Spec Pro

CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
1. SILVERIO SR. VS. SILVERIO, JR. (G.R. NOS. 208828-29, AUGUST 13, 2014)
A probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the property under administration, made by
private respondent, the same having been effected without authority from said court. It is the probate court that
has the power to authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court
that can declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. Jurisprudence
is clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by
the probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
FACTS:
The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will. In the course of the intestate proceedings, the
intestate court ordered among others, the sale of certain properties belonging to the estate. By virtue of the
aforesaid Order, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. (Silverior Jr). executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Citrine Holdings over the
property located at Intsia Road, Forbes Park (Intsia Property), and in favor of Monica Ocampo over the property
located at Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park (Cambridge Property). Silverio Sr. thereafter filed a motion Deed of
Absolute Sale as null and void, to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) effecting the transfer of the
concerned properties, and to reinstate the TCT in favor of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. and the Intestate Estate of the
late Beatriz S. Silverio. The Intestate Court granted this motion.
Silverio, Jr. questioned before the CA the aforementioned issuances of the intestate court. The CA
reversed and set aside the order declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the
Cambridge and Intsia Property null and void. Hence, this petition contending that he CA erred in upholding the
validity of the sale of the Intsia and Cambridge properties on the ground intestate court cannot annul the sales as
it has a limited jurisdiction only and which does not include resolving issues of ownership. It is asserted that the
CA should not have stopped there and looked into the nature of the properties sold, which formed part of the
conjugal partnership Silverio Sr. and Beatriz S. Silverio.
In their Comment, respondents Silverio, Jr., Monica Ocampo and Citrine Holdings, Inc. argued that the
intestate court should not have ruled on the validity of the sale of the subject properties to third parties after it
itself had authorized their disposal in partial settlement of the estate, especially so when separate actions
assailing the new titles issued to said third parties were already instituted by petitioner.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the intestate court could annul a sale of a property on the ground that such intestate
court has limited jurisdiction which does not include resolving issues of ownership.
2) Whether or not the annulment by the court of sale to Monica Ocampo and Citrine Holdings is invalid on
the ground that it already previously authorized their disposal.
HELD:
1) YES, the court could annul a sale.
It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedents
estate and any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the
propertyunder administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected without authority
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS: ATTY. CAYCOABAJON AGBAY ALDEZA ALMOJUELA AMANTE BAGALANON BARRIOS BELARMINO
BUEN CATURLA CRUZ DEONA DIZON LADRERA LAURETA LIBUNAO MAGAMPON MAGBANUA MALAMBUT MANLULU
MARILIM MATIBAG MONTOYA PINCA PINEDA QUILANG RAFAEL RECIO RUBA SANGALANG SANTOS SEMETARA
TORRECAMPO TUAZON TURARAY VELASCO VENTURANZA YAMBOT 1
from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4
and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for as long as the
proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioners contention that the probate court
cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power pertaining to the said court. Our
jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective
heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate
property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition.
2) YES, the annulment of the sale is invalid.
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with
priorapproval of the intestate court. Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled by the said court on
motion by petitioner.
In reversing the intestate courts order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the CA noted that
said ruling is anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time when the TRO and writ
of preliminary injunction issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect. It then concluded that the
eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only with respect to
the appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of
whether the sale was executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were in effect.
Prepared by: Abajon, Michael
2. SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS (514 SCRA, FEBRUARY 2007)
There is also a distinction between residence for purposes of election laws and residence for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, residence" and domicile are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However,
for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Paragraph 2, Article 26 traces its origin from the 1985 Van Dorn, which was decided before the
enactment of the Family Code. This case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof,
our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent. But even if there was no valid
marriage, a party may still be considered an interested person and thus, has legal capacity to file a petition for
issuance of letters of administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), former Governor of Laguna, contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six children. Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo. His second was with Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son. Merry Lee, an American citizen,
filed a Complaint for Divorce before a court in Hawaii issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce in 1973.
Finally, his third was with Felicidad San Luis (Felicidad), with whom he had no children.
Following the death of Felicisimo in 1992, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. In her petition, she stated that, among others, the decedent was
residing New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila. Rodolfo San Luis (Rodolfo) and Linda San Luis (Linda),
decedents children by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue. They
claimed that the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.
Felicisima submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his
public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila
which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code. Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo
because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the venue was not properly laid on the ground that Felicismo, as Governor of Laguna,
was a resident of Laguna.
2) Whether or not Felicisima has not legal capacity on the ground that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
given retroactive effect.
HELD:
1) NO, the venue was properly laid.
The term resides connotes actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile.
Resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. There is also a distinction between residence for purposes of election laws and residence for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, residence" and domicile are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be
his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
Here, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa Hence, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
2) NO, Felicisma has legal capacity.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn
case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse
is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a
situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family
Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.
Here, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos
surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and
that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Therefore, this case should be remanded
to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
But even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we
find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may
be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint
efforts during their cohabitation. Under Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that a petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person. An interested person has been defined
as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
Here, Felicisima would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves
the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides
that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. If respondent fails to prove the validity of both the
divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled
the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
Prepared by: Abajon, Michael
3. AGTARAP VS. AGTARAP (651 SCRA, JUNE 2011)
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates
only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but
does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
FACTS:
Joaquin Agtarap left 2 parcels of land with improveements , as well as it has been known that he
contracted two marriages respectively to Lucia who died 1924 with three children Jesus, Milagros and Jose, and
then to Caridad with three children namely Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes.
On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114, Pasay City, a
verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin) The
RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as administrator.
The RTC issued an Order of Partition on Oct 23, 2000 which ruled that bulk of estate property were
acquired during the existence of 2nd marriage, TCTs showing Joaquin married to Caridad. Eduardo, Sebastian,
and oppositors Joseph & Teresa (Jose children) filed their respective motions for reconsiderations. The RTC
Denied Eduardo & Sebastian motion for reconsiderations, but granted those of Joseph and Teresa,
and Declared that the real properties belonged to conjugal partnership of Joaquin & Lucia and directed Oct
Partition to reflect correct sharing of heirs Eduardo & Sebastian both appealed to CA before RTC could issue
new order of partition. The CA dismissed the appeals and affirmed the RTC resolution. The CA also directed the
partition of Joaquins properties. Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed separate MRs which were denied. They
filed separate petitions for review which were eventually consolidated.
It was Sebastians contention that, Joseph and Teresa failed to stablish their legitimacy as heirs of Jose
and thus the claim to the estate of the decedent. That the certificates of title of subject property indicat that the
decedent married to Caridad which is conclusive proof of ownership and thus is not subject to collateral attack.
Furthermore, Eduardo alleged that the Court of Appeals erroneously settled Joaquins estate together with the
estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria and Milagros in one proceeding. That the Estate of Milagros
cannot be distributed, since a proceeding was already conducted in another court for the probate of Milagros will
violating the rule on precedence of testate over intestate proceedings.
That RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction has no jurisdiction to determine questions
of ownership which belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the RTC as intestate court has jurisdiction to resolve ownership of real properties?
2) CA settlement of Joaquin estate together with the estates of the other heirs
3) Legitimacy of Joseph & Teresa
HELD:
1) The Court held that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve ownership of the real properties.
The General Rule is that Jurisdiction of trial court, either as probate or intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with probate of will and or settlement of estate of deceased persons and does not extend to
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
Exceptions, as justified by expediency and convenience:
Probate court may provisionally pass upon in intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion or
exclusion, from inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination in a separate action.
If interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement of the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the court and the rights of third persons are not impaired.
Estate is settled and distributed among heirs only after payment of debts of the estate, funeral charges,
administrative expense, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. Records show these were not complied
with in1965. The court also ruled that Sebastian did not present evidence to support averments to exclude
Joseph and Teresa as heirs. And finally the Court of Appeals disposition is related only to the estate of Joaquin.
According to the Rules of Court; Sec 1 Rule 90: RTC granted jurisdiction to determine lawful heirs of Joaquin as
well as their respective shares in the payment of obligations. Thus, The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Mercedes and
Gloria was merely a necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquins estate, they being his legal heirs.
Thus; Eduardos petition granted. Sebastians petition denied. CA affirmed with modification that the share
awarded in favor of Milagros shall not be distributed until the final determination of the probate of the will.
Prepared by: Agbay, John Philip C.
4. SUNTAY III VS. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY (683 SCRA, OCTOBER 2012)
The law [of intestacy] is founded on the presumed will of the deceased Love, it is said, first descends,
then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the descendants, then the ascendants, and
finally the collaterals, always preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption
that the deceased would have done so had he manifested his last will Lastly, in default of anyone called to
succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will that
his property be given to charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity
FACTS:
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay
(Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina
and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several
grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein respondent,
Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II.
Emilios marriage was annulled and thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and
Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita) sired with two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos,
respectively. After the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren. It was
altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the
unwanted visits of her grandparents.
Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. On
October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor. Federico
filed his opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and he
should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by
Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the administration After a failed attempt by the parties to settle
the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son,
Emilio III, as administrator of the decedents estate on his behalf. Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs
Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case.
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died and the trial court rendered a
decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristinas
intestate estate.
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against the wishes of the decedent
who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the
wishes of the surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as administrator.
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III. In marked contrast, the CA focused on the
fact that Emilio III is an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in
the estate of the latters legitimate mother, the decedent. That he cannot be appointed for the ff reasons:
The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e., Federicos appointment as
administrator of the estate. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate offspring (Emilio III)
of decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is preferred, being the "next of kin" referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child
from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the appointment of an administrator of the estate under Section 6 Rule 78 of the Rules of
court, or the article 992 of the Civil code applies.
2) Under the undisputed facts, where herein petitioner was reared by the decedent and her spouse since
infancy, whether article 992 of the new civil code applies so as to bar him from being appointed
administrator of the decedents estate.
HELD:
The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is quite the opposite
scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and
Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one
to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, especially in
cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of
the estates, a situation which obtains here.
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including another
illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and
the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the
putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their
respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.
One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar
between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts
indubitably demonstrate the contrary - Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated
by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their
businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedent's husband, the original oppositor to respondent's petition
for letters of administration.
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e.,
love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate
grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed
out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist
animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
Prepared by: Agbay, John Philip C.
5. LEE VS RTC Q.C. (G.R. No. 146006, February 23, 2004)
Our jurisprudence is clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective
heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property
can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition.
FACTS:
In July 1980, Dr. Juvencio Ortaez died intestate. He left behind his wife (Juliana), three legitimate
children (Rafael, Jose, and Antonio), and five illegitimate children (herein private respondents Ma. Divina Ortaez-
Enders, and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico, Manuel, and Cesar).
In September 1980. Rafael filed before CFI Quezon City a petition for the letter of administration of the
intestate estate of Dr. Ortaez. In March 1982, Rafael and Jose were appointed as special administrators.
Included in the inventory of Dr. Ortaez estate were the 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life
Insurance Company (Philinterlife).
In March 1982, Juliana, Rafael, and Jose entered into a memorandum of agreement for extrajudicial
settlement the estate, partitioning the estate among themselves. In April 1989, Juliana, claiming that she owned
1,014 Philinterlife shares of stocks as her conjugal shares in the estate, sold said shares to Filipino Loan
Association Group (FLAG). In October 1991, Jose, claiming the remaining shares as his inheritance share in the
estate, sold the same.
In July 1995, Ma. Divina and her siblings filed a motion for appointment of special administrator of
Philinterlife shares of stock. The motion was granted. Upon motion of Ma. Divina (acting as special adminstratix),
the trial court declared the sales as void ab ignition reasoning out that the dispositions were made without
approval of the probate court. Subsequently, in August 1997, the extrajudicial settlement of estate was declared
void insofar as the dispositions of shares of stocks were concerned.
The Court of Appeals, likewise, declared the extrajudicial partition had no legal basis since the
settlement was made without the intestate courts approval especially considering the presence of other heirs
who stood to be prejudiced. Jose elevated the case to the Supreme Court but it was denied. In February 1999,
the resolution dismissing the petition became final. Henceforth, in July 2000, Ma. Divina obtained an order of
execution from the intestate court.
Petitioners, in their capacity as President and Treasurer of Philinterlife, filed a petition before the Court
of Appeals assailing the order of execution, and the declaration of nullity of dispositions in favor of FLAG.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the order nullifying the dispositions of shares of stock in favor of FLAG was proper.
2) Whether the intestate or probate court can execute its order nullifying the sales.
HELD:
1) YES. The memorandum of agreement was entered into despite the parties knowledge that there were
other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. The
appropriation was invalid. Hence, the subsequent dispositions were invalid. More importantly, property
under administration need the approval of the probate court before it can be disposed of, and any
unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void. Moreover, under the Rules, it is
the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and &, Rule 89),
hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had not
been closed or terminated. Definitely, the court can annul the unauthorized sale.
2) YES. The court has such power, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized sale or fraudulent
disposition of estate property would be meaningless.
Prepared by: Aldeza, Daniel Francis C.
6. ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 118761. JANUARY 29, 1996)
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after
all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been
paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed
by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when
provision is made to meet those obligations.
FACTS:
On June 27, 1987 Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond
Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private
respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine, and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond. Hilario bequeathed
to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties. Edmond was named executor.
In April 1988, Hilario died. The cash component was distributed among the heirs. However, it was only
in June 1992 when a petition for probate was filed by private respondent Montes.
In November 1992, the property in Valle Verde, which was bequeathed to the three granddaughters,
was leased out by Edmond to third persons. In January 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with
the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments in the amount representing the one-year lease of the
Valle Verde property.
In May 1993, the probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters of
testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.
In August 1993, probate court granted respondent Montes motion to release the rent payments to the
three granddaughter. It also ordered the delivery of the titles and the possession of the properties bequeathed to
the three granddaughters. Edmond moved for reconsideration. In December 1993, the probate court ordered the
release of funds to Edmond but only such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of allowances
and administration for support of the granddaughters. The court also held in abeyance the release of the titles to
respondent Montes and the three granddaughter until the lapse of six months from date of first publication.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the order releasing the titles to the private respondents within six month from date of first
publication was valid.
2) Whether the order granting an allowance to the testators grandchildren was valid.
HELD:
1) No. Respondent erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the properties bequeathed
properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. In
settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all
the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond
in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
2) It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive
law in force at the time of the testators death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law clearly limits the
allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to the grandchildren, regardless of their minority
or incapacity.
Prepared by: Aldeza, Daniel Francis C.
7. UNIONBANK v. SANTIBAEZ (G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005)
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. This is in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibaez entered into
a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00.
In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the
principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations.
On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement. Again, Efraim and Edmund
executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan.
In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. A testate proceeding was commenced before the RTC
of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the
testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein
they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors. In the meantime, a
Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank,
wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, Union Bank
filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the
RTC of Makati City.
Edmund was not served with Summons since he was in the United States. Florence, on the other hand,
filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to Edmund and Florence as
provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped
Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.
Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim
Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the
execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the
agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the
approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the suit for collection of sum of money was properly filed against the heirs in a separate
action.
HELD:
NO. The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a
creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. This
requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator
of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability
incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the
continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son
Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after
Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.
Prepared by: Almojuela, Maria Anthonette Ramos
8. GARCIA-QUIAZON v. BELEN (G.R. No. 189121. July 31, 2013)
The letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province
where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
A compulsory heir is deemed an interested party.
FACTS:
Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma. Lourdes Belen. When
Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the RTC of Las Pias City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its
value. She likewise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children, filed an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident of Capas,
Tarlac and not of Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there
are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In
validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes
lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5,
Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the
decedent was a resident of Las Pias City.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.

2) Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.
HELD:
1) YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides
at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in
a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed.
In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for
special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of
venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las
Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his
estate may be laid in the said city.
2) YES. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos
estate, is deemed to be an interested party.
With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate
attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory
heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a
vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
Prepared by: Maria Anthonette Ramos Almojuela
9. PILAPIL vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, (February 5, 2007 G.R. No. 150175)
Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which provides that, [i]f property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes.
FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata), consisting of her surviving sister,
Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalinas daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other nephews and nieces
of Donata,. Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones (Maximino), composed of
his nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of the deceased siblings of
Maximino. Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino died,
Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husbands estate, which then issued appointed Donata as
the administratrix of Maximinos estate. Donata died. Erlinda instituted a petition for the administration of the
intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed as administrators of Donatas
intestate estate. Silverio Briones, a nephew of Maximino, filed for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate
of Maximino, which was initially granted.
The trial court also issued an order, allowing Silverio to collect rentals from Maximinos properties. But
then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order, claiming that the said properties were already
under his and his wifes administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverios Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC. The heirs of
Maximino filed a complaint against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession
of real property. They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and
misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in
her name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.
Furthermore, the facts show that after Donatas death, Erlinda took possession of the real properties,
and continued to manage the same and collect the rental fees thereon. Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were
so obviously exercising rights of ownership over the real properties, in exclusion of all others, which must have
already put the heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still had rights thereto. The heirs of
Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his wake. They did not offer any explanation as to
why they had waited 33 years from Maximinos death before one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino on 21 January 1985. After learning that the intestate estate of
Maximino was already settled in a special proceeding, they waited another two years, before instituting, on 3
March 1987, a complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property belonging to the estate of
Maximino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents right to recover possession of the disputed properties, based on implied
trust, is also barred by laches.
HELD:
YES. Respondents right to recover possession of the disputed properties, based on

