CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVIEWER

Rule 110: Prosecution of Offenses

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal actions

Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows:
a. For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant to Section 1 of
Rule 112, by filing the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conducting
the requisite preliminary investigation.
b. For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly with the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or the complaint with the
office of the prosecutor. In Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint shall be
filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.

The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running period of prescription of
the offense charged unless provided in special laws.

- If b is done, the Court itself still does the preliminary investigation.

- Stopping the prescription:
o Prevent negligence in the part of the complaining parties
So that they can seek redress for their grievances for the violation of their
rights.
o A warning to the offender that there will be no toleration for their hiding

BPI v. Hontanosas
- A preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of a case, or decide controverted
facts, for, being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further
injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the party can be settled.
- It was a mistake for the private respondents to file for a preliminary injunction when their
rights are not yet affected as there was no information filed just yet. They cannot prevent
a preliminary investigation.

Heirs of Delgado v. Gonzalez

- The Courts have the judicial power to review the probable cause.
- When RTC/MTC receives an information, they are tasked to check whether there is
probable cause.
- In this case, petitioners had NO legal standing to sue as it is the Office of the Solicitor
General who must represent the Government in the Supreme Court in ALL CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS.
o Criminal proceedings -> a proceeding instituted to determine a persons
guilt/innocence.
o EXCEPTIONS:
Denial of due process to the prosecution
In this case, the petitioners did not claim that the failure of the SG
to appeal CAs decision is a denial of due process.
Private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of the lower
court.
 No civil aspect as the lower courts have yet to decide on the merits
of the case.
The case is about probable cause, which is a criminal aspect of the
case.

Lim v. Mejica
- Mejica filed a complaint in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for a preliminary
investigation for grave oral defamation. It was denied, but Mejica filed for a Motion for
Reconsideration.
- While he was filing an MR, he found out after a consultation with a friend that he could
file the complaint directly with the MCTC. He filed the same criminal complaint with the
MCTC.
- No forum shopping.
o Forum shopping is when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in once case will amount to res judicata in another.
Identity of parties
Identity of rights asserted
Identity with the respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases,
such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other case.
- OPP: to find a probable cause
- MCTC: conviction of Lim
- Prosecutors resolution does not constitute as a valid and final judgment because his duty,
if he should find a probable cause, is to file the appropriate information before the court.

Section 2. The Complaint or information

The complaint or information shall be in writing, in the name of the People of the
Philippines and against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved.

Ampatuan v. De Lima
- A mandamus cannot be used to compel the prosecutors to execute a discretionary act. Not
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is what you file to compel officers to
discharge their ministerial duties. This does not include discretionary acts.
o In this case, Ampatuan filed a mandamus to compel De Lima to include Dalandag
in the charges. The right to prosecute by prosecutors vests them with a wide range
of discretion. They are solely responsible to determine whether or not the amount
of evidence is sufficient to establish probable cause needed to justify the filing of
appropriate criminal charges.
o Records also do not show a grave abuse of discretion on the part of prosecutors.
Dalandag falls under the exception of Section 2, Rule 110.
When a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness
Discharge from criminal cases, Section 17, Rule 119.
Witness Protection Program
o Offense in which testimony to be used is a grave felony
o Absolute necessity for the testimony
o No other direct evidence available
o Testimony substantially corroborates with material points
o Not most guilty
Section 3. Complaint defined
A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed
by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the enforcement of
the law violated.

Oporto, Jr. v. Monserate

- There was gross ignorance of law in this case as the criminal complaint that was filed in
the MCTC was not sworn nor under oath. At the same time, the affidavits and sworn
statements were not under oath. Still, Judge Monserate of the MCTC issued a warrant of
arrest against Oporto and co-accused Rada. On the mistaken notion that it was under the
jurisdiction of the RTC, he conducted a preliminary investigation and declared that there
was probable cause.
- A criminal complaint is a SWORN, written statement charging a person.1

Salazar v. People
- It is not necessary that the proper offended party file a complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that unless the offense subject of the
complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a
complaint for preliminary investigation.
- Information must be filed by the Fiscal
- Complaint for Preliminary Investigation can be filed by anyone.

Sec. 4. Information defined.

An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed
by the prosecutor and filed with the court.

People v. Arrojado
- The date and number of the MCLE Certificate must be placed even in an Information.
BM No. 1922 provides that it must be written in all pleadings and before the courts or
quasi-judicial bodies.
o An Information is defined to be a writing charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the Court.
o It is considered as a pleading.

Salazar v. People
- It is not necessary that the proper offended party file a complaint for purposes of
preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that unless the offense subject of the
complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a
complaint for preliminary investigation.
- Information must be filed by the Fiscal
- Complaint for Preliminary Investigation can be filed by anyone.

Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions.

All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the
offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law

1 Rule 110, Section 3. (emphasis supplied)

violated may prosecute the case. This authority cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor
or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court. (This Section was repealed by A.M. No.
02-2-07-SC effective May 1, 2002)

The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including the guilty parties, if both alive, nor, in any case, if the offended party has consented to
the offense or pardoned the offenders.

The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian, nor,
in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by any of them. If the offended party dies
or becomes incapacitated before she can file the complaint, and she has no known parents,
grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.

The offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the offenses
of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness independently of her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so. Where the offended party, who is a
minor, fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The
right to file the action granted to parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all other
persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided, except as stated in the
preceding paragraph.

No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of the offenses
mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed by the
offended party.

The prosecution for violation of special laws shall be governed by the provisions thereof.

- The State must be included.

- The State controls the flow of prosecution for the general welfare of society.
- In criminal cases, it is the State that has legal standing. The private offended party is only
a witness.

Worldwide Web Corp. v. People

- An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. Thus, conformity with public
prosecutor is not necessary.
- A search warrant is a special criminal process rather than a criminal action.
o It can be instituted by filing an application and be applied for by anyone.
o It is incidental in a pending criminal case or in anticipation of a criminal case.

Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman

- No Information may be filed without the authority of the Ombudsman. An amendment
done by the Ombudsman is allowed by the Rules of Procedure and Rules of Court. The
Ombudsman is also in-charge of conducting preliminary investigations.
o Furthermore, the Ombudsman merely facilitated the amendment of the complaint
to cure the defect pointed out by Alfredo.
o The Ombudsman has full discretion in determining probable cause.
Jimenez v. Sorongon
- Petitioner in this present case had no interest.
o Material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case.
o Petitioner had no civil interest as the public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal.
Real interest
Present and substantial interest
In a criminal case, it is the People of the Philippines who has real
interest.
o All criminal actions commenced by complaint or Information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor.

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.

A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in
the complaint or information.

People v. Sandiganbayan
- An Information alleging the grant of unwarranted benefits and existence of undue injury
may not grant the precise amount of the alleged benefit unduly granted as well as identity,
specify, and prove the alleged injury to the point of moral certainty.
o The Main Purpose of an Information is to ensure that an accused is formally
informed of the facts and acts constituting the crime/offense charged.
Sec. 6 and 9 of Rule 110:
Name of accused
Designation of the offense
Acts or omissions complained constituting the offense
Name of the offended party
Approximate date and place
Sec. 9:
Sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is charged, as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
True Test:
Whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such
particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of
the offense charged.
o What must be alleged are elements of crime.
However, the elements must be sufficiently stated.
- Unwarranted benefit does not have to be monetary, but the allowance of operation without
permit.

Zapata v. People
- Sec. 6, Rule 110 only specifies the approximate date of the commission of the offense.
- Sec. 11, Rule 110 also adds that:
 o It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date of the
offense except when it is a material ingredient of the offense.
o It just has to be as near as possible to the date of commission of the crime.

Sec. 7. Name of the accused.

The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the accused or any
appellation or nickname by which he has been or is known. If his name cannot be ascertained, he
must be described under a fictitious name with a statement that his true name is unknown.

If the true name of the accused is thereafter disclosed by him or appears in some other
manner to the court, such true name shall be inserted in the complaint or information and record.

People v. Bali-Balita
- Filiation of the appellant to the victim was not properly alleged in the Information.
o Sec. 7 provides that the name, surname, and nickname must be placed in the
complaint or Information.
o Sec. 9 provides that Acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
must be stated
- The fact that he is the common law husband of her mother was not listed or stated in the
cause of the accusation. It must be alleged, being an element of the crime.
o The relationship was stated as a more detailed description. Filiation was not
properly alleged in the Information.
- What is controlling is the description of the criminal act, and not the description of the
identity of the accused.

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense.

The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute,
aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.

People v. Valdez
- It is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce Valdez guilty of 3 homicides, instead of 3
murders on the account of the Informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of
treachery.
o Treachery is the employment of means to the execution of any crime against
persons to ensure its execution. As such, there is an actual need for the State to
specifically aver the factual circumstances that constitute such.
o It cannot be determined from the caption or specification of the provision of law,
but from the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.

People v. Asilan
- CA did not err in appreciating the circumstance of treachery in this case. RTC correctly
appreciated the qualifying circumstance by sufficiently establishing the attendance of
treachery.
o Both witnesses testified on how Asilan stabbed the victim from behind sans
provocation or warning.
o The said circumstance was alleged in the Information.
- Since treachery was correctly alleged in the Information and was duly established by the
prosecution, it is proper.
- To distinguish Valdez and Asilan, check the facts on the Information.
 o Asilan: attacking from behind repeatedly, stabbing with a knife and grabbing the
gun to shoot him.

People v. Bayabos
- Information did not contain all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to
hazing.
o Test: Whether all the facts averred would establish the presence of the essential
elements of crime as defined in the law?
Embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or
psychological suffering or injury
Acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission.
o Only the first element of the crime was established, but not the second element.

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation.

The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

People v. Sandiganbayan
- An Information alleging the grant of unwarranted benefits and existence of undue injury
may not grant the precise amount of the alleged benefit unduly granted as well as identity,
specify, and prove the alleged injury to the point of moral certainty.
o The Main Purpose of an Information is to ensure that an accused is formally
informed of the facts and acts constituting the crime/offense charged.
Sec. 6 and 9 of Rule 110:
Name of accused
Designation of the offense
Acts or omissions complained constituting the offense
Name of the offended party
Approximate date and place
Sec. 9:
Sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is charged, as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
True Test:
Whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such
particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of
the offense charged.
o What must be alleged are elements of crime.
However, the elements must be sufficiently stated.
- Unwarranted benefit does not have to be monetary, but the allowance of operation without
permit.

Dungo v. People
- An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a
higher court authority.
- With regard to the Information, Sec. 9 of Rule 110 is enlightening:
 o It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in
alleging the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
TEST: Whether it enables a person of common understanding to know
the charge against him, and the court to render judgment.
Planned initiation rite: includes act of inducement
Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of
hazing. To require the prosecutor to indicate every step is nearly impossible.
The law does not require the impossible.
o The proper approach is to require the prosecution to state every element of the
crime of hazing, the offenders, and the accompanying circumstances.
- Prosecution established conspiracy.
o Jurisprudence dictates that conspiracy must be established by positive and
conclusive evidence.
o Participation was proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence unless
they prevented the commission of acts therein.
- Some of the overt acts that could be committed by the offenders would be to (1) plan the
hazing activity as a requirement of the victims initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the
victim to attend the hazing; and (3) actually participate in the infliction of physical injuries.

Sec. 10. Place of commission of the offense.

The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that
the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients occurred at some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential
element of the offense or is necessary for its identification.

Navaja v. De Castro
- Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction. But in determining the venue where the
criminal action was instituted, Sec 15a of Rule 110 provides:
o tried in the Court where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred.
- Section 10 states:
o that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at
some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it
was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is
necessary for its identification.
- IN OTHER WORDS, the venue of action and of jurisdiction is sufficiently alleged where
the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
o The allegations in the Information and the complaint-affidavit make out a prima
facie case that such crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol.
o In this crime, where the document is actually falsified to the prejudice of or intent
to prejudice a third person, whether or not it was put to improper or illegal use.
o W/N the crime was committed in Jagna or Cenu City is a question of fact, and
thus, it is not under the SCs jurisdiction to try facts and reexamine pieces of
evidence presented before the SC.
- Improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. Unlike in civil cases, this cannot be done in a criminal case because
it is an element of jurisdiction.
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense.
It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to
have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.

People v. Buca
- It bears stressing that the precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an
essential element of the crime. Thus, as long as it is alleged that the offense was committed
at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is
sufficient.
- In Sec 11, Rule 110, it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise
date the offense was committed, unless it is a material ingredient of the offense. Such
requirement is not applicable to rape where the date of the commission of the offense is
not an essential element.
- In addition, as correctly pointed out by the CA, the Information is valid as under Section
6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an information is deemed
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
o He was also able to testify, so the Court knew that Buca knew what the crime was
about

Sec. 12. Name of the offended party.

The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the person against
whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by
which such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious name.
a. In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the
property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense
charged.
b. If the true name of the of the person against whom or against whose properly the
offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause the
true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record.
c. If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any name
or designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without need of
averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law. (12a)

Lee Pue Liong v. Chua

- When a person commits a crime, he offends two entities: the society, and the individual
member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or
directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
o Sec 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Institution
of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
o At the same time, for the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the
appearance of a private prosecutor is allowed under Sec. 16 of Rule 110.
 o Sec. 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure defines an offended
party as the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed. It is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission
of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, and
therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the
offended party.
In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, the offended party may also be a
private individual whose person, right, house, liberty, or property was
actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the
accused or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the
delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right;
a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him
to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is
sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will
be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities.
Thus, in this case, the statement of the petitioner regarding his custody is
injurious to the respondents personal credibility and reputation insofar as
her faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board
Member and Treasurer of CHI.
o Even if there is no civil liability, the Court held in Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, that
whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to
consider the intervention of the offended party as merely a matter of tolerance.
Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the
proceedings, said right must be respected.

Senador v. People
- An error in the designation in the Information of the offended party does not violate the
accuseds constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
her.
- The variant between the allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the
prosecution does not entitle the accused to an acquittal, especially if it is a mere formal
defect, which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.
- What is absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the criminal act charged in the
information. Thus, this sort of error mandates the correction of the information, and not
its dismissal.
o Rule 110, Sec. 12 provides that:
The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the
person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been
or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party
is unknown, the property must be described with such particularity
as to properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose
property the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or
ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in
the complaint or information and the record
- It is only when the identity of the offended party is material that it can be a violation of
such constitutional right.
 - Doctrine wherein that if the subject matter of the offense is specific or one described with
such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous
designation of the offended party is not material and would not result in the violation of
the accuseds constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her.
o 1902 case of Kepner, this Court ruled that the erroneous designation of the person
injured by a criminal act is not material for the prosecution of the offense because
the subject matter, a warrant, was sufficiently identified with such particularity as
to properly identify the particular offense charged.
o If the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, such as the
money unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation of the offended
party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the
subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, such as a warrant, as in
Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the designation of the
offended party is immaterial.

Sec. 13. Duplicity of the offense.

A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except when the law prescribes
a single punishment for various offenses.

People v. Jugueta
- There was a violation of Rule 110.
- The facts as alleged in the information showed that appellant is guilty of two counts of
crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as it was not a result of one single act. Appellant
is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder.
o The Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Sec. 13,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.
o A complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is
defected.
This is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against
him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. And thus, the
accused may file for a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise,
the defect is deemed waived.
o However, since the appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and
failed to move for the quashal of the informations, he is deemed to have waived
his right to question the same.
o When 2 or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information, but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for
each offense.

Loney v. People
- There is no duplicity of charges in the present case. Duplicity of cases means a single
complaint or information charges more than one offense, as provided in Sec. 13 of Rule
110.
o A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
o In short, there is only duplicity when a single Information charges more than one
offense. Such act is a ground to quash the Information.
o However, in this case, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses,
with each information charging only one offense.
 - Furthermore, this Court has ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or
more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, thus justifying the prosecution of
the accused for more than one offense. The only limit is when a person is placed in double
jeopardy for the same offense.
o Two or more offenses arising from the same act are not the same if it requires an
additional fact or element, which the other does not.
In PD 1067, the additional element is the dumping of mine tailings into
the river without permit.
In PD 984, the existence of actual pollution.
In RA 7942, the willful violation and gross negligence to comply with the
terms of the ECC.
Art. 365, the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence,
recklessness, and imprudence

People v. CA
- The Court of Appeals was biased to the testimony of the private respondents, disregarding
the testimony of AAA. AAA, even if she was conscious, was intoxicated at that time, and
was even forced to drink more by the private respondents, thus, robbing her of her consent.
Furthermore, this Court ruled in the past that if a victims testimony is seen to be credible,
the accused may be convicted, given the nature of the crime.
- However, as regard to the Information, the prosecution filed only a single Information,
when it charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or information
must charge only one offense, otherwise, it is deemed defective. Non-compliance of this
rule may be a ground to quash the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
o However, if the accused fails to file a motion to quash during their arraignment, it
is deemed to have been waived.
o Thus, in this case, the private respondents are deemed to have waived their right
to question the same.
o Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different
counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, there is no duplicity
to speak of.
o Furthermore, allegations and the evidence presented supported that AAA was
raped and defiled several times, upon the admission of private respondents that
they had sexual intercourse with AAA more than once.

Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution.

A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court
shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,
especially the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the
accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail
for their appearance at the trial.

Balindong v. CA
- Sec. 14 provides that if it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided that the
accused would not be placed in double jeopardy.
o Sec. 14 applies only when there has been a mistake in the part of the public
prosecutor in charging the proper offense.
o In this case, the public prosecutor did not make amistake in charging the proper
offense. There was no mistake in charging the proper offenses. At the same time,
Balindong, et.al. fully exhausted the procedure to determine the proper offense by
going all the way to the SOJ. Their quest was ultimately settled with finality by the
SOJ denying their second MR. Even this court issues its judicial imprimatur on the
probable cause for two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of
frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder.

Mendez v. People
- There is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial amendment, but
jurisprudence provides that it consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the Court. Under Sec. 14, the prosecution
is given the right to amend before accused has entered his plea. It is only after arraignment
that the prosecution is prohibited from seeking a substantial amendment.
o Amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in
the original one or do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case as to cause
surprise are considered merely as formal amendments.
o The present case pertains to the alleged change on the date, the addition of
Mendez Medical Group, the addition/change in the branches, but the Court
cannot see how these amendments would adversely affect any substantial right of
the petitioner as accused.
o Date: That the actual date of the commission of the offense pertains to the year
2002 is only consistent with the allegation in the information on the taxable year it
covers: 2001. Since the information alleges that the petitioner failed to file his ITR
for the taxable year 2001, the offense could only be committed before the due date
of filing which is on April 2002.
o Mendez Medical Group and change of branch:
When paying taxes, the person must only keep two basic things: where to
file and when to file.
On the other hand, ITR must be paid on or before April 15. Since the
petitioner operates as a sole proprietor, he should have filed a consolidated
return in his principal place of business, regardless of the name and
location of his other branches. Even if there is a change and/or addition
to the branches, there is still the theory that petitioner failed to file his ITR.

Ocampo v. Abando
- Political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against petitioners prior to
a determination by the trial court that the murders were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
o Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of
rebellion (if it is in the furtherance of rebellion.)
 o However, it is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge
respondents with simple rebellion instead of common crime.
o Petitioners aver that the alleged murders were committed in the furtherance of
rebellion. However, the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be
discharged by the defense. The proof showing political motivation is adduced
during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence
supporting his defense. If during trial, petitioners are able to show such, Sec. 14,
Rule 110 provides the remedy:
If it appears any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint
or Information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense
in accordance with Sec. 19, Rule 119.
o Thus, if it seen that the proper charge against the petitioners should have been
simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss charges upon the filing of the
Information for simple rebellion.
o While an Information for rebellion was filed, however, the petitioners were never
arraigned. They also asked to seek to enjoin the prosecution of such case.
Eventually, the crime was dismissed, and thus, first jeopardy never had a chance
to attach.

Kummer v. People
- Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is
merely a formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required.
o Sec. 14, Rule 110 permits a formal amendment even after the plea, but only if it is
made with leave of court and provided that it does not cause prejudice to the rights
of the accused. A mere change in the date of the crime, if the disparity of time is
not great, is more formal than substantial.
When the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or
information would no longer be available after the amendment is made,
when any evidence the accused might have would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, and when any evidence of the accused would
be inapplicable to the complaint or information.
Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused one court and in
notifying him the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
However, it is only needed when there is substantial amendment. Formal
amendments do not charge an offense different from that charge in the
original complaint/information, do not alter the theory of prosecution, do
not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense, and do not adversely
affect the substantial rights of the accused.
The amendment was only changing the month, from July 19, 1988 to June
19, 1988.

Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted.

Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred.
 Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle while
in the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any
municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such its trip,
including the place of its departure and arrival.

Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or
territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles
of international law.

Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised
Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed.

Union Bank v. People

- Venue is an essential element. Its determines not only the place where the criminal action
is to be instituted, but the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case.
o The jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial
court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction.
o Laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of
having an accused on trial in the province where witnesses and other facilities for
his defense are available.
o A finding of improper venue carries jurisdictional consequences.
o Both provisions (Sec. 10 and 15a of Rule 110) categorically place the venue and
jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was
committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
o Sec. 5, Rule 7 contains the requirement for Certificate against Forum Shopping.
o Art. 183 elements:
made a statement under oath upon a material matter.
statement was made before a competent officer
made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood
it is required by law or made for a legal purpose
o Where the jurisdiction is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of
improper venue, the allegations must be examined together with Sec. 15a. On this
basis, we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding
that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction
of the MeTC- Makati.
The first element, on the execution of the Certificate, was alleged in the
Information to have been committed in Makati City. As well as the second
and fourth offenses.
Thus, Makati City is the proper venue, and MeTC-Makati is the proper
court to try the perjury case.
In verified petitioners obtaining false statements in Pasig, but filed in
Makati and Tagaytay, the proper court is Makati and Tagaytay as they were
the places where the verified petitions were filed. It is upon filing that the
intent to assert an alleged falsehood becomes manifest and where the
alleged untruthful statement found relevance or materiality.

- False testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case

- False testimony in a civil case
 - False testimony in other cases
- Perjury is committed by the act of representing a false document in a judicial proceeding.
Venue: where the fall document was presented.
- false testimony in a civil case and criminal case
o where you
- execution of false affidavit
o venue where you executed the affidavit
o where the affidavit was subscribed

Navaja v. De Castro
- Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction. But in determining the venue where the
criminal action was instituted, Sec 15a of Rule 110 provides:
o tried in the Court where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred.
- Section 10 states:
o that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at
some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it
was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is
necessary for its identification.
- IN OTHER WORDS, the venue of action and of jurisdiction is sufficiently alleged where
the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
o The allegations in the Information and the complaint-affidavit make out a prima
facie case that such crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol.
o In this crime, where the document is actually falsified to the prejudice of or intent
to prejudice a third person, whether or not it was put to improper or illegal use.
o W/N the crime was committed in Jagna or Cenu City is a question of fact, and
thus, it is not under the SCs jurisdiction to try facts and reexamine pieces of
evidence presented before the SC.
- Improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. Unlike in civil cases, this cannot be done in a criminal case because
it is an element of jurisdiction.

Sec. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.

Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
offense.

Villalon v. Chan
- Sec. 16 of Rule 110 expressly allows an offended party to intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense for the recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal
action. The civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action, except when offended
party waives the civil action.
o CA found no waiver by the respondent. The fact that respondent had secured the
services of a lawyer in the PH reveals her willingness and interest to participate in
the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability. And thus, the RTC
should have allowed Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as the
respondent is afford by law to participate through counsel in the prosecution of
the offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
Rule 111: Prosecution of Civil Action

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint
or information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the

criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated
in a separate civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the
filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based
on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may
be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of
this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
 - EXCEPTION TO INSTITUTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO:
o Waiver
o Reservation
Made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence AND
under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity
to make such reservation.
o Prior institution to criminal action
o BP 22 cases
- LIEN IN JUDGMENT:
o The Court must specify the damages.
o When the Court gets money from the offender to the offended party, the Court
deducts the amount from the damages.
o Question: what if the Court deducts the damages that the person requested?
- RES JUDICATA:
o same parties
o same cause of action and relief prayed
o same issues
- QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE FOR CRIMINAL CASES: Proof beyond reasonable
doubt
- QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE FOR CIVIL CASES: Preponderance of evidence
- Civil Liability: (1157)
o Law
o Contracts
o Quasi-Contracts
o Delicts
ex-delicto (see Art. 100 of RPC)
If the accused dies during the pendency of the trial, the criminal
and civil liabilities are both extinguished.
o Quasi-delicts
o Arts. 32-34 (independent civil actions) (defamation, fraud, or physical injuries)
can be pursued against the owner of a PUV
you can also sue via Torts
- Recovery of property/damages to injury to person or property -> Against the executor or
administrator
- Money claim -> against the Estate
- Procedural rules apply retroactively, even to pending cases.

Chiok v. People
- Chiok is liable for the amount of Php9,563,900. According to jurisprudence, if the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt, accused is not automatically exempt from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
o Preponderance of evidence: weight, credit, and value of aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater
weight of the evidence or Greater weight of the credible evidence.
 Evidence more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which
is offered in opposition thereto.
o Chiok admitted to the Php9.5M amount, and there is no merit in his claim that his
absolution from civil liability in the BP 22 case bars civil liability in this estafa case.
It is not res judicator.
o Rule 111 of the Rules of Court allows the institution of a civil action in the crimes
of both estafa and violation of BP 22, without need of election by the offended
party. There is no forum shopping because both remedies are simultaneously
available to the offended party. While every such act of issuing a bouncing check
involves only one civil liability for the offended party, who has sustained only a
single injury, this single civil liability can be the subject of both civil actions in the
estafa and the BP 22 case. But, there may be only one recovery of the single civil
liability.
o The basis of Chioks acquittal is the prosecutions failure to show that a notice of
dishonor was first given to Chiok.

