HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM, G.R. No.

168156
Represented by Rogelio Lasam
and Atty. Edward P. Llonillo,
Petitioners, Present:
PANGANIBAN, C. J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
VICENTA UMENGAN, Promulgated:
Respondent.
December 6, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Heirs of
Rosendo Lasam, represented by Rogelio M. Lasam and Atty. Edward P. Llonillo,
seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated February 16, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80032. The assailed decision reversed and set
aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan
and dismissed, for lack of merit, the complaint for unlawful detainer file by the
said heirs against respondent Vicenta Umengan.

The RTC decision affirmed that of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of the same city, Branch III, which had rendered judgment in favor of the
heirs of Rosendo Lasam and directed the ejectment of respondent Vicenta
Umengan from the lot subject of litigation.

The present petition likewise seeks the reversal of the CA Resolution

dated May 17, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the heirs of
Rosendo Lasam.
As culled from the records, the backdrop of the present case is as follows

The lot subject of the unlawful detainer case is situated in Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan. It is the eastern half portion of Lot No. 5427 and Lot No. 990. The first
lot, Lot No. 5427 containing an area of 1,037 square meters, is covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 196. The second lot, Lot No. 990 containing an area
of 118 sq m, is covered by OCT No. 1032. These lots are registered in the names
of the original owners, spouses Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan.

In an instrument denominated as Deed of Confirmation and acknowledged before a

notary public on June 14, 1979, the heirs of the said spouses conveyed the
ownership of Lots Nos. 990 and 5427 in favor of their two children, Irene
Cuntapay and Isabel Cuntapay. In another instrument entitled Partition Agreement
and acknowledged before a notary public on December 28, 1979, it was agreed that
the eastern half portion (subject lot) of Lots Nos. 990 and 5427 shall belong to the
heirs of Isabel Cuntapay. On the other hand, the remaining portion thereof (the
west portion) shall belong to the heirs of Irene Cuntapay. The subject lot (eastern
half portion) has an area of 554 sq m.
Isabel Cuntapay had four children by her first husband, Domingo Turingan,
namely: Abdon, Sado (deceased), Rufo and Maria. When Domingo Turingan
passed away, Isabel Cuntapay remarried Mariano Lasam. She had two other
children by him, namely: Trinidad and Rosendo.

Sometime in January 2001, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam (son of Isabel Cuntapay by
her second husband) filed with the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Vicenta Umengan, who was then occupying the subject lot. Vicenta
Umengan is the daughter of Abdon Turingan (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her first
husband).

In their complaint, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam alleged that they are the
owners of the subject lot, having inherited it from their father. Rosendo Lasam was
allegedly the sole heir of the deceased Pedro Cuntapay through Isabel
Cuntapay. During his lifetime, Rosendo Lasam allegedly temporarily allowed
Vicenta Umengan to occupy the subject lot sometime in 1955. The latter and her
husband allegedly promised that they would vacate the subject lot upon
demand. However, despite written notice and demand by the heirs of Rosendo
Lasam, Vicenta Umengan allegedly unlawfully refused to vacate the subject lot
and continued to possess the same. Accordingly, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam were
constrained to institute the action for ejectment.
 In her Answer with Counterclaim, Vicenta Umengan specifically denied the
material allegations in the complaint. She countered that when Isabel Cuntapay
passed away, the subject lot was inherited by her six children by her first and
second marriages through intestate succession. Each of the six children allegedly
had a pro indiviso share of 1/6 of the subject lot.

It was further alleged by Vicenta Umengan that her father, Abdon Turingan,
purchased the respective 1/6 shares in the subject lot of his siblings Maria and
Sado. These conveyances were allegedly evidenced by the Deed of Sale
dated March 3, 1975, appearing as Doc. No. 88, Page No. 36, Book No. XIV,
series of 1975 of the notarial book of Atty. Pedro Lagui.

Prior thereto, Rufo already sold his 1/6 share in the subject lot to Vicenta
Umengan and her husband as evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated June 14, 1961,
appearing as Doc. No. 539, Page No. 41, Book No. V, series of 1961 of the notarial
book of Atty. Pedro Lagui. Also on June 14, 1961, Abdon donated his 1/6 share in
the subject lot to her daughter Vicenta Umengan as evidenced by the Deed of
Donation appearing as Doc. No. 538, Page No. 41, Book No. V, series of 1961 of
the notarial book of the same notary public.

According to Vicenta Umengan, the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her

second husband (Rosendo and Trinidad Lasam) own only 2/6 portion of the subject
lot. She thus prayed that the complaint for ejectment be dismissed and that the
heirs of Rosendo Lasam be ordered to pay her damages.

