Maxwell y La Metáfora Científica

Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys., Vol. 32, No. 3, pp.
395441, 2001
r 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Printed in Great Britain
1355-2198/01/$ - see front matter
On Understanding: Maxwell on the Methods of

Illustration and Scientic Metaphor
Jordi Cat*
In this paper I examine the notion and role of metaphors and illustrations
in Maxwell\s works in exact science as a pathway into a broader and richer
philosophical conception of a scientist and scientic practice. While some
of these notions and methods are still at work in current scientic
researchFfrom economics and biology to quantum computation and
quantum eld theoryF, here I have chosen to attest to their entrenchment
and complexity in actual science by attempting to make some conceptual
sense of Maxwells own usage; this endeavour includes situating Maxwells
conceptions and applications in his own culture of Victorian science and
philosophy. I trace Maxwells notions to the formulation of the problem of
understanding, or interpreting, abstract representations such as potential
functions and Lagrangian equations. I articulate the solution in terms of
abstract-concrete relations, where the concrete, in tune with Victorian
British psychology and engineering, includes the muscular as well as the
pictorial. This sets the basis for a conception of understanding in terms of
unication and concrete modelling, or representation. I examine the
relation of illustration to analogies and metaphors on which this account
rests. Lastly, I stress and explain the importance of context-dependence, its
consequences for realism-instrumentalism debates, and Maxwells own
emphasis on method. r 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Maxwell; Unication; Models; Illustrations; Metaphors;

Scientic Method.
(Received 9 January 1999; revised 20 May 1999)

*Conceptual Foundations of Science, University of Chicago, 1126 E. 59th St., Chicago, IL 60637,
U.S.A. (e-mail: j-cat@uchicago.edu, drjordicat@yahoo.com).
PII: S 1 3 5 5 - 2 1 9 8 ( 0 1 ) 0 0 0 1 8 - 1
395
396 Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics
1. Introduction
For centuries the use of metaphors has been well documented and even
regulated. But it does not follow that metaphors have been well understood.
This is not surprising, for in the philosophical and the scientic literatures the
valuable use of metaphors has been repeatedly denied, discouraged and
dismissed. Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Berkeley established the so-called
literal-truth paradigm. Hobbes warned that metaphors are used to deceive
others; Bacon and Locke, that they are for nothing else but to insinuate the
wrong ideas; and Berkeley advised that a philosopher should abstain from
metaphors altogether. In the last century it did not help matters that the
philosophical orthodoxy turned to language, ordinary and scientic. The so-
called linguistic turn has proved in this respect too narrow an approach to
understanding the world and how we know it, let alone a broader range of
scientic practices. Ironically, one main problem is that, from Carnap to
Davidson, this approach has rested on too narrow and monolithic a
conception of how language can work.
But progress on this front has been made. Since the 1960s discussions of how
metaphors work have occupied philosophers of language, linguists, and
cognitive psychologists alike. And since the publication of Max Blacks famous
essays in the mid 1950s (collected in Black (1962)) the number of publications
on metaphors has grown exponentially, and this I mean quite literally. Despite
illustrious exceptions, however, most of the substantial contributions have
failed to address the case of scientic language other than by assuming that
scientic metaphors can be trivially understood under ordinary language
models. The reluctance on the part of many historians and philosophers of
science to dig out and to elucidate scientic metaphors is not mysterious: under
the conception that a metaphor is merely an ornamental gure of speech,
taking metaphors seriously seemed either a dangerously irrelevant task or an
uncomfortable exercise in reductionistic cultural criticism. But, as I said,
important work has been done to unseat that prejudice.
Evelyn Fox Keller, for instance, has drawn attention to the fact that through
metaphors the language of gender has carried into science certain norms and
values that contribute to its shape and growth. From a feminist point of view
such norms and values are epistemologically limiting as well as ideologically
unacceptable. In that spirit, Nancy Stepan (1986) has shown that when
anthropologists in the nineteenth century proposed an analogy between racial
and sexual dierences, or between racial and class dierences, they began to
generate new data on the basis of such analogies and the interpretations that
follow were accepted partly because of their congruence with cultural
expectations. More generally, Fox Keller (1983, 1985, 1989, 1995) has noted
that dierent metaphors give rise to dierent cognitive perspectives, dierent
aims, questions and even dierent methodological and explanatory prefer-
ences. She has illustrated this important point with examples from genetics and
evolutionary biologyFe.g. selsh gene, gene action, competition, and
On Understanding: Maxwell on the Methods of Illustration and Scientic Metaphor 397
others.1 And Mark Johnson and Nancy Tuana (1986) have discussed the case
of Hans Selyes research in the 1920s on metabolic stress. Selyes shift from
mechanical to organic metaphors for categorising the body changed in a very
denite manner the way in which his medical experience, expectations,
theorising and treatment were structured as coherent units.
Perhaps more familiar to philosophers of science are the works of Mary
Hesse and Richard Boyd. In her classic Models and Analogies in Science (1966)
and subsequent works (Hesse, 1974, 1980, 1993), Hesse is concerned with the
relation between metaphor and truth and concludes that metaphors are
explanatory redescriptions of phenomena.2 I believe Hesses attention to
historical cases to be important as it reveals the plurality of methods employed.
I disagree, however, with her exclusive emphasis on truth and the use of
analogies in making and justifying inferences. I will go back to Hesses ideas in
Sections 5 and 6 of this paper. Boyd argues in Metaphor and Theory Change
(1993) that important metaphors are theory-constitutive. They introduce a
causal mechanism for reference xing and advance explanatory hypotheses
leading to causal theories. In both instances the value of the analysis is
considerably diminished by the uncritically narrow driving assumptions and by
hasty concluding over-generalisations. Moreover, Boyd couples the pursuits of
a causal theory of reference and a causal theory of the world. But we know that
not only can one make do without either but that they do not need to go
together (in particular, Wesley Salmons and Hilary Putnams well-known
views illustrate, respectively, how one can hold one assumption without the
other). Both Hesse and Boyd seem to nd scientic value primarily, but not
exclusively, in explanation and in the pursuit of a realist agenda.3
Here I examine the role of metaphors as an insightful path of inquiry into
Maxwells works. This paper is not just about metaphors; it is also about
understanding, and, relatedly, about modelling and unication. Attention to
Maxwells works is relevant because, I believe, science, even as the object of
philosophical consideration, is intrinsically historical. Therefore, I believe also
that any episode in its history is in principle as relevant as any other to the
scrutiny of philosophy of science. In addition, just as I do not believe that
scientic metaphors constitute a trivial extension of metaphors in ordinary
1
Fox Kellers point has been made in the context of ordinary language by G. Lako and
M. Johnson in their classic Metaphors We Live By (1980).
2
In her (1966) Hesse argues that models and analogies contribute to the interpretation and
testability of theoretical hypotheses, especially by introducing phenomenological restrictions. The
connection of this function to the use of metaphors, and hence, their role in the design of
experiments has been discussed explicitly by G. Cantor in the context of eighteenth-century theories
of light; see Cantor and Christie (eds) (1987). In this paper I will argue a similar point regarding
Maxwells use of illustrations.
3
An exception is, for instance, Earl McCormach, who tries to use the cognitive dimension of
metaphors to bridge the semantic gaps that according to Feyerabends theory-based account of the
meaning of concepts necessarily open between theories and to characterise scientic change; see
McCormach (1971). In Hesse (1980) Hesse makes a similar attempt to defend deductivity and
realism in models of scientic explanation.
language, I do not believe either that metaphors in science should be captured

in principle by one unique account. So I do not believe that what, if I am right,
amounts to Maxwells account captures all there is to the scientic use of
metaphors. But if there is a general account, it should incorporate Maxwells.
I do not claim, either, that Maxwells application of his own views is strictly
consistent and systematic. In this paper I argue that, nonetheless, metaphors
play an important role in Maxwells scientic work, that their role is
intentionally played out by Maxwell, and that they exemplify his own views
on the subject.
Maxwell speaks of a method of scientic metaphor and on his view,
I argue, metaphors serve primarily, though not exclusively, the function of
illustration. As a consequence, the dichotomy between realism and instru-
mentalism proves inadequate for making sense of Maxwells position. This
function rests on a relation between abstractions and the concrete conceptions
that characterise some privileged and familiar representation of our interac-
tions with the world as well as guide our decisions and actions in it. The
relevant notion of concreteness, I will argue, goes beyond the misguided
exclusive emphasis on Maxwells resort to geometrical imagery. It will become
clear how the centrality of models rests on their two most characteristic
features, namely, concretisation and idealisation. This view exemplies a
philosophy of science for which representation of the scientic method cannot
be separated from conceptions of language and the functions of the mind. In
this respect I will show that, contrary to recent emphasis on the nineteenth-
century rejection of imagination in science in favour of mechanical objectivity
of instruments and rules, Maxwells view pointed to an inclusive methodology
that would both accommodate and harness the use of the imagination (see
Daston and Galison (1992); and Daston (1998)).
Connectedly, our representation of nature cannot be separated from our
understanding and use of language. The connection is a key to understanding
the cognitive function of metaphors in Maxwell. I will argue that this should
not be surprising since a similar attitude towards the relation between logic,
language and rhetoric was widespread among nineteenth-century philosophers.
And, nally, central to the understanding of scientic ideasFand to the
understanding of understandingFis the consideration of the scientists own
body. Echoing previous work by Otto Sibum and Michael Polanyi I would like
to call this type of understanding embodied understanding.4
More generally, then, on this view the practice of science engages the
scientists intellect, imagination, body, material environment and culture; and,
correspondingly, in the proper understanding of scientic practice, history,
4
See Polanyi (1962) and Sibum (1989, 1995). It is analogous to gestural or personal tacit forms of
knowledge proper; although, as I hope to make clear, it is also more basic. This portrayal of
intellectual activity is clearly at odds with the hellenistic and medieval ideal of vita contemplativa.
See H. Arendt (1958). For a more general and somewhat reductionistic discussion of the role of the
body and its interaction with the environment in the construction of metal categories, see
M. Johnson (1989).
logic, mathematics, epistemology, philosophy of language and psychology

intersect and interact. With a Victorian emphasis on method Maxwell
eectively introduced and harnessed this variety of considerations into a
broader and more complex view of scientic method. But he also called
attention to how its values were inseparable from its limitations. On pain of
losing sight of its subject matter, then, if philosophy of science is to take
account of the richness of science, it needs to engage a rich pool of concepts
and considerations. Philosophy of science must be able to cut across the
articial divides between philosophical subdisciplines that expect, quite
mistakenly in my opinion, to develop in isolation. In particular, the example
of Maxwells ideas suggests precisely that some such considerations cannot be
introduced in isolation. It is a virtue of the history of science that by bringing
out the complexity of philosophically interesting enterprises it requires that,
and points to ways in which, dierent philosophical concerns intersect. On
these grounds proper attention to metaphors and illustrations, and more
broadly, the question of understanding, raises a legitimate and invaluable
challenge and resource for both philosophers and historians of science.
In Section 2 I argue that Maxwell was educated in a culture in which
language and thought, literature and philosophy, or more academically, issues
of rhetoric, logic and psychology, were inextricably linked. Attention to this
context brings the signicance of Maxwells use of metaphors and analogies
into a sharper historical and philosophical focus. In Section 3 I oer a
formulation of Maxwells problem of understanding abstract representations
in physical theory such as potential functions and the Lagrangian formalism.
In Section 4 I point to the solution to the problem in terms of understanding
and illustration as an abstract-concrete relation, with a broad notion of
concreteness that includes both the pictorial and the muscular; I situate this
notion in the Victorian scientic and philosophical culture of the time. In
Section 5 I try to articulate an account of understanding in terms of the
connection between illustration, analogy and metaphor that I believe is at work
in Maxwells scientic research. I note the signicance of the mathematical
character and the context-dependence of this methodology and the implica-
tions for the understanding of the role of models and their ontological and
epistemological status. In Section 6 I discuss specic methodological virtues of
Maxwells illustrations.
2. Language and Cognition in Victorian Culture
James Clerk Maxwell was born in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1831. He

