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ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes the impact of economic, social and political factors on
municipal debt behavior. With this aim, we have obtained a stratified random sample of
130 cities during a five-year period. These data have been used to configure a micro panel
to obtain accurate estimates and to control for problems such as unobserved
heterogeneity. The main conclusion obtained from this process is that non-financial
surplus/deficit, financial independence, capital expenditures, and capital revenues are the
variables that best explain the indebtedness of this type of entities.
INTRODUCTION
There are three government levels in Spain: central government (Parliament and the
Cabinet), regional government (17 autonomous communities), and local government (50
provinces and 8,102 municipalities). Municipalities are grouped by provinces, and the
latter are grouped by autonomous communities. Each level is multi-functional, within its
jurisdiction, on different issues and activities.
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THE DETERMINANTS OF THE MUNICIPAL DEBT POLICY IN SPAIN
Municipalities have always played a crucial role with regard to two aspects of the
Spanish public sector: first, in relation to political representation and second, because they
must provide key services such as day-care nurseries, public transport, waste disposal,
sewage, construction and management of sports centers and public green areas. 2
During the last few years, interest has grown to limit the indebtedness of the Public
Administration in Spain and in the rest of the European Union. The efforts have been aimed
particularly at sub-central governments. The different reasons that justify the establishment
of these limits can be summed up as follows (Monasterio, 1996):
Different types of instruments can be used to establish these limitations. They range
from trusting market mechanisms to establishing some internal control at the center of the
public sector (Ter-Minassian & Craig, 1997). In this latter option, the control instruments
can be the establishment of rules limiting indebtedness, the introduction of coordination
mechanisms, or finally, the use of direct control means by the Central Government.
In the case of the Spanish Local Governments, the Central Government opted for the
establishment of a series of limitations. These limitations vary according to the type of
Aside from these limitations, Parliament passed in December 2001 the Law of
Budgetary Stability to implement the Pact of Stability and Growth, which was agreed upon
in the pact of Amsterdam of June 1997. This Pact limits the use of the public deficit as an
instrument of
economic policy in the European Economic and Monetary Union. In accordance with that Law
(effective January 1, 2003), the Public Administrations will not be able to have a non-financial deficit
(see Table 3). This means that the non-financial revenues will have to cover, at least, the non-financial
expenditures. Therefore, in practice, this implies the impossibility of getting into debt, unless very
special situations occur.
Table 2 analyzes the extent to which municipalities are complying with these debt limits. We
have subdivided the municipalities into two subsets (population less than or exceeding 20,000
inhabitants) in order to test if there are differences due to size. The conclusion reached is (see Table 2)
that the requirement stipulating the concretion of a non-financial surplus (as established in the
General Law of Budgetary Stability) is the one least met. Although this legal limitation was not in
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BENITO & BASTIDA
effect during the period studied, we have considered it convenient to include seeing what is the
starting point for municipalities in relation to this issue. Finally, no differences based on population
were found.
TABLE 2
Non-compliance with Legal Debt Limits (In %)
In relation to Table 2, it is worth mentioning the existence of empirical literature that both
confirms and rejects the effectiveness of debt limits on sub-national governments.4 On the other hand,
we observe that as the electoral year approached (1995, 1999) municipalities
exceeded the limits in higher percentages. 5 However, dealing with these two issues in more detail
would exceed the purpose of this paper, and therefore, they will be addressed in future works.
In Spain, as well as in the USA, there have been several events that have contributed to
reduce the amount of resources available to the cities; consequently, municipalities have
been forced to issue debt to finance their policies. As Cropf and Wendel (1998) indicate, the
issue of local indebtedness warrants attention and analysis. Furthermore, whereas twenty
years ago no one spoke of excessive indebtedness, now it is a concern for both American
cities and the cities of other countries (Clark, 1994).