The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam and
directed the ejectment of Vicenta Umengan. In so ruling, the MTCC gave credence
to the newly discovered last will and testament (entitled Testamento Abierto)
purportedly executed by Isabel Cuntapay where she bequeathed the subject lot to
her son, Rosendo Lasam, thus:
x x x my share 1/5th (one-fifth) of the Cuntapay heirs, bordered on the North by
Sr. Elia Canapi; to the South, by Calle Aguinaldo; to the East, by Calle P. Burgos
and the West, by the late Don Luis Alonso; on the property which is my share
stands a house of light materials where I presently reside; this 1/5th (one-fifth)
share of my inheritance from the Cuntapays I leave to my son Rosendo Lasam
and also the aforementioned house of light material x x x[2]

The MTCC reasoned that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam anchored their claim
over the subject lot on the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay while Vicenta
Umengan hinged hers on intestate succession and legal conveyances. Citing
jurisprudence[3] and Article 1080[4] of the Civil Code, the MTCC opined that
testacy was favored and that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the
testator should prevail. It observed that the last will and testament of Isabel
Cuntapay was not yet probated as required by law; nonetheless, the institution of a
probate proceeding was not barred by prescription.

With the finding that the subject lot was already bequeathed by Isabel
Cuntapay to Rosendo Lasam, the MTCC held that the siblings Abdon, Sado, Rufo
and Maria Turingan no longer had any share therein. Consequently, they could not
convey to Vicenta Umengan what they did not own. On the issue then of who was
entitled to possession of the subject lot, the MTCC ruled in favor of the heirs of
Rosendo Lasam as it found that Vicenta Umengans possession thereof was by
mere tolerance. The dispositive portion of the MTCC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, this Court Resolve[d]
to order the EJECTMENT of VICENTA T. UMENGAN and in her place
INSTITUTE THE HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM.

It is further ordered the defendant shall pay the Heirs of Rosendo Lasam the sum
of P500.00 pesos representing the monthly rental of the land from August 2000 to
the time this case shall have been terminated.

Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 attorneys
fees plus cost of this litigation.

So Ordered.[5]
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC. The RTC
echoed the reasoning of the MTCC that the testamentary disposition of the
property of Isabel Cuntapay should be respected, and that the heirs of Rosendo
Lasam have a better right to possess the subject lot.

Undaunted, Vicenta Umengan filed an appeal with the CA. She argued that
the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case as it involved the recovery
of ownership of the subject lot, not merely recovery of possession or unlawful
detainer. She also assailed the RTCs and the MTCCs holding that the
purported Testamento Abierto of Isabel Cuntapay prevails over Vicenta Umengans
muniments of title and, consequently, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam have a better
right to the subject lot than Vicenta Umengan.

In the assailed Decision dated February 16, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC. The appellate court preliminarily upheld the jurisdiction of
the MTCC over the subject matter as it found that the allegations in the complaint
made out a case for unlawful detainer. The heirs of Rosendo Lasam in their
complaint, according to the CA, only sought for Vicenta Umengan to vacate and
surrender possession of the subject lot. The CA also rejected the contention of the
heirs of Rosendo Lasam that the issue of ownership of the subject lot had already
been settled in another case, Civil Case No. 4917, before RTC (Branch 3)
of Tuguegarao City. The CA stated that the trial courts order dismissing the said
case was not a judgment on the merits as to constitute res judicata.

However, the CA declared that the RTC, as well as the MTCC, erred in ruling that,
by virtue of the purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, the heirs of
Rosendo Lasam have a better right to the subject lot over Vicenta Umengan. The
CA explained that the said last will and testament did not comply with the formal
requirements of the law on wills.[6]