Bernardo v. People
- An act or omission causing damage may give rise to several distinct civil liabilities. If the
conduct constitutes a felony, accused may be held civilly liable under Art. 100 of the
Revised Penal Code (ex delicto). This particular civil liability due to the offended party is
rooted on facts that constitute a crime. CIVIL LIABILITY ARISES FROM THE
OFFENSE CHARGED. It is not required that the accused be convicted to be entitled to
civil liability based on delict.
o As long as the facts constituting the offense charged are established by
preponderance of evidence, civil liability may be awarded. Moreover, the civil
liability based on delict is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately,
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
- Furthermore, Bernardos civil liability may be enforced in the present case, despite her
death. Death extinguishes criminal liability or any liability arising from the offense.
However, the independent civil liabilities survive death and an action for recovery may be
generally pursued but only by filing a separate civil action. This separate civil action may
be enforced against the estate of the accused.
o However, in BP 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil actions. Instead of instituting two separate cases, only a single
suit is filed and tried to help declog court dockets.
o As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil liabilities arising from the
issuance of a worthless check are deemed instituted in a case for violation of BP
22. The death of Bernardo did not extinguish the action.
o The independent civil liability based on contract, which was deemed instituted in
the criminal action for BP 22, may still be enforced against her estate in the present
case.
- Plus, she failed to adduce sufficient evidence of her payment. Thus, she is civilly liable.
Standard Insurance Co. v. Cuaresma
- There was no preponderance of evidence. The evidence provided was not enough to
showcase that it was the respondents negligence that brought about the accident.
o Traffic Accident Investigation Report
requisites were not complied with. It failed to establish petitioners claim
that respondents negligence was the proximate cause of the damage
sustained by Chams vehicle.
- There exists no forum shopping for the filing of the instant suit is expressly allowed to
proceed independently of the criminal action filed by respondents.
o Forum shopping is the filing by a party against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly a favorable opinion in
another suit other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It is the act
of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action for
the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
o Even though the two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have
different causes of action. Criminal case is based on culpa criminal, while the civil
case is based on culpa aquiliana. Quasi-delict under Arts. 2176 and 2177.
o Furthermore, par. 6, sec. 1, of Rule 111 expressly requires the accused to litigate
his counterclaim in a separate civil action:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the
accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Italics
supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum shopping if
the accused files such separate civil action.
o Petitioner, who is surrogated to the rights of Cham, the accused in the criminal
case instituted by respondents, cannot be guilty of forum shopping for its separate
civil action is expressly allowed to proceed independently of the criminal action
involved herein.

Heirs of Simon v. Chan

- There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22. It is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which provides
that:
o the criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed.
- The said Rule is applicable, as the retroactive application of procedural laws is oaky as long
as it does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected.
- Moreover, the said rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97, that took effect
in Nov. 1, 1997.
 - There was litis pendentia in this case, as the parties involved in the criminal case and civil
are the same, the information that alleged the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for are the
same, and the judgment of one would bar the other by res judicator.

Heirs of Burgos v. CA
- CA correctly dismissed the special civil action of certiorari which questioned the RTCs
grant of bail to respondent, Co.
o When the trial court acquits the accused on the ground of lack of evidence, the
civil action is not automatically extinguished since liability can be determined on
mere preponderance of evidence.
The question of granting bail is but an aspect of the criminal action,
preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of conviction. It has
no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction.
Here, Co has been arraigned. And thus, trial and judgment, with award for
civil liability when warranted, could proceed even in his absence.

Sec 2. When separate civil action is suspended.

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before
judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended
party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-
examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided
jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended
shall be tolled.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist.

Co v. Muoz
- The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the
accuseds civil liability. The last paragraph of sec 2, Rule 111 apples to civil actions to claim
 civil liability arising from the offense charged, regardless if it were instituted with or filed
separately from the criminal action.
- Undoubtedly, sec. 2 governs situations when the offended party opts to institute the civil
action separately from the criminal action.
- The last paragraph governs all claims for civil liability ex delicto. This is based on Art. 100
of RPC that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.
- Ex delicto may be enforced:
o through a civil action deemed instituted in the criminal action
o through a civil action that is filed separately, either before the criminal action or
after.
- An appeal is a proper remedy that a party may avail with respect to the judgment. The
extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil
action, where the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action.
o The offended party may still claim if there is a finding in the final judgment that
the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists.
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
liability of the accused is only civil
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon
the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
- The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.
o His statement is privileged communication.
o While the law presumes that every imputation is malicious, there are exemptions:
private communication made by any person to another in performance of
any legal, moral, or social duty
a fair and true report made in good faith
Remarks directed against a public figure are privileged.
o Privileged communication has the effect of destroying the presumption of malice
and consequently requiring the existence of malice in fact.
o In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. Malice
is no longer presumed, and the prosecution has the burden of proving that Muoz
acted with malice, but prosecution failed to.
o Without the crime, no civil liability may be claimed by Co.

Domingo v. Colina
- The last paragraph of Sec. 2, Rule 111 provides that:
o However the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is
a finding in the final judgment of a criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
- Second paragraph also provides that:
o In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist
 - In the instant case, the Orders did not contain any finding or determination. Court agrees
with the CA that in acquitting the petitioner, the MTCC did not rule on the civil aspect of
the case. While it is held that the Order did state the act from which the civil liability of
the accused in favor of the private complainant may arise does not exist in this case, the
MTCC, nonetheless, failed to cite evidence, factual circumstances or any discussion in its
decision which would warrant such ruling.
o Instead, it merely concluded that since the prosecution failed to prove all the
elements, the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
o Furthermore, the tenor of the Orders is that the case was dismissed based on
reasonable doubt. Only the second and third elements were not proven: the check
is applied on account or for value for, and knowledge that there is insufficient
funds. However, the first and fourth were proven, (person draws a check, and the
check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds). Hence, the fact that the
petitioner issued a check and that the said check was dishonored for inadequate
funds lead to the logical conclusion that the fact from which civil liability may arise,
indeed, exists.

Ching v. Nicdao
- An acquittal does not necessarily carry with it the extinguishment of the civil liability of
the accused. It is also relevant to mention that judgments of acquittal are required to state
whether the evidence of prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilty of the accused
or merely failed to prove his guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
- Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal:
o acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
o court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only
civil in nature
o civil liability is not derived from the criminal act
- However, Ching may appeal the civil aspect of the case, but it must be done during the
reglementary period. The appeal period accorded to the accused should also be available
to the offended party who seeks redress of the civil aspect of the decision. At the same
time, it must fall under the three reasons for its non-extinguishment by acquittal.
o CAs acquittal was not based on reasonable doubt, but the finding that she did not
commit the act penalized under BP 22. The Php20M check was a stolen check and
was never issued nor delivered by Nicdao to Ching. As such, Ching did to acquire
any right or interest to the check.
o CA also did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to Ching, since she has fully paid
her obligations.
o While petitioner Ching attempts to show that Nicdaos liability came from her loan
obligations to him, he failed to prove by preponderant evidence the existence of
these unpaid loan obligations.

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently

In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.

Lim v. Kou Co Ping

- It is not forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for specific
performance and damages, while appealing the judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal
case for estafa.
- The first action (*) is a civil action ex delicto, having been instituted together with the
criminal action. However, the second one (+) is a civil action arising from a contractual
obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights.) In her civil complaint, Lim alleges
that she entered into a sale contract with Co under certain terms (37,200 bags of cement
at the rate of Php64, and after full payment, Co deliver it to her the withdrawal authorities,
and that said authorities were valid for 6 months, but then, Co and his co-defendants
wanted her to pay for more, contrary to the agreed price.)
o It is evident that Lim seeks to enforce the defendants contractual obligations,
given that she has already performed her obligations. She prays that the defendants
either honor their part of the contract or pay for the damages that their breach has
caused her.
o Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were committed in
such manner as to cause damage to Lim without regard for morals, good customs,
and public policy (and thus, would constitute tortious conduct.)
o Thus, the Civil Case (+) involves only the obligations arising from contract and
tort, while the appeal in the estafa case (*) involves only the civil obligations of Co
arising from the offense charged.
o The civil liability arising from the offense (ex delicto) is based on the acts or
omissions that constitute the criminal offense. Hence, its trial is inherently
intertwined with the criminal action. Thus, the ex delicto is impliedly instituted
with the criminal offense. If the action for ex delicto is instituted prior to or
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until
the final outcome of the criminal action.
o On the other hand, independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal
action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Arts. 31 and 33 of the
Civil Code.
o Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities,
jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil
liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively without offending the rules on forum
shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.

Casupanan v. Laroya
- An accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file a separate
civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant.
- The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action. However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because
 the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action.
o The criminal case is used on the RPC, while the civil action for damages was based
on Art. 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two arose from the same act or
omission, they have different causes of action.
The criminal case is based on culpa criminal, while the civil case is based
on culpa aquiliana based under Arts. 2176 and 2177.
Furthermore, any aggrieved person can invoke these articles, provided he
proves by preponderance of evidence that he has suffered damage because
of the fault or negligence of the other. Either the private complainant or
accused can feel a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing
in the law or rules that state that only the private complainant in a criminal
case may invoke these articles.
o Par. 6, Sec. 1, of Rule 111 expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim
in a separate civil action. Thus, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files
such separate civil action.
o The rule on the Suspension of the Separate Civil Action is only applicable to
separate civil actions filed to recover liability ex-delicto. This rule does not apply
to independent civil actions based on Arts. 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code.
o Sec. 3 of Rule 111 allows the offended party to bring an independent civil action
under Arts. 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code. This civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
o An accuse can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in par. 6, Sec. 1 of Rule
111.
Accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect
that is deemed instituted in the criminal case.
The accused has a right to invoke Art. 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same
way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent
of the criminal action.

Cabugao v. People
- Ynzon died due to multi-organ failure, but his civil liability attaches.
o It attached as it is predicted on a source of obligation other than delict. While his
death extinguishes his criminal liability, but the recovery of civil liability subsists as
it is based on contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty under.
o Thus, a separate civil action may be enforced against the executor/administrator
or the estate of the accused, depending on the source f obligation which the same
is based.
o Sec. 4, Rule 111:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions.The death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall
extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict.
However, the independent civil action instituted under Section 3 of this
Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other
sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate,
as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the
deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or
 administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
o Thus, the party may file a separate civil action against the executor or administrator
of the estate of the accused.

Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions.

The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action
shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action
instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising
from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the
accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused
may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and
be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to
any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased. (n)

People v. Lipata
- Appellants death extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities.
- However, appellants civil liability ex quasi-delicto may now be pursued because
appellantss death extinguished both his criminal liability and civil liability ex- delicto.
- Because there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was
there any reservation for filing a separate case for the cause of action arising from quasi-
delict. The heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case. However, the lack of a separate
civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict leads us to the conclusion that, a
decade after Cuenos death, his heirs cannot reoccur even a centavo from the amounts
awarded by the CA.

Cabugao v. People
- Ynzon died due to multi-organ failure, but his civil liability attaches.
o It attached as it is predicted on a source of obligation other than delict. While his
death extinguishes his criminal liability, but the recovery of civil liability subsists as
it is based on contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty under.
o Thus, a separate civil action may be enforced against the executor/administrator
or the estate of the accused, depending on the source f obligation which the same
is based.
o Sec. 4, Rule 111:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions.
The death of the accused after arraignment and during the
pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability
arising from the delict.
 However, the independent civil action instituted under Section 3 of this
Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other
sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate,
as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the
deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
o Thus, the party may file a separate civil action against the executor or administrator
of the estate of the accused.

Asilo v. People
- Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. However, in this case, the civil liability is
based on another source of obligation: Law
o Law on human relations:
o Art. 31 of Civil Code and 32(6):
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages:
The right against deprivation of property without due process of
law;
o Furthermore, the complaint or civil liability was filed way ahead of the information
of RA 3019. There was a violation to the right of private property. The accused
public officials should have accorded the spouses the due process of law
guaranteed by the Constitution and New Civil Code.

People v. Bayot
- According to Art. 89 of the RPC, death extinguishes criminal liability as well as the civil
liability ex delicto. A criminal action is extinguished as there is no longer a defendant to
stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.

Sec. 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar.

A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is
not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant for the same act or omission subject of the
civil action. (4a)

Madarang v. CA
- The petitions for certiorari are defective since petitioners failed to implead the People of
the Philippines as respondent.
- A special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion.
When an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to
certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course.
 - Furthermore, it is not res judicata as there is no identity to the parties since the People is
not a party in the replevin suit.
- The decision of the RTC is also not finally and executory. CA even modified the decision
of the RTC.
- Res Judicata is not a ground to quash an information.
- Sec. 4 of Rule 111 explicitly recognizes that a final judgment rendered in a civil action
absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action.

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.

A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)

Ty-de Zuzuarregui v. Villarosa

- For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension
of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following
requisites must be present:
o (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based;
o (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and
o (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
- The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two (2) conflicting
decisions.
- If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility
of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that
the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not
involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
- The Court of Appeals is principally for the determination of the validity of the compromise
agreement which did not include Peter, Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter,
Catherine, and Fannie presented evidence to prove that they are also biological children of
Bella and Alejandro. On the other hand, Criminal Case before the MeTC involve the
determination of whether petitioner committed falsification of public documents in
executing pleadings containing untruthful statements that she and Rosemary were the only
legal heirs of Bella.
- It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the
petitioner in the criminal cases for falsification of public documents. The criminal cases
arose out of the claim of Peter, Catherine, and Fannie that they are also the legal heirs of
Bella.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.

The elements of a prejudicial question are:
a. the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
b. the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
- c. Jurisdiction to try said question is lodged with another tribunal
People v. Arambulo
- A prejudicial question arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime, but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilty or innocence of the accused. And for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that the said case involves facts intimately related,
but also that in the resolution of the issue in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.
- Sec. 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedures prescribes the elements:
o previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action
o resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
o [civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based
o in the resolution of the issue of the civil case, the innocence or guilty of the accused
would be necessarily determined
o jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal]
- As correctly stated by the CA, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a prejudicial
case as it is an action for accounting of all corporate of funds, annulment of sale, injunction,
etc. Even if such case will be decided against respondents, they will not be adjudged free
from criminal liability. It also does not necessarily follow that an accounting of corporate
funds would result in the conviction of respondents in the estafa case.
- However, in the other case, there is a prejudicial question. It prays for the nullification of
the election of the Anaped directors. Essentially, the issue is the authority of the officers
to act for and in behalf of the corporation. If SEC rules that the present directors and
officers were not validly elected, then Victoria may have every right to refuse remittance
of rental to Buban. Thus, the essential element of misappropriation of estafa may be absent.

San Miguel Properties v. Perez

- An action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative
agency, still raised a prejudicial question. The action for specific performance was an action
civil in nature, but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose
jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.The determination of whether the
proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question is restored on
whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings of the administrative case were so
related with the issues in the criminal complaint.
o An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance
of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise
terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it. Evidently, there must first be a
breach of contract.
o On the other hand, PD 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and
condominiums. The action for specific performance would determine w/n SMP
was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the
criminal action would decide w/n BF Homes Directors and Officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs.
o The resolution of the former must preceded that of the letter., for should the
HLURB hold that San Miguel Properties is not entitled, the basis of the violation
of PD 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal
case.
 o For prejudicial questions, it is enough that to simply test the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the
criminal case.

Spouses Gaditano v. San Miguel Corporation

- Petitioners insist that CA erroneously ruled against the existence of a prejudicial question
by separately treating their joint savings and current account, and concluding that the civil
and criminal case could proceed independently of each other. Petitioners maintain that
since the checking account was funded by the money deposited in the savings account,
what mattered was the sufficiency of the funds in the savings account.
o For prejudicial question to exist, both civil and criminal cases must have similar
issues, or that the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other.
IT must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues
would determine the guilt or innocences off the accused. If it doesnt, or if that
there is no necessity in taking the civil case first, nor if both can proceed
independently of each other, then there is no prejudicial question.
o The material facts surrounding the civil case bears no relation to the criminal
investigation conducted by prosecutor. SMC is not privy to the nature of the
allegedly materially altered check. The source of funds of petitioners savings
account is no longer SMCs concern. It is between petitioners and AsiaTrust Bank.
The issue for the preliminary investigation, however, is w/n petitioners issued a
bad check to SMC.

Pimentel v. Pimentel
- A resolution for an annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question.
- The Civil Case must be instituted before the Criminal Case. The Information for
Frustrated Parricide was dated Aug. 30, 2004. It was raffled to RTC QC on Oct. 25, 2004.
The RTC QC set for pre-trial and trial on Feb. 14, 2005. On the other hand, petitioner was
saved summons for the civil case on Feb. 7, 2005. The petition in the civil case was dated
Nov. 4, 2004 and was filed on Nov. 5, 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed
after the filing of the criminal case. As such, the requirement of sec. 7, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent
to the filing of the criminal action.
- Furthermore, an annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case for
parricide.
o Prejudicial questions exist when a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever, the issue
raised in the civil action may determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.
o The relationship between the offender and victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide. However, the issue in the annulment case is not similar or intimately
related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. The relationship between the
offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
o The issue in an annulment for marriage is W/N petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential martial obligations. The issue in parricide
is W/N the accused killed the victim. Furthermore, at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. Thus, the subsequent
 dissolution of their marriage will have no effect in the alleged crime that was
committed at the time of the substance of the marriage.
o Even if the marriage will be annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since he was still married to respondent at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime.

Dreamwork Construction Inc. v. Janiola

- There is no prejudicial question in this case.
- The elements of a prejudicial question are the following:
o previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action
o resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
- The civil action must precede the criminal action. Furthermore, the civil case was filed two
years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that private
respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site and stopping the
construction of the propose building for no valid reason.
- Furthermore, BP 22 punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, and not for the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions, relating to its issuance. And
thus, even if the trial court declares that the construction agreement is void, this would not
affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact is that private
respondent issued checks which were dishonored for insufficient funds.

Rule 112: Preliminary Investigation

Section 1. Preliminary Investigation, defined.

Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Except as provided in Sec. 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be
conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least 4 y, 2m, and 1 day without regard to the find.

- A preliminary investigation is a mere privilege.

- Two kinds of determination of probable cause:
o Executive
One made during preliminary investigation
It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given
a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law and thus should be held for trial.
ends with filing of Information
o Judicial
One made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest must be
issued against the accused.
It is distinct from the executive probable cause. It is not a review of the
executive probable cause
But, it is making its own assessment.
 - Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
o It falls under the first instance with the Prosecutor
o executive function
o it is not an interference with the executive function because it still has to be
submitted to the court if the person can be subjected under the jurisdiction of the
Court (by filing a warrant of arrest).
- But, after a Warrant of Arrest has been issued, what you should file is an MR or Motion
to Quash the Warrant.

Mendoza v. People
- A trial court judge may dismiss an Information filed by the Prosecutor on the basis of its
own independent finding of lack of probable cause.
- The conduct of preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the
existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecution. If
upon evaluation of the evidence, the prosecution finds sufficient basis to find probable
cause, he/she shall then cause the filing of the information with the court.
- Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then personally evaluate the resolution
of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence to determine whether there is probable cause
to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.
- Two kinds of determination of probable cause:
o Executive
One made during preliminary investigation
It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given
a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law and thus should be held for trial.
o Judicial
One made by thug to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest must be issued
against the accused.
- Executive determination of probable cause concerns with the filing of an Information,
while judicial determination determines whether a warrant of arrest must be issued.
- The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to
review the prosecutors determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a
determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutors finding.
o While the Information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali
had the discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to
order the arrest of the accused and proceed with trial.
Sec. 6a of Rule 112 mandates the judge to immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record fails to establish probable cause.
Once a complaint/informaiton is filed in Court, the dismissal, conviction,
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court.
In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the
evidence on record and concluded that the evidence adduced does not
 support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and
estafa.
She found that Juno Cars failed to prove by competent evidence to
substantiate the charge of qualified theft. Thus, Judge Capco-Umali
correctly dismissed the case against Alfredo. However, even if
jurisprudence and procedural laws allow it, a judge must always proceed
with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering
the preliminary nature of the evidence before it.
- In the Mendoza case, it is open to judicial question because the Information has already
been filed, and thus, already in the jurisdiction of the Court.

Callo-Claridad v. Esteban
- Petition for reviews under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to review decisions, resolutions, or
awards made by quasi-judicial officers, agencies, or bodies. However, the SOJ was not
performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP on the matter
of probable cause, it was performing an essentially executive function to determine
whether the crime alleged against the respondent was committed, and whether there was
probable cause to believe that the respondents were guilty thereof.
o Courts could intervene in the SOJs determine of probable cause through a
certiorari.
- Second, an examination of the CAs decision indicate that CA correctly concluded that the
SOJ did not abuse his discretion in passing upon and affirming the finding or probable
cause by the OCP.
o A preliminary investigation -> an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there
is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.
o It is called preliminary because it is yet to be followed by the trial proper in a court
of law. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of evidence, but for
the presentation of such evidence as may engender a well-founded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the offense.
o Three reasons:
to inquire concerning the commission of a crime and the connection of
the accused with it
to preserve the evidence and keep the witnesses within the control of the
State
to determine the amount of bail
o The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of
the public prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation upon the complaint
of an offended party.
Probable cause: such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof.
 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that it
was committed by the accused.
A public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that
establishes the probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information
against the respondent because the determination of existence of a
probable cause is the function of the public prosecutor.

Uy v. Javellana
- The Revised Rule of Summary Procedure shall govern the following cases:
o Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
o Violations of the rental law;
o Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
o Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
o All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties,
accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, this
Rule shall govern
- The crime of malicious mischief should be governed by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, and not the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
- In People v. Lopez, Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even when it was not
required or justified. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a
preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under the said Rule.
o Sec. 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Crim Pro only requires a preliminary
investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an
offense here the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2 mos, and 1 day
without regard to the fine. As having been established, the maximum penalty in
People v. Lopez is just 6 months.
o He also did not provide any reason on why he needed to conduct a preliminary
investigation in People v. Lopez. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily
conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case,
and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.

Arroyo v. DOJ
- Sec. 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the
COMELEC. Par. 6 vests in the COMELEC the power to file petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
o The grant to the COMELEC of the power to investigate and prosecute election
offenses is intended to enable to COMELEC to effective ensure to the people the
free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The constitutional grant of
prosecutorial power in the COMELEC was reflected in Sec. 265 of the BP 881
(Omnibus Election Code.)
 o The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That
in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months
from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal
[public prosecutor], or with the Ministry [Department] of Justice for proper
investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
- The power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the COMELEC,
but it was also give the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms.
Thus, provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants are given continuing authority as
deputies to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses
under election laws and to prosecute the same. The complaints may be filed directly with
them or may be endorsed to them by the petitioner or duly authorized representatives.
o Thus, while exclusive jurisdiction is vested with the COEMLEC, the prosecutors
had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing
delegated authority given by the COMELEC.
o Moreover, in People v. Basilla, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution
of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections will
not be possible without the assistance of provincial and city prosecutors, their
assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors.
o Sec. 43 of RA 9369 amended Sec. 265:
The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under
this Code, and to prosecute the same.72
Thus, DOJ also exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the COMELEC to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecutor
the same. Thus, there is no impediment for the COMELEC and DOJ to
create the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team for the purpose of
conducting a thorough investigation of the alleged massive electoral fraud
and manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 National
elections.
- There was a valid conduct in the preliminary investigation.
o Sec. 6a, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedures grants the respondent
such right of examination under Sec. 3b, Rule 112. The subpoena issued against
respondent should be accompanied by a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents.
o GMA has the right to examine documents, but only to the documents or evidence
submitted by the complainants, which she may not have been furnished and to
copy them at her expense.
o While Sen. Pimentel was ordered to furnish petitioners with all the supporting
evidence, he manifested that he was adopting all the affidavits attached to the Fact-
Finding Teams Initial Report. Thus, when GMA was furnished with the
documents attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted the right to
 examine. Those were the only documents submitted by the complainants to the
Committee.

Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.

The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
1. Provincial or City Prosecutor and their assistants
2. National and Regional State Prosecutors
3. Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by
the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.

- A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, effective October 3, 2006 amended Sec. 5, removing MCTC or
MTC judges from being able to conduct preliminary investigations.

Mangila v. Pangilinan
- The writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed
to the question whether the proceedings and the assailed order are null and void. The writ
is not ordinarily granted where there are other remedies in the regular course and in the
absence of exceptional circumstances. It is also a summary remedy. It is to inquire into the
legality of the detention and if found illegal, to require the release of the detainee.
o There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against
petitioners, Judge Pangilinan was empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations involving all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. His authority was expressly provided in Sec. 2,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
o Furthermore, under Sec. 6b of Rule 112, the investigating judge could issue a
warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its
conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the
complaint and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a
probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
o The authority of the MTC and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations
was removed only effective on Oct. 3, 2005. With Mangilas arrest and ensuing
detention by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of
habeas corpus is not an appropriate remedy.
o Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after examining Palayon, one of the
complainants against Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge,
considered Palayons evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against her and
her cohorts, which finding the Court justifiably presumes from his act of referring
the case and its records to the Office of the City Prosecutor on the day immediately
following the preliminary investigation he conducted, her petition for habeas
corpus could not be the proper remedy by which she could assail the adequacy of
the adverse finding. Even granting that there was a failure to adhere to the law or
 rule, such failure would not be the equivalent of a violation of her constitutional
rights
o It was also not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance of the warrant
by hinting that the investigating judge did not consider the necessity of determining
the existence of probable cause due to time constraints.
o It was clear under Sec. 5, Rule 112 that the resolution of the investigating judge
was not final but was still subject to the review of the public prosecutor who could
order the release of the detainee if no probable cause should be ultimately found
against her.

Sec. 3. Procedure

The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

a. The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by
the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting
documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there
are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be
subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of
who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

b. Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall
either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting
affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense.
If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which
he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for
examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for
examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.

c. Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting
affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that
of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The
counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in
paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant.
The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-
affidavit.
 d. If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-
affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the
complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.

e. The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified
from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the
right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating
officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-
affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their
submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.

f. Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine
whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.

Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman

- There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his correspondents.
o Secs. 3-4 of Rule 112, and Rule II of the Admin Order No. 7 do not provide so.
It pertains to the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as
other supporting documents to establish probable cause.
The respondent simply has the right to examine the evidence submitted by
the complainant which he may not have been furnishes and to copy them
at his expense.
o Rule II of the Admin Order No. 7
If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the
investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses
to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.
After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue
an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting
documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with
proof of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file
reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.
If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer
may consider the comment filed by him, if any, as his answer to the
complaint. In any event, the respondent shall have access to the evidence
on record.
o Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request violates his constitutional right
to due process, but he fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a
compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the
Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his
 correspondents. Neither Sec. 3b, Rule 112 or Sec. 4c, Rule II support Sen.
Estradas claim.
o What the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman
to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is
issued to the respondent.
Clearly, what Sec. 4b refers to are affidavits of the complainants and his
witnesses, and not the affidavits of the correspondents.
Although Sec. 4c provides that a respondent shall have access to the
evidence on record, but it is to be construed in relation to 4a and 4b of the
same rule, as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Sec. 3b, Rule 112 provides that the respondent shall have the right to
examine the evidence submitted by the complainant. Thus, there is no
requirement that the affidavits executed by the co-respondents should be
furnished to a respondent.
The denial of his request happened during the preliminary investigation
where the only issue is the existence of a probable cause for the purpose
of determining whether an information should be filed, and does not
prevent Sen. Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of
his co-respondents during the pretrial or during the trial.
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of
probable cause.
Probability of guilty and should be determined in a summary
manner.
Thus, the rights of a respondent are limited to those granted by
procedural law.

