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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L21325October29,1971

THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
PABLEODRAMAYO,PATERNOECUBIN,PRIOLOBILLONA,FRANCISCOBILLONA,MODESTO
RONQUILLA,CRESCENCIOSAVANDALandSEVEROSAVANDAL,defendantsPABLEODRAMAYOand
PATERNOECUBIN,defendantsappellant.

OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralFelixV.Makasiar,AssistantSolicitorGeneralArturoG.IbarraandSolicitorConrado
T.Limcaocoforplaintiffappellee.

ArturoE.Balbastrofordefendantsappellants.

FERNANDO,J.:

Thereisanelementofingenuityaswellasofnovelinthepleamadebycounseldeoficio in this appeal of the

accusedPableoDramayoandPaternoEcubin,whoweresentencedtolifeimprisonmentforthemurderofEstelito
Nogaliza.Theclaimisvigorouslypressedthatbecausetheinformationallegedconspiracyonthepartofseven
defendants, with only the two appellants being convicted, two having been utilized as state witnesses and the
otherthreehavingbeenacquittedonthegroundofinsufficiencyofevidenceastotheirculpability,thejudgment
ofconvictionagainsttheappellantscannotstand,therebeingareasonabledoubtastotheirguilt.Tobolstersuch
acontention,certainallegeddeficienciesintheproofofferedbytheprosecutionwerenoted.Acarefulstudyofthe
evidenceofrecordwouldleavenootherrationalconclusionbutthatthedeceasedmethisdeathatthehandsof
theappellantsinthemannerasfoundbythelowercourt.Hencetheappealcannotprosper.Weaffirm.

ThegoryincidentwhichwasattendedbyafatalitystartedonthemorningofJanuary9,1964.Thetwoaccused,
now appellants, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in the company of the deceased Estelito Nogaliza, all of
BarrioMagsaysay,oftheMunicipalityofSapao,SurigaodelNorte,sawitschiefofpolice.Theirpurposewasto
shedlightonarobberycommittedinthehouseofthedeceasedfivedaysbeforebybeingavailableaswitnesses.
Theresponsewasdecidedlyinthenegativeastheythemselveswereprimesuspects,havingbeenimplicatedby
atleasttwoindividualswhohadconfessed.Atabout7:00o'clockofthesameday,whiletheywereinthehouseof
their coaccused Priolo Billona, the accused Dramayo invited all those present including the other accused
FranciscoBillons,ModestoRonquilla.CrescencioandSeveroSavandal,foradrinkingsessionataplaceatthe
backoftheschoolhouse.ItwasonthatoccasionthatDramayobroughtuptheideaofkillingEstelitoNogalizaso
thathecouldnottestifyintherobberycase.TheideawasforDramayoandEcubintoambushEstelito,whowas
returningfromSapao.Theothersweretostationthemselvesnearby.1

Soontheunfortunatevictimwassighted.HewasaccostedbyDramayowitharequestforacigarette.Itwasthen
that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation
consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. It was the
former also, who warned the rest of the group to keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened. His
equanimityappearedundisturbedforearlythenextmorning,hewenttothehouseofthedeceasedandinformed
the, latter's widow Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of
policeweredulynotified.Thelatter,uponnoticingbloodstainsonthetrousersofDramayo,askedhimtoexplain.
The answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof. 2 The death was due to the wounds
inflicted,twointheepigastricregion,oneintherightlumbarregion,andanotherintheleftbreast.

Itwasonthebasisoftheabovetestimonyofferedbytheprosecutionthatthelowercourtreacheditsdecision.Its
dispositive portion found the accused, now appellant Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime of [murder], defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
qualifiedbythecircumstanceofevidentpremeditationaggravatedbynighttime,andimposesuponeachofthe
saidaccused,PableoDramayoandPaternoEcubin,thepenaltyof[reclusionperpetual]."3 Reference was likewise
madeinsuchdecisionastowhytheothercoaccusedwerenotconvicted,twoofthem,CrescencioSavandalandSevero
Savandal being utilized as state witnesses, and the others three, Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto Roquilla
acquitted.