implied trust, is also barred by laches.
Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as respondents conduct before
this Court, particularly the belated submission of evidence and argument of new issues, respondents are
consistently displaying a penchant for delayed action, without any proffered reason or justification for such
delay. It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when
the law requires them to act. The law does not encourage laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the
contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he must show that he is not guilty of any of the
aforesaid failings.
In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
Prepared by: Amante, Melody Ellaine
10. SABIDONG VS. SOLAS (A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013)
Article 1491(5)
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
FACTS:
Trinidad Sabidong, complainants mother, is one of the longtime occupants of a parcel of and,
designated as Lot 11 originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and situated at aro, Iloilo City. The
Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of the said Hodges Estate, as the other half-portion
was occupied by Priscila Saplagio. In 1983 ejectment suit however Saplagio was ordered to vacate the portion of
Lot 11 leased to her. In 1984, respondent who was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City Offered to
Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. The Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected respondents because
the actual occupant of Lot 12 manifested their intention to buy it. He was nevertheless informed that he may file
an offer to purchase Lot 11 "should the occupant fail to avail of the priority given to them which the respondent
immediately made. The probate court (Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special Proceedings No. 1672
("Testate Estate of the Late Charles Newton Hodges, Rosita R.Natividad,Administratrix"), approved the offer
upon the courts observation that the occupants of the subject lots "have not manifested their desire to purchase
the lots they are occupying up to this date and considering time restraint and considering further, that the sales in
favor of the xx x offerors are most beneficial to the estate x x x".
Consequently the title of the lot was transferred to the respondent. Later on a writ of demolition was
issued by the probate court in favor of respondent and against all adverse occupants of Lot 11. In 1999, a
complaint was initiated against the respondent in the Supreme Court alleging the prohibition for court personnel
to buy properties in litigation. The complaint likewise alleged that the respondent committed deception,
dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of authority. It was alleged that complainant and his family were made
to believe by the respondent that he is the representative of the Estate. The complainant relied on the
representations of the respondent that he was authorized to facilitate the sale, with more reason that respondent
represented himself as the City Sheriff;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is prohibited to purchase the property subject of probate.
HELD:
NO. For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during
the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the termination of
the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil
Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it can not be
said that the property is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then
under settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc.No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court but also from
the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.
A property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until
the probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as
long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated.
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and
the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been
closed and terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994,
Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate The rule on
disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before another court (RTC)
and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
Prepared by: Amante, Melody Ellaine
11. ARANAS VS. MERCADO (713 SCRA, JANUARY 15, 2014)
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent
is to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and
in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of
the estate.
FACTS:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife,
Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado,
Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his
first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir
Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He
assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in
Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as
the administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition.
The letters of administration in favor of Teresita. As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the
estate of Emigdio for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time
of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties" worth P6,675,435.25 in all,
consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at
P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P22,708.25.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma
moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. Teresita filed a
compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of
stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock; 4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on
January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir
Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30,
1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00. Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be
examined under oath on the inventory. The RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present
evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.
Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the
inventory. The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by
Teresita had excluded properties that should be included. The RTC denied the administratrix's motion for
approval of inventory and orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties which are supposed
to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado. The RTC also directed the administratrix to render an
account of her administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession.
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14,
2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already
been sold to Mervir Realty, On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision insofar as the inclusion of the inclusion
of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject
matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of
the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be
submitted by the administratrix is concerned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been
either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime.
HELD:
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that
material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of
the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special
proceedings, viz.: Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken.An interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are
the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled; (c)
Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it; (d) Settles the account of an executor,
administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the
rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the
person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the
discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies
intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to
direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse,
as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the
issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent
is to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and
in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of
the estate. Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on
the question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, 71 Phil. 66
(1940), the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties
are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of positive abuse of discretion, for in the
administration of the estates of deceased persons, the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the
appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that
there has been a positive abuse of discretion. As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The
trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third
parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional
and may be still revised.
Prepared by: Bagalanon, Kirk Joseph P.
12. BUTIONG VS. PLAZO (765 SCRA 227, AUGUST 5, 2015)
Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from is estate,
may divide the estate either extra judicially or in an ordinary action or partition without submitting the same for
judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator by the court. The reasons that where
the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to
administer the Estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately
entitled.
FACTS:
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with
his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties including a
resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square
meters, and a family home, the land on which it stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in
Nasugbu, Batangas.
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession
dated September 15, 1993, respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that their co-
heirs, Pedros second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners,
spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B.
Villafria, without their knowledge and consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same,
showing respondents a document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did
not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank. The document
actually evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount of P87, 352.62 releasing her and her late
husbands indebtedness therefrom. Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that
he has no record of any transaction involving the subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles
to the same. When respondents went to the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the
resort had been demolished. They were not, however, able to enter as the premises were padlocked.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of
estate of their late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused the annotation of
their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their
complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the
petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of personal
knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his testimony during trial, petitioner
Francisco further contended that what they purchased was only the resort. He also presented an Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides, among others, that
respondents' co-heirs sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well
as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650, 000.00.
On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject Properties to petitioners and
spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as well as the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized
by a notary public that was not duly commissioned as such on the date it was executed. The Deed of Sale was
Undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the Typewritten name "Pedro Rifioza,
Husband" on the left side of the document was not signed. The trial court also observed that both documents
were never presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for registration and that the titles to the subject
properties were still in the names of Pedro and His second wife Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries and
buyers of the Subject properties were not even presented as witnesses whom supposedly witnessed the signing
and execution of the documents of conveyance. On The basis thereof, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not ruling that the Regional trial Court
acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Pedro Rinoza
and the civil action for annulment of title of heirs and third persons in one proceeding.
HELD:
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was captioned as "Judicial Partition with
Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show that the cause of action is actually
one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that settlement of estate is a special proceeding
cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction while judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of
possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction in entertaining the latter while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the
prohibition found in the Rules on the joiner of special civil actions and ordinary civil actions. Thus, petitioner
argued that the ruling of the trial court is void and has no effect for having been rendered in without jurisdiction.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate court that since the finding of
forgery relates only to the signature of respondents and not to their co-heirs, who assented to the conveyance,
the transaction should be considered valid as to them. Petitioner also denies the Findings of the courts below
that his parents are builders in bad faith for they only took possession of the subject properties after the
execution of the transfer documents and after they paid the consideration on the sale.
The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner maintains that since. Respondents complaint alleged the
following causes of action, the same is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. That Pedro L. Rifi.oza, Filipino and resident of Nasugbu, Batangas at the time of his death, died
intestate on November 16, 1989. Copy of his death certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A";
2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants enumerated from paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the only
known heirs of the above-mentioned decedent. The plaintiffs and the Defendants Rolando, Rafael,
Antonio, Angelita, Loma all surnamed Rifioza, and Myrna R. Limon or Myrna R. Rogador, Epifania Belo
and Ma. Theresa R. Demafelix are the decedents legitimate children with his first wife, while Benita
Tenorio Rifioza, is the decedents widow and Bernadette Rifioza, the decedent's daughter with said
widow. As such, said parties are co-owners by virtue of an intestate inheritance from the decedent, of
the properties enumerated in the succeeding paragraph;
3. That the decedent left the following real properties all located in Nasugbu, Batangas:
xxxx
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza has no known legal indebtedness;
17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and it will be to the best interest of all heirs that it
be partitioned judicially.
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the properties
left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon may fall
under an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that,
based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action, is clearly one for
judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an
Extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for
partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit
shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or
stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond
with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property
involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of
any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the
decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years
after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be Published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no Extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A person having the right
to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents in their complaint are
but customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged:
(1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the
exception of one who is represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the
heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of all real
properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful
heirs to the decedents estate, pray for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is
clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the
complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights
thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name
an executor in his will or the executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond
equipped by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent
court shall appoint a qualified administrator the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
An exception to this rule, however, is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a
decedent, who left no will and no debts due from is estate, may divide the estate either extra judicially or in an
ordinary action or partition without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the
appointment of an administrator by the court. The reasons that where the deceased dies without pending
obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the Estate for them and to
deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without a
will, leaving his estate without any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioners contention, respondents were
under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate of a special proceeding for settlement of
intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.
Prepared by: Bagalanon, Kirk Joseph P.
13. ALVARICO v. SOLA (G.R. No. 138953. June 6, 2002)
Only the State can institute reversion proceedings under the Public Land Act. A private individual may
not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the
corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form
part of the public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so.
FACTS:
Petitioner Castorio Alvarico is the natural father of respondent Amelita Sola while Fermina Lopez is
petitioner's aunt, and also Amelita's adoptive mother. On June 17, 1982, the Bureau of Lands approved and
granted the Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of Fermina (aunt/adoptive mother) over Lot 5.
On May 28, 1983, Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over Lot 5 in
favor of Amelita, who agreed to assume all the obligations, duties, and conditions imposed upon Fermina under
MSA Application. Amelita assumed payment of the lot to the Bureau of Lands. She paid a total amount of
P282,900.
On April 7, 1989, the Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights and granting the
amendment of the application from Fermina to Amelita. On May 2, 1989, An Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
was issued in favor of Amelita.
On June 24, 1993, herein petitioner (natural father) filed Civil Case for reconveyance against Amelita.
He claimed that on January 4, 1984, Fermina donated the land to him and immediately thereafter, he took
possession of the same. He averred that the donation to him had the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to
Amelita.
Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is void because Fermina was no longer the owner of
the property when it was allegedly donated to petitioner, the property having been transferred earlier to her. She
added that the donation was void because of lack of approval from the Bureau of Lands, and that she had validly
acquired the land as Fermina's rightful heir. She also denied that she is a trustee of the land for petitioner.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the Court of Appeals REVERSED the
ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has a better claim to the land.
HELD:
NO. The petitioner does not have a claim over the land.
Petitioner claims that he has a better right over the property because he was first in material possession
in good faith. However, this allegation of bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola in acquiring the title is devoid of
evidentiary support. Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in bad
faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act.
A private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of
canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land
covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead may do so. Since Amelita Sola's title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of
Amelita's title. It follows that he cannot "recover" the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is
the rightful owner thereof.
Prepared by: Barrios, Melanie R.
14. MALTOS v. HEIRS OF EUSEBIO BORROMEO (G.R. No. 172720, September 14, 2015)
The sale of a parcel of agricultural land covered by a free patent during the five-year prohibitory period
under the Public Land Act is void. Reversion of the parcel of land is proper. However, reversion under Section
101 of the Public Land Act is not automatic. The Office of the Solicitor General must first file an action for
reversion.
FACTS:
On February 13, 1979, Eusebio Borromeo was issued Free Patent No. 586681 over a piece of
agricultural land located in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. On June 15, 1983, well within the five-year
prohibitory period, Eusebio Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo Maltos.
Eusebio Borromeo died on January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed that prior to his death, he allegedly told
his wife, Norberta Borromeo, and his children to nullify the sale made to Eliseo Maltos and have the TCT
cancelled because the sale was within the five-year prohibitory period.
On June 23, 1993, Norberta Borromeo and her children (respondents herein) filed a Complaint for
Nullity of Title and Reconveyance of Title against Eliseo Maltos, Rosita Maltos, and the Register of Deeds of
Agusan del Sur.
The Maltos spouses argued that the sale was made in good faith and that in purchasing the property,
they relied on Eusebio Borromeo's title. They further contend that since the sale was made during the five-year
prohibitory period, the land would revert to the public domain and the proper party to institute reversion
proceedings was the Office of the Solicitor General.
The Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur also filed an Answer, arguing that the deed of sale was
presented for registration after the five-year prohibitory period, thus, it was ministerial on its part to register the
deed.
The heirs of Borromeo countered that good faith was not a valid defense because the prohibitory period
appeared on the face of the title of the property.
The RTC ruled that the sale is null and void and that no title passed from Eusebio Borromeo to Eliseo
Maltos. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held that since Eusebio
Borromeo sold his property within the five-year prohibitory period, the property should revert to the state.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reconveyance must be made in favor of the petitoners.
HELD:
NO. The reconveyance is not possible.
In this case, Section 101 of the Public Land Act is applicable since title is already vested in Eusebio
Borromeo's name by way of free patent issued to him. This shows that he already had title to the property when
he sold it to petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the sale was made
within the five-year prohibitory period. Thus, there is suffcient cause to revert the property in favor of the state.
However, this court cannot declare reversion of the property in favor of the state in view of the limitation
imposed by Section 101 that an action for reversion must first be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Prepared by: Barrios, Melanie R.
15. PILAR GOYENA VS. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO (G.R. NO. 147148, JANUARY 13, 2003)
As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian,
and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the interested
parties, his actions should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.
FACTS:
From the Court of Appeals Decision affirming that of the Regional Trial Court Special Proceeding
appointing respondent Amparo Ledesma-Gustilo as guardian over the person and property of her sister Julieta
Ledesma, Pilar Y. Goyena, Julietas close friend and companion of more than 60 years, filed a petition for review
on certiorari.
Respondent filed a Petition for Letters of Guardianship over the person and properties of her sister Julieta due
to the latters condition, i.e. medical attention for old age, general debility, and a mini-stroke. Petitioner filed an
Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship alleging that the petition for guardianship lacked factual and
legal basis and that Julieta Ledesma is competent and sane and there is no need to appoint a guardian to take
charge of her person/property.
The trial court found Julieta incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property and appointed
responded as guardian of her person and properties. Further, the lower court noted that the oppositor has
interposed her objections to the appointment of Amparo as guardian because she thinkgs that the latter dislikes
her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court and the trial court erred in finding that respondent is not suitable for
appointment as guardian of the person and properties of Julieta Ledesma.
HELD:
No. The Court held that in the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the
judge who deals directly with the parties. As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and
diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action
which are urged by the interested parties, his actions should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he
has fallen into grievous error.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error. Petitioners
assertion that respondents intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to take control of Julietas
properties and use them for her own benefit is purely speculative and finds no support from the records.
Finally, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit: 1) Petitioner opposed the petition
for appointment of respondent as guardian before the trial court because, among others, she felt she was
disliked by respondent, a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for appointment as guardian, and
petitioner concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial court, which is reflective of a lack of
good faith.
Prepared by: Belarmino, Aliza L.
16.CANIZA VS. CA (G.R. No. 110427, FEBRUARY 24, 1997)
The relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or
the ward.
FACTS:
Carmen Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor, was declared incompetent by
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.
Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included
cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and
estate.
Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City and her guardian
commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said
premises. Defendants declared that they had been living in Caizas house since the 1960s in consideration of
their faithful service to Caiza. Further, they alleged that Caiza executed a holographic will wherein the latter
bequeathed to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
Judgment rendered by the MetroTC ordering the Estradas to vacate the premises. On appeal, the
Regional Trial Court reversed the said decision. Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision
but failed.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Evangelista, as Caizas legal guardian had the authority to bring the action for the
recovery of possession of the property in dispute
2) Whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Caiza after the latters death.
HELD:
1) YES. Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the
person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Further, the Letters of Guardianship clearly
installed her as the guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent Carmen Caiza with
full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in
which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of the
properties By that appointment, it became Evangelistas duty to take care for her aunts person, to
attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in
preference to relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise
control or control over Caizas property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the
ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That the right to
manage the wards estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone
who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.
2) YES. It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule afford no advantage to the
Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latters only two (2) surviving
heirs, the other being Caizas nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this
Court, they were in fact substituted as parties to the appeal at bar in placed of the deceased.
Prepared by: Belarmino, Aliza L.
17. NERI VS. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY (G.R. NO. 194366, OCTOBER 10, 2012)
Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides: When the property of the child under parental
authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court
appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos,
the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the childs property, with the duties and obligations of
guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court
may, however, appoint other suitable persons.
FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari by petitioners: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Rosa, Douglas,
Eutropia, and Victoria seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the CA which annulled the Decision of the
RTC of Davao del Norte, and entered a new one dismissing Ps complaint for annulment of sale and damages
against herein respondent.
During the lifetime of Ps mother, Anunciacion, she and her 2nd husband, Enrique, acquired several
homestead properties. When Anunciacion died, however, Enrique in his personal capacity and as natural
guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda executed an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale (1979) adjudicating among themselves the
said homestead properties, and thereafter, sold the properties to the late spouses Uy for a consideration of
80,000.
On 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of the said sale against spouses Uy,
assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. And for having been executed
without the consent or approval of Eutropia, Victoria, Rosa and Douglas. Thus, depriving the latter siblings of
their legitime.
Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5 year prohibitory period from the issuance of the
homestead patents. They also denied that Eutropia and Victoria were excluded from the Extra-judicial settlement
and sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the defense of prescription and laches.
RTC rendered a Decision annulling the Extra-judicial settlement of estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It
ruled that the sale is void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique
had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
On appeal, however, CA reserved and set aside RTC decision. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether Enrique, as guardian of his children and co-owner (with his children), CAN sell their co-owned
property.
HELD:
NO, as to the shares of the minor children. As a natural guardian, he is merely clothed with
powers of administration. Even the parents of their minor children are bound to post bond.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and
sale, their NATURAL GUARDIAN and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the
basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION and
bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Power of dominion, is granted by law only to a JUDICIAL GUARDIAN of the wards property and even
then only with courts prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the
proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable in
accordance with Art. 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute
deed of sale. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.
Therefore, the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas. Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead
properties with Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who retained title to their respective shares.
Prepared by: Buen, Mikka Concepcion B.
18. OROPESA VS. OROPESA (G.R. 184528, APRIL 25, 2012)
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a guardian
acts for another called the ward whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship
is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property,
as well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody
involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one
in loco parentis as well.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision rendered by the CA affirming the
Order of the RTC in a Special Proceedings which dismissed Nilo Oropesas, peitioner, petition for guardianship
over the properties of his father, respondent, Cirilo Oropesa.
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Paraaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be
appointed as guardians over the property of his father, respondent, Cirilo Oropesa.
In said petition, petitioner alleged that respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has
been sickly for over 10 years already having suffered a stroke that his judgment and memory were impaired and
such has been evident after his hospitalization. That due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without
outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around
him, particularly his girlfriend, Ms. Luisa Agamata.
Respondent filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship filed by his (ever caring and loving) son.
During trial, petitioner presented his evidence which consists of his, his sister, and respondents former
nurses testimony.
After presenting evidence, petitioner rested his case but failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
Respondent, thereafter, filed his Omnibus Motion to declare that petitioner has waived the presentation
of his Offer of Exhibits and Evidence since they were not formally offered; to expunge the documents of the
petitioner from records; and to grant leave to the Oppositor to file Demurrer to Evidence. A subsequent Demurrer
was filed and was granted.
MR was filed by petitioner and appealed the case to CA; failed, now to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent is considered incompetent as per the Rules who should be placed under
guardianship.
HELD:
NO. Respondent is not incompetent and should not be placed under guardianship and therefore
the petition was denied. The only medical document on record is the Report of Neuropsychological Screening.
Said report, was ambivalent at best, although had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of
respondent, it also contained finding that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed
competent.
According to the respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or testimonial
evidence. The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen.Cirilo O.
Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs.
On the contrary, Respondent pointed out in the petitioners evidence which includes a
Neuropsychological Screening Report stating that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of
the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem
situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly
impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still
sharp, alert and able. It is also long settled that "factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great
weight and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on
record." We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the
grant of respondents demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.
Prepared by: Buen, Mikka Concepcion B.
19. ABAD VS. BIAZON (687 SCRA, DECEMBER 5, 2012)
It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the
death of either the guardian of the ward.
The court motu proprio or upon verified motion of any person allowed to file a petition for guardianship
may terminate the guardianship on the ground that the ward has come of age or has died. The guardian shall
notify the court of such fact within ten days of its occurrence. (Rule 97, Sec 25)
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura Abad
with the RTC, he alleged that he is a resident of Quezon City and Maura's nephew. Maura who is single, more
than 90 years old and a resident of Pangasinan, is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her
business affairs. Due to her advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take care of
herself and her properties unassisted thus becoming an easy prey of deceit and exploitation.
Since no opposition at that time, RTC heard the case ex parte. When the case was to be submitted for
decision, Biason filed motion for leave to file opposition; he alleged that he is also a nephew and that he was not
notified of the pendency of the petition and that he opposed the appointment of Abad as he can possibly perform
his duties since he resides in Quezon City while Maura maintains her abode in Pangasinan. Biason prayed that
he be appointed as Maura's guardian since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of attorney to
manage her properties
RTC ruled in favor of Biason as the latter is in better position to be Maura's guardian. Abad then filed an
appeal to the CA arguing that RTC erred in disqualifying him from being appointed as Maura's guardian the fact
that he is a resident of QC should not be a ground for this disqualification and he had actively and efficiently
managed the affairs and properties of his aunt even if he is residing in Metro Manila.
CA affirmed RTC's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not guardianship is terminated upon death.
HELD:
YES. The case became moot and academic as there is no longer justiciable controversy. It is
well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by death. There is no
longer tie between Maura Abad and Leonardo Biason, rendering it pointless to delve into the propriety of
Biason's appointment.
Prepared by: Caturla, Mikaela E.
20. LAND BANK OF THE PHIL. VS. PEREZ (G.R. 166884, JUNE 13, 2012)
Before entering on the duties of his trust, a trustee shall file with the clerk of the court having jurisdiction
of the trust a bond in the amount fixed by the judge of said court, payable to the Government of the Philippines
and sufficient and available for the protection of any party in interest, and a trustee who neglects to file such
bond shall be considered to have declined or resigned the trust; but the court may until further order exempt a
trustee under a will from giving a bond when the testator has directed or requested such exemption and may so
exempt any trustee when all persons beneficially interested in the trust, being of full age, request the exemption.
Such exemption may be cancelled by the court at any time and the trustee required to forthwith file a bond.
FACTS:
LBP is a government financial institution and the official depository of the Philippines. Respondents
were officers of Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC), a corporation engaged in the
construction business. On several occasions, respondents executed in favor of LBP trust receipts to secure the
purchase of construction materials that they will need in their construction projects. When the trust receipts
matured, ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the construction projects or the construction materials
subject to trust receipts. After several demands went unheeded, LBP filed a complaint for estafa against the
respondent officers of ACDC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents may be validly prosecuted for estafa in relation with Section 13 of the
Trust Receipts Law.
HELD:
NO. In this case, no dishonesty or abuse of confidence existed in the handling of the
construction materials. The misappropriation could be committed should the entrustee fail to turn over the
proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by the trust receipt transaction or fail to return the goods
themselves. The respondents could not have failed to return the proceeds since their allegations that the clients
of ACDC had not paid for the projects it had undertaken with them at the time the case was filed had never been
questioned or denied by LBP. What can only be attributed to the respondents would be the failure to return the
goods subject of the trust receipts.
We do not likewise see any allegation in the complaint that ACDC had used the construction materials
in a manner that LBP had not authorized. As earlier pointed out, LBP had authorized the delivery of these
materials to these project sites for which they were used. When it had done so, LBP should have been aware
that it could not possibly recover the processed materials as they would become part of government projects, two
of which (the Metro Rail Transit Project and the Quezon Power Plant Project) had even become part of the
operations of public utilities vital to public service. It clearly had no intention of getting these materials back; if it
had, as a primary government lending institution, it would be guilty of extreme negligence and incompetence in
not foreseeing the legal complications and public inconvenience that would arise should it decide to claim the
materials. ACDCs failure to return these materials or their end product at the time these trust receipts expired
could not be attributed to its volition. No bad faith, malice, negligence or breach of contract has been attributed to
ACDC, its officers or representatives. Therefore, absent any abuse of confidence or misappropriation on the part
of the respondents, the criminal proceedings against them for estafa should not prosper.
Prepared by: Caturla, Mikaela E.
21. CASTRO V. GREGORIO (G.R. 188801, OCTOBER 15, 2014)
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings vis-a-vis the law on adoption
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which denied the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment
of the trial court that granted Rs decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated later on
due to their incompatibilities and Joses alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters:
Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne
Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio
(Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosarios housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social
Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose had been
remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she single-handedly raised and
provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and allege lover, Larry,
and even went to the extent of adopting Larrys two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne knowledge
and consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that he had remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that
he always offered help but it was often declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children thats why he adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of the TC
approving Jed and Reginas adoption. Petitioner allege that Rosarios consent was not obtained and the
document purporting as Rosarios affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Reginas birth
certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO certificates shows
the father to be Larry. P further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Joses illegitimate children but the
legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.
The CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled
that there is no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be
personally notified of the hearing.
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth certificates
required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of
the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is
required in an action for annulment of judgment.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case.

