that
the Special Order is (a) devoid of legal basis as it does not preserve and
maintain a status quo before the controversy, (b) against the interest of
public service considering that Epitacio Lanuza has been cited for two cases
both involving dishonesty, abuse of privileges and character unbecoming a
government official, (c) improper, inappropriate and devoid of moral
justification, and (d) a violation of Civil Service rules and regulation
considering that it violates the rule on nepotism since Epitacio Lanuza and
Administrator Lanuza are cousins.
Petitioner as Acting Administrator of FIDA issued a Memorandum to Agda

directing him to immediately submit his development programs Also, Mr.
Seguritan, requested Teotico to require Agda to turn over to him (Seguritan)
the keys of the vault in FIDA Region I. Teotico referred the request to Agda
with the note: "For immediate compliance pls. so as not to hamper the
conduct of our operations and service in Region I."
Agda refused and so Teotico formally charged him for insubordination and
conduct prejudical to the best interest of the service.
Agda filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction with
preliminary injunction and restraining order against Teotico and the three (3)
members of the FIDA-AC alleging, in substance, that Special Order No. 219 of
13 November 1987 issued by then Fida Administrator Lanuza is null and void
for having been issued in violation of Section 48 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service
Decree) which prohibits the detail or re-assignment of civil service personnel
within three months before an election and Section 261(h) of Batas
Pambansa Blg 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which prohibits transfer or
detail of officers and employees in the civil service within the election period
except upon prior approval of the Commission on Elections, and that all
succeeding orders or memoranda issued in connection with or by reason of
such Special Order or in implementation thereof are likewise null and void.
The election referred to was the January 18, 1988 local election. He further
alleges therein that he "is filing" with the COMELEC criminal charges for
violation of Sections 3, 261(h) and 264 of B. P. No. 881 against former
Administrator Lanuza and Teotico and applied for an injunction. RTC upheld
Agda saying that the latter was denied due process.
ISSUE/S: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion .
HELD: Yes. Agda was not appointed as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA
Region I, but as CHIEF FIBER DEVELOPMENT OFFICER; he was not appointed
to any specific station. He was merely designated as Acting Regional
Administrator For FIDA Regions I and II.
Not having been appointed to any specific station, he could be tranferred or

assigned to any other place by the head of office where in the opinion of the
latter his services may be utilized more effectively.
The Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807, allows transfer, detail and re-
assignment. If the employee concerned believes that there is no justification
therefore, he "may appeal his case to" the CSC.
We are not persuaded by Agda's claim that the questioned detail was done in
violation of Section 261(h) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election
Code) Considering that (a) he raised this matter for the first time only in his
Amended Petition, or five (5) months after the issuance of the Special Order.
No evidence has been presented, or at least strongly and convincingly
suggested, to prove or show that no prior approval was obtained by
Administrator Lanuza from the COMELEC for such detail, or that a case for
violation of Section 261(h) was in fact filed against Lanuza or Teotico. All that
Agda can show are his alleged letter to the COMELEC to inquire if Special
Order No. 219 had been referred to it and an alleged answer dated 14 April
1988 of Atty. Horacio SJ Apostol, Manager of the Law Department of the
Commission, to the effect that the records of the Department do not show, as
of that date, that the Special Order was submitted or referred to the
Commission. The latter is not conclusive proof that no prior authority was in
fact obtained by Administrator Lanuza for the reassignment or detail of Agda.
No law requires the submission. to the COMELEC of special orders reassigning
or detailing employees within the prohibited period. What is needed is "prior
authority," the request for which and its approval may be in separate
documents or papers.
The writ was improvidently and capriciously issued. The issuance of the writ,
although addressed to the sound discretion of the court, is conditioned on the
existence of a clear and positive right which should be protected.
CARIÑO v. DAOAS
PONENTE: Kapunan, J.:
DOCTRINE: It is true that the transfer or detail of a public officer or

employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority and that it can be done
as the exigencies of the public service may require.
FACTS: Cristina Jenny Cariño was appointed Accountant III in the National
Commission for Indigenous People. She was later reassigned by Daoas to the
position of Technical Assistant of the Socio-Economic Division. She alleged
that her reassignment was an offshoot of her refusal to sign a Disbursement
Voucher for the travel expenses to Indonesia of RD Rosalina Bistoyong. She
further alleged that the position was non-existent.
She filed an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct, Oppression and

Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against Bistoyong.
Daoas issued a Notice/Order of Separation, dated 25 April 1997, and received

by Cariño on 13 May 1997 informing her that she was dropped from the rolls
because of her absence without leave for more than thirty (30) days.
ISSUE/S: 1) Whether the termination is valid; 2) Whether the reassignment is

null and void
HELD: No. As correctly stated by the CA, the validity of the reassignment of
petitioner was already settled by the pronouncement of the CSC that such
reassignment was not valid and that she could not be transferred to another
region without her consent. It is true that the transfer or detail of a public
officer or employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority and that it
can be done as the exigencies of the public service may require. As such, this
Court in a number of cases allowed the reassignment of personnel but in such
instances, they were not appointed to a specific station or particular unit or
agency.
The rule proscribes transfers without consent of officers appointed - not

merely assigned - to a particular station, such as in the case of herein
petitioner who was appointed as Accountant III in Region I. Hence, she could
not be reassigned to another station or region without her consent.
Otherwise, the unconsented transfer would amount to a removal.8
2) No Petitioner has good cause for not complying with the reassignment
order. In this case, petitioner, instead of complying with the reassignment
order, continued to report to her workstation in Region I. For her failure to
report to Region II, she was considered AWOL and was dropped from the rolls.
The dropping of petitioner from the rolls was sustained by the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court cited Resolution No. 98-0488 of the Civil Service
Commission which mandates that "a reassigned employee who does not
agree with the order must nevertheless comply until its implementation is
restrained or it is declared to be not in the interest of the service or have
been issued with grave abuse of discretion." According to the appellate court,
petitioner should have asked the Commission to enjoin the effectivity of her
reassignment order, and for her failure to do so, she had only herself to
blame.
It was not petitioner who appealed to the Commission as there was no need
for her to do so.
PASTOR v. CITY OF PASIG
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.:
DOCTRINE: It has been held that a reassignment that is indefinite and

results in a reduction in rank, status, and salary is in effect a constructive
removal from the service.
FACTS: Petitioner is Budget Officer of the Municipality (now City) of Pasig. In

1992, she was reassigned to the Office of the Municipal Administrator
pending investigation of reports against her concerning the issuance of
Advice of Allotments by her. In 1995, after three years with no case filed
against her, she asked for reinstatement to her former position. But she was
instead reassigned to another unit of the now city government.
CSC ordered her reinstatement as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig.

However, on appeal of the city government, the CA set aside the decision of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S: Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals should be set aside
and that of the CSC reinstated.
HELD: Yes. It has been held that a reassignment that is indefinite and results
in a reduction in rank, status, and salary is in effect a constructive removal
from the service. In this case, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals,
petitioner's reassignment to different offices in the local government of Pasig
City is indefinite. Petitioner has been on virtual floating assignments which
cannot but amount to a diminution of her rank, hence impermissible under
the law. As already noted, her reassignment began in 1992 with her detail to
the Office of the (now) City Administrator pending investigation of reports
that she had issued Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash collections.
However, no investigation appears to have ever been conducted on the said
charge. To justify her continuing reassignment, respondent City Mayor
claimed that the same was "due to petitioner's long years of experience in
finance" which especially fitted her for studies regarding the city's revenues.
For the same reason, petitioner's reassignment to various offices should be

considered more than merely a temporary one. For all intents and purposes,
her reassignment, lasting nearly ten years now, is a removal without cause as
Budget Officer of the City of Pasig.
TUPAS v. NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION
DOCTRINE: The civil service now covers only government owned or

controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those
created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated
under and pursuant to a general legislation. Since the NHC is a GOCC without
an original charter, it is not covered by the Civil Service Law but by the Labor
Code.
FACTS: National Housing Corporation is a corporation organized in under

Executive Order No. 399 of the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations.
Its shares of stock are and have been 100% owned by the government from
its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law. The government
entities that own its shares of stock are the GSIS, SSS, DBP, the National
Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation. On the other hand, Trade Unions of the Philippines and
Allied Services is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.
In 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with
DOLE Regional Office in order to determine the exclusive bargaining
representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members
comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition was
dismissed by the med-arbiter holding that NHC being a government-owned
and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form,
join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining
pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code.
TUPAS appealed to BLR which, in turn, reversed the med-arbiter and ordered
a certification election to be conducted. However, the same was reversed in
the MR. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:WON a certification election may be conducted among the NHC

employees
HELD: Yes. Under the present (1987) Constitution, the civil service now
covers only government owned or controlled corporations with original or
legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special
law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation.
Since the NHC is a GOCC without an original charter, it is not covered by the
Civil Service Law but by the Labor Code.
Anyway, whether the NHC is covered by Labor Code or the Civil Service Law
is beside the point. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now
explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and
the private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that the right of the people,
including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
SSS v. COURT OF APPEALS
PONENTE: Cortes, J:
DOCTRINE: Employees of GOCCs with original charter are prohibited from

engaging in strikes.
FACTS: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and
members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to
the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work
and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was
reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the
strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that
the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that
a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the
strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein)
be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the
union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old
SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues;
payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay;
conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or
more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement
to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular
employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00,
and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the
employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor
practices [Rollo, pp. 21-241].
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order
pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
[Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging
the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.]
To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the
issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. On July 22,1987, in a

four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted
the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding
that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83- 86]. As petitioners' motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14, 1988
[Rollo, p. 94], petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 79577. In a resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the
Third Division, resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court
of Appeals on March 9,1988 promulgated its decision on the referred case
[Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to recall the Court of Appeals'
decision. In the meantime, the Court on June 29,1988 denied the motion for
reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners'
motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied in view
of this Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141- 143].
Hence, the instant petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
[Rollo, pp. 12-37].
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from
pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp.
151-152].
The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and
supplemental reply filed by petitioners, considered the issues joined and the
case submitted for decision.
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining
order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the
Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations
Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that
the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and
regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to
strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute,
the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary

injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the
employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to
strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had
jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing with their
strike.
ISSUE/S:1) Whether or not the RTC can enjoin the Social Security System
Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking
employees to return to work. 2) Whether or not employees of the Social

Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
HELD: 1) The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to

petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to
restrain it.
2) No. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where
the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government
employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation
with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the
strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
BANGALISAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
DOCTRINE: While the Constitution recognizes the right of government

employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action
which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services.
NATURE: Appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the Court of Appeals
FACTS: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public
school teachers who staged "mass actions" on September 17 to 19, 1990 to
dramatize their grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of the
public authorities to implement in a just and correct manner certain laws and
measures intended for their material benefit.
The Secretary of the (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed

to comply with said order, hence they were charged by the Secretary with
"grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law,
rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform
official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines." They were
simultaneously placed under preventive suspension.
Despite due notice, petitioners failed to submit their answer to the complaint.
On October 30, 1990, the DECS Secretary rendered a decision finding
petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing them from the service effective
immediately. It was later modified to suspension for nine months without pay.
ISSUE/S: Whether the teachers have the right to strike.
HELD: No. It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the
public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes
the right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only to
the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.
Petitioners contend, however, that they were not on strike but were merely
exercising their constitutional right peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. We find such pretension devoid of
merit.
The issue of whether or not the mass action launched by the public school
teachers during the period from September up to the first half of October,
1990 was a strike has been decided by this Court in a resolution, dated
December 18, 1990, in the herein cited case of Manila Public School Teachers
Association, et al. vs. Laguio, Jr., supra. It was there held "that from the
pleaded and admitted facts, these 'mass actions' were to all intents and
purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage
of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty to perform,
undertaken for essentially economic reasons."
It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners'
purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact
that the conventional term "strike" was not used by the striking employees to
describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the
substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling.
BORROMEO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr., J.:
DOCTRINE: The terminal leave pay of qualified members of the Judiciary and
Constitutional Commissions who retired or shall retire on or after the
February, 1986 political upheaval shall be based on highest monthly salary
plus COLA and RATA.
FACTS: Petitioner wrote a letter to COA Chairman, coursed through the CSC
Chairman, requesting an opinion on whether or not the money value of the
terminal leave of retired Constitutional Commission members should include
the allowances received at the time of retirement. The petitioner, in his letter,
further stated that while retired members of other Constitutional
Commissions received terminal leave pay computed on the basis of highest
monthly salary including allowances, the former's terminal leave was
computed solely on the basis of highest monthly salary.
Upon the petitioner's request for payment of terminal leave differential

representing the unpaid COLA and RATA amounting to P111,229.04, the CSC
Chairman informed the petitioner that the release of the corresponding
advice of allotment and cash outlay to cover the payment of his terminal
leave differential had already been requested from the DBM.
In a letter addressed to the CSC Chairman, the DBM denied the petitioner's
request for payment of terminal leave differential for the following reasons,
among others:
1) Computation of the money value of vacation and sick leave is based on

"basic pay" or "basic salary" pursuant to the provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by R.A. No. 1081.
2) Under Section 2(1) of P.D. No. 1146, the term salary refers to the basic pay
or salary received by an employee, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime
pay and allowance.
3) The cases of former COA Commissioners Pobre and Sarmiento cannot be

validly invoked as precedents for purposes of DBM Budgetary action since
said claims were processed without prior involvement of the DBM.
Faced with the DBM refusal to release the corresponding allotment, the CSC
yielded to DBM instead of asserting its initial determination. It issued
Resolution No. 90-514 dated May 30, 1990 wherein the Commission deemed
it proper not to rule on the issue on "ethical considerations" and
"compulsions of delicadeza" and advised the petitioner to file an action for
declaratory relief (sic) on the issue with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not RATA and COLA should be added to the highest
monthly salary in computing the petitioner's terminal leave pay.
HELD: The terminal leave pay of qualified members of the Judiciary and
Constitutional Commissions who retired or shall retire on or after the
February, 1986 political upheaval shall be based on highest monthly salary

plus COLA and RATA.
It is clear from RA 91 0 as amended that the five-year gratuity is based on

highest monthly salary plus transportation, living and representation
allowance.
"Commutation of salary" as used in Section 286 is, however, not the same as
"commutation of leave credits." The former is applied for by an employee
during employment when he goes on ordinary leave.
VITAL-GOZON v. COURT OF APPEALS
PONENTE: Davide Jr., J.:
DOCTRINE: Under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and 2217 of the
Civil Code, a public officer, like petitioner herein, may be liable for moral
damages for as long as the moral damages suffered by private respondent
were the proximate result of petitioner's wrongful act or omission, i.e., refusal
to perform an official duty or neglect in the performance thereof.
NATURE: Petition seeks to reverse the CA Resolution
FACTS: In the early months of 1987 — and pursuant to Executive Order No.
119 issued on January 30, 1987 by president Corazon C. Aquino —
reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health commenced;
existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnel effected.
At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief
of Clinics of the National Children's Hospital, having been appointed to that
position on December 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he occupied the post of
Medical Specialist II, a position to which he was promoted in 1977 after
serving as Medical Specialist I of the same hospital for six (6) years (since
1971).
On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the Department of

Health that he would be re-appointed "Medical Specialist II." Considering this
to be a demotion by no less than two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics,
Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board. When his
protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission
where it was docketed as CSC Case No. 4. In the meantime "the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over
to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr."
Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals denied her due process by
refusing to admit her answer, considering that: (a) she personally attended
each and every hearing of the mandamus case; (b) in its decision of 9 June
1989, the Court of Appeals explicitly declared that it was not the proper
forum for the claim for damages, at which point then the necessity of an
answer had become moot; (c) it was only on 27 September 1989 that the
Court of Appeals reconsidered its decision of 9 June 1989 thereby upholding
its jurisdiction to hear the claims for damages; (d) but then, consistent with
her stand that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the claims for
damages, she assailed such ruling before this Court, hence she could not
have been expected to file an answer; (e) nonetheless, upon receipt of the
adverse decision of this Court of 4 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428, she
immediately filed her answer with a corresponding motion for its admission;
and (f) while her motion for admission of the answer had been pending since
18 October 1992, the Court of Appeals did not act on it until it was already
her turn to present her evidence on the claim for damages.
ISSUE/S: 1) whether petitioner was denied due process when her answer to
the petition was not admitted; and 2) whether the awards of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees were proper.
HELD: 1) No. The record of CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 shows that in the resolution
of 29 December 1998, the Court of Appeals gave due course to private
respondent's petition and required herein petitioner and the other
respondents to answer the petition within 10 days from notice of the
resolution. Clearly, therefore, petitioner's failure to file the answer to the
petition was due to her fault or negligence. She was, by formal resolutions of
the Court of Appeals, required to file answers to both the original petition and
the Supplemental/Amended Petition; yet, she failed to heed both resolutions.
2) It is thus evident that under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and
2217 of the Civil Code, a public officer, like petitioner herein, may be liable
for moral damages for as long as the moral damages suffered by private
respondent were the proximate result of petitioner's wrongful act or
omission, i.e., refusal to perform an official duty or neglect in the
performance thereof.
There can be no question that private respondent was entitled to be restored

to his position as Chief of Clinics by virtue of the final and executory decision
of the Civil Service Commission. Petitioner, as head or chief of the National
Children's Hospital, then had the duty to see to it that the decision be obeyed
and implemented. This she failed to do and private respondent's two official
demands for compliance with the Civil Service Commission's decision were
merely referred by petitioner to the Legal Department of the Department of
Health; and as further noted by this Court in its decision in G.R. No. 101428,
"she did not answer [private respondent's] letters not even to inform him of
the referral thereof to the Assistant Secretary [for Legal Affairs]. She chose
simply to await 'legal guidance from the DOH Legal Department.'"
MANCENIDO v. COURT OF APPEALS