exhibited very early in his life a strong personal inclination towards reading
and writing poetry, much encouraged by his father, himself educated in the
study of the classics (as betted a member of the landed orders). Maxwells
fondness of literature, classic and Victorian, is well known, ranging from Greek
poems to Jane Eyre and Middlemarch. More generally, the links between
Victorian science and literature are now commonplace. Recent scholarship has
shown that science shared with British culture the interest in and the inuence
of the works and values of Victorian literature, especially in the case of Darwin
(see Levine (1987) and Beer (1996)). It has also shown the appropriation of
German romantic values, ideas and practices among members of what has been
called the Cambridge network such as William Whewell, Adam Sedgwick and
George Peacock. Some of them, like John Tyndall, were educated at German
universities and it was there that they encountered romanticism and idealism
(see Cannon (1978) and Preyer (1981)). For others the place of religion and a
dimension of transcendence in British intellectual culture, especially at
Cambridge, facilitated their familiarity with German ideas (see Schweber
(1981)).
The recourse to concrete ctional representations, let alone the use of
metaphors, places Maxwells scientic narrative very much on a par with the
rhetorical devices of the Victorian literature of his time. In both cases concrete
models illustrate abstract higher truthFtypically moral in Victorian literatureF
and in the case of Maxwell, the symbolic representations involved in the
description of new electromagnetic phenomena. It may be argued that in both
cases such a representational attitude to abstract concepts and truths was
reinforced by its pervasive and inuential use in the Bible. In a narrower
context, Paleys revival of natural theology at the turn of the century came to
drive much scientic thinking and certainly contributed substantially to the
popularisation of analogical thinking. More specically, Maxwells application
of rhetorical elements from biblical texts would have stemmed from his own
lifelong religious fervour. In this regard, one acquaintance testied to
Maxwells love of speaking in parables (see Campbell and Garnett, 1882,
p. 417).
Underlying such particular choices of representation stood a perceived
connection between thought and language. Maxwell held a deep-seated
intellectual interest in language as a vehicle for representing scientic ideas.
Thus he wrote: There is no more satisfactory evidence of the progress of
science than when its cultivators, having settled all their dierences about the
connexion of the phenomena, proceed to reconstruct the denitions. Even in
the most mature sciences, such as geometry and dynamics, the study of the
denitions still leads original thinkers into new regions of investigation.5 This
attitude was reinforced, if not inspired, by his own intellectual education and
milieu. John Herschel, Michael Faraday and William Whewell had expressed a
similar sensitivity to the cognitive importance of scientic language. In his
obituary of Faraday, Maxwell referred to Faradays careful coining of new
terms and praised his eorts to control the meaning the word was intended to
denote.6 Maxwell had borrowed the notions of denotation and connotation
5
Letter to the Editor of The Electrician, 26 April 1879.
6
W.D. Niven (ed.) The Scientic Papers of James Clerk Maxwell (1890, Vol. 2, p. 351). (I will
hereafter refer to this collection as SP.)
from Mill, even if his use is not strictly in accordance with Mills own
denitions.7 John Herschel and John Stuart Mill had made clear that precise
technical nomenclature was the way to carve out, quantify and classify natural
properties in order to discover their governing laws (see, for instance, Herschel
(1830, Ch. 5) and Mill (1848, Book IV, Ch. VIII)).
The importance of language can be traced to its connection to the
intellectual activities of the mind. For Mill as well as for Alexander Bain,
language, especially questions of meaning, is central to questions of logic and
exact thinking, and analogy occupies a place between univocal (deductive) and
ambiguous (inductive, not conclusive) thought. The distinction is in degree, not
in kind. This is the aspect of analogical thinking that relates most directly to
the contemporary attention given by Hesse (1974) and others (Kargon, 1969;
Turner, 1955; North, 1980). For both Mill and Bain the connection between
logic and rhetoric is a substantive one.8 Maxwells early teacher in Edinburgh,
William Hamilton, had similarly found a place for analogies and the
constructive role of the imagination in the study of logic and the laws of
thought (Hamilton, 1861, Vol. 2, lectures 32 and 33). He placed them within
the framework of a view that concepts are by nature relational and that all
knowledge is knowledge of relations. Bain was also a Scott; he was born in
Aberdeen, where both he and Maxwell taught in university colleges and
working-mens institutions; in 1860, the year Maxwell lost his college teaching
position, Bain was appointed to the Chair of Logic at the newly constituted
University of Aberdeen. Bain referred to Hamilton when he introduced the law
of similarity as fundamental to all reasoning (as well as classication,
abstraction and concept formation) and as a force shaping the intellectual
spontaneity of the mind.9 Note that like the idealist streak in Whewell,
Hamilton and Maxwell, the distinctive and novel feature of Bains psychology
is the incorporationFalbeit within a physiological frameworkFof the
spontaneity of the mind in both thought and volition.10 Bain, like Mill and
Maxwell, believed that, in contrast with deductive reasoning, reasoning by
analogy yields only approximate knowledge.
7
From his correspondence we know that Maxwell had been reading Mills System of Logic early in
the spring of 1854.
8
See Mill (1848, Ch. 2, Sect. 8) on the importance of naming as part of the province of logic and
especially on analogical and metaphorical uses of names.
9
Bain (1856, Sect. 38). Bain also mentions the tradition of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy.
10
The acquaintance between Bain and Maxwell is hard to pinpoint and deserves further scrutiny.
They both frequented intellectual and scientic circles in London and Scotland, they were both
associated with working-class educational institutions and sporadically referred to each others
works. In his (1870), Bain quotes Maxwell on the characterisation of viscosity of uids; and at least
on two occasions, in a draft of 1868 on conceptions of matter and in a letter to Tait of 14 November
1870, Maxwell refers to Bains works. Below I will point to surprisingly close similarities regarding
notions of illustration, analogy, metaphor and concreteness, especially the importance of the
muscular sense. Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, the hypothesis I oer of the inuence
between Bain and Maxwell is too intriguing to be ignored.
It is in this context of the cognitive dimension of language that the use of

metaphors was legitimised in the widely inuential works on rhetoric and logic
by Archbishop Richard Whately since the late 1820s (see Whately, 1826a,
1826b), and by Alexander Bain since the mid 1850s (see Bain, 1856, 1866, 1868,
1870). For both authors metaphors were legitimate cognitive devices by virtue
of their role in the psychology of understanding, and the role of analogy in
concept formation and inductive inferences. For them the relevant and
valuable use of analogy drives home a point against conceptualism and realism
about abstractions: the abstract exists only in the concrete, and the former can
only be apprehended in the latter. Moreover, Bain distinguishes two kinds of
scientic minds: one drawn to the abstract or articial, the extreme case
represented by the objects of mathematics; the other more adept at
understanding the concrete or real, the extreme case represented by the
objects of natural history.11
Analogy manifests a fundamental law of thought in abstraction, classica-
tion and reasoning which bears on the activities of the abstract mind; but it also
serves the purpose of clear illustration; thus Bain speaks of illustrative
comparisons (1856, Ch. 4). In doing so it relieves the more concrete kind of
mind from the impossible task of understanding the abstract without the
concrete. The abstract is associated with scientic notions which are articial
and abstruse, while the concrete is identied, cognitively, with the familiar
and intelligible insofar as it is linked to the consideration of actual
appearances to the senses: the seen and palpable, and fullness of the
details. Here it is crucial to note that among the senses Bain notoriously
includes the muscular sense. Its role is to provide the source of many
fundamental ordinary and mechanical notions corresponding to properties of
objects as well as a physiological and mechanical basis for both vision and
volition. In this sense, for Bain concrete representations are not necessarily and
exclusively pictorial (1856, Ch. 2).12 With the help of the retentive and
constructive powers of the imagination, illustration meets their conceptual
need to connect the abstract to the concrete. In this sense, for Bain, scientic
models, diagrams and metaphors serve the constructive function of what he
calls concreting the abstract.13
3. The Problem with Abstraction
In what circumstances did Maxwell encounter a problem concerning

abstractions? In this section I will discuss two cases: potential functions
11
Bain classies scientic disciplines as abstract, concrete or mixed.
12
Bain distinguishes, as well as draws connections between the sense of touch and the muscular
sense. On the view that I attribute to Bain and Maxwell the distinction is only relevant to the
importance of the muscular sense; but clearly both contribute to the formation of concepts of
properties of objects and thereby to the extension of the concrete beyond the visual.
13
Bain (1856, in The Intellect, Ch. 4, Sect. 14). Similarly, for Bain poetic conceptions are the
embodiment of an abstract idea (ibid., Sect. 13).
and Lagrangian formulations in electromagnetism. In both cases metaphors

and illustrations served as mediators between mathematical symbolism and
physical phenomena. In particular, they aorded Maxwell a mechanical point
of view for understanding electromagnetic phenomena mechanically and
abstract theoretical concepts more concretely.
When Maxwell tackled the subject of electricity and magnetism in
Cambridge he encountered two potential functions at the centre of the
mathematical theory. A scalar potential, V; corresponding to the electric eld
and a vector potential, A; corresponding to the magnetic eld (the standard
presentation at the time was in terms of components in Cartesian coordinates).
The functions for the elds of forces and the potentials were connected, by
denition, by dierential operators combining partial derivatives:

E @grad V @V=@x; @V=@y; @V=@z 1
and
B curl A

@Az=@y@@Ay=@z; @Ax=@z@@Az=@x; @Ay=@x@@Ax=@y : 2
The scalar potential was introduced by Laplace in the 1770s and used by
Lagrange, Poisson and Gauss as the central function in theories of action at a
distance, mainly gravitation and electrostatics. It was a computational tool
that allowed the calculation of the components in each direction of a force at
any point from a single scalar function. The value of the force at that point in
each direction is directly proportional to the dierence in the value of the
potential in the innitesimal neighbourhood around that point. The potential
provided mathematical relations between physical quantities but itself bore no
distinct physical interpretation.
The vector potential was introduced in 1845 by Franz Neumann in
order to formulate the electromagnetic force between currents in
distant circuits in terms of a potential function and in the Newtonian
paradigmatic form f 1=r2 : Neumann could derive Faradays law of induction
of electric force on a current in a circuit in relative motion with respect to a
magnetic eld, E @@A=@t: Moreover, in 1845 Faraday discovered what is
now called the Faraday eect or magneto-optical eect: the plane of
polarisation of light passing through certain substances rotates in the presence
of a magnetic eld. The expression of the magnetic eld in terms of a vector
potential, B curl A; was introduced in 1847 by William Thomson. The
expression rested on an analogy with the mechanical representation of vortical
motion in continuous media. The potential was meant to capture in terms of
Stokes continuum mechanics the newly discovered rotational character of
magnetism.
Then some time circa 1851 Maxwell wrote:
When properties of this kind [potentials] are attributed to portions of space
whether occupied by matter or not, it must be carefully remembered that such
properties imply nothing more than what is expressed in their denitions and that
they are to be considered for the present as mere mathematical abstractions

introduced to facilitate the study of certain phenomena.
The most remarkable example of the use of a mathematical abstraction of this
kind in mechanical science is the function used by Laplace in the theory of
attractions and to which Green in his Essay on Electricity has given the name of
the Potential Function. We have no reason to believe that anything answering to
this function has a physical existence in the various parts of space, but it
contributes not a little to the clearness of our conceptions to direct our attention
to the potential function AS IF it were a real property of the space in which it
exists.14
In this quote Maxwell explicitly points to a problem and to a project. The

problem is that the potential cannot be given an independent physical
interpretation at any given point where force exists. In the early 1840s
Thomson had drawn attention to the mathematical analogy between, on the
one hand, the expression for the electrostatic force in terms of the gradient of
the scalar potential and, on the other, Fouriers expression for the contiguous
ow of heat across a surface in terms of the gradient of temperature. Maxwell
saw in that analogy a project: to understand the action of electric forces as a
eld of contiguous action. This was the interpretation that Faradays
experiments had suggested and that Faraday had advocated. Clearly, the role
of the potential function in that interpretation would be central, since the
potential would represent a mechanical property of the intervening medium.
But, as Maxwell would put it years later, the problem is that the electrical
potential, which is the analogue of temperature, is a mere scientic concept. We
have no reason to regard it as denoting a physical state.15 Unlike the potential,
Maxwell thought, temperature is univocally connected to a cluster of
measurable quantities with a physical signicance that can be independently
identied. In the letter to the editor of the journal The Electrician in 1879
Maxwell wrote that one could understand something of temperature by
visiting a Turkish bath, but that is just the sort of understanding that the
potential cannot be given, and he adds: the student who wishes to acquire a
more intimate knowledge of potential by feeling what it is like will be
disappointed.16
Local physical quantities leave the local value of potentials underdetermined
or ambiguous. Elsewhere I have argued that the requirement that physical
quantities must be univocally determinedFa condition that I call
connectednessFis implicit in the interpretation of potential functions of
physical forces in Maxwells and previous treatments as non-empirical. The
condition seems enforced by the ideology of exactness in the scientic
representation of the world, an ideology Maxwell subscribed to for a number
14
P. Harman (ed.) The Scientic Letters and Papers of James Clerk Maxwell (1990, Vol. 1, pp. 210
211; my emphasis). (Hereafter I will refer to this collection as SLP.) I have discussed the problem
and its historical and conceptual background more extensively in Cat (1995).
15
J. C. Maxwell An Elementary Treatise on Electricity (1881, p. 53). (Hereafter ET.)
16
See footnote 5.
of reasons, including logical and theological ones.17 So the remaining challenge

that Maxwell poses himself in the manuscript of 1851 is to compensate for the
epistemic impossibility of concretising the abstract potential function
physically with the introduction of a suitable ctional but clear physical
conception. The task would involve capturing Faradays local representations
of electromagnetic phenomena. Maxwells writings suggest that the same
considerations apply to the vector potential.
The same problems of abstraction and ambiguity apply also to the
Lagrangian formulation of electromagnetic phenomena. Lagrange introduced
the formalism as a general way to represent a mechanical system with
connected parts in terms of a reduced number of variables determined by the
constraints describing their connections. The reduced number of variables are
adopted as the physical, controllable degrees of freedom in whose terms the
energy function can be adequately represented. Then if one can express the
kinetic and potential energies of the system, T and V; respectively, in terms of
the reduced degrees of freedom, one can express the Lagrangian function of the
system, L T@V; and then apply to it the general principle of least action in
order to derive, from the top down, so to speak, the equations of motion of the
system. The energies and forces are expressed in terms of variables that bear
little resemblance to the elementary mechanical properties of the elementary
system. In fact, Lagrange was very proud of the fact that the expressions for
the potential energy or of the velocities for the total system looked so devoid of
geometrical and mechanical interpretation; in other words, that they were so
abstract.
In 1861 Maxwell had attempted to provide a consistent mechanical model of
electromagnetic contiguous action in terms of the ether as a connected system.
It is the so-called molecular-vortex model or the idle-wheels model (SP 1, pp.
451488) (see Fig. 1). Yet he soon realised that the molecular model was awed
as it could not include a consistent representation of diamagnetic behaviour.
He then decided to seek a representation of electromagnetic action in terms of
the more general possible variables that would obviate the more specic
representation in terms of hidden mechanical connections. The Lagrangian
formalism provided just that, a description in terms of elds and energies that,
while standing for a specic hidden system of connected parts, did not require
the detailed knowledge of its mechanical characteristics. In his own words:
17
Cat (1998, n. 101). For a discussion of the requirement of non-ambiguity, or connectedness, see
also Cat (1995), and R. Anderson (1991). See Maxwells remarks on exactness in his inaugural
lecture at Kings College, London, in October 1860, in SLP 1, p. 672, and in Faradays obituary, in
SP 2, p. 360; see also my remarks in Section 4, below. As early as 1856 Maxwell believed not only
that physical sciences are based on precision and generality but also that there is nothing more
essential to the right understanding of things than a perception of the relation of number; the
deniteness of quantication is directly linked to the notion of intelligence; without exact
representation, the universe of sense is neither one nor many, but indenite (SLP 1, p. 377). In 1870
he speaks of an innite complexity. The Kantian inuence from Hamilton is manifest. See
footnote 22.
Fig. 1. The molecular vortex model. From On Physical Lines of Force. Part I, Philosophical
Magazine, vol. XXI, April and May 1861.
The attempt which I then made to imagine a working model of this mechanism
must be taken for no more than it really is, a demonstration that mechanisms may
be imagined capable of producing a connexion mechanically equivalent to the
actual connexion of the parts of the electromagnetic eld. [But] The problem of
determining the mechanism required to establish a given species of connexion
between the motions of the parts of a system admits of an innite number of
solutions. Of them, some may be more clumsy or more complex than others, but
all must satisfy the conditions of mechanism in general.18
Maxwell assumed that the macroscopic empirical properties of the