Specifically, the CA found that the pages of the purported last will and
testament were not numbered in accordance with the law. Neither did it contain the
requisite attestation clause. Isabel Cuntapay as testator and the witnesses to the will
did not affix their respective signatures on the second page thereof. The said
instrument was likewise not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The CA even raised doubts as to its authenticity, noting that
while Isabel Cuntapay died in 1947 and the heirs of Rosendo Lasam claimed that
they discovered the same only in 1997, a date May 19, 1956 appears on the last
page of the purported will. The CA opined that if this was the date of execution,
then the will was obviously spurious. On the other hand, if this was the date of its
discovery, then the CA expressed bafflement as to why the heirs of Rosendo
Lasam, through their mother, declared in the Partition Agreement dated December
28, 1979 that Isabel Cuntapay died intestate.
It was observed by the CA that as against these infirmities in the claim of the heirs
of Rosendo Lasam, Vicenta Umengan presented a Deed of Sale and a Deed of
Donation to justify her possession of the subject lot. The CA noted that she has
also possessed the subject property since 1955. Such prior possession, the CA held,
gave Vicente Umengan the right to remain in the subject lot until a person with a
better right lawfully ejects her. The heirs of Rosendo Lasam do not have such a
better right. The CA stressed that the ruling on the issue of physical possession
does not affect the title to the subject lot nor constitute a binding and conclusive
adjudication on the merits on the issue of ownership. The parties are not precluded
from filing the appropriate action to directly contest the ownership of or the title to
the subject lot.
The decretal portion of the assailed decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The
August 29, 2003 decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan in Civil Case No. 5924 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Private respondents complaint for unlawful detainer against
petitioner is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[7]
The heirs of Rosendo Lasam sought the reconsideration thereof but their motion
was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated May 17, 2005.

The heirs of Rosendo Lasam (petitioners) now come to the Court alleging that the
CA committed reversible error in setting aside the decision of the RTC, which had
affirmed that of the MTCC, and dismissing their complaint for unlawful detainer
against respondent Vicenta Umengan.

Petitioners argue that the CA erred when it held, on one hand, that the MTCC had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint as the allegations therein make
out a case for unlawful detainer but, on the other hand, proceeded to discuss the
validity of the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay.

Petitioners insist that respondent is holding the subject lot by mere tolerance and
that they, as the heirs of Rosendo Lasam who was the rightful owner of the subject
lot, have a better right thereto. It was allegedly error for the CA to declare the last
will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay as null and void for its non-compliance with
the formal requisites of the law on wills. The said matter cannot be resolved in an
unlawful detainer case, which only involves the issue of material or physical
possession of the disputed property. In any case, they maintain that the said will
complied with the formal requirements of the law.

It was allegedly also erroneous for the CA to consider in respondents favor

the deed of sale and deed of donation covering portions of the subject lot, when
these documents had already been passed upon by the RTC (Branch 3)
of Tuguegarao City in Civil Case No. 4917 when it dismissed the respondents
complaint for partition of the subject lot. The said order allegedly constituted res
judicata and may no longer be reviewed by the CA.

Petitioners emphasize that in an unlawful detainer case, the only issue to be

resolved is who among the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession
of the property in dispute. On this point, the MTCC held (and the same was
affirmed by the RTC) that petitioners have a better right since the merely tolerated
possession of the respondent had already expired upon the petitioners formal
demand on her to vacate. In support of this claim, they point to the affidavit of
Heliodoro Turingan, full brother of the respondent, attesting that the latters
possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of Rosendo Lasam who
inherited the same from Isabel Cuntapay.
According to petitioners, respondents predecessors-in-interest from whom she
derived her claim over the subject lot by donation and sale could not have
conveyed portions thereof to her, as she had claimed, because until the present, it is
still covered by OCT Nos. 196 and 1032 under the names of Pedro and Leona
Cuntapay. Their respective estates have not been settled up to now.
It is also the contention of petitioners that the CA should have dismissed outright
respondents petition filed therewith for failure to comply with the technical
requirements of the Rules of Court. Specifically, the petition was not allegedly
properly verified, lacked statement of material dates and written explanation on
why personal service was not made.
This last contention of petitioners deserves scant consideration. The
technical requirements for filing an appeal are not sacrosanct. It has been held that
while the requirements for perfecting an appeal must be strictly followed as they
are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly
discharge of judicial business, the law does admit of exceptions when warranted by
circumstances.[8] In the present case, the CA cannot be faulted in choosing to
overlook the technical defects ofrespondents appeal. After all, technicality should
not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights
and obligations of the parties.[9]
The Court shall now resolve the substantive issues raised by petitioners.
It is well settled that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the physical
or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of ownership may be
provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to
possession de facto.[10]
In the present case, petitioners base their claim of right to possession on the theory
that their father, Rosendo Lasam, was the sole owner of the subject lot by virtue of
the newly discovered last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay bequeathing the
same to him. Respondent is allegedly holding the subject lot by mere tolerance of
Rosendo Lasam and, upon the petitioners formal demand on her to vacate the
same, respondents right to possess it has expired.

On the other hand, respondent hinges her claim of possession on the legal
conveyances made to her by the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first husband,
namely, Maria, Rufo, Sado and Abdon. These conveyances were made through the
sale and donation by the said siblings of their respective portions in the subject lot
to respondent as evidenced by the pertinent deeds.

