Tan v.
Andrade ISSUE: Whether the properties belong to the
GR No. 171904 and 172017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Persons and Family Relations: Property
Relations
FACTS: Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the
registered owner of four parcels of which she
mortgaged to one Simon Diu, who foreclosed
on the same. When the redemption period
was about to expire, Rosario sought the
assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed to
redeem the subject properties. Thereafter,
Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son,
Proceso as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale.
Proceso executed a Deed of Assignment,
ceding to Bobby his interests over the
properties. The Deed of Assignment was
signed by Henry, one of Rosarios sons, as
instrumental witness. Bobby extended an
Option to Buy the subject properties to
Proceso, giving the latter until 7:00 in the
evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the
properties for the sum of P310,000. When
Proceso failed to purchase them, Bobby
consolidated his ownership over the
properties, and the TCTs were issued in his
name.
On October 7, 1997, Rosarios children,
including Proceso and Henry, filed a
complaint for reconveyance and annulment
of deeds and damages against Bobby before
the RTC. They alleged that the initial
transaction between Rosario and Bobby was
actually an equitable mortgage which was
entered into to secure Rosarios
indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed
that since the subject properties were
inherited by them from their father, the
subject properties were conjugal in nature,
and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of
their respective shares.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the CA upheld the trial courts ruling.
conjugal partnership of Rosario and her late
husband and co-owned by her and her
children
HELD: NO
Pertinent to the resolution of this second
issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code38 which
states that "[a]ll property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife." For this presumption to apply, the party
invoking the same must, however,
preliminarily prove that the property was
indeed acquired during the marriage. As held
in Go v. Yamane:
x x x as a condition sine qua non for the
operation of [Article 160] in favor of the
conjugal partnership, the party who invokes
the presumption must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage.
In other words, the presumption in favor of
conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing of when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the
presumption may be rebutted only with
strong, clear, categorical and convincing
evidence. There must be strict proof of the
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses,
and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it.
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal
partnership of Rosario and her husband was
terminated upon the latters death on August
7, 1978 while the transfer certificates of title
over the subject properties were issued on
September 28, 1979 and solely in the name
of "Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age,
widow, Filipino." Other than their bare
allegation, no evidence was adduced by the
Andrades to establish that the subject
properties were procured during the
coverture of their parents or that the same
were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover,
Rosarios declaration that she is the absolute
owner of the disputed parcels of land in the
subject deed of sale was not disputed by her
son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the
same. Hence, by virtue of these incidents,
the Court upholds the RTCs finding that the
subject properties were exclusive or sole
properties of Rosario.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
ENCUMBRANCE/ DISPOSITION OF
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY
WONG v IAC, 200 SCRA 792
FACTS: Romarico Henson married Katrina
Pineda on January 6, 1964 they had been
most of the time living separately. During the
marriage or on January 6, 1971, Romarico
bought a 1,787 square-meter parcel of land,
in June 1972, Katrina entered into an
agreement with Anita Chan who consigned
to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at
199,895 Hong Kong dollars or P321,830.95.
Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry
within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita
Chan demanded payment of their value.
Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong
filed against Katrina and her husband
Romarico Henson, an action for
collection of a sum of money. Trial court
promulgated a decision in favor of the
Wongs. A writ of execution was thereafter
issued. Levied upon were four lots in Angeles
City all in the name of Romarico Henson ...
married to Katrina Henson. Lots were sold
September 9, 1977.
August 8, 1 978, Romarico filed an action for
the annulment of the decision because he
was "not given his day in court, the court,
finding that there was no basis for holding the
conjugal partnership liable for the personal
indebtedness of Katrina, ruled in favor of
reconveyance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the execution of a
decision in an action for collection of a sum
of money may be nullified on the ground that
the real properties levied upon and sold at
public auction are the alleged exclusive
properties of a husband who did not
participate in his wife's business transaction
from which said action stemmed
HELD: Romarico and Katrina had in fact
been separated when Katrina entered into a
business deal with Anita Wong. Thus, the
business transaction involved the personal
dealings of his estranged wife. Writ of
execution cannot be issued against
Romarico since he was not represented in
court.
On the matter of ownership of the properties
involved, having been acquired during the
marriage, they are still presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership even though
Romarico and Katrina had been living
separately but the conjugal nature of the
properties notwithstanding, Katrina's
indebtedness may not be paid for with them
her obligation not having been shown by the
petitioners to be one of the charges against
the conjugal partnership.
Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for
with them her obligation not having been
shown by the petitioners to be one of the
charges against the conjugal partnership. In
addition to the fact that her rights over the
properties are merely inchoate prior to the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
consent of her husband and her authority to
incur such indebtedness had not been
alleged in the complaint and proven at the
trial.
Under the Civil Code, a wife may bind the
conjugal partnership only when she
purchases things necessary for the support
of the family or when she borrows money for
the purpose of purchasing things necessary
for the support of the family if the husband
fails to deliver the proper sum; when the
administration of the conjugal partnership is
transferred to the wife by the courts or by the
husband and when the wife gives moderate
donations for charity. Having failed to
establish that any of these circumstances
occurred, the Wongs may not bind the
conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's
personal obligation to them.