Why they should not be found guilty was explained in the appealed decision thus: "From the beginning the
accusedModestoRonquillamaintainedthathewasnotwiththegroupbutthathewasfishingintheseaduring
the night in question. These facts that is, that none of the prosecution witnesses has testified that any of these
three accused actually helped in the killing of the deceased, Estelito Nogaliza that these three accused were
includedinthecaseonlymuchlaterafterthefilingofthiscaseagainstPableoDramayoandPaternoEcubinthe
consistent contention of the accused Modesto Ronquilla that he was out in the sea fishing during the night in
question and the testimonies of the accused Priolo Billona [and] Francisco [and their witnesses,] Juan Billona,
Esperanza Oposa Billona, Guillerma Ponce, and Anselmo Lisondra, given in a straightforward manner, without
hesitation, revealing a clear conscience, and the fact that the testimonies of these witnesses have not been
refuted by the PC soldiers (whom they accused of maltreatment] when they were available to the prosecution,
causetheCourttoentertainaveryseriousdoubtastotheguiltofthesaidaccused."4

The lower court was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi interposed by now appellants Dramayo and
Ecubin,anditmusthavebeentheirlackofpersuasivecharacterthatmusthaveledtotheablebriefofcounselde
oficio, Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro, stressing the absence of evidence sufficient to convict, there still being a
reasonable doubt to be implied from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged, only two of the seven accused
were held culpable. To repeat, a meticulous appraisal of the evidence justifies a finding of the guilt of the
appellantsfortheoffensecharged,thuscallingfortheaffirmanceofthedecision.

1. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the
Constitution. 5 That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymouswithguilt.Itisincumbentontheprosecutiondemonstratethatculpabilitylies.Appellantswerenotevencalled
upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
convictionbeinexistence.Theirguiltbeshownbeyondreasonabledoubt.TosuchastandardthisCourthasalwaysbeen
committed.Thereisneed,therefore,forthemostcarefulscrutinyofthetestimonyofthestate,bothoralanddocumentary,
independently whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
conclusionthatthecrimehadbeencommittedpreciselybythepersonontrialundersuchanexactingtestshouldsentence
beoneofconviction.Itisthusrequiredthatcircumstancefavoringhisinnocencebedulytakenintocount.Theproofagainst
himmustsurvivethereasonthestrongestsuspicionmustnotbepermittedtoswayawayjudgment.Theconsciencemust
besatisfiedthatonthedefendantcouldbelaidtheresponsibilityfortheoffensechargedthatnotonlydidheperpetratethe
actbutthatitamountedtoacrime.Whatisrequiredthenismoralcertainty.

Soithasbeenheldfromthe1903decisionofUnitedStatesv.Reyes.6UnitedStatesv.Lasada,7 decided in 1910,

yields this excerpt: "By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an
investigationofthewholeproofandaninability,aftersuchinvestigation,toletthemindresteasyuponthecertaintyofguilt.
Absolutecertainofguiltisnotdemandedbythelawtoconvictofanycarnalchargebutmoralcertaintyisrequired,andthis
certainty is required as to every proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense."8 To the same effect is an excerpt
fromtheopinionofthelateJusticeTuasoninPeoplev.Esquivel.9Thus:"Inthisconnectionitmaynotbeoutofplaceto
bring to the attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of laying before the court the pertinent facts as their
disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their
evidence,totheendthatthecourt'smindmaynotbetorturedbydoubts,thattheinnocentmaynotsufferandtheguiltynot
escapeunpunished.Obvioustoall,thisistheprosecution'sprimedutytothecourt,totheaccused,andtothestate."10