2) Whether or not the consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter are
required.
HELD:
1) YES. The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic
fraud. When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested
party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through
the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during the trial. Joses actions prevented Rosario
and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne
been allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Joses petition since he failed to
fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of
Joses acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
2) YES. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not
only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA
8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however, provides for
several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own
children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to
adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally
married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must
first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to
adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopters children if they are 10 years old or older
(ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal
service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that
their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case.
Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never
validly acquired jurisdiction.
Prepared by: Cruz, Joed Aldin B.
22. CANG VS. CA (296 SCRA 128, SEPTEMBER 25, 19998)
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that
the latter has abandoned them?
FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's extramarital affairs, which
the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court
granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert contest the
adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art.
188 of the FC requires the written consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent
of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to
his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on
the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.
HELD:
YES. Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption; the written consent of the
natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires
a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not
insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the decree of
adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly
intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent
which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It
means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe
their children."
In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone,
without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent,
he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court find
pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular communications with his wife and children through
letters and telephone, and send them packages catered to their whims.
Prepared by: Cruz, Joed Aldin B.
23. TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB VS. CA (G.R. NO. 135216, AUGUST 19, 1999)
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.
FACTS:
Plaintiff-Appellant Tomasa Vda. De Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo
E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratrix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-Appellee Pedro Pilapil on the
other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order
issued by then Judge Jose Moya, CFI Cam Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by the deceased Alfredo
in favor of Pedro. During the settlement of estate proceeding of the deceased of Alfredo Jacob initiated by
Tomasa, Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceaseds estate as Alfredos adopted son
and his sole surviving heir. Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention of Pedro as she questions his claim as
Alfredos legal heir.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.
HELD:
NO, the Court held that he is not. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person
claiming such relationship. D failed to do so. Moreover, the evidence presented by Tomasa shows that the
alleged adoption is a sham. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however,
Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open
court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch
where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not
contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapils conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged
adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter.
In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise,
both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob.
Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.
Prepared by: Deona, Renan G.
24. REPUBLIC VS. CA and CARANTO [G.R. No. 103695. March 15, 1996]
The trial court acquires jurisdiction over the case as long as the publication of the petition for adoption
involved an obvious clerical error in the name of the child to be adopted (misspelling of first name).
FACTS:
Private respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto filed this petition for the
adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime since he
was seven years old. Among those sought in the petition was that the first name which was mistaken registered
as MIDAEL be corrected to MICHAEL. The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the
correction of the name of the child from Midael to Michael. He argued that although the correction sought
concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for
adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The RTC ruled
in favor of the spouses Caranto, declaring MICHAEL C. MAZON as the son by adoption of the spouses Caranto,
and changing his name to MICHAEL. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The Solicitor General raised the issue
to the SC contending further that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption because
the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private respondents petition for adoption.
HELD:
YES. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. The
correction involves merely the substitution of the letters ch for the letter d, so that that appears as Midael as
given name would read Michael. Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one.
Changing the name of the child from Midael C. Mazon to Michael C Mazon cannot possibly cause any confusion,
because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig).
The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption
can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case.
Prepared by: Deona, Renan G.
25. REYES V. MAURICIO (G.R. No. 175080 November 24, 2010)
This is a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Eugenio Reyes to
assail the decision of court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Darab which ruled that there is tenancy
relationship between the petitioner and the plaintiff-appellee and declared that the Kasunduan dated Sept
28,1994 as void.
FACTS:
Eugenio inherited a property which initially was in a tenancy relationship between his predecessor-in-
interest and tenant Godofredo Mauricio since 1936 and which was evidenced by Kasunduang Buwisan sa
Sakahan dated May 26,1993.
Eugenio Reyes caused a document entitled Kasunduan which was for the purpose of ejecting the heirs
of Godofredo from the property . He convinced the heir of Godofredo Mauricio to sign the document in exchange
for P50,000 without explaining the contents thereof to the latter who can neither write nor read. The document
was notarized in Pasig, Metro Manila by Notary Public Ma. Sarah Nicolas, despite of the fact the document was
executed in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, thus the latter was not in a position explain much less ascertain the veracity
of the contents of the alleged Kasunduan as to whether or not the plaintiff- appellee Librada Mauricio had really
understood the contents thereof.
The Darab rendered a decision that there was an existing tenancy relationship and that the Kasunduan
dated September 28, 1994 which was caused by the petitioner and which was signed by the plaintiff-appellee
was void owing to the fact that she was illiterate and ignorant. The Court of Appeals confirmed the decision of
the Darab.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there is tenancy relationship between the parties.

2) Whether the Kasunduan dated September 28, 1994 is valid and enforceable
HELD:
1) There is tenancy relationship between the parties. Although the petitioner is not a party to the
tenancy agreement between his predecessor-in-interest and the plaintiff-appellee, the transfer of
ownership of the subject property of tenancy relationship carries with the tenancy relationship. Thus, the
plaintiff-appellee is the tenant of the petitioner.
2) The Kasunduan dated September 28, 1994 is not valid. The plaintiff-appellee is illiterate and
ignorant who can neither read nor write and she does not comprehend the content of the document,
thus it cannot be enforced against the plaintiff-appellee. The Court therefore the plaintiff appellee be
restored to the peaceful occupation of the property subject of litigation.
Prepared by: Dizon, Maria Pilar
26. IN THE MATTER STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA (G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005)
FACTS:
Stephanie is an illegitimate child of her father. Upon approval of the court of her fathers adoption of her,
her name would be Stephanie Catindig.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Stephanie may still use the surname of her mother as her middle name
HELD:
There is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by natural father.
Notably, the law is silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. The law merely provides that an
adopted child shall bear the name of the adopter. The Court finds no reason why she should not be allowed to
use the surname of her mother, thus Stephanie should be allowed to do so, that is to to use Garcia, her mothers
surname as her middle name.
Prepared by: Dizon, Maria Pilar
27. IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE & MICHAEL LIM (G.R. NO. 168992-93, MAY 21, 2009)
Doctrine: SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