electromagnetic action are like a black box. He used the example of a closed
bell tower: the visible properties of the hidden connected system, which is the
hidden intervening medium. Following Thomson, Maxwell called this
approach a method of ignoration. Thomson and Tait introduced the
dynamical formalism with the use of constraints with the purpose of the
ignoration of co-ordinates. In his review of their Treatise Maxwell remarks:
In the cases to which the method of ignoration is applied there are certain
variables of the system such that neither the kinetic energy nor the potential
energy of the system depends on their momenta and velocities. The motion of
the rest of the system cannot in any way depend on the particular values of
these variables, and therefore the particular values of these variables cannot be
ascertained by means of any observation of the motion of the rest of the
18
J. C. Maxwell Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism (1873/1891, Vol. 2, art. 831). (Hereafter
EM.)
system (SP 2, p. 782). This representation is, according to Maxwell, the most
general specication of a material system consistent with the condition that the
motions of those parts of the system which we can observe are what we nd
them to be (SP 2, p. 780). In that sense, the formalism led to the use of
quantities that, like potentials, are also, for Maxwell, abstract. And as in the
case of the potentials, Maxwell believed that underdetermination aected the
relation between the more general and abstract dynamical representations of
electromagnetism and the models of concrete mechanisms.
The cognitive problem raised by the Lagrangian formalism was the abstract
character of its quantities, namely, that one would lose sight of any immediate
specic mechanical story. The corresponding challenge was then, in Maxwells
words, to retranslate their results from the language of the calculus into the
language of dynamics, so that our words may call up the mental image, not of
some algebraic process but of some property of moving bodies (EM 2, art.
554). As in the case of the potentials, the problem here involved the absence of
univocality between the general and the specic concrete representations. In
order to solve it Maxwell would turn to Hamiltons reformulation in terms of
coordinates of a system and their associated momenta rather than Lagrangian
associated velocities.
4. Symbols and Muscles: Abstract-Concrete Relations and the Function

of Illustration
Now I turn to Maxwells general solution to the problem of interpretation,

namely, the problem of how to provide an understanding of potentials and,
more generally, of the language of mathematical physics applied to new
phenomena. Maxwell admitted a number of possible forms of understanding.
Each one furnished a kind of understanding or interpretation, and he
attributed each to a dierent possible kind of scientic mind:
There are, as I have said, some minds which can go on contemplating with
satisfaction pure quantities presented to the eye by symbols, and to the mind in a
form which none but mathematicians can conceive.
There are others who feel more enjoyment in following geometrical forms,
which they draw on paper, or build in the empty space before them.
Others, again, are not content unless they can project their whole physical
energies into the scene which they conjure up. They learn at what rate the planets
rush through space, and they experience a delightful feeling of exhilaration. They
calculate the forces with which the heavenly bodies pull at one another, and they
feel their own muscles straining with the eort.
To such men momentum, energy, mass are not mere abstract expressions of the
results of scientic inquiry. They are words of power, which stir their souls like
memories of childhood.
For the sake of persons of these dierent types, scientic truth should be
presented in dierent forms, and should be regarded as equally scientic, whether
it appears in the robust form and the vivid colouring of a physical illustration, or
in the tenuity and paleness of a symbolical expression (SP 2, p. 220).
Here Maxwell would appear to have followed Alexander Bain.19 The two main
types of minds and representations are symbolic and illustrative (or concrete).
Maxwell is explicit about their respective characteristic association with forms
of understanding, or, equivalently, of interpretation (SP 1, pp. 155157, 521
523, 564; and SLP 1, p. 672). For Maxwell both kinds of understanding
constitute warranted alternatives to the unwarranted introduction of explana-
tory hypotheses (SP 1, p. 156). The abstract interpretation of a quantity
corresponds to its symbolic meaning. The symbolic meaning is grasped by
appreciating the algebraic relations that the quantity satises. This grasp yields
a kind of clarity and distinctness and an interpretation that bears on our
understanding natural phenomena.20 It is clear, in this way, to the calculational
mind of the mathematician.
By contrast, the understanding, or interpretation through illustration is
meant to circumvent the problem of abstract symbols losing sight of the
phenomena at hand. It is a third way implemented through what Maxwell
referred to as physical analogy to convey physical ideas without either
introducing unwarranted physical hypotheses or empty symbols (SP 1, p. 156).
To do so illustrations must, in Maxwells own terms, bridge over the gulf
between the abstract and the concrete.21 Dierent forms of illustration
instantiate dierent forms of abstract-concrete relations.22 This more intuitive
19
Bain (1856). See footnotes 10 and 11 above.
20
In this sense of interpretation from mathematical deniteness, Maxwell stated that we can go
beyond the powers of mere calculation in the application of principles and the interpretation of
results (Inaugural Lecture at Kings College, London, October 1860; SLP 1, p. 672); in the same
spirit he claimed that the aim of physical science is to observe and interpret natural phenomena
(General Considerations Concerning Scientic Apparatus, SP 2, p. 505). Like Whewell, Maxwell
believed that this kind of interpretation provided in the form of mathematical exactness a clarity
and distinctness of representational and methodological value in yielding the most eectual means
of discovering error, and an absolute security against vagueness and ambiguity (ibid., p. 669).
21
SP 2, p. 248; see also ibid., p. 220. It is in this sense of interpretation that at the Inaugural Lecture
at Kings College, London, in October 1860, Maxwell stated that in the study of Natural
Philosophy we shall endeavour to put calculations into such a form that every step may be capable
of some physical interpretation(SLP 1, p. 672). The concern expressed by Maxwell appears almost
verbatim in the works of a number of his predecessors including several Common Sense Scottish
philosophers as well as Whewell. In the same inaugural address Maxwell implies that this kind of
interpretation rests solely on the almost mechanical autonomy of scientic language as a tool.
22
I distinguish between ontological and representational concreteness. The former is attributed to
particular objects or phenomena of experience. The latter involves theoretical concepts and other
representations. There I distinguish between logical abstract-concrete relations, as involved in type-
token, and general-specic relations, and cognitive abstract-concrete relations, where cognitive
concreteness is attributed to the more cognitively basic, intuitive ideas. Even in the case of
imaginary mental representations, the eectively illustrative representation is the particular,
ontologically concrete one entertained by the mind at a particular time. See Cat (1995). That the
abstract-concrete relation is mapable onto the one between the general and the specic is illustrated
by and sheds light on the case of Maxwells introduction of the Lagrangian formalism. His
introduction was meant precisely in the same terms in which mechanics had been pursued by
theorists in France at the turn of the century, as the science of mechanism in general (see Grattan-
Guiness, 1983).
mode of understanding dismissed the tenuity and paleness of a symbolical

expression and required, instead, illustration by reference to concrete, clear
ideas. These he also refers to as conceptions and mental representations.23
According to Maxwell, these kinds of ideas were concrete, vivid, robust,
embodied, clear, familiar, and involving physical imagery, physical
conception, or suggested by words of power.24
These ideas are antecedently clearer or more familiar to us because they are
ingrained in our bodily experiences in the course of our daily commerce with
the world. Their concreteness, in the special form of familiarity and clearness,
satises the cognitive demand that Maxwell designated as xity and
deniteness. As his own works attest, the concrete form of understanding
was favoured by Maxwell himself. This fact was acknowledged on a more
personal psychological level by his friend and biographer Lewis Campbell as
one of Maxwells personal character traits in just the same terms: His
imagination was in the highest sense concrete, grasping the actual reality, and
not only the relations of things. No one was ever more impatient of mere
abstractions (Campbell and Garnett, 1882, pp. 425426). It is the sort of
concreteness also favoured by the Scottish Common Sense philosophers as well
as William Whewell in Cambridge (see Olson (1975) and Siegel (1991)). In these
very same terms Maxwells Edinburgh teacher William Hamilton had written
that geometry, for instance, has always been reckoned as the transition study
from the concrete to the abstract (quoted in Davie (1961, p. 128)). The
concreteness at stake here is both ontological and cognitive, it is about largely
empirical representations of what exists or takes place. Noting that all our
senses are involved, Maxwell wrote:
we shall ensure the association of the doctrine of science with those elementary
sensations which form the obscure background of all our conscious thoughts, and
which lend a vividness and relief to ideas which, when presented as mere abstract
terms, are apt to fade entirely from the memory (SP 2, p. 242; emphasis added).
According to Maxwell there are two main kinds of illustrations:

experimental models and imaginary models. Experimental illustration is
exemplied by the unambiguous experimental identication of a property as
directly as possible. Maxwell distinguished between experiments of illustration
and experiments of research (SP 2, p. 242). Experiments of research are
directed toward yielding a measurement result, a magnitude that enables one to
enter a phenomenon or idea into a chain of mathematical reasoning.
Experiments of illustration, by contrast, are directed to presenting a
23
The more concrete kind of clarity has its philosophical antecendents in the empirical
representations discussed in works of Hume and Kant. In the introduction to the Critique of
Pure Reason, which Maxwell read, Kant distinguished between discoursive and illustrative clarity.
The second kind appears to capture very closely the clearness that Hume and Bain attribute to ideas
of experience.
24
The terminology occurs in the earliest as well as much later works. See for instance SP 1, p. 155;
and SP 2, p. 215.
phenomenon to the senses so that an appropriate scientic idea can be grasped.

In this sense, Maxwell speaks also of a demonstration. To the scientist most
of these ideas have adequate scientic representation in elementary notions of
geometry and mechanics. And muscular ideas play an important role in
experimental illustration at the level of observation and measurement. This is
specially captured by the experiential vocabulary of shoves, kicks and jerks
employed by Maxwell and his students at the Cavendish laboratory during the
1870s.25
As I indicated in the previous section, Maxwell would seem to have adopted
from his predecessors the requirement of univocal empirical determination of
quantities. Yet he also would seem to have wanted to escape their conclusion
by rejecting the additional implicit dilemma between physical signicance and
mathematical abstraction. Maxwell had adopted the metaphysics of contig-
uous action, which in turn imposed a mechanical conception of potentials. But
this conception must be nested in the second form of illustration. His solution
to the problem of interpretation of potentials comes in the form of imaginary
illustrations. In the relevant context such ideas are provided by the imagination
and do not correspond to any real element present in the physical situation.
Concreteness of imaginary illustrations is primarily cognitive, in the sense of
ideas that are most familiar, and closest to perceptual representations. Their
concreteness goes beyond the realm of the pictorial. Typically, such models
include representations that are either geometrical or mechanical, either visual
or muscular, depending on the properties selected.
It is crucial for understanding the role of illustrations to notice that the
properties involved in their connotations combine both concreteness and
precision. The former comes both from the non-technical meaning of the
corresponding terms in ordinary languageFsuch as work and tensionFand
from their technical meaning familiar to engineers and scientists and
concretised in machines and laboratory instruments. In industrial Britain for
scientists and many laypersons the two domains overlapped. In this sense
mechanical notions were culturally shared as cognitively primary and
determined the way in which new scientic ideas were to be, in young
Maxwells own telling metaphors, xed or screwed to the head. Nevertheless
the cognitive importance of illustration cannot be dismissed as merely an
educational tool. They occupied a central place in the course of his research
and in his most important technical writings and addresses to professional
audiences.26 His most explicit remarks were addressed to the Mathematics and
Physics Section at the Liverpool meeting of the British Association for the
Advancement of Science in 1870. At the same meeting John Tyndall delivered a
25
See the correspondence of Whipple to Maxwell, 6 May 1874 and Maxwell to Jenkin, 22 July 1874
and 4 November 1874, cited in Sibum (1995); and EM 2, arts 743751. This association of terms
helped Maxwell bring closer at the Cavendish higher theory and experimental practice.
26
This consideration adds to Cantors criticism of Boyds distinction between educational, or
exegetic, and theory-constitutive metaphors. See Cantor (1987).
general lecture on related ideas about the use of imagination and illustration in
science (see Tyndall, 1870).
Maxwell epitomised the imaginary type of illustration in a series of
imaginary models. Among the mechanical ones the rst was the imaginary
uid in his 1855 essay that illustrated the lines of electric and magnetic force;
although the most notorious one is the molecular vortex model of 1862 (see
Fig. 1).27 The ctional character of such illustrations is precisely what Maxwell
indicated with the expression as if in his undergraduate manuscript; the place
where he expressed his desideratum of a clear conception of the potential as if
it were real.28
One kind of illustration is notoriously pictorial and geometrical. It is well
known that he was keen on colours and geometrical gures since childhood
(see Campbell and Garnett, 1882). Examples of Maxwells geometrical models
and discussions thereof are the following: his early conceptual representations
of elds in terms of Faradays lines of force and their subsequent images of
1862 and 1873 (Fig. 2); his discussion of diagrams of forces and structures;29
his reference to a mutual embrace of electricity and magnetism30 in the
magnetic eld induced by a closed current (Fig. 3); his related interest in the
topology of closed curves and surfaces (SLP 2, pp. 433442; and EM 1, art. 18);
and, within innitesimal domains, the geometrical representation of dierential
operators as describing the convergence and the curling of lines (Fig. 4).31
It is worth noting that two usually confused yet dierent levels of
geometrical representation are at work. I call them second- and rst-order
illustrations, respectively. Second-order illustration is the more abstract
conceptual representation in the context of the mathematical theory: the
geometrical idea of line of force is, when Maxwell followed Faraday, a
conceptual unit of representation of the eld of electromagnetic action. The
27
As Ole Knudsen has emphasised, the vortex model was originally taken by Maxwell realistically,
oering explanatory description as well as illustration. See Knudsen (1995).
28
The distinctive meaning of the expression as if as a linguistic marker for ctional imaginary
reresentations was mentioned by John Tyndall in his general lecture in Liverpool. See Tyndall
(1870, p. 20).
29
In his essay Diagrams Maxwell denes a diagram as a gure drawn in such a manner that the
geometrical relations between the parts of the gure help us to understand relations between other
objects (SP 2, p. 647). He distinguishes dierent kinds of diagrams according to their uses and
nature: diagrams of illustration, metrical diagrams, graphic and symbolic diagramsFthe last one
includes symbols. He characterises diagrams of illustration in general as follows: The diagrams in
mathematical treatises are intended to help the reader to follow the mathematical reasoning. The
construction of the gure is dened in words so that even if no gure were drawn the reader could
draw one for himself. The diagram is a good one if those features which form the subject of the
proposition are clearly represented. The accuracy of the drawing is therefore of smaller importance
than its distinctness (ibid.).
30
SP 1, p. 184. Geometrical ideas are manifest in relations between integrals around loops (for
example around a close circuit) and over surfaces. For a discussion of Maxwells geometrical
interpretation of the integral equations of electromagnetism, see Wise (1977). The geometrical
signicance of potentials is clearer in that context.
31
For a more detailed discussion of the interpretation of dierential operators, see Cat (1998).
Fig. 2. From A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism (1873), Vol. 1, art. 118.
Fig. 3. From On Physical Lines of Force, Part I, Philosophical Magazine, vol. XXI, April and May
1861.
strength of the eld is related to the density of lines and their calculations are
related accordingly (SP 1, pp. 160161). The corresponding rst-order
illustration is the kind of representation suggested by Faradays observations
and pictures, namely, the concrete graphic representation of lines of force in
Fig. 4. From On the Mathematical Classication of Physical Quantities, Proceedings of the London
Mathematical Society, vol. III, n. 34 (1871).
order to provide a graphic geometrical representation of the eld as in Fig. 2.

