CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE / GRAVE

MISCONDUCT AND DISHONESTY

Misconduct is "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of established rules, must be manifest and established by substantial
evidence. Grave misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of simple misconduct. Thus,
a person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the
misconduct does not involve any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as grave.

We point out that to constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be

connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. The
respondent in the present case summoned the SWAT for a purely personal matter, i.e., to aid
her brother and sister-in-law. There was no link between the respondent's acts and her official
functions as a city prosecutor. In Manuel v. Judge Calimag, Jr., the Court explained that:

x x x Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon in Lacson v.

Lopez in these words: "Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal meaning.
By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an
officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has
been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of
the officer x x x It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal
from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of
official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure
to discharge the duties of the office x x x."

The respondent's actions, to my mind, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, an administrative offense which need not be related to the respondent's official
functions. In Pia v. Gervacio, we explained that acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public
office. Additionally and contrary to the CA's ruling, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service may or may not be characterized by corruption or a willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules.

In Manhit v. Office of the Ombudsman (Fact Finding & Intelligence Bureau), the Court had the
occasion to define "gross" and "prejudicial" in connection with the offense of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as follows:

The word "gross" connotes "something out of measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused;
flagrant; shameful" while "prejudicial" means "detrimental or derogatory to a party; naturally,
probably or actually bringing about a wrong result."
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In Mariano v. Roxas, the Court ruled that the offense committed by a CA employee in forging
some receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations, was not misconduct but conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service because her acts had no direct relation to or
connection with the performance of her official duties." We similarly ruled in Cabalitan v.
Department of Agrarian Reform that the offense committed by the employee in selling fake
Unified Vehicular Volume Program exemption cards to his officemates during office hours was
not grave misconduct, but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Notably, the Court has also considered the following acts or omissions, among others, as
constituting conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service: misappropriation of public
funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back to work without prior notice, failure to
safekeep public records and property, making false entries in public documents and falsification
of court orders.

In these lights, we hold that the Ombudsman correctly ruled that the respondent's acts of
seeking the assistance of the SWAT and in riding on board a SWAT vehicle constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and not misconduct, since there is no nexus
between these acts and her official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the
image and integrity of his/her public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the
erring public officer or employee.

With regard to the other acts alleged by Emily in her affidavit-complaint, the Ombudsman and
the CA already ruled that the respondent is not administratively liable for her acts of taking the
company logbook outside of the premises of KD Surplus; and for handing a yellow paper
containing a list of the checks issued by Mariven to Emily for the latter's signature. We see no
reason to overturn their findings and conclusions in the absence of any showing that these had
been arrived at arbitrarily.

We additionally note that Guia, stated in his affidavit that the respondent "borrowed the
security logbook for the purpose of securing a photocopy" and later returned it to him. We thus
find unpersuasive Emily's claim that the respondent took the security logbook outside of the
company's premises without permission.

Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is classified as a grave offense with a
corresponding penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the
first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense. Since this is the first time that
the respondent had committed these acts, we deem it proper to impose on her the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we MODIFY the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated February 13, 2006 and May 2, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78933.
Respondent Mary Ann. T. Castro is declared guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and is suspended from service for six (6) months and one (1) day.

SO ORDERED.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-VISAYAS vs. CASTRO, G.R. No. 172637, April 22, 2015
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The Court is inclined to disagree with the CA not only in downgrading the offense from Grave
Misconduct to Simple Misconduct, but on the nature of the offense charged itself. The Court
indeed finds Mayordomo administratively liable, but modifies the designation of the offense
and the penalty imposed by the CA.

The Court has come to a determination that the administrative offense committed by the
respondent is not misconduct. To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties. The duties of Mayordomo
as a member of the GSIS FMAD surely do not involve the modification of IP addresses. The act
was considered unauthorized, precisely because dealing with the GSIS networks IP addresses is
strictly reserved for ITSG personnel who are expectedly knowledgeable in this field. In Manuel
v. Calimag, Jr., the Court emphatically ruled:

In order to be considered as misconduct, the act must have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of his official duties amounting either to maladministration
or willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the office. Misconduct in
office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon in Lacson v. Lopez in these words:
"Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal meaning. By uniform legal
definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not
such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all
times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer x x x
x It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of
an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge
the duties of the office x x x More specifically, in Buenaventura v. Benedicto, an administrative
proceeding against a judge of the court of first instance, the present Chief Justice defines
misconduct as referring to a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. [Emphasis ours,
citations excluded]

In Cabalitan v. Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court sustained the ruling of the CSC that
the offense committed by the employee in selling fake Unified Vehicular Volume Program
exemption cards to his officemates during office hours was not grave misconduct, but conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In Mariano v. Roxas, the Court held that the
offense committed by a CA employee in forging some receipts to avoid her private contractual
obligations, was not misconduct but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
because her acts had no direct relation to or connection with the performance of her official
duties.
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Accordingly, the complained acts of respondent Mayordomo constitute the administrative

offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, which need not be related to
or connected with the public officers official functions. As long as the questioned conduct
tarnishes the image and integrity of his/her public office, the corresponding penalty may be
meted on the erring public officer or employee. Under the Civil Service law and rules, there is
no concrete description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service. Jurisprudence, however, is instructive on this point. The
Court has considered the following acts or omissions, inter alia, as Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service: misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office, failure to
report back to work without prior notice, failure to safe keep public records and property,
making false entries in public documents and falsification of court orders. The Court also
considered the following acts as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, to wit: a
Judges act of brandishing a gun and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; a
court interpreters participation in the execution of a document conveying complainants
property which resulted in a quarrel in the latters family.

Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service is classified as a grave offense under
Section 22(t) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other
Pertinent Civil Service Laws, with a corresponding penalty of suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second
offense.

GSIS vs. MAYORDOMO, G.R. No. 191218, May 31, 2011

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MISCONDUCT and DISHONESTY

To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of his official duties. In the case of Manuel v. Calimag, Jr., we opined that:
Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon in Lacson v. Lopez in
these words: Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal meaning. By
uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an
officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has
been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of
the officer x x x. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting
removal from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office x x x. More specifically,
in Buenaventura v. Benedicto, an administrative proceeding against a judge of the court of first
instance, the present Chief Justice defines misconduct as referring to a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence
by the public officer.
The misconduct, however, is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence.
As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct. If any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as grave is not manifest and is not
proven by substantial evidence, a person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for
simple misconduct.
X X X

Although the respondent Dianco claims that the funds involved are not public in nature, that is
not sufficient to exculpate him from any administrative liability for serious dishonesty.
In Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, we said:
[D]ishonesty, x x x need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the
person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is
dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are
not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot
tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well,
because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to
commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the
government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys
and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct,
oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts
and actuations. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life.
Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and
the discipline and morale of the service.
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Likewise, we find Dianco administratively liable for grave misconduct. In the present case,
Diancos acts run contrary to the policy of promoting a high standard of ethics in the public
service. As the Report correctly pointed out, the excursion of the members of the CA security
group was a court-sponsored affair, one imbued with public interest. Foremost of which is to
provide respite to our tired guards, up their morale and esprit de corps, and to develop a highly
respected and efficient security group. Thus each officer had the duty to act in a proper,
dignified and righteous and responsible manner.

The fact that Dianco initiated the drinking spree with a clear intent to violate the prohibition
during the excursion was admitted by Dianco himself. In fact, even prior to the excursion,
Dianco already had too much to drink. Although Dianco avers that there is no written policy
against drinking, the absence of any general policy, by itself, does not negate the fact that
Dianco instigated a violation of a policy clearly established for that specific activity. Diancos
and Sorianososs admissions during the preliminary investigation proved that they were well
aware of the prohibition.

In particular, during the preliminary investigation of the Security and Safety Committee Fact
Finding Committee, Dianco stated the following:

J. Pizarro: xxx The rules of the subdivions are: 1) no drinking, and xxx Maliwanag sa inyo na
walang inuman. Ang tanoong ko diyan, bakit kayo uminom? You were all observed
to be drunk. x x x x

J. Pizarro: Ikaw Sorianosos, uminom ka?

SG Opo, sir. Uminom po ako.

Sorianosos:

J. Pizarro: Bakit ka uminom?

SG Nadala po ako sa kasiyahan, sir.

Sorianosos:

xxxx

J. Pizarro: Ikaw, Mr. Dianco, parang ikaw ang naging pasimuno. There was a report that
before the bus took off, you already wanted to drink? You were under the influence
of heavy liquor. People noticed you. What can you say about that?
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Chief Yes sir, that was my mistake. (Emphasis supplied)

Dianco:
We note that public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence, and skill. They must enter public
service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty and endeavor to discourage any
perception of impunity. In instigating the violation of the no alcohol policy, Dianco placed the
CA in a bad light and compromised the image of public service and public servants.

Thus, we find Dianco guilty of serious dishonesty and grave misconduct, which are enough to
warrant his dismissal from service. Although Dianco pleads the existence of circumstances to
mitigate his liability, these circumstances do not apply to the offenses of serious dishonesty and
grave misconduct since both are punishable with dismissal for the first offense, a penalty with
no minimum, medium or maximum periods.

The penalty of dismissal from the service likewise carries with it the forfeiture of Diancos
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service. As we held in the case of of Ramos v. Mayor:

Under Section 52 (A)(1) and (A)(6), Rule IV of the "Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service" (Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999), respondent's act of making
untruthful declarations in his PDS renders him administratively liable for falsification of public
document and dishonesty which are classified as grave offenses and, thus, warrant the
corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service even if either of them is respondent's first
offense. Section 58 of Rule IV thereof states that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification
for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.

COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND SAFETY, COURT OF APPEALS vs. REYNALDO V. DIANCO - CHIEF
SECURITY, JOVEN O. SORIANOSOS - SECURITY GUARD 3, AND ABELARDO P. CATBAGAN -
SECURITY GUARD 3, A.M. No. CA-15-31-P (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 13-218-CA-P), June 16, 2015