xxx xxx xxx
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the
other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
Effects of Adoption are the following:
(1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent
is the spouse of the adopter;
(2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and
(3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including but not limited to:
(i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.
FACTS:
Petitioner married Primo Lim, they were childless. Minor children whose parents were unknown were
entrusted to them by Lucia Ayuban. Spouses Lim, registered the children (Michael and Michelle) to make it
appear that they were the children parents. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their
own. They used the surname Lim in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, the husband died.
Petitioner married Angel Olario an American citizen.
Petitioner decided to adopt the children under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a
child. Thus, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.
Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
The trial court dismissing the petitions. It ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should
have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code and that
petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552.
Petitioner argued that mere consent of her husband would suffice, such was untenable for under the law, there
are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was
not even made a party in this case, must comply.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
HELD:
NO. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario.
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since
the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court
was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the
three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third,
petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not
suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic
relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the
adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed
to enter the adopters country as the latter adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved
during the trial. These requirements on residency and certification of the alien qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Prepared by: Ladrera, Khristina M.
28. NERY VS. SAMPANA (A.C. NO. 10196 SEPTEMBER 9, 2014)
Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the aliens qualification
to adopt is waived.
FACTS:
Nery engage in the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an
alien adopter. The petition for annulment was granted. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an
aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana in installment
and did not ask for receipts since she trusted Sampana.
Nery alleged that Sampana sent a text message informing her that he already filed the petition for
adoption and it was already published. Furthermore, Samapana informed Nery that they needed to rehearse
before the hearing. When Nery asked why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her
presence was no longer necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Nery inquired about the status of
the petition for adoption and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the court.
Sampana argued that Nerys allegations were self-serving and unsubstantiated. However, he admitted
receiving "one package fee" from Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage and adoption. He alleged that
Nery insisted on being adopted despite the factors that affects the adoption. Thus, he suggested that "if the
[alien] adopter would be married to a close relative of, the adoption could be possible." he, required Nery to
submit the documents, including the marriage contracts and the certification of the aliens qualification to adopt
from the Japanese Embassy. Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the certification. He alleged
that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it because he was still waiting for the certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana claimed that
Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the petition for adoption, and that the
annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana committed to refund the
amount Nery paid him, after deducting his legal services and actual expenses.
IBP found Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believed that he filed the petition for
adoption and for failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nery can be legally adopted.
HELD:
NO. In the present case, Sampana admitted that despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file
the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampanas proffered
excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy.
In his position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her close
relative, the intended adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana
suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of
his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the aliens qualification to adopt is waived.
Clearly, there was no proof that the adoption may be granted for under the Rules on Adoption A.M no.
2-06-02 SC under Sec 5 (Domestic Adoption) and Sec 29 (Inter-country Adoption), petitioner does not in any of
those that are enumerated by the law. The law provides the following:
SEC. 29. Who may be adopted. Only a child legally available for domestic adoption may be the
subject of Inter-country adoption.
SEC. 5. Who may be adopted. The following may be adopted:

(1) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been voluntarily committed to the
Department under Articles 154, 155 and 156 of P.D. No. 603 or judicially declared available for
adoption;
(2) The legitimate child of one spouse, by the other spouse;
(3) An illegitimate child, by a qualified adopter to raise the status of the former to that of legitimacy;
(4) A person of legal age regardless of civil status, if, prior to the adoption, said person has been
consistently considered and treated by the adopters as their own child since minority;
(5) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded;
(6) A child whose biological or adoptive parents have died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be
initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parents.
(7) A child not otherwise disqualified by law or these rules. (DOMESTIC ADOPTION)
Likewise as stated in Sec 4 of the same rule, it states that:
SEC. 4. Who may adopt. The following may adopt:

(2) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above-stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That
his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he has been living in the
Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and
maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he has been certified by his
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt
in his country, and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child.
Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt in his country may be waived for the following:
Xxx xxx xx
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his spouse a relative within
the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse.
Since there was no valid proof or evidence to justify the adoption proceedings, the petition for adoption
should be dismissed.
Prepared by: Ladrera, Khristina M.
29. CASTRO VS. GREGORIO (G.R. 188801, OCTOBER 15, 2014)
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing of notice and
consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse
attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children must be personally
notified through personal service of summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive
service.
FACTS:
Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose) filed a petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jed) and
Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the
father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro
M. Castro" and her nickname, "Jayrose." In the petition, Jose alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.
The trial court approved the adoption and a certificate of finality was issued.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals, seeking to
annul the decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina's adoption.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition. The motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. In their petition,
Rosario and Joanne argue that the appellate court erred in its application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground
to annul a judgment. They argue that because of the fabricated consent obtained by Jose and the alleged false
information shown in the birth certificates presented as evidence before the trial court, they were not given the
opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were concealed from them. Petitioners also argue
that the appellate court misunderstood and misapplied the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due process,
notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable parties. They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires
the consent, not only of the spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such
consent was never secured from Joanne.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners
to (1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
HELD:
The petition was granted. The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a
showing of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it
appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children
must be personally notified through personal service of summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified
through constructive service.
The petitioners should have been given notice by the trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws
require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings and for the court to validly acquire jurisdiction.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested party,
then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents
or perjured testimony during the trial.
Prepared by: Laureta, Jayson U.

