A.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION

ONG CHIA V. REPUBLIC

FACTS: Ong filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known
as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Prosecutor himself did not present evidence to counteract
the petitioners testimony.

The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed, [annexed thereto was a copy of
petitioners 1977 petition for naturalization] claiming that:

1) He failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known (Loreto ChiaOng);
2) He failed to state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7 (J.M. Basa St.,
Iloiloonly);
3) He failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines, in violation of 2 (lived with his future wife from 1953 to 1977 without the benefit of
marriage; only married in 1977, no marriage license of alleged 1953marriage);
4) He has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or
misdeclared, also in contravention of 2 (1973-1977 ITR, could hardly sypport his family);and
5) He failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentaryevidence.4

CA reversed the RTCs decision. Ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the State is not
precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by
the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision?

HELD: No, it did not err in considering such pieces ofevidence.

The rules of court shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules
may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the
case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact,
appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not
preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the
samedocuments.

ZULUETA V. CA
FACTS: Cecilia Zulueta took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between her husband Dr. Alfredo
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs
for use in a case between the two for legal separation and a case for disqualification from the practice of medicine
filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner.

RTC granted the prayer for recovery, issued a final injunction against use of the seized materials as evidence
against Dr. Martin, and ordered payment of nominal (1k) and moral damages (5k).
CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Does the SCs decision in Alfredo Martin v. Atty. Alfonso Felix, Jr (Cecilias lawyer) [ruling that use of the
documents and papers were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix,
Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct] bind the CA and ought it have been the basis of a reversal of

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the RTC decision?

HELD: No, it does not so bind the CA.

The only reason he was acquitted was because the SC itself issued a TRO against the enforcement of the RTC
judgment.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution
is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in
anyproceeding.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with
the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

PEOPLE V. YATAR

FACTS: At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel
Dawangs house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked body of
Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.

The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the
house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.

The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked
cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters
from the house of Isabel.

The accused was arrested that same night. He was charged with rape with homicide.

RTC guilty! Sentenced to death! Automatic review!

*In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used
as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which
testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one
such novelprocedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence
or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR
testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable
since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found in the victims vaginal canal, the trial court
appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt:
(1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In
June 1998, appellants wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim,
Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by
Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel
Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the

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ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a
black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan
saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was
found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The
victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of
the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10)
Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victims vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white
shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared
with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but
was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative ofguilt.

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads
to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the
crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

*In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him
as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against
self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the
lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not
an incrimination but as part of objectevidence.

*Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional
on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA
typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules
of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.

TATING V. MARCELLA
FACTS: On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner
Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the
name of Nena.She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due
thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.However, the land remained in possession
ofDaniela.

On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of
selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject
property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the
purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any
loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property
reconveyed to her.

Daniela died on July 29, 1988leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos
and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement
she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their
rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela.Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably
proved futile.

Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a complaint with the
RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale

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 executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new
title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela

RTC declared the sale void

CA affirmed the RTC decision

Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed on October 14, 1969, the Sworn Statement was
purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was discovered only after the death of Daniela in 1994.
Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed simulated, Daniela would have taken action against the petitioner
during her lifetime. However, the fact remains that up to the time of her death or almost 20 years after the Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed, she never uttered a word of complaint againstpetitioner.

HELD: Reversed. In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their
allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the sworn statement
of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private
respondents evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative weight to thisdocument.

There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence.The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade.Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.It is settled that affidavits are classified as
hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon.The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement
probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC
and the CA should not have given probative value on Danielas sworn statement for purposes of proving that the
contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was
created between them.

Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that
Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of sale
in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of
his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of
the defendant. Aside from Danielas sworn statement, private respondents failed to present any other
documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that
Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.

In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is the complete
absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights of ownership over the
disputed property.In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner declared the
property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in hername.

PEOPLE V. SALAFRANCA
FACTS: The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del
Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon
was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed
him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that it
was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite
receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto
Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time.

As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for
his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail.

RTC guilty (murder)! Treachery! Flight!

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 CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC, citing the dying declaration made to his uncle
pointing to Salafranca as his assailant, and Salafrancas positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza
The SC affirms.
It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estao, his uncle, to seek help
right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine
General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and
the latter had told Estao that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had
seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten
minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced
dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res
gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right
after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which
was an exception to the hearsay rule.

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely:
i) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarantsdeath;
ii) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impendingdeath;
iii) that the declarant is competent as a witness;and
iv) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is avictim.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit:
i) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
ii) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;and
iii) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

SCC CHEMICALS CORP V. CA

FACTS: SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its chairman, private respondent Danilo Arrieta and
vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the
amount of P129,824.48. To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili
executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the
maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili,
but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.

On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with theRegional Trial Court of Manila. In its answer, SCC
asserted SIHIs lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the promissory note upon which SIHI
anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.

RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered SCC to pay,[SIHI only presented 1 witness but SCC was
ultimately declared to have waived its right to cross-examine for repeatedly failing to appear before the
court]

CA affirmed the judgment in toto

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that private respondent SIHI had
proved its cause of action by preponderant evidence (WON the evidence presented was hearsay)

HELD: Petitioners reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is
excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to
object tohearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.Therationale for this exception is to be found in the right
of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the
matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be waived.

Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a
competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the

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requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were
satisfied.

Nor will petitioners reliance on the best evidence rule advance its cause. Respondent SIHI had no needto present
the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the
execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to
bequestioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its
obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of
extinguishment of said obligation.

B. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

LBP V. BANAL
FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares of
agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, and Camarines Norte. A portion of the land consisting of 6.2330
hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of1988.

Landbank valued the property at P173.9k pursuant to the the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994. Respondents rejected the above
valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as amended, a summary administrative proceeding
was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land.
Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbanks valuation.

Respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a
Special Agrarian Court, a petition for determination of justcompensation, docketed as Civil Case No.6806.
Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation of
P100,000.00 per hectare for both coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.

During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the following admissions of facts:

The subject property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was distributed to the
farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited the provisional compensation based on the valuation
made by the DAR.Therewas no trial on the merits. The courtdispensed with hearing and required the
parties to submit memoranda.
RTC - computed the just compensation for the coconut landatP657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or
a total of P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents valuation ofP623,000.00. The court further awarded
compounded interest at P79,732.00 in cash.

For the coconut land

Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) = Net Income (NI)
NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula under Republic Act No.3844)

For the Riceland

2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH (using the formula under
Executive Order No. 228[)
AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994)
CA - affirmed the decision in toto.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred insustaining the trial courts valuation of the land?

HELD: Yes, it did. Case remanded to the RTC for trial on the merits.

A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a
Special Agrarian Courtfor final determination of just compensation.

In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Courtand, on its own initiative or at the
instance of any of the parties, appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts
relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof x x x.In determining

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just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as
amended.

The RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements in determining just
compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since the determination of just compensation involves the
examination of the following factors specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657.

Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during a hearing wherein the
contending parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the intricate nature of determining the
valuation of the land, Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint
commissioners for such purpose.

*Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents property is P703,137.00, merely took
judicialnotice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied thesame
to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties.

Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same
judge.Theymay only do so in the absence of objectionand with the knowledge of the opposing party,which are not
obtaining here.

Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In
this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a
court takes judicial notice of a certain matter.

PEOPLE V. KULAIS

FACTS: Five Informations for kidnapping for ransom and three informations for kidnapping were filed before the RTC
of Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina
Hassan de Kamming, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and
several John and Jane Does
The informations for kidnapping for ransom set forth identical allegations save for the names of the victims.
The three informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, likewise alleged
identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims.
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended.

The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one count of kidnapping a
woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six terms of life imprisonment. It also found him
guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco.

[May 7, 1991] Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their
Joint Notice of Appeal. In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their
appeal because of their application for amnesty (said motion granted) Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for
the consideration of the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another case, also
pending before it, affects the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt by other
clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and documentary?

HELD: No. The appeal of Kulais is bereft of merit. In the case at bar, appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due
process when the trial court took judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades
Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts. Because
he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he
contends that the latter's testimony should not be used against him.

Even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in
deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was

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based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando
Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by
appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional
surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

PRINCIPLE:

Judicial Notice: As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are
actually pending before the same judge.

True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are
actually pending before the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.

On Alibi and Denial: Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses
than to the negative testimonies of the defense.

The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the prosecution
witnesses positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of
prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense. Between positive and categorical
testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally
prevails. Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and
frank manner; and their testimonies were compatible on material points. Moreover, no ill motive was
attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.

LAUREANO V. CA

FACTS: On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff (pilot) of his termination effective November 1, 1982 and
that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he
could not uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust
all possible avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month
salary. Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissalbefore the Labor Arbiter.
Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was
withdrawn. Thereafter (in 1987), plaintiff filed the instant case for damagesdue to illegal termination of contract of
servicesbefore the court a quo. The defendant assailed the RTCs jurisdiction (Singapore, labor arbiter)
RTC decided in favor of plaintiff; awarded compensation from filing until payment, $154k for consequential
damages, 1M each for moral and exemplary damages.

CA set aside the TC decision and dismissed the case.Action prescribed

Petition denied; decision affirmed.

All money claims arising from employee-employer relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be
filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred. (LC
291)

Although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its
dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no
action had been commenced at all.

As to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the appellate court found
that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment.

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply supported by
evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:

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 "When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline industry resulting in
a slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian Area) where the
Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down
services, number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number of flying points for the A-300
fleet. As a result, defendant-appellant had to layoff A-300 pilots, including plaintiff- appellee, which it
found to be in excess of what is reasonably needed.

MAQUILING V. COMELEC

FACTS: We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has
already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the relief
sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either affirm the
validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for publicoffice.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Courts Decision dated April
16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated
that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be stressed, however, that the relevant
question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question before this Court.

Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of
expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims
that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all the rights of an American
citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates
this claim.

ISSUE: Whether the court can take Judicial Notice of Foreign Laws?

HELD: No. The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public documents of a
foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof." Mere reference to a foreign law in a
pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.

Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States "providing that a person who
is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by
using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation."

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code calls for
application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not
only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law and not of
any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to run for any local elective position.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act." This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2) requires those
who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective publicoffice, to renounce any and all foreign
citizenship.

This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates
a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a
former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to continue using a foreign passport which indicates the
recognition of a foreign state of the individual as its national even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign
citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.

Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship
from running for local elective positions.

There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country
which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named
therein as its national.

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It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by
naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American
citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times

PEOPLE V. BAHARAN

If the declarant repeats the statement in court, it becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony
admissible to both as conspirators.

FACTS: Elmer Andales, bus conductor, testified as to the events.

Shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group Abu Solaiman announced over radio station
DZBB that the group had a Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he
again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.

As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview some time
after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentines Day bombing incident. In another exclusive
interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused
Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied theexplosive devices for the 14 February 2005
bombing. Thebus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two
men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal
Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other John and Jane Does were
then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustratedmurder. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat
werearrested, while the other accused remain at-large.

Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty on re-arraignment to multiple frustrated murder while Asali turned
statewitness.

HELD: Affirmed.

Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted or of the
factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and
Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge multiplemurder based on the same act relied upon in the
multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes thatprior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused
Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive
television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial
stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem itunnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of
the searching inquiry in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the
accuseds plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.

Accused contend that the testimony of Asali as to theexistence of a conspiracy is inadmissible pursuant to
Sec.30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a
co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court
ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats thestatement in court, his extrajudicial confession
becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.

6. REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN CELINE

LIGTAS V. PEOPLE

FACTS Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information
provides that on or about the 29th day of June 2000 at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Municipality of Sogod,
Province of Southern Leyte, Ligtas, with intent of gain, entered into the abaca plantation belonging to one Anecita
Pacate, and willfully, unlawfully and feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at
Php29.00 per kilo, without the consent of said owner, Anecita Pacate.

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On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other before the Sogod Police Station. Ligtas admitted to
harvesting the abaca but claimed that he was the plantation owner. According to Ligtas, he had been a tenant of
Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate since 1993. Andres Pacate installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to
two hectares of land involved in the criminal case.

Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent workers to harvest abaca from the land he cultivated.
Ligtas prevented the men from harvesting the abaca since he was the rightful tenant of the land.

Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern
Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21, 2000. On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered
the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land.

While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the trial court,
records are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and without
any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.

In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that "the prosecution was able to prove the
elements of theft.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. According to it, "the burden to prove the existence of the
tenancy relationship" belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the essential elements of a tenancy
agreement.

ISSUE: Whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as tenant of the land owned by private
complainant Anecita Pacate is conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft.

HELD: We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is conclusive and binding on courts
if supported by substantial evidence.

The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy
relationship between adverse parties. This court has held that "judicial determinations [of the a DARAB] have the
same binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body."

It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even records of other
cases that have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.

In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is
presumed that the Decision has long lapsed into finality. It is also established that private complainant participated in
the initial stages of the DARAB proceedings. Therefore, the issue of the existence of a tenancy relationship is final as
between the parties.

The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and private complainant
negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner's consent. The DARAB Decision
implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all
the elements of theft.

C. RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

PEOPLE V. MALLILIN

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse
the hypothesis of guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of the accused
but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.

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FACTS: On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City, a team of five police
officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The search
conducted in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his
mother, Normaallegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing
residual morsels of the said substance.

Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Petitioner entered a negative plea. Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the
examination on the seized items, was presented as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the
laboratory. She revealed that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four
were positive of containing residue of the same substance. She further admitted that all seven sachets were
delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that
it was not she but rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the laboratory.

The trial court finds accussed guilty of the crime charged and reasoned that the fact that shabu was found in the
house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioner's animus possidendi sufficient to convict him of the
charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership are
presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioner's failure to ascribe ill motives to the police officers to fabricate
charges againsthim.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the
judgment of the trial court but modifying the prison sentence. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same
was denied by the appellate court. Hence, the instant petition which raises substantially the same issues.

ISSUE: Whether the chain of custody rule was strictly complied with?

HELD: NO.Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of possession
of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by
law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to
a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable
mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that
the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence
are removed.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and
is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to
observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration,
tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to
fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates the
level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.

A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu
allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with the seized objects, only Esternon
and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon
supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom
Esternon directly handed over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in
court to establish the circumstances under which they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might then
ask the question: Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested

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and offered in court asevidence?

The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering that it was Gallinera who
recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same
items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his
own. The same is true of Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under
which she received the items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her possession
until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.

The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing the identity of the seized items
because it failed to offer not only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient explanation for such
failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out
the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment. This holds true not only
with respect to the two filled sachets but also to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels of shabu.

Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure in the
implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly misplaced.
The presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled
with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police custody before offered in court,
strongly militates a finding of guilt.

PEOPLE V. PAGADUAN

FACTS: The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165. The appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits, thereafter, followed.
Buy bust operation was conducted wherein appellant was apprehended. PO3 Almarez, posed as the buyer and when
he handed the marked money to the appellant, he immediately apprehended the appellant. Captain de Vera took the
marked money from the appellants right pocket, and then arrested him. PO3 Almarez, for his part, marked the sachet
with his initials. Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought the appellant to the Diadi Police Station for investigation.

At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request for laboratory examination. The appellant was transferred to
the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained. Two days later, or on December 29, 2003, PO3 Almarez transmitted
the letter-request, for laboratory examination, and the seized plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they
were received by PO2 Fernando Dulnuan. Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the Forensic Chemist of
the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted an examination on the specimen submitted, and found it to be positive for the
presence of shabu.

The RTC, in its decision of August 16, 2005, convicted the appellant of the crime charged, and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.

The appellant appealed to the CA. The CA, in its decision dated May 22, 2007, affirmed the RTC decision.

The CA further ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove an unbroken chain of custody of the shabu. It
explained that PO3 Almarez sealed the plastic sachet seized from the appellant, marked it with his initials, and
transmitted it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. PSI Quintero conducted a qualitative examination and
found the specimen positive for the presence of shabu. According to the CA, the prosecution was able to prove that
the substance seized was the same specimen submitted to the laboratory and presented in court, notwithstanding
that this specimen was turned over to the crime laboratory only after twodays.

The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to show an unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized
drug. He claims that there was no evidence to show when the markings were done. Moreover, a period of two days
had elapsed from the time the shabu was confiscated to the time it was forwarded to the crime laboratory for
examination.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that the chain of custody of the shabu was
sufficiently established. It explained that the shabu was turned over by the police officers to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, whereit was found by the forensic chemist to be positive for the presence of shabu. The OSG likewise

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claimed that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the
police. The OSG further added that a prior surveillance is not indispensable to a prosecution for illegal sale of
drugs.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid chain of custody that can be admitted as Real or Object Evidence?

HELD: After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the police complied with paragraph 1,
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act.

Requirement under Section 21:

In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution
must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence
that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or
substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown by presenting the
object of the illegal transaction.26 To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized
drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually
recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No.
9165fails.

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in

Section21,paragraph1,ArticleIIofR.A.No.9165,whichstates:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof

This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165.
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic
rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by
accident or otherwise. The records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing that the buy-
bustteamfollowedtheoutlinedproceduredespiteitsmandatoryterms.

The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the trial:

In several cases, we have emphasized the importance of compliance with the prescribed procedure in the custody
and disposition of the seized drugs. We have repeatedly declared that the deviation from the standard procedure
dismally compromises the integrity of the evidence. In People v. Morales, we acquitted the accused for failure of the
buy-bust team to photograph and inventory the seized items, without giving any justifiable ground for the non-
observance of the required procedures. People v. Garcia likewise resulted in an acquittal because no physical
inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under the circumstances required by
R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules. In Bondad, Jr. v. People,33 we also acquitted the accused for the failure
of the police to conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized items, without justifiable grounds.

In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to justify the failure of the police to
conduct the required physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs. The apprehending team failed to show
why an inventory and photograph of the seized evidence had not been made either in the place of seizure and
arrest or at the nearest police station (as required by the Implementing Rules in case of warrantless arrests). We
emphasize that for the saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had been preserved. In other words, the
justifiable ground for noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds are
or that they even exist.

The "Chain of Custody" Requirement

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 Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti
- the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime
must be established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures
that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

Blacks Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise:

In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the narcotics in a trial of drug case, must account for the
custody of the evidence from the moment in which it reaches his custody until the moment in which it is offered in
evidence, andsuchevidencegoestoweightnottoadmissibilityofevidence.

Likewise, Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 which implements R.A.
No. 9165 defines "chain of custody" as follows:

"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the
course of safekeepinganduseincourtasevidence,andthefinaldisposition[.]

In Malillin v. People, the Court explained that the chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.

In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the
shabu presented in court was the very same specimen seized from the appellant.

SALAS V. MATUSALEM

FACTS: Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner)
in the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City. Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son Christian
Paulo Salas who was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she
was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where
respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation
and hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioners family to take the child from
her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent
further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of P20,000.00, as well as
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

Petitioner claimed in his answer that he was not the father of the child and he only helped with the birth expenses out
of altruism.

During the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo (owner of the apartment Respondent rented for her)
testified. Petitioner did not present any evidence.

RTC granted the prayer for support (2k/month, 1999).

CA appeal dismissed

ISSUE: Was paternity satisfactorily proven?

HELD: NO. We hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent proof of
paternity and the totality of respondents evidence failed to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An
order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives
of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.

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Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and
on the same evidence as legitimate children.

Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states: The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the
foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: The open and continuous possession of thestatus of a
legitimate child; or Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in whichthe name of petitioner
appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondentwho filled up the
entries and signed the said document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information
she wrote therein.

We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate.25 Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother,
doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity.26 Neither can such birth certificate be
taken as a recognition in a public instrument27 and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the
alleged father.28

As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have
ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of theadministration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily
competent evidence ofthe veracity of entries therein with respect to the childs paternity.30

The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters,hospital bill
and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside theirrented apartment unit.

Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence
to prove paternity. Showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant
evidentiary value. The Statement of Account from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent
herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child
notwithstanding petitioners admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of
respondents child as an act of charity.

As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic
trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by
petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if
these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis--vis Article 175 of the Family Code which
admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned.

PEOPLE V. ERIC ROSAURO

FACTS: The Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit of Misamis Oriental conducted a test-buy operation using a
confidential agent. The confidential agent bought shabu from, herein respondent, Eric Rosauro y Bongcawil
(Rosauro). The substance bought from Rosauro was examined by the PNP crime laboratory and yielded a positive
result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (commonly known as shabu).

The Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) conducted a buy-bust operation using a
confidential agent. The PAID-SOTU elements saw Rosauro negotiate with the confidential agent. In exchange for the
one (1) sachet of shabu given by Rosauro to the confidential agent, the latter gave him a marked 100-peso bill with
serial number YZ7 12579. After the transaction, the PAID-SOTU elements arrested Rosauro.

The sachet of shabu was taped and marked as Exhibit A. The confidential agent took pictures of Rosauro and the
drugs. He also prepared a Certificate of Inventory and a Request for Laboratory Examination in the police station.
Both the drugs and Rosauro were then turned over to the Crime Laboratory.

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 The Forensic Chemical Officer of PNP Crime Laboratory conducted a laboratory examination on the contents of the
sachet, on Rosauro, and the marked money. The examination of the seized item yielded positive result from
methamphetamine hydrochloride; while Rosauro and the marked money tested positive for the presence of ultra-
violet fluorescent powder.

The lower court finds Rosauro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under RA 9165. Rosauro, on
the other hand, avers that: (1) the prosecution was not able to prove the corpus delicti, (2) the chain of custody rule
was not followed.

ISSUE: (1) Whether the prosecution was able to prove the corpus delicti? (2) Whether the chain of custody rule were
not followed?

HELD: (1) YES. This Court laid down the essential elements to be duly established for a successful prosecution of
offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like shabu, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.
Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money by the seller
successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction or
sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

Verily, all the elements for a conviction of illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs were proven by the
prosecution: the identity of accused- appellant as the seller, and that of the confidential informant as poseur-buyer
were established, as well as the exchange of the sachet of shabu and the marked money. It was also ascertained
that the seized item was positive for shabu, a dangerous drug, and that the same item was properly identified in open
court by SPO4 Larot. Moreover, the P100.00 bill with serial number YZ712579, or the subject marked money, as well
as the living body of the accused-appellant revealed a positive result for ultraviolet fluorescent powder.

(2) YES. The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R. A. No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs states:

"Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items."

In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential informant gave the seized item to SP04 Larot
who placed tape on the sachet and marked it "Exhibit A." Upon reaching the police station, SP04 Larot executed the
Certificate of Inventory, as well as the request for laboratory examination. The request, the specimen, as well as the
marked money and accused-appellant were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. They were
received.by SP02 Ricardo Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office, who then forwarded
them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Moreover, the seized item was duly identified by SP04 Larot in open court as the same item seized from accused-
appellant.

5. PEOPLE V. CALANTIAO- EASTER

Object/Real Evidence

PEOPLE V. HERMANIS JOJIT CONSTANTINO JR.

FACTS: On January 20, 2005, 2 P.M., P/Supt. Mariano Rodriguez, the Chief of Police of Tuguegarao City,
immediately formed a buy-bust group after receiving a report from a confidential informant (CI) that a certain Jojit was
selling illegal drugs. One of the police officers (PO3 Domingo) was designated as the poseur-buyer.

At around 8 P.M. of the same day, Jojit was arrested after handing two plastic sachets to PO3 Domingo. The buy-
bust money was also recovered from him (Jojit).

Thereafter, Constantino was brought to the police station where the recovered drugs and money were turned over to
the investigator. The recovered drugs were then marked. The incident was recorded in the police blotter with an
inventory of the recovered drugs and money.

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Constantino denied the accusation against him and asserted that he was merely framed-up.

RTC: Constantino is guilty of the crime of illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

CA: RTC Decision is affirmed in toto.

ISSUE: Whether the guilt of Constantino is proven despite the prosecutions failure to establish the chain of custody
of the drug specimens allegedly confiscated from him?

HELD: No. Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference point.

The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidences chain of custody is fatal to its case as the Court can no
longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug
were properly preserved.

In light of the foregoing, Constantino is acquitted of the crime charged, not because the Court accords credence to
his defense of frame-up, but because the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE V. DELA CRUZ

FACTS: At around 7:15 o'clock in the evening some of the police officers and their civilian asset proceeded to the
house of Dela Cruz, while others were strategically hidden more or less ten (10) meters away. The civilian asset
called Dela Cruz and told her that they will buy shabu worth P200.00. Thereafter, Dela Cruz handed one of them a
small plastic containing white crystalline substance and in exchange he handed to the former the P200.00 bills. Upon
getting hold of the money, the officers who were hiding and saw the consummation of the transaction rushed to the
scene. While being arrested, Dela Cruz, shouted for help and resisted arrest. She was able to escape because her
neighbors blocked the officers way as they were chasing her.

On their way to the police station, the arresting officer handed to PO3 Batobalonos the small plastic containing white
crystalline substance which he purchased from Dela Cruz. Afterwards, PO3 Batobalonos marked the seized item.

A Request for Laboratory Examination of the seized item was subsequently prepared by PO3 Batobalonos. The
Request and the seized item were delivered to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office.

Thereafter Forensic Chemist PCI Salinas issued Chemistry Report No. D-1771-2006," with the finding that the
specimen gave positive result for the presence of Methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Later, dela Cruz was apprehended by virtue of a warrant of arrest.

Criminal case was filed against her with the RTC which found her guilty of illegal sale of shabu under R.A. No. 91653.
CA affirmed in toto. Hence, this appeal.

Dela Cruz contended that the drugs were marked not at the place where she was apprehended but at the police
station and that there was no physical inventory made on the seized item nor was it photographed. Consequently, the
evidence is inadmissible for non-compliance with legal requirements of the law.

ISSUE: Whether the seized item is inadmissible for failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21 of RA 9165?

HELD: No. The evidence is admissible.The alleged non-compliance was not fatal to the prosecution's case because
the apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs.

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As a general rule, the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of custody in the handling of evidence. The law
provides for an exception. Substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of the seized item is
sufficient as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken.

Here, the failure to strictly comply with the requirements was satisfactorily explained by the apprehending officers.
They testified that a commotion erupted when accused-appellant resisted and shouted for help while she was being
arrested. The commotion eventually gave accused-appellant the opportunity to run and elude arrest. The arresting
officers further alleged that the people who gathered around them were already aggressive prompting them to decide
to immediately proceed to the police station for their safety. 16 In fact, the arresting officers even had to fire a warning
shot and arrest the person who intervened in the arrest of accused-appellant, in order for them to pacify the people
around them.

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or
proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the burden of showing that the evidence
was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public
officers and the presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties. 17 Accused-appellant in this case
failed to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of
the apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit. 18 In fact, accused-appellant did not even question the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses. She simply anchored her defense on denial and alibi.

