Article VII Executive Department

A.) MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS: Executive power is not limited to powers enumerated in the
1987 Constitution. The President has an inherent obligation under the Constitution to protect the
people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. In this case, the power involved
is the Presidents residual power to protect the general welfare of the people or as protector of
the peace.

ATTY DE VEGA: The right to return to ones country is not included in the right to travel.

B.) LAUREL VS. GARCIA: The President, on his own, cannot convey real property owned by
the Government. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by
the Congress and requires executive and legislative concurrence.

C.) ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO: Presidential immunity does not extend beyond the Presidents
tenure. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. These crimes,
especially plunder are not covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.

D.) IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ VS. ARROYO: The intent of the framers is
clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his
term. In the case at bar, PGMAs term ended already when the suit was filed by Rodriguez. It
is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield
herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo
proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez under the
Doctrine of Command Responsibility.

E.) MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC: Only Congress can canvass of the votes and the proclaim
the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation including the votes
from absentee voters.

F.) PIMENTEL VS. JOINT COMMITTEE: The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress
may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004,
but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of
Canvassers.

G.) LOPEZ VS. SENATE: The creation of the Joint Committee tasked to canvass voted for the
2004 elections does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived petitioner
and the other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very
Rules under attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the
approval of the joint session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately.
H.) DE RAMA VS. CA: Midnight appointments are only prohibited for national executive
positions. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during
the last days of his or her tenure.

I.) DE CASTRO VS. JBC: The election appointment ban under Article VII, Section 15 of the
constitution should not apply to the appointment of members of the supreme court whose period
for appointment is separately provided for under Article VIII, section 4(1).

J.) SARMIENTO VS. MISON: The 1987 constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads
of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent of the commission on appointments. Under
the 1987 constitution, only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16
Article VII require confirmation.

K.) BAUTISTA VS. SALONGA: The appointment by the president of the chairman of the
commission on human rights is to be made without the review and participation of the
commission on appointments.

L.) PIMENTEL VS. ERMITA: The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its
temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by
an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee
of her choice could assume office.

M.)MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO: An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because

it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character.

N.) MALARIA EMPLOYEES VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY: The President has the
authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and
statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1
and 17 of the 1987 Constitution: Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President
of the Philippines. Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

O.) DE LEON VS. CARPIO: It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined
in the Constitution that all executive departments, bureaus, and offices are under the control of
the President of the Philippines. The Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him
over the members of the Cabinet who in turn and by his authority control the bureaus and other
offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. ()
P.) OCAMPO VS ENRIQUEZ: The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of
Government is a self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory
implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. This
is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President
Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As
the incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into
by his predecessors

Q.) IBP VS. ZAMORA: President, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Philippines,
may call out the armed forces subject to two conditions: (1) whenever it becomes necessary; and
(2) to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

R.) LAGMAN VS. MEDIALDEA: In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the
President prior to, or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.

ATTY. DE VEGA: The SC also discussed the unique features of the third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII which should be treated as sui generis. This is because under the third paragraph
of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on
standing as any citizen may file it.

S.) MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN: Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public
office forfeited by reason of the conviction. However, such pardon undoubtedly restores his
eligibility for appointment to that office. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To
regain her former post, she must undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

T.) GARCIA VS. COA: If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this
innocence and it is as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. When a person is
given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all
punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good
reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

U.) PEOPLE VS. SALLE: It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is " final
conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973
Constitution, or conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of
conviction becomes final.

V.) DAVID VS. ARROYO: As regards proclamations of Martial Law judicial inquiry can only
determine whether the president acted arbitrarily. Thus, the standard laid down is not
correctness, but arbitrariness. In integrated bar of the Philippines, this court further ruled that it
 is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the presidents decision is totally bereft of factual
basis and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then this court cannot
undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.

W.) ABAYA VS. EBDANE: Exchange of notes is binding as executive agreement. The Court
holds that the Loan Agreement taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes between the
Japanese Government and the Philippine Government is an executive agreement.

X.) SAGUISAG VS. OCHOA: EDCA is an executive agreement and does not need the Senate's
concurrence. As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties
that it purports to implement. The President is allowed to enter into an executive agreement on
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities if: (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence
of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law
or treaty and holding that the EDCA is one such executive agreement