PONENTE: Quisumbing, J.:
DOCTRINE: Only when the provincial fiscal is disqualified may the municipal
council be authorized to hire the services of a special attorney
NATURE: This is a petition for review.
FACTS: Mancenido filed an action for mandamus and damages with the RTC
against the petitioners provincial board of Camarines Norte, the school board,
provincial governor, provincial treasurer, and provincial auditor to pay the
teacher's claim for unpaid salary increases.
Respondent judge issued an order (1) recalling the order of February 23,
1994, granting the appeal of petitioners, (2) approving the appeal of private
respondents; and (3) granting their motion for partial execution.
Dissatisfied with the denial, respondents herein filed a petition for

mandamus, prohibition. and injunction with the Court of Appeals with the
prayer, among others, that their notice of appeal be given due course and the
trial court be prohibited from enforcing the partial execution of its judgment.
Said petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34331.
Subsequently, the appellate court rendered its decision of October 17, 1994,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
ISSUE/S: 1) Whether a private counsel may represent municipal officials

sued in their official capacities; and 2) Whether a Notice of Appeal filed
through private counsel and with notice to petitioners and not to their
counsel is valid.
HELD: 1) The Court has previously ruled that only when the provincial fiscal
is disqualified may the municipal council be authorized to hire the services of
a special attorney; 2) No, service of notice when a party is represented by
counsel should be made upon counsel, and not upon the party. The purpose
of the rule is to maintain a uniform procedure calculated to place in
competent hands the prosecution of a party's case. We find petitioners'
reliance on Riego proper and to the point.
LOPEZ, JR., v. COURT OF APPEALS
PONENTE: FELICIANO, J.:
DOCTRINE: The option of retiring under Section 12(c) or Section 12(e), in

the circumstances of this case, belongs to private respondent Manapat and
not to his employer, the City of Manila.
FACTS: Private respondent retired from the government service as Chief of

the Legal Division of the office of the Municipal Board of Manila. He retired
under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as amended, having then rendered
twenty (20) years of service to petitioner City of Manila and received the
amount of P24,479.02 representing his full retirement benefit.
Manapat was reemployed by the City of Manila this time as Secretary of the
City of Manila Board of Tax Assessment Appeals, with a monthly salary of
P3,993.33. He occupied that position until he reached the compulsory

retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on 27 June 1989. The City of Manila
extended his period of service for six (6) months, i.e., up to 27 December
1989. During this additional period of service, i.e., on 1 July 1989, the Salary
Standardization Law (R.A. No. 6758) took effect and increased Manapat's
monthly salary from P3,993.33 to P11,385.00.
Upon expiration of private respondent Manapat's six (6)-month extended

period of service, he filed with the Government Service Insurance System
("GSIS") an application for retirement under R.A. No. 1616, as amended. This
application was approved by the GSIS on 6 April 1990, initially on the basis of
his previous salary of P3,993.33 per month; on that basis, he was entitled to
a total retirement gratuity of P179,274.04, less the amount of P24,479.02
previously received as retirement pay when he first retired on 29 February
1972, making a net balance of P154,795.02.
On 16 May 1990, the GSIS adjusted Manapat's approved application for

retirement to conform with his last standardized monthly salary of
P11,385.00. This adjustment resulted in a total collectible retirement pay or
gratuity of P486,634.84 for Manapat.
The approved adjusted claim of Manapat for retirement benefits was

forwarded by the GSIS to the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals of the City of
Manila. The Assistant Department Head of that Board in turn transmitted the
papers to the Chairman of the Committee on the Settlement of Claims for
Retirement Gratuity and Terminal Leave Pay ("Committee") by an
Indorsement dated 21 May 1990. The next day, however, the Chairman of
that Committee returned the papers to the Manila Board of Tax Assessment
Appeals without acting on the retirement gratuity claim of Manapat, upon the
ground that it was existing policy of the City of Manila that an employee who
has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years must
retire under R.A. No. 660 and not under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as
amended.
Manapat appealed the action of the Chairman of the Committee to the City
Budget Officer.
Manapat then commenced in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila, a
special civil action for mandamus to compel petitioner officials of the city of
Manila to allow Manapat to retire under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as
amended. The trial court dismissed the petition.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the trial court and
issued a writ of mandamus ordering petitioner officials to pay the retirement
claim of Mr. Manapat in the amount of P486,636.84 with legal interest from
the time of filling of the petition for mandamus and awarded as well Mr.
Manapat P30,000.00 as moral damages and another P30,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
ISSUE/S: (1) Whether a government employee, who has reached the

compulsory retirement age of 65 years, may opt to retire under R.A. No. 1616
as amended or, alternatively, is entitled only to retirement benefits under the

mandatory retirement clause of R.A. No. 660; and
(2) Whether the City of Manila as employer may be compelled to pay the
retirement benefits of its employees under R.A. No. 1616, notwithstanding
lack of available funds for that purpose.
HELD: 1) We consider, therefore, and so hold that an employee who shall

have satisfied the requirements for retirement under more than one (1)
subsection of Section 12 of C.A. No. 186 as amended is entitled to choose the
subsection (whose requirement he has complied with and) under which he
shall retire. The option of retiring under Section 12(c) or Section 12(e), in the
circumstances of this case, belongs to private respondent Manapat and not to
his employer, the City of Manila. That option cannot be taken away from the
retiree by the employer, which is precisely what petitioners purported to do
through the medium of the "policy" of restricting the options open to a retiree
who has reached the age of sixty-five (65) to retirement under Section 12(e)
even though such retiree simultaneously satisfies the requisites of retirement
under some other subsection or subsections of Section 12. To sustain the
petitioners' alleged "policy" would in effect constitute an amendment of the
terms of the applicable statute something which neither this Court nor
petitioners are authorized to do.
2) We expressly reject the argument of petitioners that the funding of private

respondent's retirement gratuity under Section 12(c) is "discretionary" on the
part of such employer. The fact that petitioner City of Manila may have no
item in its General Appropriation Ordinance specifically earmarking an
amount of P486,634.84 for payment to Mr. Manapat, presents no legal
obstacle. In Baldivia, et al. v. Lota, etc., 6 the petitioners were denied
payment of their terminal leave pay because allegedly the Municipality of
Taal, Batangas, had no budget or appropriation ordinance setting aside the
sums necessary to pay petitioners' terminal leave pay.
SANTOS v. CA
PONENTE: Davide, Jr., C.J.:
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: After the military-backed EDSA revolt, petitioner was reappointed as

judge. He optionally retired from the Judiciary under R.A. No. 910, as
amended, and received his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire
years in the government service; and five years thereafter he has been
regularly receiving a monthly pension.
In 1993, he re-entered the government service. He was appointed Director III
of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA.
In 1995, Congress reorganized the MMA and renamed it as Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) which provides that the national
government shall provide such amounts as may be necessary to pay the
benefits accruing to displaced employees at the rate of one and one-fourth
(1¼) month’s salary for every year of service: Provided, That, if qualified for
retirement under existing retirement laws, said employees may opt to
receive the benefits thereunder pursuant to the reorganization.
MMDA issued a Memorandum to petitioner informing him that in view of his
“voluntary option to be separated from the service” his services would
automatically cease effective at the close of office hours on 15 September
1996, and that he would be entitled to “separation benefits equivalent to one
and one-fourth (1¼) monthly salary for every year of service as provided
under Section 11 of the MMDA Law.”
Petitioner asserts that since the retirement gratuity he received under R.A.
No. 910, as amended, is not an additional or double compensation, all the
years of his government service, including those years in the Judiciary, should
be credited in the computation of his separation benefits under R.A. No.
7924.
CSC argued that petitioner cannot be retirement benefits twice. He can only
exercise one of two options in the computation of his separation pay under
R.A. 7924. These options are (1) to refund the gratuity he received under
R.A. No. 910, as amended, after he retired from the MeTC and get the full
separation pay for his entire years in the government, that is 9 years and 2
months with the MeTC plus two (2) years and eight (8) months for his
services as Director III in the defunct MMA, at the rate of one and one-fourth
salary for every year of service pursuant to MMDA Memorandum dated 30
August 1996; or (2) to retain the gratuity pay he received for his services as
MeTC Judge but an equivalent amount shall be deducted from the separation
benefits due from the former MMA for his entire government service.
ISSUE/S: Whether petitioner is precluded from receiving double gratuity.
HELD: Yes. We agree with the Court of Appeals and the Civil Service
Commission that for the purpose of computing or determining petitioner’s
separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924, his years of service in the
Judiciary should be excluded and that his separation pay should be solely
confined to his services in the MMA.
In the first place, the last paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 on the
grant of separation pay at the rate of “one and one-fourth (1¼) months of
salary for every year of service” cannot by any stretch of logic or imagination
be interpreted to refer to the total length of service of an MMA employee in
the government, i.e., to include such service in the government outside the
MMA. Since it allows the grant of separation pay to employees who were to
be displaced thereby the separation pay can be based only on the length of
service in the MMA.
Second, petitioner himself must have realized that Section 11 does not allow
the tacking in of his previous government service. If he were convinced that
it does he could have instead applied for retirement benefits, since by adding
his years of service in the MMA to his previous years of service in the
Government he could have retired under the third paragraph of Section 11,
which pertinently reads:
Third, after the approval of his optional retirement on 1 April 1992, petitioner
was fully paid of his retirement gratuity under R.A. No. 910, as amended; and
five years thereafter he has been receiving a monthly pension.
The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of
Article IX-B of the Constitution, which provides:
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or
indirect compensation.
This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can
continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another
government position to which another compensation is attached.
Indeed, the retirement benefits which petitioner had received or has been
receiving under R.A. No. 910, as amended, do not constitute double
compensation. He could continue receiving the same even if after his

retirement he had been receiving salary from the defunct MMA as Director III
thereof. This is but just because said retirement benefits are rewards for his
services as MeTC Judge, while his salary was his compensation for his
services as Director III of the MMA.
PEOPLE v. JALOSJOS
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
DOCTRINE: Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable

classification in criminal law enforcement.
NATURE: Motion
FACTS: Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at

the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of
a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE/S: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes

and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general?
HELD: The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public

officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The
duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members
of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the

Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function
well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on
the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the
Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The
importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a
mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A
doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents.
A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those
others who are validly restrained by law.
Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in

criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted
in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
CENA, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
PONENTE: Medialdea, J.:
DOCTRINE: Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or

establishing retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered
in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.
FACTS: Petitioner entered the government service as Legal Officer II of the

Law Department of Caloocan City where he stayed for seven (7) years until
his transfer on November 16, 1986 to the Office of the Congressman of the
First District of Caloocan City where he worked for only three (3) months, or
until February 15, 1987, as Supervising Staff Officer.
He was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro

Manila, the position he held at the time he reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years on January 22, 1991. By then, he would have
rendered a total government service of 11 years, 9 months and 6 days.
Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of Justice,
through Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-year
service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old-age
pension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146.
The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the CSC whether or
not to allow the extension of service of petitioner Cena as he is covered by
Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, series 1990.
CSC denied petitioner Cena's request for extension of service.
ISSUE/S:
May a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of
government service, be allowed to continue in the service to complete the
15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of an
old-age pension?
HELD: Yes. Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (November 24, 1987) cannot be interpreted to
authorize the Civil Service Commission to limit to only one (1) year the
extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 without having completed 15 years of service, when
said limitation his no relation to or connection with the provision of the law
supposed to be carried into effect.
Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishing

retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the
persons intended to be benefited thereby. The liberal approach aims to
achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency,
security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.
We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes creating

pension or establishing retirement plans in cases involving officials of the
Judiciary who lacked the age and service requirement for retirement.
RABOR v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

DOCTRINE: Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is

hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby
declared valid and effective.
FACTS: Petitioner is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City.
He entered the government service as a Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at the
age of 55 years.
Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City,

advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had
already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with
thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor
responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" issued
by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May
1988.
Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to

the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City
("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice "as
to what action [should] be taken on this matter."
Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated
14 August 1991, asking for extension of his services in the City Government
until he "shall have completed the fifteen (15) years service [requirement] in
the Government so that [he] could also avail of the benefits of the retirement
laws given to employees of the Government." The extension he was asking
for was about two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health and
very able to perform the duties and functions of [his] position as Utility
Worker," Rabor sought "extension of [his] service as an exception to
Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President."
This request was denied.
ISSUE/S: Whether Rabor may be allowed to extend?
HELD: No. Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is
hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby
declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must,
accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We
reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government
agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow
extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five
(65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of government
service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the
provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
NERI v. SENATE
PONENTE: Leonardo-De Castro, J.:
DOCTRINE: Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for
the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information
which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a
coordinate and co-equal department.
FACTS: Former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified before the
Senate for 11 hours relating to the ZTE-NBN mess. However, when probed
further on what he and the President discussed about the NBN Project, he
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to
answer 3 questions:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it
Unrelenting, the Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to

Neri, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007. However,
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested the Senate Committees to
dispense with Neri’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. In his
letter, Ermita said “that the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with China.” Neri did not appear
before the Committees. As a result, the Senate issued an Order citing him in
contempt and ordered his arrest and detention until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE/S: 1) Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3)

questions covered by executive privilege? 2) Does it violate right to
information? 3) May the Congress require the executive to state the reasons
for the claim with particularity? 4) Is the contempt and arrest Order of Neri
valid?
HELD: 1) Yes. The Communications elicited by the 3 Questions are covered

by Executive Privilege. xxx “we are convinced that the communications
elicited by the questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor,
being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no

adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
2) No. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people,

it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of
its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. The
right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of
legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to public information.
The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita: There
are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on
matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production
of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither
does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony
from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an
individual citizen.
3) No. The Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for
the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information
which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a
coordinate and co-equal department.
4) No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of

the contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity. The respondent
Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v.
Ermita that the invitations should contain the “possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry,” along with “the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof.”
The SC also find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent
Committees violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring
that the inquiry be in accordance with the “duly published rules of
procedure.” The respondent Committees’ issuance of the contempt Order is
arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees
did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner
of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as
“unsatisfactory” and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt
and ordering his immediate arrest and detention.
COJUANGCO JR., v. CA
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.:
DOCTRINE: Public officers may still be held liable for nominal damages if
they had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
NATURE: Petition for Review
FACTS: Petitioner horses won the races on various dates, landing first,
second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes. He sent letters of
demand to the defendants for the collection of the prizes due him.
Defendants answered that prizes are being withheld on advice of PCGG
Commissioner. The matter was brought to court. RTC held that PCSO had no
authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings of petitioner, since no
writ of sequestration therefor had been issued by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and ordered the PCSO and
Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioner's claimed winnings plus interests.
While the case was pending with the Court of Appeals, petitioner moved for
the partial execution pending appeal of the RTC judgment, praying for the
payment of the principal amount of his prize winnings. Private respondents
posed no objection thereto and manifested their readiness to release the
amount prayed for.
CA reversed the trial court's finding of bad faith on the part of Carrascoso, it
held that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction
of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner. It noted that, at the
time, the scope of the sequestration of the properties of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies was not well-defined. Respondent Court
explained. It also noted that the following actuations of Carrascoso negated
bad faith: (1) he promptly replied to petitioner's demand for the release of his
prizes, citing PCGG's instruction to withhold payment thereof; (2) upon
PCGG's subsequent advice to release petitioner's winnings, he immediately
informed petitioner thereof; and (3) he interposed no objection to the partial
execution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision. Respondent Court finally
disposed as follows: 10
ISSUE/S: Whe award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is

warranted by evidence and the law
HELD: The petition is partly meritorious. Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty
due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
We do not believe that the above judicially settled nature of bad faith
characterized the questioned acts of Respondent Carrascoso. On the
contrary, we believe that there is sufficient evidence on record to support
Respondent Court's conclusion that he did not act in bad faith.
Moreover, the finding of bad faith against defendant Carrascoso is

overshadowed by the evidences showing his good faith. He was just recently
appointed chairman of the PCGG when he received the first demand for the
collection of the prize for the March 16, 1986 race which he promptly
answered saying he was under instructions by the PCGG to withhold such
payment.
The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and
exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless
there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a
clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code.
The trial court's award of these kinds of damages must perforce be deleted,
as ruled by the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that
Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxx xxx xxx
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted
with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of
the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable
motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties.
TECSON v. SANDIGANBAYAN
PONENTE: Quisumbing, J.:
DOCTRINE: It is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public

official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or
for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be
held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing.
FACTS: Upon the offer of petitioner, he and Mrs. Luzana agreed to engage in
an investment business. Tecson extorted money from Lanuza for the
issuance of their business permit but this was later revoked by the
Sanggunian Pangbayan which was also presided over by Tecson.
This prompted Lanuza to file a case Tecson for violation of Section 3 [c], R.A.
No. 3019 and Section 60 of B.P. Blg. 337 (then Local Government Code) with
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), a civil case for
damages and a complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” with the Ombudsman.
The Sandiganbayan found Tecson guilty.
ISSUE/S: 1) Whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

exonerating the accused serves as a bar by prior judgment to the decision of
the Sandiganbayan;
2) Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitutional right of the

accused against double jeopardy; and
3) Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
HELD: 1) No. First, it must be pointed out that res judicata is a doctrine of
civil law. It thus has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. Second, it is a basic principle of the law on public officers
that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for
violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a
public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a
wrongful doing.
2) No. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before
a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. None of the foregoing applies to the hearings conducted by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in Adm. Case No. SP 90-01. It
must be stressed that the said proceedings were not criminal, but
administrative in nature. Hence, double jeopardy will not lie.
3) Yes. Sandiganbayan, all of the aforementioned elements concur in the

instant case. Its findings on this concurrence are as follows: First, Tecson was
in September 1989 a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. Second, in his official capacity as Mayor, he
signed and issued on September 27, 1989, a Mayor's Permit to and in the
name of Mrs. Luzana for their investment business in which he does not
appear to have made any contribution to the capital. Third, before he
released the Mayor's Permit to Mrs. Luzana, he requested and received on
that same day, September 27, 1989, at about 11:00 a.m., the amount of
P4,000.00 to be used by him in the fiesta to be held on September 29, 1989.
And, fourth, Tecson requested and received the amount of P4,000.00 as cash
advance in consideration of the help he gave—viz, issuance of Mayor's Permit
which he would not deliver to Mrs. Luzana unless she acceded to his request.
OCAMPO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
PONENTE: Buena, J.:
DOCTRINE: The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose

administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health
in all respects.
NATURE: Petition for certiorari
FACTS: Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of NIACONSULT, INC., a

subsidiary of the National Irrigation Administration conducted trainings and
received the payment corresponding therefor. When NIACONSULT president,
Tiongco, demanded the turn-over of the total training fee paid by ADBN
petitioner failed to remit the said amount prompting NIACONSULT through its
president, Maximino Eclipse, to file an administrative case before respondent
OMBUDSMAN for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust.
Petitioner was given several chances to respond to the letter of the
Ombudsman but he continuously failed to respond giving rise to the assailed
Resolution.
While the case is pending, petitioner filed a Manifestation stating that the
criminal complaint for estafa and falsification filed against him based on the
same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative case, was
dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on February 24, 1997. With the
dismissal of the criminal case, petitioner manifests that the administrative
case can no longer stand on its own and therefore should be dismissed.
ISSUE/S: Whether the dismissal of the criminal complaint against petitioner

forecloses the administrative case against him.
HELD: No. Such manifestation is not well taken. The dismissal of the criminal
case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give
him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in
dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution
was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a
condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for
there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of
evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative

proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering
the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed
and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the
findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the
other.
RODRIGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.
DOCTRINE: The exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does

not mean the automatic dismissal of the complaint against them – the
preliminary investigation, after all, is independent from the investigation
conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct from each other.
FACTS: The Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by petitioner Mayor