It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of
appellants beyond reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi interposed hardly meriting any further discussion. It
cannot be denied though that the credible and competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty being
entertained not only by the trial judge but by us as to the culpability of appellants. The force of the controlling
doctrines,ontheotherhand,requiredthattheotherthreeaccusedbeacquittedpreciselybecause,unlikeinthe
caseofappellants,therequisitequantumofprooftoshowguiltbeyondreasonabledoubtwasnotpresent.There
isnoquestionastotheothertwowhotestifiedforthestatebeinglikewisenolongsubjecttoanycriminalliability.
The reference then to opinion of the late Justice Laurel, stressing the need for adhering to the fundamental
postulate that a finding of guilt is allowable only when no reasonable doubt could be entertained, is unavailing.
ThisisevidentfromtheverycitationinthebriefofappellantsoftheopinionofJusticeLaurelinPeoplev.Manoji.
11Thus:"Upontheotherhandtherearecertainfactswhichiftakentogetheraresufficienttoraiseinthemindofthecourta
gravedoubtastotheguiltofthedefendantappellant,'thatdoubtengenderedbyaninvestigationofthewholeproofandan
inability after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.' (U.S. v. Lasada [1910], 18 Phil. 90,
96.) The finding of the two gold teeth of the deceased the suitcase of Maradani, and the testimony of Erajio Ello that he
gavethehat...toMaradaninotonlyengenderseriousdoubtinourmindsastotheguiltoftheappellantbutalsoseemsto
sustainthetheoryofthedefenseandstrengthenthesuspicionofthetrialcourt,thatMaradaniandSalupudinarenotforeign
to, or entirely ignorant of, the killing of Seijin Ige. In the light of the facts and circumstances of record, we feel that it is
bettertoacquitamanuponthegroundofreasonabledoubt,eventhoughhemayinrealitybeguilty,thantoconfineinthe
penitentiaryfortherestofhisnaturallifeapersonwhomaybeinnocent...." 12Thefactsofthepresentcasecertainlydo
notfitwithintheabovemold.Relianceonthepartofappellantsontheabovedecisionisthereforefutile.
Thejudgmentofconvictionshouldnothaveoccasionedanysurpriseonthepartofthetwoappellants,asfrom
the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The
presumptionofinnocencecouldnotcometotheirrescueasitwasmorethansufficientlyovercomebytheproof
thatwasofferedbytheprosecution.Whatwouldhavebeenablotonthelawisthatif,onthefactsasestablished,
noreasonabledoubtbeingentertained,thetwoappellantswouldhavebeenacquittedlikewisejustbecausethe
otherfivedefendants,forthereasonsabovestated,werenotsimilarlysentenced.Theprincipalcontentionraised
isthusclearlyuntenable.Itmustbestatedlikewisethatwhilesquarelyadvancedforthefirsttime,therehadbeen
caseswherethisCourt,notwithstandingamajorityofthedefendantsbeingacquitted,theelementofconspiracy
likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime
charged,amoralcertaintyhavingarisenastotheircapability.13

2. The brief for appellants did seek to fortify the allegation as to their guilt not having been sufficiently
demonstrated with the contention that the lower court overlooked or did not properly consider material and
significantfactsofrecordthatoughttohavesubstantiallyaffectedoralteredthejudgment.Eventhemostcareful
readingofsuchbrief,however,withduerecognitionofthevigorinwhichthisparticularpointispressed,wouldnot
destroythecredibilityofthefactsastestifiedtoconcerningthemannerinwhichthedeceasedwaskilledandthe
motivethatpromptedappellantstoputanendtohislife.Thatsuchaversioncouldnothavebeenconcoctedis
shown by the undeniable fact that the two appellants were duly convicted of robbery, with the deceased as the
offended party. It was understandable then why they would want to do away with the principal witness against
them.Therewasthusastronginducementfortheappellantstohavecommittedthiscrimeofmurder.Withthe
testimonyofrecordpointingtonootherconclusionexcepttheperpetrationofthekillingbythem,theeffortoftheir
counsel,whiletobeexpectedfromanadvocatezealousindefenseofhisclients'rights,certainlyshouldnotbe
attendedwithsuccess.ItsufficestoreiteratethewellsettledprinciplethatthisCourthasinvariablyrespectedthe
findings of facts of a trial judge who was in a position to weigh and appraise the testimony before him except
when,aswasnotshowninthiscase,circumstancesweightorinfluencewereignoredordisregardedbyhim.14

WHEREFORE,thejudgmentofSeptember8,1965affirmedwiththemodificationthattheindemnificationtothe
heirsofEstelitoNogalizashouldbeinthesumP12,000.00.Withcosts.

