R Transport Corporation v.

Yu, GR 174161, February 18, 2015

Facts: One morning, Loreta J. Yu, after having alighted from a passenger bus in front of Robinson's Galleria along
the north-bound lane of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA), was hit and run over by a bus driven by Antonio P.
Gimena, who was then employed by petitioner R Transport Corporation. Loreta was immediately rushed to Medical
City Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival. the husband of the deceased, respondent Luisito G. Yu,
filed a Complaint for damages against petitioner R Transport, Antonio Gimena, and Metro Manila Transport
Corporation (MMTC) for the death of his wife.

Issue/s: Whether or not R Tranport is solidarily liable for damages as the employer of Antonio Gimena

Ruling: Yes. R Transport is direct, primary and solidary liable as stated under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180
of the New Civil Code. The liability which petitioner is being made responsible actually arises not from a pre-existing
contractual relation between petitioner and the deceased but from a damage caused by the negligence of its
employee. Petitioner cannot, therefore, rely on our ruling in Tamayo and escape its solidary liability for the liability of
the employer for the negligent conduct of its subordinate is direct and primary, subject only to the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.

Valenzuela v. CA, GR 115024, February 7, 1996

Facts: At around 2:00 in the morning, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No.
FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. Having been told by
the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she
parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the
rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will
help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and
registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against
the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from
under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle
connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to
have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)".

Issue/s: (a) Whether or not Richard Li and Alexander Commercial Inc., registered owner of the car, are liable for
damages; and (b) Whether or not Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela guilty of contributory negligence

Ruling: (a) Yes. Court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence
and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's
employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180; and (b) No. Under the "emergency rule"
adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger
and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.

Rosete v. Auditor General, GR L-1120, August 31, 1948

Facts: Damages were caused to the buildings belonging to Inocencio Rosete and others, which according to the
appellant's claim were destroyed by fire that came from the contiguous warehouse of the Emergency Control
Administration, ECA, due to the negligence of a certain Jose Frayno y Panlilio in igniting recklessly his cigarette-
lighter near a five gallon drum into which gasoline was being drained, and of the officers of the said ECA, which is an
office or agency of the Government, in storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of Ordinances of
the City of Manila.

Issue/s: Whether or not the ECA acted as a special agent of the Government, making the latter liable for damages

Ruling: No. There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the Emergency Control
Administration or its officers, was done by an special agent, because the officers of the Emergency Control
Administration did not act as special agents of the government within the defined meaning of that word in Article 1903
of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in warehouse of the ECA, the government is not responsible for the damages
caused through such negligence.

Quezon City v. Dacara, GR 150304, June 15, 2005

Facts: At 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of '87 Toyota Corolla 4-door
Sedan with Plate No. 877, while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at
Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra, Jr.
allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of
earth

Issue/s: Whether or not Quezon City governments contention that they are not liable because they have exercised
ordinary due diligence and care

Ruling: No. Quezon City governments contention is untenable. The evidence proffered by the respondent was found
to be sufficient proof of the negligence of herein petitioners. The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code
capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it
exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision
found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable. Harsh
application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and
repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable. Not
only is the work of petitioners impressed with public interest; their very existence is justified only by public service.
Hence, local governments have the paramount responsibility of keeping the interests of the public foremost in their
agenda. For these reasons, it is most disturbing to note that the present petitioners are the very parties responsible
for endangering the public through such a rash and reckless act.

Philtranco v. CA, GR 120553, June 17, 1997

Facts: The victim Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle, along the Gomez Street of Calbayog City.
The Gomez Street is along the side of Nijaga Park. On the Magsaysay Blvd., defendant Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco) Bus driven by defendant Rogasiones Manilhig y Dolira was being pushed by some
persons in order to start its engine. The Magsaysay Blvd. runs perpendicular to Gomez St. and the said Philtranco
bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street. As the bus was pushed, its engine started
thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still
riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and
suddenly, its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine, thereby the subject bus bumped on
the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result thereof fell and, thereafter, was run over by the said bus which
resulted to his death.
Issue/s: Whether or not CA erroneously awarded excessive damages to the private respondent

Ruling: Yes, CA erroneously fixed the "death indemnity" at P200,000. The private respondents defended the award
in their Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration by saying that "in the case of Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 185 SCRA 110, our Supreme Court held that the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of
the life expectancy of the deceased." In that case, the "death indemnity" was computed by multiplying the victim's
gross annual income by his life expectancy, less his yearly living expenses. Clearly then, the "death indemnity"
referred to was the additional indemnity for the loss of earning capacity mentioned in Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code,
and not the basic indemnity for death mentioned in the first paragraph thereof.

The award of P1 million for moral damages to the heirs of Ramon Acuesta has no sufficient basis and is excessive
and unreasonable. This was based solely on the testimony of one of the heirs, Atty. Julio Acuesta. Since the other
heirs of the deceased did not take the witness stand, the trial court had no basis for its award of moral damages to
those who did not testify thereon. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of
the defendant. They are awarded only to allow the former to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve
to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant's culpable action and must, perforce, be
proportional to the suffering inflicted.

The award of P500,000 for exemplary damages is also excessive. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
awarded if the party at fault acted with gross negligence. The Court of Appeals found that there was gross negligence
on the part of petitioner Dolira. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages.
Considering its purpose, it must be fair and reasonable in every case and should not be awarded to unjustly enrich a
prevailing party.

Finally, the award of P50,000 for attorney's fees must be reduced. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be
recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Stated
otherwise, the grant of attorney's fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule, as counsel's fees are
not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit. Such attorney's fees can be awarded in the cases enumerated in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, and in all cases it must be reasonable. Among the instances mentioned in Article 2208
of the Civil Code when attorney's fees may be recovered is "(1) when exemplary damages are awarded." Under the
circumstances in this case, an award of P25,000 for attorney's fees is reasonable.