1. SPS. SILOS HAZELLE

MCMP CONST. CORP V. MONARK

FACTS: MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy equipment from Monark Equipment Corporation
(Monark) for various periods in 2000, the lease covered by a Rental Equipment Contract (Contract). Thus, Monark
delivered five (5) pieces of heavy equipment to the project site of MCMP in Tanay, Rizal and Llavac, Quezon, the
delivery evidenced by invoices as well as Documents and acknowledgment receipts received and signed by
representatives of MCMP, namely, Jorge Samonte on December 5, 2000 and Rose Takahashi on January 29, 2001,
respectively. The latter failed to pay rental fees for the use of five (5) pieces of heavy equipment as stated in their
Rental Equipment Contract, as started in the agreement and so, SUIT FOR SUM OF MONEY was filed against
MCMP.

During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses, Reynaldo Peregrino (Peregrino), its Senior Account Manager.
Peregrino testified that there were two (2) original copies of the Contract, one retained by Monark,, while the other
was given to MCMP. He further testified that Monarks copy had been lost and that diligent efforts to recover the copy
proved futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the Contract which he personally had on file. MCMP
objected to the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents of the Contract arguing that there were no
diligent efforts to search for the original copy. Notably, MCMP did not present its copy of the Contract notwithstanding
the directive of the trial court to produce the same.

The lower court ruled in favor of Monark, on appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether the presentation of the secondary evidence should not be allowed?

HELD: The petition has been denied by the SC. The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production
of the original document whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court which provides: Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.

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In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC gave
credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has been lost and that
diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has
been repeatedly held by this Court, findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left
to the trial court. Hence, the Court will respect the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino.

2. LOON V. POWER MASTER INC

FACTS: Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the petitioners as
janitors and leadsmen in various Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in Metro Manila
area.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against Power Master, Inc., Tri-C General
Services and their officers, the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin (collectively, the respondents). The
petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium,
service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays. They further averred that the respondents made them
sign blank payroll sheets. On June 11, 2001, the petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal
dismissal as their cause of action. They claimed that the respondents relieved them from service in
retaliation for the filing of their originalcomplaint.

Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter except on April 19,
2001 and May 21, 2001 when Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondents behalf. The
respondents counsel also appeared in a preliminary mandatory conference on July 5, 2001.
However, the respondents neither filed any position paper nor proffered pieces of evidence in their defense
despite their knowledge of the pendency of the case.

LA - awarded the petitioners salary differential, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays
[burden of proving payment rests with the ERs] but denied backwages, overtime, holiday, and premium
pays. Also ruled that the petitioners cannot be declared to have been dismissed from employment because
they did not show any notice of termination of employment. They were also not barred from entering the
respondents premises. BOTH parties appealed.

Respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They attached:

1) Photocopied and computerized copies of list of employees with automated teller machine
(ATM) cards to the supplemental appeal. This list also showed the amounts allegedly deposited in
the employees ATMcards
2) They also attached documentary evidence showing that the petitioners were dismissed for
cause and had been accorded dueprocess.

NLRC - allowed the respondents to submit pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal on the
ground that they had been deprived of due process. It found that the respondents did not actually
receive the LAs processes. It also admitted the respondents unverified supplemental appeal on the ground
that technicalities may be disregarded to serve the greater interest of substantial due process. Furthermore,
the Rules of Court do not require the verification of a supplemental pleading. Only affirmed the award of
holiday pay and attorneys fees, but dismissed therest.

CA affirmed the NLRC.

HELD: In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required. Time and again, we have
allowed evidence to be submitted for the first time on appeal with the NLRC in the interest of substantial justice. Thus,
we have consistently supported the rule that labor officials should use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, in the interest of dueproces.

However, this liberal policy should still be subject to rules of reason and fairplay. The liberality of procedural rules
is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should adequately explain any delay in the submission of
evidence; and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven.The reason for these
requirements is that the liberal application of the rules before quasi-judicial agencies cannot be used to perpetuate

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injustice and hamper the just resolution of the case. Neither is the rule on liberal construction a license to disregard
the rules ofprocedure.

Guided by these principles, the CA grossly erred in ruling that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
arbitrarily admitting and giving weight to the respondents pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal

The respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Why the respondents photocopied
and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious
question that lends credence to the petitioners claim that the respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of
appeal. While we generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in
administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to
present the original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals,
especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents
effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not
adducing the originals. This Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the respondents failure to present the
originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse ifproduced

It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRCs proposition that it is of common knowledge that there are
many people who use at least two or more different signatures." The NLRC cannot take judicial notice that many
people use at least two signatures; especially in this case where the petitioners themselves disown the signatures in
the respondents assailed documentary evidence. The NLRCs position is unwarranted and is patently unsupported
by the law and jurisprudence.

Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the employees. This conclusion is consistent
with the rule that the employers cause can only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of the employees evidence.

We also reverse the NLRC and the CAs finding that the petitioners are not entitled to salary differential, service
incentive, holiday, and thirteenth month pays. As in illegal dismissal cases, the general rule is that the burden rests
on the defendant to prove payment rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment of these money claims. The
rationale for this rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents
which will show that differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid are not in the
possession of the worker but are in the custody and control of theemployer

3. DIMAGUILA V. MONTEIRO

FACTS: Respondent spouses Monteiro filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages before the RTC, against the
petitioners Dimaguilas. The complaint alleged that all the parties were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a
residential house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St., Liliw, Laguna. Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a
deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila(Pedro).

In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there was no co-ownership to speak of in
the first place. They alleged that the subject property had long been partitionedequally.

During the course of the proceedings, several incidents were initiated.

Upon resumption of the proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended
Complaint. The RTC granted their motion. In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the
Dimaguilas' admission in their original answer that the subject property had already been partitioned. Spouses
Monteiro further averred that Pedro's share was sold by his heirs to them through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming
Karapatan (Bilihan) with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of
Conformity and Waiver; and that when they attempted to take possession of the share of Pedro, they discovered that
the subject portion was being occupied by the Dimaguilas.

In their Answer to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject property was inherited by, and
divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their original answer that it had been

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actually divided into southern and nmihern portions. Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial Partition mentioned
only the division of the subject property "into two and share and share alike." In effect, they argued the existence of a
co- owenrship, contrary to their originalposition.

The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered the Dimaguilas to turn over the possession of the subject 1
/3 portion of the southern-half of the property.

The RTC found that although the extrajudicial partition merely divided the property into two share and share alike,
evidence aliunde was appreciated to show that there was an actual division of the property into south and north
between Perfecto and Vitaliano, and that such partition was observed and honored by their heirs. These pieces of
evidence were the cadastral map of Liliw and a corresponding list of claimants, which showed that the subject
property had long been registered as Lot 876 (northern-half), claimed by Buenaventura Dimaguila (Buenaventura), an
heir of Vitaliano, and Lot 877 (southern-half), claimed byPerfecto.

As to the authenticity of the Bilihan, the RTC found the document to be regular and authentic absent any piece of
evidence to thecontrary.The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the rule on hearsay and best evidence rule were violated?

HELD: NO. Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody or the record.

Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by the
map were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's
Office, a repository of such documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record
officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list
of claimants, as ce1iified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records
are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of
requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty.
The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.

Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and
manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of
claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such,
they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

4. REPUBLIC V. MUPAS KAYE

ORTANEZ V. CA

FACTS: On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land in Quezon
City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively.

Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner.
On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles. Private respondents, however,
refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, and petitioner's acquisition of
the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.

Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer with
counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions which were never
reflected in the deeds of sale:

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"3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants (private respondents) until plaintiff
(petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements have been met:
(i) Plaintiffwillcausethesegregationofhisrightofwayamountingto398sq.m.;
(ii) Plaintiffwillsubmittothedefendantstheapprovedplanforthesegregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of defendants' lot to segregate his right ofway;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be incurred by reason of sale. x xx."

During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the sale was subject to the
above conditions, although such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely
objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the parol evidence rule, the
lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the parol evidence is admissible?

HELD: The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents' oral testimony on the
alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on
human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously
unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is
deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the
contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not
found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we
cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition.Asacontract,itisthelawbetweentheparties.

Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement Development, Co.
vs. Garcia Plantation where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a contract may be established by parol
evidence. However, the material facts of that case are different from this case. In the former, the contract sought to
be enforced expressly stated that it is subject to an agreement containing the conditions-precedent which were
proven through parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any pre- conditions
or other agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms.

Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that:

The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to
show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties.

Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence is admissible under the
exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true intent of the
parties. Such exception obtains only in the following instance:

"[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot
be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the
contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when
they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the
instrument."
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt
in the terms thereof.

Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents contention that they "put in issue by the pleadings" the failure of
the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Record shows that private respondents did not
expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the intention of the buyer (petitioner)
and the seller (private respondents). Such issue must be "squarely presented." Private respondents merely alleged
that the sale was subject to four (4) conditions which they tried to prove during trial by parol evidence. Obviously, this
cannot be done, because they did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. Their case is
covered by the general rule that the contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of the agreement.
Considering that private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer (and former judge) he was "supposed to be steeped
in legal knowledge and practices" and was "expected to know the consequences" of his signing a deed of absolute
sale. Had he given an iota's attention to scrutinize the deeds, he would have incorporated important stipulations that
the transfer of title to said lots were conditional.

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LAPU-LAPU FOUNDATION V. CA

FACTS: Sometime in 1977, petitioner Elias Q. Tan, then President of the co- petitioner Lapulapu Foundation, Inc.,
obtained four loans from the respondent Allied Banking Corporation covered by four promissory notes in the amounts
of P100,000 each.

As of January 23, 1979, the entire obligation amounted to P493,566.61 and despite demands made on them by the
respondent Bank, the petitioners failed to pay the same. The respondent Bank was constrained to file with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint seeking payment by the petitioners, jointly and solidarily, of the sum of
P493,566.61 representing their loan obligation, exclusive of interests, penalty charges, attorneys fees and costs.

In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from the respondent Bank
alleging that the loans were obtained by petitioner Tan in his personal capacity, for his own use and benefit and on
the strength of the personal information he furnished the respondent Bank. The petitioner Foundation
maintained that it never authorized petitioner Tan to co- sign in his capacity as its President any promissory note
and that the respondent Bank fully knew that the loans contracted were made in petitioner Tans personal capacity
and for his own use and that the petitioner Foundation never benefited, directly or indirectly, therefrom. For his part,
petitioner Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from the respondent Bank in his personal capacity.

According to petitioner Tan, the respondent Banks employee required him to affix two signatures on every
promissory note, assuring him that the loan documents would be filled out in accordance with their agreement.
However, after he signed and delivered the loan documents to the respondent Bank, these were filled out in a
manner not in accord with their agreement, such that the petitioner Foundation was included as party thereto.
Further, prior to its filing of the complaint, the respondent Bank made no demand on him.

RTC ruled in favor of Allied Bank. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the court a quo by
deleting the award of attorneys fees in favor of the respondent Bank for being without basis.

The appellate court disbelieved petitioner Tans claim that the loans were his personal loans as the promissory
notes evidencing them showed upon their faces that these were obligations of the petitioner Foundation, as
contracted by petitioner Tan himself in his official and personal character. Applying the parol evidence rule, the CA
likewise rejected petitioner Tans assertion that there was an unwritten agreement between him and the respondent
Bank that he would pay theloansfromtheproceedsofhissharesofstocksintheLapulapuIndustriesCorp.

ISSUE: WHETHER COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AS
BASIS FOR ADJUDGING JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY ON THE PART OF PETITIONERS ELIAS Q. TAN
AND LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC?

HELD: The Court particularly finds as incredulous petitioner Tans allegation that he was made to sign blank loan
documents and that the phrase IN MY OFFICIAL/PERSONAL CAPACITY was superimposed by the respondent
Banks employee despite petitioner Tans protestation. The Court is hard pressed to believe that a businessman of
petitioner Tans stature could have been so careless as to sign blank loan documents.

In contrast, as found by the CA, the promissory notes clearly showed upon their faces that they are the obligation of
the petitioner Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan in his official and personal capacity. Moreover, the
application for credit accommodation, the signature cards of the two accounts in the name of petitioner Foundation,
as well as New Current Account Record, all accompanying the promissory notes, were signed by petitioner Tan for
and in the name of the petitioner Foundation. These documentary evidence unequivocally and categorically
establish that the loans were solidarily contracted by the petitioner Foundation and petitioner Tan.

As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tans claim regarding the
purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the payment of the obligation. Section 9,
Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors-in- interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent Bank. These promissory
notes contained maturity dates as follows: February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978, April 11, 1978 and May 5, 1978,
respectively. That these notes were to be paid on these dates is clear and explicit. Nowhere was it stated therein that
they would be renewed on a year-to-year basis or rolled-over annually until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans
shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten agreement could not be made to vary or

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contradict the terms and conditions in the promissory notes.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot
serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned
at all in writing, unless there has been fraud ormistake.Nosuchallegationhadbeenmadebythepetitionersinthiscase.

LEOVERAS V. VALDEZ

FACTS: Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners of a parcel of land located in
Pangasinan. Sta. Maria sold her share to Benigna Llamas. When Benigna died in 1944, she willed her share equally
to her sisters Alejandra Llamas and Josefa Llamas. Thus, Alejandra and Josefa each owned one-half () of
Benignas share.
Alejandras heirs sold their predecessors one-half () share to the respondent, as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale.

Josefa sold her own one-half () share (subject property) to the respondent and the petitioner, as evidenced by
another Deed of Absolute Sale. On even date, the respondent and the petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting
their portions of the subject property.

Petitioner and the respondent executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the subject property. The parties took
possession of their respective portions of the subject property and declared it in their name for taxation purposes.

Respondent asked the Register of Deeds on the requirements for the transfer of title over the portion allotted to him
on the subject property. To his surprise, the respondent learned that the petitioner had already obtained in his
name two transfer certificates of title (TCTs). Respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance
and Damages against the petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the disputed property on the ground that the
petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square meters identified in the parties Agreement. The respondent assailed
the Benigna Deed by presenting Benignas death certificate. The respondent argued that Benigna could not have
executed a deed because Benigna already died in 1944. Respondent denied his purported signature appearing in
theAffidavit

The RTC dismissed the complaint. The court ruled that the respondent failed to preponderantly prove that the
Benigna Deed and the Affidavit are fabricated and, consequently, no ground exists to nullify the petitioners titles.
The court observed that the respondent did not even compare his genuine signature with the signatures appearing
in these documents.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling against the authenticity of the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit. The
CA gave weight to Benignas death certificate which shows the impossibility of Benignas execution of the deed in
1969. The CA also noted the discrepancy between the respondents signatures as appearing in the Affidavit, on
one hand, and the documents on record, on the other. The CA added that the respondents failure to compare his
genuine signature from his purported signatures appearing in the petitioners documents is not fatal, since Section
22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court allows the court to make its own comparison.
Petitioner filed the present appeal by certiorari, claiming that the CA committed "gross misappreciation of the facts"
by going beyond what the respondent sought in his complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was able to prove his title over the disputed potions?

HELD: Yes. The respondent adequately proved his ownership of the disputed property by virtue of the (i) Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Josefa in favor of the parties; (ii) the parties Affidavit of Adverse Claim; and (iii) the
parties Agreement, which cover the subject property.

The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity of these documents, particularly the
Agreement. However, he claims that since the Agreement does not reflect the true intention of the parties, the
Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to reflect the parties true intention.

The petitioners argument calls to fore the application of the parole evidence rule, i.e., when the terms of an
agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no
evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained in the written agreement. Whatever is not
found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned.

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To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence modifying,
explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as in this case, the
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the written
agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or
accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the parties.

At the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol evidence, the alleged true intention of the parties by presenting
the Affidavit, which allegedly corrected the mistake in the previously executed Agreement and confirmed his
ownership of the parcels of land covered by his titles. It was the petitioners staunch assertion that the respondent co-
executed this Affidavit supposedly to reflect the parties true intention.

In the present petition, however, the petitioner made a damaging admission that the Benigna Deed is fabricated,
thereby completely bolstering the respondents cause of action for reconveyance of the disputed property on
the ground offraudulent registration of title. Since the Affidavit merely reflects what is embodied in the Benigna
Deed, the petitioners admission, coupled with the respondents denial of his purported signature in the Affidavit,
placed in serious doubt the reliability of this document, supposedly the bedrock of the petitioners defense.

4. PARAS V. KIMWA - MARIA

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v.GAYAM. PAS IMIO

FACTS: On May 19, 2005, Pasimio filed suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum of money and damages before
the RTC of Paraaque City. In her complaint, she alleged having a peso and dollar time deposit accounts with PNB
where both investment placements have matured; and when she sought to withdraw her deposit money with accrued
interests, PNB refused to oblige. In its Answer with Counterclaim, with annexes, PNB admitted the fact of deposit
placement for the amount aforestated but it claimed that Pasimio is without right to insist on their withdrawal, the
deposited amount having already been used in payment of her outstanding loan obligations to the bank.

Pasimio denied obtaining any loan from PNB. She agreed to affix her signature on these loan documents in blank or
in an incomplete state, she added, only because the PNBs branch manager, Teresita Gregorio (Gregorio), and
Customer Relations Officer, Gloria Miranda (Miranda), led her to believe that what she was signing were related to
new high-yielding PNB products. PNB offered the following evidence where it can be gleaned from the facts of the
case that [PNB] was able to obtain the signature and assent of plaintiff-appellee in re-lending the loan proceeds to a
certain Paolo Sun, in a manner not in accordance with the ordinary course of business of banks.

Moreover it was found out that, the loan application form which was verified with a notary public on April 30, 2001 did
not utilize any residence certificate of plaintiff and the same former document carried bolder typewritten entries for the
names of depositors but faint entries for the amount. Which circumstances bring in a question on the validity and
veracity of the loan documents. Verily, from the foregoing instances, PNB held to be indeed grossly negligent in its
transactions with plaintiff-appellee.

ISSUE: Whether CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision granting Pasimio's complaint for a sum of money?

HELD: Yes. The court held that Pasimio failed to prove her claim by preponderance of evidence. It is settled in
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court that the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts a right and the
quantum of evidence required by law in civil cases is preponderance of evidence. With the view we take of the case,
Pasimio has failed to discharge this burden.

There can be no quibbling that Pasimio had, during the time material, opened and maintained deposit accounts with
PNB. However, PNB also succeeded in substantiating its defense for refusing to release Pasimio's funds by
presenting documents showing that her accounts were, made collaterals for the loans she obtained from the bank
and were eventually used to pay her outstanding loan obligations. Unfortunately, Pasimio failed to trump PNB's
defense after the burden of evidence shifted back to her.

However, It is germane to observe at this juncture that PNB has, in its favor, certain presumptions which Pasimio
failed to overturn. Rule 131, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court specifies that a disputable presumption is satisfactory if
uncontradicted and not overcome by other evidence that there was sufficient consideration for a contract and that a
negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration.

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Furthermore, on the issue of the veracity of the instrument. According to the law, the authenticity of these loan
documents should not be affected merely because their blank spaces appeared to have been filled up, if that be the
case, on different dates, using different typewriters. As PNB aptly puts it, there is nothing suspicious or inherently
wrong about bank forms being filled up on different dates since these are usually pre-typed, with the blanks thereon
to be filled up subsequently, depending on the specific terms of the transaction with a client, and thereafter presented
to the latter for signing.

The absence of Pasimio's community tax certificate number do not invalidates the document. If at all, such absence
renders the notarization of the loan documents defective. Under the notarial rules at that time, i.e., Sec. 163 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, where an individual subject to the
community tax acknowledges any document before a notary public, it shall be the duty of the administering officer to
require such individual to exhibit the community tax certificate. The defective notarization of the loan documents only
means that these documents would not be carrying the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution; that they should be treated as a private document to be examined in appropriate cases under the
parameters of Sec. 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides that "before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Settled is the rule that a defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private
instrument, and the evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based on preponderance of evidence.

It must be stressed that the adverted defective notarization should not have been made an issue at all in the first
place, for Pasimio already admitted executing the documents in question, or to put it in another way, she did not deny
that the signatures appearing thereon were hers and her husband's. Thus, the requirements of Sec. 20, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court have been sufficiently met and all doubts as to their authenticity and due execution should have
been put to rest.

Finally, it is well to consider this rule: that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-
interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing.

Under this rule, parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be given to contradict, change or vary a written document,
except if a party presents evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of a written agreement and puts in issue in
his pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties; (c) the validity of the written agreement; and (d)
the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written
agreement.

Such evidence, however, must be clear and convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to overturn the written
agreement.52 Since no evidence of such nature is before the Court, the documents embodying the loan agreement
of the parties should be upheld. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

HEIRS OF SABANPAN V. COMORPOSA

The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value. Just because a piece of evidence is
admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute.

FACTS: A Complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by petitioners against respondents before the
Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.

The Complaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of the disputed property. In 1960, he
died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.

In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated from his job. The termination
of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo
Saez allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii,
U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are
occupying the premises through petitioners tolerance. On 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents
to vacate the premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they were the legitimate
claimants and the actual and lawful possessors of the premises. Thus, an action for unlawful detainer was filed by
petitioners against respondents.

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Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the Complaint and alleged that they entered and
occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and owners of the said lot
way back in 1960 and up to the present time; that they have acquired just and valid ownership and possession of
the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional Director of the DENR,Region XI has
already upheld their possession over the land in question when it ruled that they were the rightful claimants and
possessors and were, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.

The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor of petitioners but the Regional Trial
Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set aside the saiddecision.

Affirming theRTC, the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants and possessors. The appellate court held that
-- although not yet final -- the Order issued by the regional executive director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) remained in full force and effect, unless declared null and void. The CA added that the
Certification issued by the DENRs community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when
the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person.Hence, this
Petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in giving weight to the CENR Officers Certification, which only bears the
facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda?

HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because the
signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales Jr. and
argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by respondents for the first time on appeal.

In Garvida, the Court held:

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter
by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
specified amount of electric current.

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not
admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or authentic.

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose
F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned
here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized
as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has
acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998.

If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference
in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as
the latter was under the formers direct control and supervision.

Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as the pretrial
conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked as evidence for
respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. The Certification was not formally offered, however,
becauserespondentshadnotbeenabletofiletheirpositionpaper.

Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence that has not been
formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by
the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.

TORRES V. PAGCOR

FACTS: Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor of respondent PAGCOR. On the basis of an alleged
intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila,
respondent PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to verify the veracity
of such report. The CIU served petitioner with a Memorandum of Charges for dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud

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and violation of office rules and regulations which were considered grave offenses where the penalty imposable is
dismissal.

On the same day, another Memorandum was issued to petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty.
Petitioner was then required to explain in writing within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof. Petitioner wrote
Manager Bangsil a letter explanation/refutation of the charges against him. He denied any involvement or
participation in any fraudulent manipulation of the CMR or padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked for a
formal investigation of the accusations againsthim.

On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dismissing him from the service.

Petitioner then filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits.

Respondent PAGCOR filed its Comment wherein it alleged, among others, that petitioner failed to perfect an appeal
within the period and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Law.

On June 23, 2008, the CSC, treating petitioner's complaint as an appeal from the PAGCOR's decision dismissing
petitioner from the service, issued Resolution No. 081204 denying petitioner's appeal.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the twin
resolutions issued by the CSC.

The CA issued its assailed decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

In dismissing the petition, the CA found that petitioner failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that he had
filed a motion for reconsideration. It found insufficient to merit consideration petitioner's claim that he had sent
through a facsimile transmission a letter/reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to PAGCOR's Chairman,
members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board; that assuming arguendo that a letter
reconsideration was indeed sent through a facsimile transmission, such facsimile transmission is
inadmissibleaselectronicevidenceundertheElectronicCommerceActof2000.

ISSUE: Whether the facsimile transaction is considered as an electronic document that would render the petitioners
MR filed within the reglementary period?

HELD: NO. Clearly, as to CSCs rules, a motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery.
When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the
postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other hand, in case of personal
delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15 days
from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.

Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent
through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by
petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or
personal delivery.

In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled
that:

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic
matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area
by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via
microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and
the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on
paper referred to as a facsimile.

A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an
original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine

Page | 29
and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.

Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce
Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, the SC determined the question of whether the
original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the
Electronic Commerce Act: The terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission
cannot be considered as electronic evidence.It is not the functional equivalent of an original
undertheBestEvidenceRuleandisnotadmissibleaselectronicevidence.

ANG V. REPUBLIC

FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were
classmates at Wesleyan University. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end
of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten
pregnant, Irish broke up withhim.

Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that
he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his
responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed
to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with spread legs and with Irishs face superimposed on the figure. The senders cellphone number,
stated in the message, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face
from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003.

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish
contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked
Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle.
After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched
him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.

After trial, the RTC found Irishs testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The
crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of
human nature and experience." Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found
RustanguiltyoftheviolationofSection5(h)ofR.A.9262.

On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008, affirming
the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustans motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus,
Rustan filed the present for review oncertiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case?

HELD: Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule
5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time
before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such
ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground
forobjection.

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies
only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE V ENOJAS

FACTS: Appellants Enojas, Gomez, Santos and Jalandoni were charged for the crime of Murder before the
Regional Trial Court. P02 Gregorio testified that he was with P02 Pangilinan when they saw a suspiciously parked

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taxi, of which the driver was appellant Enojas, they invited the said driver to the police station for further
questioning; appellant Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers. However, on their way to the police station,
they stopped at a convenience store, wherein they had an encounter with suspected robbers. P02 Pangilinan was
able shoot one of the suspects dead, but was shot, causing his death. Upon hearing the shots, P02 Gregorio
responded but was unsuccessful. The suspected robbers successfully fled, and upon return to the police mobile,
appellant Enojas fled as well. Suspecting that appellant Enojas was involved, the police officers searched
theabandonedtaxiandfoundamobilephonebelongingtoappellantEnojas,of which they used to monitor and to
communicate with the accused appellants. Thereafter, they were able to conduct an entrapment operation that
resulted to the arrest of herein appellants. Appellants pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since they
were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.The trial Court rendered its decision finding the accused appellants guilty of murder. On appeal, the
appellate Court affirmed the decision of the court a quo, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate Court erred when it affirmed the decision of the trial Court and held that electronic
evidence may be admitted as to criminal cases?

HELD: No, the Court held that the appellate Court did not erred when it held the admissibility of electronic evidence
to text messages.

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Courts earlier Resolution
applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a
person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused
Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of
those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such
messages and was competent to testify on them.

The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But, assuming that this was so, it
cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken
from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any
rate, a crime had been committedthe killing of PO2 Pangilinanand the investigating police officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it. The text messages to and from
the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the
accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.