30.BARTOLOME VS. SSS (G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014)
The biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of
adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of
the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights
of the biological parents and those by adoption vis--vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
FACTS:
John Colcol (John) was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the
vessel Maersk Danville. As such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program
(ECP). Unfortunately, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to
his untimely death.
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
John's biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626
with the Social Security System (SSS). However, the SSS office denied the claim because petitioner is no longer
considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on
documents submitted to SSS.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered
secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP.
HELD:
The Decision of the ECC is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio's adoption of John, without more, does not
deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John's death as a dependent parent given
Cornelio's untimely demise during John's minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death
benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole
remaining beneficiary.
Prepared by: Laureta, Jayson U.
31. ILUSORIO VS. BILDNER (332 SCRA 169, MAY 12, 2000)
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visist
a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority
and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other
process.
FACTS:
Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband Potenciano
alleging that respondents refused petitioners demands to see and visit her husband.
The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration but denied the petition for
habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.
Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the
custody of her husband and enforce consortium as the wife.
Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision giving Erlinda visitation rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a wife can secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in their
conjugal dwelling.
HELD:
NO. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the
extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continuous
unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedom. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restrainment, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right choice may not be the subject of visitation rights against
free choice. The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where
Erlinda never even prayed for such right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other mesne process.
Prepared by: Libunao, Ma. Victoria P.
32. SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (396 SCRA 443, JANUARY 28, 2003)
Petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting ones right to bail. It cannot be
availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter
has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper
recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings
thereon to proceed.
FACTS:
Atty. Edward Serapio (petitioner) filed two petitions in the SC; these are: 1. A petition for certiorari
assailing the resolutions of the Third division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for
reinvestigation and motion to quash; 2. Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of plunder together with Former President Joseph Estrada and
son Jinggoy Estrada among others. Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation. He allegedly received, on behalf of the said foundation, millions of pesos coming from
illegal activities.
The Ombudsman recommended the filing of a case against him before the Sandiganbayan. A warrant
for his arrest was issued. Upon learning of the said warrant he voluntarily surrendered to the PNP. Petitioner,
thereafter, file an Urgent Motion for Bail but such motion is opposed by the prosecution for the reason that
petitioner should be arraign first before he can avail of Bail. Later on Petitioner simultaneously filed a motion to
quash.
The bail hearing was reset several times due to various pleadings filed by petitioner and the
prosecution. Due to this, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus for the reason that the prosecution have
waived their right to present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; the prosecution launched an endless
barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to prevent the conduct of the bail hearings; and, on the failure of the
People to adduce strong evidence of his guilt. For the said reasons, he is still being deprived of his liberty.
Petitioner cited also Moncupa vs. Enrile, which in such case the Court held that habeas corpus extends
to instances where detention, while valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition habeas corpus should be granted.
HELD:
NO. SC finds no basis for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. The general rule applies.
Moncupa vs Enrile does not apply in this case because petitioners restraint of liberty did not become arbitrary.
His application for bail has yet to commence (to be heard).
The delay in the hearing of his petition for bail cannot be pinned solely to the Sandiganbayan or on the
prosecution because he himself is partly to be blamed (his actions caused delay too.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so. In exceptional
circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained
pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action due to its ability to cut
through barriers of form and procedural mazes.
Prepared by: Libunao, Ma. Victoria P.
33. LACSON VS. PEREZ (357 SCRA 756 May 10, 2001)
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention. Such confinement or
detention involves either of two things: (a) the deprivation of liberty; or (b) the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.
The writ of habeas corpus will not issue in behalf of a person not actually restrained of his liberty.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and
not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty.
FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal- Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a
state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital
Region. Warrantless arrests of several leaders and promoters of the rebellion were effected.
On May 6, 2001, President ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila.
On May 10, 2001, 2001, four petitions were filed before the court:
a. G.R. No. 147780 (by Lacson, Aquino, and Mancao) filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus
and habeas corpus
b. G.R. No. 147781 (by Defensor-Santiago) filed for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis
for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order
c. G.R. No. 147799 (by Lumbao) filed for prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
d. G.R. No. 147810 (by Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino) filed for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court should grant the petitioners petition for writ of habeas corpus
HELD:
NO, the petitioners allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners
from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which remains speculative up to
this very day.
Section 5, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: A court or judge authorized to grant the
writ must, when a petition therefor is presented and it appears that the writ ought to issue, grant the same
forthwith, and immediately thereupon the clerk of the court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in
case of emergency, the judge may issue the writ under his own hand, and may depute any officer or person to
serve it. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory
operation on the filling of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the
judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court
is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus is granted.
If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed,
the petition should be dismissed.
Prepared by: Magampon, Ma. Jenice S.
34. SANGCA VS. CITY PROSECUTOR OF CEBU (524 SCRA 610)
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its
essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if
such restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic
freedom of physical liberty.
FACTS:
On January 4, 2007, petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus and the release of Lovely Impal Adam who was detained in the Cebu City Jail for alleged
violation of Section 5, Article 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
Lovely Impal Adam was arrested due to an entrapment operation. A case was filed against her but the
prosecutors found that there was no probable cause or enough evidence to try her (the alleged buy-bust
operation was not proven by the police officers). Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for being rendered moot and academic.
HELD:
YES, the petition is moot and academic because Adam has already been released pending this petition.
Prepared by: Magampon, Ma. Jenice S.
35. MANGILA VS PANGILINAN (G.R. No. 160739 July 17, 2013)
When writ of Habeas Corpus not allowed or discharge authorized- Section 4 Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this
rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or
of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
FACTS:
Anita Mangila and four other persons were charged with syndicated estafa as well as violations of
Republic Act 8042 with respect to the recruiting and promising of overseas employment to several complainants,
before the Presiding Judge, Heriberto Pangilinan, of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Puerto
Princesa City.
After conducting a preliminary examination of one of the complainants, the judge ordered the arrest of
Mangila and others without bail, and the records transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa for further
proceedings in accordance with law. As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained
at the NBI headquarters in Manila.
Averring that Judge Pangilinan had no authority to conduct preliminary investigation, and the issuance
of the warrant was without any justification or probable cause, Mangila filed a petition for habeas corpus. She
argues that habeas corpus is available to her as she had no adequate remedy in law since the records of the
case were already forwarded to the Office of the City Prosecutor who had no authority to recall the warrant of
arrest.
The CA denied the petition for habeas corpus, holding that if the petitioner believes she is being
restrained on an invalid warrant of arrest, the remedy is not habeas corpus but a motion to quash the warrant or
reinvestigation by the municipal judge or city or provincial prosecutor. In this case, she could have filed with the
Provincial Prosecutor a motion to be released from detention on the grounds raised in the petition. Anita
appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not habeas corpus is available to Anita Mangila
HELD:
NO. The Court held that Habeas Corpus is not an available remedy to Anita Mangila.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole
purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention may
be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks
relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties
before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only
question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ
may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the
detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the
writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that if it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of
a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
With Mangilas arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge
Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her
liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into
through habeas corpus.
It was clear that under Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the resolution
of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the review by the public prosecutor who had the
power to order the release of the detainee if no probable cause should be ultimately found against her. In the
context of the rule, Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release
from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the
preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor,
who had been meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant of
arrest, following Judge Pangilinans transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. We agree
with the CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available
remedy.
Prepared by: Magbanua, Denn Reed Mae A.
36. TUJAN-MILTANTE VS. CADA DEAPERA (G.R. NO. 210636, JULY 28, 2014)
Service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.
FACTS:
The respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the R TC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of
habeas corpus. She demanded the immediate issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina
Tujan-Militante to produce before the court respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada (Criselda),
and to return to her the custody over the child.
The trial court issued the writ of habeas corpus against the petitioner. However, the sheriff was
unsuccessful in personally serving the petitioner copies of the petition. The Sheriff left copies of the court
processes at petitioners Caloocan residence, as witnessed by respondents counsel and barangay officials.
Nevertheless, petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearings before the RTC-Caloocan.
The petitioner then filed for guardianship over the child which was subsequently dismissed on the
ground of litis pendentia. Respondent then filed a criminal case of kidnapping against the petitioner.
Petitioner moved for the quashal of the writ and prayed for the dismissal of the writ of habes corpus on
the ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and the child because she
was not personally served with summons.
The RTC denied the petition. A year later, the issue was raised to the Court of Appeals which then also
denied the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the case
HELD:
YES. The court held that the Regional Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the habeas corpus
proceeding. Arguing that the RTC-Caloocan lacked jurisdiction over the case, petitioner relies on Section 3 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and maintains that the habeas corpus petition should have been filed before the family
court that has jurisdiction over her place of residence or that of the minor or wherever the minor may be
found. As to respondent, she asserts, among others, that the applicable rule is not Section 3 but Section 20 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. As provided:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall been enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
The respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and
Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be
implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the
above rule.
Regarding petitioners assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to state that service
of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.
Prepared by: Marilim, Edgar John E.
37. DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO VS. THE WARDEN (755 SCRA 296)
The writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The remedy of habeas
corpus is extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty."
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint
is illegal." "Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."
FACTS:
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos
were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. He returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009.
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao
suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang. Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder
for allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest
issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name.
There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the November
23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time. To support his allegations, Salibo
presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other documents" tending to
prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009.
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not Butukan
S. Malang. Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport
that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu
Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days.
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus
questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty. He maintained that he is not the accused
Butukan S. Malang.
The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City.
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged" under any resolution, information, or
amended information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information presented in court did not charge
Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or
Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial
court granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention
On appeal by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court's
Decision. Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the
Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]" According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy
was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
Thus, this Petition.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the Decision of the Regional Trial Court on Salibos Petition for Habeas Corpus was
appealable to the Court of Appeals
2) Whether or not Salibos proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus
HELD:
1) YES, the Court held that contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly
appealed before the Court of Appeals.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. Should the court
issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to
decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the power and
authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas corpus.]" Therefore, the decision on the petition
is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.
The Trial Court acquired the power and authority to determine the merits of petitioner Salibo's Petition.
The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of the
Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial
courts, respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.
2) YES, petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense.
Hewas not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of
his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None
of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to
Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest
from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in
this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. The Information
and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are
the same person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these processes is not
Butukan S. Malang but another person named Datukan Malang Salibo.
Prepared by: Manlulu, Rudolfh Kevin A.
38. ELEOSIDA VS. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF Q.C. (MAY 9, 2002)
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary.
FACTS:
On January 30, 1997, the petitioner Elosida filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City seeking to correct the surname of his child as Eleosida and not Borbon, date of the parents wedding to be
dated as blank and that the informants name should be Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E.
Borbon." She alleges that her child was born out of wedlock and that she and the father of his child was never
married. She claims that the child is illegitimate and therefore should follow the mothers surname. The petition
impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents.
The Regional Trial Court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The trial court ruled that It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A
HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc., may be the
subject of a judicial order (contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code), authorizing changes or
corrections and: NOT as may affect the CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE PERSONS
INVOLVED.
Petitioner filed a motion for review, hence the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil
Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are
substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.
HELD:
YES. The court held that corrections of entries in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may
be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless
and innocuous nature. The court held that proceedings under Rule 108 may either be summary or adversary in
nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial,
and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
The court also held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed
and considered.
The court stressed that what is important is that the procedural requirements to be followed. If the
procedural requirements were followed then a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of
birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as
summary.
Prepared by: Marilim, Edgar John E.
39. REPUBLIC VS KHO (526 SCRA 177, June 29, 2007)
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as An Act Authorizing the
City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct A Clerical or Typographical Error In An Entry
and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of Judicial Order, has been
considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status
of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.
FACTS:
Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family applied for the correction of various details in their birth certificate. Kho
petitioned for (1) change the citizenship of his mother from Chinese to Filipino; (2) delete John from his
name; and (3) delete the word married opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was
ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised on Republic Act No. 9048, which
allows first name and nickname in birth certificates without judicial order. The Municipal officer approved of the
change. The Solicitor General objected to the correction on the ground that the correction not merely clerical but
requires an adversarial proceeding. The Court of Appeals found in favor of Kho.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Khos request for change in the details of their birth certificate requires an adversarial
proceeding.
HELD:
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of Carlitos mother
as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the married status of Carlitos parents in his and his siblings
respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction
of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and
controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a grave
and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but
also of the offspring.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents were married alters their
filiation from legitimate to illegitimate, with significant implications on their successional and other rights.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding.
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as An Act Authorizing the
City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct A Clerical or Typographical Error In An Entry
and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of Judicial Order, has been
considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status
of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary
proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied.
Prepared By: Magbanua, Denn Reed Mae A.
40. PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN CARULASAN WANG (G.R. NO. 159966, MARCH 30,
2005)
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish
him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
FACTS:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang
and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on
September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed
from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let
him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in
Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they
anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name
which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since
they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have
the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.
RTC denied the petition. The reason for the denial is that the change sought is merely for the
convenience of the child. Also under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of the father and mother, and there is no reason why this right should be taken from Julian,
considering the he is still a minor.
A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner which was denied by the court. The basis of the denial
was the fact that the dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due course to or application of
the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling.
Hence, the petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not law allow the dropping of middle name.
HELD:
NO. There are only a handful of cases involving requests for change of the given name and
none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name.
Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual
from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It
is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act
inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middle names
have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person
as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and
the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their
filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a
given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten
instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier
and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion
when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the
value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under
our laws.
Prepared by: Matibag, Lorenzo V.
41. BRAZA VS. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (607 SCRA 2009)
Validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a
quo.
FACTS:
Ma. Cristina and Pablo Braza were married on Jan. 4, 1978. They had three children namely Josef,
Janelle and Gian. However Pablo died on April 2002 in a vehicular accident in Indonesia. During his wake, the
respondent Lucille introduced her son Patrick as Pablos child.
Naturally Ma. Cristina inquired as to the veracity of Lucilles claim. She acquired a copy of Patricks birth
certificate from the Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City. It reflects that the child was born on Jan. 1, 1996 but was
registered late a year after. It has an annotation wherein Pablo acknowledge the child as his, and that the child
was legitimated by a subsequent marriage of his parents on April 1998.
Because of her findings, she filed a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick with RTC
of Himamaylan Negros Occidental. Her contention is that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of Lucille and Pablo because such is bigamous, their marriage was subsisting at that time.
She prayed for the correction of Patricks legitimation, acknowledgment of the father, and use of Braza as last
name. She also asked that Patrick be submitted to DNA testing and to declare Lucille and Pablos marriage as
bigamous.
Respondent filed Motion to Dismiss alleging that a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court
does not have jurisdiction to annul her marriage, impugn legitimacy and order DNA testing. Why? Because the
court is not acting as a family court. These should be ventilated in an ordinary action.
RTC granted Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners filed Motion for Reconsideration but was denied so they
filed this present action.
ISSUE:
Whether RTC has jurisdiction to annul the marriage of respondent and impugn legitimacy of
respondents child in a petition to correct entries in local civil register.
HELD:
NO. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiation.
The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry.
A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error
made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as
a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which
all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
Prepared by: Montoya, Jacques Evan M.
42. REPUBLIC VS. SILVERIO (537 SCRA, OCTOBER 22, 2007)
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be
presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has
to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped
in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. On January 27, 2001, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in
Bangkok, Thailand. Thereafter, examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon
in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. As such, he sought
to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female."
On November 26, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the
Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.
Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made. During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
The trial court ruled in his favor nonetheless, the Republic of the Philippines, thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals on August 18, 2003 alleging that there is no law allowing the change
of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. The Court of Appeals reversed RTCs decision and
the petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, he filed this petition alleging that the change of
his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
ISSUES:
2) Whether or not petitioners first name can be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.
2) Whether or not petitioners gender can be changed on the ground of sex reassignment
HELD:
1) NO. The Court held that RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. He must prove that his reason are one of the grounds provided in RA 9048. In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true
and official name.
RA 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change
of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community;
or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code was amended by RA 9048. RA 9048 now governs the
change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the
city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the administrative officers. The intent and
effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name)
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless
an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down
the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change
of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
The petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was not within
that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper
venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it
had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.
2) NO. The Court held that while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry
as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. A correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which
the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes. In this connection, Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code were amended by RA 9048 in
so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion
that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
Prepared by: Pinca, Jana Paola E.
43. REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN (G.R. NO. 166676 SEPTEMBER 12, 2008)
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.
Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. Under
Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
FACTS:
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the
RTC. In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed
to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both
male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her
early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age
thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no
breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her
gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and
was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and
authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical
certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He further testified that respondents condition is
permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her
chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition. Thus, a petition by the Office of the Solicitor General was filed
seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as
CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
NO. The trial court did not err in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her gender.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so
far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies
only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some
middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly
female. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or
as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such
rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the
birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual
deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences
that will follow. The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a
feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with
the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
Prepared by: Pineda, Christine Sharmaine M.
44. REPUBLIC VS UY (703 SCRA ,AUGUST 12, 2013)
A petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated.
FACTS:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth.
Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on February
8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that
her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay."
She further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine
Certificate, and passport bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child
considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother. She also
contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are
all Filipinos.Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly granted.
However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the
RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance
and setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three consecutive
weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the OSG and the City
Prosecutors Office for their information and guidance. Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the
publication requirement.
RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion. On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC
Order. The CA held that respondents failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the
publication of the Order. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable
parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
HELD:
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file
a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceeding is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in
his record.
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those
pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name
which she has been known for since childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and
professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname
"Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes, however, are
obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondents filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from
"Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect,
changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the
same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules
of Court is mandated If. the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary
proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might
be detrimental and far reaching.
Petition nullified.
Prepared by: Quilang, Jeremiah Joy
45. MINORU FUJIKI VS MARINAY (G.R. NO. 196049, JUNE 26, 2013)
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record acts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, [t]he
law required the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produces legal consequences upon a persons
legal capacity and status x x x The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
FACTS:
Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese citizen, married Maria Paz Marinay, a Filipino, here in the Philippines. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara. Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in japan which declared the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara
be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC
to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that what Fujiki wanted is to have the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared null (hence a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage); that under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, a petition for such may only be filed by the husband or wife or in this case either Marinay or Maekara
only.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court is correct in applying A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
HELD:
NO. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relation to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. The recognition of a
foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment and it can be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court provides that [a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right, or a particular fact. Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by
the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as
birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording.
As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas the Supreme Court declared that [t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or particular fact. That the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the
Japanese Family Court.
Prepared by: Rafael, Romm Albert D
46. PEOPLE VS. MERLINDA OLAYBAR (G.R. NO. 189538, FEBRUARY 10, 2014)
FACTS:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof,
she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National. She denied having
contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; She, thus, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.
During trial, She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist
in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel
agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. A document examiner
testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.
The RTC held in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there
was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion
of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for
correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate
adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity was used by an unknown person to
contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage
may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
HELD:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to
be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 225 Phil. 408 the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts
established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding."An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary.
The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it
mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if
any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the
court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections
and changes in entries of the civil register. Lee v. CA 419 Phil. 392
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for
an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among
these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support
pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his
entry of marriage in the civil registry. Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office
G.R.No. 196049, June 26, 2013.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot
nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion
thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
Prepared by: Recio, Nikki Dianne S.
47. ONDE VS CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIAS (734 SCRA, SEPTEMBER 2014)
Petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in his certificate of live birth be corrected as follows:
Entry From To
1. date and place of marriage of his parents December 23, 1983 Bicol Not married
2. First name of his mother Tely Matilde
3. His first name Franc Ler Francler
In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the
ground that it is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial since the
first correction is substantial in nature and would affect petitioners status as a legitimate child. It was further held
that the correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul
General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the
Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. It also denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be
done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048.
2) Whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioners birth certificate that his parents
were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring
adversarial proceedings.
3) Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries.
HELD:
1) RA 10172 provides that No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in
the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical
error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.
2) Correcting the entry on petitioners birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983
in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is
substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In
Republic v. Uy, we held that corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial alterations. Substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceedings.
3) The correction he sought on his and his mothers first name can be done by the city civil registrar.
Under the circumstances, we are constrained to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of entries
before the RTC bereinstated since the same petition includes the correction he sought on his and his
mothers first name.
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Eleosida, we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
as the procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the proceedings under Rule 108
adversary. In Republic v. Uy, we have similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations,
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition,
petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as parties since the substantial correction
he is seeking will also affect them. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to
dwell on the last issue as petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents
were not married on December 23, 1983 when he files the new petition for the purpose.
Prepared by: Ruba, Ericson I.
48.TAPUZ VS. DEL ROSARIO (G.R. NO. 182484, JUNE 17, 2008)
The writ of amparo was originally a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as
an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. It is not a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
The petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data must contain material allegations of ultimate facts relating
to the manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of
the petitioner.
FACTS:
Private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay,
Aklan a complaint for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz and others. The MCTC rendered a decision
in favor of the private respondents.
On appeal before the Regional Trial Court, the court granted the private respondents motion for
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, conditioned on the private respondents posting a
bond. After complying with the imposed condition, the respondent Judge Elmo del Rosario issued a writ
authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC Decision. On private respondents motion, the
respondent Judge issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition.
The petitioners, then, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review of the Permanent
Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC.
The respondent Sheriff Nelson dela Cruz, on the other hand, issued the Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition. As a result, the petitioners filed a petition before the Supreme Court, praying for three remedies - (1)
petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, (2) the issuance of a writ of habeas data
under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, and (3) the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitions for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data are sufficient in form and
substance.
HELD:
NO. The Court dismissed the petition outright for deficiencies of form and substance patent
from its body and attachments. The Court held that the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
is fatally defective, both in substance and in form, while the petition for the issuance of the writ of
amparo is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.
The Court emphasized that the writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security. It is not a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. The subject petition is based on the sworn and unsworn statements involving property
issues arising from the original complaint for forcible entry. The violation or threat against the right to life, liberty
or security can only be discerned from the alleged occurrence of past violence, presence of armed men bare to
the waist, and pointing and firing of weapons. There is no affidavit supporting that the threat to the rights to life,
liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing. The Court further explained that a writ of
amparo should not be issued when applied for as a substitute to appeal or certiorari process, or there is no clear
prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing.
As for the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data, the Court did not find any concrete allegations
of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure
information, has not also been shown.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states: "The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act of omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity. The writ shall cover the extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.
Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that The petition shall be signed and
verified and shall allege the following:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and the personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act
or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and
conduct of investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and the recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts
of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission;
and
(f) The relief prayed for the petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable
reliefs.
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of
ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right
to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent. In case of threats,
the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."
Prepared by: Sangalang, Shalena S.
49. CARAM VS. SEGUI (G.R. No. 193652, AUGUST 5, 2014)
The privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or
omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee
the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Christina Caram (Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano
Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latters child without the benefit of marriage.
After getting pregnant, Christina misled Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she
proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted
through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun and Moon) in Paranaque City to avoid placing her family in a
potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.
On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Jilian and Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and
medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Jilian by way of a Deed of
Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. Consequently, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died without knowing
about the birth of his son. During the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelinos family that she and the deceased
had a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial embarrassment.
After Christinas revelation, Marcelinos family vowed to help her recover and raise the baby. However,
on November 27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza Cabral, issued a certificate declaring Baby
Jilian as Legally Available for Adoption. On May 5, 2010, Christina wrote a letter addressed to the DSWD
asking for the suspension of Baby Jilians adoption proceedings.
The DSWD, through Atty. Marijoy Segui, sent a Memorandum stating that the certificate declaring Baby
Jilian legally available for adoption had attained its finality three months after Christina signed the Deed of
Voluntary Commitment. In addition, the DSWD further stated that should Christina wish to reacquire her parental
authority over Baby Jilian or halt the adoption process, she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the
reglementary period for her to regain her parental authority had already lapsed under Sec. 7 of RA 9523.
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of QC
seeking to obtain custody of Baby Jilian from Atty. Segui and the DSWD. The RTC dismissed the petition and
ruled that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child. The subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Christina was likewise denied. Hence, this case was filed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Writ of Amparo is the proper recourse available to the Petitioner.
HELD:
NO. The Writ of Amparo is not the proper remedy for obtaining parental authority and custody of
a minor child of the Petitioner.
The Court, citing its decision in the case of Secretary of National Defense, et al v. Manalo, et al held:
The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
"Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law.
Section 1, of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the
latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for
adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the
child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue
of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been
legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
Prepared by: Santos, Rea Ann T.
50. VIVARES VS. ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE (G.R. NO. 202666 SEPTEMBER 29, 2014)
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances - Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data states who may file for such action Any
aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by: (a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved
party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
FACTS:
This case involves graduating students of the STC-Cebu City; wherein, the students involved posted
pictures on their Facebook account of them wearing no shirt, but only brassieres from waist up. Said photos were
taken while they were changing into their swimsuits for a beach party. The said photos were reported to the
STCs computer teacher, named Mylene Rheza Escudero. Escudero asked several of her students to show her
other photos of Julia and Julianne, above-mentioned graduating students, they saw photos of: them along the
streets of Cebu wearing clothing which shows their black brassieres (duh, Sinulog? Hello?); them drinking hard
liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar (Private property OUTSIDE school premises); and that their Facebook
accounts were accessible to any Facebook user.
Upon discovery thereof, Escudero reported the matter to the school authorities. The poor students
involved were investigated and were barred to attend their high school graduation rites which is experienced by a
person once in their lifetime. Heartless.
A case was filed against the STC and its officials for Injunction and Damages. Injunction as to the order
of the school not to allow the poor children to attend their graduation rites. A petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas data was also filed. Petitioners (Parents of the students involved) assert that the privacy of the children
were unlawfully invaded. Since the Facebook accounts of the children are set at Friends Only; That the photos
were owned by the ladies, thus cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Old hag, however, violated
this by saving digital copies and subsequently showed them to the STCs officials.
RTC issued the writ and directed the respondents to file their verified written return within 5 working
days from service of the writ.
Respondent denied the petitioners allegation, among others, because there can be no violation of their
right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of habeas data is a proper remedy
HELD:
NO. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The purpose of which is to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to
the truth and to informational privacy. The Writ of Habeas Data is not only confined to cases of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data

