1.

The one-year period in which the complainant waited before filing the charges was contrary to the
immediate and natural reaction of an aggrieved person. If complainant was indeed aggrieved, he would
not have waited for that long before filing her claim.

2. No termination by the employer nor the agency. The act of the complainant in parting from
employment relationship constitutes resignation. The nature of termination being that of voluntary
resignation, the claim of constructive dismissal had no basis since it is deemed to be voluntarily and
freely tendered by the employee.

Concrete Aggregates v. NLRC, G.R. No. 82458, September 7, 1989. The environmental circumstances of
the case show that private respondent voluntarily resigned from employment and signed the quitclaim
and waiver after receiving all the benefits for her separation. While it may be true that her boss Mr.
Magtibay appeared to be hostile towards her, he did not show by his acts any desire to fire her from
employment. It is thus clear that she was not eased out much less was she forced to resign.

3. No valid termination without just cause. There is failure on the part of the complainant to follow the
procedure laid down by the Labor Code. Under Article 300[285], an employee may terminate without
just cause the employer-employee relationship by serving a written notice on the employer at least one
month in advance. Since the complainant did not in any manner informed the said agency of said
termination, such failure to serve any written notice of resignation within the said 30-day period would
make the resigning employee liable for damages.

4. In Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 152616 the respondent employee
was hired as a domestic helper in Taiwan under a one-year contract, with 40 days probationary period
before she would become a regular domestic helper. Terminated after ten (10) days of work, she filed an
illegal dismissal case. The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of her termination within the probationary
period but noted that the twin requirements of notice and hearing were not observed. Respondent is
therefore entitled to the award of P30,000.00 as nominal damages for failure to observe due process.

5. An employee may be constructively dismissed and at the same time legally dismissed. Formantes v.
Duncan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., G.R. No. 170661. In ruling that Formantes was already constructively
dismissed, the Supreme Court observed that the discriminatory acts by the company were calculated to
make petitioner feel that he is no longer welcome nor needed in respondent company short of sending
him an actual notice of termination. Despite this holding, however, the Supreme Court declared that his
dismissal was valid and legal, and therefore it is impractical and unjust to reinstate him as there was a just
cause for his dismissal from service consisting of his sexual abuse of a subordinate female employee which
although not cited in the Notice of Termination served on him, was duly proved during the trial of the
case before the Labor Arbiter. It must be noted in this case that the petitioner was terminated not on the
ground of sexual abuse but due to insubordination for his failure to report to the office and file written
explanations. While the dismissal is valid, it was found that there was no compliance with the twin
procedural requirements of notice and hearing for a lawful dismissal.
6. Mandapat v. Add Force Personnel Services, Inc., G.R. No. 180285, July 6, 2010. Mere allegations of
threat or force do not constitute evidence to support a finding of forced resignation or constructive
dismissal. No act of discrimination committed against petitioner that would render her employment
unbearable. The Supreme Court did not consider the acts of disconnection of computer and internet
access privileges as harassment. The acts respondent complains about are just measures enforced by
respondent to protect itself while the investigation was ongoing. In order for intimidation to vitiate
consent, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given;
(2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there being evident
disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing
the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear
from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the
threatened injury to his person or property. None of these requisites was proven by petitioner. No
demand was made on petitioner to resign. At most, she was merely given the option to either resign or
face disciplinary investigation, which respondent had every right to conduct in light of the numerous
infractions committed by petitioner. There is nothing irregular in providing an option to petitioner.

7. The facts of the case should be considered to determine if there is constructive dismissal. Philippine
Rural Reconstruction Movement v. Pulgar, G.R. No. 169227, July 5, 2010. Primarily, we underscore the
fact that when Pulgar filed an illegal dismissal complaint on April 3, 1997, he was still on leave from the
organization. In other words, from PRRMs standpoint, Pulgar was still its employee when he filed the
illegal dismissal case against the organization.
While we recognize the rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that
the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, in the present case, however, the facts and the
evidence do not establish a prima facie case that the employee was dismissed from employment. Before
the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first
establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal,
then there can be no question as to its legality or illegality.[19] Bare allegations of constructive dismissal,
when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.

in Machica v. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc., G.R. No. 168664, May 4, 2006, :

The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to
prove their allegation that respondents dismissed them from their employment. It must be stressed that
the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the employer bears
the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here because the respondents deny
having dismissed the petitioners

8. Management prerogative.
Right to discipline. The employers right to conduct the affairs of his business according to his own
discretion and judgment includes the prerogative to instill discipline among its employees and to impose
reasonable penalties, including dismissal, upon erring employees. (Deles Jr. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121348,
March 9, 2000.)
The employer cannot be compelled to maintain in his employ the undeserving, if not undesirable
employees. Shoemart, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 74229 August 11, 1989. In this case, the petitioner was
justified in assuming that Soriano was no longer interested in resuming her employment. "Abandonment"
of work is manifest. It can not be said that Soriano was not aware of the consequences of her acts under
the circumstances of this case. The petitioner cannot be faulted for not continuing Soriano in her
employment. In the final analysis, respondent Soriano was afforded due process although belatedly
before the Labor Arbiter and then before the NLRC. As the Supreme Court have ruled, the purpose of the
law is to insure that the employer's prerogative to dismiss or lay-off an employee is exercised without
abuse of discretion or arbitrariness.