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THE DETERMINANTS OF THE MUNICIPAL DEBT POLICY IN SPAIN
The studies focused on municipal finances dealing with cross-sectional and time-
series data were conducted using the corresponding panel data methodology. Examples of
this kind of works are Metcalf (1991); Kiewiet and Szalaky (1996); Dickson and Yu
(1997); Dahlberg and Johansson (1998); Brown (2000); and Holtz-Eakin (2001). In
Spain, this methodology had not been applied to the analysis of the indebtedness of local
governments. In fact, Spanish works had been based only on cross-sectional data, and,
consequently, they were under the limitations pointed out by Wei-Te (1995).
In order to fill this gap, we have obtained the necessary data and have carried out the
appropriate steps to test our hypotheses. These hypotheses are supported by both previous
empirical and theoretical literature, and the methodology used is homogeneous to that
literature. Therefore, the results obtained can be compared with those from works
performed in other countries. Finally, this survey could be the starting point of future
research in Spain.
Moreover, an important feature of the analysis of local governments is that the panel
data provide samples large enough that permit the study of other key characteristics
without problems of degrees of freedom and insufficient variation of important variables.
We must bear in mind that national level studies consider time series for a single element,
reducing, consequently, the possibilities of the research. On the other hand, these latter
works deal with aggregated data, and consequently suffer from the problems pointed out
by Farnham (1985).
To sum up, the interest of the paper lies in obtaining results that can be compared to
the works of other countries. We think that this will contribute to enrich similar
international literature on this matter.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. First, a description of general works
regarding municipal indebtedness is provided. Second, we review those studies dealing
with financial variables, i.e., factors directly connected to the management of the
municipality. Finally, a summary of the literature related to external socioeconomic factors
is provided.8
General Works
From a theoretical point of view, we can highlight, among others, the work of Zehms
(1991), who proposed 13 ratios for the financial analysis of local governments depending
on the needs of the three user groups identified by Jones, Scott, Kimbro and Ingram (1985):
(1) citizens, (2) legislative and overseeing bodies, and (3) lenders and creditors.
Metcalf (1991) carried out an empirical survey to determine in which way the fiscal
policies of the federal government affected the level of acquisition of financial assets and
financial liabilities of the municipalities. 9 The main conclusion reached was that fiscal
policy influences municipal indebtedness.
In view of financial problems faced by cities such as New York and Cleveland during
the 1970s, Groves, Godsey and Shulman (1981) proposed a technique called "indicators
analysis" {Financial Trend Monitoring System, FTMS). This technique consisted of several
ratios that explained the financial situation, among them: population, per capita income, and
capital expenditures divided by operating expenditures. These indicators are used as
independent variables in our model. On the other hand, Mercer and Gilbert (1996) also
considered the variable 'per capita income' as a good gauge of the indebtedness of the
municipality.
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BENITO & BASTIDA
Benito and Vela (1998) discussed some ratios in order to check the financial situation
of municipalities. We highlight the investment ratio (capital expenditures/total
expenditures), the self-financing ratio (taxation revenues/operating revenues), and the net
operating balance ratio (net operating balance/operating revenues).
Financial Variables
Oates (1972) and King (1984) stated that sub-national governments must follow two
rules when financing expenditures: current expenditures should be financed with taxes,
whereas long-term debt should finance capital ones. 10 Mceachern (1978), Cropf and Wendel
(1998), and Holtz-
Eakin (2001) also argued theoretically that the municipal debt should fund local capital
projects.
On the other hand, as pointed out by Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997), according to
Spanish laws, long-term loans are generally restricted to investment needs, thus
conditioning the financial management of municipalities.
We can also quote the outstanding work by Musgrave and Musgrave (1989),
regarding the "intergenerational equity" theory, i.e., capital projects must be financed
through long-term debt, so that the people enjoying these capital goods repay the
corresponding incurred debt.
Brusca and Labrador (1998) proposed a linear regression model aimed at explaining
local indebtedness in a sample of Spanish municipalities. They considered the stock of
per-capita debt as the dependent variable. The number of inhabitants, the annual revenues
per inhabitant, the annual expenditures per inhabitant, the net operating balance, the gross
operating balance and the budgetary surplus per inhabitant were used as the independent
variables.11 They found out that the annual expenditure per inhabitant and the gross
operating balance influenced per capita debt level, with the expected sign in both
regressions, i.e., the higher expenditures are and the lower the gross operating balance is,
the larger indebtedness is.