Ocampo v. Abando
- A preliminary investigation is not a casual affair. It serves an opportunity for the
presentation of the respondents side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the
investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable
belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was respondent who committed it.
o Petitioners alleged that they did not receive a copy of the complaint due to the false
address. Furthermore, they also claim that they were denied the right to file an MR
because the latter delayed the service of the Resolution.
o However, Sec. 3d of Rule 112 allows Prosecutor to resolve the complaint based on
evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts
to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present
countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.
They were served subpoenas at their last known addresses, but they could
no longer be found at such, thus, they were not served copies of the
complaint and the attached documents or evidence.
Callo-Claridad v. Esteban
- here was no showing of any prima facie evidence that indicated the respondents
involvement in the commission of the crime. It is clear that there was no eyewitness of the
actual killing of Chase, or that there was any evidence showing how he was killed, how
many persons killed him, and who had been the perpetrator/s of his killing. Petitioner
relies solely on circumstantial evidence.
o All the circumstances must be consistent with one another and must constitute an
unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been
committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof.
More than one circumstance
Facts from which the inference are derived have been proven
Combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt
o There was also a lack of the requisite certifications, since the affidavits were not
sworn in as required in Sec. 3. They are required to disallow self-serving evidence
and testimonies that are unreliable.

Artillero v. Casimero
- Art. III, Sec. 14 (right to be informed) is a right that cannot be invoked by petitioner, but
by the accused.
o It is also clear that because a preliminary investigation is not a proper trial, the
rights of parties depend on the rights granted to them by law, and cannot be based
on whatever they believe they are entitled or those that may be derived from due
process of law
- A complainant in a preliminary investigation does not have a vested right to file a Reply.
There is no provision in Rule 112 that gives the Complainant or requires the prosecutor
to observe the right to feel a Reply to the accuseds counter-affidavit. Sec. 3d of Rule 112
gives the prosecutor the right to resolve the Complaint even without a counter-affidavit.
It is discretionary on the Provincials Prosecutors part to require or allow the filing or
submission of reply-affidavits. There was also no need to send a copy of the Sept. 10, 208
Resolution since it did not attain finality since it wasnt approved by the Ombudsman yet.
o Petitioner, as complainant, was not entitled to a copy of this recommendation. The
only obligation was to forward the copy of the case to the proper officer within 5
days from the issuance of his Resolution (Sec. 4, Rule 112.)
o Even though petitioner was indeed entitled to receive a copy of the Counter-
Affidavit, whatever procedural defects of this case suffered were cured when he
filed for an MR.
o All of the supposed defenses of the petitioner in this case have already been raised
in his MR and adequately considered and acted on by the Office of the
Ombudsman.
o He was already given the opportunity to be heard.
- Even then, even if the procedural defect was cured, it does not change the fact that
Provincial Prosecutor had the duty to send petitioner a copy of Aguillons counter-affidavit.
Sec. 3c of Rule 112 grants that right and he has the duty to observe that requirement of
 due process. It was only deemed complied with because of the filing of an MR by the
Complainant.

Sec. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review

If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare
the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown
by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses;
that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.

Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in
cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They
shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately
inform the parties of such action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor

without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his
recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or
the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by
himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct any other assistant prosecutor or
state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.

If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned
either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation,
or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The
same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman

Quisay v. People
- Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that the filing of
a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named
officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts.
o No complaint or information may be field or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
 o Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations field before the courts without
the prior written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders
the same defective, and therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 117
of the same Rules.
o The CA correctly ruled that the City Prosecutor of Makati issued OCP-Makati
Order No. 32, which gave division chiefs or review prosecutors authority to
approve or act on any resolution, issuance, other action, and any information
recommended by any prosecutor for approval. While the Pasiya was validly made
as it bore the approval of SACP Hirang, however, the same could not be said the
Information filed before the RTC.
All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz, and thus, there
was no showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor, or any
of the division chiefs or review prosecutors.
There was no proof that ACP De LA Cruz was authorized to file the
Information before the RTC by himself.

De Lima v. Reyes
- Under existing laws of procedure and jurisprudence, SOJ is authorized to issue DO No.
710.
o Sec. 4 of RA 10071 outlines the powers granted by law to SOJ.
o A criminal prosecution is initiated by the filing of a compliant to a prosecutor who
shall then conduct a preliminary investigation in order to determine whether there
is probable cause to hold the accused for trial in court. The recommendation of
the investigating prosecutor on whether to dismiss the complaint or to file the
corresponding information is still subject to the approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor.
o However, a party is not precluded from appealing their resolutions to the SOJ.
Appeals may be taken within 15 days from receipt of resolution by filing a verified
petition for review before the SOJ.
o In this case, the SOJ designated a panel to investigate the Complaint. The First
Panel resolved to dismiss. Dr. Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open and Motion for
Partial Investigation, which were both denied by the First Panel. Before Dr. Ortega
could file a petition for Review, SOJ issued DO. No. 710.
- CAN AN SOJ ORDER THE CONDUCT OF REINVESTIGATION WITHOUT A
PENDING PETITION FOR REVIEW?
o Under Rule 112, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court, the SOJ may motu propio reverse or
modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor
even without a pending petition for review.
o SOJ exercises control and supervision over prosecutors and it is within her
authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors.
o Sec. 4 of RA 10071 gives SOJ the authority to directly act on any probable
miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional
prosecution office, and the provincial or city prosecutor.
o Accordingly, SOJ may step in and order a reinvestigation without a prior motion
or petition from a party in order to prevent any probable miscarriage of justice.
 o DR. Ortega filed a Motion to admit as evidence mobile phone conversations
between Edrad and respondent. but, it was denied by the First Panel.
o The SOJ had reason to believe that the First Panels refusal may cause a probable
miscarriage of justice to the parties. Second Panel was created to ensure all the
evidence was investigated. Therefore, SOJ did not act in arbitrary or despotic
manner.

Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman

- There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his correspondents.
o Secs. 3-4 of Rule 112, and Rule II of the Admin Order No. 7 do not provide so.
It pertains to the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as
other supporting documents to establish probable cause.
The respondent simply has the right to examine the evidence submitted by
the complainant which he may not have been furnishes and to copy them
at his expense.
o Rule II of the Admin Order No. 7
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports,
the investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting
witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall
issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other
supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting
evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The
complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of
the counter-affidavits.
c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating
officer may consider the comment filed by him, if any, as his answer to the
complaint. In any event, the respondent shall have access to the evidence
on record.
o Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request violates his constitutional right
to due process, but he fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a
compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the
Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his
correspondents. Neither Sec. 3b, Rule 112 or Sec. 4c, Rule II support Sen.
Estradas claim.
o What the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman
to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is
issued to the respondent.
Clearly, what Sec. 4b refers to are affidavits of the complainants and his
witnesses, and not the affidavits of the correspondents.
 Although Sec. 4c provides that a respondent shall have access to the
evidence on record, but it is to be construed in relation to 4a and 4b of the
same rule, as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Sec. 3b, Rule 112 provides that the respondent shall have the right to
examine the evidence submitted by the complainant. Thus, there is no
requirement that the affidavits executed by the co-respondents should be
furnished to a respondent.
The denial of his request happened during the preliminary investigation
where the only issue is the existence of a probable cause for the purpose
of determining whether an information should be filed, and does not
prevent Sen. Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of
his co-respondents during the pretrial or during the trial.
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of
probable cause.
Probability of guilty and should be determined in a summary
manner.
Thus, the rights of a respondent are limited to those granted by
procedural law.

Sec. 5. Resolution of Investigating Judge and its Review

Within ten (10) days after the preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall
transmit the resolution of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or
his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, for appropriate action. The resolution shall state the findings of facts and the law
supporting his action, together with the record of the case which shall include: (a) the warrant, if
the arrest is by virtue of a warrant; (b) the affidavits, counter-affidavits and other supporting
evidence of the parties; (c) the undertaking or bail of the accused and the order for his release; (d)
the transcripts of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation; and (e) the order of
cancellation of his bail bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal of the complaint.

Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the records, the provincial or city prosecutor, or
the Ombudsman or his deputy, as the case may be, shall review the resolution of the investigating
judge on the existence of probable cause. Their ruling shall expressly and clearly state the facts and
the law on which it is based and the parties shall be furnished with copies thereof. They shall order
the release of an accused who is detained if no probable cause is found against him.

Mangila v. Pangilinan
- It is clear under Sec. 5, Rule 112 that the resolution of the investigating judge was not final
but was still subject to the review of the public prosecutor who could order the release of
the detainee if no probable cause should be ultimately found against her.
o It was also not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance of the warrant
by hinting that the investigating judge did not consider the necessity of determining
the existence of probable cause due to time constraints.
Sec. 6. When Warrant of Arrest May Issue
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint
or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the
judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge
may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of
information.

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. When required pursuant to the second paragraph of
section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court may be conducted by either the judge or the prosecutor. When
conducted by the prosecutor, the procedure for the issuance of a warrant or arrest by the judge
shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section. When the investigation is conducted by the
judge himself, he shall follow the procedure provided in section 3 of this Rule. If the findings and
recommendations are affirmed by the provincial or city prosecutor, or by the Ombudsman or his
deputy, and the corresponding information is filed, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. However,
without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if
he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in
the form of searching question and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.

(c) When warrant of arrest not necessary. A warrant of arrest shall not issue if the
accused is already under detention pursuant to a warrant issued by the municipal trial court in
accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, or if the complaint or information was filed pursuant
to section 7 of this Rule or is for an offense penalized by fine only. The court shall then proceed
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

Pestillos v. Generoso
- The Court held that there was a valid warrantless arrest since all the requirements under
Sec 5b of Rule 113 were complied with: a crime had just been committed, and the police
had determined probable cause based from personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that a crime had been committed by the petitioners.
- Personal knowledge of a crime just committed does not require actual presence at the
scene while a crime was being committed. IT is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
recently committed the crime. Furthermore, they arrived into the scene of the crime in less
 than an hour since the crime had been allegedly committed, wherein Atty. Generoso was
able to point the petitioners as those who had mauled him.
- An inquest proceeding must be conducted if there are valid warrantless arrests, since no
preliminary investigation is conducted. Therefore, it was necessary for the valid warrantless
arrest to be established, so that the inquest proceeding could be held as valid and thus, the
motion for regular preliminary investigation can be validly denied.

Hao v. People
- A judge is mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause after his
personal evaluation of the prosecutors resolution and supporting evidence for the crime
charged.
- Sec. 5a of Rule 112 grants the trial court three options upon the filing of the complaint or
information:
o dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause
o issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause
o order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within 5 days from notice in
case of doubt on the existence of probable cause.
- In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners and
their co-accused. To be valid, the warrants must have been issued after compliance with
the requirement that probable cause be personally determined by the judge. The judge is
tasked to merely determine the probability, and not the certainty of the guilty of the
accused. He only needs to personally review the prosecutors initial determination and see
if it is supported by substantial evidence.
- He made a personal determination of the existence of probable cause to support the
issuance of the warrants. The petitioners did not present any evidence to controvert this.
- A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts and
circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was committed.
o Probable cause -> such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense was committed by the
person sought to be arrested
o The probable cause for warrant of arrest is different from the prosecutors finding
of probable cause for the filing of proper criminal information.
o The probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity of
placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Mendoza v. People
- While the Information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali had the
discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest
of the accused and proceed with trial.
o Sec. 6a of Rule 112 mandates the judge to immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record fails to establish probable cause.
o Once a complaint/informaiton is filed in Court, the dismissal, conviction, or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court.
 o this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence on
record and concluded that the evidence adduced does not support a finding of
probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa.
o She found that Juno Cars failed to prove by competent evidence to substantiate
the charge of qualified theft. Thus, Judge Capco-Umali correctly dismissed the case
against Alfredo. However, even if jurisprudence and procedural laws allow it, a
judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of probable
cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it.

Marcos v. Cabrera
- Judge Cabrera-Faller demonstrated lack of knowledge and understanding of the basic rules
of procedure when she issued the questioned orders.
o She violated the Admin. Circular NO. 7-A-92 when she issued the order directing
the immediate archiving of the criminal case. When Judge Cabrera-Faller issued
the warrants, she had achieved the case, but she did not cite any ground in AC No.
7-A-92 for the suspension of the proceedings. She did not even bother to wait for
the return of the warrants or wait for the six-month period. She opted to
completely ignore the law or the regulations.
o She showed manifest and partiality or gross ignorance of the law by recalling the
warrants of arrest, claiming that they were issued inadvertently. In the judicial
determination of probable cause, no less than the Constitution mandates a judge
to personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant
of arrest.
She was mandated to personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents regarding the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. Though she was not required to
personally examine the complainant or his witnesses, she was obliged to
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor before ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
When she recalled the warrants, she failed to explain why she issued the
warrants inadvertently. The Court cannot accept this. There was clearly an
abdication of the judicial function. It could only mean that she failed to
comply with her constitutional mandate to personally determine the
existence of probable cause before ordering the issuance of the warrants
of arrest. It is her task to determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
Most probably, she did her duty to examine and analyze the attached
documents but because she took pity on the young accused (never mind
the victim), she chose to ignore or disregard them. Nonetheless, "when the
inefficiency springs from failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule,
law or principle in the discharge of duties, the judge is either insufferably
incompetent and undeserving of the position she holds or is too vicious
that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in
grave abuse of judicial authority.
 o At the same time, she should be held accountable for hastily dismissing the case.
The judges action must neither impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the
right of the State and the offended party to due process of law.The Information
was instituted by the OCP on May 10, 2013. On June 3, 2013, she issued the order
finding probable cause. On June 13, 2013, she recalled the warrants. And on Aug.
15, 2013, she lifted the warrants of arrests and dismissed the case.
o The Court cannot close its eyes in the manner by which the case was dismissed.
She failed to take into consideration the earlier resolution of the OCP and failed
to evaluate the evidence in support thereof, which sustained the probable cause
against the accused.
o The OCP resolution was based on the Sworn Statement and Affidavit executed by
Marcelo who recounted in detail the initiation rites that transpired on July 29, 2012,
his participation, and the names of the people who were present. The said
testimony was corroborated by two other neophytes who were present.
o Her reason of no probable cause was trained and taxed ones credulity. Despite
admission on the part of the accused, she brushed aside these admissions and the
narrations of the prosecution witnesses and simply opted to believe the claim of
the accused that it was Marcelo alone who inflicted the fatal blow on his recruit.
The finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
believed that the act of omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
A judge may dismiss the case or lack of probable cause only in clear-cut
cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause.

Sec. 7. When Accused Lawfully Arrested Without Warrant

When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires
a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without
need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing
rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the
offended party or a peace office directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the
waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation,
the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule.
 - Formal amendment
o no prejudice to the accused
- If there is an inquest proceeding, and the penalty imposed is > 4 y, 2m, 1d, then the accused
may request for a preliminary investigation, but only within 5 days.
o Motion for Preliminary Investigation
o Motion for Reinvestigation is filed after a Preliminary Investigation.

Ladlad v. Velasco
- Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without
warrant. Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the
instances when such warrantless arrest may be effected.
o The joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers states that the officers arrested
Beltran without a warrant for Inciting to Sedition, and not Rebellion. Thus, the
inquest prosecutor could only have conducted an inquest for Inciting to Sedition
and no other.
o Beltran was charged for giving a speech during the EDSA revolution.
o Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second
inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority, rendering the
second inquest void. None of Beltrans arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in
their presence, of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient enough to
form probable cause that he had committed Rebellion.
o What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit was that they saw and heard
Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on Feb. 24, 2006.
o Under DOJ Circular No. 61, the initial duty of the inquest officer is to determine
if the arrest of the detained person was made in accordance with the provisions of
pars. a and b of Sec 5, Rule 113. If not, then the inquest officer should proceed
under Sec. 9 of Circular No. 61.
he shall recommend the release of the person, note down the disposition
on the referral document, prepare a brief memorandum indicating for the
action taken, and forward the same with the record to the City or Provincial
Prosecutor.
If the recommendation is approved, but the evidence warrants the conduct
of a regular preliminary investigation, the order of release shall be served
and shall direct the said officer to serve the subpoena or notice of
preliminary investigation.

De Castro v. Fernandez
- Petitioner is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. Under Sec. 7 of
Rule 112, if an information is filed in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused
may, within five days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation.
His failure to request for a preliminary investigation within the specified period is deemed
a waiver of his right to a preliminary investigation.
o The Information was filed on June 18, 2002. On June 20, 2002, a Glenn Apura, on
behalf of Atty. Villena requested for copies of the pertinent documents on the
 petitioners case. ON June 25, 2002, Atty. Villena entered his appearance as counsel
for petitioner. Yet, petitioner only asked for a reinvestigation on July 1, 2002, more
than 5 days from the time the petitioner learned of the filing of the information,
thus, he is deemed to have waived his right to ask for a preliminary investigation.

Sec. 8. Records
(a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint
filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their
witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case.

(b) Record of preliminary investigation. The record of the preliminary investigation,

whether conducted by a judge or a fiscal, shall not form part of the record of the case. However,
the court, on its own initiative or on motion of any party, may order the production of the record
or any of its part when necessary in the resolution of the case or any incident therein, or when it
is to be introduced as an evidence in the case by the requesting party.

People v. Sandiganbayan
- Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion when SB quashed the information
that respondent acted on the basis of the Jan. 12, 1994 Memorandum. SB concluded that
the respondent could not be considered as having usurped the authority of the building
official or SPWH. They also relied on the resolution of Pamute, the Graft Investigator.
However, the said Memorandum had been amended by a subsequent issuance of
Memorandum No. 4, which states that the authority to act on violations of the Building
Code no longer rested with the City Administrator, but with the City Engineer or his
assistant.
o Furthermore, the said Memorandum was contrary to Sec. 307 of PD 1097, which
states that within 15 days, the applicant-permittee may file an appeal within 15 days
to the SPWH. To rectify his erroneous memorandum, the Mayor issued
Memorandum No. 4.
o At the same time, SOJ ruled that only the city engineer has the exclusive authority
to act on matters relating to the issuance of demolition permits or the revocation
or suspension thereof.
o SB also quoted a portion of the resolution of Special Prosecutor Pamute and
omitted the ratio decidendi thereof.
o The respondent also had no Motion to Leave/Quash Information as it had been
converted to an MR. Accordingly, the required investigation was conducted to
ascertain if there was probable cause. Thus, there was no motion to quash pending
resolution by the SB.
o Under Sec. 3, Rule 117, a Motion to Quash may be filed only for several grounds.
The absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a
ground for the quash of the Information, but is a ground for the dismissal of the
case.
The RTC issues a warrant for the arrest only upon finding probable cause
based on the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, the affidavits, and
 other evidences appended to the Information. If there is no probable cause,
then the court may dismiss the case. Its dismissal is without prejudice to
the refiling thereof.
o In Sec. 6, Rule 112, the trial court is mandated to immediately dismiss the case
upon finding that no probable cause exists to issue a warrant of arrest, and having
evaluated the resolution of the prosecutor and the supporting evidence.
The absence or presence of probable cause is to be determined from the
material averments of the information as enumerated in Rule 112, Sec. 8.
Thus, by quashing the Information on the premise of lack of probable
cause, instead of merely dismissing the case, the SB acted in violation of
case-law and thus, acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Okabe v. Gutierrez
- In determining the existence or non-existence of probable case, the judge should not only
consider the report of the investigating report, but also the other affidavits, documentary
evidence, and counter-affidavit, as well, as the transcript of the stenographic notes taken
during the preliminary investigation. This rule is embedded in Sec. 8a, Rule 112, which
provides that an Information shall be supported by affidavits, counter-affidavits, and
together with the other supporting evidence of the resolution.
o There was no receipt to document the entrustment of the Php3.9M in Japanese
Yen.
o The affidavit of Santiago is unreliable as it was based on information relayed to her
by Tanghal, who failed to submit any counter-affidavit.
o The affidavit of Izumiya is unreliable as it was based on information relayed to her
by Barbiran.
o There was no indication in the resolution that the petitioner received the fax
message of Tanghal.
o There was no showing of the evidence that Tanghal had remitted $1000 to her.
o There was an allegation of deceit in the IPs resolution, but abuse of confidence
was charged on the Information.
o Thus, there was no probable cause.

People v. Grey
- The language of the Order clearly shows that the judge made his own personal
determination of the existence by examining not only the prosecutors report, but by also
his supporting evidence, consisting of the sworn statements of the prosecutions witnesses.
o In Soliven v. Makasiar, the Court explained that the constitutional provision does
not mandatory require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her
witnesses, but he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.
o What the law requires as personal determination on the part of a judge is that he
should not rely solely on the report of the investigation prosecutor. This means
that the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor
but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-
 affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, and the transcript of the stenographic
notes taken during preliminary investigation.
o The Court has ruled that the personal examination of complainant and witnesses
is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter
failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause.

Sec. 9. Cases Not Requiring a Preliminary Investigation nor Covered by the

Rule on Summary Procedure

(a) If filed with the prosecutor. If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor
involving an offense punishable by imprisonment of less four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day, the procedure outlined in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The prosecutor shall
act on the complaint based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the
complainant within ten (10) days from its filing.

(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court. If the complaint or information is filed
directly with the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for an offense covered by
this section, the procedure in section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days
after the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable cause after personally
evaluating the evidence, or after personally examining in writing and under oath the complainant
and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers, he shall dismiss the same. He
may, however, require the submission of additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to
determine further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no probable cause despite
the additional evidence, he shall, within ten (10) days from its submission or expiration of said
period, dismiss the case. When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and hold him for trial. However, if
the judge is satisfied that there is no necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue
summons instead of a warrant of arrest.

Victoria Milling Co. v. Padilla

- The MTCC Judge failed to determine the existence of probable cause against respondents
as conspirators in the crimes charged.
o The applicable provision was Rule 112, Sec. 9 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which covers the cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of RTC
nor Rule on Summary Procedure. No preliminary investigation is required on such
cases.
The Rule essentially provides that if the MTCC judge finds no probable
cause against respondents, he shall dismiss the complaint or information.
Otherwise, he shall issue either warrants of arrest or summonses.
In the present case, Padilla and co are charged in each information as
conspirators. In other words, where respondents signed the falsified
documents, they are alleged to have conspired in making untruthful
statements in such documents.
 MTCC Judge proceeded to issue the warrants only against the signatories.
He opined that each respondent is only liable for the RSDO that he signed.
However, he ruled out the existence of conspiracy on a wrong ground. The
MTCC Judge needed not to find proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
existence of conspiracy. He must only satisfy himself whether there is
probable cause or sufficient ground to hold each respondent for trial as a
co-conspirator. It is obviously absurd for the MTCC Judge to require that
conspiracy must be proven before conspiracy can be alleged in the
informations.
Since remedial laws may be given retroactive effect, the Court orders the
MTCC Judge to determine the existence of probable cause against
respondents as conspirators pursuant to Sec. 8b of Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Crim Pro.

Rule 113. Arrest

Sec. 1. Definition of arrest.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense.

Sec. 2. Arrest; how made.

An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to
the custody of the person making the arrest.

No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not
be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention.

Sanchez v. People
- After going through the records of the case, the Court finds some facts of weight and
substance that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court
which cast doubt on the guilt of Sanchez. It is observed that the CA confused the search
incidental to a lawful arrest with the stop-and-frisk rule principle. That confused view
guided the CA to wrongly affirm the petitioners conviction.
o The stop-and-frisk search is entirely different from and should not be confused
with the search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 13, Rule 126.
o In Malacat v. CA, the Court ruled that in a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the
precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases. At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area
within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy.
Stop-and-frisk search is valid where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that the person he is dealing may be armed and dangerous, and thus, he
must identify himself as a policeman and make reasonable inquiries, and
then, he is entitled to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons that may be
used against him.
 o Neither of the two applies in justifying the warrantless search and seizure made by
the police operatives on Sanchez. A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is
sanctioned by the Rules of Court. IT requires that the search be incidental to a
lawful arrest.
o Arrest is defined under Sec. 1, Rule 113 as the taking of a person into custody
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Sec. 2,
it is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or his voluntary
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
o In this case, no arrest was effected by the police operatives upon the person of
Sanchez before conducting the search on him. It appears that after they caught up
with the tricycle, they noticed Sanchez holding a match box, and then, they
requested to see the contents, which the petitioner acceded to. That was when they
saw the shabu inside. The search was first undertaken and then, later an arrest.
o The warrantless arrest was unlawful as Sec. 5, Rule 113 provides the intense on
lawful warrantless arrests:
in flagrante delicto:
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime.
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
hot pursuit
at the time of the arrest, an offense has in fact just been committed
and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be apprehended has committed it.
escapee of a penal establishment.
o None of these elements are applicable to the case in bench. No overt physical
attack could be attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the
police operatives. He was just boarding a tricycle. At the same time, the police had
no personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought shabu from the notorious
drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle.
Probable cause: a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged.

Homar v. People
- Sec. 5, Rule 113 provides the only occasions when a person may be lawful arrested without
a warrant. In the present case, the respondent alleged that the petitioners warrantless arrest
was due to his commission of jaywalking in flagrante delicto and in the presence of Tan
and Tangcoy. However, there are two requisites for in flagrante delicto:
o person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime
o such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
- The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the crime of the warrantless arrest
from which the corpus delicti was obtained.
- In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner was committing a crime.
- The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner allegedly crossed.
Tan merely stated that petitioner crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard not designated for
crossing. The respondent failed to private that the portion of Roxas Boulevard where the
petitioner crossed was indeed a no jaywalking area. The petitioner was also not charged
of jaywalking. These are pieces of evidence that could have supported the conclusion that
 the petitioner was committing a crime of jaywalking, and thus the subsequent arrest and
search in his person was valid.
o However, even if there is a criminal charge, prosecution is not relieved from
proving the burden that there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest preceding the
warrantless search that produced the corpus delicti of the crime.
o Neither can the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This
presumption cannot overcome the presumption of innocence or constitute proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
o Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense. It is enough that there be an intention
of one of the parties to arrest the other, or that there be an intent of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
o However, no arrest preceded the search on the petitioner. They simply accosted
him and told him to cross at the designated area. They only intended to arrest the
petitioner after they had confiscated the shabu from the petitioner.
o The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz v. People.