In this case the representation is schematic, partial and metonymical since the
eld is a three-dimensional continuum and only a few lines in a two-
dimensional plane are represented.32 Maxwells emphasis on the cognitive
function of illustrations suggests that the value of the second-order illustrations
requires a token-instantiation of a rst-order one, either materially, on paper,
say, or mentally, before the minds eye.33
Geometrical or visual ideas do not exhaust Maxwells stock of scientic
illustrations. This is a central point in this paper. Beginning in his rst paper on
electromagnetism and potentials, in 1855, Maxwells most concrete and vivid
mechanical illustrations of potentials described states of work, momentum,
tension and stress in incompressible uids and elastic solids. They are, I want to
emphasise, muscular illustrations. In contrast with the pictorial or optic
representations, we may say, more broadly, that these include the tactile, or
haptic, and kinesthetic. Unlike optical ones, the ones of the latter kind are
undoubtedly most apt to bring to mind the experience of contiguous action.34
They provide, in Maxwells own terms, an embodied conception of an
abstract quantity such as a potential function. As Maxwell put it in his
presidential address to the Mathematics and Physics Section of the British
Association for the Advancement of Science, in general concrete ideas can be
pictorial as well as connoted by words of power; the latter, such as energy
and momentum and strain are associated with the exhilaration of motion,
and the feeling our muscles straining with eort (SP 2, p. 220). In a lecture in
32
John Roche has pointed to this feature of eld diagrams to argue that they do not constitute fully
naturalistic representations; see Roche (1993, p. 228).
33
See Cat (1995) for a discussion of this point.
34
This is not to mean that the continuity of lines cannot represent geometrically the contiguous
propagation of action. They simply fail to include mechanical characteristics that are more directly
and precisely sensible to the muscles. In addition, with the exception of Maxwells geometrical
conception of dierential operators such as convergence and curl from continuum mechanics,
geometrical considerations are generally associated with the less local outlook of integral, rather
than dierential representations. In that formulation, continuity and contiguity of actual
transmission cannot be empirically distinguished by the experimental curved induction lines from
a resultant of forces acting in straight lines at a distance. As Nancy Nersessian has pointed out, for
instance, Faraday failed to draw even this conceptual distinction between the two kinds of paths in
his analysis of induction; see Nersessian (1984, p. 51).
defence of contiguous action Maxwell compared the states of stress in the

medium in which Faradays lines of force act to the states of a muscle:
According to the theory of magnetic lines of force which I have been describing
the magnetic eld is in some way put into a state of stress like that of the muscle,
lines of force tending to shorten themselves and expand laterally, and it appears
that if this stress has a certain denite relation to the degree of concentration of
the lines of force it will produce a mechanical eect exactly corresponding with
what actually takes place (SP 2, p. 320).
The reference to muscles should come as no surprise. Their cognitive
signicance was well-entrenched in nineteenth-century Britain and Maxwells
professional and non-professional audiences could eectively relate to them.
Muscles had a long-time experimental signicance uniting notions of
mechanics with notions of electricity and magnetism; in particular it is
important to remember that throughout the history of concepts of electricity
and magnetism the identication of electrical properties such as currents and
discharges as well as the systematic experimental researches had been
intimately related to human and animal muscles: the most emblematic
instances may be Galvanis kicking frogs and the pervasive references to the
occurrence of shocks in the reports of electric phenomena.35 Also in the
writings of Poisson, the French engineers and then in Thomson,36 the idea of
muscle was present in the connotation of the terms force and motive and
resistive work, and brings them in relation to the use of machines and the
economic culture of industrial technology.37
There is also the culture of physiological research on the mechanics and
physiology of muscles, especially in connection with energy conservation since
the late 1840s: Helmholtzs own researches in electro-physiology in Germany
since the 1840s (see Brain and Wise, 1994) and William Carpenters discussions
of the interconversion of electrical nerve-force (vis nervosa) and muscular force
and work (vis musculosa) in London (see Hall, 1979). Carpenter, like Bain and
Thomson, maintained the existence of a muscular sense, essential in causing
voluntary motion (see, for instance, Carpenter (1855, pp. 512514)). In fact,
35
For details and examples see Heilbron (1974).
36
Thomson refers to the muscular sense for the phenomenological grounding ideas of force and
work as early as in his lectures in 1848 and later in his and P.G. Taits Treatise on Natural
Philosophy (1867, Part 1, art. 207).
37
The commensuration of animal and machine work begins in the eighteenth century; see Morton
(1996). William Whewell draws a strong connection between human (or political-economic) and
engineering notions of work in his Mechanics of Engineering (1841). Also does so William J.M.
Rankine in his Manual of Applied Mechanics (1858, p. 15), where he characterised the daily eect
exerted by the muscular strength of a man or of a beast in terms of resistance, velocity overcoming
it and amount of time of continued work in order to calculate the best for economy of power. In
this standard textbook on applied mechanics for physicists and engineers Rankine stated, along
Whewells lines, that the notion of force is rst obtained by sensation; for the forces exerted by
voluntary muscles can be felt to balance sometimes each other, and sometimes external pressures.
For the cultural location of the notion of work see Grattan-Guinness (1983); Wise and Smith
(1986); and Smith and Wise (1989).
like Thomson and Maxwell, Carpenter was a long-time member of the British
Association for the Advancement of Science and its president in 1872, exactly
one year after Thomsons tenure, and two years after Maxwells presidency of
the Mathematics and Physics Section. In his presidential address Carpenter
mentioned that the tactile ideas of hardness and motion involve the sense of
touch, the muscular sense and the mental sense of eort;38 and like Whewell
and Thomson, independently, and Bain after him, Carpenter maintained that
the notion of force is an elementary form of thought that rests on the
physiology of muscle and such tactile sense.39 For Bain, as I have mentioned
at the beginning of the paper, the notion of muscular sense is a cornerstone
of psychology. In addition to providing a physiological basis for the expression
of volition, muscular feelings are constitutive of our conception of properties of
matter such as extension (in combination with touch), weight and solidity, and
the mechanical ideas of force, pressure, resistance, and momentum.40
Lastly, Maxwells belief that both geometrical and muscular ideas are
concrete or cognitively primary might have been reinforced by, among other
activities, his childhood interest in basket-weaving and knitting, his enthusias-
tic participation in the Cambridge local sporting culture (see Warwick, 1998)
and his involvement with the Christian Socialist movement and the education
of workers. By the time he started writing his rst essays on electromagnetism
he had been long acquainted with the ideas of the Cambridge theologian F. D.
Maurice and had started teaching local manual workers at the Cambridge
branch of the Working Mens College, founded in London in 1854 under
Maurices auspices. After accepting a post at the University of Aberdeen in
1856 Maxwell began teaching at the local Craftsmen School. Subsequently,
upon his move to London, Maxwell acted as external examiner for the London
branch of the Working Mens College in 1861. More generally, a co-founder of
the College, the historian and clergyman Charles Kingsley, popularised the
notion of Muscular Christianity that combined the religious life with the manly
Victorian worship of force (see Houghton, 1957, p. 204).
It is worth noting that a textbook originally designed for the use by the
University students at Cambridge brings together the abstract and bodily
aspects of education. The text was written by the Reverend Harvey Goodwin,
the Dean of Ely and the principal since 1854 of the Cambridge branch of the
38
Reports of the BAAS (1872), p. lxxviii.
39
the moment [a man] puts his hand upon any part of the machinery, and tries to stop its motion,
he takes as direct cognizance, through his feeling of the Eort required to resist it, of the force
which produces that motion, as he does through his eye of the motion itself (ibid., p. lxxxii;
emphasis in the original).
40
Bain (1856, Ch. 1, Sects 2021; and Ch. 2, Sect. 13). In Maxwells biography, Campbell and
Garnett (1882, p. 129) quote Maxwell asserting in a letter to Campbell of 14 March 1850, that the
possibility (with respect to the agent) of an action (as simple) depends on the agent having had the
sensation of having done it, and they add in a note that Maxwell often insisted on this in
conversation, with special reference to our command of the muscles depending on the muscular
sense.
Working Mens College, and was often used for instruction in the subjects of
mathematics and mechanics. Since both kinds of students shared an interest in
sporting activities it is not surprising to nd on the title page of Goodwins text
the following epithet from Bacons Advancement of Learning: As Tennis is a
game of no use in itself, but of great use in respect it maketh a quick eye, and a
body ready to put itself into all postures; so in Mathematics, that use which is
collateral and intervenient is no less worhty than that which is principal and
intended (Goodwin, 1860).
5. Elements and Rules of Illustration: Models, Analogies and Metaphors
In order to convey muscular illustrations and concrete illustrations in

general Maxwell often applied what he called the method of scientic
metaphors: to abstract symbols he attached terms used to refer to various
concrete properties. Thus in 1855 he designated the vector potential as electro-
tonic state and the scalar potentials as electrical tension and magnetic
tension. Subsequently he designated the vector potential as electrokinetic
momentum and electromagnetic momentum by analogy with Newtons
Second Law relating forces and variations of momentum.
In each experimental context, there is a heuristic that constrains and guides
the method of illustration: the method of physical analogy, the third way,
between empty symbols and unwarranted hypotheses, which Maxwell
introduced in his 1855 essay On Faradays Lines of Force.41 It is important
to see that metaphors are constrained by analogies and that both are, in turn,
subordinated to the goal of concrete illustration. I have mentioned above that
this connection, especially for Maxwells purposes, was widespread in
Victorian thought. This relation has not been articulated in the literature on
Maxwell.
The method of illustration associates ideas and cognitive virtues
of one languageFthe more familiar, or illustratingFwith the terms of
anotherFwith which we are less acquainted, or illustrated. In Maxwells
examples the illustrating language is more concrete. Not surprisingly, Maxwell
designates such illustrative correspondence as a gure of speech as well as a
gure of thought (SP 2, p. 227). In the course of his writings Maxwell
identies two related gures of speech/thought: physical analogy
41
Scientic metaphors connote entire systems of imaginary knowledge and introduce general
senses of concrete terms for abstract symbols (as shown in his concretisation of the Lagrangian
abstract symbolism), thus providing extensions of the use of elementary notions to new
phenomenological domains. However, Maxwell, also aware of the limits of the use of analogies,
issued caution about the degree of applicability of old ideas to new phenomena. Maxwell might
have read Mill on the connection between analogy and metaphor, in the same section of Mills
System of Logic from which Maxwell learned about denotation and connotation. This connection
was standard in rhetoric manuals of the time such as R. Whatelys Elements of Rhetoric (1828), G.
Campbells Philosophy of Rhetoric (1841) and A. Bain (1866) English Composition and Rhetoric.
and scientic metaphor. The rst Maxwell introduced as a method in 1855