Brusca and Condor (2001) stated theoretically that the non-financial surplus was a
key issue necessary to explain the indebtedness of local governments.
Brown (1996) stated that a high percentage figure in direct and indirect taxes out of
total revenues is recommended, since it is a good indicator of the financial independence
of the Local Government. If this ratio is low, local governments are unable to mobilize
resources within their own jurisdictions to finance an increasing volume of expenditures.
This situation leads to larger deficits and growing sub national indebtedness (De Mello,
2001). However, Farnham (1985) stated that a higher percent of revenue from own
resources, indicating lesser dependence on aid from state government, may have a
positive effect on a locality's borrowing.
Socioeconomic Factors
Political theory (Tusell Gomez, 1996) has stated that left wing governments allow a
higher laxity regarding governmental financial discipline. These progressive parties, thus,
defend a bigger public sector with a wider scope of responsibilities than right wing
governments. Accordingly, the latter become less indebted than the former. Blais and
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THE DETERMINANTS OF THE MUNICIPAL DEBT POLICY IN SPAIN
Nadeau (1992), among others, verified empirically this theoretical assumption. However,
works such as Abizadeh and Gray (1993) did not find a significant relationship.
Dickson and Yu (1997) investigated the spending of local governments. They
concluded that the left wing governments spend more than right wing governments, and
that spending increases with increases in per capita income. This latter idea was also
discussed by Foot (1977) and Hulten and Peterson (1984). Also, Farnham (1985) stated that
the per capita income variable could pick up the influence of a positive income elasticity
of demand for capital goods, in which case its sign would be positive, as we have
hypothesized. However, Adams (1977) argued that the per capita income of a municipality
was negatively related to its debt level. Consequently, the empirical findings of Farnham
refuted the arguments of Adams (1977).
Kiewiet and Szalaky (1996) tried to test the determinants of public debt. With this
aim, they applied the panel data methodology, with cross-sectional (49 American States)
and time-series (1961-1990) data.12 The relevant conclusion emphasized in their work is
that per capita personal income and the ruling party's ideology (left wing) had a positive
effect on the level of indebtedness. Mceachern (1978) also proved that the per capita
income influenced positively the level of local debt.
On the other hand, Bunch (1991) proved that the fact that the same party
(conservative or progressive) controlled the government for many years led to a higher
creation of public authorities that issued revenue bonds (not subject to debt limits) in
order to circumvent debt limits.
Hempel (1973), Hulten and Peterson (1984), and Rivers and Yates (1997) argued
theoretically that population growth caused a rise in the requirement for municipal
services and capital stock. As a result, this situation led to a higher debt burden. The same
relationship was empirically proved by and Farnham (1985).
Mitchell (1967) concluded that debt limits provoke the "devolution phenomenon"
and also that higher population and wealth suggested higher levels of indebtedness. Pogue
(1970) found that, while per capita income did not significantly affect the level of
municipal indebtedness, the increase in population did affect it.
Wei-Te (1995) suggested that tourist municipalities had a higher economic growth,
and consequently, they had to meet the demand for municipal services such as economic
infrastructures and public services. This situation increased the debt burden of the
municipality.
METHODOLOGY
Description of the Sample
As stated above, the financial data of municipalities has been obtained from the
Annual Accounts,13 during a five-year period (19941998), of 130 municipalities. In
addition, other variables have been taken into account: political tendency, economic level,
population, and geographical location (tourist). All variables are described in the next
section (selection of variables).
With regard to this sample structure, a micro panel of data has been created. There
were 7,150 total possible observations, including crosssectional information (11 variables
per year in 130 municipalities) and temporal (5 years: 1994-1998). However, we could
only use 6,316 effective observations; therefore, we had 834 missing values. The level of
missing observations is similar to that obtained by Metcalf (1991).