NB: A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, September 24, 2002.

RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG vs. TERESITA D. RIVERA

FACTS: The petitioner is the president while the herein respondent was a former accounting manager of BANFF
Realty and Development Corporation (BANFF). The latter, after having tendered her resignation still continued her
employment for some time until the completion of the turn-over of the documents to a certain Jennifer Lumapas who
succeeded her. Then, herein respondent demanded payment for her remaining salaries, benefits and incentives but
Lumapas informed her that her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by the petitioner.
Herein respondent texted Lumapas expressing her dismay and then filed a complaint with the NLRC against herein
petitioner for non-payment of salaries, incentives, and also for grant of gratuities and tax refund. On the other hand,
Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, with the text message of respondent as the basis of the
complaint. Rivera filed a Motion to Quash and argued that the text message, which was the subject of the libel
complaint, merely reflected the undue stress she had suffered due to the delay in the release of her unpaid salaries,
benefits and incentives. The RTC denied the Motion to quash and stated that the grounds raised by the respondent in
the motion to quash are evidentiary in nature, which can only be threshed out in a full blown hearing to determine if
said text message falls squarely within the parameters of "Privileged Communication" or the elements of Article 353
of the Revised Penal Code are not fully established by the Prosecutions evidence. Upon denial of the motion for
reconsideration, herein respondent elevated the case to CA which reversed the ruling of the lower court and ordered
the dismissal of the information for libel filed against Rivera. Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of the Decision
rendered by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether text messages are covered by the rule on qualified privileged communication?

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HELD: Yes. The court hold that the text message is not actionable libel. It does not serve to cast a shadow on
[Syhunliongs]character and integrity[,] there being no direct and personal imputation of a venality to him. At best, the
statement that [Syhunliong] should understand the meaning of the mass suggests that [Syhunliong] should be more
compassionate and caring to the employee.

The matter contained in the text message is privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code
which negates the existence of malice in a private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty. It was Lumapas who told her of the stand of Syhunliong on the matter
of her wage claims, and her reaction through the text message may be deemed a part of her duty to seek redress of
her grievances through the same source. She was speaking in response to duty and not out of an intent to injure the
reputation of the person who claims to be defamed.

The Court, thus, finds no error in the CA' s declaration that Rivera's text message falls within the ambit of a qualified
privileged communication since she "was speaking in response to duty to protect her own interest and not out of an
intent to injure the reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, "there was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond
that of conveying it to the party concerned."

MARCOS V. HEIRS OF ANDRES NAVARRO

FACTS: Sps. Navarro, during their lifetime, acquired several parcels of land, including the one involved in this case.
They left behind three children, Luisa, Lydia, and Andres Jr. Luisa and Lydia found out that Andres' heirs are claiming
exclusive ownership of the lot in question, citing an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property (donation) allegedly
executed by Andres Sr. They sought the examination of PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that
Andres, Sr.s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. PO2 Alvarez found that
it was a forgery. As a result, plaintiffs- petitioners filed an action for annulment of the deed of donation.
After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the RTC
did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that presenting PO2
Alvarez as a witness will violate their constitutional right to due process since no notice was given to them
before the examination wasconducted.

RTC granted the motion [hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres,
Sr. Also, there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness,
because her testimony is not yetneeded.]
CA dismissed the petition [the dismissal of the case has mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarezs disqualification
as a witness.]
CA on MR dismissed the petition [refused to take judicial notice of the decision of another CA Division
which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. The CA held that a CA Justice cannot take judicial notice of decisions
or matters pending before another Division of the appellate court where he or she is not a member. The CA
also held that the sisters were negligent for belatedly informing it that Civil Case No. 5215 wasreinstated.]

ISSUE: Whether the CA should have taken judicial notice of the reinstatement of the case? Whether there
was GAD by the RTC in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness?

HELD: Yes. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other
than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes that an
express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other exceptions. As a general rule, where there are
express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be
implied. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her perception to others. We
have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she possesses none
of the disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents motion to disqualify her should have been
denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the
qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of hertestimony.

The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is
genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and

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discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or
detection from an unpracticed observer.

Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarezs testimony would be hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of
theRules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document examiner was
allowed inTamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset that PO2 Alvarezs testimony is hearsay even before her
testimony is offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances, the CA should have issued
acorrectivewritofcertiorariandannulledtheRTCruling Petition granted.

PEOPLE V. GOLIMLIM
FACTS: Mental retardate Evelyn was raped at knifepoint by her aunt's husband Salvador Golimlim. She
tried to tell her aunt but the latter did not believe her. She became pregnant by him, which was discovered
and confirmed by her half-sister Lorna much later. She was examined at Pascual General Hospital in
Novaliches and also at the Municipal Health Office of Bulan, Sorsogon where Evelyn was examined by Dr.
Estrella Payoyo. Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint for rape against appellant before the
Municipal Trial Court.

Appellant, on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true "[b]ecause her mind is not
normal,"18 she having "mentioned many other names of men who ha[d] sexual intercourse with her."1

RTC found him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, 50k each in actual and moral damages.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in giving weight to Evelyn's testimony [couldn't remember specific date and
time, but general narration consistent and spontaneous?

HELD: No. No cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the trial court
with respect to the assessment of Evelyns testimony.

That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereftof
truth.

A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental
condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no
matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter
can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.

From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyns credibility. To be
sure, her testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.

By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric Department of
the Bicol Medical Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering from moderate mental
retardation with an IQ of 46,30 she is capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to her.
[Interviewed alone several times and used different questions and was given consistentanswers.]Decision
affirmed.

ALVAREZ V. RAMIREZ

FACTS: Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner.
He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent. [Basically: complaining witness is the sister-in-law
of the accused.] He tried to burn Susan's house knowing that his wife was there (they were already separated for 6
months). Her sister Esperanza testified during trial and there was no objection thereto. However, the proceedings
were suspended because of her uncontrollable emotions. Only after such suspension did the counsel for the defense
file a motion to diqualify Esperanza based on 130.22 (maritaldisqualification).

RTC granted the motion and disqualified her from testifying. Petition for certiorari filed before the CA
CA granted the petition! Petition for review on certiorari before SC.

ISSUE: Whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. YES,
she can?

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HELD:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger ofperjury;
3.The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure
of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness;and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony
of theother.

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between
the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions
are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For
instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and
tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims
at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
Decision affirmed.

PEOPLE V. CASTANEDA

FACTS: On the basis of the complaintof his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent Benjamin Manaloto
was charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, with the crime of Falsification of Public Document for
forging signature of his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of sale executed by said accused wherein he sold a
house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of said spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana notarized by
Notary Public Gorospe.

At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her
as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130.

The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that the case falls under the exception to the rule,
contending that it is a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.

RTC granted the motion and disqualified her as a witness. Petition for certiorari with a prayer for PI/TRO filed
before SC by the fiscal.

ISSUE: Whether the case comes within the exception to the marital disqualification rule?

HELD: Yes. We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a
criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.

The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the
accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented
to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It
must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband
in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said
husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the
offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime
committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the
factual antecedents of the instant case.

The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too narrow; and the rule that any
offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic relations within the exception is too broad. The better rule is
that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE
CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a
witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.

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 Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be disqualified from
testifying against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General," (t)o
espouse the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of a husband committing as many
falsifications against his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital privilege as a license to
injure and prejudice her in secret

all with unabashed and completeimpunity. Petition granted; order set aside.

RAZON V. CA

FACTS: The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on the ownership of 1,500 shares of stock in E.
Razon, Inc. registered under the name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the corporation.

An action was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Chuidian for the recovery of 1500
shares of stock in E. Razon Co. which was in Razon's possession.

CFI The CFI declared that Enrique Razon, the petitioner in G.R. No. 74306 is the owner of the said shares
ofstock.
IAC The IAC, however, reversed the trial court's decision and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased
father of petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315 is the owner of the shares of stock. Both parties
filed separate motions for reconsideration.

Enrique Razon wanted the appellate court's decision reversed and the trial court's decision affirmed while
Vicente Chuidian asked that all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights accruing to the 1,500
shares be ordered delivered to him.

Razon claims that after organizing the E. Razon, Inc., he distributed shares of stock previously placed in the
names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends including Juan T. Chuidian. The late
Chuidian himself delivered the certificates to him because it was Razon who paid for all the subscription on
the shares of stock in the corporation and the understanding was that he (defendant Razon) was the owner
of the said shares of stock and was to have possession thereof until such time as he was paid therefor by
the other nominal incorporators/stockholders. These facts were contained in a testimony by Razon,
which was ultimately excluded by the appellate court for having gone against the Dead Man's
Statute.

ISSUE: Was the exclusion proper?

HELD: NO, it was not. The rule is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate
upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. In this case, the action was brought by the
administrator.

Also, even if it were within the prohibition, failure to object thereto constituted a valid waiver of said rule.

As to the ownership of stocks--in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the certificate must be
properly indorsed and that title to such certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly
indorsed certificate of stock. (Section 35, Corporation Code) Since the certificate of stock covering the questioned
1,500 shares of stock registered in the name of the late Juan Chuidian was never indorsed to the petitioner, the
inevitable conclusion is that the questioned shares of stock belong toChuidian.

a) In G.R. No. 74306, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court ofAppeals, are affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

b) In G.R. No. 74315, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution insofar as it denied the petitioner's
motion to clarify the dispositive portion of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the appellate court is MODIFIED in that all cash and stock
dividends as, well as all pre-emptive rights that have accrued and attached to the 1,500 shares in E. Razon, Inc.,

Page | 35
 since 1966 are declared to belong to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian.

SUNGA-CHAN V. CHUA
FACTS: Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against Lilibeth Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner
Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia), daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L.
Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of
Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment with the RTC. He claims that he and Jacinto verbally
agreed that they would enter into a partnership (100k contribution each) for the distribution of Shellane Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila but they registered it only in Jacinto's name for convenience. The business was
managed by Jacinto and Josephine, Lamberto's sister-in-law (he claims they were understating the income for tax
evasion). Upon Jacintos death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his
daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite
without respondentsconsent.

Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed respondent that the P200,000.00 represented partial payment of the latters
share in the partnership, with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up of the
properties of the business establishment. Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedly failed to comply with their
duty to account.

2 MTDs were filed by respondents. Both were denied for lack of merit. A petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus was filed with the Court of Appeals. A motion to suspend the PTC was granted.

1. SEC hasjurisdiction
2. Action should be dismissed and prosecuted against the estate of deceased Jacinto in a probate or intestate
proceeding.

CA denied the petition.

SC denied the petition for review on certiorari. The decision became final and entry of judgment was made by the
Clerk of Court and the case was remanded to the trial court.

The proceedings before the RTC were continued. Petitioners were deemed to hav waived their right to
present evidence for their failure to attend the scheduled date for reception of evidence despite notice.

RTC ruled in favor of the respondent Chua.

CA dismissed the appeal.

Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a
partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacintos death. In the absence of any
written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argue that these
courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to
prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacintos death. To support this argument, petitioners
invoke the Dead Mans Statute or Survivorship Rule under Section 23, Rule 130.

ISSUE: Whether the Dead Man's Statute applies to this case?

HELD: No. The Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to
the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.
But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is
necessary that:

1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case isprosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a
person of unsoundmind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against person of unsoundmind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased person or

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 before such person became of unsoundmind.

Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Mans Statute to this case.

First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondent in their answer before the trial court, and
with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the
Dead Mans Statute. Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or
representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may
testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in
the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of
the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Mans Statute for the simple reason that she
is not a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Records
show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between
respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an
assignor because the term assignor of a party means assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not
the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen.[15]Plainly then, Josephine is
merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the partyplaintiff.
Petition denied.

BORDALBA V. CA
FACTS: The subject lot located in Mandaue City was originally owned by the Sps. Jayme. After their death, and
extrajudicial partition was entered into by the heirs by which the property was divided:

1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private respondent Candida Flores
and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their
grandchild Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and
CarmenJayme-Daclan;
2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P. Bordalba;and
3) 1/3 to an unidentifiedparty.

Petitioner, daughter of Elena, was successfully granted a free patent and a corresponding OCT over the lot.
Thereafter, she caused its subdivision into 6 lots and disposed of 2 (sold to Sps. Cabahug, mortgaged to Rural Bank
of Mandaue). As a result, respondents filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the free patent and the OCT
against petitioner, the Sps. Cabahug, and the Bank.

RTC granted the decision but found that the Sps. Cabahug and the bank were a purchaser and a mortgagee in GF,
respectively.
CA affirmed the decision.

Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on
matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the trial court, as
the same violated the dead mans statute.

ISSUE: Whether the Dead Man's Statute applies?

HELD: No. As to the alleged violation of the dead mans statute, suffice it to state that said rule finds no
application in the present case. The dead mans statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as
to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with
the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.

CHAN V. CHAN
FACTS: Petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution
of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children toher.

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During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny attached to his
answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a physicians
handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on
August 22, 2006 Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed
to Medical City, covering Johnnys medical records when he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a
motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces tecum. Johnny opposed the
motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patientprivilege.

RTC request denied.

CA denied petition for certiorari. [if courts were to allow the production of medical records, then patients would be
left with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept
confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent
hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He
attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement.]

Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the
"testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states
that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their
professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the
examination of the physician at the trial.

ISSUE: Whether the denial of the request for a subpoena was proper?

HELD: Yes.

1. The objection ispremature.

The time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they
are offered. The offer could be made part of the physicians testimony or as independent evidence that he
had made entries in those records that concern the patients healthproblems.
SEC. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the
offer ismade.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer
unless a different period is allowed by the court.

In any case, the grounds for the objections mustbe specified.

Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial,Josielenes request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at
the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their
disclosure.

2. Even if treated as a motion for production of evidence prior to trial, it is still not allowed to be
produced because it covers privileged information. The privilege under 130.24 cannot be
circumvented by allowing access to records of facts to which the physician is prevented
fromtestifying.

It is of course possible to treat Josielenes motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the
hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant
prior to trial (Section 1, Rule 27). But the above right to compel the production of documents has a
limitation: the documents to be disclosed are "not privileged."

This argument cannot be gven merit. To allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital
recordsthe results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patients illness, and the
advice or treatment he gave himwould be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patients consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patients records.

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 Disclosing them would be theequivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters he gained while dealing with the
patient, without the latters prior consent. [You'd be doing indirectly something you're prohibited from doing.]

3. The attachment of the PhilHealth claim form does not constitute a waiver under 132.17 (When part of
transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainderadmissible).

Trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth
claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the
details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his
answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.

LACUROM V. JACOBA

FACTS: This administrative case arose from a complaint filed by Judge Lacurom against respondent-spouses Atty.
Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (respondents). Complainant charged respondents with violation of
Rules 11.03, 11.04, and 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Sps. Jacoba had a law firm. They represented Veneracion, the plaintiff, in an unlawful detainer case.

1. A very rudely worded Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition) was filed by Olivia from a
decision reversing the MTC in an unlawful detainer case she was found guilty of contempt after hearing and was
sentenced to 5d imprisonment (she claims her husband, then suspended from practice, drafter it ans she merely
signed it withoutreading)
2. Veneracion, assisted by Ellis, filed an affidavit accusing the judge of knowingly rendering unjust
judgment through inexcusablenegligence and ignorance and violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA
3019).
3. The judge issued another order directing Ellis to explain why he should not be held in contempt. Against
Velasco-Jacobas statements implicating him,he invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. He was found
guilty and made to pay a fine of500.
4. Then this instant action was filed before theIBP.

IBP Commissioner Navarro recommended 6m suspension.

IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation but reduced the suspension to 3m.

ISSUE: Whether the marital privilege applies?

HELD: The privilege may be waived as was done in this case.

We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion.
He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas statement pointing to him as the author of the motion.

The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did
not contain a denial of his wifes account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by
stating that he trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic
andmonumental.

Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacobas version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to
the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacobas defense which was raised only
after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba hadbeen
counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacobasassertion that she
had not actually participate[d] in the prosecution of the case.

Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await the
outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him.This petition for
certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacobashandiwork.

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely
to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to
Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.

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SAMALA V. VALENCIA
FACTS: Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty.
Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate
occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false
documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d)
having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimatechildren.

Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City,
entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel
for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an
Explanation and Compliance before the RTC.

In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S.
Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez
against Bustamante - one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC,
Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000, Presiding
Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of record of both
parties in Civil Case No.95-105-MK.

But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph
J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for
Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba,
respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.

Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-
MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga albeit he filed the
Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez
in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341- MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the
counsel for Alba although the case is entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because
Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property and it was only Valdez who signed the
complaint for ejectment. But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that
he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa.Thus, the filing of
Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK againstAlba.

HELD: The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good
taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the
client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the
privileged communications of his client.

The termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is
that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional
employment. Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do
anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented
himnor should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.

In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act of the
latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the
complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from
representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client
but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a clear
indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case.
Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer- client relationship between him and Alba has long been
severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his
client is required.Guilty; suspended for 3y.

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ALMONTE V. VASQUEZ

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces
tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as
chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers
(salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988" and to enjoin him from enforcing hisorders.

Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the
EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the
Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been
written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with
copies furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.

[Claim: The EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also
the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA). ]

To put this case in perspective it should be stated at the outset that it does not concern a demand by a
citizen for information under the freedom of information guarantee of the Constitution. 7 Rather it concerns
the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to obtain evidence in connection with an investigation conducted by itvis-
a- vis the claim of privilege of an agency of the Government.

There are several subsidiary issues raised by petitioners, but the principal ones revolve on the question whether
petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB
employees on the plea that such documents are classified. Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on the
ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will
necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its
being" and this could "destroy the EIIB.

Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum nor the relevancy or
materiality of the documents required to be produced, to the pending investigation in the Ombudsman's office.
Accordingly, the focus of discussion should be on the Government's claim of privilege.

HELD: In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and
evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as,
but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." 18 Consequently, while in cases which
involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, 19 no similar
excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.

Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB as
classified information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to support their contention
that there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that the "only item of expenditure which
should be treated strictly confidential" is that which refers to the "purchase of information and payment of
rewards."

The other statutes and regulations invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that the documents sought in
the subpoena duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate the confidential nature of the EIIB's
functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for its funds to the proper authorities. The
need for the documents thus outweighs the claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is more, while there
might have been compelling reasons for the claim of privilege in 1988 when it was asserted by petitioners, now,
seven years later, these reasons may have been attenuated, if they have not in fact ceased. The agents whose
identities could not then be revealed may have ceased from the service of the EIIB, while the covert missions to
which they might have been deployed might either have been accomplished or abandoned. On the other hand, the
Ombudsman's duty to investigate the complaint that there were in 1988 unfilled positions in the EIIB for which
continued funding was received by its officials and put to illegal use, remains.

Page | 41
 Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this decision would
only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. However, as concession to the
nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no information of a confidential character is disclosed, the
examination of records in this case should be made in strict confidence by the Ombudsman himself.
Reference may be made to the documents in any decision or order which the Ombudsman may render or issue but
only to the extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the agency. Above all, there must be a scrupulous
protection of the documentsdelivered.

DISCUSS EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE UNDER THE DOCTRINES IN

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ERMITA DARYL

NERI vs SENATE COMMITTEE

FACTS: On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven
(11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the
Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered
him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,5
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.

Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioners answers to these three questions by requiring him to
appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground of
executive privilege.

ISSUE: Whether the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege?

HELD: YES. We considered the subject communications as falling under the presidential communications privilege
because (a) they related to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, (b) they were received by a
close advisor of the President, and (c) respondent Committees failed to adequately show a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

A. "Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of
substance.24 On the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to
another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor.25 The power to enter into an
executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence.26 Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or
guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power. The executive power to
enter or not to enter into a contract to secure foreign loans does not become less executive in nature
because of conditions laid down in the Constitution.

B. The operational proximity test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In
determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to
officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of
their positions in the Executives organizational structure.

Page | 42
With respect to respondent Committees invocation of constitutional prescriptions regarding the right of the people to
information and public accountability and transparency, the Court finds nothing in these arguments to support
respondent Committees case.

There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to information and the constitutional
policies on public accountability and transparency. These are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a
democratic government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power has
been delegated if they are denied access to information. And the policies on public accountability and democratic
government would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied.

In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in
any way curb the publics right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency.

The constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute right to information. By
their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right to the regulation of the law is unmistakable. The
highlighted portions of the following provisions show the obvious limitations on the right to information, thus:

Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

CONSTANTINO V. HEIRS OF PEDRO CONSTANTINO

FACTS: Complaint for nullification of the deed denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" of August10,
1992 and Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-02653 in the name of Oscar Constantino and Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-
02655 in the name of Casimira C. Maturingan (from Maxima Constantino to Casimira C. Maturingan).

RTC dismissed the complaint (in pari delicto)

CA it was error to declare the parties in pari delicto SC decision reversed!

the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver, referred to a property owned by Pedro Sr. There is such basis from
the facts of this case.
The records show that apart from respondent Asuncion Laquindanumss statement that the parcel of land
subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver is not part of the estate of Pedro Sr., their
common ancestor, no other evidence was offered to support it. The CA in giving credence to the
respondents claim, merely relied on the alleged typographical error in the Deed. The basis for the CAs
conclusion was the inclusion of the wife of Pedro Jr. and that of their children, which the CA considered as
proof that the property was owned by Pedro Jr. and not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. As pointed out by the
petitioners, the mention of the names of the children of Pedro Jr. in the Extrajudicial Settlement is not proof
that the subject of the deed is the property of Pedro Jr. Meant to exclude all the other heirs of Pedro Sr., only
the children of Pedro Jr. appeared in the Extrajudicial Settlement as heirs.

Weak as the reasoning is, the CA actually contradicted the admissions made no less by the respondents during the
pre-trial conference where they stipulated that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 consisting of 192
sq. m belongs to Pedro Sr.

Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil
cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course
of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. In Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et. al.,
this Court emphasized that:

Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become
binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even
if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must
assume the consequences of the disadvantage. (Highlighting ours)

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Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan, this Court declared that:

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof;
production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of
controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making
such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith
should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or
admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a
position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.

PEOPLE V. GANDIA

FACTS: Information for the crime of rape was filed against Lendoy, appellant herein. The prosecution presented
Remelyns mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia stated in her complaint affidavit that two weeks
after the incident, Remelyn told her, that Lendoy is crazy, he brought me to the ipil-ipil trees. The prosecution also
presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns neighbor and a barangay kagawad in their area. Mik testified that on 24 March
1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their way home after registering at the COMELEC office. They
were in a hurry as their child was running a fever. Mik saw appellant carrying a small girl in his arms. He identified
the little girl as Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward the
ipil-ipiltrees.

The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi.

After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict appellant for the crime of
rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven years of age. Appellant was sentenced to
death.

ISSUES: Whether the offer of compromise by appellants parents as tendered to Amalia Loyola should not be taken
against him, while the offer of compromise he allegedly made to Amalias husband, as relayed by Amalia in her
testimony, should be excluded as evidence for being hearsay (as to offer ofcompromise)

HELD: Appellants charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to Amalia,
and by the appellant himself to Amalias husband should not have been taken against him by the trial court, even if
sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia
Loyolas husband is hearsay evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the
alleged offer, and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail.
A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception. The offer of
compromise allegedly made by the appellants parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimony of
Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of his parents
cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was
privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence
against appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of theappellant.

DOLDOL V. PEOPLE
FACTS: A team of State Auditors led by State Auditor Emilie S. Ritua, with State Auditors Lydia Naoe and Beverly T.
Cruz as members, conducted an audit of the cash and cash account of Conrado C. Doldol, the Municipal Treasurer
of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. The audit covered the General Fund, Special Education Fund and Trust Fund in his
custody for the period of November 30, 1994 to June 8, 1995. Doldol and the Municipal Accountant were present
during the audit. The State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a shortage of P801,933.26. They also noted that on
June 5, 1995, he made cash withdrawals from the municipalitys deposit account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) amounting to P360,000.59. The withdrawal, purportedly for salaries, wages, allowances and mid-
year bonuses of municipal officers and employees, had not been recorded in the General Fund Cashbook as of
June 8, 1995. The State Auditors also noted that Doldol made adjustments in the said cashbook on June 8, 1995,
increasing his P801,933.26 shortage to P1,134,421.54. In a Letter dated July 5, 1995, the State Auditors demanded
the immediate refund of the said amount, and for Doldol to submit within 72 hours a written explanation on the said
shortage. Doldol failed to respond and was, thereafter, relieved of his duties. On July 20, 1995, he was directed to
transfer the account to Assistant Municipal Treasurer LoidaCancino.

The State Auditors then conducted another audit of the said account, this time covering the period of June 8, 1995

Page | 44
 to July 19, 1995. They discovered that Doldol incurred an added cash shortage of P149,905.92. In a Letter to Doldol
dated July 27, 1995, the State Auditors demanded the immediate restitution of the missing fund, and directed him to
submit within 72 hours a written explanation why he incurred such shortage. Again, Doldol failed to respond. The
State Auditors submitted their Report to the Provincial Auditor on their examinations showing his shortages. On
August 3, 1995, the State Auditors submitted their Memorandum on the result of the audits to the ProvincialAuditor.

Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On September 15, 1995, he
remittedP200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he was issued Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol
promised to pay the balance of his shortage, as follows: P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, and
P884,139.66 on or before November 30, 1995. However, he reneged on hispromise.

Two informations for malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Carlos City.

RTC and CA found him guilty

HELD: Except for his bare testimony, the petitioner offered no competent and credible evidence to prove
that the missing funds were actually cash advances of employees in the municipality. The petitioner could
have offered in evidence the documents evidencing the names of the recipients and amounts of the cash
advances, but failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner wrote the Provincial Auditor and offered to
refund the missing funds as follows: P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, P200,000.00 on or
before October 31, 1995, and P884,139.66 on November 30, 1995. He was able to pay only P200,000.00 on
September 15, 1995, and failed to remit the balance of his shortage. Such partial restitution of the
petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of the missing funds.
Petition denied.

LADIANA V. PEOPLE

FACTS: Petitioner, a member of the PNP, was originally charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan (alleging
that he took advantage of his official position); the information was later amended pursuant to an order of said court
to show adequate facts that vest jurisdiction over the case. He is alleged to have killed Francisco San Juan while the
latter was allegedly stealing steel pipes that served as a barricade in a street. He pled notguilty.
Testimony for theprosecution:
o Wifes testimony an unidentifiedwoman told her that Petitioner killed her husband.
o PO2 Cacalda, radio operator assigned at the police station got what happened from people
milling around the body (later found that the accused voluntarily surrendered)
o Dr.Javan

Mario Cortez Assistant Prosecutor; person before whom the petitioner subscribed and swore to a counter-
affidavit.

Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief on Cortez, the defense counsel made an admission as to the
authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was
subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. In said counter-affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the
fatal shots on Francisco. However, accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense as Francisco was then
purportedly attacking accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already inflicted a stab wound on the arm of accused
Ladiana.

However, Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the preliminary investigation of the complaint
which led to the filing of the subject case. Additionally, Cortez testified that he would not be able to anymore
recognize the face of the affiant in the said counter- affidavit, but maintained that there was a person who appeared
and identified himself as Josue Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the counter-affidavit.

SB found him guilty of homicide. [affidavit used as evidence against the petitioner] R45 PFR.

ISSUES:

1) WON the conviction was proper, considering there are no eyewitnesses and the only evidence presented was
the testimony of the prosecutor;YES
2) WON his right against self-incrimination was violated, considering the execution was admitted by his counsel
and not him personally;YES

Page | 45
3) WON the counter affidavit, considered by the SB as an XJ confession, may be admitted as evidence
against him even if he was not assisted by counsel and while he was under custodial investigation. YES

Criminal Law; Homicide; Rights of the Accused; Custodial Investigations; Extra-Judicial Confessions or
Admissions; Indeed, the rights enumerated in the constitutional provision exist only in custodial
interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of accused persons. It is well-settled that the foregoing legal
formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to extrajudicial confessions or
admissions obtained during custodial investigations. Indeed, the rights enumerated in the constitutional
provision exist only in custodial interrogations, or in- custody interrogation of accusedpersons.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition.Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significantway.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinguished from Preliminary Investigation; Definition.A preliminary
investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court has unequivocally declared that a defendant on trial or
under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. Evidently, a person undergoing
preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be considered as being under custodial
investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally declared that a defendant on trial or under preliminary
investigation is not under custodial interrogation. It explained as follows: His [accused] interrogation by the
police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in
court (or the public prosecutors office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already
pending in court (or the public prosecutors office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under
custodial interrogation laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution [now Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution], for the obvious reason that he is no
longer under custodialinterrogation.

Same; Same; Same; The accusedwhether in court or undergoing preliminary investigation before the
public prosecutor unquestionably possess rights that must be safeguarded. The accusedwhether in
court or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutorunquestionably possess rights
that must be safeguarded. These include: 1) the right to refuse to be made witnesses; 2) the right not to
have any prejudice whatsoever imputed to them by such refusal; 3) the right to testify on their own behalf,
subject to cross-examination by the prosecution; and 4) while testifying, the rightto refuse to answer a
specific question that tends to incriminate them for some crime other than that forwhich they are being
prosecuted.

Confessions; Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other.
Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows: SEC.
26. Admissions of a party.The act declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him. SEC. 33. Confession.The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged,
or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. In a confession, there is
an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact not directly involving an
acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged.

Same; Same; Same; Admissions; In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by
showing they were made by mistake.In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or
by showing they were made by mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the
admission was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of
the true state of facts. Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such admissions had been
made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case at bar, are
evidence of great weight against the declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a mistake.

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PEOPLE V. ULIT

FACTS: Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four Informations were filed against her uncle, the
appellant. Her direct examination was reset several times due to what was later found to be PTSD. Testimonies of
her father and mother were also presented, as well as a Sinumpaang Salaysay prepared in the Office of the
Barangay Chairman in which the appellant admitted that he raped Lucelle in February 1997, and on March 2, 1997,
which was signed in the presence of the barangay chairman and barangaytanods.

A custodial investigation of the appellant who was without counsel during which the latter admitted having raped the
victim. The police also took the sworn statements of the victim and her mother.

He pled not guilty during arraignment. During trial, the following objections were interposed, which were both
overruled:
1) As to the admissibility of the SinumpaangSalaysay,
on the ground that the appellant was not assisted by
counsel and that, he was forced and coerced into signing the same; and
2) As to the admissibility of the victims sworn statement, on the ground that she was incompetent to
give the same because of her mentalillness.

After the prosecution rested its case, the counsel for the accused manifested to the court that he was
changing his plea to guilty and that he would no longer be adducing evidence in his favor.

RTC found him guilty for all the crimes charged (2 counts of statutory rape, 2 of acts of
lasciviousness)

HELD: *There was an issue as to the discrepancy in the dates contained in the SS and the charges filed

Where the trial court receives, independently of the plea of guilty, evidence to determine whether the
accused committed the crimes charged and the precise degree of his criminal culpability therefor, he may
still be convicted if there is ample proof on record, not contingent on the plea of guilty, on which to
predicate conviction.As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital
offenses because of the improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment. However, where the trial court receives, independently of his plea of guilty, evidence to
determine whether the accused committed the crimes charged and the precise degree of his criminal
culpability therefor, he may still be convicted if there is ample proof on record, not contingent on the plea of
guilty, on which to predicate conviction.

Custodial Investigations; Right to Counsel; Exclusionary Rule; The barangay chairman is not deemed a
law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitutiona suspects uncounselled statement before the barangay chairman is admissible.
Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the barangay
chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him because he was not
under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his statement. The exclusionary rule is
premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical
and psychological, is forcefully apparent. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this
covers investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the
municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government. The barangay
chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article
III of the Constitution. Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that thea ppellants
statement before the barangay chairman is inadmissible.

By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credence to be
attributed to the witness herself but rests solely in part on the veracity and competence of some persons from whom
the witness has received the information; In criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation
of the constitutional provision guaranteeing the accused the right to confront and cross-examine the witness
testifying against him.We do not agree with the ruling of the trial court that the contents of the sworn statement of

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 Lucelle are hearsay, simply because she did not testify thereon and merely identified her signatures therein. By
hearsay evidence is meant that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credence to be
attributed to the witness herself but rests solely in part on the veracity and competence of some persons from
whom the witness has received the information. It signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the personal
knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited, and which, consequently, is not subject to cross-examination. The
basis for the exclusion appears to lie in the fact that such testimony is not subject to the test which can ordinarily be
applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony, since the declarant is not present and available for
crossexamination. In criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional
provision that the accused shall enjoy the right to confront and cross-examine the witness testifying against him.
Generally, the affidavits of persons who are not presented to testify on the truth of the contents thereof are hearsay
evidence. Such affidavit must be formally offered in evidence and accepted by the court; otherwise, it shall not be
considered by the court for the simple reason that the court shall consider such evidence formally offered and
accepted. Affirmed with modification reclusion perpetua na lang.

PEOPLE V. SAYABOC

FACTS: Sayaboc was charged with murder, while Buenviaje and two others were charged with homicide (the first as
principal and the rest as accomplices) for the death of Joseph Galam. They all pleaded not guilty.

[Sayaboc shot him, the rest were in the tricycle/escape car]

On the afternoon of that day, SPO4 Cagungao was called to the Provincial Command Headquarters in Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, to take the statement of Sayaboc. When he arrived at the headquarters he saw Sayaboc being
interviewed by reporters inside the investigation room. He then brought Sayaboc to the inner part of the room. Before
taking the statement of Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he
wanted to have a counsel of his own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name one, Cagungao asked the
police officers to get a lawyer. Half an hour later, the police officers brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO, who
then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc say, okay, he continued the investigation,
during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire time. However, Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc
whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave to go to the comfort room. That night Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial
confession in Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the
sum of P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The confession was also signed
by Atty. Cornejo and attested to by one Fiscal MelvinTiongson.

Sinabi lang to perfunctorily: That you have the right to remain silent or refuse to answer the
questions which you think will incriminate you; That you have the right to seek the services of a
counsel of your own choice or if not, this officewill provide you a lawyer if youwish.

Everyone except Sayaboc filed a demurrer without leave. This was denied so only Sayaboc was allowed to
proceed with the presentation of his defense.

Sayaboc denied having committed the crime and proffered the defense of alibi. He also flatly denied having
met Atty. Cornejo or having been informed of his rights. He testified to having been beaten by six or seven
police officers in the investigating room, who then coerced him to confess to having killed Galam.

Apart from his testimony, he submitted a handwritten statement dated 20 March 1995 and an affidavit
dated 10 April 1995 to support his claim of police brutality and retraction of his confession.

RTC Sayaboc guilty of murder (treachery as qualifying and craft and price/reward as aggravating
circumstances) the others for homicide only

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of accused
Sayaboc when it was taken without the assistance of a competent and independent counsel nor by an
effective and vigilant counsel. YES, it did (it is inadmissible), but his guilt was nevertheless proven for
the crime of homicide.

Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Witnesses; Extrajudicial Confessions; Even if the confession may
appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged

Page | 48
 intimidation for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a
custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.Jurisprudence provides
that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this presumption, however, is
that the prosecution is able to show that theconstitutional

requirements safeguarding an accuseds rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with,
especially when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any
fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating
environment that is inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been
given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the
failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless
and inadmissible.

The court said that the usual procedure is ceremonial and perfunctory, that these would be typed and the
accused would only be made to sign it.
Here, it was important because he only finished Grade 4, was not from Nueva Vizcaya, and was already in
custody for 2 days for anotheroffense.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to be Informed; The right should allow the suspect to consider the
effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights.The right to be informed requires the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle. It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he
might make of these rights.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; If the advice given (by the counsel) is so cursory as to be
useless, voluntariness is impaired.The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is
rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the
rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is
impaired.

It was alleged that the accused would do what he wanted to do regardless of the advice of others, but the
court held that this wasnt an excuse for failure to inform him of the consequences of his actions.

Other shit:
The extrajudicial confession and the newspaper reports adduced by the prosecution, which both contained
Sayabocs statement pointing to Marlon Buenviaje as the one who paid him P100,000 to kill Galam, are
inadmissible in evidence. The first, as earlier stated, was executed in violation of Sayabocs constitutional rights.
The second are hearsay, since the authors of such reports were not presented as witnesses to affirm the veracity
thereof.
Conspiracy need not, however, be established by direct proof; it may be shown by circumstantial evidence.
As correctly found by the trial court and concurred with by the OSG, the concatenation of circumstantial
evidence shows that Marlon Buenviaje conspired withSayaboc, Decision modified.

TANENGGEE V. PEOPLE

FACTS: Five separate Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed against
petitioner, manager of COMMERCIO BRANCH OF METROBANK, for falsifying PNs and cashiers checks totaling
around 60M. He forged Romeo Tans signature (as endorser and payee) and appropriated the proceeds for himself.

The RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter aplea.

Constitutional Law; Custodial Interrogation; Words and Phrases; Custodial interrogation means any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.The constitutional proscription against the
admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person

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under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof,
viz.:

(1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3)
to be informed of the two other rights above. In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner
gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he
managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement
authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither
arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly,
petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the
constitutional prerogative during the taking of his writtenstatement.

Same; Right to Counsel; In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590 (2001), the Supreme Court
declared that the right to counsel applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not
to those made in an administrative investigation.In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 362
SCRA 304 (2001), we declared that the right to counsel applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. Amplifying further on the matter, the
Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission, 630 SCRA 202 (2010):
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to
protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12
of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation. Here, petitioners written statement was given during an administrative inquiry
conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course
of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in
giving due consideration to petitioners written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to
itsadmissibility.

Same; Evidence; Confessions; A confession [or admission] is presumed voluntary until the contrary is
proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary.[I]t is settled that a confession [or
admission] is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of
proving the contrary. Petitioner failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement
was found to have been executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement
were of such nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish.

Same; Extrajudicial Confessions; It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of
compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed
intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be
considered as having been voluntarily executed.The fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and
file any charges, criminal or administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly
intimidated him and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule
that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his
extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having been voluntarily executed. Neither will petitioners assertion
that he did not read the contents of his statement before affixing his signature thereon just to get it over
with prop up the instant Petition. To recall, petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational
institution and had been a bank manager for quite a number of years. He is thus expected to fully understand and
comprehend the significance of signing an instrument. It is just unfortunate that he did not exercise due diligence in
the conduct of his own affairs. He can therefore expect no consideration forit.

FRONTERAS V. PEOPLE -GIGI

Page | 50
PEOPLE V. SANTOS

FACTS: Appellant Santos was charged (together with three others who have evaded identification (except Morales)
and arrest) with the crimes of murder with the use of unlicensed firearms and frustrated murder for the death of
Cupcupin and for the frustrated murder of Bautista.

[The two were shot at while riding a jeep; Bautista was able to run away. He picked out Morales and Santos from a
police lineup later and this was contained in a sworn statement.]

RTC At arraignment, Raul Santos entered a plea of not guilty. A joint trial of the two (2) criminal cases ensued,
culminating in a judgment of conviction. [identified by Bautista and Bohol, traffic aide; a sworn statement of a certain
Ronaldo Guerrero was also admitted, who was a witness in another criminal case against the accused for the
murder of Daniel Nuguera which occurred in the same corner (Yangco/Estrella)]

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in considering one of the two cases (not the instant ones) filed against the
accused in holding also for his guilt?

Evidence; Similar Acts as Evidence; An affidavit of a prosecution witness in a case, other than the instant one, shall
be admissible in evidence for the limited purpose of proving knowledge, plan or scheme employed by the accused
and failure to seasonably object to its admission is deemedwaiver of the hearsay character of said evidence;
Case at bar.Appellant Santos now complains that the affidavit of Ronaldo Guerrero was hearsay evidence,
considering that the prosecution did not present Ronaldo Guerrero as a witness during the trial. We consider that the
trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose for proving
knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant knew that the particular corner of two (2)
particular streets in Malabon was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its passengers. Appellant also had waived
the hearsay character of this evidence by failure seasonably to object to the admission of the affidavit; it is too late
in that day to raise the hearsay rule in the appellants memorandum after prosecution and defense had presented
their respective cases and had made their respective offers of evidence.

When the prosecution first presented the sworn statement of Guerrero in order to show criminal
propensity on the part of appellant Santos, the defense objected to admission of such sworn
statement; the trial court sustained the objection and rejected the evidence for the purpose it
was initially offered. However, the trial court admitted the same as falling within one or more of
the exceptions set out in Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules ofCourt.
However, even if excluded, the conclusion would be the same because of the weight given to
the testimonies of Bautista andBohol.

PEOPLE V. NARDO
FACTS: Raped by her father; only her aunt believed her. During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray Lorielyn
as an incorrigible liar [Atty. Gonzales, his employer, said she stole P15 from her grandfathers wages; that the date in
question he was drinking with the accused and the alleged victims grandfather; her own grandfather and mother
corroborated this story (said that she had a boyfriend and lied about having a retreat; Mrs. Nieva the mother of a
sclassmate also testified borrowed money claiming her grandfather was sick].

RTC found guilty.

Occasions were cited wherein Lorielyn supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents permission
to leave the house. However, Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: While lying may
constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the moment to
be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging ones own father of the sordid
crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions
Accused-appellant insists that Lorielyns conduct after the rape, during which she continued to perform her tasks and
lived with her father in their house, negates the commission of rape. Accused-appellants proposition is derived from
Lorielyns perfunctory yes-or-no answers to the leading questions propounded to her on cross- examination. Rather
than sustain this argument, we rely instead on the observations of the Social Welfare Officer, whom we find to be an
impartial witness, in this wise:

Page | 51
Per observation, Lorielyn is a shy and silent type person. She talked in a very small voice and during the interview
she only talks when being asked. She also appears to be very sad and have been staring blankly

RP V. HEIRS OF ALEJAGA

FACTS: In 1978, Alejaga Sr. filed a Free Patent Application over a parcel of land with an area of 0.3899 ha located
in Roxas city. This was supported by an inspection by Land Inspector Recio. This was approved and an OCT was
thereafter issued in his name.

In 1979m the heirs of Arrobang filed a letter-complaint for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land
in favor of [respondent]. Special Investigator Cartagena recommended to the Director of Lands appropriate civil
proceeding for the cancellation of the Free Patent Title and the correspondingOCT.

In the meantime, [respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan for 100k under the Cottage Industry Guarantee and Loan
Fund by the defendant Philippine National Bank secured by a REM. The government later (1990) instituted an action
for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against [respondent], the PNB of Roxas City and
defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City.

RTC ruled in favor of the Republic

CA reversed! [failure to prove fraud in obtaining patent and title; assuming it was, action should have been brought
within 1 year from registration)

Further, the CA brushed aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagenas testimony that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio
had not conducted an investigation on the free patent application of Felipe Alejaga, Sr. The CA added that
petitioner had failed to support its claim that the lot covered by respondents free patent and title was
foreshoreland.
The court found that there was
indeed fraud in obtaining the free
patent.
The alleged inspection was
done a day before the filing of
theapplication!
The report is not signed, so presumption of regularity doesntapply.
The report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not been successfully rebutted. In that
report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted an investigation and ocular
inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagenas statement on Recios alleged admission may be
consideredas
independently relevant.
o He took the witness stand and was subject to cross-examination.
o A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another personthe latters
knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith and the formers statements may then be
regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsayrule.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Doctrine on Independently Relevant Statements Defined.The

doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a witness by a
third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually
made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. Decision reversed;
land reverts to public domain.

PATULA V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Sales representative (took whole sale orders) misappropriated 131k, charged with estafa. Pled not guilty.

[The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, whom Footluckers employed as its store auditor.
She found and reported that there were discrepancies in receipts given to around 50 customers and the duplicate
copies submitted to them.]
RTC found her guilty of violating RPC315 par1(b)

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ISSUE: Whether Guivencans testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive)
to prove petitioners misappropriation or conversion was inadmissible for being hearsay. YES, it wasinadmissible.

Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from the
customers or remitted by petitioner to Footluckers. This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the
receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers corresponding to each customer, as
well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on
the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability
of the entries as evidence of petitioners misappropriation or conversion through cross- examination by petitioner.
The denial of that opportunity rendered theentire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable
and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of theaccused.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; The rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground
that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay
is not obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any
contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple
assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. Thus, the rule against
hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to crossexamine the declarant.

The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a
party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.

The rules provide solutions the following remedies: requiring the testimony to be under oath or
affirmation (132.1) and requiring that all witnesses be subject to cross-examination by the adverse
party (132.6).

Same; Same; Same; If an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted
but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. The theory of the
hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the
assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made
on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross- examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as
an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule
does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that
the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but
merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not
legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the
hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule
applies.

PEOPLE V. GATARIN

FACTS: On the fateful night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol vehicle performing their
routine duty when they met two men, later identified as the accused, who were running at a fast speed. The
policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching them and they continued patrolling the area.

There they saw Januario lying on the street. As he was severely injured, the policemen immediately loaded Januario
to the patrol vehicle and brought him to the Zigzag Hospital.

While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He answered that it was Jay-R and his
uncle who stabbed him. Subsequently, Januario died due to the fatal wounds he has sustained.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the victims statement to SPO3 Mendoza is a dying declaration.

(2) Whether the test of admissibility to SPO3 Mendoza as a part of res gestae is applicable in the case.

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(3) What is corpus delicti?

HELD:

(1) NO. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites occur, namely: (a) the declaration concerns the cause and the
surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the
declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had
he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarants death.

In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the records, no
questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not appear that the declarant was
under the consciousness of his impending death when he made the statements.

The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must
be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact
that renders a dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival
and looked on death as certain impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a
dying declaration.

(2) YES. Even if Januarios utterance could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his statements may still be
appreciated as part of the res gestae.

Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declaration that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication.

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a
part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.

When Januario gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring to a startling occurrence which
is the stabbing by accused and his co-accused. At that time, Januario and the witness were in the vehicle that would
bring him to the hospital, and thus, had no time to contrive his identification of the assailant. His utterance about
assailant and his co-accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question of SPO3 Mendoza, was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.

Definitely, the statement is relevant because it identified the accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of
Januario perpetrated by accused, is adequately proven by the prosecution.

(3) Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact
that a crime is actually been committed.

As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.

In this case, the element of taking, as well as the existence of the money alleged to have been lost by assailant was
not to the alleged robbery.

PP V. PALANAS -HAZELL

Page | 54
PP V. BERNAL

FACTS: Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and whereabouts are
still unknown, were charged with the crime of kidnapping Bienvenido Openda Jr. in Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution
presented certain Salito Enriquez who testified that Openda Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernals wife Naty and this was
the motive behind the Bernals kidnapping of Openda Jr. Another witness who testified for the prosecution was one,
Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend and neighbor of the victim who overheard at the billiard hall at about 11AM with
his two companions that a certain person has to be kidnapped and it turned out to be Openda Jr.

RTC rendered judgment finding Bernal "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction
and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr. under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses' allegedly illusory
testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of Salito is admissible?

HELD: Yes. Openda, Jr.s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernals wife is admissible in
evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:

Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against
the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third
persons.

With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present provision, it is safe to assume that
declaration against interest has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary,
moral or even penal.

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: (1) that the declarant is dead
or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said
declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant
had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true. Openda, Jr., having been missing since his
abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own
interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence
becausenosanepersonwillbepresumedtotellafalsehoodtohisowndetriment.

TIZON V. CA

FACTS: This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero died
and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and
consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation
from the property disputed property presenting documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent
contended that the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never
presented for cross-examination.

The trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance.

In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein
petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to
prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the evidences are all admissible and sufficient to prove filiation?

HELD: Yes. Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison,
the baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture, and
several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she identified and explained in the course and as part of
her testimony. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is
the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime
in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration

Page | 55
about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant
be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by
evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only
before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the third
element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration
made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if
at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.

The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both
claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant
to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this
fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the
relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to
establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of thefamily.

We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general requirement on
evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself.
Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is
admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other
preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of
receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute
failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by thedecedent.

From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's declaration and
without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As
held in one case, where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's own relationship to another person, it seems
absurb to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is
offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.

JISON V. CA

FACTS:
At the age of 39 yrs old, Monina Jison brought a petition for recognition as an illegitimate
child of petitioner Francisco Jison. She presented 11 witnesses 25 plus documentary evidence
(i.e. birth cert, baptismal cert, school records, various notes and letters 26 written by Franciscos
relatives recognizing her as hischild).
Her version: Francisco was then married to Lilia Lopez Jison when he cavorted with the nanny
Esperanza Pansay Amolar. As a result, Monina was born on Aug 6, 1946 in Dingle, Iloilo and
since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of
Francisco by his acts and that of his family. Esperanza died when Monina was19.
She further alleged her father, whom she calls Daddy, gave her support and spent for her
education (from prep school to her Masters degree, followed by her CPA training, and
eventually, as a Central Bank examiner). Francisco also paid for her mothers burial expenses.
Moninas evidence and testimonies showed 1) she was close to Franciscos relatives, 2) she
received PhP15 as monthly allowance from her father coursed through the accountants of his
office, 3) her filiation was known in the Jison office and household, 4) her allowance was not
recorded in the books but in a separate cash book because it had to be hidden from Mrs Jison
and children, and 5)that she even asked for a Christmas gift from her godfather, Don Vicente,
father of MrsJison.
They had a falling out when Monina wanted to go to Spain. She asked for P25,000, which
Francisco at first refused to give. Monina returned to Bacolod by plane on Franciscos
expense. Before the money could be turned over, the lawyers required Monina to sign an
affidavit stating that she was not Francisco's daughter.
Ultimately though, Monina decided not to go abroad, opting to spend what she received through a Bank of
Asia check, which only amounted to PhP15K, for her CPA review, board exam and graduatestudies.

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 Francisco disputed all of Moninas allegations. The RTC, noting that for the years between Moninas birth
and her mothers death, no action of any kind was instituted against Francisco either by her or her mothe,
dismissed the case. Moninas evidence were either one of 3 categories: hearsay evidence, incredulous
evidence, or self-serving evidence.
Monina appealed to CA. CA reversed decision and ruled in her favor. Although it rejected the docs/certs
presented, it found that Monina established her filiation as Franciscos illegitimate daughter by
overwhelming, and not merely, preponderant evidence. Weight on the testimony of Pansays brother, Lope
who even after 41 yrs since the confrontation with Francisco was able to recount the details. It held that
Franciscos vague denial and statements of firing his staff was grossly inadequate to overcome the
probative weight of Monina's testimonialevidence.

ISSUE: WON conflicting findings of fact between TC and CA upheld Moninas status as illegitimate child?

HELD: Yes. Under Art 175 FC, illegitimate filiation such as Moninas, may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Moreover, Art 172 provides the various forms of evidence which
may be presented. Monina was able to present a high standard of proof which was coherent, logical and natural as
compared to Franciscos evidence which was barren and mostlydenials.

As regards the issue that there was opportunity for Moninas mother to have slept with other men during the time
she conceived Monina, Francisco had the burden of proof which he failed to deliver. The issue of whether sexual
intercourse actually occurred inevitably goes to the victims or mothers word, as against the accused or putatives
fathers protestations. Although Pansay unfortunately passed away and therefore cannot testify, this does not mean
that Monina could no longer prove her filiation. It was established that Pansay was still employed under Francisco at
the time Monina was conceived, sexual contact between Pansay and him was not at all impossible.

Francisco is Moninas father and she was conceived at the time Pansay worked for him. He recognized
Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct as was found by CA and such recognition has been
consistently shown and manifested throughout the years publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an
uninterrupted manner.

Moreover, if Monina were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been unnecessary for Francisco to
have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation.

Monina filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial of her
action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.

DISPOSITION: Petition denied. Challenged CA decision affirmed.

As to Exhibits S, T, U, and V, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives,
namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly
attesting to MONINAs filiation, while their due execution and authenticity are not in issue, as
MONINA witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39,
the contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-
authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and
MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Common Reputation, Explained; It is the general repute, the common
reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going
to establish pedigree.Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting family possessions as
discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted
on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation, it having been observed that: [T]he weight of
authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the common reputation in the family, and
not the common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. x x x
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or
vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the
community.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence of Pedigree; Words and Phrases;Family Possessions, Explained; Statutory
Construction; Ejusdem Generis; The enumeration contained in the second portion of Rule 130, Section 40, in light of
the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as family possessions, or those

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articles which represent, in effect, a familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person.We
hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem
generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as family possessions, or those articles which represent,
in effect, a familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been described as objects
openly exhibited and well known to the family, or those which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving
a family tradition. Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a familys reputation or
tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.

PP V. FELICIANO -KAYE

PP V. VILLARICO
The statement of Haide to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Bertinguttered in the
immediate aftermath of the shooting where he was the victimwas a true part of the res gestae.

FACTS: We find that the requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal actthe shooting of Haidewas a startling
occurrence. Secondly, his statement to his mother about being shot by the group of Berting was made before Haide
had time to contrive or to devise considering that it was uttered immediately after the shooting. And, thirdly, the
statement directly concerned the startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance (that is, the identities of
the assailants). Verily, the statement was reliable as part of the res gestae for being uttered in spontaneity and only
in reaction to the startling occurrence.