The CA correctly held that, as between the respective claims of petitioners

and respondent, the latter has a better right to possess the subject lot.
As earlier stated, petitioners rely on the last will and testament of Isabel
Cuntapay that they had allegedly newly discovered. On the basis of this
instrument, the MTCC and RTC ruled that petitioners have a better right to the
possession of the subject lot because, following the law on succession, it should be
respected and should prevail over intestate succession.

However, contrary to the ruling of the MTCC and RTC, the purported last
will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be relied upon to
establish petitioners right to possess the subject lot because, without having been
probated, the said last will and testament could not be the source of any right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having
jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the
testators death shall govern.

The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as

may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the
lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
In Caiza v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court ruled that: [a] will is essentially
ambulatory; at any time prior to the testators death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right
can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: No will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court.[12]
Dr. Tolentino, an eminent authority on civil law, also explained that [b]efore any
will can have force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to
prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that
purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of
the deceased person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been
executed, attested and published as required by law, and that the testator was of
sound and disposing mind. It is a proceeding to establish the validity of the
will.[13] Moreover, the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a
matter of public policy.[14]
Following the above truisms, the MTCC and RTC, therefore, erroneously ruled
that petitioners have a better right to possess the subject lot on the basis of the
purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, which, to date, has not been
probated. Stated in another manner, Isabel Cuntapays last will and testament,
which has not been probated, has no effect whatever and petitioners cannot claim
any right thereunder.
Hence, the CA correctly held that, as against petitioners claim, respondent has
shown a better right of possession over the subject lot as evidenced by the deeds of
conveyances executed in her favor by the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first
marriage.
Contrary to the claim of petitioners, the dismissal of respondents action for
partition in Civil Case No. 4917 before the RTC (Branch 3) of Tuguegarao City
does not constitute res judicata on the matter of the validity of the said
conveyances or even as to the issue of the ownership of the subject lot. The order
dismissing respondents action for partition in Civil Case No. 4917 stated thus:
For resolution is a motion to dismiss based on defendants [referring to
the petitioners herein] affirmative defenses consisting inter alia in the
discovery of a last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, the original
owner of the land in dispute.
xxx
 It appears, however, that the last will and testament of the late Isabel
Cuntapay has not yet been allowed in probate, hence, there is an
imperative need to petition the court for the allowance of said will to
determine once and for all the proper legitimes of legatees and devisees
before any partition of the property may be judicially adjudicated.

It is an elementary rule in law that testate proceedings take precedence

over any other action especially where the will evinces the intent of the
testator to dispose of his whole estate.

With the discovery of the will of the late Isabel Cuntapay in favor of the
defendants, the Court can order the filing of a petition for the probate of
the same by the interested party.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing considerations, let the above-

entitled case be as it is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[15]

For there to be res judicata, the following elements must be present: (1) finality of
the former judgment; (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.[16]The third requisite, i.e., that the former judgment
must be a judgment on the merits, is not present between the action for partition
and the complaint a quo for unlawful detainer.As aptly observed by the CA:
Our reading of the Orders (dated June 16, 1997 and October 13, 1997) in
Civil Case No. 4917 reveals that the RTC, Branch 3, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, dismissed the complaint for partition because of the discovery
of the alleged last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay. The court did
not declare respondents [referring to the petitioners herein] the owners of
the disputed property.It simply ordered them to petition the court for the
allowance of the will to determine the proper legitimes of the heirs prior
to any partition. Instead of filing the appropriate petition for the probate
of Isabel Cuntapays will, the respondents filed the present complaint for
unlawful detainer. Viewed from this perspective, we have no doubt that
the courts Orders cited by the respondents are not judgments on the
merits that would result in the application of the principle of res
judicata. Where the trial court merely refrained from proceeding with
 the case and granted the motion to dismiss with some clarification
without conducting a trial on the merits, there is no res judicata.[17]

Further, it is not quite correct for petitioners to contend that the children of Isabel
Cuntapay by her first marriage could not have conveyed portions of the subject lot
to respondent, as she had claimed, because until the present, it is still covered by
OCT Nos. 196 and 1032 under the names of Pedro and Leona Cuntapay. To recall,
it was already agreed by the heirs of the said spouses in a Partition Agreement
dated December 28, 1979 that the subject lot would belong to Isabel Cuntapay. The
latter died leaving her six children by both marriages as heirs. Considering that her
purported last will and testament has, as yet, no force and effect for not having
been probated, her six children are deemed to be co-owners of the subject lot
having their respective pro indiviso shares. The conveyances made by the children
of Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage of their respective pro indiviso shares in
the subject lot to respondent are valid because the law recognizes the substantive
right of heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship
and/co-ownership among the heirs. The Court had expounded the principle in this
wise:

This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can
sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the property
under administration. This is a matter which comes under the jurisdiction
of the probate court.