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BENITO & BASTIDA
Castellon
Alicante
Alicante
Valencia
Inhabitants Valencia Total Total
Selection of Variables
Taking into account the variables considered in previous works, we have selected the
variables shown in Table 5 for our model. In addition, we have tried not to include an
excessive number of regressors and consequently we have focused only on the most
relevant.15
The statistical description of the dependent and independent variables, including all
years, is summarized in Table 6.
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THE DETERMINANTS OF THE MUNICIPAL DEBT POLICY IN SPAIN 8
The variable dnivelec applies only to municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants
(La Caixa, 2000). Also, intermediate case (dnivelec = 5) has been eliminated in order to
stress the differences between the two subgroups of municipalities. Consequently, we are
faced with the problem of a low number of valid observations (N = 205). This situation
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9 BENITO ft BASTIDA
According to the theoretical and empirical literature available, the following hypotheses
will be tested:
H0-i: dcostero>0
I
H0-2: E[vnpfii dnivelec=0] <E[vnpfit \ dnivelec it=\]
The economic level (measured by disposable family income) causes a higher demand for
infrastructures and other kinds of expenditures, and, consequently, a larger debt burden for
local governments (Hulten & Peterson, 1984). 19 This assumption was empirically proved by
Mitchell (1967), Dickson and Yu (1997), Mceachern (1978), Kiewiet and Szalaky (1996), and
Foot (1977). Farnham (1985) also stated theoretically and tested empirically this hypothesis.
On the other hand, Mercer and Gilbert (1996) and Groves et al. (1981) stated
theoretically that this variable explained municipal indebtedness.
This hypothesis, in accordance with the previously given reasons, will be tested by
means of a univariate analysis.
Left wing governments, in line with the political theory (Tusell Gomez, 1996) and with
the empirical literature (Blais & Nadeau, 1992; Kiewiet & Szalaky, 1996; Dickson & Yu,
1997) become more indebted than right wing ones. Therefore, according to the definition of
the dummy variable dsp, we expect a negative sign.
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THE DETERMINANTS OF THE MUNICIPAL DEBT POLICY IN SPAIN 10
Balaguer (2001) also proved this hypothesis. On the other hand, this premise is included in
Spanish laws (Ter-Minassian & Craig, 1997). Finally, we can refer to Groves et al. (1981)
and Zehms (1991) in order to justify the relevance of the variable. They pointed out that it
was a good indicator of the investment activity of the municipality. 22
From a fiscal point of view, the more autonomous the municipalities are, the less they
get into debt (De Mello, 2001; Mceachern, 1978). The level of autonomy is measured by the
percentage of direct and indirect taxes out of total revenues (excluding indebtedness).
Furthermore, as previously stated, according to Brown (1996), a high figure in this ratio is
recommended.
Once we have described our hypotheses, we will proceed to explain the estimation
procedure applied. First of all, we propose a traditional cross-sectional regression, estimated
by means of an ordinary least squares test (OLS), between-groups (BG) and within-groups
(WG) estimators. If the assumptions of cross-sectional data are correct, these three estimations
should yield quite similar results. On the other hand, if it does not happen, it implies that the
initial model was not well specified and did not reflect the real economic nature of the
phenomenon at issue. In this latter case, the panel data regression model should be applied.
Subsequently, within this model, we must test if individual-specific factors (unobserved
heterogeneity, Tji) are correlated with regressors (Arellano & Bover, 1990). If the correlation
exists, a fixed-effects model should be the appropriate (WG estimator); otherwise, a random-
effects regression (BG estimator) model should be used.
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11 BENITO ft BASTIDA
cov(X u , vnpfu)
Where: J3 =
cov(Xu,Xu)
Applying the OLS estimator to the above expression we get the between-groups estimator
(BG):
T ( x i - x ) ( v n p f. - v n p f ) zzzz z
Z
$BG = ~-------------------- ------ =----------------- > &
BG =
vn
Pf ~ KG X (VI)
NT
i=l,...130; and
Finally, if model (iii) is correctly specified, we can also apply OLS to the following
expression:
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THE DETERMINANTS OF THE MUNICIPAL DEBT POLICY IN SPAIN 12
vnpfu = a + X j ,P + Z, y+ n, + u (ix)
Where:
- Xu is the matrix of time-variant regressors: dsp, gkgtos, iking, inding, rping;
- Z, is the matrix of time-invariant regressors: dcostero, dpobl, dpob2, dpob3;
- 77, stands
for unobserved heterogeneity;
- Uj,stands for the residuals, which given that they do not include unobserved heterogeneity, are
supposed to be iid,~(0, au2).