(SP 1, p. 156); the second he did not explicitly introduce until 1870
(SP 2, p. 227). Yet Maxwell used both in 18551856; and in 1856 Maxwell
pointed to a relation between metaphors and analogies in general: metaphors
are analogies which are articial or concealed (SLP 1, p. 376). In their
scientic version their main dierence lies in the degree of their cognitive,
illustrative value.
Imaginary illustrations are selected through the method of analogy, or in
other words, through the identication of physical analogies. Maxwell oers a
formal criterion of partial similarity: two kinds of physical phenomena are
physically analogous if there exists a resemblance in the mathematical form of
some of the formulae representing each kind of phenomenon (SP 1, p. 156).
More formally, for two collections of quantities {F} and { f } occurring in the
abstract representation of physical phenomena P1 and P2, respectively, a
certain number n of algebraic relations RF 0 and R f 0 satised by a subset
fF 0 g of {F} and { f 0 } of { f }, respectively, must be isomorphic (of the same
mathematical class) (SP 2, p. 219). The quantity n would represent a measure
of the degree of similarity or convergence between the two characterisations;
that is, the inverse of what in 1862 Maxwell refers to as the divergence of the
laws of the two sets of phenomena.42 The collection of interpreted quantities
{ f 0 } subset of { f } satisfying the n relevant similar mathematical laws
constitute an analogical model.43
Maxwells rst example, in 1855, is the analogy between Faradays lines of
electric force and the tubes of uid motion. Their respective main features
{F 0 }={force of attraction (F1 ), potential (V), distance (x)} and { f 0 }={force
(per unit volume in the limit of an innitesimal volume) driving the
incompressible uid against resisting medium (F2 ), pressure (p), distance (x)}
obey a similar dierential equation:
F1 @@V=@x and F2 @@p=@x: 3
In 1861 Maxwell introduced the emblematic molecular-vortex model also
based on a number of analogies. Here I will mention two. First, in the case of
Faradays induction of electromotive force in a conductor by a varying
magnetic eld, the {magnetic vector potential (A), electromotive force on
current (E), time (t)} and {mechanical momentum (p), force (F), time interval
(t)} satisfy, respectively,
E @@A=@t and F @p=@t: 4
This analogy reappears in 1864 and 1873, in Maxwells later applications to
electric circuits of the Lagrangian equations for the dynamics of connected
42
SP 1, p. 488; although the exact degree of divergence is never an issue.
43
The earliest explicit relation between analogy and model is drawn in Maxwells essay of 1856 Are
There Real Analogies in Nature? (SLP 1, p. 382). In connection with diagrams, he later wrote that
the model or diagram is supposed to resemble the material system only in form, not necessarily in
any other respect (Maxwell, 1876, art. 5).
bodies. And second, Maxwells treatment of the electromagnetic nature of light

waves also in 1864 and 1873 involves an analogy between the propagation of
the disturbance in the magnetic eldFand also its potentialFand the wave
equation for a disturbance in an elastic medium.44
The formal requirement cashes out Hamiltons general principle that
the similarity is a similarity between relations, not a similarity [in
kind] between the things related; that is, no real physical similarity
between the causes [of the respective phenomena] (ET, p. 5; see also SLP 1,
p. 382). Indeed, a feature that brings out the purely cognitive function of
the method of analogy is that the method must circumvent any commitment
to a causal explanation or a hypothesis that yields a mechanical account
of electromagnetic phenomena. The desideratum underlies Maxwells
emphasis on the partial character of the formal analogy between the set of
laws of each kind of physical system. Thus, in the 1856 lecture on analogical
thinking Maxwell stressed that only by discovering disanalogies can we avoid
mistaking similarities for explanatory (reductive) physical identities.45 He
distinguished analogy from identity in 1856 (SLP 1, p. 380). He reiterated the
point later in the two treatises.46 This point is important because it establishes
that while for Maxwell the use of analogies has a robust methodological status,
it also had its limits. The method has an irreducibly yet valuable approximative
nature.47
The importance of the mathematical dimension of illustration should not be
underestimated. The formal condition on analogical models reveals the formal
aspect of illustrative models: illustrative ideas must be engrained in a
mathematical form that expresses their symbolic meaning. Clearly, it is on
account of their shared symbolic meaning that abstract quantities can be
associated with the analogous illustrating terms and thus take on the latters
intuitive contents and thereby be illustrated. In this way the formal dimension
eliminates some of the prima facie indeterminacy of similarity and then
emerges as a condition of the possibility of a contentful analogy. Connectedly,
44
I have discussed in much more detail the evolution of Maxwells interpretation of potential
functions in Cat (1995); the details and the periodisations are not central to the main ideas in this
paper.
45
The distinction is given quantitative expression by the degree of divergence mentioned above.
46
EM1, art. 72 and TE, p. 51. See Olson (1975, p. 292) and Turner (1955, p. 230). The importance
of the elements of dissimilarity for a general understanding of the concept of analogy has been
discussed by Hesse under the rubric negative analogy, in Hesse (1966, pp. 57100). For a
comparison of Hesses and Maxwells views see above. For a criticism of other discussions of
Maxwell on analogy and on illustration see Cat (1995).
47
The quantitative measure of that approximation would correspond presumably to the degree of
convergenceFor divergence. This point echoes the methodological discussions of analogy by
Whately, Mill and Bain referred to above. See also footnote 31. Maxwell points to the distinction
between absolute accuracy and rough approximation in his discussion of science and free will;
see SPL 2, p. 821. In the Democratic Intellect (1961, pp. 142143) Davie mentions a connection
between abstraction and approximation in one strand of Scottish empiricism and mathematics (the
other is atomistic empiricism).
it satises another feature of physical science, namely, the desideratum of exact

ideas. Maxwell wrote:
the advancement of the exact sciences depends upon the discovery and
development of appropriate and exact ideas, by means of which we may form a
mental representation of the facts, suciently general, on the one hand, to stand
for any particular case, and suciently exact, on the other, to warrant the
deductions we may draw from them by the application of mathematical
reasoning.48
The formal analogy may purvey additional understanding precisely through

the interpretation of certain mathematical relations. The emphasis on partial
dierential relations over spatial and temporal variables embodies Maxwells
belief in contiguous action and its propagation. In this sense, physical analogies
are the product of a system of representation and commitments, rather than its
independent source (a point made by the philosopher Nelson Goodman about
total resemblance between pictures and things depicted as the basis for
considerations of realism and objectivity). It would be a mistake, however, to
identify the relation of illustration with the relation of formal analogy. One
should draw a distinction between mathematical analogy and physical
analogy.49 Hesse has drawn attention to the distinction but fails to discuss
the full importance of the mathematical aspect of Maxwells analogies.
Mathematical analogies were particularly favoured by William Thomson in
order to introduce convenient mathematical results from better developed
theories, such as in his well-known analogy between electrostatic induction and
Fouriers theory of heat ow. Maxwells condition of formal analogy (SP 2, p.
219) is only a necessary condition in establishing a cognitive relation of
illustration and suggesting theoretical inferences. Scientic ideas must be both
exact and appropriate. Hesse (1966, 1974) has argued for the logical role of
models and the exclusive value of analogies in making inferences and
predictions. I think this analysis is misleading and her realist agenda renders
her discussion of scientic metaphors inapplicable to the case of Maxwells
own method. While I accept the potential and restricted inferential use of
analogies, here I will emphasise their illustrative value. If the method of
physical analogy is to have any bearing on the cognitive function of illustration
a further interpretive condition is required that guarantees that the analogy is
48
SP 2, p. 360. The remarks are similar to the ones in his inaugural lecture at Kings College in
October 1860; see footnote 20. The specic context, relevant to his lectures on experiment in 1871 at
the occasion of the founding of the Cavendish Laboratory, would seem to place the immediate
signicance in the corrective intellectual value of precision of method, theoretical and experimental,
in the face of obscurantist trends capturing the interest and the imagination of the public opinion.
In the 1850s Maxwell ridicules, for instance, the interest in speculative dark science of the mind;
see Campbell and Garnett (1882, pp. 228229). See also footnote 21.
49
See Hesse (1974, Ch. 11). For a positive discussion of the geometrical value of mathematical
analogies in Maxwells formulation of the laws of electromagnetism, see Wise (1977). Goodman
made the point about the representation-dependence of resemblance in Languages of Art (1976,
p. 39).
not restricted to mathematical ideas but includes the appropriate physical ones
as well (see Cat, 1995). In general, without a specic context and desideratum,
the relevant aspects of analogy are maximally indeterminate.
Note that the symmetric conditions of formal and physical analogy still fall
short of determining the choice of specic illustrations. Instead, these
conditions establish the formal and general interpretive framework. The
function of such a framework is then to establish the possibility of introducing
concrete mechanical illustration proper. It is the specication of the illustrative
concrete features of the imaginary mechanical models that breaks the
symmetry and brings about the cognitive event of illustration: when Maxwell
suggests, for instance, that we may think of the scalar potential as similar to the
pressure in a continuous medium.50 Focusing solely on the notion of analogy
leaves uncharted at the linguistic level the illustrative eect of geometrical and
imaginary mechanical properties on the abstract terms to be illustrated: when
Maxwell wants us to conceive of the scalar potential as pressure, or when he
claims that the lines of force are, rather than are like, the lines of uid ow.
On both grounds, the gure of speech/thought of analogy can be said to simply
lay down the formal and interpretive stepping stones to illustration. Only by
extending the analysis of Maxwells interpretive categories to cover such
further claims can the relation of physical analogy be understood to be
illustrating.
It is often pointed out by philosophers and historians that in her classic
Models and Analogies in Science (1966), Hesse oered an account of the role
and structure of analogy and metaphor in science both generally and according
to Maxwell. But that is not the case. Hesses discussion is primarily a general
one. Even though she borrows examples of analogies from Maxwell she does
not claim or attempt to articulate Maxwells views on the subject.
Furthermore, Maxwells views, within whose context his examples are best
understood, cannot be accommodated by Hesses too restricted characterisa-
tion of analogy and metaphor in science. By contrast, to articulate Maxwells
views, distinguishing, elucidating and adequately connecting his concepts of
analogy, metaphor and illustration, is one prime goal of this paper. Besides
purely formal analogy, Hesse perceives what she designates material analogy
holding between the models of phenomena and their corresponding analogical
models. Material analogy includes causal relations between properties within
each representation and of identity (in positive analogy) or dierence (in
negative analogy) between properties from each representation (Hesse, 1966,
pp. 60, 8687). Yet surely both elements render the characterisation too
stringent to capture Maxwells. In particular, it has been convincingly argued
by Sellars that the second condition (identity or dierence) fails to
accommodate important uses of analogy in science (Sellars, 1967, pp. 345
346, 349). According to Sellars, Hesse characterises similarity in analogy as rst
50
That in many contexts analogies have a built-in cognitive asymmetry has been noted in Tversky
(1977).
order similarity between particulars, that is, between the systems represented
by the phenomenological and analogical models, respectively, which requires
them to share a common attribute (condition of identity or dierence in
attributes). On the other hand, for Sellars and also for Maxwell, scientic
analogy rests on similarity of second order, that is, between attributes
manifesting some identical second order property (property of a property).51
Lastly, there is the question of the value of analogy. Like Maxwell, albeit only
marginally and with no reference to him, Hesse points to a function of
interpreting theoretical terms occurring in the representation of phenomena
along with the observational terms. The semantic function is independent
both of the role of denitions as well as the realist attitude to the analogical
model. Unlike Maxwell, however, Hesse takes for granted that analogy serves
both predictive and explanatory purposes.52
As I have mentioned above, Hesses analysis is also too conned by her
interest in the structure of logical inferences, which leaves out any other
cognitive function. In subsequent works not only is her discussion of
mathematical analogy too narrow, but subject to her inferential approach,
Hesse misleadingly categorises Maxwells own analogies as follows: in contrast
with what she refers to as mere mathematical similarity she categorises
physical analogies as experimental identications and classies them further
as either generic [property or kind] identications and substantial
identications (Hesse, 1974, p. 266). On her view, Maxwell introduced neither
new concepts nor new entities. The emphasis on empirical analogy can be
understood as her attempt to subsume Maxwells method of analogy under her
general view that models yield analogical argument from empirical system to
empirical prediction (Hesse, 1974, p. 222). And Hesse links this method to
Newtons deductions from phenomena.
But as I have discussed above and will again below, Maxwells analogical
models are not to be taken from empirical domains, in some unqualied sense,
much less in the context of electromagnetic phenomena. Nor are his
deductions of electromagnetic laws straightforward from phenomena,
whether electromagnetic or mechanical. While some mechanical concepts
may have empirical instantiation in certain domains, many of Maxwells
mechanical models are imaginary idealisations which lose empirical status in
51
In 1856 Maxwell wrote that in a scientic point of view the relation is the most important thing
to know, and that dierence, or resemblances, are of relations (SLP 1, p. 382). And subsequently
he explicitly asserted that the similarity which constitutes the analogy is not between the
phenomena themselves, but between the relations of these phenomena (ET, p. 51).
52
A similar take is adopted in Hesse (1973), where she explicitly discusses Maxwells use of
analogical reasoning. Her discussion does not draw a connection between analogy and the semantic
function of illustration. Hesse does mention the importance of analogy in interpretive experimental
identicationsFe.g. potential in static electricity and electric currentsFon the level of descriptive
language; but she misses the general role of analogy in the formation of metaphors and thereby the
generation of generalised concepts, which cannot be conated with that of identication on the
same level of abstraction.
the microscopic domain of analogical application. Hesse claims, with her