The right of an heir to dispose of the decedents property, even if the

same is under administration, is based on the Civil Code provision
stating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted
to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the
decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are however,
two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs.

The Civil Code, under the provisions of co-ownership, further qualifies

this right. Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from
 selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in
common.

As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir to

dispose of property under administration. In the case of Teves de
Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., it was said that the sale made by an heir of
his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending
administration, in no wise, stands in the way of such administration. The
Court then relied on the provision of the old Civil Code, Article 440 and
Article 399 which are still in force as Article 533 and Article 493,
respectively, in the new Civil Code. The Court also cited the words of a
noted civilist, Manresa: Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs
becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the
part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate which
remains undivided.[18]

Contrary to the assertion of petitioners, therefore, the conveyances made by

the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage to respondent are valid insofar
as their pro indiviso shares are concerned. Moreover, the CA justifiably held that
these conveyances, as evidenced by the deed of donation and deed of sale
presented by respondent, coupled with the fact that she has been in possession of
the subject lot since 1955, establish that respondent has a better right to possess the
same as against petitioners whose claim is largely based on Isabel Cuntapays last
will and testament which, to date, has not been probated; hence, has no force and
effect and under which no right can be claimed by petitioners. Significantly, the
probative value of the other evidence relied upon by petitioners to support their
claim, which was the affidavit of Heliodoro Turingan, was not passed upon by the
MTCC and the RTC. Their respective decisions did not even mention the same.

In conclusion, it is well to stress the CAs admonition that

x x x our ruling on the issue of physical possession does not affect title
to the property nor constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on
the merits on the issue of ownership. The parties are not precluded from
filing the appropriate action directly contesting the ownership of or the
title to the property.[19]
 Likewise, it is therefore in this context that the CAs finding on the validity
of Isabel Cuntapays last will and testament must be considered. Such is merely a
provisional ruling thereon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to
possession de facto.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed

Decision dated February 16, 2005 and the Resolution dated May 17, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80032 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,

vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the
Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died,
leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor. 1 The will was
admitted to probate before the Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as
executor due to Richards renunciation of his appointment. 2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta
(petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator. 3

In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely,
Kimberly and Kevin.

On October 12, 1982, Audreys will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 4 As administrator of Audreys estate in the
Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audreys conjugal share in real
estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00
(Makati property); (2) a current account in Audreys name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares
of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his
rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by
the Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who
in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law
Offices, as ancillary administrator.

Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as
Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986. 8
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs
of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audreys estate, with Richard being
apportioned the undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from
the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G
Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10

The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12,
1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT
No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (
undivided interest) and Kyle ( undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333
shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the
amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs. 12

Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the Estate
of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5of
Richards undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to
Richards three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland,
"a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since
Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then
his entire undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.

The trial court found merit in respondents opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the
project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richards entire
undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent. 15

On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of
the trial courts Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No.
9625.16Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the
State of Maryland on the distribution of Audreys estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since
Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not
merely thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent.

Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondents allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good faith in
submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of
the State of Marylands laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the
"best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares."
Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.

On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial courts Orders dated February 12, 1988
and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.17 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu
thereof, a new one is entered ordering:

(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey ONeill Guersey in favor of the estate of W. Richard
Guersey; and

(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and the issuance of
a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27, 1999. 19
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely
erred in not holding that:

A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625
"IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY
GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING AND
HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO
LONGER BE ANNULLED.

B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD,
EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY ONEIL GUERSEYS ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO
FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID
ORDERS.20

Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can no
longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the administration as to all matters
involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the
proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and the same has already been executed. 21

Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary administrator. He
maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of
Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on
the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubreys will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised
respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided. 22

Respondent argues that petitioners breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubreys estate
amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of
Aubreys will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner
in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.

Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because she was not a
party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubreys will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after
Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richards estate.

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees,
which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other
judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack
of jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding
may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. 26

The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want
of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. 27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment of
judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud. 29

In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February
12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondents cause and found that petitioners failure to follow the
terms of Audreys will, despite the latters declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that
under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should
have distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was
prompted to distribute Audreys estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and
Richard Guerseys adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.

Petitioner contends that respondents cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984, respondent
was already well aware of the terms of Audreys will, 30 and the complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the
other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to question petitioners acts
since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of
partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to
seek another counsel to protect her interest.31

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences
to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondents knowledge of the terms of Audreys will is
immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioners failure to introduce in evidence
the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been
committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondents
discovery thereof.

Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richards estate, the opposition thereto, and the order
of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in
1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only through
Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioners acts. Obviously,
respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for
annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.

Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court stated that
"man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary."

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which
prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there
is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing
party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is
extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the
defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an
attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has
never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set
aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing. 34

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.35

Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and
confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that
trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the
same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in
similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged. 36

Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of her will and as
dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of
her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audreys death, she was
residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972
was executed and probated before the Orphans Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated
and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was
admitted by the Orphans Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the
Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is
governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent."

As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and
Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:

SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters
of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the
estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons
who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice
of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audreys estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence
the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and
merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the
trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audreys will. The obvious result
was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence
presented.

Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept petitioners
protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of
Audreys will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in
the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big
legal staff and a large library."39 He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon
him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed
on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.

Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said law
when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as
Audreys heirs, and distributing Audreys estate according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This
eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property.

In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or mistake of
counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy,
its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the
power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.

The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. The
CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom
petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts,
thus:

In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the
principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in
the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending
his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his
primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of
Audrey ONeill Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as
well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also
duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey ONeill Guersey
during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject estate in
accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light as indicated in a
portion of his direct examination, to wit:

xxx

It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey ONeill Guersey was prompted by
defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas concern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiffs adopted daughter Kyle
Guersey.

Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas action appears to have breached his duties and
responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be
considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendants
position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedents last will, combine to create a circumstance that
is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas omission to prove the national laws of the
decedent and to follow the latters last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair
submission of the real issues involved in the case. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result
of petitioners abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioners pleasure as to which
law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from
enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioners omission was
beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioners omission and it was
belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In
cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their
rights.42

The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the State of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:

Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland on Estates
and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass
directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for administration and distribution," while Section
4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7,
Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the
general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate
of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances". 43

In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audreys conjugal share in the
Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audreys death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will,
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares,
which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to
respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to
pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently
proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling
in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the
same. The Court held, viz.:

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing
on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law,
especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as
Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was
presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on
January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the
State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada,
especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of
such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and the
trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed project
of partition of Richards estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for that matter, does not
dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audreys and Richards estate should be distributed according to
their respective wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire
Makati property belongs to respondent.

Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang, 45 wrote:

A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate
court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in
the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and
testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them
to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said.

Honorable as it seems, petitioners motive in equitably distributing Audreys estate cannot prevail over Audreys and
Richards wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46

x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended
to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. 47

Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens who owned real
property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property.

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of the public
domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and
entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of
1946, which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public
domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does not
include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private lands
by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands
acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in
Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-
Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal
succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee
is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then
whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as
the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27, 1999
of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
CRISOLOGO C. DOMINGO, Petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO AND RAYMUNDO LANDICHO, JULIAN ABELLO, MARTA DE SAGUN AND EDITHA G.
SARMIENTO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Crisologo C. Domingo (Domingo) filed on April 20, 1993 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City an
application for registration,1 docketed as LRC No. TG-451, of five parcels of land delineated as Lot Nos. 7513, 7515,
7516, 7517 and 7518, Cad. 355 under Approved Survey Plan AS-04-0024752 (the lots).

The lots, which are located at Barangay Tolentino, Tagaytay, have a total land area of 38,975 square meters.

In his application, Domingo claimed that he bought the lots from Genoveva Manlapit (Genoveva) in 1948 and has
since been in continuous, open, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of an owner.

Domingo further claimed that prior to his purchase of the lots, Genoveva had been in possession thereof in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years.3

To Domingos application the following documents were attached:

1. Tracing Cloth of Approved Plan AS-04-002475 (surveyed from September 24, 1963 to February 13, 1964
and approved on December 12, 1990).4

2. Photocopy of the Technical Description of Lot Nos. 7513, 7515, 7516, 7517, and 7518. 5

3. Photocopy of the Geodetic Engineers Certificate.6

4. Owners Copy of Tax Declaration Nos. GR-019-0893-R (covering Lot 7513), GR-019-0894-R (covering
Lot 7515), GR-019-0895-R (covering Lot 7516), GR-019-0896-R (covering Lot 7517), GR-019-0897-R
(covering Lot 7518), all dated January 7, 1993 and in the name of Crisologo C. Domingo.7

5. Land Management Inspectors 2nd Indorsement dated October 22, 1990 recommending approval of AS-
Plan.8

The Land Registration Authority (LRA), which filed before the RTC its Report9 dated September 27, 1993, stated that
after plotting Plan AS-04-002475 in the Municipal Index Sheet thru its tie lines, a discrepancy was noted. The RTC
thus referred the matter to the Lands Management Sector, Region IV for verification and correction.