In the face of the positive identification of all the four accused, it did not matter whether only one or two of them had
actually fired the fatal shots. Their actions indicated that a conspiracy existed among them.

Same; Res Gestae; In a general way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of
the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main
fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.The term res gestae refers to those circumstances which
are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act. In a
general way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve
to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the
idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement.

Same; Same; Test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae; Requisites of Res Gestae.The
test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is
so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded
a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae
that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a)
the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.

PEOPLE VS. PALARCA

FACTS: Concepcion C. Javier was a 70 year old widow who personally tended her 24-hour sari-sari store while
Norman Palarca was a 28 year old keyboardist and sequencer of an establishment that produces minus one
music. He was a resident of the same subdivision and a frequent buyer at private complainants store during the wee
hours of the morning.

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At that time, accused-appellant was still in front of the store finishing the two bottles of beer he bought from
Concepcion. After her children left, Concepcion went to the kitchen and took her regular dose of sleeping pill.
Suddenly, Norman entered through the kitchen door and raped Concepcion.
After Norman left, Concepcion struggled to get up and wiped the blood on the floor. Then, she proceeded to the
bedroom where one of her daughters, Teresa, was sleeping. Teresa woke up and saw the bloodied underwear of her
mother. Concepcion told her that she was raped by accused-appellant but failed to give the details as she dozed off
to sleep

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the victim should be given weight?

HELD: Yes. Private complainants thorough narration of the rape incident on the witness stand, which remained firm
and consistent under exhaustive cross-examination by the defense, convinces us that she was indeed raped. It is
settled jurisprudence that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has been committed. It is hard to believe that a 70-year old woman who was not shown to have any
grudge against accused-appellant would concoct a humiliating rape story and spend the remaining days of her life in
sending a man to prison if her motive was not to avenge her honor and have her ravisher punished. Bolstered by the
medical findings showing that private complainant sustained multiple abrasions on the vaginal wall, as well as bruises
on the abdomen and right arm which confirmed that she was indeed boxed and grabbed by accused-appellant, we
see no reason to doubt her testimony.

Likewise, we find no merit in accused-appellants attempt to discredit private complainant on account of ailing memory
triggered by an alleged terminal cancer disease and dose of sleeping pills which supposedly impaired her mental
faculties. The said physical ailment of private complainant was not shown to have affected her mind.

We find nothing contrary to human experience in the behavior of private complainant during the rape incident as well
as during the preliminary investigation. The lack of resistance by the victim during the rape can be explained by
the physical assault employed by accused-appellant, not to mention the effects of the sleeping pill. So also,
the absence of raging anger on the part of private complainant when she saw accused-appellant at the preliminary
investigation does not make her behavior unnatural. As a mature widow, her wisdom must have dictated her to
remain composed rather than be hysterical and expose herself to further ridicule. Furthermore, different people react
differently to the same or similar stimuli. There is no standard behavior for rape victims with which we can compare
herein private complainants comportment, as there is no model form of behavioral response when one is confronted
with a strange, startling or frightful experience.

PHIL AIRLINES V. RAMOS

FACTS: Plaintiffs Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros Ilano, Daniel Ilano and Felipe Javalera, are
officers of the Negros Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for PAL Flight No. 264 from Naga City to
Manila on September 24, 1985, scheduled to depart for Manila at 4:25 p.m. The tickets were brought sometime in
August 1985.

Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that they went to the check-in counter of the defendant's Naga branch at least one
(1) hour before the published departure time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes before departure, but
upon checking -in and presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk who showed up, their tickets were
cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had to go to Manila by bus, and seek actual,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees for breach of contract of carriage.
The trial court rendered judgment finding defendant guilty of breach of contract of carriage in bumping-off the
plaintiffs from its F264 flight of September 25, 1985, and ordered defendant to sum of money.

PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 15, 990, the appellate court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which, reads:

ISSUE: Is PAL guilty of breach of contract of carriage?

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HELD: No.Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, each party in a case is required to prove his affirmative
allegations. In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is preponderance
of evidence or that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party
(Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 83376, May 29, 1989, 173 SCRA
619,625).

In the absence of any controverting evidence, the documentary evidence presented to corroborate the testimonies
of PAL's witnesses are prima facie evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane tickets of the private
respondents, exhs. "1," "2," "3," "4," (with emphasis on the printed condition of the contract of carriage regarding
check-in time as well as on the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately
upon the check-in of private respondents) and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh. "5," (which showed
the non-accommodation of Capati and Go an the private respondents)are entries made in the regular course of
business which the private respondents failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than
their testimonies.

The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly connected
with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are
admissible as apart of the res gestae. Their failure to come on time for check-in should not militate against PAL.
Their non-accommodation on that flight was the result of their own action or inaction and the ensuing cancellation
of their tickets by PAL is onlyproper.

LAO V. STANDARD INSURANCE

FACTS: Petitioner Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck. The truck was insured with respondent Standard Insurance
Co., Inc. for the maximum amount of P200,000 and an additional sum of P50,000 to cover any damages that might
be caused to hisgoods.

While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. At around 8:00 p.m. of April 24, 1985, in Barangay Buhang, Jaro,
Iloilo City, the insured truck bumped another truck. Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the
proceeds from his policy. However, the claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that when its
adjuster went to investigate the matter, it was found that the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, did not
possess a proper drivers license at the time of the accident. The restriction in Leonardo Anits drivers license
provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the insured truck he
was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated the authorized driver clause of the insurance policy.
In addition, respondent cited the contents of the police blotter of the Iloilo INP which stated
thatitwasLeonardoAnitwhodrovethetruckattimeofincident.

Petitioner claims that at the time of the accident, it was in fact another driver named Giddie Boy Y Coyel who was
driving the insured truck. Giddie Boy possessed a drivers license authorizing him to drive vehicles such as the truck
which weighed more than 4,500 kgs. As evidence, petitioner presented the Motor Vehicle Accident Report wherein
the Investigating Officer, Pat. Felipe D. Villahermosa, stated that it was Giddie Boy driving the insured truck and not
LeonardoAnit.

Hence, petitioner filed the civil case before the RTC but the RTC dismissed the case. On appeal with the Court
of Appeals, the RTC decision was affirmed. The petition was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was
denied.

In his petition for review, petitioner averred that the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER
COURT RELIED MAINLY ON SECTION 44, RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT IN UPHOLDING THE ENTRY
IN THE POLICE BLOTTER WHICH STATED THAT THE DRIVER OF THE INSURED VEHICLE WAS LEONARDO
ANIT Y PANES, WHO WAS NOT AN AUTHORIZED DRIVER. UNDER THE SAID SECTION 44, RULE 130
ITSELF HOWEVER, THE POLICE BLOTTER IS MERELY A PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS STATED
THEREIN WHICH MAY BE NULLIFIED BY OTHER EVIDENCE.

ISSUE: Whether the police blotter is admissible as evidence?

HELD: Yes. The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule,
the following are the requisites for its admissibility:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to doso;

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 (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or
bysuchotherpersonintheperformanceofadutyspeciallyenjoinedbylaw;
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through officialinformation.

We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was properly admitted as they form
part of official records. Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially
enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either
substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. Although police blotters are of little probative value, they
are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated
therein.

SABILI V. COMELEC

FACTS: When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had
been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight months. Prior to the 2010 elections, he had been twice
elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial Board Member representing the 4th District of Batangas. During the
2007 elections, petitioner ran for the position of Representative of the 4th District of Batangas, but lost. The 4th
District of Batangas includes Lipa City. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007
elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan,Batangas.

Private respondent Florencio Librea filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and
to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification" against him before the COMELEC.
Citing Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, private respondent alleged that petitioner
made material misrepresentations of fact in the latters COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency
requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his
COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May
2010 local elections.

For ease of later discussion, petitioners evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1) his Income Tax Returns and
corresponding Official Receipts for the years 2007 and 2008; (2) Certification from the barangay captain of
Pinagtong-ulan; (3) Affidavit of his common-law wife, Bernadette Palomares; and (4) Affidavits from a previous
property owner, neighbors, Certificate of Appreciation from the barangay parish and Memorandum from the local
chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

The COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from
seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of
which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa
City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position. He accordingly filed a Manifestation with
the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.

The COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.

Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC. Petitioner attached to his
Petition a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and proclamation of Winning Candidates for Lipa City Mayor and Vice-
Mayor issued by the City/Municipal Board of Canvassers, as well as a copy of his Oath of Office. He also attached to
his Petition another Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade and
sworn to before a notary public.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC erred when it did not consider the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay
Captain Dominador Honrade on the ground that the said Certification was not sworn to before a notary public?

HELD: YES.The COMELEC did not consider in the first instance the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay
Captain Dominador Honrade (Honrade) that petitioner had been residing in Brgy Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When
this oversight was raised as an issue in petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC brushed it aside on
the ground that the said Certification was not sworn to before a notary public and, hence, "cannot be relied on."
Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong- ulan
Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now been sworn to before a notarypublic.

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 We disagree with the COMELECs treatment of the Barangay Captains Certification and find the same tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrades Certification would not only be admissible in
evidence, but would also be entitled to due consideration.

Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 44. Entries in official records.Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi- purpose Cooperative, Inc., we
explained that the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in
evidence:

(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to doso;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
otherpersonintheperformanceofadutyspeciallyenjoinedbylaw;and
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have
been acquired by him personally or through official information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to "keep an updated
record of all inhabitants of the barangay."
Regarding the second requisite, we have explicitly recognized in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, that "it is the
business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay." Anent the third requisite, the
Barangay Captains exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position
requireshimtobeprivytotheserecordskeptbytheBarangaySecretary.

Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrades Certification on the sole
ground that it was initially not notarized

CERCADO V. VICENTE CERCADO ET AL

FACTS: In their Complaint, petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya Cercado-Belison (Ligaya)
claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married last 9
October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. In support of the existence thereof, petitioners presented a copy of the Contrato
Matrimonial which was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente church. Petitioners insist that the Contrato
Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato
Matrimonial which should be regarded as original. Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document,
petitioners maintain that said document should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from
the requirement of authentication.

In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were married on
27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal. In
their Comment, respondents submit that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document and the fact that marriages
are required to be registered in the local civil registrar does not ipso facto make it a public document. Respondents
assert that the certificate of baptism is likewise a private document which tends to prove only the administration of the
sacrament of baptism and not the veracity of the declarations therein. Respondents moreover refute the certification
issued by the local civil registry arguing that it does not prove filiation but only the fact that there is no record of
Ligaya on file with said office.

RTC upheld the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita and considered the subsequent marriage
between Vicente and Leonora as void and bigamous before it concluded that the subject property was part of the
conjugal property of Vicente and Benita. Consequently, the trial court held that the Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate (Deed) executed and signed by respondents is null and void because it deprived Benita of her share of the
property as surviving spouse and impaired the shares and legitimes of petitioners. Thus, it ruled that petitioners are
entitled to recover their share in the subject property.

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CA ruled that the trial court "can pass upon the issue of the validity of marriage of Vicente and Leonora [because] no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity and the court may pass upon the validity of a
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same, as long as it is essential to the determination of
the case before it." However, the appellate court found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a
private document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence. Moreover, the appellate court
did not consider the baptismal certificate submitted by petitioners as conclusive proof of filiation. The Joint Affidavit
executed by a certain Mario Casale and Balas Chimlangco attesting to the birth of Ligaya to Vicente and Benita was
not given credence by the appellate court for being a hearsay evidence. For failure of petitioners to prove their cause
of action by preponderance of evidence, the appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision and Resolution of
the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is sufficient to prove the fact of marriage between
Vicente and Benita?

HELD: No. Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. As early as in the
case of U.S. v. Evangelista,22 it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made
subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public
writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must
therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.

Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a duplicate original, hence, the
original need not be produced. The Court do not agree. The Court had previously ruled in Vallarta v. Court of Appeals
that " a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a
duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non- production of the original. But, an
unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is
no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy."

On the other hand, the document presented to prove Ligayas kinship is a Joint Affidavit executed by two persons to
the effect that she was born to Vicente and Benita. These two affiants were never presented in court. Thus, their
statement is tantamount to hearsay evidence.

Petitioners also presented certifications from the local civil registrar certifying that the records of birth from 1930 to
1946 were destroyed by fire and/or war. In said documents, there contains an advice that petitioners may make a
further verification with the NSO because the local civil registrar submits a copy of the birth certificate of every
registered birth with the NSO. The advice was not heeded. Petitioners failed to present a certification from NSO
whether such records do exist or not.

Considering that petitioners failed to prove the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita, it follows that they
do not have a cause of action in the case for the declaration of nullity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
Vicente and Leonora.

Moreover, ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might
reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the
circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is found where it
would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for.

MERALCO V. QUISUMBING

FACTS: MEWA, the duly recognized labor organization of the rank-and-file employees of MERALCO informed the
latter of its intention to re-negotiate the terms and conditions of their existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Thereafter, collective bargaining negotiations proceeded. However, despite the series of meetings between the
negotiating panels of MERALCO and MEWA, the parties failed to arrive at terms and conditions acceptable to both
of them which prompted MEWA to file a Notice of Strike with the National Capital Region Branch of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the DOLE on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor
practices. Upon the existence of the strike, MERALCO filed an Urgent Petition with the DOLE Secretary praying that
the latter should assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute and to enjoin the striking employees to go back to work.
Acting on such petition, the Labor Secretary granted and resolved the labor dispute by ordering the grant of a 4,500
wage increase, as well as a new and improved fringe benefits under the remaining 2 years of the CBA for the rank-
and-file employees. Unsatisfied, MERALCO filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration alleging that the
Secretary did not property appreciate the effect of the awarded wages and benefits on MERALCOs financial viability.

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Hence, in a decision on January 27, 1999, the orders of the Secretary were set aside and the wage increase is now
from 1,900 to 2,200. MERALCO warns that if the wage increase of 2,200 per month as ordered by the Secretary is
allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers through increase in the rate of
electricity.

ISSUE: Whether the argument is tenable?

HELD: No. This is a non sequitur. The Court cannot be threatened with such a misleading argument. An increase
in the prices of electric current needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory government agency and does
not automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of petitioners employees. Besides, this argument
presupposes that petitioner is capable of meeting a wage increase. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union
relies to support its position regarding the wage issue can not be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the
rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:

"Commercial lists and the like. - Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation
contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of
any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them therein."

Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only "if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by
them therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper
account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight
for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to its
accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation.
Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch with the
market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these
reports are not admissible. In the same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in
evidence when the source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of such
reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can be easily made available
considering that the same is necessary for compliance with certain governmentalrequirements.

PP. ORTIZ-MIYAKO
FACTS: Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati on a complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. In
addition, she was indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the same court, the offended party being Elenita
Marasiganalone.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges and the cases were tried jointly in Regional Trial Court
of Makati.

Of the three complainants in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale, Marasigan was the only one who testified
at the trial. The two other complainants, Generillo and Del Rosario, were unable to testify as they were then abroad

The prosecution sought to prove that Generillo and Del Rosario, the two other complainants in the illegal recruitment
case, were also victimized by appellant. In lieu of their testimonies, the prosecution presented as witnesses Lilia
Generillo, themotherofImeldaGenerillo,and Victoria Amin,the sister of Del Rosario.

The final witness for the prosecution was Riza Balberte, a representative of the POEA, who testified that appellant
was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment, POEA certificate certification.

On the other hand, appellant, who was the sole witness for the defense, denied that she recruited the complainants
for overseas employment and claimed that the payments made to her were solely for purchasing plane tickets at a
discounted rate as she had connections with a travelagency.

The evidence presented by the parties was thus contradictory but the trial court found the prosecutions evidence
more credible. Judgment was rendered by said court convicting appellant of both crimes as charged.

In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court adopted a previous decision of Branch 78
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paranaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was a conviction

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for estafa,involvingthesamecircumstancesintheinstantcase,whereincomplainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged
appellant with two counts of estafa. This decision was not appealed and had become final and executory.

In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment case, the decision therein of the Regional Trial Court stated that
the facts in the foregoing estafa cases were the same as those in the illegal recruitment case before it. It, therefore,
adopted the facts and conclusions established in the earlier decision as its own findings of facts and as its rationale
for the conviction in the case before it.

ISSUE: Whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of the respondent for illegal recruitment in
large scale?

HELD: No. It will be noted that the principle embodied is likewise found in the following provision of Rule 130:

Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or
unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation. Such right has
two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the
deportment and appearance of the witness whiletestifying.

This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness
who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a
distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made admissible
because it makes the administration of justice orderly and expeditious. Under these rules, the adoption by the
Makati trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the Paraaque trial court does not fall under the exception to
the right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent
witnesses made in previous proceedings,anddoesnotincludeutilizationofpreviousdecisionsorjudgments.

A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously
convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent
case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay.
To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right
of the accused to confront the witnesss againsthim.

As earlier stated, the Makati courts utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of the Paraaque court must
be rejected. Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation
of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of another court, especially
where what is presented is only its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein
and upon which the decision isbased.

Furthermore, this is not the only reason why appellant may not be held liable for illegal recruitment in large scale. An
evaluation of the evidence presented before the trial court shows us that, apart from the adopted decision in the
previous estafa case, there was no other basis for said trial courts conclusion that illegal recruitment in large scale
was committed against all three complainants.

The testimonies of Generillos mother, Lilia Generillo, and Del Rosarios sister, Victoria Amin, reveal that these
witnesses had no personal knowledge of the actual circumstances surrounding the charges filed by Generillo and
Del Rosario for illegal recruitment in large scale. Neither of these witnesses was privy to the transactions between
appellant and each of the two complainants. The witnesses claimed that appellant illegally recruited Generillo and Del
Rosario. Nonetheless, we find their averments to be unfounded as they were not even present when
GenerilloandDelRosarionegotiatedwithandmadepaymentstoappellant.

For insufficiency of evidence and in the absence of the third element of illegal recruitment in large scale, particularly,
that the offense is committed against three or more persons, we cannot affirm the conviction for illegal recruitment
in large scale. Nonetheless, we agree with the finding of the trial court that appellant illegally recruited Marasigan, for
which she must be held liable for the lesser offense of simple illegalrecruitment.

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GO V. PEOPLE
FACTS: Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) docketed as Criminal Case
No. 396447
Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from
his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing. However, trial dates were subsequently
postponed due to his unavailability. The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6
of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos,
Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill
health.

Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the
directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC
denied, prompting petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23
on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific
provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases,
which is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him
face to face.

Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration through an Order
datedMarch5,2006,12theprosecutionelevatedthecasetotheCA.

On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision which held that no grave abuse of discretion can
be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no
rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners
would still have every opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness and make timely objections during the
taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or through the consular officer who would be taking the
deposition of thewitness.

On November 28, 2008, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the MTCC was correct in allowing the taking the deposition of the witness outside the PH
nothwithstanding the constitutional guarantee given to the accused?

HELD: NO. We rule in favor of petitioners. The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution
Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119.

The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal
cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him
face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the
judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions,
however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of
theirdepositionsastestimonialevidenceinlieuofdirectcourttestimony.

Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination of witnesses both for
the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos
explicitly states that

"x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be
resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as
modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and
prosecution witnesses."

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the
judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:

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SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no
definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending.
Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure
or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken
may be admitted in behalf of or against theaccused.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court where
the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li
Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination
in thiswise:

The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally examined
before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119
must be interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose
demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of
deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent
is sick or not.

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where
the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also
deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his
credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against
the accused.

It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal
as well as special proceedings, the deposition- taking before a Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be
deemed allowable also under thecircumstances.

Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent
reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise."

PEOPLE V. IBANEZ

FACTS: Appellants Edwin and Alfredo, with Jesus Monsillo y Taniares (Jesus), were all charged in an Information
for Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. During arraignment, Edwin and Alfredo pleaded not guilty.
Jesus, on the other hand, remained at large; the case against him was archived. Thereafter, trial ensued. The
prosecutions version was testified to by the victims wife and daughter, in succession.

On that fateful day, Wilfredo was invited by Alfredo to a drinking session with Jesus and Edwin making them a party
of four. Rachel, Wilfredos daughter, an adolescent at the time, was underneath the house (silong in the vernacular)
of a neighbor, three (3)meters away from the place where Wilfredo and his companions were ostensibly
inmerrymaking.

Rachel saw Edwin snatched a t-shirt from a nearby clothesline, and hooded the t- shirt over the head and face of
Wilfredo. Robbed of vision as his head was fully covered, Wilfredo was wrestled and pinned down by Edwin, while
Alfredo boxed the left side of Wilfredos chest. Jesus, armed with a long iron bar, swung at and hit Wilfredo in the
head. Terrified, Rachel stood immobilized as she watched the attack on father. Thereafter, she saw her mother
running out of their house and crying for help. Edwin and Alfredo stood beside Jesus; Edwin held a white shirt.
Forthwith, Jesus and Alfredo ran away while Edwin went home. Rowena asked for help to bring Wilfredo to the
hospital. However, Wilfredo did not reach the hospital alive and was pronounced dead onarrival.

The two accused-appellants pointed to Jesus as the sole culprit, proclaimed their innocence and professed to being
at the scene of the crime only because of their curiosity for what had occurred.

On appeal, Edwin and Alfredo found no reprieve. The Court of Appeals did not deviate from the RTCs ruling and
affirmed in toto its finding of guilt.

ISSUE: Whether the accused are guilty of murder?

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HELD: YES.Both lower courts, however, found the testimony of Rachel credible:

This Court finds the testimony of Rachel clear and convincing. The testimony flows from a person who was present in
the place where the killing occurred. They are replete with details sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to
appellants. We have no reason to doubt Rachels credibility. Her candid account of the incident, standing alone,
clearly established the components of the crime of murder. Appellants defense of denial, not sufficiently proven,
cannot overcome the conclusions drawn from said evidence. We find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings
and conclusions of the trial court. Rachels testimony was delivered in a firm, candid, and straightforward manner.
There is no showing that Rachel wavered from the basic facts of her testimony, even when she was subjected to a
rigorous examination.

We find no error in the lower courts disposal of the issue. We have scrutinized the testimony of lone eyewitness,
Rachel. Throughout her testimony, in her direct, cross and re-direct and re-cross examinations, she candidly
recounted the events surrounding the killing of her father.

As the lower courts have done, we accord full faith and credence to Rachels testimony. She was young and
unschooled, but her narration of the incident was categorical, without wavering. It has no markings of a concocted
story, impressed upon her by other people.

We cannot take Rachels testimony lightly simply because she was a mere child when she witnessed the incident
and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of
testifying and of relating the incident truthfully.

With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the
burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding
the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty
to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a
child. Thus, petitioners flimsy objections on Rachels lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no
weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.

We likewise note that the line of questioning of the defense during cross- examination on the competency of Rachel
to read and tell time did not distract her in recollecting how her father was attacked by accused-appellants. From
her position underneath the house of her "Kuya Unyo," she saw her father, Wilfredo, attacked by accused-
appellants. Although she was astonished as the happening unfolded, her ability to perceive, remember, and make
known her perception was not diminished.

PEOPLE V. ESUGON-CZARINA

PP V. ABRIOLN

FACTS: Appellants PO2 Albert Abriol of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Macario Astellero, Januario Dosdos,
and PNP P/Chief Inspector Gaudioso Navales were charged with murder allegedly committed against Alejandro
Flores alias Alex and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 on Illegal Possession of Firearms..

The incident happened in the intersection of P. del Rosario St. and Jones Avenue, Cebu City when one Romeo Sta.
Cruz, a radio news reporter aboard his jeep, around ABS-CBN Compound heard a couple of gunshots and saw a
man shouting for help. He also saw a red Jiffy which made a U-turn and stopped at beside the fallen figure of a
man and a tall, thin man alighted and fired several shots at the prostrate figure. The Jiffy sped away but was
accosted still by the police patrol cars and arrested the persons inside the Jiffy who were now the accused. When
arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges. Since the indictments arose from the same incident,
the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented SPO4 Lemuel Caser, ballistician of the PNP Crime
Laboratorytoestablishtheguncaliberusedthatwoundedandkilledthevictim.

Page | 68
However, the defense presented Dr. Jesus Cerna, medico-legal officer of the Cebu City PNP Command to testify on
the caliber of the firearms which might have caused the gunshot wounds. The latter also opined that with respect to
the grazing wounds found on the victims body, it was impossible to determine the caliber of the firearm used. Trial
court convicted the accused.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecutions expert witness is qualified to testify as such capacity?

HELD: Yes. An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of the
inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an opinion."
There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to
testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors be present:

(1) training andeducation;

(2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case;and
(3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. The question of whether a witness is
properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trialcourt.

We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a licensed criminologist,
trained at the Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp
Crame, and in the National Bureau of Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness in at least
twenty-seven (27) murder and homicide cases all over the country. An expert witness need not present
comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his findings. Examination under a
comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the same gun
issufficient.

OPINION RULE

ERIBERTO BAUTISTA V. CA

FACTS: The dispute involves a parcel of land situated in Sampaloc, Manila, containing an area of approximately
105sqm. This parcel of land was previously owned and registered in the name of the late Cesar Morelo. Cesar is the
uncle of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, being the brother of her mother, Rosario Morelos. Cesar, who was married
to Rosario Duran, did not have any children. Rosario died in 1972. Cesar died of cardiac arrest on April 15,
1982. During his lifetime, Cesar sold and conveyed the said parcel of land in favor of Laura, as evidenced by a Deed
of Absolute Sale notarized by Luis M. de Guzman. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate Title was issued in the name of
Laura.

Respondent Fernando Morelos (Fernando), claiming to be the illegitimate child of Cesar with Angelina Lim-Gue
(Angelina), instituted a complaint for the declaration of nullity of sale and title with damages before the RTC of
Manila. At the trial, he presented testimonies of expert witnesses who claimed that the signature of Cesar on the
Deed and the fingerprint appearing on his Residence Certificate were not his.

Petitioners countered that the Deed was valid. The witness to the Deed, Carmelita Marcelino, testified that she saw
Cesar and Laura sign the same. After hearing, RTC rendered judgment declaring the Deed executed between the
late Cesar in favor of Laura valid, and dismissed for insufficient evidence the claims and counterclaims for damages
of the parties. Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed and set aside the judgment of the RTC. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the testimonies of the expert witnesses are conclusive to be a strong basis to nullify a duly executed
and notarized Deed of Absolute Sale?

HELD: NO. Petitioner asserts the validity of the Deed and invoke the testimony of Carmelita Marcelino, the
instrumental witness to the signing of the document, who confirmed that it was the decedent who affixed his signature
to the document.

