G.R. No.

188289 August 20, 2014

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,

vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
1

CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial
2

Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.

The factual antecedents are as follow:

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.

Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was
engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:

PHILIPPINES
FAIR MARKET
PROPERTY
VALUE
House and Lot with an area of 150 1,693,125.00
sq. m. located at 1085 Norma
Street, Sampaloc, Manila
(Sampaloc property)
Agricultural land with an area of 400,000.00
20,742 sq. m. located at Laboy,
Dipaculao, Aurora
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 490,000.00
hectares located at Maria Aurora,
Aurora
175,000.00
3
A parcel of land with an area of 175
sq.m. located at Sabang Baler,
Aurora
3-has. coconut plantation in San 750,000.00
Joaquin Maria Aurora, Aurora
USA
FAIR MARKET
PROPERTY
VALUE
House and Lot at 1155 Hanover
 Street, Daly City, California
$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of
$285,000.00)
Furniture and furnishings $3,000
Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup $13,770.00
truck
Bank of America Checking Account $8,000
Bank of America Cash Deposit
Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00
4
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, $56,228.00
annuities

The Sampaloc property used to beowned by Davids parents. The parties herein secured a loan from
a bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid
a total of 1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.

Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December
2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc
property for 2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his
family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand
executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of Davids father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
December 2003 stating that: 1) the 1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property
shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia 750,000.00,
which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3)
that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties
situated in the Philippines. David was able to collect 1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc
5

property, leaving an unpaid balance of 410,000.00.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on
24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005. The California court granted to
6

Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couples properties in the USA. 7

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the
RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and Davids failure to
comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal
properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject
conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children;
4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc
property; and 5) the payment of50,000.00 and 100,000.00 litigation expenses. 8

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29
June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorneys fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership. 9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:

1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital
infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of the parties properties in favor of the petitioner
and their two (2) children.

2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the
same can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.

3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and
respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latters property
rights over their conjugal properties.

4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the 2.2

[M]illion sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the 1.5
[M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.

5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.

6. Whether or not the attorneys feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable
against their conjugal properties.

Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:

Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive
legitimes.
10

On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are
hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in
the United States of America remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras
a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the
parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled
and new titles be issued in the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;

3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding

paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner
LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must
be annotated on the titles covering the said properties.Their share in the income from these
properties shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent within the first half of
January of each year, starting January 2008;

4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia
Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her
two minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said
legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their
 share in the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the
petitioner within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;

5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A.
Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from
their presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food,
clothing, education and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The monthly
allowance due from the respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the
children require and his financial capacity can afford;

6. Of the unpaid amount of 410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the
Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay 5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and
405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but
the share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint
account tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or
by their representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such
payment/deposit shall be made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of
this Decision, with the passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of the
Clerk of Court of this Court within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from
the Clerk of Court only by the children or their attorney-in-fact; and

7. The litigation expenses and attorneys fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by
them individually.11

The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by
virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County
of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties marriage had already been dissolved.
Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute
community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the
children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.

With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute
community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the
solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled
that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because
the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their
national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the
law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot
beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to
prove abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.

The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for
considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of
equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the
childrens presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family Code, the
waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision by directing the equal division of
the Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common childrens
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the
amount of 520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the
assailedDecision dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil
Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are
hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and
respondent David A. Noveras;

xxx

4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall
pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income
therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half of
January, starting 2008;

xxx

6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to
pay the amount of520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive
legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom,
which shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latters
names. The payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt
ofa copy of this Decision and the corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe
Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period, withdrawable only by the children or their
attorney-in-fact.

A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:

8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic)
the amount of 1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property.

The last paragraph shall read as follows:

Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of
Quezon City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street
corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the
children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.

The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED. 12

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the California
Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the
pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia
to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering
that the latter was already granted all US properties by the California court.

In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in
the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of
California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With
respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation ofconjugal
properties.

At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of
marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, we stated that:
13

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must beproven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense. 14

The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must
comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court. 15

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal
may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The
certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, asthe case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates
to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.

It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals, we relaxed the requirement on certification where
16

we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the divorce and
that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy
of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the divorce
decree was obtained.