Acting on the directive of the RTC, the Director of Lands filed a Report that "per records of the Lands Management
Bureau in Manila, the land involved in said case was not covered by any land patent or by public land application
pending issuance of patent." 10

The LRA later filed a Supplementary Report11 dated December 22, 1993 stating that:

xxxx

2. The Regional Technical Director, Region Office IV, thru the Chief, Surveys Division, Robert C. Pangyarihan in his
letter dated November 22, 1993, a copy is attached hereto as Annex "A", informed that per records on file in that
Office, the correct adjoining survey along line 8-9 of Lot 7516 and along lines 3-4-5 of Lot 7515 should be Lot 9237
Cad-355, covered by As-04-000091 and that the parcel of land covered by As-04-002475 are not portions of or
identical to any previously approved isolated survey; and

3. When the above-furnished correction was applied on plan As-04-002475 no more discrepancy exists.

xxxx

On November 26, 1993, herein respondents Severino and Raymundo Landicho, Julian Abello, Marta de Sagun, and
Editha G. Sarmiento filed an Answer/Opposition12 to Domingos application, claiming that they have been in open,
continuous, adverse and actual possession and cultivation of the lots in the concept of an owner and have been
paying real estate taxes thereon;13 and that Survey Plan AS-04-002475 was lifted from the cadastral survey of the
government which was surveyed for them and other individual owners. 14

During the pendency of his application or on March 9, 1996, Domingo died. His counsel, Atty. Irineo Anarna, did not,
however, inform the RTC of his death.

By Decision15 of December 22, 1997, the RTC approved Domingos application for registration, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby renders judgment
approving the instant application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan AS-04-002475 as Lots 7513,
7515, 7516, 7517 and 7518, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre, containing an area of 10,519 square meters, 3, 956
square meters, 18, 921 square meters, 3, 985 square meters and 1, 594 square meters, respectively, as supported
by their technical descriptions now forming parts of the records of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced, in
the name of CRISOLOGO C. DOMINGO, Filipino, of legal age, married to Corazon A. Domingo, and with residence
at No. 34 Dao St., Project 3, Quezon City, Metro Manila.

Once this decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.16

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that contrary to Domingos claim that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots, Domingo has
always been a resident of No. 34 Dao St., Project 3, Quezon City; that despite Domingos claim that he has a
caretaker overseeing the lots, he could not even give the name of the caretaker; and that Domingo admittedly
declared the lots in his name only in 1993.

By Decision17 of June 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed
Domingos application for registration of land title.

The appellate court ruled that while Domingo sought judicial confirmation of his imperfect title under the Public Land
Act and Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, "The Property Registration Decree," he failed to prove
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession and occupation of the lots under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.18

And the appellate court noted that Domingo failed to present the alleged deed of sale executed by Genoveva 19and
"could only prove through his Tax Declaration No. 0298 (new) that his possession in the concept of an owner started
only in 1948 (Exhibit L, Records, p. 117)."

Domingos Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, the present petition was lodged,
faulting the appellate court:

I
 . . . x x x x WHEN IT LIMITED CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTERS ESTABLISHED IN THE
APPLICATION TO SECTION 48 (B) OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT AND SECTION 14 (1) OF PD 1529.

II

. . . x x x WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE OVER
THE SUBJECT LAND, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED HIS ENTITLEMENT [TO] REGISTRATION OF TITLE OVER THE LAND UNDER SECTION
14 (1) AND (4) OF PD 1529.20 (Underscoring supplied)

Domingos present counsel argues that assuming that Domingo failed to establish his possession from June 12, 1945
or earlier in accordance with Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, he is still entitled to registration of title under Article
111321 in relation to Article 113722 of the Civil Code.23

In their Comment24 to the present petition, respondents pray for its denial for being substantially defective, Domingos
death not having been alleged, albeit the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping was signed by
Domingos alleged "Surviving Spouse and Heirs." 25

To respondents Comment, Domingos counsel filed a Reply26 stating that there is no clearer manifestation of the
death of Domingo than the statement under oath of his surviving spouse and heirs "in substitution of deceased
CRISOLOGO C. DOMINGO" contained in the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping which forms part
of the present petition.27 Nonetheless, the counsel presented a certified true copy of Domingos death
certificate28 showing that he died on March 9, 1996 (during the pendency of his application before the RTC as earlier
stated).

The petition is bereft of merit.

Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 provides:

Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.29 (Underscoring supplied)

To thus be entitled to registration of a land, the applicant must prove that (a) the land applied for forms part of the
disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) he has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.30

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State, and
unless it has been shown that they have been reclassified by the State as alienable or disposable to a private person,
they remain part of the inalienable public domain.31

To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports
of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. 32

While petitioner presented a document denominated as "2nd Indorsement" 33 issued by Land Management Inspector
Amadeo Mediran that the lots are "within the alienable and disposable zone under Project No. 3 LSC-3113 issued on
April 5, 1978 as certified by the Director of the Forest Development," the genuineness of the document cannot be
ascertained, it being a mere photocopy. Besides, the truth of its contents cannot be ascertained, Mediran having
failed to take the witness stand to identify and testify thereon.
In fine, Domingo failed to adduce incontrovertible evidence 34 showing that the lots have been declared alienable.
They are thus presumed to belong to the public domain, beyond the commerce of man, and are not susceptible of
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.

But even assuming arguendo that the lots are alienable, Domingo failed to comply with the requirement on the period
of possession. While he alleged in his petition that he bought the lots from Genoveva in 1948, he failed, as the
appellate court correctly noted, to adduce the deed of sale executed for the purpose, or to explain the reason behind
the failure and to present sufficient evidence to prove the fact of sale.

Again, even assuming arguendo that the lots were indeed sold to him by Genoveva, Domingo failed to adduce proof
that Genoveva, from whom he seeks to tack his possession, acquired registrable title over them on June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Under the same assumption, Domingos claim that he has been in actual, continuous, adverse and open
possession of the lots in the concept of an owner since 1948 is a conclusion of law which must be substantiated with
proof of specific acts of ownership and factual evidence of possession. 35

An examination of the tax receipts36 presented by Domingo shows that they are of recent vintage, the earliest being
dated January 8, 1993.

Tax Declaration Nos. 0298, GR-019-0884, and GR-019-0885,37 which appear to have been issued
in 1947 [sic], 1964, and 1968, respectively, contain the declaration "Filed under Presidential Decree No. 464" below
the title "Declaration of Real Property." P.D. No. 464, "The Real Property Tax Code," took effect, however, only on
June 1, 1974. Specifically with respect to the first tax declaration, it even shows that Domingo subscribed and swore
to it on August 1, 1947 at which time he had not bought the lot yet, in 1948 by his claim.

A note on Domingos death during the pendency of his application at the RTC. Indeed, the records do not show that
his death on March 9, 1996 was brought to the RTCs attention, which is not in accordance with Sections 16 and 17,
Rule 3 of the 1994 Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party. Whenever a party to a pending case
dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such
death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or
other legal representative. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

SEC. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a
period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

When a party dies in an action that survives and no order is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal
representative or of the heirs of the deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no substitution
has ever been effected, the proceedings held by the court without such legal representatives or heirs and the
judgment rendered after such trial are null and void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the
legal representative or of the heirs upon whom the trial and judgment would be binding.38

Unlike, however, jurisdiction over the subject matter which is conferred by law, jurisdiction over the person of the
parties to the case may, however, be waived either expressly or impliedly. 39 In the case at bar, the surviving heirs
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court, albeit belatedly, by participating in the present
petition.

Under the now amended Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, failure of a counsel to comply with the
provision thereof is a ground for disciplinary action, viz:
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply
with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. 1avvphi1

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear
within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party,
may be recovered as costs. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

The failure of Domingos former counsel, Atty. Irineo A. Anarna of No. 4 Madlansacay St., Poblacion Lilang 4118
Cavite, to comply with the immediately quoted provisions of the Rules, is compounded by his misrepresentation,
before the CA, that Domingo was well and alive when he stated in his Motion to Withdraw Appearance as
Counsel40 dated July 8, 2004 that the "motion for withdrawal [was] conformed to by Mrs. Rosemarie Manlapit
Zamora, representative of the applicant as shown by her signature . . . and that Mrs. Rosemarie Zamora also
undertakes to personally seek the conformity of the Applicant" (Underscoring supplied); and by his retaining of the
name of Domingo in the title of his pleadings before the appellate court.

Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court." Rule 10.01 likewise provides that "a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice." And Rule 10.03 provides that "a lawyer shall
observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."

This Court thus takes this occasion to warn Atty. Anarna that a repetition of a similar violation of the Rules of Court
and the Code of Professional Responsibility will be dealt with strictly.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussion, DENIED.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished Atty. Irineo A. Anarna of No. 4 Madlansacay St., Poblacion Lilang, 4118
Cavite.

SO ORDERED.