Concepcion,C.J.,Reyes,J.B.L.,Makalintal,Zaldivar,Castro,Teehankee,VillamorandMakasiar,JJ.,concur.

Barredo,J.,tooknopart.

Footnotes

1Transcriptofstenographicnotes,pp.2122,2427,4447,155157,207209.

2Ibid,pp.2427,4546.

3Decision,AppendixtoBriefforAccusedAppellants,p.19.Itwasfurtheradjudgedthattheaccused
appellantswhichinthemeanwhile,hadalreadybeenconvictedforrobberywiththedeceasedasthe
offendedparty,shouldservethesentencesimposedonthemoffromfouryearsandtwomonths
prisioncorreccionalwasminimumtonotmorethantenyearsofprisionmayorasmaximumbefore
commencingtoservethesentenceimposeduponthemformurder.Theindemnityimposedwasin
thesumofP10,000.00.

4Ibid,pp.1819.

5AccordingtoSection1,paragraph17ofArticleIIIoftheConstitution:"Inallcriminalprosecutions
theaccusedshallbepresumedtobeinnocentuntilthecontraryisproved,..."

63Phil.3(1903).Latercasesthatspeaktotheeffectare:UnitedStatesv.Lasada,18Phil.90
(1910)Peoplev.Lanas,93Phil.147(1953)Peoplev.Lavarias,12June29,1963,23SCRA1301.

718Phil.90.

8Ibid,pp.9697.

992Phil.453(1948).Cf.UnitedStatesv.Garces,31Phil.637(1915)Peoplev.Gallego,44Phil.
192(1922)Peoplev.Tayag,59Phil.606(1934)Peoplev.Abana,76Phil.1(1946)Peoplev.
Tanchoco,76Phil.463(1946)Peoplev.Somera,83Phil.548(1949)Peoplev.Lanas,93Phil.147
(1953)Peoplev.SyPio,94Phil.885(1954)Peoplev.Palo,101Phil.963(1957)Peoplev.Del
RosarioMurray,105Phil.591(1959)Peoplev.Delimios105Phil.845(1959)Peoplev.Saik106
Phil.957(1960)Peoplev.Corpuz,107Phil.44(1960)Peoplev.Macatangay,107Phil.188(1960)
Peoplev.Fraga,109Phil.241(1960)Peoplev.Magborang,L16937,Sept.30,1963,3SCRA108
Peoplev.Argana,L19448,Feb.28,1964,10SCRA311Peoplev.Contante,L14639,Dec.28,
 1964,12SCRA653Peoplev.AlipisL17214,June21,1965,14SCRA297Peoplev.Cunanan,L
17599,April24,1967,19SCRA769Peoplev.Baquiran,L20153,June29,1967,20SCRA451
Ramosv.People,L22348,Aug.23,1967,20SCRA1109Peoplev.Parayno,L24804,July5,
1968,24SCRA3Peoplev.Pagaduan,L26948,Aug.25,1969,29SCRA54Peoplev.GalloraL
21740,Oct.30,1969,29SCRA780Peoplev.Madarang,L22295,Jan.30,1970,31SCRA148
Peoplev.Gallema,L3358889.June10,1970,33SCRA440.

10Ibid,p.459.

1168Phil.471(1939).

12Ibid,p.475.

13Cf.Peoplev.Bernal,91Phil.619(1952)Peoplev.Hufana103Phil.304(1958)Peoplev.
Amajul,L1462627,Feb.28,1961,1SCRA682Peoplev.DueasL15307,May30,1961,2SCRA
221,Peoplev.Hernandez,L6025,May30,1964,11SCRA223Peoplev.SagarioL18659,June
29,1965,14SCRA468Peoplev.ChawYawShun,L19590,April25,1968,23SCRA127People
v.Wong,L2213032,April25,1968,23SCRA146Peoplev.Provo,L28347,Jan.20,1971,37
SCRA19.

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