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did with respect to the
17

property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to
begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration
of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially approved
and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code. 18

Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4
and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:

(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it
civil interdiction;

(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;

(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;

(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or
her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;

(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has
abused that power; and

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one
year and reconciliation is highly improbable.

In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against
the guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of
property. (Emphasis supplied).

The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate
judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court
ratiocinated:

Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid
cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal
dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the
allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within
the period of three months from such abandonment.

In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his
hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the
alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their
children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October
2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of
marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the
saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines. 19

Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled
in the trial courts decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of
the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for
more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had
not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from
her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation
form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California
20

court in June 2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition
for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the
absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
(Emphasis supplied).

Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community
regime and the following procedure should apply:

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In
case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article 94.

(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered
to each of them.

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net
assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been
a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net
profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said
profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at
the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
 (5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.

(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with
whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of
seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration
the best interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the
case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of
Appeals on the trial courts Decision with respect to liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in
the absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their childrens
presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property. While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent
1wphi1

a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the
community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of 120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of
300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at
least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act
No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the
criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In
sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of
120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of 1,040,000.00.

xxxx

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute
community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their
respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of 410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia
should each pay them the amount of 520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom. 21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of
1

the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled
People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No.
CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
2

named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen
(16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by
the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
4

old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
5 6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
7

support to the son, Roderigo.8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and
since then, have been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a business known
9

as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. To date,
10

all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.
11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter. 12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. Respondent submitted
13

his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit. Thereafter, the
14

Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for
the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and
still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor,
of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO
LAW. 15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent. Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. Petitioner also
16 17

filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his

Opposition. Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned. Subsequently, without the
18 19

RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the
crime charged. 20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant
21

criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which
states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010. 22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondents obligation
to support their child under Article 195 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable
23

under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to
support their minor children regardless of the obligors nationality."
24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order denying petitioners Motion for
25

Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused
is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parents
duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A.
9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262
applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by
our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the
court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be
dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010. 26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the
fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic
v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial
28

court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In
Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to
wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered
in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for
review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
"The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions
of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on
questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. 29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not
a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or
not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable
under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the
factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will
eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and
remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus,
in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should
prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do
not fully agree with petitioners contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that
the legal obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides the parents obligation to support
30

his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in
relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, respondent is not excused from complying with his
31

obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. Respondent also
32

added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil
34

Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New
35

Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to
Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by
their national law with respect to family rights and duties.
36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject
to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his
child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. 37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel, the Court held that

38

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by
their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign
country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This
does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
40

national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity
to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he
41

is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, has already enunciated that:
42

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43

In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine
of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support
44

has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with
Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as
45

well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the
matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely
show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is
placed on petitioners allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondents
obligation to support his child is specifically stated, which was not disputed by respondent.
46

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that
parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law,
said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v.
American Realty Corporation, to wit:
47

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded
and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid
down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to
the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws. 48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable
in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, to wit:
49
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added) 50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section
5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioners son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom
of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her
or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children. 51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioners claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New
Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the
alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed
here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As
such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is
likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondents argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a
legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been
extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which
52

provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty
(20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the
53

instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioners child calls
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of
facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has
jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the
merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380

Petitioner,

Present:

Davide, Jr., C.J.,

- versus - (Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent. Promulgated:

October 5, 2005

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise
remarry under Philippine law?
 Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently
novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion
for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to
remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code
and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is
given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove
Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it
only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The
proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. [5] Furthermore, the
OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and
not of judicial determination.[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
 appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and
for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. [8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution
of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent,
praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the
intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to
Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference
of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos
who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry,
while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
 2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted
and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties
were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in
1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where
the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning
of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.[12]

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then
the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either
a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in
this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie;
hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition
there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decisiondated May
15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23,
are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez,
for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escao," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City,
where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of
age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered
colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-
army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic
chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply
in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out
their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving
money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken;
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and
then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of
Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got
wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home
where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were
surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the
great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The
following morning, the Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a
recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the
Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating
chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February
1948 Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a
letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship
between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and
thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs.
Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his
job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare,
was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.

Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly
accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating
with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June,
1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez,
Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She
did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-
appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City,
and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein
plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe,
on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of
divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation
of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives
with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8
August 1958.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that
they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his
wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto
Escao and Mena Escao for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the
plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for
damages and in dismissing the complaint;.

2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena
Escao liable for damages;.

3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant
parents on their counterclaims; and.

4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.

That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
Vicenta Escao, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise
qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army
chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was
not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.

The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church
and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in
force at the time) expressly provided that
 SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)

The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore,
not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage
act, which provided the following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid
because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it
was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who
solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was
perfectly legal.

The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of
the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father
Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original
action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to
plaintiff was valid and binding.

Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez.
Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but
merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was
never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
was dismissed for non-prosecution.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery
of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
 Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect,
give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of
those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private
parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-
resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95
Phil. 579).

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for
her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion
of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled
to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit
nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim,
adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
"intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in
accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that
were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines,
in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing
before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-
mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of
particular interest. Said this Court in that case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of
Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations;
and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until
her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in
the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous
relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil
Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis
supplied)

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to
Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority
for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action
for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved
in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.

True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are
not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the
members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are
too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife,
the late Doa Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct
toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez
about the Escao's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and
are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta,"
Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for
"misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful
pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court
Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry
Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after
learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents
of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the
canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no
recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escao and
his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escao did not seek to
compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that
they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the
fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that
they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to
divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).

There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently,
and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the
absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always
presumed until the contrary is proved.

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes between the right
of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of
parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent
isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he
wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless
he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he
acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty
to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even
 where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the
obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or
where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that
the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take
his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay
away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of
advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to
a son.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have
been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts
and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or
spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from
defendant Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim
for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived
together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ.
Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather
than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena
Escao, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded
suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no
way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a
common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the
decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the
whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escao;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount
of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Neither party to recover costs.

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY G.R. No. 155635

BAYOT,
Petitioner, Present:

- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF TINGA,
APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL VELASCO, JR., and
BAYOT, BRION, JJ.
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY G.R. No. 163979
BAYOT,
Petitioner,

- versus -
Promulgated:
November 7, 2008
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

 The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca

Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R.
No. 155635, Rebeccaassails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution[2] of
the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,[3] granting a
writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal
Bayot staving off the trial courts grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,[4] docketed G.R. No.
163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision[5] of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case
No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application
for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a
resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation
of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San
Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage
[6]
Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American
citizen[7] born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and
Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to

Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital
relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated
divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First
Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared,
while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the
Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,[8] ordering the dissolution of the
couples marriage and leaving them to remarry after completing the legal
requirements, but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a
year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,[9] settling the
couples property relations pursuant to an Agreement[10] they executed
on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the conjugal
property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real
property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained at
502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.[11]

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of
Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a
petition[12] dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of
marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later
moved[13]and secured approval[14] of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of

[15]
Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since
1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child
not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the
Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage[16] on the
ground of Vicentes alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No.
01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal
Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it,
Rebecca also sought thedissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that
Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in
the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss[17] on, inter alia, the
grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior
judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the
allowance of her application for support pendente lite.
 To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on
her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that,
therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage,

and Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each
other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca.
Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[18] denying Vicentes motion to

dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebeccas application for
support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by

the respondent is DENIED.Petitioners Application in Support of the
Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is
hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support
for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.[19]

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked
by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a
matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of
support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery
against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.

Following the denial[20] of his motion for reconsideration of the

above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for
certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction.[21] His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.[22] On April 30, 2002,
the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the

petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this
case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed
Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November
20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-
094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of
P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Rebecca moved[24] but was denied reconsideration of the

aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the
preliminary injunctive writ[25] was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration
of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her
motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are
presently being assailed in Rebeccas petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R.
No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March
25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental
orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA
Decision reads:
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November
20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of
action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[26]