Luz v. People
- There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not arrested for this sole reason.
o Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he/she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or the persons voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force is required. It is
enough that there be an intention of one to arrest the other, or that one submits
to the other under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
o Under RA 4136, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not
the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license. Similarly, the
PNP manual provides the procedure for the issuance of a citation ticket.
o At the time, he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner
could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part
of PO3 Alteza to arrest him. In fact, PO3 Alteza testified that the only reason they
went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost
in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convince. There was no
intention to take petitioner into custody.
o The municipal ordinance also penalizes the violation with a fine only. Under the
Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the the information or
charge filed for an offense is penalized by a fine only.
o Furthermore, the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. If a
person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter
the reason for the arrest, and he must show a warrant of arrest. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement they make could be used against them. They were only complied with
AFTER petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

People v. Cunanan
- There was an in flagrante delicto arrest.
- HE was lawfully arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto selling an illegal drug in a
buy-bust operation. It is not inconceivable that he would openly sell an illegal drug in
public.
 o The testimony of PO1 Gunda clearly recounts on how the sale transaction between
him and Cunanan transpired.
o It is crystal clear that a sale transaction took place between appellant and PO1
Gunda. It involved the illegal sale of dangerous drug, which was sufficiently shown
by the prosecution through tis establishment of the elements of the offense.
identity of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration
delivery of the thing sold and payment
o Furthermore, any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be timely
raised in a motion to quash the information before arraignment. The failure of
which will make him deemed to have waived such right to question such
irregularity.

Sec. 3. Duty of arresting officer.

It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest the accused and to deliver
him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay.

Soria v. Desierto
- Public respondents did not err in construing Art. 125 as excluding Sundays, holidays, and
election day in computation.
- The said complaint was backed up by law and jurisprudence.
o An election day or a special holiday should not be included in the computation of
the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in
cases of warrantless arrests, it being a no-office day.
o As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information
had already been filed, public respondents acted well within their discretion in
ruling thus.
The complaints against him was seasonably filed in the courts of justice
within the 36-hour prescribed by law as discussed. The duty of the
detaining officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the
complaints.

Sec. 4. Execution of warrant.

The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for execution shall
cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after
the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report
to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the
reasons therefor.

People v. Givera
- The prosecution presented evidence which shows beyond reasonable doubt that all were
responsible for the killing of Eusebio Gardon. The testimony of the daughter was
spontaneous, detailed, and consistent. The defense tried to discredit it during the cross-
examination, but the defense only succeeded in enabling her to give further details of her
testimony. The discrepancies were only minor (stone-throwing), and it did not touch upon
the central fact of the crime. Thus, it did not impair the credibility of the witnesses.
- The allegations of conspiracy have been established. There was a coordinated action by
the group in the execution of the crime. It is not necessary that all the conspirators actually
hit and killed the victim. What is important is that all participants performed the specific
acts with such closeness and coordination.
- However, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in the case. There was only implied
conspiracy, and thus without proof as to how and when the place was hatched or what
 time elapsed before it was carried out, there cannot be sufficient time between its inception
and its fulfillment dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences.
o The arrest was also made by virtue of a warrant issued by the court on Apr. 27,
1995. The records showed that the warrant was returned unserved on July 7, 1995
as he could not be found. He was finally found only on May 4, 1996, thus, no alias
warrant of arrest is needed to make the arrest.
o The same remains enforceable, until it is elected, recalled, or quashed. The 10-day
period provided in Rule 113, S4 is only a directive to the officer executing the
arrant to make a return to the court.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.

A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b. When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

Homar v. People
- Sec. 5, Rule 113 provides the only occasions when a person may be lawful arrested without
a warrant. In the present case, the respondent alleged that the petitioners warrantless arrest
was due to his commission of jaywalking in flagrante delicto and in the presence of Tan
and Tangcoy. However, there are two requisites for in flagrante delicto:
o person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime
o such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
- The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the crime of the warrantless arrest
from which the corpus delicti was obtained.
- In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner was committing a crime.
- The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner allegedly crossed.
Tan merely stated that petitioner crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard not designated for
crossing. The respondent failed to private that the portion of Roxas Boulevard where the
petitioner crossed was indeed a no jaywalking area. The petitioner was also not charged
of jaywalking. These are pieces of evidence that could have supported the conclusion that
the petitioner was committing a crime of jaywalking, and thus the subsequent arrest and
search in his person was valid.
o However, even if there is a criminal charge, prosecution is not relieved from
proving the burden that there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest preceding the
warrantless search that produced the corpus delicti of the crime.
o Neither can the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This
presumption cannot overcome the presumption of innocence or constitute proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 o Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense. It is enough that there be an intention
of one of the parties to arrest the other, or that there be an intent of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
o However, no arrest preceded the search on the petitioner. They simply accosted
him and told him to cross at the designated area. They only intended to arrest the
petitioner after they had confiscated the shabu from the petitioner.
o The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz v. People.

People v. Breis
- There was a valid warrantless arrest.
o The vehicle that carried the prohibited drugs was about to leave. The PDEA agents
made a judgment call to act fast, as time was of the essence. The team arrived at
the terminal around 15 minutes before the bus was scheduled to depart. Upon
boarding the bus, Mangili and Peralta identified two men fitting the description
given by the informant in possession of a box described by the informant to
contain marijuana.
o Moreover, the PDEA agents had reasonable suspicion based on appellants'
behavior that the latter were probably committing a crime. After being asked
about who owns the box, and answering that it belonged to them, Yumol suddenly
stood up and tried to leave. PO1 Peralta prevented him from getting off the bus.
Then Mangili asked appellant Breis what was contained in the box. Instead of
answering, Breis shoved IO1 Mangili and tried to flee. It must be noted that
Mangili identified himself as a PDEA agent before either appellant tried to leave
the bus.
o The accused's act of standing up to leave the bus under different circumstances
may be natural; but it is not so in this case. They were attempting to get out of a
bus that was about to leave the terminal, and not one that had just arrived, where
the other passengers were, as can be expected, seated in preparation for departure.
It is unnatural for passengers to abruptly disembark from a departing bus, leaving
their belongings behind. Any reasonable observer would be put on suspicion that
such persons are probably up to no good. To a trained law enforcement agent, it
signaled the probability that appellants were committing an offense and that the
objects left behind might be contraband or even dangerous articles.
o Indeed, as observed by the PDEA agents, appellants were not simply passengers
carrying a box in a bus. They engaged in suspicious behavior when they tried to
flee after IO1 Mangili showed interest in their box and identified himself as a
PDEA agent. Worse, in his attempt at flight, Breis pushed IO1 Mangili, already
knowing that the latter was a PDEA agent.

Comerciante v. People
- The law requires a lawful arrest before a search can be made. The process cannot be
reversed. Sec. 5, Rule 113 lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests.
o in flagrante delicto
o arrest of suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there
is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime that had just been
committed
o arrest of a prisoner who had just escaped from custody serving finally judgment or
temporary confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
 - In a and b, the officers personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense
is absolutely required. However, they were aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of
30kph. And they were 10 meters away.
- Thus, the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag would be able to identify with
reasonable accuracy miniscule amounts of the white crystalline substance inside 2 very
small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. No other overt act could have roused suspicion.
o Even if they were showing improper and unpleasant acts, it wouldnt have been
sufficient to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
- 5b wouldnt hold, as well as:
o As already discussed, the factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that
PO3 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed
by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in
fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.

In Re: Salibo v. Warden

- Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In
such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally
detained. And thus, Salibo properly availed the remedy of Habeas Corpus.
- First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and accused in the
Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of People vs Ampatuan. Based
on the evidences presented, Salibo sufficiently established that he could not have been
Butukan S. Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging
him of an offense, nor restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court.
- Second, Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. When he was in the presence of
authorities, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police
officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Salibo
was also not an escape prisoner.
- The police officers have deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. Therefore,
Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Pestilos v. Generoso
- There was a valid warrantless arrest.
o The requirements of a valid warrantless arrest under Sec. 5b, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are the following:
Crime should have been just committed
The arresting officers exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of
probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within
his personal knowledge.
o To verify if the said requirements were complied with, the following questions
should be asked.
Has the crime just been committed when they were arrested?
Did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime?
Would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted
murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners?
o From a view of the records, the Court held that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they have properly determined
probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. Based on the
 police blotter taken at 4:15am, the alleged crime was committed at 3:15am. The
time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter is 4:15am, and thus, it would
connote that the arrest took place less than an hour from the time of the occurrence
of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place 2 hours after the
commission of the crime is unfounded. The arresting officers personal observation
of Atty. Generosos bruises is corroborated by the petitioners admissions that Atty.
Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioners, Macapanas and his brother,
although they asserted self-defense. The said bruises were also corroborated by the
Medico-Legal Certificate issued at 8:10am.
o With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they
have personally observed less than an hour from the time that they have arrived at
the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, the Court found
it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances, justifying the petitioners warrantless arrests. These
circumstances qualify as their personal observation, which are within their personal
knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
o Personal knowledge of a crime just committed does not require actual presence at
the scene while a crime was being committed. IT is enough that evidence of the
recent commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has recently committed the crime.

Sec. 6. Time of making arrest.

An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night.

Colorado v. Agapito
- Sec. 6 Rule 113 provides that an arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day
or night.
- It is of no moment that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent on a Friday, because
it is clear from the foregoing that an arrest may be made on any day regardless of what day
the warrant of arrest was issued. Nowhere in the Rules or in our jurisprudence can we find
that a warrant of arrest issued on a Friday is prohibited.
- Even if the rest was made on a Friday, remedies were available to Colorado: he could have
posted bail. SC Circular No. 95-96 provides for a skeletal force on a Saturday from 8am to
1pm (meaning a judge assigned by an Executive Judge through a rotation of MTC, MeTC,
and MCTC judges + skeletal staff) primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent
matters. On Saturday afternoons, Sundays, and non-working holidays, any judge may act
on any bailable offenses.
- Hence, no grave abuse of authority in the action of Judge Agapito.

Sec. 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant.

When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be
arrested of the cause of the arrest and of the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest,
except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or
when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant
in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the
warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable.
Mallari v. CA
- The court concurs with the Court of Appeals in its finding that when the petitioner was
arrested, there was a standing warrant of arrest against him in connection with Criminal
Case No. 471. Pfc. Danilo Manipon and Pat. Jose Esguerra testified to the existence of the
warrant of arrest of the petitioner which the defense failed to rebut during the trial. Further
bolstering the arresting officers' testimonies is the absence of any motive on their part to
falsely testify against the petitioner. And it has been repeatedly held that without proof of
such motive, law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duties. Thus,
absent strong and convincing proof to the contrary, this Court is bound by the
presumption that the arresting officers were aware of the legal mandates in effecting an
arrest and strictly complied with the same.
- The Court stresses that this is not a case of a warrantless arrest but merely an instance of
an arrest effected by the police authorities without having the warrant in their possession
at that precise moment. Thus, the applicable rule is not of Sec 5 of Rule 118, but Sec 7 of
Rule 113, which provides:
o When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person
to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and of the fact that a warrant has been
issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has
opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil
the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of
the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall
be shown to him as soon as practicable.
- The rule clearly allows a police officer to effect arrest without the warrant in his possession
at the time of the arrest. Thus, appellant's arrest being lawful, the search and seizure made
incidental thereto is likewise valid, albeit conducted without a warrant.

Sec. 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant.

When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested
of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission
of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees or forcibly resists
before the officer has opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest.

People v. Tan
- In convicting the accused, the Court imputed the following errors surrounding the arrest.
o Fire truck was used by accused-appellants in the pursuit of the alleged thieves.
Assuming that there was a complaint for theft, the usual procedure should have
been to search for the suspects, and if they are located, to apprehend them
employing the least force as may be necessary to effect a lawful arrest without
warrant. Under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court then in force:
Sec. 2. x x x. No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an
arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint
than is necessary for his detention.
- Although the employment of high powered firearms, which in this case were M-16 rifles,
does not necessarily connote unnecessary force, the police had no reason to fire their
weapons indiscriminately at a group of persons on board a moving boat.
- The Rules of Court mandates that the police officer or any person conducting arrest must
identify himself as such and state his intention to arrest when there is no danger to himself
or it would not prejudice the arrest.
 - Further, the rules of engagement, of which every police officer must be thoroughly
knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest caution, does not require
that he should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person asked or to be accosted
does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his next move and not vengeance
for personal feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more than the
lawful apprehension of suspects since the completion of the process pertains to other
government officers or agencies.
o The victims in this case and all those on the pump boat were not under any
obligation to surrender since they were not prisoners who had escaped from
detention, nor were they identified suspects. Not even the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty can be resorted to by appellants, nor does it
find application in this case because they were no longer performing a duty when
they immediately fired their weapons.
o Acorda asked for accused-appellant Tans badge, the latter instead drew his gun
instead. Whenever a police officer introduces himself as such, he must show his
police identification card or badge. Persons who deal with the police need not
even ask for the officers identification papers because the officer should have
taken the initiative outright. His service firearm is not an identification card. The
best and immediate evidence of police identity is the badge, the ID and the proper
uniform. It is a basic norm of police work, particularly when approaching a
stranger with whom he has no prior contact, not just to introduce himself properly
but also to present his police badge and ID.

Sec. 9. Method of arrest by private person.

When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the person to be arrested of the
intention to arrest him and cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission
of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists
before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such
information will imperil the arrest.

Sec. 10. Officer may summon assistance.

An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems
necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall assist
him in effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself.

Sec. 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure.

An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as
provided in section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the person to be arrested is
or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing his authority
and purpose.

People v. Castiller
- The warrantless arrest and warrantless search conducted were within the boundaries of
law.
- Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto delivering to the poseur-buyer two (2) sticks of
marijuana. The offense was committed in the presence of the police officer, and therefore
the latter had personal knowledge of the commission of the offense. Under the
circumstances, appellant's arrest was lawfully effected without need of a warrant.
 o Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
- As to the validity of the search conducted upon the premises of appellant's store and the
consequent seizure of incriminating evidence found therein, this Court finds that both
search and seizure were valid.
- Furthermore, where, as in this case, the person to be arrested attempts to evade the same,
the Rules on Criminal Procedure allow a peace officer, in order to make a lawful
warrantless arrest, to "... break into any building or enclosure in which the person to be
arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after he has
announced his authority and purpose" [Section 11, Rule 113, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure]. In the case at bar, the police officers did not have to break into the premises
since appellant voluntarily allowed the law officer inside the store.
- Therefore, the entry by the law enforcers into the store in order to effect appellant's arrest
was perfectly lawful.

Sec. 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure.

Whenever an officer has entered the building or enclosure in accordance with the
preceding section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself.

Sec. 13. Arrest after escape or rescue.

If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately pursue or
retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines.

Sec. 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested.

Any member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or of another
acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with such person in the jail or any
other place of custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable regulations, a relative
of the person arrested can also exercise the same right.

OTHER NOTES:
Rule 43 and Rule 65: The Difference
- Separation of Powers; thats why it has to be Rule 65.
- Rule 43 -> quasi-judicial body
- Rule 65 -> other bodies

Review of Certiorari -> rule 45 (question of law petition)

Rule 65 (question of jurisdiction)
- independent action (separate from the main case)
- it can go through simultaneously
- it is not the original case
- the rule that OSG can only be the person to bring the case is not applicable.
Rule 114. Bail.
- Liability of the bondsman is to secure the appearance of the accused whenever required
by the Court or by the Rules of Court.
- After conviction, bail is discretionary because the presumption of innocence is
overthrown.
- General rule: Bail is a matter of right
o EXCEPTION: When the penalty prescribed is life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua,
or death, AND the evidence of guilt is strong.
- How Bail is granted:
o Application
o Application must be acted upon by the Court, by giving notice to the prosecutor
and giving him an opportunity to prepare evidence.
o Conduct of Hearing

Sec. 1. Bail defined.

Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him
or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions
hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash
deposit, or recognizance.

Enrile v. Sandiganbayan
- Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent. Bail is
not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes, but to guarantee
the appearance of the accused at the trial or whenever so required by the trial court. It acts
as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in his provisional
liberty before or during the trial, and the societys interest in assuring the accuseds
presence at the trial.
- The right to bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion. It is expressly afforded
by Section 13 of Article III. This Constitutional provision is repeated in Sec. 7, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court.
o The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest,
or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee
of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail
unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail
shall be recognized.
o As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the MeTC, MTC, and
MCTC are bailable as matter of right. It is a matter of right prior to conviction by
the RTC for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by such
penalties, provided that the evidence of guilt is not strong.
o However, it is discretionary. It is upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment; if the RTC has
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years but none of the following
circumstances is present, as per Sec. 5, Rule 114:
 That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence,
or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
- Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua
is subject to judicial discretion. The determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, such
discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilty
of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, should primarily determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
o In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense
or reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply
with the guidelines in Cortes v. Catral:
In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as amended);
Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, Rule
114)
Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;
If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond (Section 19, Rule 114) Otherwise petition should
be denied.
- Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail. At the same time, he was already over
70 years old at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and he also voluntarily
surrendered. Furthermore, the Court is mindful of the Philippiness responsibility arising
from the UDHR. This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not
only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extradites upon a clear and
convincing showing:
o that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
o that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances
At the same time, Dr. Gonzales, the director of PGH, classified Enrile as a geriatric patient
who was following from chronic hypertension, diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular
disease, atrial and ventricular arrhythmia, asthma, problems with his eyes, and others. He
also attested that the said medical conditions of Enrile could pose a significant risk to the
life of Enrile. Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided that his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
 It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to
have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation
of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

Sec. 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements

All kinds of bail are subject to the following conditions:
a. The undertaking shall be effective upon approval and unless cancelled, shall
remain in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of
the RTC, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to
it;
b. The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the
court or these rules;
c. The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and despite
due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In such
case, the trial may proceed in absentia, and
d. The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the
final judgment.
The original papers shall state the full name and the address of the accused, the amount of
the undertaking and the conditions required by this section. Photographs (passport size)
taken within the last six months showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused
must be attached to the bail.

- Liability of the bondsman: security of the appearance of the accused whenever required.

Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (MR)

- People were not kept in the dark on the health condition of the petitioner. He presented
medical certificates to show that his physical condition required constant medical attention.
They were included in his Omnibus Motion, Supplemental Opposition, Motion To Fix
Bail, and also in the petition for certiorari. Thus, they were not denied the reasonable
opportunity to challenge and refute the allegations about his advanced age and the
instability of his health.
- There was no preferential treatment. They were proper bases, legal and factual, for the
favorable consideration and treatment of his plea for his provisional liberty on bail.
- Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court expressly states that one of the conditions of bail is
for the accused to appear before the proper court whenever required by the court or these
rules.
o In Villasenor v. Abano, the Court pronounced the principal factor considered in bail
fixing is the probability of the appearance of the accused to avoid punishment.
o Bail exists to ensure societys interest in having the accused answer to a criminal
prosecution without unduly restricting his or her liberty and without ignoring the
accuseds right to be presumed innocent. The spirit of the procedure is to enable
them to stay out of jail until a trial with all the safeguards has found and adjudged
them guilty.

Pantillo III v. Canoy

- It is settled that an accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to bail. but the
letter-complaint focuses on the manner of Melgazos release from detention.
 o Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Criminal Procedure allows any person in custody who is
not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city, or
municipality where he is held. However, in this case, Melgazo did not file any
application or petition for the grant of bail within the surigao City RTC. Despite
the absence of any written application, respondent judge verbally granted bail to
Melgazo. This is a clear deviation from Sec. 17.
o Rule 114 also prescribes other requirements for the release of the accused:
Sec. 14: Deposit of cash as bail.
Sec. 2: conditions of bails
In the case at bar, Melgazo did not deposit the amount of bail
recommend by Prosecutor Gonzaga with the nearest collector of
internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer. Instead,
Judge Canoy ordered the Clerk of Court to accept the cash deposit
as bail, to earmark an official receipt, and to date it the following
day. He also did not require Melgazo to sign a written undertaking
by the conditions of the bail under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied
with by Melgazo.
Immediately upon receipt by Suriaga of the cash deposit by Suriaga
from Melgazo, he ordered the police escorts to release Melgazo
without any written order of release. There was no written
application for bail, no certificate of deposit from the BIR collector
or provincial/city/municipal treasurer, no written undertaking
signed by Melgazo, and no written release order.
- There is also no such thing as constructive bail. Despite the nobles of reasons, the Rules
of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the rights of the
other.

Sec. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail

No person under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon
order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.

- Authority is judicial in nature.

Ambil v. Sandiganbayan
- Petitioner is not authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of their power
as Provincial Jailer or as Local Chief Executives. The power of supervision is merely
to oversee that the subordinate officers perform their duties. It is the provincial
government that has the authority to exercise control and supervision over provincial jails.
o Furthermore, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found
in Sec. 1737, under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the
neighboring province if the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to
accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this was superseded by Sec. 3,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Crim. Pro:
- No person under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon
order of the court of when he is admitted to bail.
- Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal
process is vested in the Court, and not in the provincial government, much less the
governor.
- This was clarified by the DILG ASec, who wrote a letter dated Oct. 6, 1998 to petitioner,
Ambil.
Sec. 4. Bail as a matter of right; exception
All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties,
or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule:
a. Before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and
b. Before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment.

- RTC: 6 y, 1d.
- After conviction, however, the presumption of innocence is overthrown.

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary

Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and
acted upon by the trial court, despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted
the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail
can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail, subject to the consent
of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding 6 years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice
of the accused, of the following or other circumstances:
a. That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
b. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
c. That he committed the offense while under probation parole, or condition pardon;
d. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
e. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of
the RTC after notice to the adverse party in either case.

- Discretionary: if there are no attendant circumstances in sec. 5 present, it is upon the

discretion of the Court whether it should grant bail or not.
- But, if there is at least 1, automatically, the Court will deny bail.

Qui v. People
- Bail pending appeal is governed by Sec. 5 of Rule 114:
o Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by d, rp, or li, admission
to bail is discretionary.
o If penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding 6 years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances.
- In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental
principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercise with grave caution
and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused was convicted by the trial court.
 - CAs denial is on the ground that she is a flight risk, a bail-negating factor under Sec. 5d
of Rule 114. They anchored its denial on several circumstances which showed petitioners
propensity to evade the law, wherein she failed to attend the hearings before the RTC.
o Lied that her father was admitted to the hospital, when he died a year prior to the
hearing.
- After one is convicted by the trial court, ones presumption of innocence and the
constitutional right to bail ends.

Leviste v. CA
- Sec. 5, Rule 114 provides:
o Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by d, rp, li, admission
to bail is discretionary.
o If the penalty imposed exceeds 6 years, the accused shall be denied bail or his bail
shall be canceled upon a showing by the prosecution that the following
circumstances occurred:
recidivist, quasi-recidivist, habitat delinquent, crime aggravated by
reiteration
previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of bail w/o valid justification
committed the offense while under probation, parol, or conditional pardon
risk at flight
undue risk that he might commit another crime during the pendency of
appeal.
o One, pending appeal of a conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
d, rp, or li, the admission to bail is discretionary.
o Second, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as
this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature
of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with
the appellate court. Thus, the CA had jurisdiction to hear and resolve the urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal.
o Grave abuse of discretion: not simply an error in judgment, but such a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
o Paragraph 3 of Sec. 5, Rule 114 contradicts petitioners interpretation. The third
paragraph of Sec. 5, Rule 114 apples to two scenarios where the penalty imposed
on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding 6 years.
First scenario: circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely,
recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from
legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his
bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under
probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the
probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another
crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances)
not present
Bail is a matter of discretion
o Judicial discretion: defined as choice.
Second scenario: the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
No bail shall be granted
Thus, even if none of the circumstances apply, appellate court still has the
discretion to grant or deny bail.
 Laws should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or
senseless consequences.
o Petitioners theory deviates from history and evolution of rule on bail pending
appeal
Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules
Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114, 1985.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 114, 1988
Admin Circular No. 2-92.
Admin Circular No. 12-94.
o The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more
restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the
bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency
but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
- Peralta, dissenting:
o Discretion on bail should have been decided after appellate court considered the
circumstances.
Evidence of murder was not strong that was why it was downgraded to
homicide
o Rebuttal to dissenting: Even then, he was convicted by the RTC already. So, its
still discretionary.

Sec. 6. Capital offense defined.

A capital offense is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission
and of the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.

Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable.
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage
of the criminal prosecution.

People v. Valdez
- Maalac v. People resolved that an accused charged with such complex crime, where the
amount involved exceeds Php22K, is not entitled to bail as a matter of right, because it
has an actual imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua.
- Art. 48 also provides that in complex crimes, the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Thus, in Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification of Public Documents, the prescribed penalties for
malversation and falsification should be taken into account.
o If the amount exceeds 22K for malversation, the penalty is reclusion temporal in
its max to reclusion perpetua.
o Falsification -> prision mayor.
o Thus, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
- Sec. 13 of Art. III provides that all persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua
- Sections 4 and 7, Rule 114 provide that
o All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right: a) before or
after conviction by the MTCC, MTC, MTCC, MCTC, and b) before conviction by
the RTC of an offense not punishable by d, rp, li.
 o No person charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or li, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
o PUNISHABLE: Following Temporada, the prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. After trial, should the commission
of such crime be proven, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
It is the imposable penalty prescribed by the law for the crime charged
which should be considered, and not the penalty to be actually imposed.
- BUT, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found guilty of Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification of Official/Public Documents. Falsification must be alleged
and proven during the trial. For purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature to
rule that the supposed crime is a complex crime since it is only when the trial has
terminated, that falsification could be appreciated as a means to commit malversation.
- It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and grant her the same
only after trial if it turns out that there is no complex crime committed.
- To note, Art. 48 does not change the nature of the constituent offenses, it only requires
the imposition of maximum period of the penalty prescribe by law.
o When committed through falsification, the RPC does not intend to classify
malversation as a capital offense. Otherwise, it would have been expressly included
in RA 7659.
- Prescribed -> to the penalty that is imposable
o J. Villaramas dissenting opinion:

Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application

At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the
commission of an offense punishable by d, rp, li, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial, but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any
witness for additional examination, unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise
unable to testify.

Gacad v. Clapis
- Sec. 8 of Rule 114 provides that at the hearing of an application for bail filed by the person
who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by d, fp, li, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong.
o This presupposes that:
an application for bail was filed
the judge notified the prosecutor and conducted a bail hearing for the
prosecution to be able to adduce evidence to prove the guilt of the accused.
o The records showed that he set the first bail hearing on March 29, 2010, even when
the Petition for Bai was only filed on April 8, 2010. Furthermore, the April 12-14,
2010 bail hearings reveal that the prosecution was not given the opportunity to be
heard in Court. During the April 12, 2010 hearing, Gacad appeared by herself
because the private prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. She
requested for more time to secure a new private counsel, and she also manifested
that she already filed a Motion for Arafol to Inhibit from the case. Judge Clapis
allowed her to secure a new private counsel. But, it was only during the April 14
hearing that Gacad was represented by another public prosecutor since she could
not secure a new private counsel. But immediately, after the defense completed
presenting its evidence in support of its bail application, the petition for bail was
submitted for resolution.
 o The prosecution was not given an opportunity to present evidence to prove that
the guilt of the accused is strong.