experimentalist emphasis, that Maxwell never introduces novel concepts or
hypothetical entities. But then his introduction of vector potential functions,
electromagnetic ether and microscopic idle-wheels in his mechanical explana-
tion of electromagnetic elds should be considered uninsightfully anomalous.
If Hess refers to empirical concept formation, then the origin of the magnetic
vector potential, A; in Thomson and Maxwell involves the geometric
representation of the rotational nature of magnetism displayed in Faradays
magneto-optic eect in the form of B curl A (see Fig. 4); but this is not
grounds for a distinct empirical interpretation of the potential function relative
to magnetic force, nor is it to be taken as an empirical redescription thereof.
Nor did the scalar and the vector potential functions possess a distinctive
experimental meaning in mechanical domains prior to Thomsons and
Maxwells introduction in the representation of electromagnetism. In the case
of its introduction in Maxwells formulation of Faradays law of electro-
magnetic induction, the concept and the derivation of the law are meant to
capture Faradays mechanical speculations, not a salient empirical aspect of
the phenomenon, about a certain state of tension. Nor did Maxwell consider
the introduction of the displacement current in his generalised Amperes law to
be an empirical result. Even the notion of electromagnetic ether, the result in
Hesses example of substantial identication, was cognitively entrenched and
inseparable from conceptions of undulatory phenomena, yet it seems of
dubious empirical nature.53
As a matter of empirical justication, Maxwells introduction of the
displacement current, discussed in the next section, hardly follows the form
of a straightforward empirical analogical inference in Hesses sense.54 And
I can see little dierence in epistemological status between, on the one hand,
Maxwells explanatory postulation in 1861 of microscopic idle-wheels and
vortices and, on the other, the uncontroversially hypothetical mechanical
atomsFwith empirically and mechanically familiar properties, whether in
Newtonian or Laplacean physics. Maxwells use of analogies and analogical
models spans a changing variety of uses. Next to Hesses emphasis on inductive
analogical inference, I hope my discussion in this paper makes this variety and
its intricacies more poignant.
Regarding Hesses generic identications between properties, some of
them, but not all, seem formally to meet Sellars demand in analogies of
second-order properties. The presence of such identications, over and above
the mere mathematical formal analogies, is central to the role of analogy.
Contiguous action as described by dierential equations is part and parcel of
the analogy between potential and pressure; and forces and energies are
53
In this case Hesses attribution of substantial identication should be corrected in the light of
footnote 59.
54
Compare Hesses discussion in Hesse (1974, Ch. 11), with the more detailed discussions in
Darrigol (1993) and Siegel (1991).
attributed to electric and magnetic elds and currents because they can, at a
general level, be subsumed under laws of force and energy describing
mechanical systems. But Hesse seems ultimately to be interested in how
such identications in kind become literal rst-order identications, with truth
value and explanatory power. So she has to struggle to accommodate
Maxwells reference to physical identity, which involves the second-order
identications that are implicit in his examples of physical analogy (Hesse,
1974, Ch. 11). Maxwell explicitly emphasises that his method of physical
analogy is based on similarity between relations and not on similarity
[in kind] between things related, but not all of his analogies lead exclu-
sively to empirical identications. In any event, even rst-order identications
surely do not exhaust the role of Maxwells method of analogy. As I explain
below, the method of metaphor is based on general identications but its goal
is also illustrative function. Yet Hesse neither links MaxwellsFand
herFanalysis of his method of analogy to her view of metaphors nor
attributes a corresponding view to Maxwell.
Metaphor is the gure of speech/thought related to analogy that
expresses more aptly the cognitive transfer that illustration brings about
between scientic terms. Maxwell designates it explicitly as scientic
metaphor. Maxwells use of scientic metaphors can be traced back to
18551856, when the notion of illustration nds its rst appearance and
applications.
Since its rst applications the method of physical analogy led Maxwell to
statements of numerical identities such as between electrostatic scalar potential
and mechanical properties of the incompressible uid in the following form
P @p (potential is equal to pressure) and whole potential of
(SP1, p. 177): V
a system=@ V dm=kW, where W is the work done by the uid to
overcome resistance. Despite Maxwells observation that such identities
express the analogy between electrical attraction and uid motion, strictly
speaking they hardly qualify as statements of an analogy. Maxwell concluded
the presentation of results of the physical analogy with the following identity
statement: The lines of force are the units of tubes of uid motion (SP 1, p.
177; emphasis added). And in the well-known case of the billiard-ball model of
gases, he asserts that the particles are hard, spheric and elastic.55 Again, these
statements do not strictly correspond to the explicit formulation of a similarity
relation. The statements are of the familiar form of man is a wolf and Juliet
is the Sun. They are statements of a metaphorical identity or predication. In
the case of physics, in which quantities represent properties of physical systems
rather than specic entities, the metaphorical is maybe either of more general
predication, or, taken more strongly, and more locallyFin a circumscribed
model or settingFof theoretical identity. (In a container, temperature can be
identied with the mean kinetic energy of the moving particles, but outside that
55
SP 1, p. 378. As I will mention below the case of the gas molecules is slightly dierent as it was of
heuristically stronger value and of a potentially explanatory hypothetical nature.
setting, kinetic energy does not always amount to temperature; within the
broader viewpoint, temperature may be identied as a particular form of
energy; their relation is one of predication, in which (kinetic) energy is the more
general property, and hence, predicate.) The fact that they are not strict
similarity statements does not imply that analogies play no role. Indeed, in
accordance with Maxwells understanding of metaphors at the time, they
consist of statements based on concealed or articial analogies (SLP 1, p.
376). Nor does it imply a claim to physical identity; for Maxwell makes clear
that by seeking ideas of illustrative value, he intends to circumvent any
explanatory hypothesis in the form of a statement of causal relation or of
physical identity.
More signicant uses of metaphors in scientic language also abound
in the 18551856 essay On Faradays Lines of Force. In the same spirit,
Maxwell had borrowed from Faraday the notion of electro-tonic state to
extend the metaphorical designation of potentials to the magnetic
vector potential (SP 1, p. 187). The illustrative value of the metaphor is
grounded on Thomsons elastic solid model of magnetic action (SP 1, p. 188).
Faradays term enabled Maxwell to oer a unied mechanical illustration of
the abstract concepts of potential. In Faradays obituary Maxwell
would praise Faraday precisely for his investment of scientic terms
with connotative meanings, that is, at the expense of the meaning which
the word is intended to denote (SP 2, p. 359). Such connotative meanings
are clearly the result of the metaphorical use of familiar termsFtonic
stateFfor the purpose of illustrating new electromagnetic phenomena
with a clear intuitive conception: We have, rst, the careful observation of
selected phenomena, then the examination of the received ideas, and the
formation, when necessary, of scientic terms (e.g. electro-tonic state)
adapted for the discussion of the phenomena in the light of the new ideas
(SP 2, p. 359).
In the course of subsequent writings, Maxwell gives the magnetic vector
potential additional metaphorical connotations. The metaphorical use of
additional terms for the potential operate as a pointer to additional mechanical
illustrations. In the context of Faradays law of magnetic induction of currents
the vector potential receives a new connotation from the analogy with a feature
of the mechanical molecular-vortex model: the momentum acquired by a
machine as a result of an impulsive force (i.e. an instant blow). The illustration
is associated with the potential through the metaphorical use of the term
momentum.
The vector potential gets its metaphorical identity as mechanical momentum
also through its occurrence in the application to electromagnetic phenomena of
the Hamiltonian version of the Lagrangian formalism. But instead of mapping
the representation of the electromagnetic system onto that of a mechanical
system, Maxwell provided the abstract generalised notions that occur in the
dynamical equations for constrained systems with a metaphorical mechanical
identity by analogy with the elementary mechanical ideas from concrete
applications of Newtons Laws.56 In particular, the vector potential represents

the contribution to the generalised momentum of the circuit by each
dierential element. The mechanical identity of the vector potential is
automatically suggested by the metaphorical connotation of the terms
electrokinetic momentum and electromagnetic momentum (EM 2, arts 590
and 606 respectively).
In general, then, the examples indicate that the cognitive relation
of illustration nds its linguistic expression in scientic metaphors.
Abstract quantities such as potentials are associated with terms that
call to mind the concrete familiar ideas: the clear conceptions. Metaphors
remind us what a certain quantity may be more clearly conceived as, by
pointing to a property of the illustrative model. Hesses account of metaphor
is much less relevant to Maxwells ideas (especially in Hesse (1966)).
Unlike Maxwell, she fails to associate analogy and metaphor with the
function of illustration and conceives of metaphors in the context of
theoretical explanations or explanatory models. On that view, the aim of
models is a perfect metaphor whose referent is just the domain of the
explanandum. And Hesses ultimate claim is that explanation is metaphorical
redescription.
We should distinguish between intra-scientic and trans-scientic meta-
phors. Many illustrative ideas are so by virtue of bearing names that even in
their elementary sense are metaphorical in a non-technical trans-scientic way,
namely, their concreteness rests on their meaning in ordinary language: eld,
potential, mass, momentum, stress, work, and so forth (work, for
instance, was clearly adopted by economic discourse and introduced into
physics within that perspective). This strategy was explicitly contemplated in
logic texts such as Whatelys in 1826 as a way of introducing precise technical
terms. But familiarity or clearness is psychologically and culturally relative.
Once trans-scientic terms become part of technical scientic discourse they are
illustrative by virtue of having for scientists like Maxwell a degree of
concreteness that they might lack for the layperson. However, during the
industrial revolution the ordinary world was substantially shaped and invaded
by objects and notions from the laboratory of scientists and engineers. Since
then many technical terms have, in turn, penetrated ordinary language. The
distinction between intra-scientic and trans-scientic cannot be easily
established. But trans-scientic metaphors become easily internal to science
and amenable to intra-scientic analogies and metaphors between dierent
scientic theories or domains. In that sense, in pointing to such interactions
metaphors constitute an interesting tool for historical and philosophical
research as they establish a broader social and cultural underpinning of the
cognitive assumptions of scientic methodology.
56
Mention of this fact can be found in Simpson (1970, p. 253) and Olson (1978, p. 319); however
these commentators oer no discussion of the metaphorical use and its connection to both its
analogical basis and its illustrative function.
Maxwell did not address the notion of scientic metaphor explicitly until
1870. In his presidential address to the Mathematics and Physics Section of the
British Association for the Advancement of Science he rst discusses the
method of physical illustration as the alternative to the abstract mathematical
method of interpreting scientic terms. Only then does he present the notion of
metaphor with its linguistic and cognitive aspects: The gure of speech or of
thought by which we transfer the language and ideas of a familiar science to
one with which we are less acquainted may be called Scientic Metaphor (SP2,
p. 227).
Maxwells chosen examples are the terms velocity, momentum and
force in the Hamiltonian formalism. The illustrative function of metaphor is
clear from his remarks I quoted earlier. The dynamical metaphor species
how each corresponding abstract term is illustrated. Maxwell tries to
capture precisely this idea with the claim that all abstract terms are
metaphorical (ibid.).
By metaphorical term Maxwell means the term for an elementary idea
associated with the abstract quantity to be illustrated; he speaks of a
metaphorical use of the elementary term (ibid.). The interpretive import of
the metaphorical use is suggested by the contrast he established between
metaphorical term and metaphorical use, on the one hand, to elementary
ideas, elementary sense and precise meaning (ibid.). Maxwell seems to have
borrowed and adapted such distinctions from Whately, Mill and Bain. And in
the terms he had borrowed from Mill we may say that the metaphorical use
associated a connotative meaning to abstract terms (SP2, p. 359). This
accords with the cognitive function and the imaginary character of concrete
illustrations. In the context of illustration, the corresponding terms are not
meant to denote anything in physical reality associated with the new
phenomenon under discussion. Their connotative meaning and the meaning
involved in its metaphorical use are then the same, namely, the relevant
mechanical idealisation instantiated in rst-order concrete mental representa-
tions. In that case we may speak of a metaphorical sense for illustrated abstract
terms.
Now we are in a position to specify how abstract terms get their
metaphorical sense successfully from elementary terms for the properties of
illustrative models:
(1) They must satisfy the familiar requirement of formal analogy: each term
in the metaphorical use retains all the formal relations to the other terms of the
system which it had in its original use (ibid.). This criterion reects the classical
view that underlying metaphors are articial or concealed analogies (SLP 1, p.
376). The metaphorical sense should not be identied with the uninterpreted
abstract or symbolic meaning.
The next two properties capture the asymmetry embedded in the illustrative
function of metaphors.
(2) There must exist a dierence in cognitive value between the abstract term
and the term corresponding to the illustrating idea: we transfer the language
and ideas of a familiar science to one with which we are less acquainted (SP2,
p. 227). This condition links the use of metaphors precisely to the cognitive
eect of illustration.
(3) In an unspecied way, the relation of the metaphorical sense of an
abstract term to the corresponding elementary sense is that of the general to the
more specic. As Maxwell has it, metaphorical terms are generalized forms of
elementary ideas (ibid.). He illustrated the point with the example of the
familiar generalised concepts of abstract dynamics:
Thus the words Velocity, Momentum, Force, ac. have acquired certain precise
meaning in Elementary Dynamics. They are also employed in the Dynamics of a
Connected System in a sense which, though perfectly analogous to the elementary
sense, is wider and more general (ibid.).
But what makes the metaphorical sense more general?57 It could not be by
virtue of a more general illustrative connotation. The association with the
concrete intuitive contentFthe senseFof the illustration must be held xed;
otherwise the cognitive transfer involved in illustrating would not be
warranted. The metaphorical use of a term does not imply a modication in
the connotation of the elementary term.
The generality of the metaphorical sense resides, rather, in the more general
interpretive category dened by an underlying physical analogy. For instance,
the elementary sense of momentum is linked to the original use as
(momentum)=(mass) (velocity). Its more general sense springs from the
functional relation to mechanical forces through Newtons Second Law in a
dierential form: (force)=d(momentum)/d(time). The more general sense of
momentum corresponds to the quantities X that fall under a category dened
by the relation (force)=dX/d(time). This general physical category expresses a
physical analogy. And it sets the interpretive grounds for the illustration
relation that links X to our mechanical intuitions of the notion of momentum
of elementary masses. This general sense describes the aspect that brings
dierent phenomena under the same concept or kind (SP 1, p. 484). It is
brought out by the analogy in a symmetrical way; it is the formal sense in
which Maxwells relation of illustration may be understood as reciprocal.58
Note that unlike in many cases in ordinary language, here a common
property indicated by a metaphor is precisely characterisable. However it does
not exhaust the contents and function of metaphor. Moreover the generalised
57
The question lies close to modern disputes about whether there exists a dierence between literal
and metaphorical meanings; for an extensive collection of dierent views on the use and nature of
metaphors see Ortony (1993).
58
Only indirectly and additionally, on the basis of the asymmetric relation of illustration, does it
make sense then to say with Maxwell that two representations can stand in a symmetric relation of
illustration and illustrate each other; see SP 1, p. 488n. and SP 2, p. 227. This is not surprising. In
this weaker sense the relation of representation is symmetric, just as, in Maxwells own terms,
analogy, seeing-as, or picturing-as, and their associated shared mental capacities of recognition
can be.
sense can be picked out only by auxiliary constraints imposed on the analogy
such as assumptions about mechanical representations of contiguous action
(see Cat (1995) for details). The terms convergence and curl, which Maxwell
introduces to refer to mathematical dierential operators, are metaphors in this
sense. This case shows clearly that the role of metaphors cannot be reduced to
exclusively bringing out the formal analogy in which they are based. They get
illustrative value from their geometrical form and concrete application to the
widespread mathematical representation of uids and elastic solids. With their
illustrative value they guide their application to electromagnetic eld quantities
(see Cat (1998, n. 101)).
The metaphorical use of terms rests on an implicit reference to an illustrative
mechanical model. That is, the equations and the illustrative concepts they
relate to are not general laws of mechanics but specic descriptions of the
behaviour of mechanical systems. The industrial connotation becomes explicit
in Maxwells introduction of the molecular vortex model, where he suggested
the motion of idle-wheel electrical particles by analogy with Siemens governor
for steam engines (SP 1, p. 468). Even the dynamical theory of electromagnet-
ism, based primarily on considerations of energy and taken as independent of
mechanical conceptions, is only independent of the detailed molecular vortex
model, but is not independent of all mechanical illustrations. Not only, as I
have shown above, are the quantities in the Lagrangian formulation of the
theory mechanically-laden but in the context of Faradays law of induction
Maxwell explicitly illustrated the magnetic vector potential with the reduced
momentum of a y-wheel connected to a driving wheel at the driving point (SP
1, p. 536). And in the case of the electromagnetic induction between circuits
Maxwell described a system of parallel wheels connected by a dierential
gearing. The vector potential is illustrated in terms of the momentum as
reduced impulse on one wheel when the other is suddenly stopped (EM 2, arts
586, 590).
Illustration is context-dependent. It depends (1) on the form and the
concepts involved in the description of an electromagnetic phenomenon and (2)
on the model representing a mechanical system. This selective aspect strongly
relates the dependency to the sense in which models are not just concretisations
but also idealisations (and as Maxwell himself acknowledged, this makes their
associated laws empirically adequate only ceteris paribus). In 1862 the magnetic
eld appeared illustrated both as elastic displacement and centrifugal force of
molecular vortices. The scalar potential can be found equally illustrated as the
pressure of a tube of uid ow (in 1855), or as the pressure of electric particles
against each other and as the tension distribution in the electromagnetic
medium (in 1862). And the magnetic vector potential connotes vaguely a state
of tension (in 1855), or is illustrated as a momentum density in the molecular
vortices (in 1862), or the reduced momentum of a y-wheel and the elastic
displacement propagating with the electromagnetic wave (in 1864). Not
surprisingly then, in the context of illustration the properties of the respective
models cannot be jointly taken realistically. This result has to do with the fact
that the interpreted variables represent context-dependent properties, not