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicentes motion to dismiss on the
basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or
petition states a cause of action.[27] Applying said rule in the light of the essential
elements of a cause of action,[28] Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente
for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her
marriage with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been dissolved
on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an
American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, such divorce restored Vicentes capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebeccas contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino
citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her
allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not
shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The
Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not
indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having
professed to have that nationality status and having made representations to that
effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b)
when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually
secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before
she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil
Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
 (5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly
Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebeccas
representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured
her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the
validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above

Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4,
2004 Resolution.[29] Hence, Rebeccas Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as

grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the
proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTCs orders
which would have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case
No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision
submitting as follows:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND

NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS
THE FACT OF PETITIONERS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY
STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON

ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT
BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER

THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE
 TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS

ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS
A GRAVE ABUSE.[30]

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being
determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce

obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner.[31] Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the
time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by
a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.[32]

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R.

No. 155635, i.e., thepropriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the
appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner
Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in
the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment
of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for
and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to
be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following
are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was
born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American
territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she
was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.[33]

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed,

asserted, and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during
her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of
Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention
may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment[34] in which she stated being an
American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration

(Bureau) of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport.
On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed
been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that
such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the
Secretary of Justice of Rebeccas recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition
issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY

BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and
partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars
are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was r e c o g n i z e d as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to

Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of
Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez
dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
 Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel
purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and
dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued
the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary
of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen
was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of
recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October
11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have
been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice
issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given
for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the
issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes
judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16,
2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that
the certificate in question must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino

citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued
by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987
Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ
which is tasked to provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services
and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of
aliens. Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino
citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.
 Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002[35] on Recognition as a
Filipino Citizen clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall

automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its
Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the
way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of
Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292.No Identification
Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the
Secretary of Justiceand any Identification Certificate issued by the
Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate
thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis
ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine

passport only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice
Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be
too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which,
to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was
not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that
ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law
Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be
issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically,
therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino
citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebeccas passport a few
days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino

citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not
have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when
she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican
Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca
voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No.
96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her
alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that,
while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March
14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the
foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about
said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as
annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract
(Annex A) and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex B). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC
9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to
expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the
question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage

under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have
the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted
of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Divorce
Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondents Motion to Dismiss
dated 31 May 2001)[36] did Rebecca attach as Annex C ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis
to dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said
petition, taken together with Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition
to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of
cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and
406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be
recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a
Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American
citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce,
her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured
personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil
Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to

the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of
temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United
States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing at
502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x,
who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN
ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of
Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and
residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino,
appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS,
attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the
19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L.
Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to
subscribe all the acts concerning this case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws
of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the
property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through
their Agreement[38] executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96
was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97
issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was
valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a
foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as
a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.[39] Be this as it may,
the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the
Union,[40] the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
 It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been
denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the
jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on
the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both
appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to
the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr
v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x
x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court
(now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of

a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive

upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive

evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign

judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In
this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary.[41]

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the

foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr.
Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce
decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and,
consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of
the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to
nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen
on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or
not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the countrys policy
against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at
the time a valid divorce is obtained.[42]

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same
shall be given a res judicataeffect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is
considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain
language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As
the divorce court formally pronounced: [T]hat the marriage between MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x
x leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal requirements.[43]

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be

subject to a husbands obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be
obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
Rebecca.[44]

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph
of Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the
applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
 x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.[45]

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the
fact of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and
their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and
the Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente
as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couples
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which

they acquired during their marriage consists only of the real
property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered
by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds
of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot,
married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.[46] (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the

divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated
March 4, 1997, ordered that, THIRD: That the agreement entered into between
the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall
survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the
parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision
of said agreement.[47]
 Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the
Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court
from asserting that her and Vicentes conjugal property was not limited to their
family home in Ayala Alabang.[48]

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that

Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of action,
thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of

the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack
of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in
the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute
a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.[49]

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebeccas underlying petition before the
RTC, Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the
documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a
marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must
show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.[50] With the valid
foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to
Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente
and Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not
clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the
support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been
born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or
four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of
nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which
allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate
civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix
can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The
trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support
includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into
the issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebeccas right to support pendente
lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of
her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal
anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is

hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for review
in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25,
2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.