Tanog v. Balindong
- There was no grave abuse of discretion.
o The right to bail flows from the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a
person in the custody of the law who may be allowed provisional liberty upon filing
of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required under
specified conditions. Before conviction, it is a matter of right or of discretion.
o Sec. 7, Rule 114 states that no person charged with a capital offense or rp or li
when evidence is strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.
The accused was charged of murder, a crime punishable by rp to death. If
the information charges a capital offense, the right to bail becomes a matter
of discretion and the grant thereof may be justified as a matter of right if
the evidence of guilt is not strong. The determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains
with the judge.
o To be sure, the discretion of the trial court is not absolute nor beyond control. It
must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds.
Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the
judges individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its
exercise be guided by well-known rules that, while allowing the
judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views,
prevent rulings that are out of control
o Judge Balindong did not act in a whimsical, arbitrary, and capricious manner. The
records show that a hearing on the application for bail was conducted, and that the
prosecution presented 4 witnesses. He evaluated the testimonies and found out
that none of them witnessed the actual shooting of the victim. They merely saw
Sidic running toward the direction of the vehicles, or that Noma pointed Sidic as
one of the assailants, ro that they described the attire of one of the men he saw at
the canteen, but did not mention the name of Sidic. The affidavits also failed to
show that the evidence against Sidic was strong. The color of the Tamaraw FX was
inconsistent, no plate number of blue Toyota Corona.
o Sec. 9, Rule 114 also provides that in fixing the amount of bail, the judge shall
consider the following factors:
financial ability of the accused
nature and circumstance of the offense
penalty charged
character and reputation of the accused
age and health of accused
weight of evidence against accused
probability of the accused appearing at the trial
forfeiture of other bail
accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested
pendency of other cases were the accused is on bail
o The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of defendant when
required, but no higher than is reasonable calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Health of accused has languished in jail since his apprehension on July 5,
2004 up to present (for more than 4 years)
 he was a former Councillor of Pualas, Lanao. An incumbent councilor at
the time of detention
Weak weight of evidence
Financial ability.
o DOJ Bail Bond Guide is not binding on the courts.
o Petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation that Judge Balindong is related to
Sidic within the sixth degree of consanguinity.

Sec. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines

The judge who issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount
of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following factors:
a. financial ability of the accused
b. nature and circumstance of the offense
c. penalty charged
d. character and reputation of the accused
e. age and health of accused
f. weight of evidence against accused
g. probability of the accused appearing at the trial
h. forfeiture of other bail
i. accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested
j. pendency of other cases were the accused is on bail
Excessive bail shall not be required.

Sec. 10. Corporate surety

Any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a surety in accordance with law and
currently authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a bond subscribed jointly by the accused
and an officer of the corporation duly authorized by its board of directors.

Sec. 11. Property bond, how posted.

A property bond is an undertaking constituted as a lien on the real property given as
security for the amount of bail. Within 10 days after the approval of the bond, the accused shall
cause the annotation of the lien on the certificate of title on file with the ROD if the land is
registered, or if unregistered, in the Registration Book on the space provided therefor, in the ROD
for the province or city where the land lies, and on the corresponding tax declaration in the office
of the provincial, city, and municipal assessor concerned.
Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the court his compliance and his failure
to do so shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bond and his re-arrest and
detention.

Re: Report on Judicial Audit

- Sec. 17a, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that:
o Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or
in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal
circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in
a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also
be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is
available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal
circuit trial judge therein.
Prerequisites:
 Application for bail must be filed in the court where the case of
pending. In the absence or unavailability of the judge, the
application for bail must be filed with another branch of the same
court within the province/city
If accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than
the case is pending, bail may be filed with any RTC of the place.
- In the present case, Judge Bugtas did not present any proof that Judge Alvarez was
unavailable or that the accused were arrested in Borongan.
- He not only wrongly accepted the bail, but he also failed to forward the bail, order of
release, and other supporting papers to Judge Alvarez as required in the rules of Court.
o Sec. 19, Rule 114:
The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the judge
with whom it was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule. When
bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge
who accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release
and other supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending, which
may, for good reason, require a different one to be filed.
In Naui v. Mauricio, the Court held that the judges should forward the
records pertaining to the bail bond immediately after receiving them.
In the instant case, he accepted the bail bond on Dec. 9, 1999, but only
forwarded the documents after a subpoena was issued on Jan. 29, 2002.
When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending,
the judge who accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the
order of release and other supporting papers, to the court where
the case is pending.
o Sec. 11, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court states that the failure of the accused to
cause the annotation of the lien on the propertys certificate of title within 10 days
after the approval of the property bond shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation
of the bond and re-arrest and detention of the accused.
Judge Alvarez could have cancelled the property bond and issued the
warrant of arrest much sooner had Judge Bugtas followed Sec. 19.
o In Criminal Case No. 393, he not only wrongfully accepted the bail bond but also
approved a spurious property bond. The Court held that judges are bound to
review the bond documents before approving the bond.
He approved the property bond without the knowledge and consent of the
registered owner of the property.
- Quitorio is also liable for having personally signed the order of release in Criminal Case
No. 358. The issuance of a release order is a judicial function, not an administrative one.
A Clerk of Court has no power to order the release on bail of persons charged with penal
offenses.
o Sec. 17a, Rule 114 provides that:
SEC. 17. Bail, where filed.(a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed
with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability
of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province,
city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be
filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is
available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge therein.
 o In the present case, Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 were pending before Judge
Alvarez; there was no showing that he was unavailable; and the accused were not
arrested in Borongan. Thus, Quitorio should not have presented the bail bonds in
these cases to Judge Bugtas for approval. He fully knew that they were pending
before Judge Alvarez, yet he opted to present the bail bonds in these cases to Judge
Bugtas for approval.

Sec. 12. Qualifications of sureties in property bond.

The qualifications of sureties in a property bond shall be as follows:
a. Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines;
b. Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the amount
of the undertaking;
c. If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount less than that
expressed in the undertaking, but the aggregate amount of the justified sums
must be equivalent to the whole amount of the bail demanded.
In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over
and above all just debts, obligations, and properties exempt from execution.

Sec. 13. Justification of sureties

Every surety shall justify by affidavit taken before the judge that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed in the preceding section. He shall describe the property given as security,
stating the nature of his title, its encumbrances, the number and amount of other bails entered into
by him and still undischarged, and his other liabilities. The court may examine the sureties upon
oath concerning their sufficiency in such manner as it may deem proper. No bail shall be approved
unless the surety is qualified.

Sec. 14. Deposit of cash as bail

The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest
collector of internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer, or the clerk of court where
the case is pending, the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who
investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written
undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of Sec. 2, Rule 114, the warden or person
having custody of the accused shall release him without necessity of a further order from the court.
The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of the fine
and costs, while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit.

Lachica v. Tormis
- It was impossible for Judge Tormis to have issued the Release Order on July 2, 2004, at
7pm. She was still in Manila at that time, and she had only arrived on July 3, at 1pm.
- Accused was arrested at 8:45pm and was brought to the police station at 9pm.
- Furthermore, on the examination of records, what was received by SPO1 Estrera was a
Receipt of Cash Bail Bond and not the Order of Release.
o Furthermore, respondent judge should not receive the cash bail bond for the
accused.
o Sec. 14, Rule 114 specifies the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be
deposited: the collector of internal revenue or the provincial/city/municipal
treasurer.
A judge is not authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should
such cash be kept in his office. She is guilty of gross misconduct for having
abused her judicial authority when she personally accepted the cash bail
 bond and for deliberately making untruthful statements and during the
investigation with intent to mislead the court.

Sec. 15. Recognizance

Whenever allowed by law or these Rules, the court may release a person in custody on his
own recognizance or that of a responsible person.

Sec. 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or recognizance

No bail shall be required when the law or these Rules so provide.
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible
maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense charged, he shall be released immediately,
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum
to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after 30 days of preventive
imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal
penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at
the discretion of the court.

OCA v. Judge Floro

- Re: Charge of proceeding with motion for release on recognizance without presence of
trial prosecutor.
o The release of an accused on recognizance entails more than a cursory interview
of the custodian and the applicant
o Under the Probation Law and as the court explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares, it is
incumbent upon the Judge hearing the application to ascertain first that the
applicant is not a disqualified offender as (p)utting the discharge of the accused on
hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the request for
provisional liberty.
o Moreover, from Judge Floros explanations, it would seem that he completely did
away with the requirement for an investigation report by the probation officer.
Under the Probation Law, the accuseds temporary liberty is warranted only during
the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report on the
application for probation and the resolution thereon.
- Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders:
o Judge Floro argues that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance
need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic
notes
o According to Echaus vs. CA, no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory,
has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and
promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to
the parties and implementation.
o Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not
reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the accused.
- In fine, the SC perceives three fundamental errors in Judge Floros handling of probation
cases.
o First, he ordered the release on recognizance of the accused without the presence
of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said
release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the
probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused.
 Finally, the order granting the release of the accused on recognizance was not
reduced into writing.
o It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on recognizance,
as well as his eventual probation, was already a done deal even before the hearing
on his application as Judge Floro took up the cudgels for the accused by instructing
his staff to draft the application for probation.
o Thus, the SC agrees in the observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a
matter of policy, had been approving applications for release on recognizance
hastily and without observing the requirements of the law for said purpose.
o Verily, the SC has nothing against courts leaning backward in favor of the accused;
in fact, this is a salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants. In
herein case, however, the SC cannot countenance what Judge Floro did as the
unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly deprived the prosecution and
the private complainants of their right to due process.

Adalim-White v. Bugtas
- Bugtas tries to reason out that he used Sec. 16, Rule 114, and Sec. 5, Rule 11.
- Bagaporo was sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment from 4y,2m to 8y,1d. Counting four
years and two months from the said date, should have been on April 9, 2000. Therefore,
it is wrong for Bugtas to claim that Bagaporo has already served the minimum of his
sentence, which was on Feb. 16, 2000.
- It is also erroneous for respondent to release the convict on recognizance.
o Sec. 24, Rule 114 is clear in prohibiting the grant of bail after conviction by final
judgement and after the convict has started to serve sentence.
o The only exception is when the convict has applied for probation before he
commences to serve sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are within the
purview of the Probation Law.
There is no showing that Bagaporo applied for probation. In fact, at the
time of his application for release on recognizance, he was already serving
his sentence. When he was about to complete service of the minimum of
his sentence, he filed an application for parole. There is no showing that
the Board of Pardons and Parole approved his application.
Sections 5 and 16, Rule 114 only apply to an accused undergoing
preventive imprisonment during trial or on appeal. It does not apply to a
person convicted by final judgment and already serving sentence.

Sec. 17. Bail, where filed.

Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the
absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the
accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipal other than where the case is pending, bail may
also be filed with any RT of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan
trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit judge therein.
Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on
recognizance, the application may be filed only in the court where the case is pending, on trial or
appeal.

Re Anonymous Letter Complaint Against Tamang

- Judge Tamang admittedly approved not only of the bail bonds issued by Covenant, but
also the bail bonds in some instances of accused persons charged in criminal cases pending
outside her territorial jurisdiction. She claimed that she did so because the accused were
 detained in San Juan and Pateros, where she was the Presiding Judge. However, her
explanations cannot exonerate her.
o Judge Tamang approved bail bonds issued by Covenant, although they manifestly
lacked the required clearance from the SC indicating that Convenant was qualified
to transact business with the courts. They were blacklisted at the time of issuance
of the bail bonds. Thus, she is guilty of a neglect of duty.
- According to Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory, the judge is still bound to
review the supporting documents before approving the bail bonds, even if
it is the Clerk of Court who has the duty to ascertain that the bail bonds
are in order, and that all requisites for approval have been complied with.
In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted and Padilla v. Silerio, the Court
expressly enjoins a judge to carefully pore over all documents before
signing the documents and giving them official imprimatur.
o Furthermore, Sec. 17a, Rule 114 governs the approval of bail bonds for criminal
cases pending outside the judges territorial jurisdiction.
Under the provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where
the case is pending, or with any RTC of the place of arrest, or if no RTC
Judge is available, with any MeTC or MTC of the place of arrest.
The list of approved bail bonds contained in the OCA Memorandum,
showed 24 involved accused detained in Pasig, 7 in Taguig, 6 in San Juan,
and 1 in Pateros. The remaining three cases involved accused who
voluntarily surrendered to Judge Tamang in San Juan MeTC. However, all
of the criminal cases were pending in the Pasig RTC.
She contends that under Sec. 17a, the accused who were detained and who
voluntarily surrendered in San Juan could file their applications for bail in
San Juan, the accused detained in Pateros could do the same, and that the
bail applications to those detained in Taguig were legal approved because
she was then the Pairing Judge of the MeTC in Taguig.
She was correct on the approval of applications for bail to those
who voluntarily surrendered and been detained in San Juan,
Pateros, and Taguig City, because Sec. 7a, Rule 114 granted her the
authority to approve applications for bail of accused detained
within her territorial jurisdiction in the event of the unavailability
of any RTC Judge in the area.
However, she did not substantiate her explanation that she had
approved the bail applications of the accused detained in
Pasig City and had issued the corresponding release orders
after office hours on Fridays because no RTC Judges had
been available in Pasig City. Aside from the affidavits that she
stayed and worked until 9pm, and that the orders of release had
been immediately served on the jail warden, she offered no proof
to justify her approval of the questioned bonds. Thus, her
explanation did not exculpate her for her approval of the bail
bonds.

Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor

In this application for bail under Sec. 8, Rule 114, the court must give reasonable notice of
the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation.
Torrevillas v. Natividad
- In this case, the respondent judge did not conduct the requisite hearing before he granted
bail to the accused.
o Sec. 8, Rule 114 provides for a hearing.
o Sec. 18 also provides that the Court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to
the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation.
In the discharge of a judges duties, however, when the inefficiency springs
from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle,
the judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and
title he holds, or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.
If the rule or law is so elementary, as the above-quoted sections of Rule
114 are, not to know it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law, without even the complainant having to prove malice
or bad faith on the part of the judge, as it can be clearly inferred from the
error committed
He also committed undue delay in disposing of the cases assigned
to him.
He also committed dishonesty by saying that Criminal Case Nos.
3440, 3093, and 3274 were not yet submitted for decision when the
judicial audit was conducted and that he conducted bail hearings,
albeit the records do not show.

Sec. 19. Release on bail

The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the judge with whom it was
filed in accordance with Sec. 17, Rule 114.
When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted
the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the
court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a different one to be filed.

Sec. 20. Increase or reduction of bail

After the accused is admitted to bail, the court may, upon good cause, either increase or
reduce its amount. When increased, the accused may be committed to custody if he does not give
bail in the increased mount within a reasonable period. An accused held to answer a criminal
charge, who is released without bail upon filing of the complaint or information, may, at any
subsequent stage of the proceedings and whenever a strong showing of guilt appears to the court,
be required to give bail in the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof, committed to custody.

Conquilla v. Bernardo
- The reduction of bail based on her allegation is not substantial. The Court takes note that
while he did not know of this transaction, he did not deny that there was such.
o However, while Rule 114 allows a judge to grant bail in bailable offenses and to
increase/decrease bail, it assumes that the judge has jurisdiction over the case.
o In the present case, there is a showing that respondent judge conducted
preliminary investigation without authority and issued the warrant of arrest. These
acts are void for want of jurisdiction. The reduction of bail is also void because
respondent judge had no jurisdiction over the case itself.
Sec. 21. Forfeiture of bail.
When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen
shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to
appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty
(30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be
rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:
a. produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
b. explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly
and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the
liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.

Re: Josefina Farrales

- Judge Ubiadas is not guilty of gross ignorance and/or gross misconduct in reducing the
lability of Commonwealth Insurance Company and Pacific Union Insurance Company.
- The rule governing forfeitures of bail bonds is found in Sec. 21, Rule 114.
o When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his
bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and
time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared
forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce the
principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for
the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondmen must:
produce the body of the principal or give the reason for his non-
production; and
b. explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first
required to do so.
o Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen,
jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The Court shall not reduce or
otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted.
- An OCA Circular was also released, which provides the reduction of bon liability, but only
if the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. Only in these two instances may Judges
reduce or mitigate the liability of the bondsmen.
o However, Judge Ubiadas conduct on this matter cannot be characterized as gross
ignorance or gross ignorance in the absence of specific guidelines which the
OCA itself stated in its report as necessary as a standard to measure the propriety
or impropriety of mitigation of a bondsmans liability.

Mendoza v. Alarma
- Sec. 21, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court clearly provides for the procedure to be followed
before a bail bond may be forfeited and a judgement on the bond rendered against the
surety. There are two occasions on which the trial court judge may rule adversely against
the bondsman:
o non-appearance by the accused
o the bondsman, after the summary forfeiture, are given 30 days to show cause why
a judgment should not be rendered agains them for the amount of the bond.
- It is only after the 30-day period that the trial court may render a judgement on the bond
against the bondsmen. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such
judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen
to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so.
 - In the present case, it is undisputed that the accused failed to appear in person and that
the trial court declared his bail forfeited. The trial court gave the bondsmen a 30-day period
to produce the accused or a reasonable explanation for their non-production. However, 2
years had passed and no judgment has been rendered against the bondsmen for the amount
of the bail. Instead, an order of execution was issued and the property was put up for sale.
- There was a failure of due process. The execution was issued, not on a judgment because
there was none, but simply and solely on the declaration of forfeiture.
o An order of forfeiture is conditional and interlocutory, there being something more
to be done such as the production of the accused within 30 days. This process is
also called a confiscation of bond. It is different from a judgement on the bond
which is issued if the accused was not produced within the 30-day period. It is the
one that ultimately determines the liability of the surety, and when it becomes final,
execution may issue at once.
- No judgement was ever issued and neither has an amount fixed for which the bondsmen
may be held liable.

Sec. 22. Cancellation of bail

Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be
cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal
of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bond.

Bongcac v. Sandiganbayan
- The Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief and the instant petition are merely
dilatory tactics employed by the petitioner to delay the execution of the judgment in the
criminal cases for estafa which had long become final and executory. He cannot file any
petition to forestall the execution of a final judgment.
o Execution of a final judgment is the fruit and end of the suit.
o The March 28, 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision has attained finality. Thus, it is no
longer subject to change, revision, amendment, or reversal. At the same time, the
Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify, or alter the same.
Exception: Cases where there needs to be correction of clerical errors or
the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
or where the judgment is void, the judgement can neither be amended nor
altered after it has become final and executory.
Principle of immutability of final judgment.
o The cancellation of petitioners cash bail bond was due to the execution of the final
judgment of conviction.
Sec. 22 of Rule 114 provides:
Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the
prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the
accused or proof of his death. Bail shall be deemed automatically
cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or
execution of the judgment of conviction. In all instances, the
cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

People v. Cawaling
- Cawaling jumped bail and fled.
- A Manifestation with Motion to withdraw property bond was filed.
o Sec. 22 of Rule 114 is explicit.
 Upon application of the bondsmen with due notice to the prosecutor, the
bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the
accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability
on the bail.
o With the conviction of Cawaling for murder, and the Courts failure to execute the
judgment of conviction because of his flight, the motion must be denied. The bond
cannot be cancelled, nor can it be withdrawn and replaced with a cash, unless
Cawaling surrenders to Court or adequate proof of his death is present.

Silverio v. CA
- The Motion to Quash was filed long after the filing of the Information and only after
several arraignments had already been scheduled and cancelled due to his non-appearance.
The Motion to Quash was set for hearing only on Feb. 19, 1988.
o The lower courts found that the reason for his failure to appear was because he
was in the US.
o Since the information, he never appeared in person before the Court.
o The bond posted had been cancelled twice and warrants of arrest issued against
him all for the same reason failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.
- The bail bond he posted had been cancelled and Warrants of Arrests had been issued
because of his failure to appear scheduled arraignments. They were issued against him for
violation of the conditions of his bail bond. Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearance before any court when so required by the Court o the Rules.
o Thus, the foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available
at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
of his right to travel. (Manotoc, Jr. v. CA)
- Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while
the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations.

Sec. 23. Arrest of accused out on bail

For the purpose of surrendering the accused, the bondsmen may arrest him or, upon
written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, cause him to be arrested by a
police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion.
An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he
attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where the case is pending.

Sec. 24. No bail after final judgment; exception.

No bail shall be allowed after the judgment of conviction has become final. If before such
finality, the accused has applied for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail.
When no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on
recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case shall bail be
allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence.

Vicente v. Majaducon
- The said criminal cases were indeed certified by respondent to this Court. However, the
SC resolved to return the records to the RTC and to order the said court to give due course
 to Tes notice of appeal from the Order denying her petition for habeas corpus and from
the Order requiring her to post bail in the amount of Php1M.
- He is also guilty of gross ignorance based on the provisions of Rule 102, Sec. 14, and Rule
114, Sec. 24.
o Rule 102, Sec. 14 is applicable to cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas
corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him.
o In this case, Te is serving sentence by reason of a final judgment.
Sec. 24, Rule 114 prohibits the grant of bail after conviction by final
judgment and after the convict has started to serve sentence.
The only exception is when the convict has applied for probation
before he commences to serve sentence, provided the penalty and
offense are within the purview of the Probation Law.
o In this present case, Te did not apply for probation. At the time respondent judge
granted her bail, she was already serving her sentence. Thus, she is not entitled to
bail.

Sec. 25. Court supervision of detainees.

The court shall exercise supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose of
eliminating unnecessary detention. The executive judges of the Regional Trial Courts shall conduct
monthly personal inspections of provincial, city, and municipal jails and their prisoners within their
respective jurisdictions. They shall ascertain the number of detainees, inquire on their proper
accommodation and health and examine the condition of the jail facilities. They shall order the
segregation of sexes and of minors from adults, ensure the observance of the right of detainees to
confer privately with counsel, and strive to eliminate conditions inimical to the detainees.
In cities and municipalities to be specified by the Supreme Court, the municipal trial judges
or municipal circuit trial judges shall conduct monthly personal inspections of the municipal jails
in their respective municipalities and submit a report to the executive judge of the Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction therein.
A monthly report of such visitation shall be submitted by the executive judges to the Court
Administrator which shall state the total number of detainees, the names of those held for more
than thirty (30) days, the duration of detention, the crime charged, the status of the case, the cause
for detention, and other pertinent information.

Mupas v. Espaol
- The respondents order to transfer the accused from the municipal jail to the provincial
jail cannot be justified under Sec. 25, Rule 114.
o The court shall exercise supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose of
eliminating unnecessary detention. The executive judges of the Regional Trial
Courts shall conduct monthly personal inspections of provincial, city and
municipal jails and the prisoners within their respective jurisdictions. They shall
ascertain the number of detainees, inquire on their proper accommodation and
health and examine the condition of the jail facilities. They shall order the
segregation of sexes and of minors from adults, ensure the observance of the right
of detainees to confer privately with counsel, and strive to eliminate conditions
inimical to detainees
- As Executive Judge, respondent exercises supervision over all persons in custody for the
purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention, but the rule does not give her the authority
to arrogate upon herself a power vested upon a presiding judge of the court where the case
is pending. Instead, she should have called the attention of the complainant regarding the
motions which allegedly required immediate action.
 - It is elementary that an Executive Judge only has administrative supervision over lower
courts. Her function relates only to the management of first and second level courts, within
her administrative area with a view to attaining prompt and convenient dispatch of its
business. Acting as such, she cannot unilaterally override the MTCs actions in cases
pending with it under the guise of administrative supervision, without running afoul of
the orderly administration of justice. Only when her courts jurisdiction is appropriately
invoked in an appeal or certiorari and other special civil actions can respondent judge, in
her judicial capacity, override the lower courts judgment.
- The executive judge has not been given any authority to interfere with the transfer of
detainees in cases handled by other judges, be it of the first or second level; nor to grant
hold-departure orders in cases not assigned to her sala.
o Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts.

Sec. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular
preliminary investigation.
An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the
validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity
or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that
he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable
but not later than the start of the trial of the case.

Leviste v. Alameda
- Waiver on the part of the accused must be distinguished from mootness of the petition.
However, he did not waive his stated objections.
o Sec. 26 of Rule 114 provides that an application for or admission to bail shall not
bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the
warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence
of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises
them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as
practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.
o By applying for bail, he did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of the
reinvestigation of the charge against him, the validity of the admission of the
Amended Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended
Information, which he raised PRIOR to his arraignment. In fact, during his
arraignment, he refused to enter his plea since the issues he raised were still pending
resolution in the CA.
o The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning the
illegal arrest or the lack of or irregular preliminary investigation applies only if he
voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking
his objections thereto.
There must be clear and convincing proof that he intended to relinquish
his right to question the existence of probable cause. Thus, the Court
cannot infer a valid waiver on the part of the petitioner to preclude him
from obtaining a definite resolution of the objections he so timely invoked.
o The delay arising from petitioners availment of remedies cannot be imputed as a
valid waiver, nor can the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction be
deemed as a voluntary relinquishment. It only means that the CA did not
preliminarily find an exception to the long-standing doctrine that injunction will
not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution.
 o However, this petition is now moot since the trial court rendered judgment already.
Even then, there is a need to clarify the remedies available before and after the
filing of an information in cases subject to inquest.

Rule 115. Rights of accused.

Sec. 1. Rights of accused at the trial
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
a. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
b. To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
c. To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused
may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set
forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for
purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause
at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to
be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be
deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until
custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to
defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can
properly protect his right without the assistance of counsel.
d. To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on
matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner
prejudice him.
e. To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
f. To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either
party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the Philippines,
unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.
g. To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and
production of other evidence in his behalf.
h. To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
i. To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.