On the other hand, respondent contends that the decedents signature on the Deed was forged. He presented the
testimony of Francisco Cruz, Jr., Chief Examiner of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, that the signature of
decedent on the questioned instrument, when compared to other documents bearing the authentic signature of the
decedent, did not match and appeared to have been authored by a different person. Another witness, Major Braulio

Page | 69
Monge, Chief of the Fingerprint Division of the PC-INP, testified that the thumbmark of the decedent appearing on the
residence certificate indicated in the Deed, when compared to those affixed on previous residence certificates issued
to the decedent, did not match and appears to be the thumbmark of another person.

Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following
manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person
write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against
whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

It is well-settled that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution as
well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn this legal presumption, evidence must
be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant to establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a
spurious contract. As a general rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. Hence, a finding of forgery does not
depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still
exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the
mere testimony of the handwriting expert. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned
signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly
technical issue.

In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As
against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of
the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes
indirect or circumstantial evidence at best. Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed, confirmed the
genuineness, authenticity and due execution thereof. Having been physically present to see the decedent
and Laura affix their signatures on the document, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of
petitioners. Witness Cruz, Jr. failed to establish the fact that the signature on the Deed was not that of the
decedent. He merely concluded that the document was a forgery without citing any factual basis for arriving
at that conclusion. He did not point out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and
between genuine and false specimens of writing, which would ordinarily escape detection by an ordinary lay
person.

AVELINO V. PEOPLE

FACTS: Petitioner Bobby Abel Avelino y Bulawan, together with Ricardo Tolentino, Alias Sonny Muslim, Farouk
Musa a.k.a. Boy Muslim, Alias Bubut Tuwad, Alias Angkol, Alias Mon, Renato Meneses a.k.a. Nato, Benjamin
Elbona a.k.a. Toto Mata, and Dominic Apan a.k.a. Domeng Bakukang, was charged with murder before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evidentpremeditation.

Upon arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused Renato Meneses, Benjamin Elbona, and Farouk Musa entered a
plea of not guilty. The other accused remain at-large.

At the trial, the prosecution presented eight witnesses: Delia Hispano, the wife of the victim; Diana Espinosa;
Alfredo Manalangsang (Manalangsang); Mary Ann Caada (Caada); Renato Sosas; Dr. Romeo T. Salen; P/Insp.
Mario Prado; and National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent Rizaldi Jaymalin.
Denying the accusation, the defense presented as evidence the testimonies of petitioner, PO2 Anthony P. Galang,
Adonis T. Bantiling and Scene of the Crime Operative (SOCO) PSI Lito D. Cabamongan (Cabamongan).

Petitioner advanced the defense of denial and alibi. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery, and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

For failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused Farouk Musa, Benjamin Elbona,
and Renato Meneses were acquitted of the crime charged. The CA, in its assailed decision, denied petitioners
appeal and upheld the RTC decision.

Aggrieved, petitioner now seeks to reverse his conviction, arguing that the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses Manalangsang and Caada and disregarding the inconsistencies between the statements
of Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal and SOCO PSI Cabamongan as
tothepositionofthegunman.Healsoreiteratedhisdefenseofdenialandalibi.

ISSUE: Whether the evidence of the prosecution is sufficient to warrant conviction?

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HELD: YES. The allegations of petitioner cannot exculpate him from criminal liability. Manalangsang
unequivocally identified the petitioner as the gunman. Manalangsang was able to identify the petitioner because the
latter revealed his face when he pulled down the bonnet he was wearing, thereby exposing his eyes, nose, mouth,
and chin.

The identification made by Manalangsang was likewise sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of Caada, that
she saw the petitioner, with whom she was familiar, drive away in Hispanos owner-type jeep, wearing a green jacket
and black bonnet rolled up to hisforehead.

Further, as can be gleaned from the excerpt below, the petitioners defense that Manalangsangs testimony
contradicts with the medical findings, and should then be disregarded, must fail. Petitioner claims that
Manalangsangs statements that Hispano was shot in a downward direction conflict with the findings of the medico-
legal that the trajectory of the bullets is in an upward direction.
The CA was also correct in not giving credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan as regards the position
of the gunman when the latter shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that the gunman was on board the owner-type
jeep when Hispano was shot, which is opposed to Manalangsangs testimony. However, case records reveal that
Cabamongan was presented as an ordinary witness. Hence, his opinion regarding the location of the gunman in
relation to the place where the empty shells were found is immaterial. Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the
matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this
case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make thenecessaryqualificationuponpresentingCabamonganduringtrial.

Jurisprudence further provides that minor inconsistencies in immaterial details do not destroy the probative value of
the testimony of a witness regarding the very act of the accused. The case of Madali v. People elucidates thus:

Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to assimilate all material details of a given incident,
slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well
settled thatimmaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point
bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another
on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility.Inconsistencies on minor details do
not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness. Thus, the positive identification of the petitioner as the gunman
by Manalangsang, as corroborated by Caada, must stand. Indeed, it has been consistently held by this Court that
in criminal cases the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge,
whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to
observe said witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. Absent any showing that the
lower courts overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would change the result of the
case, this Court gives deference to the trial courts appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses,
especially since Manalangsang and Caadas testimony meets the test of credibility. The Court also notes that
other than his claim of denial, petitioner failed to show how the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption
ofinnocence.

PP V. DURANAN

FACTS: This is a rape case of one named by court as AAA (Mania Lozada) filed against Emiliano Duranan alias
Kalbo. Complainant was 25 years old and considered to be retarded and finished only up to Grade VI, unemployed
and simply helped in the household chores for her family while Kalbo was a tenant in the apartment rented by the
family of AAA. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to each charge of rape against him,
whereupon he was tried.

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant AAA, complainants mother BBB, and the attending
medico-legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon.

Accused-appellant filed a demurrer to the evidence, but the trial court denied it. The defense thereafter presented its
witnesses, namely, accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan, accused-appellants alleged roommates, Rico Bariquit and
Carlito Catubig, and his wife CarlitaDuranan.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape.

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victims mental age
was not proven. He argues that under Art. 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the
prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the complainants mental age to determine if
her mental age is under twelve. He further claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the
presence of physical deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived.

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ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the mother as to the sanity of her daughter is admissible?

HELD: Yes.Rule 130, 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in
evidence regarding ---

(a) theidentityofapersonaboutwhomhehasadequateknowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity;and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficientlyacquainted.

The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental
condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to
testify on the matter.

It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided
the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in
question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion
before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: A non-expert witness may give his
opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with
such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness own
knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed
facts, as the basis for hisopinion.

PEOPLE V. DEOPITA

FACTS: Dominga Pikit-pikit was on her way home from work when suddenly a man appeared from behind, looped
his arm around her neck and warned her not to shout or else she would die. The man dragged her through the
banana plantation towards the cornfields. Dominga got a good look at the man, who turned out to be Rafael
Diopita, as he sat on her thighs and proceeded to divest her of her belongings. Thereafter, Diopita announced his
desire to have carnal knowledge of Dominga. After having his way with her, Diopita threatened Dominga not to tell
anyone about the incident or else he would shoot her. Dominga was able to report the incident to the police and
gave the description of the suspect and his possible whereabouts. A colored white/yellow, size 10 slipper was
found in the scene of the crime. In a police line-up, Dominga readily pointed to Diopita which was further bolstered
by the fact that when the police had him try the slipper, it easily fitted him. In his defense, Diopita posed the alibi
that he was at an informal Bible session of the Jehovahs Witnesses at the time of the crime. The trial court
convicted Diopita stating that alibi is a weak form of defense. Among Diopitas arguments is that it was impossible
for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a person of good moral character, holding as he does the
position of Ministerial Servant in the congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous
person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God.

ISSUE: Whether the testimonies of the accused of his good moral character is sufficient to acquit him of his charges?

HELD: No. The SC affirmed his conviction; the guilt of accused-appellant has been established by the evidence
beyond reasonable doubt.

The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he is
innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no
guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part.

Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the
impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral
character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of
whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the
evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of
accused-appellant isunavailing.

In light of this positive and direct evidence of accused-appellants culpability, the trial court correctly discarded his
defense of alibi. It is an elementary rule that alibi cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the
accused as the very person who committed the crime. Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal based on this
defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that

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 (a) he was in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. This, accused-appellant miserably failed to do.

D. BURDEN OF PROOF AND ASSUMPTIONS

FEBTC V. CHANTE
FACTS: FEBTC filed a collection case against Chan (current account depositor with a Do-It-All card which
handled both credit and debit transactions) to recover the principal sum of P770,488.30 representing the
unpaid balance of the amount fraudulently withdrawn from Chans account. [System bug 50k max, 198k in
account, but 967k withdrawn over the courseof a night; Chan claims it was an inside job, citing a newspaper
report, and that was it was physically impossible for him to withdraw that much money in the course of a
night. 770k na lang dahil kinuha nila yung 198k niya.]

RTC ruled in favor of the bank. [Rationale: tried to withdraw at a different branch 2 days later but failed;
instead issued 2 checks for nearly the entire amount in his account]
CA reversed! [no direct evidence on the withdrawals; judicial notice taken of CB circular warning of ATM
fraud]

ISSUE: Whether FEBTC sufficiently established its claim against Chan?

HELD: No. There is no question that he was in possession of the card at the time of the alleged
withdrawals. However, the exclusive possession of the card alone did not suffice to preponderantly establish
that he had himself made the withdrawals, or that he had caused the withdrawals to be made. His denial
effectively traversed FEBTCs claim of his direct and personal liability for the withdrawals, that it would lose
the case unless it competently and sufficiently established that he had personally made the withdrawals
himself, or that he had caused the withdrawals. In other words, it carried the burden of proof. In civil
cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. The
burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant
denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the
defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or
defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him fromliability.

Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon the weakness of Chans
evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly demonstrate that his ATM card had been used to
make the withdrawals, and that he had used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by another person to make the
fraudulent withdrawals. [Journal tapes of the withdrawals; withdrawal was made for seven (7) long hours in a place
frequented by hundreds of guests, over 242 transactions where the physical volume of the money withdrawn was
notinsignificant.]

IBAAN RURAL BANK V. CA

FACTS: Sps. Reyes owned 3 lots that were mortgaged to Ibaan Rural Bank in 1976. The same lots were sold later to
the Sps. Tarnate (private respondents) through a DOAS with Assumption of Mortgage. The Sps. Tarnate failed to pay
so there was an XJF of the lots. The COS issued in favor of the bank as the sole bidder stated that the redemption
period expires 2 years from the registration of the sake (Oct. 16, 1979 to 1981). The offer to redeem was made on
Sept. 1981 but the bank refused it on the ground that it had already consolidated its titles over the lots. The Provincial
sheriff also denied it since their names did not appear on the titles.

The Sps thus filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the foreclosed lots claiming that:

1) The extrajudicial foreclosure was null and void for lack of valid notice and demand upon them,and
2) Their offer to redeem and tender of the redemption price was made before the expiration of the
redemptionperiod.

RTC granted the prayer in the complaint.

CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: What was the period of redemption: two years as unilaterally fixed by the sheriff in the contract, or

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one year as fixed by law?

HELD: Two years. Remedial Law; Estoppel; When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for
whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent; When estoppel in pais arises. When
petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it
had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents. For two years, it did not object to the two-
year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the two-year
redemption period specially since it had time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the
part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent. By its silence and
inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that they had two years within which to redeem the
mortgage.

AFTER the lapse of two years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only one year
and that the period had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions,
or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to
believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the
former is permitted to deny the existence of suchfacts.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on Lazo vs. Republic Surety and Insurance Co.,
Inc., where the court held that the one year period of redemption provided in Act No. 3135 is only directory and can
be extended by agreement of the parties. True, but it bears noting that in Lazo the parties voluntarily agreed to
extend the redemption period. Thus, the concept of legal redemption was converted by the parties in Lazo into
conventional redemption.

This is not so in the instant case. There was no voluntary agreement. In fact, the sheriff unilaterally and arbitrarily
extended the period of redemption to two (2) years in the Certificate of Sale. The parties were not even privy to the
extension made by the sheriff. Nonetheless, as above discussed, the bank cannot after the lapse of two years insist
that the redemption period was one year only.

Additionally, the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of aproperty. Decision
affirmed.

ALCARAZ V TANGGA-AN
FACTS: The Tanga-ans (leased by the wife and mother* of the respondents) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against the Sps. Alcaraz for failing to vacate after demand the house subject of a lease (Entered into Nov 1991, failed
to pay since Nov. 1993, filed on Oct. 1994).

The following defense was raised: although originally owned by the NHA, ownership over the lot (and consequently,
the house) was transferred to Virgilio T (son/brother) on July 1993 so they paid Virgilio and not the plaintiffs-
respondents.

MTC decision rendered in favor of the plaintiffs- respondents; defendants-petitioners ordered to vacate the property
and pay 48k in rental arrears. [upheld the respondents title which was in the name of a trustee over Virgilios which
was still subject to pending litigation]

RTC affirmed! [ownership issue irrelevant; violation of lease lang ang pinag-uusapan dito; ejecment suit involves
only the issue of material possession or possession de facto]

ISSUE: Whether Virgilios acquisition of title over the lot necessarily included the house on the said lot (citing
NCC 40 on accessions), thus automatically canceling the contract?

HELD: No. The court ruled provisionally on the ownership issue, deciding that the house belonged to the
respondents. The only evidence the petitioners presented was an uncertified Xerox of a TCT which didnt
mention the house. On the other hand, the respondents presented a tax declaration in the name of their
trustee. They also alleged that Virginia waived her rights over the entire property to Virgilio, but any such
donation would be void for failing to follow the form requirements.

Same; Same; Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides a conclusive presumption.Section 2, Rule
131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that: Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions.The

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following are instances of conclusive presumptions: (a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act,
or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such
belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
xxx xxx xxx After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are
barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost
ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over thelot. Decision affirmed.

UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO V. BSP -HAZELL

ROSAROSO V. SORIA BRONDIAL

ROSAROSO V. SORIA (2013)
Luis Rosaroso had 9 children (one of them is Luisa, the respondent; some of his other children are the
petitioners) with his first spouse who predeceased him. He later married Lourdes, another respondent. The
case involved several transactions:

1) 1st DOAS over 6 lots in favor of thepetitioners;

2) 1st SPA with only his thumbmark (was sick, infirm, blind, and of unsound mind) by which Luisa and
Laila (Luisas daughter, the other respondent) were authorized to sell 3 of the lots already conveyed to
petitioners;
3) 2nd SPA by which Laila mortgaged the property to Vital Lending Investors, Inc.;and
4) 2nd DOAS signed by Luis by which 3 parcels of land were conveyed to Meridian RealtyCorp.
Thus, a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages was filed by Luis (later substituted by the
current petitioners) against Lourdes, Lucila, Laila and her husband, and Meridian.

The following defenses were raised: CP Sanchez personally witnessed him affix his thumbmark on the DOAS and
Meridian did look at the titles and saw that the 1st alleged sale wasnt registered; Lourdes signed the 1st DOAS out
of pity but there was no consideration.

RTC ruled that the sale to Meridian was void because the lots were already owned by petitioners at the time of the
sale.
CA reversed!

Issues/Held:
1) WON the 1st sale was valid. YES.
2) WON Meridian was a buyer in GF.NO.

Ratio:
1) The 1st sale wasvalid.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Disputable Presumptions; Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following
are disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of
business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract.The fact that the first
deed of sale was executed, conveying the subject properties in favor of petitioners, was never contested by the
respondents. What they vehemently insist, though, is that the said sale was simulated because the purported sale
was made without a valid consideration. Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are
disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has
been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate against an
adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the
prima facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The
burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the
time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the
place of evidence unless rebutted.

Same; Same; It is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not

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equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court.In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said
presumption. Aside from their bare allegation that the sale was made without a consideration, they
failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is elementary in procedural
law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of
Court. The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It relied
heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached him and convinced him
to sign the deed of sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they did not pay the
purchase price for the subject properties. This testimony, however, is self- serving and would not amount
to a clear and convincing evidence required by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the
presumption that there was sufficient consideration will not bedisturbed.

In reciprocal obligations where the other party fails to do his prestation, the other party only acquires the
right to rescind the obligation. Ownership over the thing subject of the prestation does not automatically
revest on the owner upon the other partys failure to comply with his obligation.

2) Meridian was not a buyer in goodfaith.

Meridian, through its agent, knew that the subject properties were in possession of persons other than the
seller. Instead of investigating the rights and interests of the persons occupying the said lots, however, it
chose to just believe that Luis still owned them.

HEIRS OF TRAZONA V. HEIRS OF CANADA

HEIRS OF TRAZONA VS. HEIRS OF CANADA (2013)
Trazona owned an untitled parcel of land (9500sqm) bought from the government in 1940. He had
possession of the land, cultivated it, and paid taxes thereon.

Dionisio owned the adjacent lot (purchased from Diaz) It was later found that he had encroached on a
small portion of Trazonas lot. He was then summoned by Cipriano for a confrontation before the barangay
captain in 1952. ionisio offered to buy the encroached portion, but Cipriano refused the offer. In 1956, the
latter gave Dionisio permission to temporarily build a house on said portion, where it still stands.

The present controversy arose in 1997. Petitioners (Trazonas heirs) went to the Office of the Municipal
Assessor to secure a copy of Tax Declaration No. 07764, as they intended to sell the property, but were
informed that a new one was alredy issued in the name of Dionisio, supposedly due to a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 27 June 1956 supposedly executed by Cipriano in favor of Dionisio. Petitioners filed a
Complaint against respondents for quieting of title, annulment of deed of sale, cancellation of Tax
Declaration No. 23959, recovery of possession and ownership, damages, and payment of attorneys
fees against respondents, claiming that the DOAS was aforgery.

1) Evidence for petitioners PNP Document Examiner Varona,forgery

2) Evidence for respondents Gorgonio (Canadas son) who was allegedly present during the execution of the
DOAS,
3) Ps rebuttal evidence DOAS executed by Diaz from national archives, exactly the same as the purported
DOAS executed by Trazona in favor of Canada, except for thedate

RTC granted the complaint

CA reversed! [The deed, being a notarized document, enjoyed the presumption of authenticity and due execution.
Also, the fact that it was an ancient document that remained unaltered after so many years, bodes well for its
authenticity; were in actualpossession]

Issue/Held: WON the presumption of regularity of the deed was overturned. YES, it was.

Ratio:

Same; Evidence; Notarized Documents; Disputable Presumptions; It is true that notarized documents are accorded
evidentiary weight as regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption
of regularity, this presumption is disputable.It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as
regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this
presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than

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 merely preponderant. Here, contrary to the conclusion of the CA, we find clear and convincing evidence that is
enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed.

1) The document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed had been forged. No
issue has been raised about hisexpertise.
2) the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged. It likewise supported its
finding that the signature was forged through independentobservation.
3) No one in complete possession of ones mental faculties would buy the same property twice from
differentowners.
4) Petitioners were the ones enjoying the fruits of the property from 1960 until the presentcontroversy.
5) There was an irregularity regarding the place of issuance of Ciprianos residence certificate indicated in the
assailed deed, as compared with the residence certificates of the other persons indicated on the same page of
the notarialregister.
When the record management analyst from the Bureau of Archives presented the assailed deed, the
paper was noted to be white, while its supposed contemporaries in the bunch from where it was taken
had turned yellow with age. Further, when the analyst was asked the question of when the assailed
deed was received by the Bureau of Archives, she answeredthat it was forwarded to them only on 28
September 1987 by RTC Region 7, Notarial Division.
Decision reversed.

UY V. LACSAMANA - JANUSZ

Disputable Presumption
G.R. No. 208113, December 02, 2015
DOLORES DIAZ, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LETICIA S. ARCILLA,

Facts:
On March 11, 1999, an Information for estafa was filed against petitioner before the RTC for her alleged failure to
return or remit the proceeds from various merchandise valued at P32,000.00 received by her in trust. During
arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea.

Respondent, is a businesswoman engaged in the business of selling goods/merchandise through agents (one of
whom is petitioner) under the condition that the latter shall turn over the proceeds or return the unsold items to her a
month after they were entrusted. Respondent averred that she entrusted merchandise consisting of umbrellas and
bath towels worth P35,300.00 to petitioner as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996 duly
signed by the latter. However, petitioner was only able to remit the amount of P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed to
make further remittances and ignored respondent's demands to remit the proceeds or return the goods.

In her defense, petitioner admitted having previous business dealings with respondent but not as an agent. She
clarified that she was a client who used to buy purchase order cards (POCs) and gift checks (GCs) from respondent
on installment basis and that, during each deal, she was made to sign a blank sheet of paper prior to the issuance of
POCs and GCs. She further claimed that their last transaction was conducted in 1995, which had long been settled.
However, she denied having received P32,000.00 worth of merchandise from respondent on February 20, 1996.

RTC- acquitted petitioner of the charge of estafa but held her civilly liable to pay respondent
CA -upheld petitioner's civil liability.

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in finding petitioner civilly liable to respondent.

Held: NO.

Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust receipt in blank during her
transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed to retrieve after paying her obligations, is a bare allegation
that cannot be given credence. It is well-settled that "[h]e who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence."

On the contrary, the CA correctly found that respondent was able to prove by preponderance of evidence the fact of
the transaction, as well as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00,

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or to return the same to respondent in case such merchandise were not sold. This was established through the
presentation of the acknowledgment receipt dated February 20, 1996.

In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption
is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one
does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3
(p) of the same Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every
contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it. The effect of a
presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima
facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail. In this case, petitioner failed to
present any evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also, respondent's possession of the document pertaining to
the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence
only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence. All things considered, the
evidence in this case clearly preponderates in respondent's favor.

PEOPLE V. PADRIGONE- BRONDIAL

PEOPLE VS. PADRIGONE (2002)
Padrigone and 4 others were charged with the rape of Rowena Contridas. All pled not guilty. [Broke into
the girls house and took turns raping her at knifepoint; sister nearly raped but was able to elude one of the
other co- accused. They claim that Padrigone was her boyfriend. She reported to the police that the four
raped her, but only Padrigone was named in the police blotter.]

RTC Padrigone found guilty; the other acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.

Issue/Held: WON the prosecution was guilty of suppression of evidence in not presenting Rowena herself,
thereby depriving appellant of his opportunity to cross- examine her. NO, it was not.

Ratio:
The contention is misplaced if not misleading. The basis of his conviction was not Rowenas declaration
before the Chief of Police but rather Nimfas testimony before the trial court that it was him who raped
Rowena, among others.

Same; Same; Same; Instances where the rule that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced does not apply. Besides, the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be
considered as suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the
disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or
cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of aprivilege.

Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the opportunity to subpoena
Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the
witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition and
thus cannot stand judicial proceedings yet. The nonpresentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful; Third, in
any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on
her sister. Decision affirmed.

METROBANK V. CA -BRONDIAL
METROBANK VS. CA (2000)
Mr. Chia offered the subject property for sale to private respondent G.T.P. Development Corporation (hereafter,
GTP), with assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner METROBANK secured by the subject
property. Atty. Atienza went to the bank himself and confirmed the amount due. The deed of sale and the
memorandum of agreement between Mr. Chia and respondent GTP were eventually executed and signed on 04
September 1980 in the office of Atty. Atienza. Twelve

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 (12) days later, or on 16 September 1980, Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and paid
P116,416.71 for which METROBANK issued an official receipt acknowledging payment. This notwithstanding,
petitioner METROBANK Refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject property despite repeated
requests from Atty. Atienza, thus prompting respondent GTP to file on October 17, 1980 an action for specific
performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia.

Mr. Chia denied having executed any deed of sale in favor of respondent GTP involving the subject property. The
bank justified its release by Mr. Chias advice and due to the fact that there were other loans secured by the
property.

RTC granted the reliefs prayed for.

CA initially reversed the decision, but later reinstated in via MR (due to the banks failure to bring before the court
the current statement of the mortgage debts of Mr. Chia)

Issues/Held: Was the CA decision affirming the RTC decision proper? YES, it was.

Ratio:
Respondent GTP, thru Atty. Atienza, requested from METROBANK that he be furnished a copy of the full
indebtedness secured by the real estate mortgage. In response thereto, petitioner METROBANK issued a statement
of account as of September 15, 1980 which amount was immediately settled and paid the next day amounting to
P116,416.71. Petitioner METROBANK is thus barred from taking a stand inconsistent with its representation upon
which respondent GTP, as an innocent third person to the real mortgage agreement, placed exclusive reliance.
Respondent GTP had the reasonable right to rely upon such representations as true, considering that it had no
participation whatsoever in the mortgage agreement and the preparation of the statement ofaccount.

Evidence; When the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and
he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made
against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption
arises that the evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his
adversary.[referring to METROBANKs failure to bring before respondent Court of Appeals the current
statement evidencing what it claims as other unliquidated past due loans at the scheduled hearing of 8
March1995]

DELOS SANTOS V COA- BRONDIAL

DE LOS SANTOS VS. COA (2013)
Cong. Antonio Cuenco entered into a Memorandum of Agreement5 (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center (VSMMC or hospital), represented by Dr. Eusebio M. Alquizalas (later succeeded to by
petitioner), Medical Center Chief, appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his PDAF
to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N Tommy Health Program (TNT
Program).

Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions
and referrals for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced.

COA disallowed 3.38M in disbursements and held petitioners (Medical Center Chief; Chief Admin Officer
Bacaltos for certifying in Box A that the expenses were lawful, necessary and incurred in her direct
supervision; Antoni, in her capacity as Chief of the Pharmacy Unit, for approving the supporting documents
when the imputed delivery of the medicines had already been consummated; Bien, in her capacity as
Hospital Accountant, for certifying in Box B of the disbursement voucher that the supporting documents for
the payment to Dell Pharmacy were complete and proper) and other VSMMC officials solidarily liable
therefor.

Issue/Held: WON the CoA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners solidarily liable for
the disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10.

Ratio:
The CoA correctly pointed out that VSMMC, through its officials, should have been deeply involved in
the implementation of the TNT Program as the hospital is a party to the MOA and, as such, has acted as custodian
and disbursing agency of Cuencos PDAF.47 Further, under the MOA executed between VSMMC and Cuenco, the

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 hospital represented itself as willing to cooperate/coordinate and monitor the implementation of a Medical Indigent
Support Program.48 More importantly, it undertook to ascertain that [a]ll payments and releases under [the]
program x x x shall be made in accordance with existing government accounting and auditing rules and
regulations.49 It is a standing rule that public officers who are custodians of government funds shall be liable for
their failure to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against loss or damage, and that they are expended,
utilized, disposed of or transferred in accordance with the law and existing regulations, and on the basis of
prescribed documents and necessary records.50

However, as pointed out by the SAT, provisions of the National Budget Circular No. (NBC) 47651 dated September
20, 2001 prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for a congressmans PDAF authorized under Republic
Act No. 876052 were not followed in the implementation of the TNT Program, as well as other existing auditing laws,
rules and regulations governing the procurement of medicines.