This equation represents the static panel data regression, and allows an estimation of individual
behavior models exploiting cross-sectional data (several observations) and time-series (several
periods).24 As stated earlier, almost all previous papers in Spain considered several periods in their
samples; however, they did not apply the panel data methodology, and therefore obtained a biased and
less accurate estimation of the population parameters. The key point is that these studies did not test the
existence of unobserved heterogeneity, which, as we have seen previously, may exist in cross-sectional
data observed in different periods of time (Arellano & Honore, 2000).
We clearly reject the null hypothesis (significance 0%). This means that there is
correlation between 77, and Xu. Accordingly, the fixed effects model is the right one.
Nevertheless, the Hausman test is only valid if the GLS estimator is efficient in relation to
the WG estimator under the null hypothesis. In order to ratify the result, we have regressed
using OLS the system of equations proposed by Arellano and Bover (1990), and we have
calculated the following test that confirms again the correlation between 77, and Xit:
Accordingly, we will estimate the regression of vnpf on dsp, gkgtos, iking, inding and
rping using the WG estimator, and we will obtain /3 coefficients. On the other hand, the y
coefficients applicable to time-invariant regressors (dcostero, dpobl, dpob2, dpob3) which
the WG estimator is not able to calculate, will be estimated by means of the regression
proposed by Hsiao (1986):
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13 BENITO ft BASTIDA
*
iking -0.16954 - *
**
inding -0.27426 - *
**
rping -0.22200 - *
**
- Dependent variable: vnpf
- Number of valid observations for regression: 564.
- Significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
TABLE 10
Difference of Means in Variable dnivelec (ii)
Period Mean of vnpf whether... t-test for difference of means
dnivelec= 0 dnivelec=\ t P>|t| Significance
1994-1998 -0.0561 -0.0167 -1.242 0.
216
1994 -0.0310 -0.0057 -0.520 0.
607
1995 -0.0506 -0.0900 0.504 0.
618
1996 -0.0842 0.0232 -1.354 0.
185
1997 -0.0357 -0.0138 -0.442 0.
662
1998 -0.0770 0.0099 -1.054 0.
299
Variable whose means have been compared: vnpf. The results have been confirmed with
Mann-Whitney non-parametric test. After applying Levene test, we have assumed equal
variances in all tests.
Financial Variables
The results indicate that capital expenditures {gkgtos) have a positive influence on the
variation of debt stock (see Table 8). This feature confirms both the theoretical premises
(Oates, 1972; Mceachern, 1978; King, 1984; Benito & Vela, 1998; Holtz-Eakin, 2001) and
the empirical work of Balaguer (2001). Furthermore, this feature meets the
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THE DETERMINANTS OF THE MUNICIPAL DEBT POLICY IN SPAIN 14
"intergenerational equity" theory (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). Finally, the data show
the compliance with Spanish legal regulation (Ter-Minassian & Craig, 1997).
On the other hand, capital revenues (iking), as derived from legal arguments, cause a
lower need for financial indebtedness (see Table 8).
The non-financial surplus/deficit (rping) has the same effect because if it is positive,
it generates financial resources that can be applied to reduce indebtedness (see Table 8).
This result confirms again the conclusion reached by Balaguer (2001).
Finally, the independence ratio (inding) coefficient, which measures the ability to collect
own taxes and, therefore, a measurement of financial autonomy, has a negative sign,
corroborating our hypothesis (see Table 8). It also confirms the assumption of Mceachern
(1978) and De Mello (2001) regarding the outlay decisions made by local governments.