Rodrigo, entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction, represented
by Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay Cabolan for the sum of
P486,386.18.
Petitioner MPDC Mejica prepared an Accomplishment Report stating that the

said project was 97.5% accomplished. This report was supposedly approved
by mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu.
Based on said report, payment of P452,825.53 was effected by the Municipal

Treasurer Facundo, to Philwood Construction. Later, petitioners received a
Notice of Disallowance from the Provincial Auditor for the amount of
P160,910.46 who found that as per CoA evaluation, only 60% of the project
(equivalent to only P291,915.07) was actually accomplished.
The Provincial Auditor did not act on petitioners’ request for lifting and
reinspection. Thereafter, the Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for
estafa before the Ombudsman against the Mayor, the MPDC, the Treasurer,
as well as the President/General Manager, and Project Engineer, respectively,

of Philwood Construction.
The Acting Ombudsman approved the filing of an information against

petitioners for violation of §3 (e) of RA 30196 [The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act] before the Sandiganbayan.
While the complaint was pending at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution

moved to suspend petitioners pendente lite. Petitioners opposed the motion
on the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over them.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petitioners and
ordered the suspension of petitioners pendente lite.
ISSUE/S: 1) WON the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in

filing the information against petitioners, or the Sandiganbayan in allowing
the litigation of the criminal information for conspiracy in violating §3(e) of
the Anti-Graft Act (RA 3019) when the notice of disallowance still pends with
the provincial auditor under petitioner' protest supported by certificate of
completion and acceptance of the required element
2) WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
HELD: 1) NO. Disallowance v. Suspension: At this point, it may be useful to

distinguish between a disallowance and a suspension.
A disallowance is the disapproval of a credit or credits to an

account/accountable officer's accountability due to non-compliance with law
or regulations, either in whole or in part.
Thus, the auditor may disallow an expenditure/transaction which is unlawful

or improper.
A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of action to debit/credit

the account/accountable officer's accountability pending compliance with
certain requirements.
A notice of suspension is issued on transactions or accounts which could

otherwise have been settled except for some requirements, like lack of
supporting documents or certain signatures.
It is also issued on transactions or accounts the legality/propriety of which the

auditor doubts but which he may later allow after satisfactory or valid
justification is submitted by the parties concerned.
The suspension shall become a disallowance if the charge of suspension is
"not satisfactorily explained within ninety-day period within which the
accountable officer may answer the charge of suspension may nevertheless
be extended by the Commission or the auditor for "good cause shown."
The exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does not mean the
automatic dismissal of the complaint against them – the preliminary
investigation, after all, is independent from the investigation conducted by
the CoA, their purposes distinct from each other.
The preliminary investigation involves the determination of the fact of the

commission of a crime; the audit investigation relates to the administrative
aspect of the expenditure of public funds.
Misinterpretation of §44.6.4., which provides for the Auditor's Responsibility

re Evaluation of Disallowance:
(1) petitioners were not charged with suspension but disallowance.
(2) the "written explanation" referred to in said §is "for the purpose of lifting
the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day
period prior to its conversion into a disallowance," not for contesting a
disallowance, as petitioners wrongfully assert. Hence, §44.6.4., finds no
application in this case.
§56 imposes upon the Provincial Auditor the duty to file a complaint before
the Ombudsman when, from the evidence obtained during the audit, he is
convinced that "criminal prosecution is warranted."
The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the opposition to the notice of
disallowance and the motion for re-inspection pending in his office before he
institutes such complaint so long as there are sufficient grounds to support
the same.
LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PONENTE: Martinez, J.:
DOCTRINE:
NATURE: Petition for prohibition and mandamus
FACTS: The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249. 11

persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly
an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank
robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in
Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group. Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of
the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a
summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong
Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for
Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel
later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal
allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said
incident was a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa

modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including
herein petitioner and intervenors.
All the accused questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting

that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of
Republic Act No. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused"
are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials
with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The
highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank
of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even
before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended
informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 and No. 1094 (sponsored
by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II,
respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 (sponsored by Senator Neptali
Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to
amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal"
from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A.
No. 7975. These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A.
No. 8249 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
ISSUE/S: Whether Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 is

constitutional.
HELD: The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned
provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases
could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already
started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that
makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not
yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their
respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents.
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive

application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex
post facto law for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process
as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly
acquired under R.A. 7975.
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249
is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes,
treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment. R.A 7975, which
amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of
appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not
a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules
of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A.
8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
However, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of
the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is
plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
ORTIZ v. COMELEC
PONENTE: Fernan, J.:
DOCTRINE: Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an

officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use
it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or
employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position
accompanied by the act of relinquishment.
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Commissioner of the COMELEC by then

President Ferdinand E. Marcos "for a term expiring May 17, 1992."
On July 21, 1986, the Deputy Executive Secretary requested Acting Chairman
Felipe to convey the information to Commissioners Marquinez, Ortiz, Agpalo
and Layosa that the President had "accepted, with regrets, their respective
resignations, effective immediately." After the presidential acceptance of said
"resignations," the new COMELEC was composed of Ramon H. Felipe, Jr. as
Chairman and Commissioners Froilan M. Bacungan, Leopoldo L. Africa,
Haydee B. Yorac, Andres R. Flores, Dario C, Rama and Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr.,
as members. It was to this body that Commissioners Agpalo, Ortiz and
Marquinez submitted on July 30, 1986 their respective applications for
retirement. They were followed by Commissioner Layosa on August 1, 1986.
To justify their petitions for retirement and their requests for payment of
retirement benefits, all seven former COMELEC Commissioners invoked
Republic Act No. l568 as amended by Republic Act No. 3595 and re-enacted
by Republic Act No. 6118
COMELEC denied the applications for retirement of Commissioners

Marquinez, Agpalo, Ortiz and Layosa on the ground that they were "not
entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended"
without specifying the reason therefor.
Petitioner filed an MR, contending that he was entitled to the benefits under
Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. He averred therein that he did not resign
but simply placed his position at the disposal of the President; that he had in
fact completed his term as Commissioner by the "change in the term of [his]
office and eventual replacement," and that he was entitled to retirement
benefits under the aforementioned law because Article 1186 of the Civil Code
which states that "the condition [with regard to an obligation] shall be
deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment." He
invoked the aforequoted provisions of Proclamation No. 3 and cited the cases
of former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and Associate Justice Hermogenes
Concepcion, Jr. who were allowed to retire by this Court and receive
retirement benefits.
COMELEC denied.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not a constitutional official whose "courtesy

resignation" was accepted by the President of the Philippines during the
effectivity of the Freedom Constitution may be entitled to retirement benefits

under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner's separation from government service as a result of the

reorganization ordained by the then nascent Aquino government may not be
considered a resignation within the contemplation of the law. Resignation is
defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines
his office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a complete
and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear
intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of
relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some
form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and
relinquish the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority.
ESTRADA v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
PONENTE: Puno, J.:
DOCTRINE: Even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that
he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest
by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
FACTS: After the failed impeachment proceedings. The people marched to

the streets resulting in EDSA 2. President Estrada stepped down from the
palace and then Vice-President Arroyo took her oath as the incoming
President. Estrada assails the authority of Arroyo saying that he was merely
on leave and Arroyo is merely an acting President.
ISSUE/S: Whether petitioner Estrada resigned as President.
HELD: Yes. We hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted.
It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing
his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did
not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was
going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3)
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.
Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve
the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join
him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could
not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the
past tense.
Even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
CANONIZADO v. AGUIRRE
PONENTE: Gonzaga- Reyes, J.:
DOCTRINE: No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been

mandated by Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it declares the terms of office of
the incumbent Commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in
their removal from office, removes civil service employees from office
without legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being
constitutionally infirm.
FACTS: The NAPOLCOM was originally created under Republic Act No. 6975.
Under RA 6975, the members of the NAPOLCOM were petitioners Edgar Dula
Torres, Alexis C. Canonizado, Rogelio A. Pureza and respondent Jose Percival
L. Adiong.
On March 6, 1998, RA 8551 took effect; it declared that the terms of the
current Commissioners were deemed as expired upon its effectivity.
According to petitioners, sections 4 and 8 of RA 8551 are unconstitutional.
Since their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates their
security of tenure.
ISSUE/S:Whether RA 8551 otherwise known as the "Philippine National Police

Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998" is constitutional.
HELD: Section 8 of RA 8551 is unconstitutional for being in violation of the

petitioners' right to security of tenure. The removal from office of petitioners
as a result of the application of such unconstitutional provision of law and the

appointment of new Commissioners in their stead is therefore null and void.
The NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative,

supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions.
Public respondents would have this Court believe that RA 8551 reorganized
the NAPOLCOM resulting in the abolition of petitioners' offices. We hold that
there has been absolutely no attempt by Congress to effect such a
reorganization.
It is exceedingly apparent to this Court that RA 8551 effected a

reorganization of the PNP, not of the NAPOLCOM. They are two separate and
distinct bodies, with one having supervision and control over the other. In
fact, it is the NAPOLCOM that is given the duty of submitting a proposed
reorganization plan of the PNP to Congress. As mentioned earlier, the basic
structure of the NAPOLCOM has been preserved by the amendatory law.
There has been no revision in its lines of control, authority and responsibility,
neither has there been a reduction in its membership, nor a consolidation or
abolition of the offices constituting the same. Adding the Chief of the PNP as
an ex-officio member of the Commission does not result in a reorganization.
No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by

Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent
Commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their removal
from office, removes civil service employees from office without legal cause
and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.
Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that

there are now new appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched
principle that when a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his
position never became vacant under the law and he is considered as not
having left his office. The new appointments made in order to replace
petitioners are not valid.
FABELLA v. CA
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.:
DOCTRINE:
NATURE: Petition for review on Certiorari
FACTS: DECS Secretary Cariño issued a return-to-work order to all public

school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes to demand
payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a
debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things.
Administrative cases were filed against herein petitioner-appellees, who are

teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. They were also placed under
preventive suspension.
RTC decided in favour of petitioner-appellees and this was affirmed by the

CA, holding in the main that private respondents were denied due process in
the administrative proceedings instituted against them.
ISSUE/S: Whether private respondents were denied due process of law.
HELD: Yes. In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the private
respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which may warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them as a result of administrative
proceedings. As already observed, the resolution of this case revolves around
the question of due process of law, not on the right of government workers to
strike. The issue is not wheter private respondents may be punished for
engaging in a prohibited action but whether, in the course of the
investigation of the alleged proscribed activity, their right to due process has
been violated. In short, before they can be investigated and meted out any
penalty, due process must first be observed.
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include

the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3)
a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well
as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative charges against private respondents did not include "a
representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teacher's organization" as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent
jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void.
They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private
respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers' organization in
these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was
this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right
to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due
process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity
to be heard.
AGUINALDO v. SANTOS
PONENTE: Nocon, J.:

DOCTRINE: Clear then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed
for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
FACTS: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan.
He was charged with disloyalty for acts he allegedly committed during the
1989 coup.
He was found guilty and was consequently removed. He assailed the DILG
Secretary’s decision. While this case was pending, petitioner filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May
11, 1992 elections and won.
ISSUE/S: Whether his removal as Governor by the DILG is valid.
HELD: No. Clear then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
SALALIMA v. GUINGONA
PONENTE: Davide, J.:
DOCTRINE: Public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for

administrative misconduct committed during a prior term,
NATURE: Petition to annul and set aside Administrative Order No. 153
FACTS: Sometime in 1993, several administrative complaints against the

petitioners, who were elective officials of the Province of Albay, were filed
with the Office of the President and later docketed as O.P. Cases Nos. 5450,
5469, 5470, and 5471. Acting thereon, the President issued Administrative
Order No. 94 creating an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the charges and to
thereafter submit its findings and recommendations.
The suspension imposed on respondents shall be served successively but

shall not exceed their respective unexpired terms, in accordance with the
limitation imposed under Section 66 (b) of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE/S: 1) Did the Office of the President act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in suspending the petitioners for
periods ranging from twelve to twenty months?
2) Did the Office of the President commit grave abuse of discretion in

deciding O.P. cases Nos. 5450, 5469, and 5470 despite the pendency of the
petitioners' appeal to the COA en banc from Special Audit Office (SAO) Report
No. 93-11 and the Certificate of Settlement and Balances (CSB)?
3) Did the Office of the President commit grave abuse of discretion in holding
the petitioners guilty of abuse of authority in denying the Municipality of Tiwi
of its rightful shore in the P40,724,471.74 which the Province of Albay had
received from the NPC under the Memorandum of Agreement?
4) Did the Office of the President commit grave abuse of discretion in

suspending in O.P. Cases Nos. 5469 and 5450 petitioner Salalima, who was
reelected on 11 May 1992, for an alleged administrative offense committed
during his first term; and in suspending in O.P. Case No. 5469 the other
petitioners, some of whom were elected and others reelected on 11 May
1992, for an alleged administrative offense committed in 1989?
5) Did the Office of the President commit grave abuse of discretion in holding
the petitioners in O.P. Case No. 5469 guilty of grave abuse of authority under
Section 60 (e) of the Local Government Code of 1991 although they were
charged under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and Section 60(d)
of the Local Government? Code of 1991, thereby depriving them of due
process of law?
HELD: 1) No. Assuming then that the findings and conclusions of the Office of
the President in each of the subject four administrative cases are correct, it
committed no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of

suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeded six months and the
unexpired portion of the petitioners' term of office. The fact remains that the
suspension imposed for each administrative offense did not exceed six
months and there was an express provision that the successive service of the
suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office of
the petitioners.
2) The pendency of the appeal was no obstacle to the investigation and

resolution of their administrative cases.
3) We cannot therefore fault the public respondents with grave abuse of

discretion in holding the petitioners guilty of abuse of authority for failure to
share with the municipalities of Tiwi and Daraga the amount of
P40,724,471.74 paid by the NPC.
We thus rule that any administrative liability which petitioner Salalima might
have incurred in the execution of the retainer contract in O.P. Case No. 5469
and the incidents related therewith and in the execution on 6 March 1992 of
a contract for additional repair and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public
Market in O.P. Case No. 5450 are deemed extinguished by his reelection in
the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections.
So are the liabilities, if any, of petitioner members of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan ng Albay, who signed Resolution No. 129 authorizing petitioner
Salalima to enter into the retainer contract in question and who were
reelected in the 1992 elections. This is, however, without prejudice to the
institution of appropriate civil and criminal cases as may be warranted by the
attendant circumstances. As to petitioners Victoria, Marcellana, Reyeg, Osia,
and Cabredo who became members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan only
after their election in 1992, they could not beheld administratively liable in
O.P. case No. 5469, for they had nothing to do with the said resolution which
was adopted in April 1989 yet.
Having thus held that the petitioners could no longer be administratively

liable in O.P. Case No. 5469, we find it unnecessary to delve into, and pass
upon, the fifth issue.
GLORIA v. COURT OF APPEALS

DOCTRINE:
NATURE:
FACTS: Private respondents are public school teachers. On various dates in

September and October 1990, during the teachers’ strikes, they did not
report for work. For this reason, they were administratively charged with (1)
grave misconduct, (2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil
Service Law Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, (4)
refusal to perform official duty, (5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and (7) absence without leave
(AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension. The investigation was
concluded before the lapse of their 90-day suspension and private
respondents were found guilty as charged.
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirmed the decision of

the MSPB with respect to Margallo, but found the other three (Abad,
Bandigas, and Somebang) guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations by failing to file applications for leave of absence and,
therefore, reduced the penalty imposed on them to reprimand and ordered
them reinstated to their former positions.
Petitioner Ricardo T. Gloria, then Secretary of Education, Culture, and

Sports, moved for a reconsideration insofar as the resolution of the Court of
Appeals ordered the payment of private respondents’ salaries during the
period of their appeal. His motion was, however, denied by the appellate
court in its resolution of October 6, 1997. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE/S: There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service
employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or
suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation (§51) and (2)
preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the
disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the
respondent is exonerated (§47(4)).
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty.i[10] It is a

measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges
against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way
influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a
decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and
the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation
respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be
reinstated.
A. No Right to Compensation for Preventive Suspension Pending Investigation Even if Employee is Exonerated
Is he entitled to the payment of salaries during the period of suspension?