Sec. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of
habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the
petition may be filed by: (a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party,
namely: the spouse, children and parents; or (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral
relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, a variance of habeas data situations,
would not have been made.
It is designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.

Respondent contends that it is not an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. This is erroneous.
Such individual need not be in the business of such.
To engage in something is different from undertaking a business endeavor. To engage means to do

or take part in something. It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a
business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Regularity is immaterial.
THREE STRANDS OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY:

1. Locational/Situational
2. Informational (case at bar)
3. Decisional
RIGHT TO PRIVACY WAS NOT VIOLATED because:
1. Facebook has privacy safeguard tools.
2. Utilization of this tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the users invocation of his right to
informational privacy.
That the photos are viewable by friends only does not necessarily bolsters the petitioners contention.
It is well emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile details to Friends is no assurance that it can no
longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
The users own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former.
Prepared by: Semetara, Ma. Richelle G.
51. GEN. RAZON VS. TAGITIS (G.R. No. 182498, December 3 2009)
On the test for the sufficiency for a petition for writ of amparo: To read the Rules of Court requirement
on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be determine
whether it contains the details available to the one filing the petition under the circumstances while presenting a
cause of action showing a violation of the victim's rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party
action.
FACTS:
Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. More than a month after his
disappearance, the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-
in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, et. al. The petition stated that Engr.
Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men
believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then
sped away without the knowledge of his student and according to a reliable source; that he was in the custody of
police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an
earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups; That the
respondent filed a complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, but instead of
helping her she was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband, subject of the petition, was not
missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal to
help and provide police assistance in locating her missing husband. The petitioners mainly dispute the
sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA. Petitioners contend that the petition
violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Amparo Rule intended that the petition be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victims rights for it to be given due course by the court.
HELD:
NO. The Court ruled in negative. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be
complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory
pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the
evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and
purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe
with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or
where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who
caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the
petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern
for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court requirement on
pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine
whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of
action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action.
The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to
determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or
threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
Prepared by: Semetara, Ma. Richelle G.
52. ROXAS VS. GMA (630 SCRA)
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a persons right to control
information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
FACTS:
At bench is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 26 August 2009 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on the Writ of
Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to
the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the latters
prayers for an inspection order, production order and return of specified personal belongings
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an
exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America
(BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various
provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in
conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.
Petitioners were abducted during the exposure program. During the course of the subject abduction,
petitioners were tortured and forced to provide informations against their will. After sometime, they were
released. Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given
to her. Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner
threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing
government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of
Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009. Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the
uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government
agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit Rose, Dex and RC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents can be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of
petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the
Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to,
during and subsequent to 19 May 2009 and to expunge from the records of the respondents any document
pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same.
HELD:
NO. The directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from distributing or
causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar
papers relative to the petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA, appears to be devoid of any legal basis.
The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not
proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for the
abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of
the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. For these reasons, this Court must, at least in
the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data
This case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance
with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there
would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable.
After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to this
Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish
its tasks under this decision.
Prepared by: Manlulu, Rudolph Kevin A.
53. BURGOS VS. ESPERON (G.R. NO. 178497, FEBRUARY 4, 2014)
The Court emphasize that the Courts role in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine
whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to
define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
FACTS:
Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28, 2007 the forcible
abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag
Kainan Restaurant located in Quezon City.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the
Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos. The CHR finds that the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos had
transpired and that his constitutional rights to life, liberty and security were violated by the Government have
been fully determined. The CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt.
Baliaga. Regional Trial Court found probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and ordered his
arrest in connection with Jonas disappearance.
Based on the finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The respondents have not appealed
to the court, as provided under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Hence, the petitioner filed an
Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of amparo should be issued anew in light of newly discovered evidence.
HELD:
NO. The beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. After
reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and considering all the developments of the
case, including the Court of Appeals decision that confirmed the validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo in
the present case, the Court resolve to deny the petitioners Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
The Court note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that the beneficial
purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As the Court held in Razon, Jr. v.
Tagitis the writ merely embodies the Courts directives to police agencies to undertake specified
courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves
both a preventive and a curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators through the investigation and remedial action that it directs. The focus is on procedural
curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of administrative
liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific to
what the proceedings seek to achieve.
In Razon Jr., v. Tagitis, the Court defined what the terms responsibility and accountability signify in
an Amparo case. The Court said: Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established
by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability,
on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance
and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives issued by the Court
outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its investigations resulted in
the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. The Court take judicial notice of the fact that the Regional Trial
Court has already found probable cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his
arrest in connection with Jonas disappearance.
The Court emphasize that the Courts role in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine
whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable;
and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case with
the CAs final determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced disappearance
of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal,
investigation and prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo
proceeding now before us.
Prepared by: Torrecampo, Xanthe Yvette
54. DOLOT VS. PAJE (703 SCRA)
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such
judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government
agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said
tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be
made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of
judgment shall be entered in the court docket.34 A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to
ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the courts decision."
FACTS:
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy
Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for
continuing mandamus, damages and attorneys fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No.
2011-8338. The petition contained the following pertinent allegations:
(1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot
Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail;
(2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain
the geological foundation of the municipality;
(3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental dangers of
flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard;
(4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the required permit to
operate;
(5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale
mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue;
(6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people of
Matnog; and
(7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code. Thus, they prayed for
the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining
operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO;
(3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages;
and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the
designated environmental court. In the Order dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution10 dated October 18,
2011. Aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC11 further ruled that: (1)
there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a
condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the
petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial
affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules.
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly failed to
act on which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus.
HELD:
NO. Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any
agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed
by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the
judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and
which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law." The petition should mainly involve an environmental and
other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTCs mistaken notion on the need for a final
judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under
Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such
judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government
agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said
tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be
made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of
judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to
ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the courts decision."
Prepared by: Tuazon, Ivan Luigi A.
55. MERALCO VS. LIM (632 SCRA, OCTOBER 5, 2010)
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
FACTS:
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO). An anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration
building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent.
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent
reported the matter to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.
By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed
the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," in light of the
receipt of " reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals
and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security."
Respondent, by letter addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of

MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could
voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a
denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails,
and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution
of the issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a labor related issue is within the parameters of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
HELD.
The Court ruled in the negative.
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her
reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of
petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce
ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons
right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.
Writs of habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property
right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondents reservations
on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones
employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such
concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or
unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that
petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety
amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats
and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her letter as "highly suspicious,
doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all." And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of
work "betray[s] the real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor-related.
Prepared by: Malambut, Fahimah A.
56. LEE VS ILAGAN (738 SCRA 59, OCTOBER 13, 2014)
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
FACTS:
Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy, her former
common law partner. According to him, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joys condominium and rested for a
while. When he arrived at his office, he noticed his digital camera missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted
him about a purported sex video she discovered from the digital camera showing him and another woman. He
denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but she refused. They had an altercation where Neri
allegedly slammed Joys head against a wall and then walked away.
Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a case for violation of Republic Act 9262
and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilising the said video. The use of the same violated his life to
liberty, security and privacy and that of the other woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for
issuance of the writ of habeas data.
RTC issued the writ and directed Joy to appear before the RTC and produce Neris digital camera, as
well as the original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days from receipt. In her return,. Joy
admitted keeping the memory card of the digital camera and reproducing the video but only for use as evidence
in the cases she filed against Neri. Neris petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at
suppressing the evidence in the cases she filed against him; and she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting,
or storing of data regarding the person of Neri. The RTC granted Neris petition and ordered the turn-over of the
video to Neri and enjoined Joy from reproducing the same. It disregarded Joys defense that she is not engaged
in the collection, gathering and storage of data, and that her acts of reproducing the same and showing it to other
persons (Napolcom) violated Neris right to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the return
of the video and not on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant petition before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
HELD:
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a
response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy,
most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals[, which is defined as the right to control the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule
essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, [t]he manner the right to privacy is
violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. In other words,
the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and
the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by
substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property
or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and
doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of
the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video which he fears
would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption he to failed to
explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security.
Prepared by: Turaray, Jayson D.
57. ARIGO VS. SWIFT (735 SCRA 102, SEPTEMBER 16, 2014)
The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil
actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17,
Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to
be filed separately.
FACTS:
The Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park in 1998 by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued
by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu
Sea, the USS Guardian, an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy, ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was
injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
The U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift and US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry
K. Thomas, Jr. expressed regret for the incident in a press statement. The Philippine government was assured
appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship. A US Navy-led salvage team removed
pieces of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian
cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan,
Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and
Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a
directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation
of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
Petitioners cited various violations under R.A. No. 10067, such as: unauthorized entry; non-payment of
conservation fees; obstruction of law enforcement officer; damages to the reef; and destroying and disturbing
resources. Petitioners pray that the Court grant the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan.
However, only the Philippine respondents filed their comment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.
HELD:
NO. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is an agreement which defines the treatment of United
States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote "common security interests" between the US and
the Philippines in the region. The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper
considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine
waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
A ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to

US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be
premature and beyond the province of a petition for a Writ of Kalikasan. The Court cannot grant damages
which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages,
including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed
instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.
Prepared by: Velasco, Kristin Dianne J.
58. PAJE VS. CASINO (749 SCRA 39, FEBUARY 3, 2015)
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an
ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least,
a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated
under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper
forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
FACTS:
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government agency and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation
(TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in February 2006 expressing their intention to build
a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP).
After some months, the two entities entered into another MOU, whereby TCC undertook to build and operate a
coal-fired power plant. Under such agreement, TCC identified 20 hectares of land at Subic Bay Freeport Zone
(SBFZ) as the suitable area for the project and another site of approximately 10 hectares to be used as an ash
pond. TCC intends to lease the property from SBMA for a term of 50 years with rent fixed at $3.50 per square
meter, payable in 10 equal 5-year installments.
On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
n favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC, for the construction,
installation, and operation of a powerplant. Then TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated
July 28, 2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy), a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines with the primary purpose of building, owning, and operating power plants in the
Philippines, among others.
Several Sangguniang Panglungsod (Zambales, Olongapo, etc.) issued their respective resolutions
expressing the city governments objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source and urging the
proponent to consider safer alternative sources of energy for Subic Bay. The DENR, through former Secretary
Jose L. Atienza, Jr., issued an ECC for the proposed power plant.
Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP
energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that actual environmental damage
will occur if the power plant project is implemented and that the respondents failed to comply with certain laws
and rules governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC. Both the
DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in invalidating the ECC and its amendments,
arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a
Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan
2) Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a Writ of Kalikasan.
3) Whether the Casio Group was able to prove that the construction and operation of the power plant will
cause grave environmental damage.
HELD:
1) YES, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases) allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact and, thus, constitutes an exception to
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding
the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan.
2) YES, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is principally
predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial
boundaries.
3) NO. The Court sustained the appellate courts findings that the Casio Group failed to
substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the power plant will cause
environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the Writ of Kalikasan. On the other
hand, RP Energy presented evidence to establish that the project will not cause grave environmental
damage through its Environmental Management Plan which will ensure that it will operate within the
limits of the existing laws and standards.
In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted
relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or
irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.
Prepared by: Pinca, Jana Paola E.
59. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT V. SECRETARY
ANGELO REYES ET.AL. (756 SCRA 513, APRIL 21, 2015)
FACTS:
On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department
of Energy (DOE entered into a Geophysical survey and Exploration contract102 (GSEC-102 with Japan
Petroleum Exploration(JAPEX) ,the studies include surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of
seismic and magnetic data' Geophysical and satellite surveys as well as oil an! gas sampling in Tanon strait was
conducted . On 12 December 2004 DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract 64
for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850
s4m. offshore the Tanon strait.
Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46)
awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract allowed JAPEX to conduct oil
exploration in the Taon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one exploration well. The
first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Taon Strait by two individuals acting as
legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. The second petition was filed by a non-governmental
organization representing the interests of fisherfolk, along with individual representatives from fishing
communities impacted by the oil exploration activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after
JAPEX began drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually terminated
the service contract and oil exploration activities ceased. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for the
purpose of review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not service contract no. 46 is violat[ive] of the 1987 Philippine constitution and statutes.
HELD:
YES. The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil
extraction, the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements. Section 2 Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by the president
and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and not
reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was unconstitutional.True to the constitutional policy
that the "State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature," Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual existence of
all native plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected
areas. These areas possess common ecological values that were incorporated into a holistic plan representative
of our natural heritage. The system encompasses outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important
public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and
related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland, or marine. It classifies and administers all the designated
protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic
diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to the
greatest extent possible.
Prepared by: Venturanza, Jan Emmanuel O.
60. WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM VS. PHIL. IND. CORP. (758 SCRA 289, JUNE 16, 2015)
The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human activity
sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established with full
scientific certainty.
FACTS:
Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: (1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System,
which covers a 117-kilometer stretch from Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports diesel,
gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene; and (b) the Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL) System, which extends 105 kilometers and
transports bunker fuel from Batangas to a depot in Sucat, Paraaque. These systems transport nearly 60% of
the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and parts of the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.
The two pipelines were supposedly designed to provide more than double the standard safety
allowance against leakage, considering that they are made out of heavy duty steel that can withstand more than
twice the current operating pressure and are buried at a minimum depth of 1.5 meters, which is deeper than the
US Department of Transportation standard of 0.9 meters.
In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West
Tower Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010
within the condominium premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its
inability to control the flow, WestTowers management reported the matter to the Police Department of Makati
City, which in turn called the citys Bureau of Fire Protection.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the
sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of
contaminated water into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the
residents of WestTower to abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condos power was shut
down.
ISSUE:
Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the respondents to
perform or to desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment.
HELD:
Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, on the
Precautionary Principle, provides that [w]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link
between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving
the case before it.
According to the dissent, the directive for the repetition of the tests is based on speculations, justified by
the application of said principle. This, however, is not the case. Nowhere did We apply the precautionary
principle in deciding the issue on the WOPLs structural integrity.
The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human activity
sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established with full
scientific certainty. Here, however, such absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the
presence of defects in the WOPL, which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from determining whether the
spillage of hazardous materials into the surroundings will cause environmental damage or will harm human
health or that of other organisms. As a matter of fact, the petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to the
environment and to the residents of the affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC.
Prepared by: Yambot, Timothy James M.

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CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

1) YES, the court could annul a sale.

2) YES, the annulment of the sale is invalid.

Prepared by: Abajon, Michael

2. SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS (514 SCRA, FEBRUARY 2007)

1) NO, the venue was properly laid.

2) NO, Felicisma has legal capacity.

Prepared by: Abajon, Michael

3. AGTARAP VS. AGTARAP (651 SCRA, JUNE 2011)

Exceptions, as justified by expediency and convenience:

Prepared by: Agbay, John Philip C.

Prepared by: Agbay, John Philip C.

5. LEE VS RTC Q.C. (G.R. No. 146006, February 23, 2004)

Prepared by: Aldeza, Daniel Francis C.

Prepared by: Aldeza, Daniel Francis C.

7. UNIONBANK v. SANTIBAEZ (G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005)

Prepared by: Almojuela, Maria Anthonette Ramos

8. GARCIA-QUIAZON v. BELEN (G.R. No. 189121. July 31, 2013)

A compulsory heir is deemed an interested party.

1) Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an

Prepared by: Maria Anthonette Ramos Almojuela

YES. Respondents right to recover possession of the disputed properties, based on

In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

Prepared by: Amante, Melody Ellaine

Prepared by: Amante, Melody Ellaine

11. ARANAS VS. MERCADO (713 SCRA, JANUARY 15, 2014)

Prepared by: Bagalanon, Kirk Joseph P.

12. BUTIONG VS. PLAZO (765 SCRA 227, AUGUST 5, 2015)

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:

In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:

Prepared by: Bagalanon, Kirk Joseph P.

13. ALVARICO v. SOLA (G.R. No. 138953. June 6, 2002)

Whether or not petitioner has a better claim to the land.

Prepared by: Barrios, Melanie R.

Whether or not the reconveyance must be made in favor of the petitoners.

NO. The reconveyance is not possible.

Prepared by: Barrios, Melanie R.

Prepared by: Belarmino, Aliza L.

16.CANIZA VS. CA (G.R. No. 110427, FEBRUARY 24, 1997)

Prepared by: Belarmino, Aliza L.

Prepared by: Buen, Mikka Concepcion B.

Prepared by: Buen, Mikka Concepcion B.

19. ABAD VS. BIAZON (687 SCRA, DECEMBER 5, 2012)

CA affirmed RTC's decision.

Whether or not guardianship is terminated upon death.

Prepared by: Caturla, Mikaela E.

Prepared by: Caturla, Mikaela E.

21. CASTRO V. GREGORIO (G.R. 188801, OCTOBER 15, 2014)

Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings vis-a-vis the law on adoption

1) Whether or not extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case.

Prepared by: Cruz, Joed Aldin B.

22. CANG VS. CA (296 SCRA 128, SEPTEMBER 25, 19998)

Prepared by: Cruz, Joed Aldin B.

Prepared by: Deona, Renan G.

25. REYES V. MAURICIO (G.R. No. 175080 November 24, 2010)

1) Whether or not there is tenancy relationship between the parties.

Prepared by: Dizon, Maria Pilar

Prepared by: Dizon, Maria Pilar

Doctrine: SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

Prepared by: Ladrera, Khristina M.

28. NERY VS. SAMPANA (A.C. NO. 10196 SEPTEMBER 9, 2014)

Whether or not Nery can be legally adopted.