According to these authors, the municipalities decide the mix of taxes and debt needed to
finance public goods and therefore, the more autonomy they have in levying local taxes, the
less debt they are forced to issue.
Socioeconomic Variables
The result obtained using the geographical variable (dcostero) is, at least, interesting,
since it rejects the null hypothesis (significance 1%), and reveals that non-coastal
municipalities have a higher level of increase of borrowing than the coastal ones (see Table 9).
Therefore, we do not confirm the conclusions reached by Wei-Te (1995).
Both the economic level (dnivelec) and the population (dpobl, dpob2, dpob3) are not
significant (Tables 9 and 10). Thus it seems that these factors are not useful in order to explain
the level of indebtedness of local administrations in Spain. These findings are further discussed
below.
With regard to economic level (dnivelec), we confirm the conclusions reached by Pogue
(1970) and Balaguer (2001) (see Table 10). On the contrary, Mitchell (1967), Foot (1977),
Mceachern (1978), Hulten and Peterson (1984), Kiewiet and Szalaky (1996), and Dickson and
Yu (1997) found that this variable provoked a higher debt level. This feature also fails to
confirm the theory (Hulten & Peterson, 1984; Mercer & Gilbert, 1996; Groves et al., 1981).
Considering the population (see Table 9), Pogue (1970), Hempel (1973), Hulten and
Peterson (1984), and Mercer and Gilbert (1996) stated that population growth had a positive
effect on debt levels. Furthermore, our findings do not confirm previous empirical works, such
as Farnham (1985) and Balaguer (2001).
Taking into account both factors simultaneously, Mitchell (1967) stated that the higher
population and the economic level are, the higher the indebtedness is.
Finally, the variable political ideology (dsp), according to our findings, does not affect
local indebtedness (confirming the results of Abizadeh and Gray [1993]). This feature, as set
out above, contrasts with the theoretical assumptions. Further, it does not corroborate the
works of Blais and Nadeau (1992), Kiewiet and Szalaky (1996), and Dickson and Yu
(1997), who pointed out that right wing parties held lower levels of indebtedness.
The main conclusion reached is that the financial variables that better explain the issue
of debt in these entities are non-financial surplus/deficit, financial independence, capital
expenditures and capital revenues. These two latter variables are related to one of the limits
discussed earlier, i.e., long-term debt must finance capital expenditures. Another kind of
variables considered, such as political ideology, economic level, or population have not
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15 BENITO ft BASTIDA
been found to be significant. On the other hand, geographical location (coastal or not)
influences indebtedness, but with the opposite sign than the one we originally expected.
Among the limitations of this study, there is a methodological aspect to the model. The
initial equation has been divided into two other models plus a test for medians difference.
Consequently, the whole variation of the dependent variable has not been represented by
one unique equation, and so, the R 2 of the two separate models is no longer relevant.
Therefore, it has not been included in the corresponding tables.
On the other hand, it would have been advisable to include organizational and
managerial factors, besides budgetary and financial variables, so that the behavior of the
dependent variable could be better described. However, such information was not available.
In the last few years, interrelations between financial and organizational variables are being
increasingly analyzed to:
- Circumventing legal debt limits by issuing debt that is not included in the limits
(circumvention hypothesis); or
- Shifting debt from the municipalities to other dependent entities. In Spain, it could be
towards companies or other kinds of entities created or owned by the local governments
(devolution hypothesis).
On the other hand, further research is needed to examine the electoral cycle shown in
table 2. Works such as Blais and Nadeau (1992) and Dickson and Yu (1997) have analyzed
this issue. In addition, future research should pay attention to new types of municipal
indebtedness (creative financing), which are currently being used to finance public
expenditures in Spain, as well as in the USA (Cropf & Wendel, 1998).
Finally, we intend to research in the future whether fiscal decentralization increases local
indebtedness as a result of lax debt management (De Mello, 2001). Because of its high degree
of decentralization, Spain appears to be the appropriate field for further research on this
matter.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work is part of the research project PPC/01491/03, funded by the Fundacion Seneca
of the Autonomous Community of the Region of Murcia (Spain). We also thank two
anonymous referees for their insightful comments.