- Difference between a right to a speedy trial and a right to a speedy disposition of the case.
o Speedy trial can be invoked only during criminal cases, but for a speedy disposition
of the case covers all kinds of cases.
- Four factors:
o length of delay
o The reason for delay
o Defendants assertion of his right
o Prejudice to the defendant
Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant
that the speedy trial was designed to protect to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration, to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial, and
to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired.
- Remedies:
o Motion to Dismiss
 o Habeas Corpus
- Proof beyond reasonable doubt:
o moral ascertainty
o the identity of the offender
- Equipoise rule:
o if the evidence presented by both sides have equal weight, the Court will favor the
defendant.
- The right against self-incrimination:
o Can be used by a witness in As case, if Ws testimony can be used against him in
another case
- USE IMMUNITY
o Prohibits the use of the witness compelled testimony and its fruits in
any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.
The witness can still be prosecuted but his compelled testimony may not be used
against him
- TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY
o Immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates. The witness cannot be prosecuted at all

Jacob v. Sandiganbayan
- An accuseds right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial is guaranteed in criminal
cases by Sec. 14(2), Art. III of the Constitution. This right is defined as one free from
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or of having
his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.
o The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure also include provisions to ensure the
protection of such right.
Uy v. Hon. Adriano:
Sec. 1h of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Crim Pro provides that
the accused is entitled to a speedy, impartial, and public trial.
Sec. 2 of Rule 119 provides that trial, once commenced, shall be
continuous until terminated.
o Trial, once commenced, shall continue from day to day as
far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for
a reasonable period of time for good cause.
o The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and
defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a
weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest
possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall
the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days
from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized
by the Supreme Court.
o The time limitations provided under this section and the
preceding section shall not apply where special laws or
circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period
of trial.
However, any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted
by the court motu proprio or on motion of either the accused or
his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the
continuance on the basis of its findings that the ends of justice is
 served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the
public and the accused on a speedy trial, shall be deducted.
Factors to be considered:
o W/N the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding
would likely make a continuation of such proceeding
impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice?
o W/N the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual, and
complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of
the prosecution, or that it is unreasonable to expect
adequate preparation within the periods of time established
therein.
Speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In
determining whether such right is violated, the delay should be considered
in view of the entirety of the proceedings.
Mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not
suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial
proceedings which do not exist in a vacuum.
Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan has the same factual background.
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy
disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays
in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed
with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases.
Such right is violated when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays. While justice is administered
with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and
not mere speed. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not
preclude the rights of public justice.
Four factors:
o length of delay
o The reason for delay
o Defendants assertion of his right
o Prejudice to the defendant
Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the
interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was
designed to protect to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration, to minimize anxiety and concerns of
the accused to trial, and to limit the possibility that
his defense will be impaired.
Williams v. US:
o that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that
which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay
o That there was no more delay than is reasonably attributed
to the ordinary processes of justice.
- In the present case, the Criminal cases were filed on April 10, 2000. Petitioner, Jacob, was
arraigned on June 1, 2000, while Legarda was arraigned on May 18, 2001, with both
petitioners pleading not guilty. Since then, there had been no significant development in
the cases since the prosecution repeatedly requested for deferment or postponement of
the scheduled hearings as it awaits the result of the reinvestigation of the Office of the
 Ombudsman. They consistently asked in open court that the case be dismissed every time
the prosecution moved for deferment.
- Prosecution attributed delay to the:
o 23 MRs filed by the accused, which was granted by the Sandiganbayan
o Failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to terminate its reinvestigation and
submit its report within the 60-day period fixed by the Court.
- There had been an undue and inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the cases by the
Office of the Ombudsman, which failed to submit its report, and even more than a year
after. The fact that 23 MRs filed is insignificant. It is merely a repeat investigation of the
case, a chance for the Office of the Ombudsman to review and reevaluate its findings
based on the evidence previously submitted by the parties.
- - In Corpuz, the Court warned against the overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a case
which may enable the defendant to go free without having been tried.
o In People v. Leviste, the Court stressed that the State is entitled to its day in Court
and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal has actually
increased the workload of the justice system.
- Even though the Court acknowledges the delay in the criminal proceedings, the weighing
of the interest militates against a finding that petitioners right to a speedy trial and
disposition of the cases would have justified the dismissal.
- The dismissal of the criminal cases was unwarranted under the circumstances, since the
State should not be prejudiced of its right to prosecute criminal cases simply because of
the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the Office of the Ombudsman.
o Corpuz:
There can be no denying the fact that the petitioners, as well as the other
accused, was prejudiced by the delay in the reinvestigation of the cases and
the submission by the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor of his report
thereon. So was the State. We have balanced the societal interest involved
in the cases and the need to give substance to the petitioners constitutional
rights and their quest for justice, and we are convinced that the dismissal
of the cases is too drastic a remedy to be accorded to the petitioners.
We repeatthe cases involve the so-called tax credit certificates scam and
hundreds of millions of pesos allegedly perpetrated by government officials
in connivance with private individuals. The People has yet to prove the
guilt of the petitioners of the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt. We
agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that before resorting to the
extreme sanction of depriving the petitioner a chance to prove its case by
dismissing the cases, the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor should be
ordered by the Sandiganbayan under pain of contempt, to explain the delay
in the submission of his report on his reinvestigation.
Justice Nario failed to issue a written resolution dismissing the criminal
cases. And thus, the verbal order of Justice Nario does not exist at all in
contemplation of law.

Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan
- The deafening silence of all the accused does not necessarily point to a conspiracy.
o Not all of the accused remained silent. Calinganyan put himself on the witness
stand. He also claimed that the police investigated him and his handwritten
statements were taken the morning following Renatos death.
An accused has the constitutional right to remain silent and to be exempt
from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
- A judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength of the evidence and not on
the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The circumstantial evidence in this case is
not sufficient to create a prima facie case to shift the burden of evidence to Crisostomo.
o In Salvatierra v. CA, the Court disregarded the issue of whether the defendants
jumped bail for failing to attend trial and whether their absence should be
considered as flight and as evidence of guilt.
- The records show that the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses presentation of
evidence on June 21, 22, and 23, 1995.
o The 21st was cancelled because of lack of quorum in the regular membership of
the Sandiganbayans Second Division.
o On the 22nd, Crisostomo and counsel failed to attend. On the very same day, the
Sandiganbayan ordered for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo
and ordering the confiscation of his surety bond. The said order also declared that
he had waived his right to present evidence because of his non-appearance at
yesterday and todays scheduled hearings.
o Strictly speaking, he only failed to appear on the 22nd. His appearance on the 21st
would not have mattered because the said hearing was cancelled for the lack of
quorum of justices.
Under Sec. 2, Rule 114 and Sec. 1 of Rule 115, Crisostomos non-
appearance was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such
date only and not for the succeeding trial dates.
Sec. 1, Rule 115 clearly states that:
The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial
on a particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a
waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused
under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes,
he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said
date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained.
His absence on the 22nd should not have been deemed as a waiver of his
right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such
waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to
relinquish such right.
He did not do so and even ask his attorney to waive such right.
In criminal cases where the penalty may be death, the court is called upon
to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences
of a waiver of the right to present evidence. It is not enough that the
accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to attend
the succeeding hearings. The courts must first explain to the accused
personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver.
The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable so
that the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the
waiver. It must also conform to the procedure in People v. Beriber:
o The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the
accused with their respective counsel on the desire or
manifestation of the accused to waive the right to present
evidence and be heard.
o The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the
prosecution and especially the accused with their respective
counsel in the hearing which must be recorded. Their
presence must be duly entered in the minutes of the
proceedings.
 o During the trial, the court shall:
ask the defense counsel a series of question[s] to
determine whether he had conferred with and
completely explained to the accused that he had the
right to present evidence and be heard as well as its
meaning and consequences, together with the
significance and outcome of the waiver of such
right. If the lawyer for the accused has not done so,
the trial court shall give the latter enough time to
fulfill this professional obligation.
inquire from the defense counsel with conformity
of the accused whether he wants to present
evidence or submit a memorandum elucidating on
the contradictions and insufficiency of the
prosecution evidence, if any or in default thereof,
file a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of court,
if he so believes that the prosecution evidence is so
weak that it need not even be rebutted. If there is a
desire to do so, the trial court shall give the defense
enough time for this purpose.
elicit information about the personality profile of
the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status,
and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed waiver.
all questions posed to the accused should be in a
language known and understood by the latter,
hence, the record must state the language used for
this purpose as well as reflect the corresponding
translation thereof in English.
If no waiver could be presumed, then the reason of such fight
could not be logically inferred from his absence at that hearing. His
absence did not justify the forfeiture of his bail bond.
o Furthermore, prior to his absence on June 22, 1995,
Crisostomo had regularly attended the hearings of the case.
o He was also instructed by his former counsel to wait for
the notice of hearing from him and the Sandiganbayan. But
he did not receive anything, especially the lawyer who
disappeared without informing him of his new office
address.
o It was only when he was notified on Nov. 28, 2000, that he
had voluntarily appeared before the Sandiganbayan.
It was the lawyers negligence.

People v. Abatayo
- The OSG asserts that while the appellant has the constitutional right to cross-examine the
witnesses against him, but he waived such right when he failed to invoke the same after
his initial cross-examination of Juanito.
o Under Art. III, Sec. 14, of the 1987 Constitution, the appellant has the right to
meet the witnesses against him face to face.
 o Under Sec.1, Rule 115, he has the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him at the trial.
o However, the right to confront and cross-examine is a personal one. it is not an
absolute right, which a party can claim at all times.
In Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, the Court ruled that
the right to confront the witness may be waived by the accused, expressly
or impliedly.
Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness, but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the
right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed on the
record.
The conduct of a party, which may be construed as an implied
waiver of the right to cross-examine, may take various forms. But
the common basic principle underlying the application of the rule
on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take
advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.
In Fulgado v. CA, the Court ruled the the task of recalling a witness for
cross-examination is imposed on the party who wishes to exercise said
right, and stressed that it should be the opposing counsel who should move
to cross-examine the plaintiffs witness.
o In this case, the appellant had waived his right to cross-examine Juanito. Juanito
testified for the prosecution on direct examination on Nov. 22, 1994. Thereafter,
the appellants counsel cross-examined the witness on the corpus delicti. He
moved for a resetting as he still had many questions to ask the witness. When
Juanito failed to attend due to fever, the appellant did not object to the deferment
of the cross-examination, nor did he object to the presentation of the second
witness.
o The trial was reset for the continuation of Juanitos cross-examination. However,
no subpoena ad testificandum was issued to Juanito for the said trial. There is no
showing whether Juanito was in court on March 2, 1995 when the case was called.
Furthermore, he did not object when the public prosecutor presented PO2
Andales and Basalan as witnesses.
Even during the manifestation and the stipulation on the authenticity of
the necropsy report.
Even when public prosecutor said that he had no more witnesses to
present and was ready to formally offer his documentary evidence.
He also did not object to the offer of Juanitos affidavit.
o All the instances showed that he had waived his right to further cross-examine
Juanito.

People v. Larraaga
- Sec. 14, Art. III catalogues the essentials of due process in a criminal prosecution:
o Presumption of innocence
o Right to be heard by himself and counsel
o To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
o To have a speedy, impartial, and public trial
o To meet the witnesses face to face
o To have compulsory process to secure the attendances of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf.
- Rule 115 casts the foregoing provisions in a more detailed manner.
- Of the foregoing rights, the appellants claim that these several rights were trampled upon:
o Right to be assisted:
Appointment of counsel de oficio
Refusal to suspend trial until they have secured the services of new counsel.
But, the Court held that there is no denial of the right to counsel where a
counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the accuseds
counsel de parte.
The preference in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly to a person
under investigation.
Even the choice of counsel by the accused is not a plenary one:
If the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself scarce, the court
is not precluded from appointing a de oficio counsel whom it
considers competent and independent to enable the trial to
proceed until the counsel of choice enters his appearance.
Furthermore, appellants requested 1 month or 3 weeks, but they could
have hired new lawyers at a shorter time had they wanted to.
o Right to Confront and Cross-Examine the Prosecution Witnesses:
It is not true that they werent given sufficient opportunity to cross-
examine Rusia. All of the counsel de parte had their fair share of time in
grilling Rusia concerning his background to the kidnapping of Marijoy and
Jacqueline.
People v. Gorospe:
o While cross-examination is a right available to the adverse
party, it is not absolute that a cross-examiner could
determine for himself the length and scope of his cross-
examination of a witness. The court always has the
discretion to limit the cross-examination and to consider it
terminated if it would serve the ends of justice.
The transcript shows that they had ample chance to test Rusias credibility.
Furthermore, the failure of the PAO lawyers to cross-examine some of the
prosecution witnesses was due to appellants obstinate refusal.
If some of the prosecution witnesses were not subjected to cross-
examination, it was not because appellants were not given the opportunity
to do so. The fact remains that their new counsel de parte refused to cross-
examine them.
o Right to Impartial Trial:
Records show that the intervention by way of comment of Judge Ocampo
during the hearing was not only appropriate but was necessary. One good
illustration is his explanation on alibi.
Seeing that appellants counsel were about to present additional witnesses
whose testimonies would not establish the impossibility of appellants
presence in the scene of the crime, Judge Ocampo intervened and
reminded appellants counsel the requisites of alibi.
Even the remark to the witness was not to question her morality,
but to question her credibility as a witness.
The Court is convinced that Ocampos comments were just honest
observations intended to warn the witnesses to be candid to the
court. And if he uttered harsh words, it was because they made a
mockery of the courts proceedings by their deliberate lies.
 o Right to Produce Evidence:
By an alibi, Larraaga attempted to prove that he was at a place so distant
that his participation in the crime was impossible. To prove that he was
not in the pre-flight and post-flight of the 4 major airlines would not prove
the legal requirement of physical impossibility because he could have
taken the flight prior to that date.
According to Judge Ocampo, it was imperative for appellants counsel to
prove that Larraaga did not take a flight to Cebu before July 16, 1997.
Even the presentation of additional witnesses to prove his enrollment at
the CCA as it would not prove that he was not in Cebu on such dates.

Pielago v. People
- Pielago was charged in the information for acts of lasciviousness, but he was convicted of
the crime of rape by sexual assault.
- It is well-settled that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In this respect, the designation in the
Information is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
o In the present case, the designation was changed from acts of lasciviousness to the
crime of rape.
o It cannot be said that his right to be properly informed of the nature and cause was
violated. The Court is not unaware that the Information was worded as follows:
commit an act of lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a minor being 4 years
old, by kissing the vagina and inserting one of his fingers to the vagina of AAA.
o The factual allegations contained in the Information determine the crime charged
against the accused and not the designation of the offense as given by the
prosecutor which is merely an option not binding to the courts.
Malto v. People:
What controls is not the title of the information or the designation
of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information. In
other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the
offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the
crime being charged in the information.
People v. Rayon
The Court reiterated that the character of the crime is not
determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances
in the complaint or information.
o The insertion of the penis to another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into another persons genital or anal orifice.
o This element is clearly present when AAA straightforwardly testified in Court that
Pielago inserted his forefinger in her vagina and anus.
- The amendment of the Information against the accused changing the designation of the
crime alleged from acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610 to the
crime of rape by sexual assault penalized under Article 266- A(2)37 of the RPC is not
prejudicial to the accused because the original Information already alleged the elements
of the latter felony and the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
complaint or information.
Rule 117. Arraignment and Plea
Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made
The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was
filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The
prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.
The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both
arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the validity of
the proceedings.
When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not guilty shall
be entered for him. (1a)
When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be deemed
withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him. (n)
When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its records
transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three (3) days from the filing of the
information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within ten (10) days from the date of the
raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be held within ten (10) days after arraignment. (n)
The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for purposes of
plea bargaining, determination of civil liability, and other matters requiring his presence. In case of
failure of the offended party to appear despite due notice, the court may allow the accused to enter
a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged with the
conformity of the trial prosecutor alone. (cir. 1-89)
Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the
arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of particulars
or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in computing the period.

Bandoy v. Jacinto
- He is guilty of gross ignorance of Rule 116, Sec. 1 (a) requiring arraignment of an accused
to be made in open court.
o The procedural steps laid own in Sec. 1 of Rule 116 are not empty rituals that a
judge can take nonchalantly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that crucial
stage in criminal litigation where the issues are joined and without which the
proceedings cannot advance further.
o Thus, anything less than is required by Sec. 1a of Rule 116 constitutes gross
ignorance of the law when the error committed by the judge was gross or patent,
deliberate or malicious.
- The Court also cannot fathom why the arraignment was postponed from 2007 to 2011
without appropriate action coming from the Court. Judge Jacinto should have availed of
known legal remedies to compel De Jesus to personally appear for his arraignment, but he
did not.
o Under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law or
procedure is classified as serious charge. Sec. 11 of the same Rule provides the
penalty to be imposed if a respondent Judge is found guilty of a serious charge.

Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan
- Sandiganbayan countered that it correctly denied to set aside his arraignment.
o The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman sanction the immediate
filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even
during the pendency of an MR.
Sec. 7, Rule II of the Rules provides:
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed
within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the
Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may
be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the
information has already been filed in court;
The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not
bar the filing of the corresponding information in Court on the
basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of
the motion.
If the filing of an MR of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar
the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the
arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal
procedure logically follows the filing of information.
Arraignment is that stage where an accused, for the first time, is granted
the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. The
accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he
entered a plea of guilty or not guilty.
Under Sec. 7 of RA 8493 (Speedy Trial Act), the Court must proceed with
the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the
Information or from the date the accused as appeared before the court in
which the charge is pending, whichever is later.
Sec. 1(g) of Rule 116 implements said Section in RA 8493:
Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme
Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days
from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.
They both say the same thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted from
the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
which is when the accused appears before the Court.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Sec.
11, Rule 116, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided
under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
o Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases:
The accused appears to be suffering from an
unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge
against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In
such case, the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his confinement for
such purpose.
There exists a prejudicial question; and
A petition for review of the resolution of the
prosecutor is pending at either the Department of
Justice, or the Office of the President; provided,
 that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty
(60) days counted from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office.
o Petitioner filed to show that any of the instances
constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment
obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed
no error when it proceeded with petitioners arraignment,
as mandated by Sec. 7 of RA 8493.
At the same time, it was already petitioners second MR. Under Sec. 7, Rule
II, petitioner can no longer file another MR questioning yet again the same
finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation.

Kummer v. People
- Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is
merely a formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required.
o Sec. 14, Rule 110 permits a formal amendment even after the plea, but only if it is
made with leave of court and provided that it does not cause prejudice to the rights
of the accused. A mere change in the date of the crime, if the disparity of time is
not great, is more formal than substantial.
When the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or
information would no longer be available after the amendment is made,
when any evidence the accused might have would no longer be available
after the amendment is made, and when any evidence of the accused would
be inapplicable to the complaint or information.
o Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused one court and in notifying
him the nature and cause of the accusations against him. However, it is only needed
when there is substantial amendment. Formal amendments do not charge an
offense different from that charge in the original complaint/information, do not
alter the theory of prosecution, do not cause any surprise and affect the line of
defense, and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused.
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information
or complaint. But, this pertains only to substantial amendments and not to
formal amendments that:
do not charge an offense different from that charged in the original
complaint or information,
do not alter the theory of the prosecution
do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense
An amendment does after the plea and during trial does not call for a
second plea since the amendment is only as to form.
The purpose of an arraignment is to inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The subsequent amendment could not
have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply because the
amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the
prosecution.
The amendment was only changing the month, from July 19, 1988 to June
19, 1988.
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary.

Bug-atan v. People
- First, the petitioners failed to point out any rule of procedure or provision that was
transgressed by the trial court.
o The plea bargain was validly acted upon despite the fact that all the proceedings
occurred on a single day.
Sec. 2, Rule 116 is explicit on how and when a plea bargain may be allowed.
There is nothing in the law which expressly or impliedly prohibits the trial
court from allowing an accused to change his plea, on a plea bargain,
immediately after a previous plea of not guilty. In approving the plea
bargaining agreement, the trail court undoubtedly took into consideration
the timeliness of the plea bargaining and its compliance with the
requirements of the law.
There was no error in the trial courts holding that there were no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances to appreciate even with
Maramaras confession of murder for the obvious reason that introduction
of evidence became no longer necessary after entering a plea of guilty.
o It is sufficing to say that at the time he pleaded guilty, the present charge against
petitioners was still in the initial stage of preliminary investigation.

Heirs of Gevero v. Guihing Agricultural and Development Corporation

- Sec. 2, Rule 116 provides for a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. A conviction under this
plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double
jeopardy. It is clear that an accused in a criminal case may be allowed to plead guilty to a
lesser offense, regardless of whether it is included or not in the crime charged.
o Thus, Nava who was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, was
allowed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property.
o CA, however, in limiting Navas civil liability to the cost of the damage to the
bicycle, clearly ignored the fact of the death of the victim.
o The offense of homicides necessarily produces death. The offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property does not.
o Significantly, Sec. 2, Rule 116 is silent on the effect of the plea of a lesser offense
on the civil liability of the accused.
o Amazon v. Aujero is relevant:
These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the
victims death, a clear negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought
to have alerted the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent result but to
an injustice. The failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body
of laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judges
lack of prudence, if not competence, in the performance of his duties.
While it is true, as respondent judge contends, that he merely applied the
rule to the letter, the palpably incongruous result ought to have been a red
flag alerting him of the possibility of injustice. The death of an identified
 individual, the gravamen of the charge against the defendant in the criminal
case, cannot and should not be ignored in favor of a mere expedient plea
of either attempted or frustrated homicide. We have held before that if the
law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it,
constitutes gross ignorance of law.
o The CA should have realized outright that a grave injustice will be committed
against the heirs if the accused will only be fined Php200, without awarding his
heirs civil liabilities corresponding to the fact of his death.

Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present
evidence in his behalf.

People v. Baharan
- People v. Apduhan provides that all trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an
accuseds plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty
bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he
understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.
- Trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Sec. 3, Rule 116:
o Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct
a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present
evidence in his behalf.
o The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-
arraignment.
People v. Galvez: The Court noted that since accused-appellants original plea
was not guilty, the trial court should have exerted careful effort in
inquiring into why he changed his plea to guilty.
o The requirement to conduct should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it
was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a guilty plea to the
accused, as it appears in this case.
In People v. Alborida, the Court found that there was still an improvident
plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that
his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he
understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused understood
that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had
not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.
- In this case, however, the Court is not unmindful of the context on which the re-
arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against
the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty
to another charge multiple murder based on the same act relied upon in the multiple
frustrated murder charge.
- The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan
and Trinidad made two other confessions of guiltone through an extrajudicial
confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial),
and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing
 circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching inquiry
in this instance.
- Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accuseds plea of guilt was
not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration

People v. Gambao
- As provided for by Art. 267, the penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death. A recording
of the records shows that on Oct. 7, 1998, the accused-appellants withdrew their plea of
not guilty and were re-arraigned. They subsequently entered please of guilty to the
crime of kidnapping for ransom, a capital offense.
o People v. Oden laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty
to a capital offense:
to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability,
to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires
o This is for the court to proceed with more care where the possible punishment in
its severest form, death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is
irreversible.
o The first requisite was based on a free and informed judgment. It must focus on
the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of
the plea.
Conduct of a searching inquiry:
Ascertain from the accused himself
o how he was brought into the custody of the law;
o whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel
during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and
o under what conditions he was detained and interrogated
during the investigations.
o (This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused
has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either
by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
quarters or simply because of the judges intimidating
robes.)
Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had
conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the
Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused,
such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational
background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity
to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of
the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope
of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises
of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that
the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions
because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of
 authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating
circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged
and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis
of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a
violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due
process.
All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known
and understood by the latter.
The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading
guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the
tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.
It is evident from the records that the aforesaid rules have not been fully
complied with. The questions propounded by the trial court judge failed to
ensure that accused-appellants fully understood the consequences of their
plea. In fact, it is apparent that Karim had the mistaken assumption that
his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and that both the
judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will
not mitigate the penalty, pursuant to Art. 63 of the RPC.
Karim was not warned by the trial court judge that i nacres where the
penalty is single and indivisible, the penalty is not affected by either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Despite the trial court judges shortcomings, the Court still agrees with his
ruling on the accused-appellants culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt
are set aside and the cases are remanded for further proceedings if
such plea is the sole basis of judgment. If the trial court relied on
sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the
conviction must be sustained because it is then predicated not
merely on the guilty plea, but on evidence proving the commission
of the offense charged.
They were convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of their
plea of guilt, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial court.

People v. Flores
- Sec. 3, Rule 116 provides that when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.
o In the present case, he stands charged in the information of an office in which the
maximum penalty imposable is only prision correccional.
o As to whether the offense charged is capital or not, the only determinant factor is
the information itself. A cursory reading will show that he is being charged of a
non-capital offense.
o Thus, Sec. 4 shall apply, which provides that when the accuse pleads guilty to a
non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine
the penalty to be imposed.
The reception of evidence is discretionary with the court.
Sec. 4. Plea of guilty to non-capital offense; reception of evidence,
discretionary.
When the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence
from the parties to determine the penalty to be imposed.

Sec. 5. Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty

At any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an
improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.

People v. Solamillo
- Furthermore, Julian maintains that the trial court erred in disregarding his tacit withdrawal
of his guilty plea.
o Sec. 5, Rule 116 provides that at any time before the judgment of conviction
becomes final, the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn
and be substituted by a plea of not guilty.
There should be a categorical declaration from the accused that he is
withdrawing his plea of guilt and substituting it with a plea of not guilty.
o However, there is nothing in the records to show that Julian filed a Motion to
Withdraw his Plea of Guilt or that he manifested unequivocally that he was
withdrawing his plea.
o He contends that he did so on Apr. 26, 1995, but the records show nothing. It was
not a positive and categorical declaration that appellant Julian was withdrawing his
plea of guilt.
o Furthermore, even if he did withdraw it, such fact does not operate to
automatically exculpate him from cranial liability. Convictions based on an
improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. However, the trial court relies on the extensive evidence of the
contending parties, too.

Sec. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel.

Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him
if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has
employed a counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel de oficio to defend him.

Gamas v. Oco
- In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to be present an defend in person
and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, as provided by Sec. 1, Rule 115.
- Furthermore, the Court has the duty to inform the accused of his right to counsel as
provided by Sec. 6, Rule 116.
o The right to be assisted is deemed so important that it is a constitutional right and
it is to be implemented that under the rules of procedure, it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, but it is essential that
the Court should assign one de oficio for him, if he so desires and he is poor, or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
o When a defendant appears without an attorney, the court has four important duties
to comply with:
It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have an attorney before
being arraigned.
 After giving him such information, the Court must ask him if he desires
the aid of one.
If he desires and is unable to employ one, the Court must assign an attorney
de oficio to defend him
If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own, the Court must
grant him a reasonable time therefor.
o Compliance with these 4 duties is mandatory. The only instance when the Court
can arraign an accused without the benefit of one is if the accused waives such
right, and the Court, finding the accused is capable, allows him to represent himself
in person.
The waiver must be done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
The Court must take into account all the relevant circumstances, including
the educational attainment of the accused.
- It is clear that the complainants did not satisfactorily waive their right to counsel, for even
if they were informed and inadequately explained of the same, its not a guarantee that they
have voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived such right. One cannot waive a right
if he does not know and understand such right.

Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio

The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that
may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in good standing who,
by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused. But in localities
where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of
the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.

PAO v. Sandiganbayan
- The Court held that the respondents did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the
subject Resolutions as the issuance is not characterized by caprice or arbitrariness. At the
time of PAOs appointment, the accused did not want to avail themselves of any counsel;
hence, respondent exercised a judgment call to protect the constitutional right of the
accused to be heard by themselves and counsel during the trial of the cases.
- Subsequently, respondent reduced the number of PAO lawyers directed to represented, in
view of the engagement of new counsels de parte, but retained 2 obviously to meet such
possible exigency as the accused again receiving some or all of their private counsels.