trans-contextual entities. I have argued elsewhere that the plurality and
context-dependence of concrete representationsFsuch as of energyFraise an
epistemological obstacle for the transition between illustration to explana-
tion.59 In particular they make it dicult to determine what mechanical
property the potential denotes unequivocally. That is why in contrast with the
mechanical metaphors associated with concrete illustrations of energy (elastic
or kinetic), Maxwell asserted that only in speaking of energy did he wish to be
understood literally (SP1, p. 564).
In the primary context of applicationFwhere they represent electromagnetic
phenomenaFmetaphorical terms do not refer. But we can follow Maxwell and
imagineFand pretend to believeFthat in the particular context there exists
such a system with the connoted properties that characterise the associated
model. That is the sense in which we can assert that both the metaphorical
termsFand symbolsFand material toy-modelsFor drawings and blueprints
thereofFcan refer, that is, describe or represent the ctional content. A last
aspect of the context-dependence I want to note is the holistic nature of the
interpretation or illustration of physical quantities and the electromagnetic
properties counterparts. Each quantity constitutes a representational part
insofar as the understanding of Faradays law, say, as Newtons Second Law of
mechanics is not available without the identication of a time variable and a
momentum variable in Newtons law and then the association of the vector
potential as momentum in Faradays law. However, in each context the
potential function, say, gets its illustration and metaphorical sense only by
virtue of the representational value of the set of quantities and the law in which
they are all embedded.60
The contextuality of illustration and metaphorical representation I present
here diers from the kind of contextuality in recent accounts of how metaphors
work. Thus, it has been argued that metaphors function contextually in the
way indexicals do, namely, with the context of resources shared among
speakers determining their understanding of what metaphorical expressions
convey (see Stern, 2000). This level of contextualityFand indexicalityFis in
59
See Cat (1995). Note also that the illustrations are not trivially amenable to concept-concept or
law-law reductions; Maxwell illustrates the mathematical, even law-like representations of
electromagnetic phenomena with mathematical representations of specic mechanical arrange-
ments, that is, of machines. And, as he indicated, the possibilities are innite (see Section 3). One
possible exception is the case of the molecular vortex model of the magnetic eld. The dierential
elements described by the physical laws are embedded in a continuum whereas the molecules and
idle-wheels are discrete parts of a mechanism. The ether might then not be decomposable into
discrete parts required or representations of mechanisms. This fact might stand in the way of a
strict reduction or identicationFthat is, the mechanical explanation of electromagnetic elds. For
a brief reference to this problemFwith no reference to MaxwellFin the context of a general
discussion of a mechanistic model of causal relations, see Glennan (1996, p. 68, n. 7) and Cat
forthcoming). In this sense, Maxwells 1862 identication between optic and electromagnetic ethers
referred to above cannot involve strictly speaking Maxwells specic mechanical vortex model.
60
For a distinction between iconic and semantic parts in representations see Shier (1986).
place in Maxwells account at the social, theoretical and cognitive level: where
mechanical metaphors assume a body of shared theoretical knowledge,
conventions and experience among practitioners. This will be precisely the
basis for the unifying capacity of mechanical models. But the contextuality
I mention above lies on a more specic sub-level. On this level, the variable
attached to the metaphorFsuch as the potential functionFacts as an
indexical across dierent contexts, each context being indexed and mapped
by the associated metaphor and connotation.
On the basis of this kind of context-dependence I have called metaphorical
terms model-laden (Cat, 1995). Note that in my sense the notion of model-
ladenness is not identical to the more familiar one of theory-ladenness. My use
of model-ladenness is more general. It includes reference to illustrative or
analogical modelsFsuch as the dierent mechanical models I have been
discussingFthat are not models of the theory of electromagnetism, even
though at some point it might be believed that the theory could be reduced to
the theory of mechanics to which these other models belong.
6. Methodological Reections: Why Method?
Finally I want to make four points regarding Maxwells claim that the
method of scientic metaphor is capable of generating science (SP 2, p. 227).
The rst thing that deserves mention is that Maxwell speaks of a method. A
recurring reference to method appears in Maxwells general discussions of
science. This is especially true for his remarks aimed at predominantly
professional audiences, such as in his reference to a method of physical
analogy in 1855, in his presidential address to the Mathematical Physics
Section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1870, the
inaugural lecture at Kings College in 1860, the introductory lecture on
experimental physics at the Cavendish Laboratory in 1871, and the
Introduction to the Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism of 1873, where he
referred to Faradays method of potentialsFreferring to the use of potentials
and dierential equations to represent contiguous action. Implicit in his
references is the idea of a non-arbitrary or non-personal procedure involving
guidelines and desired outcomes. This has critical (negative) and productive
(positive) value for the guided development of scientic knowledge and
distinguishes it from obscure, untutored and unfounded opinion. It also has a
formal, standard, dimension that furnishes form and identity to the discipline
of scientic practice and education. Maxwell wrote:
Our principal work, however, in the Laboratory must be to acquaint ourselves
with all kinds of scientic methods, to compare them, and to estimate their value.
It will, I think, be a result worthy of our University, and more likely to be
accomplished here than in any private laboratory, if, by the free and full
discussion of the relative value of dierent scientic procedures, we succeed in
forming a school of criticism, and in assisting the development of the doctrine of
method.
But admitting that a practical acquaintance with the methods of Physical

Science is an essential part of a mathematical and scientic education, we may be
asked whether we are not attributing too much importance to science altogether
as part of the liberal education (SP 2, p. 250).
Maxwell replied that one constant aim would be to maintain a living

connexion between our work and the other liberal studies of Cambridge
(ibid.). Maxwells attitude was in line with the belief in the distinctive nature
and value of scientic methods, held by Herschel, Mill and Whewell earlier in
the nineteenth century. But also it reected and responded to the demands of
establishing and expanding professional scientic education (see Svyedris,
1967, 1970). But the distinctly Maxwellian aspect is the hold of scientic
method on the faculty of the imagination, when according to the recent
emphasis on the advent of mechanical notions of scientic objectivity in the
nineteenth century the mechanisation of procedures went hand in hand with a
rejection of a use for the imagination.61 My discussion thus far should help to
dispel the puzzle and establish the terms and conditions in which Maxwells
approach seems to overlook such a tension.
The remainder of my points concern the values associated with Maxwells
method of scientic metaphor and illustration. Scientic metaphors organise
electric and magnetic phenomena for investigation and provide a geometrical,
mechanical and dynamical (energy-based) vocabulary through which to
understand the phenomena as well as the relevance of the mathematical
formalism. They provide a vocabulary in which to conduct the investigation.
Metaphors that play these roles surely enhance scientic understanding. This
feature places their cognitive signicance well beyond the dichotomy between
realism and instrumentalism. In the case of the metaphors that satisfy
the interpretive rules of physical analogy they involve extensions
of familiar concepts that have both unifying generality and accuracyFfor
Maxwell distinctive virtues of physical sciences. Maxwell spoke, for instance, of
a mathematical coherence vis a" vis the facts (see SP 1, p. 488). Of course,
insofar as the models have their own theoretical coherence they furnish also a
unied theoretical conception, or, in Maxwells own terms, a consistent
representation, or a physical, or mechanical, point of view.62 The
61
See Daston and Galison (1992), Daston (1998) and Tyndall (1870). It should become clear below
that the scientic legitimation of the role of the imagination depends on its de-mystied place in
post-Kantian psychological models of the mind such as Bains. Moreover, Maxwells theological
beliefs pointed to a sort of pre-established harmony between the laws of nature and the laws of the
mind. For his earliest discussion of the laws of thought in connection with necessary truth and the
brain, see his 1856 paper for the Apostles Club Analogies in Nature (SLP 1, p. 380). In his 1870
BAAS address Maxwell concludes with a discussion of the mathematical mind and a reference to
George Boole on the laws of thinking (SP2, p. 229).
62
See his 1856 lecture Analogies in Nature (SLP1, p. 378), and SP1, p. 452 and EM2, art. 866. In
general, Lako and Johnson have argued that the cognitive value of metaphors in directly related
to their coherence within a system. Systems may vary from culture to culture. See Lako and
Johnson (1980).
context-dependence of illustration mentioned above entails that this coherence

is neither abstract nor universal, but linked to descriptions of particular
systems. These descriptions of particular mechanical systems may fail to
illustrate jointly all the theoretical representations of electric and magnetic
phenomena. This is one main reason why Maxwell gave up on the potential
explanatory value of his molecular vortex model of electromagnetism; namely,
the rotational model failed to consistently accommodate several of the known
magnetic phenomena including diamagnetism.
The third methodological aspect I want to address is that illustrative
models attached to metaphors can have an indirect heuristic value:
they can suggest experiments and introduce additional structure in the
theoretical representation of phenomena and enhance its deductive structure
and, thereby, its computational and predictive power. The intended and
manifest heuristic value of the models is not completely undermined by the
factFacknowledged repeatedly by Maxwell himselfFthat their success was
also limited.
There is a more general relation between illustration and measurement.
Mechanical models, and their realisations, can be considered measurement
instruments if, given the connectedness requirement, they can represent the
unambiguous value of a magnitude by virtue of behaving in isomorphic
accordance with a theoretical relation. One of the several examples Maxwell
oered is Faradays lines of force. This equivalence between illustration and
measurement is the basis of analogue computers or calculating devices. One
such machines developed early in the nineteenth century is the planimeter, or
platometer, an integrating calculator that tracked a curve plotted on a surface
and could mechanically yield a varying magnitude of one of its partsFindexF
which corresponded to the value of the integral or area enclosed by the curve.
Interestingly, in 1855 Maxwell discussed an earlier design by a Mr. Sang of a
planimeter, later perfected further by William Thomsons brother James.
Maxwell traced the source of error in Mr. Sangs model to the slipping added
to the rolling contact between two parts (SP1, pp. 231233). Then, in his 1862
presentation of the mechanical vortex model, Maxwell discussed slipping
between cells and idle-wheelsFillustrating electricity. There, slipping, added to
rolling contact, is the source of energy wasted and dissipated in the form of
heat (SP 1, p. 486).
Illustrations could suggest experiments. In general, experiments based on
mechanical eects of electromagnetic properties were suggested by the
mechanical conception of electromagnetic action, even within the dynamical
theory. In the case of detailed mechanical illustrations such as the molecular-
vortex model of 18611862, the model led Maxwell to the following
experimental discussion: The angular momentum of the system of vortices
depends on their average diameter; so that if the diameter were sensible, we
might expect that the magnet would behave as if it contained a revolving body
within it, and that the existence of this rotation might be detected by
experiments on the free rotation of a magnet. I have made experiments to
investigate this question, but have not yet fully tried the apparatus.63 Maxwell
still discussed the experiment, which he considered unsuccessful, in 1873 in the
Treatise, where the dynamical theory is meant to be independent of any
mechanical model (EM2, art. 575).
Illustrations could also introduce theoretical structure and yield novel
results. This generative aspect of analogy is, in part, the one addressed by
Hesse in her discussion of analogical inferences. As I have stressed above,
in this context the mathematical form of illustration is crucial. In a successful
instance within his kinetic theory of gases, Maxwell drew an analogy with
statistical representation of individuals in Quetelets social statistics. As a
result, in 1859 Maxwell introduced the Gaussian law of errors to model
the distribution of velocities of molecules.64 In addition the model, based on
random mechanical collisions between elastic spheres, generated successful
predictions regarding the transport properties of gases such as the sur-
prising fact that viscosity was independent of density. Yet it also entailed
the wrong relation to temperature and the wrong distribution of energy
over the degrees of freedom of the gas molecules, which in turn entailed the
wrong ratio of the specic heats of a gas at a constant pressure and constant
volume.
Examples in electricity and magnetism are the application of Kirchho s
rules for electric circuits to the solution of a geometrical problem;65 and
the consequences of the introduction of mechanical elasticity in the
vortex model initially in order to accommodate the results of electrostatics.
With elasticity the model was able to display undulatory motion and
thereby represent the propagation of light.66 The details of the molecular
vortex model of 1862 entailed a specic value of the ratio between
electromagnetic and electrostatic forces, represented by the constant c;
approximately equal to recently measured values of the speed of light.
This is the result that suggested to Maxwell the electromagnetic nature
of light, and the unication of optics and electromagnetism (see footnote 59).
The model also entailed novel empirical predictions of its own, such as the
relationship between the dielectric constant of the medium and the wave
velocity, or equivalently, the refractive index.67 But even in dynamical
theory, less dependent on mechanical conceptions, illustrations could
63
SP 1, pp. 485486n. See also Maxwells letter to Faraday of 19 November 1861 (SLP 1, p. 688).
64
An extensive discussion of this analogy and its methodological signicance can be found in Porter
(1981). See also Achinstein (1991) and Harman (1998).
65
SP 2, p. 406. The importance of the use of physics to address mathematical problems and derive
mathematical results is more manifest in Thomsons works. A recent discussion of this tradition of
theoretical physics can be found in Garber (1999).
66
For the most detailed account, see Siegel (1991).
67
Mathematically the model subsequently led to the additional illustrative analogy between the
propagation equation for the magnetic vector potential, as well as for the eld intensities, and the
wave equation for elastic displacements; see Cat (1998).
lead Maxwell astray. Thus, the conception of the magnetic vector potential as a
mechanical momentum led him to the prediction of non-existent forces.68
Another notorious property of the model was the notion of the displacement
current. The displacement current constitutes the physical basis for the
generation of electromagnetic waves subsequently discovered by Hertz, and
thereby for the acceptance of eld theories over theories of action at a distance.
It is a contested issue to what extent its introduction in 1862 rested on
considerations of the mechanical vortex model.69 In the vortex model the
magnetic eld was associated with the centrifugal force in the vortices, and the
electric current with the ow of idle-wheel particles connecting them (see
Fig. 1). Maxwell had then been able to illustrate Amperes law, relating the
electric current in a conductor to the circular distribution of magnetic eld
intensity around it:
curl H j: 5
The two equations are instantiated by the current of electric particles pushed
by a tangential action caused by a dierence in angular velocity of the vortices
they connect. The current is automatically closed (circuital), since the
divergence of the curl of any vector is identically zero, and it satises the
equation of continuity,
div j @s=@t 0; 6
where the charge, s; is conserved.
In this context Maxwell raised two issues. First, the transmission of rotation
between vortices and particles makes mechanical sense only if the vortices are
endowed with elasticity as observed in solids (SP1, p. 489). Accordingly the
expression of the tangential action must be corrected with a factor due to
elastic deformation of the vortices in the direction of the current. This entailed,
in turn, a correction term in the expression of the current. The resulting motion
could be decomposed into a rigid rotation and an elastic deformation. The
introduction of elasticity was additionally suggested by the possibility of
transmission of transverse light waves. Second, in the case of an open circuit
with a dielectricFan insulator preventing the ow of electrical particlesFse-
parating both ends, an accumulation of charge on one end should appear. As it
stood, however, the model could not represent an open circuit and thus did not
allow for particle accumulation to account for charged bodies, and
electrostatics. It is on the basis of these considerations that Maxwell introduced
a displacement term, P (polarisation), which Maxwell conceived mechanically
along with a corresponding state of elastic pressure to which the dielectric
would yield without allowing a ow of particles (SP1, 492); the elastic
displacement would cause in turn a restoration force, @E; which would act on
the particles like the electromotive force inducing a current. And its variation
68
Buchwald (1985, Ch. 5). I want to thank an anonymous referee for stressing the theoretical cost
of Maxwells analogies.
69
Contrast, for instance, Nersessian (1984), Chalmers (1986) and Siegel (1991).
would then appear as if it were a current, j ; in the metaphorical sense. The