In particular, the TNT Program was not implemented by the appropriate implementing agency, i.e., the Department
of Health, but by the office set up by Cuenco. Further, the medicines purchased from Dell Pharmacy did not go
through the required public bidding in violation of the applicable procurement laws and rules.53 Similarly, specific
provisions of the MOA itself setting standards for the implementation of the same program were not observed. For
instance, only seven of the 133 prescriptions served and paid were within the maximum limit of P5,000.00 that an
indigent patient can avail of from Cuencos PDAF. Also, several indigent patients availed of the benefits more than
once, again in violation of the provisions of the MOA.54 Clearly, by allowing the TNT Office and the staff of Cuenco
to take over the entire process of availing of the benefits of the TNT Program without proper monitoring and
observance of internal control safeguards, the hospital and its accountable
officersrenegedontheirundertakingundertheMOAto
cooperate/coordinate and monitor the implementation of the said health program. They likewise violated
paragraph 555 of NBC 476 which requires a regular monitoring activity of all programs and projects funded by
the PDAF as well as Sections 12356 and 12457 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,58 otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (Auditing Code), which mandates the installation, implementation,
and monitoring of a sound system of internal control to safeguard assets and check the accuracy and reliability of
the accounting data.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; Absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is
a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.Jurisprudence holds that, absent any
showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. For
instance, in Reyna v. CoA (Reyna), 642 SCRA 210 (2011), the Court affirmed the liability of the public
officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered claims of good faith, since their actions violated an explicit
rule in the Landbank of the Philippines Manual on LendingOperations.

PEOPLE V. CANDIDIA -BRONDIAL

PEOPLE V. CADIDIA (2013)
Cadidia was arrested in MIA after 2 shabu packets were found in her underwear, whcih she initially claimed
was only a sanitary napkin. The packets were discovered after she was examined by PNP non-uniformed
officers Trayvilla and Bagsican in the bathroom. The trial court found her guilty of the vlating Sec. 5 Art. II of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. The CA affirmed thisruling.

The appellant claims that she is only being charged because she failed to pay the money being demanded
by the officers. She contends that the inconsistencies in Trayvilla and Bagsican's testimonies should have
been considered by the court. [Trayvilla claimed that after they went out of the comfort room, the packets
were immediately handed over to another officer, SPO3 Appang, for safekeeping. Bagsican said that she
placed it inside her blazer for safekeeping. There was also an issue as to who first asked the appellant to
bring out the contents of her underwear.]

Issues: WON the court erred in giving weight to the conflicting testimonies of Trayvilla and Bagsican.

Held: NO, it did not.

Ratio: The court found no conflict in the narration of events of the prosecution witnesses. The change in the
statement as to who asked the appellant to bring out her underwear was merely a clarification. As to what happened
immediately after they went out of the bathroom, it was found by the court that Bagsican put the packets in her
blazer and then handed it over to SPO3Appang.

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Even assuming there were conflicting statements, mere inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses'
positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator. As long as the testimonies as a whole presented
a coherent and believable recollection, the credibility would still be upheld. What is essential is
that their testimonies corroborate one another on material details surrounding the commission of the
crime.

[Relevant issue] As to non-compliance of all the requirements laid down by Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 regarding the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered dangerous
drugs, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 states that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said items
as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team. What is important is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The successful
presentation of the prosecution of every link of chain of custody is sufficient to hold the accused liable for the
offense charged.

In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident
by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed
their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Further, the evaluation of the credibility
of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much
weight and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on the stand and
ascertain if They are telling the truth or not. Applying the foregoing, we affirm the findings of the lower court in the
appreciation of facts and credibility of the witnesses.

In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police
officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the
contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers.

In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the police to impute the
crime against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty as an airport frisker when she handled the
accused who entered the xray machine of the departure area. There was no predetermined notice to
particularly search the accused especially in her private area. The unusual thickness of the buttocks of
the accused upon frisking prompted Trayvilla to notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The
subsequent search of the accused would only show that the two female friskers were just doing their usual
task when they found the illegal drugs inside accuseds underwear. This is bolstered by the fact
thattheaccusedontheonehandandthetwofriskerson the other were unfamiliar to each other. Neither could
they harbour any ill-will against each other. The allegation of frame-up and denial of the accused
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of three prosecution witnesses who corroborated on
circumstances surrounding the apprehension.Petition dismissed.

PEOPLE V. EDUALINO -BRONDIAL

PEOPLE VS. EDUALINO (1997)
Rowena Nantiza was attending a dance, was given beer by the accused, felt dizzy, and was raped in a
grassy area. This was witnessed by Aileen Yayen, who called the victims mother. The accused escaped
when he saw them.

RTC found him guilty.

It is argued that the force allegedly employed to consummate the rape was merely implied by the trial court
from complainants testimony that she did not enjoy the sexual act. Accused-appellant contends that even
assuming that the sexual act was consummated, the same could only have been successfully done with
the consent of the complainant, for if she ever attempted to resist or evade the thrust of the penis of
appellant, the latter could not have successfully hit the mark and penetrate the vagina.

Accused-appellant contends that the testimony of the complainant tends to show that there was foreplay
before the alleged rape whereby the accused allegedly kissed her, caressed her breast and bit her nipple;
that the accused was on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina and did the push and pull
movement; that she cannot remember how long it lasted but she knew [accused] had an orgasm after

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 which the accused stood up and left, all this bear the earmarks of a voluntary and mutual coition, a
consensual intercourse. There was norape.

Finally, accused-appellant raises the issue of the character of complainant Rowena Nantiza. It is argued
that a responsible and decent married woman, who was then three (3) months pregnant, would not be out
at two (2) oclock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to
accompany her to drink beer. It is contended that complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to save
her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and even
made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accused-appellant on 11 May 1994 while she was
under the influence of drugs and alcohol.
Force and intimidation should be viewed in the light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the offense.

The Court cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an attempt to conceal
addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. We fail to understand how a false rape story can save
a marriage under the circumstances averred by accused-appellant. Decision affirmed.

E. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE

PEOPLE V. FABRE- KAYE

G.R. No. 146697. July 23, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE
Facts: Leonardo Fabre was charged with rape before Regional Trial Court, Br. VI, of Prosperidad, Agusan del
Sur, because of raping his own daughter Marilou Fabre. Accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the
trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou, that of Adela Fabre, her mother and the wife of the
accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who examined Marilou, along with the medico-legal
certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of Adela, and the criminal complaint signed by both Marilou
and Adela. The defense, during its turn in the presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the
accused himself. It also called Adela Fabre back to the witness stand.

The trial court gave credence to the evidence given by the prosecution, particularly to the narration of the young
complainant, expressing a quote from an observation once made by this Tribunal in one of its decision that even
when consumed with revenge, it (would) take a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to
concoct a story which (could) put her own father for the rest of his remaining life in jail and drag herself and the
rest of her family to a lifetime of shame.

RTC Convicted the accused. The case was elevated to SC on automatic review.

The accused averred that THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED
APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND DENIAL. he defense
argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength for the failure of the
prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal evidence. The cross-examination of
a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called. The purpose of cross- examination is
to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct examination. The party against whom
the witness testifies may deem any furtherexaminationunnecessaryandinsteadrelyonanyotherevidence
theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court
thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination
merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of the accused is tenable.

Held: No. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called. The
purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct
examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination unnecessary and
instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be believed is
the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a
witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross- examined by the otherparty.

The alibi of appellant itself would not appear to be deserving of serious consideration. His account that at the time

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 of the alleged rape he was working at a coconut plantation, just about one kilometer away from the place of the
crime, hardly would amount to much. Nor would the testimony of Adela Fabre, his wife, merit any better regard. At
first, she testified that on the day of the rape incident, she had left their house at four o'clock in the afternoon. Later,
however, she changed her story by saying that she had left the house in the morning and returned only at ten
o'clock that same morning, staying home the whole day thereafter. In any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it
would not be enough for an accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he
would have to demonstrate likewise that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Clearly, in the instant case, it was not at all impossible nor even
improbable for appellant to have been at the crime scene.

Upon the other hand, the evidently candid and straightforward testimony of Marilou should be more than enough to
rebut the claim of innocence made by appellant.

PEOPLE V. PEREZ-LARIELA
G.R. No. 142556. February 5, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA
Facts: On January 22, 1997, the Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales filed an Information
charging appellant with the crime of rape penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No.7610.

Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de officio Atty. Genaro N. Montefalcon, pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged..

Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: the victim, Mayia Ponseca; the
victims mother, Hermie Ponseca; the victims father, Osias Ponseca; Virginia Espejo Giron; and Dr. Editha dela
Cruz Divino. On the other hand, the defense presented appellant and his employer, Bartolome Tolentino.

Appellant denied raping Mayia. Appellant testified that on the date of the alleged rape incident, he was working at
a fishpond at Macarang, Zambales. He heard of the rape of a young girl from his manager, Bartolome Tolentino.

On cross-examination, appellant testified that his nickname is not Johnny but Jessie. He testified that on January
17, 1997, at around 12 oclock noon, he left the fishpond and walked home to Barangay Alwa which was about
thirty meters from the fishpond. The defense formally offered the testimony of witness Tolentino to prove that
appellant was employed as caretaker of Tolentinos fishpond for almost two years before the alleged rape
incident. Appellant was purportedly of good moral character while employed as a fishpond caretaker. The
prosecution admitted the offer of testimony. Hence, the trial court dispensed with the testimony of Tolentino in
opencourt.

The Trial Court convicted the appellant. The case was elevated to SC on automatic review. Appellant contends
that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular. Appellant points out that the prosecutor had
already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt when the prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her
alleged rapist. Appellant stresses that when Mayia identified him in open court, she referred to him as a man
named Johnny and did not give any description or any identifying mark. Moreover, appellant claims he was alone
in the cell when Mayia identified him after the police arrested him. Appellant bewails
thattheidentificationwasnotdonewiththeusualpoliceline-up.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court is correct in propounding leading questions to the victim in open
court which is a departure from the usual question and answer in regular courts.
Held: Yes. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the
witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or
suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. In the case at bar, the trial
court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was evidently young and unlettered, making the
recall of events difficult, if not uncertain. As explained in People v. RoditoDagamos:

"The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the questioning of a child
witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect on
December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated
in a form appropriate to the developmental level of thechild,
(3) to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in
all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of justice."

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 The Court has repeatedly stated that it is highly inconceivable for a child of tender age, inexperienced in the ways
of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private part, subject herself
to public trial, and tarnish her familys honor and reputation, unless she was motivated by a strong desire to seek
justice for the wrong committed against her.
Mayias simple, positive and straightforward recounting on the witness stand of her harrowing experience lends
credence to her accusation. Her tender age belies any allegation that her accusation was a mere invention impelled
by some ill-motive. As the Court has stressed in numerous cases, when a woman or a child victim says that she
has been raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show that rape was indeedcommitted.

PEOPLE V. CASTELLANO-MANNY
G.R. No. 139412. April 2, 2003
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. aliasTalino, RONALD
CASTILLANO alias Nono and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun, RONALD CASTILLANO alias Nono and
JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun,

Facts: This is a murder case of one Diosdado Volante filed against Jaime Castillano Jr. and Sr., and Ronald
Castillano. The altercation of the parties to this incident begun when Diosdado did not consent and even asked
herein Jaime Castillano Sr. from the latters indiscriminate firing of his gun. Diosdado was a farmer in a barangay
in Camarines Sur in a farmland just meters away from the farmland of Jaime Castillano Sr. The animosity even
worsened and deepened which led to the alleged plan of killing Diosdado by the father and two sons, all
surnamed Castillano. Such plan was realized on that fateful night of July 8, 1996. However, upon the attempt of
the accused to flew, they were accosted during a check point in that place with their bags with them. Just to save
them all from being imprisoned, Ronald, solely admitted to have killed Diosdado but alleged self- defense. Trial
court convicted Ronald and Jaime Jr. while exonerating Jaime Sr. Appellant Jaime Jr. avers that the testimony of
Luz Volante was inconsistent with her testimony during preliminary investigation in the trial court and her sworn
statement before the police investigators.

Issue: Whether or not Luzs testimony in open court can be impeached by her own testimony during
preliminary investigation.

Held: No. The Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony of Luz, the prosecutions
principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary examination before the municipal
trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police investigators for the reason that the transcripts and
sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the appellants nor admitted in evidence by the
trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination
and her sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz was not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain the
purported inconsistencies, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:

How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement. - Before a witness can be impeached by
evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements
must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be
asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they
must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerningthem.

The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of
his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his
present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby
prevent an injustice to the witness being cross- examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to
explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they
were made.
In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her
sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any discrepancies between her present testimony
and her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. The appellants did not even mark
and offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for the specific purpose of impeaching her credibility
and her present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the trial court, said
transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.

PEOPLE V. PLASENCIA-MARA
G.R.No.90198 November 7,1995

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADO alias"Tonying," ROBERTO
DESCARTIN y PASICARAN alias "Ruby" and JOELITO (JULITO), DESCARTIN y PASICARAN

Facts: Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery with homicide
in information allegedly committed against Herminio Mansueto. When arraigned, all the accused entered a plea of
"not guilty" to the charge; whereupon, trial commenced. The main defense interposed is one ofalibi.
The Regional Trial Court did not give credence to the defense of alibi. It convicted the three accused of murder
(punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code), instead of robbery with homicide, explaining that the
term "homicide" was used in the information in its generic sense. Finding conspiracy, the trial court ruled that the
killing was qualified by both treachery and abuse of superior strength with the latter, however, being absorbed by
theformer.
On appeal, the accused appellants attacked the credibility of the prosecutions witness, Francisca Espina because
is a pejured witness who has an axe to grind against him because his dog had once bitten Francisca's child and
because of her alleged inconsistencies, faults the trial court for allowing the witness to glance at the notes written
on her palm while testifying. He also argues that his alibi, being corroborated, should have been given weight.

Issue: Whether or not the use of use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is allowed
Held: Yes. The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section 16,
Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact
occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that
the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in
evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the
particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made; but
such evidence must be received withcaution.

Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the exercise of
that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she merely wanted to be accurate on
dates and like details.

Appellants see inadvertency on Francisca's appearing to be "jittery" on the witness stand. Nervousness and
anxiety of a witness is a natural reaction particularly in the case of those who are called to testify for the first time.
The real concern, in fact, should be when they show no such emotions.

CANQUE V. CA-MARIA
G.R. No. 96202. April 13, 1999
ROSELLA D. CANQUE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
Facts: Rosario Canque is a contractor doing business under the name RDC Construction. Canque had contracts
with the government and in relation to the projects, she entered into two contracts with Socor Construction
Corporation for supplying as well as applying certain materials in the construction sites. When Socor Construction
billed Canque, it amounted to a total of P299,717.75 which included interest. Canque refused to pay the amount,
claiming that Socor Construction failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of
the items and the acceptance thereof of the government. This led to a complaint being filed with RTC of Cebu for
recovery the amount stated. During trial, Socor Construction presented its Vice President, Sofia Sanchez
and its
bookkeeper Dolores Aday while Canques evidence consisted only of her own testimony. The trial court ruled in
favor of Socor Construction, ordering Canque to pay the amount. The CA affirmed. Canque contests the
admissibility of the said Book of Collectible Accounts (Exhibit K). On its part, Socor Construction said that that
although the entries cannot be considered an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132,
Section 10 of the Rules of Court

Issue: Whether or not the Books of Collectible Accounts referred into by the private respondent in
refreshing the memory of the witness is admissible in evidence.

Held: No. It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for another purpose. Private
respondents counsel offered it for the purpose of showing the amount of petitioners indebtedness. He said:

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 Exhibit K, your Honor - faithful reproduction of page (17) of the book on Collectible Accounts of the plaintiff,
reflecting the principal indebtedness of defendant in the amount of Two hundred ninety-nine thousand seven
hundred seventeen pesos and seventy-five centavos (P299,717.75) and reflecting as well the accumulated interest
of three percent (3%) monthly compounded such that as of December 11, 1987, the amount collectible from the
defendant by the plaintiff is Six hundred sixteen thousand four hundred thirty-five pesos and seventy-two
centavos(P616,435.72);

This is also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to refresh the memory of Dolores
Aday as a witness. In other words, it is the nature oftheevidencethatischanged,notthepurposeforwhichitisoffered.

Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence. As explained in
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:

Under the above provision (Rule 132, 10), the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not
constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to
testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has testified independently of or after
his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible
as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement
prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he supports his open-court declaration with
written statements of the same facts evenifhedidpreparethemduringtheoccasionindispute,unlesstheproper
predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more, even where this requirement has been
satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only
because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the
witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence . . ..

As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge, they could only corroborate
Dolores Adays testimony that she made the entries as she received the bills.

IWASAWA V. GANGAN-RYNNAH
G.R.No.204169 September 11,2013
YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER, vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO,
AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY

FACTS: Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to the
Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as "single" and "has never married before." Since then, the two
became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and married private
respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan.

In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in
the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she
received news that her previous husband passedaway.

Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wifes confession and discovered that indeed, she was married to one
Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted petitioner to
file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their
marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following pieces of documentary evidence issued
by the National Statistics Office (NSO):
(1) Certificate of Marriage between petitioner and private respondent marked as Exhibit "A" to prove the fact of
marriage between the parties on November 28, 2002;
(2) Certificate of Marriage between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibit "B" to
prove the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20,1994;
(3) Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibits "C" and"C-
1"toprovethefactofthelattersdeathonJuly14,2009;and
(4) Certification from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage recorded by the office pertaining to
private respondent marked as Exhibit "D" to prove that private respondent in fact contracted two marriages, the first
one was to a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June 20, 1994, and second, to petitioner on November 28,2002.

The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) admitted the authenticity and due

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 execution of the above documentary exhibits during pre-trial.

RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondents prior
existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private
respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioners
testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private respondents prior marriage nor of
Arambulos death which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate between private respondent and
Arambulo and the latters death certificate. It further ruled that petitioners testimony about the NSO certification is
likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of saiddocument.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution
of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary
weight.

YES. There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public documents. As
provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts thereincontained.

As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did
not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution
since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said
documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the
private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to thecontrary.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of
the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous.

The marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan is declared NULL and
VOID.

ASIAN TERMINALS V PHILAM INSURANCE ADOLF

G.R.No.181163 July 24,2013
ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., Petitioner, vs. PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC. (nowChartis Philippines Insurance,
Inc.), Respondent.

FACTS: Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors Corporation (Universal Motors) 219 packages
containing 120 units of brand new Nissan Pickup Truck Double Cab 4x2 model, without engine, tires and
batteries, on board the vessel S/S "Calayan Iris" from Japan to Manila. The shipment, which had a declared value
of US$81,368 or P29,400,000, was insured with Philam against all risks under Marine Policy No. 708-8006717-4.

The carrying vessel arrived at the port of Manila on April 20, 1995, and when the shipment was unloaded by the
staff of ATI, it was found that the package marked as 03-245-42K/1 was in bad order. The Turn Over Survey of
Bad Order Cargoes dated April 21, 1995 identified two packages, labeled 03-245-42K/1 and 03/237/7CK/2, as
being dented and broken.

Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages in the amount of P643,963.84 against Westwind, ATI and R.F.
Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. When Universal
Motors demands remained unheeded, it sought reparation from and was compensated in the sum of P633,957.15
by Philam. Accordingly, Universal Motors issued a Subrogation Receipt dated November 15, 1995 in favor of
Philam

On January 18, 1996, Philam, as subrogee of Universal Motors, filed a Complaint for damages against Westwind,
ATI and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. before the RTC of Makati City, Branch148.

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 On September 24, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and ATI to pay
Philam, jointly and severally, the sum of P633,957.15 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, P158,989.28 by
way of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC.

All the parties moved for reconsideration, but their motions were denied in a Resolution dated January 11, 2008.
Thus, they each filed a petition for review on certiorari which were consolidated together by this Court considering
that all three petitions assail the same CA decision and resolution and involve the same parties

ISSUE: Whether the Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private
documents

HELD: YES.The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, are self- authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.
In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set
forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a
private document requires authentication in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:

SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its
due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;or
(b) Byevidenceofthegenuinenessofthesignatureorhandwritingofthemaker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when
the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness
and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;
(c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not
being offered as genuine.

Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private documents which
Philam and the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their business. Since none of the exceptions to the
requirement of authentication of a private document obtains in these cases, said documents may
notbeadmittedinevidenceforPhilamwithoutbeingproperlyauthenticated.

ALUDOS V SUERTE-BEA
LOMISES ALUDOS, deceased, substituted by FLORA ALUDOS vs. JOHNNY M.SUERTE
FACTS: Sometime in January 1969, Lomises acquired from the Baguio City Government the right to occupy two
stalls in the Hangar Market in Baguio City. Lomises entered into an agreement with respondent Johnny M. Suerte
for the transfer of all improvements and rights over the two market stalls. Johnny gave a down payment of
P45,000.00 to Lomises, who acknowledged receipt of the amount in a document executed on the same date as
the agreement:

Through a letter, Johnny protested the return of his money, and insisted on the continuation and enforcement of
his agreement with Lomises. When Lomises refused Johnnys protest, Johnny filed a complaint against Lomises
before the Regional Trial Court, for specific performance with damages.
RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and Lomises for failure to secure the consent of the Baguio City
Government to the agreement. The RTC found that Lomises was a mere lessee of the market stalls, and the
Baguio City Government was the owner-lessor of the stalls. Under Article 1649 of the Civil Code, "the lessee
cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary." As the
permit issued to Lomises did not contain any provision that the lease of the market stalls could further be assigned,
and in the absence of the consent of the Baguio City Government to the agreement, the RTC declared the
agreement between Lomises and Johnny null and void.

Lomises appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing that the real agreement between the parties was merely
one of loan, and not of sale.

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 CA rejected Lomises claim that the true agreement was one of loan. The CA found that there were two agreements
entered into between Johnny and Lomises: one was for the assignment of leasehold rights and the other was for
the sale of the improvements on the market stalls. The CA agreed with the RTC that the assignment of the
leasehold rights was void for lack of consent of the lessor, the Baguio City Government. The sale of the
improvements, however, was valid because these were Lomises private properties. For this reason, the CA
remanded the case to the RTC to determine the value of the improvements on the two market stalls, existing at the
time of the execution of the agreement.

Lomises now appeals the CA rulings through the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE : Whether or not the lease contract between Baguio City and Government is valid

NO. The CA has already rejected the evidentiary value of the lease contract between the Baguio City Government
and Lomises, as it was not formally offered in evidence before the RTC; in fact, the CA admonished Lomises
lawyer, Atty. Lockey,formakingitappearthatitwaspartoftherecordsofthecase.

Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. "The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in
evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper
barren of probative weight."
Although the contract was referred to in Lomises answer to Johnnys complaint and marked as Exhibit "2" in his
pre-trial brief, a copy of it was never attached. In fact, a copy of the May 1, 1985 lease contract "surfaced" only
after Lomises filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. What was formally offered was the 1969
permit, which only stated that Lomises was permitted to occupy a stall in the Baguio City market and nothing
else.25 In other words, no evidence was presented and formally offered showing that any and all improvements
in the market stalls shall be owned by the Baguio City Government.

WESTMONT INVESTMENT V FRANCIA-CELINE

G.R.No.194128 December 7,2011
WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., CECILIA ZAMORA, BENJAMIN
FRANCIA, and PEARLBANK SECURITIES, INC.

FACTS: Respondents Francias filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages arising from their
investments against petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation Wincorp and respondent Pearlbank Securities
Inc. Pearlbank before the RTC.

Wincorp and Pearlbank filed their separate motions to dismiss. Both motions were anchored on the ground that
the complaint of the Francias failed to state a cause of action. The RTC issued an order dismissing the motions to
dismiss of Wincorp and Pearlbank for lack of merit.

Wincorp then filed its Answer, while Pearlbank filed its Answer with Counterclaim and Crossclaim (against
Wincorp).
The case was set for pre-trial but before pre-trial conference could be held, Wincorp filed its Motion to Dismiss
Crossclaim of Pearlbank to which the latter
filedanopposition.TheRTCdeniedWincorpsmotiontodismisscrossclaim.

The pre-trial conference was later conducted after the parties had filed their respective pre-trial briefs.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Francias and held Wincorp solely liable to them.
Wincorp interposed an appeal with the CA. The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC.

The CA explained:A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial
judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this
allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as
the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. Evidence
not formally offered during the trial cannot be used for or against a party litigant. Neither may it be taken into
account onappeal.

The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable
period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, any evidence that has not been offered shall be

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 excluded andrejected.

Presiding therefrom, the very glaring conclusion is that all the documents attached in the motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the trial court and all the documents attached in the defendant-appellants brief filed by defendant-
appellant Wincorp cannot be given any probative weight or credit for the sole reason that the said documents were
not formally offered as evidence in the trial court because to consider them at this stage will deny the other parties
the right to rebutthem.

The arguments of defendant-appellant Wincorp that the plaintiffs-appellees made an erroneous offer of evidence as
the documents were offered to prove what is contrary to its content and that they made a violation of the parol
evidence rule do not hold water.

It is basic in the rule of evidence that objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally offered. In
case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified,
specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at
anyother,thatobjectiontothedocumentaryevidencemaybemade.

As to oral evidence, objection thereto must likewise be raised at the earliest possible time, that is, after the
objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable issue becomes apparent only after
the answer was given.
ISSUE: Whether all the documents attached by Wincorp to its pleadings cannot be given any weight or
evidentiary value for the sole reason that these documents were not formally offered as evidence in the
trial court

HELD: NO. It bears stressing too that all the documents attached by Wincorp to its pleadings before the CA
cannot be given any weight or evidentiary value for the sole reason that, as correctly observed by the CA, these
documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial court. To consider them now would deny the other
parties the right to examine and rebut them.

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 34. Offer of evidence The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

"The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for
the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of
probative weight."

The Court cannot, likewise, disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA as to the evidence presented by the
Francias. It is elementary that objection to evidence must be made after evidence is formally offered. It appears
that Wincorp was given ample opportunity to file its Comment/Objection to the formal offer of evidence of the
Francias but it chose not to fileany.

FORTUNE TOBACCO V CIR-CHEERLY

F. WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

PEOPLE V. CALISO CZARINA

G.R.No.183830 October 19,2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. DELFIN CALISO
FACTS: Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC), in Kapatagan,
Lanao del Norte found him guilty of murder for the killing of AAA, a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and
sentenced him to death. The appeal of the conviction was brought automatically to the Court. On June 28, 2005,
the Court transferred the records to the Court of Appeals (CA) for intermediate review pursuant to the ruling in
People v. Mateo. On October 26, 2007, the CA, although affirming the conviction, reduced the penalty to reclusion

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perpetua and modified the civil awards. Now, Caliso is before us in a final bid to overturn his conviction.