Sec. 8. Time for counsel de oficio to prepare for arraignment

Whenever a counsel de oficio is appointed by the court to defend the accused at the
arraignment, he shall be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused as to his plea before
proceeding with the arraignment.

People v. Gonzaga
- Sec. 1, Rule 116 proceeds that the arraignment must be made by the judge and shall consist
in reading the complaint/information to the defendant and delivering to him a copy
thereof, including the list of witnesses.
- In the present case, he was not adequately informed of the nature of the crime imputed
against him and the consequences of his plea. The qualifying and aggravating
circumstances were not explained to him.
o No dialogue transpired between the accused and trial judge.
o The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused on arraignment admits his guilt
freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of
his act.
 If the accused does not clearly and fully understand the nature, if he is not
advised to the meaning and the fact, or if he does not clearly understand
the consequences, his plea of guilty should not be accepted and if accepted,
it should not be held to be sufficient to sustain a conviction.
In capital offenses, the trial judge should give ample opportunity to the
counsel de oficio to examine not only the records of the case but also to
acquire every relevant information on the matter, such as conferring with
the accused adequately so that he may properly, intelligently and effectively
represent his interests.
o Under Sec. 8, Rule 116, when an attorney de oficio is employed or assigned, he
should be given reasonable time to consult with the accused and prepare his
defense before proceeding further in the case, which should not be less than 2
hours in case of arraignment, and 2 days in case of trial.
These requirements were not complied with.
o Finally, the fact that immediately after the prosecution had rested its case in the
last hearing held on November 16, 1977, the trial court read a ready-made
decision of conviction shows that the accused was meted the death penalty without
due process of law.
Sec. 9. Bill of particulars
The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly
to plead and to prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or
information and the details desired.

- Bill of Particulars:
o It simply challenges the vagueness of the valid Information.
o So, the Information is still valid, but the facts specified are just insufficient.

Enrile v. People
- Enriles Motion for Bill of Particulars was granted partially.
o Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In the 1904 case, United States v. Karelsen, the Court explained that in
order that this requirement (of informing an accused in writing of the
charges against him) may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions
of law.
In People v. Mencias, the court explained that a persons constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
signifies that an accused should be given the necessary data on why he is
the subject of a criminal proceeding. The Court added that the act or
conduct imputed to a person must be described with sufficient particularity
to enable the accused to defend himself properly.
The right to be informed of the cause of the accusation in a criminal case
has deep constitutional roots that should be carefully protected.
o An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
signed by the prosecutor and filed with the Court.
The Revised Rules of Crim Pro require certain matters to be stated in the
Information for its sufficiency. The requirement aims to enable the accused
to properly prepare for his defense since he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense charged.
An Information must state the name of the accused, designation
of the offense given by the statute, acts or omissions constituting
 the offense, the name of the offended party, approximate date of
the commission of the offense, and the place where it was
committed.
If there is no designation, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute penalizing it. The acts or omissions
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language.
They do not necessarily need to be in the language of the statute.
It should be in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is charged and what qualifying
and aggravating circumstances are alleged.
o Ultimate Facts: Those facts which the expected evidence
will support. It refers to the facts that the evidence will
prove at the trial.
o Evidentiary facts: Facts necessary to establish the ultimate
facts. They are premises that lead to the ultimate facts as
conclusion. They are facts supporting the existence of
some other alleged and unproven fact.
o In Bautista v. CA, the Court explained the concepts:
Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts
which either form the basis of the primary right and
duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts
or omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary
facts are those which tend to prove or establish said
ultimate facts.
o The procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may
be fully informed as to why he was charged and what penal offense he has to face,
to be convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt
with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. During arraignment,
he is granted the opportunity to full know the precise charge that confronts him
and made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on
the nature of the crime imputed to him.
o A concomitant component is that the Information should provide the accused
with fair notice of the accusations made against him. Thus, the Information must
provide some means of ensuring that the crime for which the accused is brought
to trial is in fact one for which he was charged, rather than some alternative crime
seized upon by the prosecution in light of subsequently discovered evidence. It
must be indicated just what crime or crimes an accused is being tried for, in order
to avoid subsequent attempts to retry him for the same crime or crimes.
An Information may be sufficient to withstand a motion to quash, and yet,
insufficiently inform the accused of the specific details of the alleged
offenses. The Rules of Court allow the accused to move for a bill of
particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial.
Bill of Particulars: It is the further specification of the charges or claims in
an action, which an accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to
enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial.
In criminal cases, it details items or specific conduct not recited in
the Information, but nonetheless pertain to or are included in the
crime charged. It is for the accused to know the theory of the
governments case.
 In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is
governed by Sec. 9, Rule 116.
o The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of
particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for
trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the
complaint or information and the details desired.
o The rule requires the Information to describe the offense
with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of the
crime charged with and to enable the Court to pronounce
judgment. The particularity must be such that persons of
ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the
Information means.
The prosecutors shall not be required to include in
the bill of particulars matters of evidence relating
to how the people intend to prove the elements of
evidence relating to the offense charged or how the
people intend to prove any item of factual
information included in the bill of particulars.
o When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite,
the remedy of the accused is a motion for a bill of
particulars. It is to supply vague facts or allegations in the
complaint or information to enable the accused to properly
plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid
Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime
charged, albeit under vague terms.
In Virata v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that it is
the function or purpose of a bill of particulars to
define, clarify, particularize, and limit or
circumscribe the issues in the case, to expedite the
trial, and assist the Court. It is to prevent injustice
or do justice in the case when that cannot be
accomplished without the aid of such a bill.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a Court should
take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order
the government to file a bill of particulars
elaborating on the charges. Doubt should be
resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full
meaning to the accuseds Constitutionally
guaranteed rights.

Sec. 10. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of

prosecution
Upon motion of the accused showing good cause and with notice to the parties, the court,
in order to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration, may order the prosecution to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing of any written statement given by the
complainant and other witnesses in any investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution
or other investigating officers, as well as any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects or tangible things not otherwise privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the case and which are in the possession or
under the control of the prosecution, police, or other law investigating agencies.
Lejano v. People
- The rights of the accused to have compulsory process to secure the production of evidence
on their behalf is enshrined in Art. III S14 of the Constitution as the accuse has the right,
in all criminal prosecutors, to have compulsory process to secure the production of
evidence in his behalf. This is echoed in Sec. 10 of Rule 116.
o Section 10, Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, in fact further mandates:
SEC. 10. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of
prosecution. Upon motion of the accused showing good cause and with
notice to the parties, the court, in order to prevent surprise, suppression,
or alteration, may order the prosecution to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing of any written statement given
by the complainant and other witnesses in any investigation of the offense
conducted by the prosecution or other investigating officers, as well as any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects, or tangible things not otherwise privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the case and which are
in possession or under the control of the prosecution, police, or other law
investigating agencies.
- Thus, the accused's right of access to evidence requires the correlative duty of the
prosecution to produce and permit the inspection of the evidence, and not to suppress or
alter it. The accused's right to access to evidence necessitates in the correlative duty of the
prosecution to produce and permit the inspection of the evidence, and not to suppress or
alter it. When the prosecution is called upon not to suppress or alter evidence in its
possession that may benefit the accused, it is also necessarily obliged to preserve the said
evidence. To hold otherwise would be to render illusory the existence of such right.
- The advent of DNA technology prompted this Court's promulgation of the New Rules
for DNA Evidence. 19 As DNA evidence provides objective proof of identification and
may be obtained from evidence left in the scene of the crime or in the victim's person, it
also gives new meaning to the above duty of the prosecution. The prosecution did not fare
well when measured against this standard.
- The RTC denied the defenses motion to submit the semen specimen to DNA Analysis
since more than 6 years had elapsed and there was no assurance that semen specimen
remained uncontaminated. Moreover, Webb was not able to show that the proper
procedure for extraction & preservation of semen sample had been complied with. Finally,
RTC said that the DNA test would only lead to a confusion of witnesses.
o However, as correctly held by (CA) Justice Lucenito Tagle in his Dissenting
Opinion, the trial judge's objections to the DNA testing were based on mere
conjectures that ran against the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty.
o Meanwhile, the idea that a negative DNA test result would not have necessarily
exculpated Webb, because previous sexual congress by Carmela with another man
prior to the crime could not be discounted, would unrealistically raise the bar of
evidence and for the wrong party, i.e., for the part of the defense, instead of for
the prosecution. If a negative DNA test result could not be considered as providing
certainty that Webb did not commit the crime, would it not have at least cast a
reasonable doubt that he committed it?
- Moreover, the argument against the relevance of the semen sample that the presence
of semen was not necessary to prove that rape was committed is not in point. What the
defense was after when it sought DNA testing was neither to prove nor to disprove the
commission of rape, but to pinpoint the identity of the assailant.
 - While it is a laudable objective to inquire into the state of mind of the prosecution and
punish it when it has committed prosecutorial misconduct, there are times when,
undoubtedly, whether through malice or plain ineptitude, its act or omission results in plain
injustice to the accused.
- In our various decisions relating to interlocutory orders and incidents pertaining to this
case, this court's adherence to instrumentalism has led to our finding in each instance that
there was no due process violation committed against petitioner, because bad faith was
not shown by the prosecution or the trial judge.
- However, since "the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our
democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who appear before or are
brought to the bar of justice are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side," the
measure of whether the accused herein has been deprived of due process of law should
not be limited to the state of mind of the prosecution, but should include fundamental
principles of fair play. Hence, as we write finis to this case, it is time we evaluate the total
picture that the prosecution's acts or omissions have wrought upon the accused's rights
with each seemingly innocuous stroke, whatever its intention may have been.
- The various violations of the accused's rights have resulted in his failure to secure a just
trial. As such, the judgment of conviction cannot stand.

Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment

Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following
cases:
a. The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effective renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to
plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
b. There exists a prejudicial question; and
c. A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office.

ABS-CBN v. Gozon
- The trial court granted respondents' Motion to Suspend Proceedings and deferred
respondents Dela Pea-Reyes and Manalastas' arraignment for 60 days in view of the
Petition for Review filed before the Department of Justice. Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the suspension of the accused's arraignment in certain
circumstances only:
o SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition
which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order
his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such
purpose;
There exists a prejudicial question; and
A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either
the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that
the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office. (12a) (Emphasis supplied)
 o In Samson v. Daway: While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the . . . provision limits the deferment of the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period,
the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.
- The Supreme Court held that the suspension of the arraignment should always be within
the limits allowed by law.
o The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Pea-Reyes and
Manalastas' arraignment after the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for
Review before the Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It was only on
September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was issued by the Court
of Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during
the interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. As Judge Mogul
reasoned in denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed with the
arraignment "disregards the requirements of due process [and] erodes the Court's
independence and integrity."

Aguinaldo v. Ventus
- If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for reinvestigation of the
resolution of the public prosecutor, the court may suspend the proceedings upon motion
by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct
the public prosecutor to submit the resolution disposing of the motion on or before the
period fixed by the court, which in no instance could be more than the period fixed by the
court counted from the granting of the motion to suspend arraignment, otherwise the
court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
- If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may suspend the
proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment
of the accused and direct the DOJ to submit the resolution disposing of the petition on or
before the period fixed by the Rules which, in no instance, could be more than sixty (60)
days from the filing of the Petition for Review before the DOJ, otherwise, the court will
proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.

Rule 117. Motion to Quash

- The nine grounds are only grounds to quash the Information.

Sec. 1. Time to move to quash

At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or
information.

Sec. 2. Form and Contents

The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed by the accused or his counsel and shall
distinctly specify its factual and legal grounds. The court shall consider no ground other than those
stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Sec. 3. Grounds
The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:
 a. That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b. That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
c. That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
d. That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
e. That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
f. That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
g. That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
h. That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
i. That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.

Tolentino v. Paqueo, Jr.

- In the petitioners Memorandum, they alleged that Tolentino was duly authorized to file
the Information. The respondent judge quashed the Information based on Sec. 3d, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in relation to the third paragraph of Sec.
4, Rule 112.
- An examination of the functions of the Regional State Prosecutor showed that they do no
include that of approving the Information filed or dismissed by the investigating
prosecutor. Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers
authorized to approve the filing or dismissal of the Information of the investigating
prosecutor, the Information filed by the petitioner did not comply with the requirement
of Sec. 4, Rule 112. Consequently, the noncompliance was a ground to quash the
Information under Sec. 3d, Rule 117.
- Petitioners contend that the accused must move to quash at any time before entering his
plea, and thus, the trial court is barred from granting further time to the accused to dos;
and that there is no evidence in support of the motion to quash.
o BUT, the Court finds that there is substantial compliance by private respondent as
it was satisfactorily explained in his Memorandum that his counsel orally moved
to quash the Information before the arraignment on Aug. 7, 2001. Furthermore,
on the Order of the same date, the respondent judge required the private
respondents counsel to file a Motion to Quash within 5 days from the issuance of
the order. Accordingly, the motion was filed.
o There was no need to submit any evidence as it was apparent and within judicial
notice that State Prosecutor Tolentino was not the City Prosecutor or Provincial
Prosecutor.

People v. Andrade
- The ground relied upon by respondents in their Motion to Dismiss, which is that the
facts alleged in the Information do not constitute an offense, is one of the grounds
provided under a Motion to Quash in Sec. 3a, Rule 117. However, the respondents in the
present case filed their Motion after they have been arraigned. Under ordinary
circumstances, such motion may no longer be allowed because of their failure to raise any
ground of a motion to quash before they plead is deemed a waiver of any of their
objections.
o Sec. 9, Rule 117 provides that the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint, either because he did not file
a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
 waiver of any objects, except those based on the grounds provided for in pars. a,
b, g, and i of Sec. 3.
o However, since the ground asserted by respondents is one of the exceptions
provided under the above provision, the timeliness of the filing is inconsequential.
Thus, the mistake lies in the RTCs dismissal of the case.
- Sec. 2, Rule 116 plainly states that in a Motion to Quash, the court shall not consider any
ground other than those stated in the motion, except for lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged. In the present case, what the respondents claim in their motion to quash
is that the facts alleged in the Informations do not constitute an offense and not lack of
probable cause as ruled by the RTC judge. The RTC judges determination of probable
cause should have been only limited to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and not after the
arraignment.
- Furthermore, considering that the RTC found probable cause, it should have denied the
Motion to Quash and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence and wait for a
Demurrer to Evidence to be filed, or allow the prosecution to amend the information.
o Sec. 4, Rule 117 clearly states that if the ground based upon is that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court
an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.
o If the defect in the Information is curable by amendment, the Motion to Quash
shall be denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to file an Amended
Information. Generally, the fact that the allegations do not constitute an offense,
or that the Information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, are
defects curable by amendment. Thus, the Court should have given the prosecution
an opportunity to amend the Information.

People v. Bayabos
- The Motion to Quash was valid. At any time before entering the plea, an accused may
assail the Information based on the grounds enumerated in Sec. 3, Rule 117, one of which
is the claim that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
o Basic Test: To determine if the facts averred would establish the presence of
essential elements of crime as defined in the law?
o In the present case, the Motion to Quash must be granted as the Information does
not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing.
o As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological
pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that
the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the
organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful
prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing.
- Furthermore, the Court rejected the Special Prosecutors claim that the Sandiganbayan
should have ordered the filing of another information or the correction of the defect by
amendment.
o Sec. 4, Rule 117 provides that if a Motion to Quash is based on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution
a chance to correct the defect by amendment.
o However, the Special Prosecutor insisted that there was no defect in the
Information. Neither has he find a new Information after the Motion was
sustained, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 117.
- Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in the ordering of the quash.
 o However, this does not mean that he is precluded from filing another Information.
Sec. 6, Rule 117 provides that an Order sustaining a Motion to Quash would not
bar another prosecution.
o Unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.

Sec. 4. Amendment of the complaint or information

If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which
can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The
motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

Sec. 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash

If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or
information be filed except as provided in section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused,
if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been
made, no new information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such further
time as the court may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless
he is also in custody for another charge.

Gonzales v. Salvador
- Sec. 4 covers the amendment of an Information. Sec. 5 deals with the filing of a new
Information.
- The amendment of an information under Sec. 4 applies if the trial court finds that there is
a defect in the Information, and the defect can be cured by amendment, in which the court
shall order the prosecution to amend the Information.
o However, under Sec. 5, where the motion to quash is sustained on grounds other
than those stated in Sec. 6, the trail court has the discretion to order the filing of
another Information, within a specific period which is extendible. The order must
be contained in the same order granting the motion to quash. If said order does
not the filing of another information and the order becomes final and executory,
the court may no longer directly the filing of another information.
o It is gathered that petitioner never asserted the propriety of amending the
Information. When the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, he did not assail
the same within the reglementary period. And thus, the order quashing the
Information became final and executory.
o The filing of another information within an extended additional time qualifies only
if the filing of a new Information is pursuant to an order.

Sec. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution;
exception
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3 (g) and (i) of this Rule.

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy

When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged,
or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information
under any of the following instances:
a. the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same
act or omission constituting the former charge;
b. the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only
after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or
c. the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the
prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of
Rule 116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the
judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.

Morillo v. People
- The violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning
that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in
one municipality, while some in another. In such cases ,the court wherein any of the crimes
essential and materials acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case. The
first court that took cognizance of the same excludes the other.
o Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried
in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
o Yalong v. People
In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued,
and delivered in Manila, records reveal that Ylagan presented the same for
deposit and encashment at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she
learned of its dishonor. As such, the MTCC [of Batangas City] correctly
took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as it had territorial
jurisdiction to try and resolve the same.
o The court of the place where the check was deposited or presentment for
encasement can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving BP 22.
- - If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court, or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on
the criminal aspect must be instituted by the OSG in behalf of the state. There have been
instances where the Court permitted the offended party to file an appeal:
o Civil Aspect
o Denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refused
to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the offended party
o Grave error committed by the judge
o Interest of substantial justice requires
- A judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari, showing that the
lower Court committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave
abuse of discretion or a denial of due process.
- If there is a grave abuse of discretion, granting that it would not tantamount to double
jeopardy, in violation of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case as the
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred
from appealing.
 - Since the instant petitioner is under Rule 45, and not under 65, the said case should be
summarily dismissed. However, there are unique and special circumstances in this petition:
o Appellate Courts dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of respondent.
Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused,
or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal
of a criminal case against the accused will not result in his acquittal.
o More importantly, moreover, since the dismissal of the instant case cannot be
considered as an acquittal of respondent herein, he cannot likewise claim that his
constitutional right to protection against double jeopardy will be violated.
An appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal
case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if:
the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of
the defendant;
the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the
evidence or of the merits of the case;
the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal
so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would
have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings,
to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
In the present case, as early as the respondents appeal of the MeTCs
decision to the RTC, respondent had already been moving for the dismissal
of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The dismissal is not an acquittal or based on merits
The question raised is based purely on a question of law.
Thus, the petitioners appeal of the appellate courts dismissal cannot be
barred by double jeopardy.

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal

A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused
and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment
of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

Bonsubre v. Yerro
- The petitioners course of action is anchored on the propriety of the Sept. 18, 2001
Dismissal Order that was grounded on failure to prosecute in consideration of respondents
right to speedy trial. It must be borne in mind that a dismissal grounded on the denial of
the right of the accused to speedy trial has the effect of acquittal that would bar the further
prosecution of the accused for the same offense.
- As such, the Sept. 18, 2001 Dismissal Order grounded on the denial of respondents right
to speedy trial is a final order that is not appealable and is immediately executory.
- If the remedy of certiorari is to be granted, petitioner must prove that trial court committed
not only merely errors of judgment, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
o In this case, no such grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the RTC in
dismissing the case for denial of the respondents right to speedy trial. Aside from
the lapse of two (2) years and nine (9) months from the time the case was dismissed
 to the time petitioner sought for a reconsideration of the same, it is also not
disputed that it was petitioner who caused the inordinate delay. As culled from the
records, it was the private prosecutor who sought for a temporary suspension of
the case during the September 12, 2000 hearing with a manifestation that they
would file the necessary motion relative to the settlement.
- The provisional dismissal of a criminal case, which is a dismissal without prejudice to the
reinstatement thereof, is governed by Sec. 8, Rule 117:
o A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of
offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any
amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been
revived.
- Under the provision, a case is provisionally dismissed if:
o The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves
for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and
the accused move for its provisional dismissal;
o The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
o The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and
o The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of provisional dismissal
of the case
- In the case at bar, none of the foregoing requisites were met. While it may appear that the
respondents consented to a provisional dismissal of the case under the Compromise
Agreement, the prosecution neither presented the same for the courts approval nor filed
the required motion that effect such that no order is fact issued granting the provisional
dismissal.

Co v. New Prosperity
- The issues raised in this petition were also the meat of controversy in the previous petition
before the CA, which was dismissed. Such dismissal became final and executory on March
20, 2006.Even if it was dismissed mainly due to procedural infirmities, the Court stated
that the petition lacked sufficient showing that respondent Court committed any reversible
error in the questioned judgment. Hence, the same constitutes sa res judicator.
- His charge of the violation of his right to speedy trial was baseless. He failed to show any
evidence of v,c,o delay that was attended with malice.
o Factors to balance:
Duration of delay
Reason therefore
Assertion of the right to assert it
Prejudice caused by delay
- He was burdened to establish the essential requisites of Sec. 8, Rule 117:
o The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves
for a provisional dismissal or both the prosecution and the accused moved for a
provisional dismissal
o The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal
o The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally
o The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal.
 - It is apparent in this case, that there was no notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal of the cases, or of the hearing thereon, which was served 3 days before said
hearing.
o It was only in open court that Co moved for provisional dismissal.
o Prior notice must have been given to the offended party.
- There is evident want of jurisprudential support on Cos supposition that the dismissal of
the cases became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 order, and not
after notice to the offended party.
o When the Rule states that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent one
year after the issuance of the order temporarily dismissing the case, it should not
be literally interpreted as such.
o The provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public
prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having
been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the
timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.

Los Baos v. Pedro

- A Motion to Quash is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of the criminal
complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law or
for defect. The Motion, as a rule, admits the truth of the facts spelled out. If a ground does
not appear under Sec. 3, then a Motion to Quash is not a proper remedy.
o Sec. 4 provides of an amendment of the complaint or information, if the motion
to quash relates to a defect curable by amendment.
o Sec. 5 dwells on the effect of sustaining the Motion to Quash the complaint or
information may be re-filed, except for instances mentioned under Sec. 6.
o Sec. 7 defines double jeopardy and complements the ground provided under Sec.
3i and the exception stated in Sec. 6.
- Sec. 3 provides the grounds for quashal of a complaint or information:
o The facts charged do not constitute an offense
o That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged
o That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused
o That the officer who filed the Information had no authority to do so
o That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form
o That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law
o That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished
o That it contains averments, which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification
o That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
- Sec. 8, Rule 117 provides for Provisional Dismissals:
o A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party.
o The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year
after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to
offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived.
 - A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements occur:
o The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves
for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and
the accused move for its provisional dismissal;
o The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
o The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and
o The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal
of the case.
- There are sine quanon requirements in the application of the time-bar ruled stated in the
2nd par. of Sec. 8. The time-bar is a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the
State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right, so that the lapse of
the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.
- While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117, it does not follow
that a Motion to Quash results in a provisional dismissal.
o Provisional Dismissal: temporary in character, dismissals that are without prejudice
to the re-filing of the case, and not the dismissals that are permanent.
o Permanent dismissals: barred by double jeopardy, previous extinction of criminal
liability, rule on speedy trial, dismissals after plea without the express consent of
the accused.
- Quashal and Provisional Dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules refer to
different situations. If the problem relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the
complaint or Information, the remedy is a Motion to Quash. All other reasons for seeking
the dismissal of the complaint or Information before arraignment and under the
circumstances outlined in Sec. 8, fall under Provisional Dismissal.
- In the current case, the grounds he cited in his Motion to Quash have no merit. The Court
found in its examination that the Information duly-charged a specific offense and provides
the details on how the offense was committed.

Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor

The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to
the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege
the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections based on the grounds provided
for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.

Rule 118. Pre-Trial

- Preliminary conference:
- - before a pre-trial is conducted by judge in open court, the AM requires that a preliminary
conference be conducted by the branch clerk:
o To do everything in Rule 118
Marking of evidence
Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence
- If pre
-
- Court Annex Mediation: (mediator)
o Mandatory, it is an integral part of pre-trial.
If you failed to appear before the mediator, the Court can impose sanctions
on you.
o No lawyers can attend
 - Judicial Dispute Resolution: (judge)
o Alternative modes of dispute resolution
o Lawyers can insist on attending

- Arraigned -> Set for Pre-Trial -> Pre-Trial 1. CAM -> 2. JDR (judge is required to do a
pre-judgment of the case) -> Case Reassignment -> 3. Preliminary Conference before the
branch clerk -> 4. Pre-Trial (under Rule 118)
-
- JDR:
o check the Syllabus AM to see the offenses/cases under the JDR
o This is more on the civil aspect of certain criminal cases:
Estafa (under jurisdiction of MTC)
Theft (under jurisdiction of MTC)
Reckless Imprudence
BP 22
o The court cannot compromise the criminal aspect of the case.
-
- Homicide, Murder -> the settlement happens outside of Court. And thus, the case is
dismissed for failure to prosper.
- Pre-Trial is mandatory, non-appearance will constitute sanctions and penalty.
- If accused is not present,
o if he is on bail, the bail will be cancelled
- If you cannot go, you have to send someone to appear on Court.
o File a Motion for Postponement.

Sec. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases

In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, the court shall after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws
or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
a. plea bargaining;
b. stipulation of facts;
c. marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
d. waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
e. modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but
interposes a lawful defense; and
f. such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal
and civil aspects of the case.

Zaldivar v. People
- One of the main reasons was that the proceedings conducted did not comply with the
prescribed procedure in the presentation of witnesses. But, what the trial court judge
should have done was to recall the witnesses and have them identify the exhibits
mentioned in their respective affidavits as provided in Sec. 9, Rule 132.
- The trial Court said that the pretrial order of Feb. 15, 2005 did not contain matters ought
to be the subject matter of a pretrial conference under Sec. 1, Rule 118. But, there is
nothing on record that will show any disregard of the rule.
o Pieces of evidence were marked, objections were raised, issues were identified, no
admissions on factual matters were arrived at, and trial dates were set. There was
due compliance with the Rules relative to the conduct of pretrial.
 o Thus, the trial court cannot simply set aside the proceedings that have been
previously duly conducted, without treading on the rights of both the prosecution
and the defense who did not raise any objection of the pretrial proceedings.
o Pretrial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues between
the parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and
maneuvering. Its chief objective is to simplify, abbreviate, and expedite or dispense
with the trial.