NOTES
3. We would like to point up that papers such as Swaroop (1995) have questioned the
merit of a balanced budget as a strict rule. This is particularly true in the case of
Germany, whose present economic crisis has forced the government to assume a
budgetary deficit as a measure to boost the economy.
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THE DETERMINANTS OF THE MUNICIPAL DEBT POLICY IN SPAIN 16
4. E.g., Pogue (1970), Mceachern (1978), Farnham (1985) and Bunch (1991). On the
other hand, Kiewiet and Szalaky (1996) and Brown (2000) suggested that the success
of the limit depended on its nature.
5. This electoral cycle was proved, among others, by Blais and Nadeau (1992) and
Dickson and Yu (1997).
7. Some of the studies focused on this issue have been discussed earlier.
8. As Cropf and Wendel (1998) pointed out, we have included these external factors in
the analysis because the municipal debt policy is strongly affected by them.
9. The sample included 185 entities from 1978 up to 1988; he applied a panel data
regression. After testing the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and the
independent variables (p. 63) he applied the appropriate model: random or fixed
effects.
10. See Farnham (1985) for a detailed discussion about this issue.
11. After performing a univariate analysis (T-student test and confirming with U-Mann-
Whitney test) to verify the significance of the difference of the means, these authors
developed a multivariate test based on a logit model. This logit regression was
estimated twice, one for each year (1993 and 1994).
12. They proposed a random effects model by means of the Generalised Least Squares
(GLS) estimator.
16. All the monetary amounts have been deflated according to the variation of the Consumer
Price Index for Autonomous Community of Valencia published by National Institute of
Statistics, and refer to thousands of constant pesetas as of December 31 st, 1994. All
variables, except dcostero, dnivelec and dsp have been drawn from Annual Accounts of
the municipalities for the period 1994-1998. The data for variable dnivelec were found in
the Spanish Trade Directory edited by La Caixa (classifies municipalities in 10 levels
according to familiar income). On the other hand, the General Sub department of
Electoral Processes (Area of Electoral Processes) of the Spanish Ministry of the Interior
sent us the necessary information to form dsp.
17. We have chosen this proxy variable because in our population almost 100% of the tourism
is located at the coast.
18. This dummy variable has been built as suggested by Erikson, Wright and Mclver(1993).
The two relevant election days in our study were: May 26 th 1991 and May 28th 1995.
According to previous studies (Blais & Nadeau, 1992 and Dickson and Yu, 1997), the
election year should be taken to fall in the current year if the election falls after June 30 th,
otherwise it should be taken to fall in the preceding year. However, in our survey, the local
election takes effect from the following year, i.e.:
- The election of 1991 forms the variable dsp for the years 19941995.
- The election of 1995 forms the variable dsp for the years 19961998.
We have chosen this approach because the politicians that win the local election in
May have to deal with the budget previously passed by the former government for the
whole year (local budgets are passed in December of each year and take effect from
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17 BENITO ft BASTIDA
January to December of the following year). As a result, the ruling party in the
municipality cannot put its policy into practice by means of the budget until the following
year to the election year.
19. Adolf Wagner hypothesized a positive correlation between per capita real income
growth and government expenditure. This theory is known as Wagner's law and, to
some extent, supports our assumption. However, the literature regarding this theory is
far from being conclusive.
20. Several studies have analyzed the effects of population on other debt characteristics.
For example, Carleton and Lerner (1969) hypothesized that a large population should
have a positive effect on the municipal bond rating. Simonsen Robbins and Helgerson
(2001) tried to prove whether the population influenced the municipal bond interest
rates.
21. See Bonner (1972), Collins (1977) and Swaroop (1995) for an extensive research on
the municipal choice between debt and taxes.
22. Works such as Benito and Vela (1998) and Estevez (1995) can also be consulted.
23. These elements include both the preferences of the community regarding the optimal
debt level (Mceachern, 1978), and regional attitudes toward debt financing (Farnham,
1985).
24. We can place this technique on the dividing line between time series and cross-
sectional analysis.
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