As already stated, the Court of Appeals ordered the DECS to pay private
respondents their salaries, allowances, and other benefits “beyond the ninety
(90) day preventive suspension.” In other words, no compensation was due
for the period of the preventive suspension pending investigation but only for
the period of preventive suspension pending appeal in the event the
employee is exonerated.
The separate opinion of Justice Panganiban argues that the employee

concerned should be paid his salaries after his suspension.
The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) provided for the payment of
such salaries in case of exoneration. Sec. 35 read:
Sec. 35. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative

Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or
employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the
Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of sixty (60) days
after the date of suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall
be reinstated in the service. If the respondent officer or employee is
exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay for the
period of suspension.ii[11]
However, the law was revised in 1975 and the provision on the payment
of salaries during suspension was deleted. Sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree
(P.D. No. 807) read:
Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative

Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or

employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the
disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the
date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential
appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the
service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case
is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the
period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
This provision was reproduced in §52 of the present Civil Service Law. It is
noteworthy that the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) categorically
provides that preventive suspension shall be “without pay.” Sec. 24 reads:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. – The Ombudsman or his Deputy

may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of
guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is

terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six
months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the
case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence
or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay
shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided.
It is clear that the purpose of the amendment is to disallow the payment

of salaries for the period of suspension. This conclusion is in accord with the
rule of statutory construction that -
As a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases

in a statute indicates that the legislature intended to change the
meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that the legislature
would not have made the deletion had the intention been not in
effect a change in its meaning. The amended statute should
accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its
amendment.iii[12]
The separate opinion of Justice Panganiban pays no heed to the evident

legislative intent to deny payment of salaries for the preventive suspension
pending investigation.
First, it says that to deny compensation for the period of preventive

suspension would be to reverse the course of decisions ordering the payment
of salaries for such period. However, the casesiv[13] cited are based either on
the former rule which expressly provided that “if the respondent officer or
employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay for
the period of suspension”v[14] or that “upon subsequent reinstatement of the
suspended person or upon his exoneration, if death should render
reinstatement impossible, any salary so withheld shall be paid,”vi[15] or on
cases which do not really support the proposition advanced.
Second, it is contended that the exoneration of employees who have

been preventively suspended is proof that there was no reason at all to
suspend them and thus makes their preventive suspension a penalty.
The principle governing entitlement to salary during suspension is

cogently stated in Floyd R. Mechem’s A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices
and Officers as follows:
§864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension

from Office. - An officer who has been lawfully suspended from his
office is not entitled to compensation for the period during which he
was so suspended, even though it be subsequently determined that
the cause for which he was suspended was insufficient. The reason
given is “that salary and perquisites are the reward of express or
implied services, and therefore cannot belong to one who could not
lawfully perform such services.”vii[16]
Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges

against him. In addition, his suspension must be unjustified. The case of
Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself similarly states that “payment of salaries
corresponding to the period [1] when an employee is not allowed to work
may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his
suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified.”viii[17]
The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with

dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized
by the Civil Service Law. It cannot, therefore, be considered “unjustified,”
even if later the charges are dismissed so as to justify the payment of
salaries to the employee concerned. It is one of those sacrifices which
holding a public office requires for the public good. For this reason, it is
limited to ninety (90) days unless the delay in the conclusion of the
investigation is due to the employee concerned. After that period, even if the
investigation is not finished, the law provides that the employee shall be
automatically reinstated.
Third, it is argued in the separate opinion that to deny employees salaries

on the “frivolous” ground that the law does not provide for their payment
would be to provide a “tool for the oppression of civil servants who, though
innocent, may be falsely charged of grave or less grave administrative
offenses.” Indeed, the possibility of abuse is not an argument against the
recognition of the existence of power. As Justice Story aptly put it, “It is
always a doubtful course, to argue against the use or existence of a power,

from the possibility of its abuse. . . . [For] from the very nature of things, the
absolute right of decision, in the last resort, must rest somewhere - wherever
it may be vested it is susceptible of abuse.”ix[18] It may be added that if and
when such abuse occurs, that would be the time for the courts to exercise
their nay-saying function. Until then, however, the public interest in an
upright civil service must be upheld.
Finally, it is argued that even in the private sector, the law provides that
employees who are unjustly dismissed are entitled to reinstatement with full
pay. But that is because R.A. No. 6715 expressly provides for the payment to
such employees of “full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and . . . other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.”x[19] In the case of the public sector, as has been noted, the
provision for payment of salaries during the preventive suspension pending
investigation has been deleted.
B. Right to Compensation for Preventive Suspension Pending Appeal if Employee is Exonerated
But although we hold that employees who are preventively suspended

pending investigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries even if
they are exonerated, we do not agree with the government that they are not
entitled to compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if
eventually they are found innocent.
Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not

a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct
an unhampered investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension
pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently
considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision
finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay
for the period of the suspension. Thus, §47(4) states that respondent “shall
be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the
appeal in the event he wins.” On the other hand, if his conviction is affirmed,
i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period of his suspension becomes part of the
final penalty of suspension or dismissal.
It is precisely because respondent is penalized before his sentence is

confirmed that he should be paid his salaries in the event he is exonerated.
It would be unjust to deprive him of his pay as a result of the immediate
execution of the decision against him and continue to do so even after it is
shown that he is innocent of the charges for which he was suspended.
Indeed, to sustain the government’s theory would be to make the
administrative decision not only executory but final and executory. The fact
is that §47(2) and (4) are similar to the execution of judgment pending appeal
under Rule 39, §2 of the Rules of Court. Rule 39, §5 provides that in the
event the executed judgment is reversed, there shall be restitution or

reparation of damages as equity and justice may require.
Sec. 47 of the present law providing that an administrative decision

meting out the penalty of suspension or dismissal shall be immediately
executory and that if the respondent appeals he shall be considered as being
merely under preventive suspension if eventually he prevails is taken from
§37 of the Civil Service Decree of 1975 (P.D. No. 807). There was no similar
provision in the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260), although under it
the Commissioner of Civil Service could order the immediate execution of an
administrative decision in the interest of the public service.xi[20] Nor was there
provision for immediate execution of administrative decisions ordering
dismissal or suspension in §695 of the Administrative Code of 1917, as
amended by C.A. No. 598, §1.xii[21] Nonetheless, under R.A. No. 2260 the
payment of salaries was ordered in cases in which employees were found to
be innocent of the chargesxiii[22] or their suspension was held to be unjustified,
because the penalty of suspension or dismissal was executed without a
finding by the Civil Service Commissioner that it was necessary “in the
interest of the public service.”xiv[23] On the other hand, payment of back
salaries was denied where it was shown that the employee concerned was
guilty as charged and the immediate execution of the decision was ordered
by the Civil Service Commissioner “in the interest of the public service.”xv[24]
Nothing in what has thus far been said is inconsistent with the reason for
denying salaries for the period of preventive suspension. We have said that
an employee who is exonerated is not entitled to the payment of his salaries
because his suspension, being authorized by law, cannot be unjustified. To
be entitled to such compensation, the employee must not only be found
innocent of the charges but his suspension must likewise be unjustified. But
though an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the
pendency of his appeal in the event he wins, his suspension is unjustified
because what the law authorizes is preventive suspension for a period not
exceeding 90 days. Beyond that period the suspension is illegal. Hence, the
employee concerned is entitled to reinstatement with full pay. Under existing
jurisprudence, such award should not exceed the equivalent of five years pay
at the rate last received before the suspension was imposed.xvi[25]
II. Private Respondents Entitled to Back Salaries Although Found Guilty of Violation of Office Rules and Regulations
and Reprimand
Private respondents were exonerated of all charges against them for acts
connected with the teachers’ strike of September and October 1990.
Although they were absent from work, it was not because of the strike. For
being absent without leave, they were held liable for violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations for which the penalty is a reprimand. Their case
thus falls squarely within ruling in Bangalisan, which likewise involved a
teacher found guilty of having violated reasonable office rules and
regulations. Explaining the grant of salaries during their suspension despite

the fact that they were meted out reprimand, this Court stated:
With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his

backwages is in order. A reading of the resolution of the Civil Service
Commission will show that he was exonerated of the charges which
formed the basis for his suspension. The Secretary of the DECS
charged him with and he was later found guilty of grave misconduct,
gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law, rules
and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform
official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and absence without official leave, for his
participation in the mass actions on September 18, 20 and 21, 1990.
It was his alleged participation in the mass actions that was the basis
of his preventive suspension and, later, his dismissal from the service.
However, the Civil Service Commission, in the questioned

resolution, made a finding that Mariano was not involved in the “mass
actions” but was absent because he was in Ilocos Sur to attend the
wake and interment of his grandmother. Although the CSC imposed
upon him the penalty of reprimand, the same was for his violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations because he failed to inform
the school of his intended absence and neither did he file an
application for leave covering such absences.
Under Section 23 of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive

Order No. 292 and other pertinent civil service laws, in violations of
reasonable office rules and regulations, the first offense is punishable
by reprimand. To deny petitioner Mariano his back wages during his
suspension would be tantamount to punishing him after his
exoneration from the charges which caused his dismissal from the
service.xvii[26]
In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals,xviii[27] a public school teacher who was found

guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for having been
absent without leave and reprimanded was given back salaries after she was
exonerated of the charge of having taken part in the strikes.
Petitioner Secretary of Education contends, however, that respondents

Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang signed a letter in which they admitted having
taken part in the mass action. This question cannot be raised now. The Civil
Service Commission gave no weight to this letter in view of individual letters
written by the three citing reasons for their absences, to wit: Abad, because
she decided to stay home to correct student papers; Bandigas, because she
had to accompany her brother to the Commission on Immigration, and
Somebang because of “economic reasons.” Petitioner did not appeal from
this ruling. Hence, he is bound by the factual findings of the CSC and the
appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated September 3, 1996, as amended by

the resolutions, dated July 15, 1997 and October 6, 1997, of the Court of
Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
salaries to private respondents shall be computed from the time of their
dismissal/suspension by the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports
until their actual reinstatement, for a period not exceeding five years.
ISSUE/S:
HELD:
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATIONv. COURT OF APPEALS
PONENTE: Purisima, J.:
DOCTRINE:
NATURE: Petitions for review on certiorari