total phenomenological, or true, current, j 0 ; is represented as the result of the
closed current, j; and the circuit-opening term, j ;
j 0 curl H@@E=@t: 7
Maxwell called the second term the displacement current. The metaphorical
status of the term is manifest. Both the displacement and current aspects have a
corresponding requisite mechanical illustration. And the contribution to its
origin by the mechanical modelFthe relation at stake hereFis also manifest.
It is true that Maxwell referred to Mossottis notion of a displacement of
electricity in each material molecule of the dielectric under induction; and that
in 1864 he derived the form of the term independently of the details of a
mechanical model. But these observations70 should not obscure the fact that in
1862 Maxwell formulated the two motivating factors for the introduction of
the displacement current in terms of properties of the model and, in addition,
he derived the sign of the corresponding quantity accordingly, which cannot be
explained otherwise.71
Even the equation of continuity, key to subsequent derivations of the term,
had for MaxwellFand ThomsonFa strong hydrodynamical connotation.
Moreover it can be argued quite persuasively that the derivation would t also
a broader approach inspired by Faraday and based on the primacy of eld as
the origin of charge (see Siegel, 1991, Ch. 4). Maxwells introduction of the
displacement current appears neither historically, nor cognitively, nor
theoretically independent of the mechanical illustration furnished by the
molecular model. Hesse has argued that Maxwell did not oer a consistent
notion of displacement current. She has pointed to the plurality of models
involved in the introduction of the displacement current. Nevertheless, for
Hesse they would contribute to the plausibility of the more generalFand
abstractFconcept in the theory. The plurality of models would contribute to
analogical inferences to a more abstract level of representation. Contra
Duhem, Hesse ultimately stresses in this sense the positive methodological
value of models and, in this case, of their diversity. Like Hesse, in this paper
I oer a positive assessment, but one that diers from and supplements hers.
Finally, and most importantly, illustration is a source of understanding and
reveals the intrinsically cognitive dimension of method. Maxwell issued caution
about the limits of analogies and the metaphorical extensions of terms.
Moreover, in contrast with models of metaphors employed for the case of
ordinary language, in Maxwells examples many primary or literal terms have
70
These are two of the objections to the heuristic role of the mechanical illustrations raised by
Chalmers. Chalmers also stresses as the most important objection, against Nerssesians claim, that
the displacement current in the molecular model cannot give raise to magnetic eects, since the
elastic distortion amounts to a displacement in the direction of the true current, but not to a
rotation that could contribute to the centrifugal force associated with the magnetic eld. But this
objection has force only against Nerssesians specic argument.
71
See Nersessian (1984) and, especially, Siegel (1991) for details.
no clear referent. They are empty descriptions. He says they denote properties
of imaginary systems. Nevertheless, outside the secondary context of
illustration, mechanical properties of models have descriptive power insofar
as physical phenomena, albeit in idealised situations, can be explained in such
terms. The understanding of the representational value of the primary
termsFin the technical theoretical sense, not their phenomenological counter-
parts or contentFdepends on ones own views of the relation between
modelsFand idealisationsFand reality.72 For Maxwell, mechanical models
do appear to have descriptiveFand explanatoryFvalue, especially in the case
of mechanisms and machines.73
Understanding then establishes the cognitive basis for explanatory value.
Before a hypothesis is deemed to be true it must satisfy our criteria of
intelligibility. But the convergence of physical analogy with the mechanical
models yields at best an asymptotic approximation to mechanical reality.
Illustration is not explanation. This is also in accordance with the context-
dependence and the plurality of illustrations associated with specic concepts
such as potential functions or eld intensities (Hesse, 1973, 1974). Maxwell
draws the distinction explicitly in regards to his statements about the specic
molecular vortex model of electromagnetic eld in the context of the more
general dynamical theory: all such phrases in the present paper are to be
considered illustrative, not as explanatory (SP 1, p. 564). And in Illustrations
of the Dynamical theory of Gases, where he introduced a detailed molecular
model of gases, he states: If the properties of such a system of bodies are found
to correspond to those of gases, an important physical analogy will be
established, which may lead to more accurate knowledge of the properties of
matter (SP1, p. 378). Explanatory truth value of analogies and metaphorical
identities required for Maxwell passing more severe tests, such as consilience or
robustness.74 That is the sense in which the ether and energy are not
instrumental ctions and for Maxwell their corresponding terms, despite their
generality, must be understood literally. Historically and philosophically
Maxwells view illustrates what understanding and explanation can be.
72
It is important to note that for Maxwell the notion of phenomenon is inseparable from the
distinction between principal and disturbing causes; see, for instance, SP 2, p. 505. For this reason
one may speak of a phenomenological model; see Cat (1995). The distinction is implicit in his
statement that the regularity described by Amperes law holds ceteris paribus; see SP 1, p. 184.
73
The problem of non-dentoting ctional terms has been discussed at length by Nelson Goodman;
but here I do not endore his nominalist solution in terms of denotation, labels and their primary
and secondary extensions; see Goodman (1976) and Elgin (1983). Their approach clearly contrasts
with Maxwells, based on psychological notions of connotation and sense (see SLP 1, p. 376).
Arthur Fine (1993, p. 16) has pointed to the role of ctions as established by Hans Vaihingers
Philosophy of As If in contemporary science. In Cat (1995) I trace the inuence of Maxwell on
Vaihinger. For a more adequate account of ctions, see Lopes (1996).
74
For a discussion of this point see Hesse (1974, Chs 10 and 11) and Achinstein (1991, Part II). In
the initial evaluation of his vortex model Maxwell uses a weaker cognitive notion of explanation as
involving a consequence of hypotheses as evidence for their credibility; see SP 1, p. 489. This
question of explanation deserves more attention that I can give here.
Again, this shows the inadequacy of the dichotomy between realism and
instrumentalism to make sense of Maxwells position.75 Instrumentalism would
have committed Maxwell to believe that quantities such as vector potential,
elastic deformation of ether vortices and displacement current, introduced to
represent electric and magnetic phenomena and the laws they obey, did not
possess for Maxwell manifest experimental or observational value (like force or
motion); they would serve only the purpose of calculation, unication or
prediction. Realism, by contrast, would have committed Maxwell to the belief
that the terms introduced in the theoretical (model-based) description of the
phenomena and the laws they obey literally also refer to states of an existing
entity, such as the ether and the molecular vortices, as described in the model.
Both philosophical positions are typically adopted with maximum generality,
that is, as an all-or-nothing question. One consequence of this position is a
trade-o between explanation and context-independent unication, as no
single mechanical model can be identied with and explain all electromagnetic
phenomena. Maxwells pattern of commitment to metaphorical and literal
understanding of theoretical terms such as electric tension, electromagnetic
momentum, ether and potential energy is irregular both over time and
within each separate discussion. This diversity and the distinction between
understanding and truth-based explanation are compatible with a pluralism
about what counts as understanding, or conversely, what counts as explanation
(the equivalence may be accommodated within a pragmatic notion of
explanation such as the one introduced by van Fraassen). Hence it leaves the
realism/instrumentalism dichotomy with little use for insight. Moreover it
neglects specic values that Maxwell emphasised. Truth is not enough; it may
be at most a necessary condition.76 Nor, one may add in that regard, are
always predictive power or computational simplicity. Our concern is under-
standing.
In conclusion, beyond the instrumentalism/realim debate, Maxwell insisted
that the chief cognitive value of illustration resides in its oering a model and a
method of, equivalently, representation, interpretation and understanding.
What specically counts as understanding is something of transient historical
nature.77 The lesson from Maxwells approach is the historical and
philosophical relevance of the very dimension of cognitive signicance.
Scientic practice cannot be reduced to the logic of method; and Maxwells
75
Howard Stein has made a similar point in Stein (1989).
76
The point is stressed in Goodman (1976, p. 263); his discussion of the importance of values over
mere talk of facts has been developed further by Elgin (1997). My discussion above shows that
unlike Goodman and Elgin, however, MaxwellFwho considers connotations and sensesFdoes
not analyse understanding, meaning and metaphors exclusively in the nominalist terms of labels,
extensions and reference. Nor did he, as Donald Davidson has done, identify cognitive signicance
with literal truth. The related relevance of van Fraassens pragmatics of explanation in The
Scientic Image (1980) was urged on me by Alex Klein.
77
Contrast this with, for instance, Carnaps explicit criticism of Maxwells approach in Carnap
(1939). Above I have outlined the historical grounding of Maxwells assumptions.
particular approach to theoretical physics is inseparable from cognitive and

linguistic considerations.
Acknowledgements FI beneted from a stimulating discussion of a previous version of this paper at

the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin in April 1998; a number of the ideas in
the paper were developed there during my visit as a Postdoctoral Fellow. I want to thank especially
Lorraine Daston and Evelyn Fox Keller. I presented another version at Northwestern University in
November 1998. I am thankful to Arthur Fine for his encouragement. For a number of helpful
conversations, stimulating criticism, assistance and encouragement over the last few years I want to
thank also Ron Anderson, Nancy Cartwright, Olivier Darrigol, Gordon Fox (Librarian of the
Working Mens College, London), Peter Galison, Jim Griesemer, Gerard Holton, Joan Richards,
Simon Schaer, Paul Teller and Andrew Warwick.
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Maxwell y La Metáfora Científica

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Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys., Vol. 32, No. 3, pp.

On Understanding: Maxwell on the Methods of

Keywords: Maxwell; Unication; Models; Illustrations; Metaphors;

(Received 9 January 1999; revised 20 May 1999)

language, I do not believe either that metaphors in science should be captured

logic, mathematics, epistemology, philosophy of language and psychology

2. Language and Cognition in Victorian Culture

James Clerk Maxwell was born in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1831. He

It is in this context of the cognitive dimension of language that the use of

3. The Problem with Abstraction

In what circumstances did Maxwell encounter a problem concerning

and Lagrangian formulations in electromagnetism. In both cases metaphors

they are to be considered for the present as mere mathematical abstractions

In this quote Maxwell explicitly points to a problem and to a project. The

of reasons, including logical and theological ones.17 So the remaining challenge

Maxwell assumed that the macroscopic empirical properties of the

4. Symbols and Muscles: Abstract-Concrete Relations and the Function

Now I turn to Maxwells general solution to the problem of interpretation,

mode of understanding dismissed the tenuity and paleness of a symbolical

According to Maxwell there are two main kinds of illustrations:

phenomenon to the senses so that an appropriate scientic idea can be grasped.

order to provide a graphic geometrical representation of the eld as in Fig. 2.

defence of contiguous action Maxwell compared the states of stress in the

5. Elements and Rules of Illustration: Models, Analogies and Metaphors

In order to convey muscular illustrations and concrete illustrations in

and scientic metaphor. The rst Maxwell introduced as a method in 1855

bodies. And second, Maxwells treatment of the electromagnetic nature of light

it satises another feature of physical science, namely, the desideratum of exact

The formal analogy may purvey additional understanding precisely through

the microscopic domain of analogical application. Hesse claims, with her

applications of Newtons Laws.56 In particular, the vector potential represents

that the interpreted variables represent context-dependent properties, not

6. Methodological Reections: Why Method?

But admitting that a practical acquaintance with the methods of Physical

Maxwell replied that one constant aim would be to maintain a living

context-dependence of illustration mentioned above entails that this coherence

would then appear as if it were a current, j ; in the metaphorical sense. The

particular approach to theoretical physics is inseparable from cognitive and

Acknowledgements FI beneted from a stimulating discussion of a previous version of this paper at

Achinstein, P. (1991) Particles and Waves (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Cat, J. (forthcoming) Modeling Cracks and Cracking Models: Structures, Incon-

Siegel, D. M. (1991) Innovation in Maxwells Electromagnetic Theory (Cambridge:

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