In his defense, Caliso denied the accusation and interposed an alibi, insisting that on the day of the killing, he
plowed the rice field of Alac Yangyang from 7:00 am until 4:00 pm. Yangyang corroborated Calisos alibi, recalling
that Caliso had plowed his rice field from 8 am to 4 pm of June 5, 1997.

The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the killing of AAA because the old-healed hymenal
lacerations of AAA and the fact that the victims underwear had been irregularly placed could not establish the
commission of carnal knowledge; that the examining physician also found no physical signs of rape on the body of
AAA; and that as to the killing of AAA, the identification by Amegable that the man she had seen submerging AAA
in the murky river was no other than Caliso himself wasreliable.

Nevertheless, the RTC did not take into consideration the testimony of Bering on Calisos extrajudicial admission of
the ownership of the short pants because the pants were not presented as evidence and because the police
officers involved did not testify about the pants in court.

As stated, the CA affirmed Calisos conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations the RTC had rendered.
The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of Caliso, despite his back being turned towards her during
the commission of the crime
ISSUE: whether Amegables identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA at noon of July 5, 1997 was
positive and reliable

In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the
identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction
without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.

When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive and reliable enough for establishing his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt?

The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct
evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no
eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome
the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive
identification in People v. Gallarde, to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very
commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen
withthevictimimmediatelybeforeorafterthecrime.TheCourtsaid:

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the
very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a
suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the
commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a
witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively
identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or one of
the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together
with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which
is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of allothers.

If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the
exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and
elementary that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Sucha
proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the
only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence
would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free
and the community would be denied proper protection.

Amegables recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number "11" did not enhance the
reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one, such pants were not one-of-a-kind apparel, but generic. Also, they
were not offered in evidence. Yet, even if they had been admitted in evidence, it remained doubtful that they could
have been linked to Caliso without proof of his ownership or possession of them in the moments before the crime

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 was perpetrated.

Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable to impute the killing to Caliso guarantee the
reliability and accuracy of her identification of him. The dearth of competent additional evidence that eliminated the
possibility of any human error in Amegables identification of Caliso rendered her lack of bad faith or ill motive
irrelevant and immaterial, for even the most sincere person could easily be mistaken about her impressions of
persons involved in startling occurrences such as the crime committed against AAA. It is neither fair nor judicious,
therefore, to have the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable raise her identification to the level of
moralcertainty.

In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accuseds constitutional right
to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, though his
innocence may be doubted. The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of
primary importance, and the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but
on the strength of the evidence for the Prosecution.

PEOPLE V. PATENTES DARYL

G.R.No.190178 February 12,2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA
The peculiar nature of rape is that conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely upon the word of the private
complainant because it is essentially committed in relative isolation or even in secrecy, and it is usually only the
victim who can testify of the unconsented coitus. Thus, the long standing rule is that when an alleged victim of
rape says she was violated, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed.
Since the participants are usually the only witnesses in crimes of this nature and the accused's conviction or
acquittal virtually depends on the private complainant's testimony, it must be received with utmost caution. It is
then incumbent upon the trial court to be very scrupulous in ascertaining the credibility of the victim's testimony.
Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman claiming to have been
sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and
humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice according tolaw.

FACTS: The present case involves eight (8) sets of Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape filed by private
complainant ("AAA") against appellant, Felimon Patentes.

AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit and bring medicines to her sick grandmother. While seated
at the rear portion of the bus, appellant suddenly sat next to her. It was the second time AAA met appellant. After
a brief conversation, appellant suddenly showed her his bolo, covered by a red scabbard tucked in his right side
while he held a red steel pipe with Arabic markings, which he used to threaten to kill AAA should AAA disobey
him. Appellant then accompanied AAA to her grandmothers place and returned to Davao City proper bybus.

Appellant then brought AAA to his house in Hacienda Heights, Davao City, where his parents, sister, brother-in-
law, nephews and nieces live.

Upon entering the house, appellant dragged AAA to a room upstairs and tied her to a sewing machine. Appellant
then started to smoke something, which he also forced AAA to inhale, causing AAA to feel light, weak and dizzy.
This prevented AAA from fighting back as appellant removed AAAs clothes. Doffed of his own clothes, appellant
mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. The rape was repeated severaltimes.

On 13 December 1998, to free herself from her predicament, AAA convinced appellant that she will marry him.
Appellant agreed. Appellants mother accompanied AAA to the latters house to discuss the marital plans with
AAAs family. Surprised by the marital plans, AAAs mother asked for a private moment with AAA. In their
conversation, AAA confessed how appellant forcibly took her to his house on 5 December 1998 and raped her for
more than a week. AAAs mother then accompanied AAA to report her ordeal to the police, where AAA was
examined by a doctor, Dr. Samuel Cruz, the City Health Officer of Davao City.
Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the following observations about AAA: (1)
contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and can readily admit a normal-sized erect
male penis without sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for spermatozoa. Dr. Cruz also added
that he cannot tell whether it was AAAs first sexual intercourse as the vagina was not injured but had healed
lacerations.

After trial, the lower court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one
(1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape.

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 Aggrieved, appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
trial court with modification as to accuseds civil liability.

The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution. A thorough reading of the transcript shows that AAAs testimony bears the earmarks of truth and
credibility." Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether there was proof beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: NO.A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means a
moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. In the case at bar, the
prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of the charge that
appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation.

The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate credulity for
the charge can easily be concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially
where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during
and after the rape is open to conflicting interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and
humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice based on the law.

The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable doubt in Our
mind. In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant must be upheld
considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the quantum of proof to support a conviction.

SC V. DELGADO DON
Supreme Court vs. Delgado 658 SCRA
Facts: Rosendo Delgado was charged with murder and contends that the victim was the unlawful aggressor.

Issues: Whether or not the evidence presented would absolve the accused with the crime of murder.

Held: "A person who seeks justification for his act must prove by clear and convincing evidence the presence of
the necessary justifying circumstance for having admitted wounding or killing his adversary, and he is criminally
liable unless he is able to satisfy the Court that he acted in legitimate self-defense." The appellant contends that
the entry point of Wound No. 1 was in the abdomen or stomach thus making the three wounds inflicted on the
deceased possible. However, this contention is not supported by any proof or explanation and is, in fact,
contradictory to the post-mortem examination report issued by an independent third party, the sanitary inspector
among whose main functions is the performance of autopsies on cadavers of deceased persons.

The appellant's claim of self-defense is further negated by other circumstances such as the absence of any major
injury on his body as against three severe wounds, any one of which would have been fatal, suffered by the
victim. According to the appellant, the victim was in a superior position to inflict harm. Moreover, the appellant
failed to tell the police authorities that he killed the victim in self-defense. His defense theory is obviously an
afterthought.

GOVT OF HONGKONG V OLALIA EASTER

G.R.No.153675 April 19,2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, representedby the Philippine
Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ
FACTS: Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense
of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance,
Cap. 201 of HongKong.
He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong
Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued againsthim.

Petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of
private respondent, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private
respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed bypetitioner.

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 After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine
law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited
himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by
respondentjudge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for
bail. This was granted by respondent judge allowing private respondent to post bail.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail since there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.

HELD: NO.

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended
period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged
deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not
provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a
motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution,
but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither
be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence
in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases
cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from
fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extraditioncourt.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincingevidence."

PEOPLE V. FONTANILLA GIGI

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO,
G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012
Facts: Alfonso Fontanilla was charged of murder for allegedly strucking Olias inthe head with a piece of wood
called Bellang causing the latter fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of
stone. As aresult, the victim died. Fontanilla claimed self-defense alleging that on the night of the incident, he had
been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed
him in the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his
fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, hadalso kicked him with both his legs; that he had

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 thus been forced to defendhimself by picking up a stone which he had hit the victimshead.

The RTC in rejected Fontanillas plea of self-defense noted that he did not suffer any injury despite his claim that
the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to any
injury he might have suffered, having been immediately released from the hospital; that Fontanillas failure to give
any statement at the time he surrendered to the police was inconsistent with his plea of self-defense.

Issue: Whether or not there is self-defense in the instant case.

Ruling:In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following
elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the partof the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent orrepel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persondefending himself.

By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. It is
basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the
deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying
circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the victim,
Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he
would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should
discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecutions evidence, even if
weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. Nonetheless, the burden to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.

Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not commit unlawful
aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanillas act of hitting the victims head with a stone, causing the
mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victims fistic attack and
kicks.

PCIB V BALMACEDA GRACE

G.R.No.158143 September 21,2011
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA and ROLANDO N.
RAMOS
FACTS: PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages before the RTC against Antonio
Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. In its complaint, PCIB alleged that between
1991 and 1993, Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch manager, fraudulently obtained and
encashed 31 Managers checks in the total amount of P10,782,150.00.

On February 28, 1994, PCIB moved to be allowed to file an amended complaint to implead Rolando Ramos as
one of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmacedas alleged fraud. PCIB also increased the
number of fraudulently obtained and encashed Managers checks to 34, in the total amount of P11,937,150.00.
The RTC granted this motion.

Since Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default. On the other hand, Ramos filed an Answer
denying any knowledge of Balmacedas scheme. According to Ramos, he is a reputable businessman engaged
in the business of buying and selling fighting cocks, and Balmaceda was one of his clients. Ramos admitted
receiving money from Balmaceda as payment for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained
that he had no knowledge of the source of Balmacedas money.

The RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB.

On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint against Ramos, holding that no sufficient evidence existed to prove
that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latters fraudulent manipulations.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that there is no evidence to hold that respondent Ramos acted in
complicity with respondent Balcameda

HELD: NO.From the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, we find it beyond question that Balmaceda,
by taking advantage of his position as branch manager of PCIBs Sta. Cruz, Manila branch, was able to apply for
and obtain Managers checks drawn against the bank account of one of PCIBs clients. The unsettled question is
whether Ramos, who received a portion of the money that Balmaceda
tookfromPCIB,shouldalsobeheldliableforthereturnofthismoneytotheBank.

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 PCIB insists that it presented sufficient evidence to establish that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the scheme to
fraudulently secure Managers checks and to misappropriate their proceeds. Since Ramos defense anchored on
mere denial of any participation in Balmacedas wrongdoing is an intrinsically weak defense, it was error for the
CA to exonerate Ramos from anyliability.

In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence offered in opposition.

This Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., defined "preponderance of evidence" in the following manner:

"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the
credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the
truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.

Thus, PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its positive assertion that Ramos conspired
with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latters scheme to defraud theBank.

On its face, all that PCIBs evidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos name as a payee when he filled up
the application forms for the Managers checks. But, as the CA correctly observed, the mere fact that Balmaceda
made Ramos the payee on some of the Managers checks is not enough basis to conclude that Ramos was
complicit in Balmacedas fraud; a number of other people were made payees on the other Managers checks yet
PCIB never alleged them to be liable, nor did the Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos
participation that would justify his separate treatment from the others. Also, while Ramos is Balmacedas brother-
in-law, their relationship is not sufficient, by itself, to render Ramos liable,
absentconcreteproofofhisactualparticipationinthefraudulentscheme.

Moreover, the evidence on record clearly shows that Balmaceda acted on his own when he applied for the
Managers checks against the bank account of one of PCIBs clients, as well as when he encashed the
fraudulently acquired Managers checks.

DE LA LLANA V BIONG HAZELLE

G.R.No.182356 December 4,2013
DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO vs. REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the name and style of
Pongkay Trading
Facts: On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along
North Avenue, QuezonCity.

His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat.

Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds
after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the cars rear end, violently
pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the cars rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered.
Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart fromthese minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to
have suffered from any other visible physical injuries.

The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that Joel
was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.

Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style
of "Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.

In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and
shoulder. Such incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the
surgery.

Dra. dela Llana,, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay.
Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and
claimedP150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and an average monthly income

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ofP30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as
attorneysfees.

In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no reasonable relation
existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llanas injury. She pointed out that Dra. dela Llanas illness
became manifest one month and one week from the date of the vehicular accident. As a counterclaim, she
demanded the payment of attorneys fees and costs of the suit.

At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile witness.

Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To prove her
claim, she identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The
medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical history
and physical examinations.

The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury to
be Joels reckless driving. Tthe CA reversed the RTC ruling

ISSUE: whether Joels reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury? NO

HELD: Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish
a quasi-delict case are:

(1) damages to theplaintiff;

(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond,
was guilty;and
(3) theconnectionofcauseandeffectbetweensuchnegligenceandthedamages.

Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three elements
of quasi-delict before we determine Rebeccas liability as Joelsemployer.

She should show the chain of causation between Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury.

Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.

Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then proceed with
the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, "an action predicated on
an employees act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or
omission committed by hisemployee."

The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations.

In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of
credible evidence.
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.

In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joels negligence and Dra. dela
Llanas whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joels
negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her
whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.

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 Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:

(1) the pictures of her damagedcar,

(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000,and
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the
vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other words,

Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum
probandum or the ultimate fact can be established.

Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary evidence in its resolution of the case. It is a basic rule that
evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments.

However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical certificate has no
probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who
is not on the witness stand.

In the present case, Dra. dela Llanas medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that she was
not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on the nature, and the
cause and effects of whiplash injury.

In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of evidence. While we
commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to
rule against Dra. dela Llanas favor. Her claim, unsupported by prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare
assertion and has no leg to stand on.

CANLAO V. PEOPLE -JANUSZ

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. REYES JODELLE

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs ANTONIO T. REYES,
G.R. No. 170512 October 5, 2011
Facts: Petitioner adjudged Reyes guilty of grave misconduct after finding that Reyes, being then the Head of
Office of the LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin, illegally exacted money from Acero in exchange for the issuance of a
drivers license to the latter, notwithstanding that Acero did not pass the requisite written examination therefor.

Issue: Whether the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by substantial
evidence.

Held:Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.[32] In administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably
opine otherwise.

Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman
are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence.[32] In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only
substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise

RAMOS V. BPI SAVINGS BANK KAYE

G.R.No.203186 December 4,2013
XAVIER C. RAMOS vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. and/or ALFONSO L. SALCEDO, JR.

FACTS: Ramos was employed by BPI Family in 1995 and eventually became its Vice-President for Dealer
Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division.

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During his tenure, a client named Trezita B. Acosta entered into and obtained several auto and real estate loans
from BPI Family which were duly approved and promptly paid.

Acosta purportedly secured another auto loan from BPI Family in the amount of P3,097,392.00 for the purchase
of a Toyota Prado vehicle (subject loan) which had remained unpaid. As it turned out, Acosta did not authorize
nor personally apply for the subject loan, rendering the transaction fraudulent.
As a consequence, BPI Family lost P2,294,080.00, which amount was divided between Ramos and his three (3)
other subordinates, with Ramos shouldering the proportionate amount of P546,000.00. The foregoing amount was
subsequently deducted from Ramos benefits which accrued upon his retirement on May 1, 2006. In relation
thereto, he executed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim agreeing to release the bank from any claim or liability with
respect to, inter alia, his separation pay or retirementbenefits.

Claiming that the deductions made by BPI Family were illegal, Ramos filed a complaint for underpayment of
retirement benefits and non- payment of overtime and holiday pay and premium pay against BPI Family and/or its
President at that time, Alfonso L. Salcedo, Jr., before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Ramoss complaint, ruling that the deduction made on his retirement benefits was
"legal and even reasonable" since Ramos was negligent in running his department.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA holding that the deduction complained of was "illegal andunreasonable".

BPI Family filed an MR DENIED; hence, it filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Pending resolution thereof,
Ramos submitted a manifestation that he had caused the execution of the NLRC decision and the sum amounting
to P600,000.00 was released in satisfaction of his claim.

The CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of Ramos, holding that Ramos was remiss in his duty as head
of Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division in failing to determine the true identity of the person who availed
of the auto loan under the name "Trezita Acosta". However, it also attributed negligence on the part of BPI Family
since it sanctioned the practice of issuing the PO and ATD prior to the approval of the credit committee.

Thus, finding BPI Familys negligence to be concurrent with Ramos. Ramos moved for reconsideration

DENIED. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the deduction made from Ramoss retirement benefits to be illegal and unreasonable

HELD: YES. The requirement that the NLRCs findings should be supported by substantial evidence is clearly
expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Courtwhichprovidesthat"incasesfiledbeforeadministrativeorquasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify aconclusion."

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the CA to have erred in attributing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC in finding that the deduction made from Ramoss retirement benefits was
improper. Two (2) reasons impel the foregoing conclusion:

First, as correctly observed by the NLRC, BPI Family was not able to substantially prove its imputation of
negligence against Ramos. Well-settled is the rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the
affirmative of an issue.

In this case, BPI Family failed to establish that the duty to confirm and validate information in credit applications
and determine credit worthiness of prospective loan applicants rests with the Dealer Network Marketing
Department, which is the department under the supervision of Ramos. Quite the contrary, records show that
these responsibilities lie with the banks Credit Services Department, namely its Credit Evaluation Section and
Loans Review and Documentation Section, of which Ramos was not partof.

Second, as similarly observed by the NLRC, Ramos merely followed standing company practice when he issued
the PO and ATD without prior approval from the banks Credit Services Department.

The report further noted that the practice has been adopted due in part to the stiff competition with other banks

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 and lending institutions. Resultantly, in 2005 alone, approximately 111 car loan applications were released ahead
of the approval of the credit evaluationsection.

Based on the foregoing, it is readily apparent that Ramoss action of issuing the PO and ATD ahead of the approval
of the credit committee was actually conformant to regular company practice which BPI Family itself sanctioned. As
such, Ramos cannot be said to have been negligent on his duties. To this end, it is well to note that in loan
transactions, banks are mandated to ensure that their client wholly comply with all the documentary requirements in
relation to the approval and release of loan applications. As BPI Family "uncharacteristically relaxed supervision over
its divisions," yielding as it did to the demands of industry competition, it is
butreasonablethatsolelybearsthelossofitsownshortcomings

LUCAS V LUCAS LARIELA

JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, G.R. No. 190710 June
6, 2011
Facts: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to
DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got
acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was adversarial
in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and
Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a
Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to
him as Jesses father.

Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish
compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba
namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between
the putative father and the child.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled
where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full- blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of
Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been
met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima faciecase.

Issue: Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

Held: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since
no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement in Herrera
v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face
has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural
aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that
cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been
filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima
facie case is built by a partysevidenceandnotbymereallegationsintheinitiatorypleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy
and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on
application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall
issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists
that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing
now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good
reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential
to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other
factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party,
including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however,
that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter ofrightif,duringthehearing,thesaidconditionsareestablished.

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 In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein
the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a
search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order
to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions
as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of
procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing
must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing
inpaternitycases.Weagree,andfindthat,asapreliminarymatter,beforethe
court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action
refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for
blood testing The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from
mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima
facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility ofpaternity.

PNB V. TRIA MANNY

G.R.No.193250April25,2012PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. AMELIO TRIA and JOHNDOE
FACTS: MWSS opened C/A No. 244-850099-6 with PNB-MWSS and made an initial deposit of PhP 6,714,621.13
on October 10, 2001. On April 16, 2003, C/A 244- 850099-6 became dormant with a balance of PhP 5,397,154.07.

In the meantime, Tria requested a listing of the dormant accounts of PNB-MWSS. PNB-MWSS received a letter-
request from MWSS instructing the deduction of PhP 5,200,000 (plus charges) from C/A 244-850099-6 and the
issuance of the corresponding managers check in the same amount payable to a certain "Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes."
The letter-request was purportedly signed and approved by the duly authorized signatories of MWSS. Hence, C/A
244-850099-6 was re-activated in light of the letter-request. Managers Check was, thus, prepared and issued in
the name of Atty. Reyes for PhP5,200,000.

On November 1, 2004, Tria retired as PNB-MWSS Manager under PNBs regular retirement plan.

On February 2, 2005, Zaida Pulida, the MWSS employee in charge of C/A No. 244- 850099-6, inquired about the
accounts outstanding balance. She inquired about a debit entry dated April 22, 2004 to C/A No. 244-850099-6 in
the amount of PhP 5,200,000. Veniegas verified that PhP 5,200,000 was indeed debited and was encashed
using Managers Check No. 1165848 in favor of Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes, negotiated and encashed at the PNB-
Circle on April 26, 2004 and was annotated with "ok for payment per confirmation and approval of PNB MWSS"
by Tria on the dorsal portion of the check. Veniegas also attempted to retrieve the files for the transaction but
discovered that the duplicate copies were all missing. Pulida notified Veniegas that MWSS did not apply for
the issuance of the managers check payable to Atty. Reyes and there was no Rodrigo A. Reyes included in
IBPs membership roster.

PNB conducted its own investigation and, at its conclusion, sought to hold Tria liable for qualified theft. Following
a preliminary investigation, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending dismissal of the
charge for Qualified Theft against respondent Amelio C. Tria due to lack of evidence and probable cause.

PNB moved for reconsideration but was denied. Undaunted, PNB filed a petition for review with the DOJ and
prayed for the reversal of the August 15, 2006 and April 13, 2007 Resolutions issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, which was, however, dismissed. PNB sought recourse before the CA. The CA
decided in favor of Tria.

ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause to hold Tria and Atty. Reyes/John Doe for trial in the crime of
qualifiedtheft

HELD: YES. While discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary investigation to ascertain
sufficient ground for the filing of an information rests with the executive branch, such authority is far from
absolute. It may be subject to review when it has been clearly used with grave abuse of discretion. And indeed,
grave abuse of discretion attended the decision to drop the charges against Tria as there was more than
probable cause to proceed against him for qualifiedtheft.

It must be emphasized at the outset that what is necessary for the filing of a criminal information is not proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him, but only that there is

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 probable cause to believe that he is guilty of the crimecharged.

Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, are such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence
of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused.
The acts of Tria and the relevant circumstances that led to the encashment of the check provide more than
sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause to file an information against him and John Doe/Atty. Reyes for
qualified theft. In fact, it is easy to infer from the factual milieu of the instant case the existence of all the elements
necessary for the prosecution of the crime of qualified theft.

DEL CASTILLO V PEOPLE MARA

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185128, 30 January 2012
Facts: Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to serve a search warrant from the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) to Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid
which prompted the police officers to immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and go directly to Del
Castillos house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing incriminating in Del Castillos residence, but one of
the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the hut several articles including four (4) plastic packs of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, orshabu.

An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not guilty. The RTC
found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the information. The Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed thedecision.

Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there was a violation of his constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure. On the contrary, the Office of the Solicitor General argued that the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against government
authorities. Hence, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the search
warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a
barangay tanod who is a private individual.

Issue: Whether or not there is probable cause.

Held: Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made
known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances
standard. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the
issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched. A review of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of Del Castillos right against unreasonable searches and
seizure

HELD: YES
It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be
searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement ofdefiniteness.

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 In the present case, the search warrant specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the
place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from
the residence of the Del Castillo. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one
described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of
which as an evidence is a violation of Del
Castillosconstitutionalguarantyagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizure.

PEOPLE V ANTICAMARA MARIA

G.R.No.178771 June 8,2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO and FERNANDO CALAGUAS
FERNANDEZ a.k.a. LANDO CALAGUAS,
FACTS: Lando, Al, Dick Taedo, Roberto Taedo, Marvin Lim, Necitas Ordeiza- Taedo, and Fred Doe are
charged with the crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention in two separate Informations.

When arraigned of the aforementioned crimes, Lando, Al and Cita all pleaded not guilty, while Dick, Bet, Marvin
and Fred Doe remained at-large. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.

At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while AAA and the victim Abad Sulpacio were sleeping inside
the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan several persons entered to rob the
place. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Taedo, and heard the
latter uttering "somebody will die". Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she saw
inside Abad Sulpacio who was blindfolded and with his hands tied. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused
Dick Taedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Taedo, Alberto Anticamara and Fred. The last time that she
saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the vehicle by Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon reaching
Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick Taedo stayed with her in the vehicle. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the
vehicle, she heard him uttered: "Make a decision now. Abad has already
four(4)bulletsinhisbody,andtheoneleftisforthisgirl."

The RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, rendered its Decision finding Accused Nicetas "Cita" Taedo
acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence; Accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (alyas Lando
Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (alyas Al Camara) are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal, of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery; the penalty of DEATH is hereby imposed upon the two (2)
accused Fernando Calaguas Fernandez (Lando Calaguas) and Alberto Anticamara (Al Camara). The CA rendered
a Decision affirming the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC gravely erred in rendering a verdict of conviction despite the fact that the guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt
HELD: NO. The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the early
morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution
adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the
perpetrators of thecrime.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the
main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
sustain conviction if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken
chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
theperpetrator.

In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken together, lead to
the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio.

In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint a
clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and
brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.

PEOPLE V DEOCAMPO RYNNAH

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 G.R.No.185212 February 15,2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARITESS ALOLOD, EFREN DEOCAMPO, ELMER DEOCAMPO and
EDWIN DEOCAMPO EFREN DEOCAMPO
Facts:
This case is about when circumstantial evidence may be considered sufficient to support a finding of guilt in a
murder case.
A number of accused are charged with murder.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that accused Efren was responsible for
the murder of the Alolod couple based on circumstantial evidence.
Held: The rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the commission of the crimeprovides:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for convictionif:
(a) There is more than onecircumstance;
(b) Thefactsfromwhichtheinferencesarederivedareproven;and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonabledoubt

The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion: the accused
committed the crime to the exclusion of all others.[2]

Here, those circumstances abound.

1. Efren had always been banned from the old couples house because they strongly disapproved his
relationship with Maritess, their adopted daughter so he had no business being around thathouse.
2. The old couple were enjoying good health before the evening of May 27, 1998.
3. On May 28 they were suddenly gone from the house, meaning that they were killed on the night of May 27
or early morning ofMay 28.
4. On the night of May 27 the security guard at Salaman Institute saw Efren and Edwin standing on the school
side of the fence next to the old couples house. They even tried to conceal themselves in the school toilet. The
next day, the guard discovered that the fence wire had beencut.
5. At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28 a neighbor heard the sound of a woman sobbing and what seemed like the
butchering of apig.
6. At break of dawn, a witness saw Efren in the Alolodkitchen.
7. From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couples house, with Efren wearing the old
manswatch.
8. Maritess definitely lied about her adoptive parents going to Cotabato City and subsequently to Davao City
for medical treatment when people started looking for them. They were of course buried in thegarden.
9. A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant more camote on a pile of red soil beside thehouse.
10. Thebodiesoftheoldcouplewerefoundunderneaththoseplants.

CELEDONIO V. PEOPLE -ADOLF

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