FACTS: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in the
National Capital Region who incurred unauthorized absences in connection
with or in furtherance of their then on-going "mass action" held sometime in
September 1990. Confronted with the strike which threatened to disrupt
classes in public schools, former DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño issued a
Memorandum ordering them to return to work under pain of dismissal. But
the said Memorandum was ignored by petitioners, prompting the DECS
Secretary to lodge administrative complaints against them for grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of the Civil Service law and rules
and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross
insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the public interest, and absence
without leave.
CSC found petitioners guilty of "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service" but it imposed only six (6) months' suspension without pay, which
was affirmed by CA with modification.
ISSUE/S: Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.
HELD: No. In light of the foregoing disquisition and jurisprudence in point,

the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the Court of Appeals erred not
in affirming the Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission finding the
petitioning public school teachers guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. Evidently, the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
public school teachers involved are "entitled to back salaries for the period
they were not allowed to teach, except for the six (6) months period during
which they were suspended for cause", does not accord with prevailing
jurisprudence. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled.xix[10] It is a salutary and necessary judicial practice
that when a court has laid down a principle of law applicable to a certain
state of facts, it must adhere to such principle and apply it to all future cases
in which the facts sued upon are substantially the same.xx[11]
It is beyond cavil that the public school teachers before the Court participated
in the September 1990 mass actions and refused to obey the return to work
order of the DECS Secretary. It is equally undisputed that they were not
completely exculpated of the charges against them, as they were adjudged
guilty of committing acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Consequently, with the ground for their suspension duly stated, the denial of
their prayer for exoneration and payment of back wages is in order.
HAGAD v. GOZO-DADOLE
PONENTE: Vitug, J.:
DOCTRINE:
NATURE: Petition seeks (a) to annul the writ of preliminary injunction, dated
21 October 1992, issued against petitioner by respondent trial court and (b)
to prohibit said court from further proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14.
FACTS: The controversy stemmed from the filing of criminal and

administrative complaints against respondent officials. Councilors Dionson
and Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had
caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by
increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to
P7,000,000.00 without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Mandaue City.
Respondent officialsprayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground

that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and
decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose
administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their
preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President.
Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government Code of 1991 could
not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions
of the Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate
cases against all public officials and that, in any case, the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had
remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of
1991.
ISSUE/S: Whether the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested of his
authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective officials
by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991.
HELD: No. Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate
that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions
of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question
are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only
uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of
laws by implication are not favored, and that courts must generally assume
their congruent application. 17 The two laws must be absolutely incompatible,
and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be
presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any
implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and
give effect to all laws on the subject.
Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very

reason that underlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987
Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of
officialdom."
i
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xix
THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS v.

xx
MARTINEZ
PONENTE: Chico- Nazario, J.:
DOCTRINE:
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS: Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay administratively charged Martinez with

Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption through the filing of a verified complaint before the
Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials pursuant
to Section 61of Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. It
also filed with the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended Administrative Complaint against
Martinez for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan and the
Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It maintained that the proper courts, and not the
petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective local official from office, in accordance
with Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, the Order of the Sangguniang
Bayan removing Martinez from service is void. As a consequence, Mayor Bagasao cannot
prevent Martinez from assuming his office on the basis of a void order. The trial court
further ruled that Martinez properly availed himself of the remedy of Special Civil Action,
where the order assailed was a patent nullity.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local
official, from office.
HELD: No. During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code,16 the
legislative intent to confine to the courts, i.e., regional trial courts, the Sandiganbayan
and the appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local
officials was evident.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from
service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (sic 125) (b), Rule XIX, of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests
power on the "disciplining authority" to remove from office erring elective local officials,
is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government
Code of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be
strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or
removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just
an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their
constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice
or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is
given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted
to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.
FRANCISCO JR. v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PONENTE:
DOCTRINE:
NATURE:
FACTS: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives

adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings, superceding
the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002,
the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003
in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on
Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23
October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House
Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results
of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed
with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional
as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year."
ISSUE/S: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings.
HELD: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating
power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of
government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is
inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is
"the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial
review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances
which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of
our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for
the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it
does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the
law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that
of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly
granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the
Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution,
is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the
manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of
one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the
above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not
intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial
review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of
judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for
the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures
that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
GARCIA v. COMELEC
PONENTE: Puno
DOCTRINE:
NATURE:
FACTS: Enrique Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan. Some mayors,
vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of
the province constituted
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of Garcia.
The mayor of
Mariveles, Honorable Oscar, de los Reyes, and the mayor of Dinalupihan, the Honorable
Lucila Payumo, were chosen as Presiding Officer and Secretary of the Assembly,
respectively. Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the Honorable Ruben Roque, was
recognized and he moved that a resolution be passed for the recall of the petitioner on
the ground of "loss of confidence." The motion was "unanimously seconded.” Petitioners
filed with the Comelec a petition to deny due course to the Resolution for failure to
comply with the requirements under the LGC. The comelec dismissed the petition and
scheduled the recall election. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the SC on the ground that section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall through the initiative of
the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the people have the sole and exclusive right to
decide whether or not to initiate proceedings, and (2) it violated the right of elected local
public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of law. They also
argued that the proceedings followed by the PRAC in passing Resolution No. I suffered
from numerous
defects, the most fatal of which was the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting
to sixty-five (65) members of the assembly.
ISSUE: Whether all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly were notified of its
meeting
HELD: Yes The failure to give notice to all members of the assembly, especially to the
members known to be political allies of Garcia was admitted by both counsels of the
respondents. They did not deny that only those inclined to agree with the resolution of
recall were notified as a matter of political strategy and security. They justified these
selective notices on the ground that the law does not specifically mandate the giving of
notice. We reject this submission of the respondents. The due process clause of the
Constitution requiring notice as an element of fairness is inviolable and should always be
considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its silence. The need for notice to all
the members of the assembly is also imperative for these members represent the
different sectors of the electorate of Bataan. To the extent that they are not notified of
the meeting of the assembly, to that extent is the sovereign voice of the people they
represent nullified. The resolution to recall should articulate the majority will of the
members of the assembly but the majority will can be genuinely determined only after all
the members of the assembly have been given a fair opportunity to express the will of
their constituents. Needless to stress, the requirement of notice is indispensable in
determining the collective wisdom of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly.
Its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to recall petitioner Garcia as
Governor of the province of Bataan.
ISSUE: WON the alternative mode of allowing a preparatory recall assembly to initiate
the process of recall is unconstitutional
HELD: No. A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that
the idea of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of
local elective officials, originated from the House of Representatives and not the Senate.
The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative
mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish
the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down
on its expenses. Our lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the mechanism
initiating recall by direct action of the electorate was utilized only once in the City of
Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the city mayor failed. Former
Congressman Wilfredo Cainglet explained that this initiatory process by direct action of
the people was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost impossible to implement.
Consequently, our legislators added in the a second mode of initiating the recall of local
officials thru a preparatory recall assembly. They brushed aside the argument that this
second mode may cause instability in the local government units due to its imagined
ease.

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PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAWS Notes & Digest

RAMON L. LABO, Jr. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROBERTO

PONENTE: BIDIN, J.:

DOCTRINE: One of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be

NATURE: Petition for Certiorari

ISSUE/S: 1) Whether or not Labo is a Filipino citizen and therefore qualified

HELD: Petition DISMISSED. 1) No. Labo was disqualified as a candidate for

2) No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle

PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: concurring and dissenting

It is my view that since Mayor Labo never validly acquired Australian

In deciding cases involving citizenship, the presumptions should be in favor of

In view of the foregoing, the PETITION is GRANTED.

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.:

DOCTRINE: Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a

NATURE: Petition for Certiorari

FACTS: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the

Mrs. Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing

ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of

HELD: Yes. COMELEC Resolution is SET ASIDE. Residence means domicile in

PONENTE: PUNO, J., concurring:

First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban,

Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage

FRANCISCO, J., concurring:

Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

Narvasa, C.J., concurs.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or

Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.

REGALADO, J., dissenting:

When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the

ANTONIO BENGSON III v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.:

NATURE: Petition for Certiorari

as a consequence he lost his Filipino Citizenship because under the

Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretation of the phrase

ISSUE/S: 1) Whether Cruz, a natural born Filipino who became an American

HELD: 1) YES. Cruz is a natural-born citizen and is therefore qualified to be a

a. Naturalization – mode for acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine

time, marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien, and political and

Cruz recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen because of his

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation

Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in

Natural-born citizens are so by virtue of birth without performing any acts.

ERNESTO S. MERCADO v. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the

PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.:

DOCTRINE: Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be

NATURE: Petition for Certiorari

HELD: No. In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the

naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin

Manzano by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino

On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines,

EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

PONENTE: FRANCISCO, J.:

NATURE: Petition for Certiorari

The Court ordered COMELEC to designate a Commissioner or a ranking

ISSUE/S: Whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice", the determination of

JUAN G. FRIVALDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE

PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.:

DOCTRINE: The citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to