Sec. 2. Pre-trial agreement

All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be
reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against
the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be
approved by the court.

Daan v. Sandiganbayan
- Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process where the accused and the prosecution work
out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.
- Plea bargaining is authorized under Sec. 2, Rule 116. Ordinarily, it is made during the pre-
trial stage of the proceedings. Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 118 require plea bargaining to be
considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference.
o But, it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has
finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court held that it is
material that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was
made only after the prosecution already presented its witnesses.
o As regard to plea bargaining during pre-trial, the trial courts exercise of its
discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and
whimsical exercise of discretion.
o In the present case, Sandiganbayan rejected petitioners plea offer on the ground
that petitioner and prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would
redound to the benefit of the public. Sandiganbayan offered valid reasons, but
subsequent events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that
petitioners plea offer should be accepted.
o Sec. 5, Rule 120 provides when an offense includes or is included in the other:
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of
the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
o An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or information
constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily
included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
part of those constituting the latter.
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are
sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses.

Sec. 3. Non-appearance at pre-trial conference

If the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference
and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper
sanctions or penalties.
Garayblas v. Ong
- Sec. 3, Rule 118 provides for the Non-Appearance of the Counsel lf the Accused or
Prosecutor during Pre-Trial Conference
o If the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial
conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation,
the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
- It is important that the counsel does not appear at the pre-trial conference and that counsel
does not offer an acceptable excuse.
- Considering that Atty. Garaybles felt the symptoms the day before the pre-trial itself, it
would not be reasonable to expect her to have been able to make the necessary
arrangements for another lawyer to attend in her stead.
- Sending a new lawyer who is not knowledgeable would lead to such careless preparation
which the Court abhors.
- However, Atty. Garayblas should have sent word to the Court and to her co-counsel that
she would not be able to attend said pre-trial conference.
- The non-appearance of Atty. De La Cruz was also excusable.
- The Court finds respondents directive for petitioners to pay part of the travel expenses is
warranted. There is nothing on record to show that the proceedings were being held in
Davao mainly because of the cases being handled by petitioners. The cancellation of hate
earring was also because of the other accuseds failure to submit their respective pre-trial
briefs.
- Atty. De La Cruz has presented a valid and acceptable excuse, for which he could not be
found liable under Sec. 3, Rule 118, but Atty. Garayblas showed some lapse in judgment,
not to mention discourteous behavior in not informing the SB 4th Division at the earliest
possible time of her illness and inability to attend said pre-trial conference.

Sec. 4. Pre-trial order

After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the
facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters
not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court
to prevent manifest injustice.

People v. Guzman
- In the Pre-Trial Order, the defense named only 4 witnesses. In the same order, the RTC
stated that all parties are informed that witnesses not mentioned in the pre0trial order shall
not be entertained during the trial on the merits. The other two witnesses failed to appear
and testify in court several times. The defense counsel moved to substitute them explaining
that they were hesitant to testify.
o The RTC was correct in denying the defense counsels Motion for Substitution
since Sec. 4, Rule 118 mandates that matters agreed upon in the pre-trial
conference and as stated in the pre-trial order shall bind the parties.
After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the
actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall
bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the
course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to
prevent manifest injustice
o The pre-trial order clearly shows that the defense need only 4 witnesses. The parties
were also informed that witnesses who were not mentioned in the pre-trial order
shall not be entertained during the trial on the merits.
 Furthermore, the RTC had observed that his motion to substitute
witnesses appears to be a fishing expedition of evidence which is clearly
unfair to the case of the prosecution.

Rule 119. Trial

- Right to speedy trial -> constitutional right, as well
o it is subjected to a balancing test:
o Maintain public order and the constitutional rights of the accused:
o Not a matter of counting days
o 4 Factors:
Duration of the delay
Reason therefor
Assertion of the right or failure to assert it
Prejudice caused by such delay
- If there is a Motion to Dismiss/Quash:
o Movant must establish that there was delay
o Once established, the burden shifts to the prosecution under the Rules that the
delay is justified.

Sec. 1. Time to prepare for trial

After a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to
prepare for trial. The trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre- trial
order.

Mari v. Gonzales
- Petitioners insist that the RTC dismissed the case too hurriedly, despite the provision in
Sec. 10 of RA 8492 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998). This provision is also incorporated in Sec.
3a and 5, Rule 119.
o A careful reading of the said rule would show that only delays that may be excluded
from the time limit within which trial must commence are those resulting from
proceedings concerning the accused. The time involved in a petition for transfer
of venue can only be excluded from said time limit if it was accused who instituted
the same.
o The 30-day time limit set by Sec. 1, Rule 119 has already been breached. The private
prosecutor received the Pre-Trial Order dated Nov. 24, 2008 on Dec. 3, 2008,
while the Provincial Prosecutor received the same on Dec. 2, 2008. Thus, at the
latest, the trial should have commented by Jan. 2, 2009, and if it were a holiday,
then the very next business day.
o Yet, because of the failure of the prosecution to appear on Dec. 12, 2008, the RTC
had to reset the hearing on Jan. 16, 2009, which was already beyond the 30-day
time limit. As observed by the RTC, petitioners showed recalcitrant behavior to
commence presentation of their evidence. They did not even show proper courtesy
to the court.
o Furthermore, the petitioners are mistaken in their notion that mere pendency of
their petition for transfer should interrupt proceedings before the trial court. Such
situation is akin to having a pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts.
In People v. Hernandez, the Court held that delay resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders must be read in harmony with Sec. 7,
 Rule 65, unless a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
o The Trial Court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance delays in the
prosecution of the case.
The private respondent had already been deprived of his liberty on two
occasions:
During the preliminary investigation before the MCTC when he
was incarcerated from Nov. 18, 2004 to March 16, 2005.
When an Information had already been issued and since rape is a
non-bailable offense, he was imprisoned from June 27, 2008 until
the case was dismissed on Jan. 16, 2009.

Sec. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements

Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated.
It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case
for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so
as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180)
days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply
where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.

Tan v. People
- The CA determined that petitioner impliedly agreed that Case No. 119830 would not be
tried until after the termination of Criminal Case No. 119831-119832. Both parties concede
that this issue is factual. It is basic rule that factual issues are beyond the province of the
SC in a petition for review.
- In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the CA on the substantial matters
are adequately supported by the evidence on record.
o An accuseds right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial is guaranteed in
Criminal Cases by Sec. 14, Art. III, of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial
may be denied as one free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its
salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the
anxiety and expense of a court litigation.
o Following the policies under the 1987, RA 8493 was enacted, with Sec. 6 limiting
the trial period to 180 days.
o The Court implemented Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has been
incorporated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 2, Rule 119.
o In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accuseds right to speedy trial is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
Factors to consider:
Duration of the delay
Reason therefor
Assertion of the right or failure to assert it
Prejudice caused by such delay
o From the initial hearing on Feb. 27, 2001 until the time prosecution filed its formal
offer of evidence on Nov. 25, 2003, both prosecution and defense admit that no
evidence was presented for Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of
almost 2y,8m, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for Criminal Case
No. 119830.
 W/N there was vexatious, capricious and oppressive delay?
NO.
Petitioners objection to the prosecutions stand is belied by the
records of the case. No objection was interposed by his defense
counsel when this matter was discussed during the initial
hearing.Thus, his conformity can be deduced from his non-
objection at the preliminary hearing. His acquiescence is evidence
from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial
presentation of the Peoples evidence in the five BW cases on Feb.
27, 2001.
During the same hearing, the People manifested that the parties
agreed to the separate trials of the BW cases.
Although the periods for trial had been stipulated, these periods
are not absolute. Where periods have been set, certain exclusions
are allowed by law.
In the cases involving petitioner, the length, complexity of the
issues, and his failure to invoke said right at the appropriate time
tolled the death knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee.

Spouses Uy v. Adriano
- Sec. 1, Rule 115 provides that the accused is entitled to a speedy, impartial, and public trial.
Sec. 2, Rule 119 provides that trial, once commenced, shall be continuous until terminated.
However, any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the Court motu
proprio or on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court
granted the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends of
justices served, shall be deducted.
o The trial court may grant continuance, taking into account the following factors:
W/N the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would likely
make a continuation of such proceeding imposable or result in a
miscarriage of justice
W/N the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual, and complex, due to
the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution, or that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time
established therein.
o Balancing Test:
The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed apropos
the fourfold factors:
Length of delay
Reason for delay
o Under Sec. 9, Rule 119, the accused have the burden to
prove the factual basis of the motion to quash on the
ground of denial of their right to a speedy trial.
Defendants assertion or non-assertion of his right
Prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.
They are related and must be considered together with other relative
circumstances.

Olbes v. Buemio
- During petitioners arraignment on Feb. 12, 2003, petitioner interposed no objecting to
the setting of the pre-trial to May 28, 2003, which was later declared a non-working day.
 The cancellation of the scheduled pre-trial on that date was beyond the control of the trial
court.
- Petitioners argument that the lapse of 253 days was unjustified is unavailing.
o In Solar Team Entertainment v. Judge How, the Court stressed that the exceptions
consisting of the time exclusions reflect the fundamentally-recognized principle
that speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily involves a degree of flexibility.
The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act do not preclude justifiable
postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation.
- While the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified, the same
appears to have been occasioned by oversight or by simple negligence which does not
prove fatal to the prosecutions case. The faux pas was acknowledged and corrected the
the MeTC recalled the arrest warrant it had issued.
- Applying the balancing test, the Court does not find petitioner to have been unduly and
excessively prejudiced by the delay in the proceeding, especially given that he had posted
bail.

Sec. 3. Exclusions
The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial
must commence:
a. Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused,
including but not limited to the following:
1) Delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of
the accused;
2) Delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against
the accused;
3) Delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;
4) Delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; provided, that the delay does not
exceed thirty (30) days;
5) Delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of
venue of cases or transfer from other courts;
6) Delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a prejudicial question; and
7) Delay reasonably attributable to any period, not exceed thirty (30) days, during
which any proceeding which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually
under advisement.
b. Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent

when his whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due
diligence. He shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but
his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.
c. Any period of delay resulting from the mental incompetence or physical inability of
the accused to stand trial.
d. If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge
is filed against the accused for the same offense, any period of delay from the date the
charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the
subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.
e. A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused
over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or, as to whom the time for trial
has not run and no motion for separate trial has been granted.
f. Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu proprio, or
on motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted
 the continuance on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice
served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused
in a speedy trial.

Sec. 4. Factors for granting continuance.

The following factors, among others, shall be considered by a court in determining whether
to grant a continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule.
a. Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would
likely make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or result in a
miscarriage of justice; and
b. Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex,
due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution, or that it is
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time
established therein.
In addition, no continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule shall be granted because of
congestion of the court's calendar or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available
witnesses on the part of the prosecutor.

Sec. 5. Time limit following an order for new trial.

If the accused is to be tried again pursuant to an order for a new trial, the trial shall
commence within thirty (30) days from notice of the order, provided that if the period becomes
impractical due to unavailability of witnesses and other factors, the court may extend it but not to
exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from notice of said order for a new trial.

Sec. 6. Extended time limit.

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1(g), Rule 116 and the preceding section 1, for
the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity on September 15, 1998, the time
limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one
hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the limit shall be one hundred
twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period, the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.

Sec. 7. Public attorney's duties where accused is imprisoned.

If the public attorney assigned to defend a person charged with a crime knows that the
latter is preventively detained, either because he is charged with a bailable crime but has no means
to post bail, or, is charged with a non-bailable crime, or, is serving a term of imprisonment in any
penal institution, it shall be his duty to do the following:
a. Shall promptly undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial or
cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner
requiring such person to so advise the prisoner of his right to demand trial.
b. Upon receipt of that notice, the custodian of the prisoner shall promptly advise
the prisoner of the charge and of his right to demand trial. If at any time
thereafter the prisoner informs his custodian that he demands such trial, the
latter shall cause notice to that effect to send promptly to the public attorney.
c. Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain
the presence of the prisoner for trial.
d. When the custodian of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a
properly supported request for the availability of the prisoner for purposes of
trial, the prisoner shall be made available accordingly.
Sec. 8. Sanctions.
In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the public attorney, or the prosecutor.
a. Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a necessary witness
would be unavailable for trial;
b. Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit;
c. Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows to be
false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or
d. Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions
hereof, the court may punish such counsel, attorney, or prosecution, as follows:
a. By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of
an accused, a fine not exceeding twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);
b. By imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public attorney, or prosecutor
a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and
c. By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice before the
court trying the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. The
punishment provided for by this section shall be without prejudice to any
appropriate criminal action or other sanction authorized under these rules.

Caballes v. CA
- In case his right to speedy trial was violated, the remedy lies under Rule 119. Sec. 8 provides
for the sanctions if his right to speedy trial was violated by the prosecution.
- If the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion, the more the appropriate remedy
would have been to file a petition for certiorari and/or a petition for mandamus to compel
the trial court to comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rule for trial and
termination of the case.
- The Court agrees that a petition of habeas corpus may be filed if one is deprived of his
right to a speedy disposition of the case and of his right to due process. However, the
petitioner never invoked in the trial court his constitutional right to a speedy disposition
of the case against him.
- What he invoked was his right to a speedy trial under Rule 119. He only invoked his
constitutional right in the CA. Even then, he failed to establish his claim that he was
deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.

Sec. 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit.
If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 1(g), Rule
116 and Section 1, as extended by Section 6 of this rule, the information may be dismissed on
motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right of speedy trial. The accused shall have
the burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with
the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under section 3 of this rule. The dismissal shall be
subject to the rules on double jeopardy.
Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the
right to dismiss under this section.

Sec. 10. Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on speedy trial in the
Constitution.
No provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be interpreted
as a bar to any charge of denial of the right to speedy trial guaranteed by section 14(2), article III,
of the 1987 Constitution.
Sec. 11. Order of trial.
The trial shall proceed in the following order:
a. The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper
case, the civil liability.
b. The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any,
arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.
c. The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-
rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to
present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
d. Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to
submit written memoranda.
e. When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.

People v. Marcial
- The rule relied upon by petitioner clearly reflects this discretionary nature of the procedure:
o Rule 119, Sec. 3e.
When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial MAY be
modified.
o RA 8493, Sec. 7 likewise states that a negative defense shall require the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt while an
affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove
such defense by clear and convincing evidence.
o Accordingly, the RTC correctly exercised its discretion in denying petitioners
request for a reverse order of trial.

Sec. 12. Application for examination of witness for accused before trial.
When the accused has been held to answer for an offense, he may, upon motion with
notice to the other parties, have witnesses conditionally examined in his behalf. The motion shall
state: (a) the name and residence of the witness; (b) the substance of his testimony; and (c) that
the witness is sick or infirm as to afford reasonable ground for believing that he will not be able
to attend the trial, or resides more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial and
has no means to attend the same, or that other similar circumstances exist that would make him
unavailable or prevent him from attending the trial. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit
of the accused and such other evidence as the court may require.

Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan
- Sandiganbayan properly ruled that no necessity existed for the conditional examination of
the 3 proposed witnesses:
o Other witnesses appearing on record are available to testify on the same facts on
which the proposed deponents would testify
o Petitioners failed to show that the video tapes recording the events prior to and
during the shooting incident could not be produced except through the same
deponents.
o Sandiganbayan specified in its Resolution that the reasons for denying the motion
were not disputed by the accused. On the contrary, they expressly confirmed it
when they conceded that for the most part, deponents testimonies are
corroborative in nature.
 o It is also clear that the reason why petitioners filed for the said motion was their
apprehension that Sandiganbayan might not consider their own testimonies to be
credible. It is speculative and cannot be a valid ground for seeking an oral
deposition.

Sec. 13. Examination of defense witness; how made.

If the court is satisfied that the examination of a witness for the accused is necessary, an
order will be made directing that the witness be examined at a specified date, time and place and
that a copy of the order be served on the prosecutor at least three (3) days before the scheduled
examination. The examination shall be taken before a judge, or, if not practicable, a member of
the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order, or if the order be made by a court
of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein. The examination shall
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the prosecutor provided he was duly notified of the
hearing. A written record of the testimony shall be taken.

Sec. 14. Bail to secure appearance of material witness.

When the court is satisfied, upon proof or oath, that a material witness will not testify
when required, it may, upon motion of either party, order the witness to post bail in such sum as
may be deemed proper. Upon refusal to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he
complies or is legally discharged after his testimony has been taken.

Seludo v. Fineza
- In the case at bar, respondent judge based his authority in ordering complainants
incarceration on Sec. 14, Rule 119. However, it does not need a keen intellect hold that the
rule relied upon by the respondent cannot be used as basis for the detention of the
complainant since he is a counsel and not a material witness to a case.
- Sec. 6, Rule 120 is likewise of no help to the respondent. It does not require the presence
of the counsel during the promulgation of a judgment.

Sec. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution.

When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to
appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no
definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the
same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the
examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
behalf of or against the accused.

Go v. People
- The procedure for testimonial examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is
covered under Sec. 15, Rule 119.
- Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other
place than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTCs
orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine
consular official in Laos.
o The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls
within the provision of Sec. 15, Rule 119. However, said Rule substantially
provides that he should be conditional examined before the court where the case
is pending. Thus, nowhere in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside
the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.
 o The application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in criminal cases has
been categorically ruled out by the Court in Vda. de Manguerra:
o It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil
procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect,
it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases.
However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and
squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply
Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
o The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness cannot defeat the rights
of the accused to public trial and confrontation of witnesses.
- The Webb Ruling is not on all fours with the instant case.
o In this case where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining
witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under Sec. 15, Rule 119 cannot
be ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.
o Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the initial trial proceedings. AT that time, his
old age and fragile constitution should have been already apparent, but the
prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or
testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant to Sec. 15, Rule 119. It should have
been imperative for them to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Pings
testimony at that instance, given the fact that he is a non-resident alien who can
leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of return.

Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos

- While it is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the
presence of the judge, it is not absolute. Rules 23-28 provide for the different modes of
discovery that may be resorted to by a party of an action.
o In criminal proceedings, Secs. 12, 13, and 15, Rule 119 allowed the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
o In the present case, is the examination of a prosecution witness who was too sick
to travel and appear before the trial court. And thus, Sec. 15, Rule 119 comes into
play:
o Rule 23 cannot apply as the reason offered by the petitioners to exempt
Concepcion is the very ground which places her within the coverage of Rule 119.
Rule 119 provides that a witness may be conditionally examined if:
witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial OR
Witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.
o Thus, Rule 119 apples to the case. It is required that the conditional examination
before the Court where the case is pending. It is necessary that accused be notified.
And that it must be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial.
o In the present case, the rules were not complied with as the deposition must be
done only before the court where the case is pending.
The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional
examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as
such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.

Sec. 16. Trial of several accused.

When two or more accused are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly
unless the court, in its discretion and upon motion of the prosecutor or any accused, orders
separate trial for one or more accused.
Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness.
When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon
motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused
to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring
the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
a. There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
b. The is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c. The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
d. Said accused does not appear to be the guiltiest; and
e. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If
the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall
be inadmissible in evidence.

Jimenez v. People
- The prosecution has complied with all the requisites under Sec. 17, Rule 119:
o In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following
conditions must be present, namely:
Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an
offense;
The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement
of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
The trial court is satisfied that:
There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in
its material points;
Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
- We see no merit in Jimenezs allegation that there is no absolute necessity for Monteros
testimony.
o Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged
when he/she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete terms, necessity
is not there is not there when the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise,
strengthen the prosecutions evidence.
o Jimenezs contention that Chua v. CA is inapplicable just because more than 2
accused are involved in the present case. The requirement of absolute necessity for
the testimony of a state witness depends on the circumstances of each case
regardless of the number of the participating conspirators.
 o In the present case, not one of the accused-conspirators, except for Montero, was
willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in her
killing. Hence, the CA was correct in ruling.
- That the prosecution could use the voluntary statements of the Montero without his
discharge as a state witness is not an important and relevant consideration. To the
prosecution belongs the control of its case, and the Court cannot dictate on its choice in
the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal requirements have not been
complied with.
o The prosecutions right to prosecute gives it a wide range of discretion - on
whether, what, and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.
o Under Sec. 17, Rule 119, the Court is given the power to discharge a state witness
only after it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.
- Monteros testimony can be substantially corroborated. The corroborated statements of
Montero are far more material than the inconsistencies pointed out by Jimenez.
o Under Sec. 17, Rule 119, the Rules only require that the testimony of the accused
sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its material points, and
not on all points.
- Montero is not the most guilty.
o Most guilty refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation
in the commission of the offense, and does not necessarily mean the severity of
the penalty imposed. What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty
would be set free, while his co-accused who are less guilty would be penalized.
o Principal by inducement is not automatically the most guilty in a conspiracy.
o In Chua v. People, which involved a motion to discharge an accused, the Court
declared that if one induces another to commit a crime, the influence is the
determining cause of the crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not have
been committed; it is the inducer who sets into motion the execution of the
criminal act.
o To place the Chua ruling in proper perspective, the Court considered the principal
by inducement as the most guilty based on the specific acts done by the two
accused and bearing in mind the elements constitutive of the crime of falsification
of private documents where the element of damage arose through the principal
by inducements encashment of the falsified check. This led the Court to declare
that the principal by inducement is the most guilty (or properly, the more guilty)
between the two accused.
o Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a
state witness, what are controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to
the crime committed.

Monge v. People
- Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto transporting and thus, in
possession of processed mahogany lumber without proper authority from the DENR.
Petitioner has never denied this fact. He claims instead that Potencio was the owner.
o The direct and affirmative testimony of Molina and Potencio as a state witness on
the circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes petitioners
liability. Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of
lumber found in his possession nor in his claim that his help was merely solicited
by Potencio to provide the latter assistance in transporting the said lumber.
o It would make no difference whether it was petitioner himself or Potencio who
owned the subject pieces of lumber.
 o Thus, whether the accused offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty
and whether there is objectively an absolute necessity for his testimony are
questions that lie within the domain of the trial court, it being competent to resolve
issues of fact
The discretionary judgment of the trial court with respect to this highly
factual issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts, except in
case of grave abuse of discretion.
An order discharging an accused from the information in order he may
testify for the prosecution has the effect of an acquittal. Once the discharge
is ordered by the trial court, any future development showing that any or
all of the conditions provided in Section 17, Rule 119 have not actually
been fulfilled will not affect the legal consequence of an acquittal.
The only instance where the testimony of a discharged accused may be
disregarded is when he deliberately fails to testify truthfully in court in
accordance with his commitment, as provided for in Sec. 18, Rule 119.

Sec. 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal.

The order indicated in the preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged
accused and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or
refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the
basis for the discharge.

Sec. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense.
When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any
other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears
good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the
proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.

Pacoy v. Cajigal
- The Court held that there was no double jeopardy in this case. There was no order to
dismiss the Information.
- Furthermore, the amendment that was made on the Information was not a substantial
amendment, but rather a formal amendment.
- There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments are exactly the same as those
already alleged in the original Information for Homicide as there was not at all any change
in the act imputed to petitioner.
- The respondent judges Order was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information, but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new Information charging
the proper offense as contemplated under the last paragraph of Sec. 14, Rule 110 and Sec.
19, Rule 119.

Sec. 20. Appointment of acting prosecutor.

When a prosecutor, his assistant or deputy is disqualified to act due to any of the grounds
stated in section 1 of Rule 137 or for any other reasons, the judge or the prosecutor shall
communicate with the Secretary of Justice in order that the latter may appoint an acting prosecutor.
Sec. 21. Exclusion of the public.
The judge may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be
produced during the trial is offensive to decency or public morals. He may also, on motion of the
accused, exclude the public from the trial, except court personnel and the counsel of the parties.

Perez v. Estrada
- Media should not be allowed to televise the court proceeding as it is a violation of the
accuseds right to an impartial trial and corollary the right to due process. Witnesses and
Judges might be pressured which would cause hindrances in their performance during the
proceeding. The accused might be subject to prejudice because of the highly publicized
nature of the proceedings. The accuseds fundamental rights win against the freedom of
the press. When the life and liberty of the accused is at stake the courts must make certain
that the decision has been reached because of a just and dispassionate judgment that would
only come from presentation of credible evidence testified by unbiased and unswayed
witnesses.

Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses.

Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of
similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court.

People v. Sandiganbayan
- The consolidation of criminal cases is a matter of judicial discretion, as provided for in Sec.
22, Rule 119.
o Charges of offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of
offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the Court
- Sec. 2, Rule XII of the SBN Revised Internal Rules also reads:
o Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common
questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to which the case
bearing the lowest docket number is raffled.
- Jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for the consolidation of cases:
o Caos v. Peralta:
Joint trial is permissible x x x where the [actions] arise from the same act,
event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or
substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction
over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one
party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the
parties.
o Querubin v. Palanca:
Where the offenses charged are similar, related or connected, or are of the
same or similar character or class, or involve or arose out of the same or
related or connected acts, occurrences, transactions, series of events, or
chain of circumstances, or are based on acts or transactions constituting
parts of a common scheme or plan, or are of the same pattern and
committed in the same manner, or where there is a common element of
substantial importance in their commission, or where the same, or much
the same, evidence will be competent and admissible or required in their
reproduction of substantially the same testimony will be required on each
trial
- Expediency was the reason for the consolidation of the cases.
 - Joint trial was deemed necessary if it involved a common question of law or if they sought
the same reliefs or involved the same parties and basically the same issues. It is also to
avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions.
o Dacanay v. People
A case in which the separate trial was requested, the resulting
inconvenience and expense on the part of the government could not be
given preference over the right to a speedy trial or over the protection of a
persons life, liberty, or property.
- There was no grave abuse of discretion as consolidation would have unduly exposed herein
private respondent to totally unrelated testimonies, delayed the resolution of the indirect
bribery case, muddled the issues therein, and exposed him to the inconveniences of a
lengthy and complicated legal battle in the plunder case.
- Consolidation has also been rendered inadvisable by supervening eventsin particular,
the testimonies sought to be introduced in the joint trial had already been heard in the
plunder case.

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence.

After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to
be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may
adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the
accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution. (15a)
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its
grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution
rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5)
days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to
evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

Macapagal-Arroyo v. People
- As a general rule, the special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such
an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides, the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
judgment.
o Exception: In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we
are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case as the ends of
justice may require. So, it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent
a substantial wrong or to do substantial (citing Ong v. People [G.R. No. 140904,
October 9, 2000]).
- The remedy of certiorari may be availed by the petitioner of the denial of the demurrer
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

People v. Sandiganbayan
- Sec. 23, Rule 119 provides for Demurrer to Evidence:
 o After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution
an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused with prior leave of
court.
- A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action to the effect that
the evidence which is adversary produced is insufficient in point of law to make out a case
or sustain the issue. The party filing the demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the
prosecutions evidence. And the Courts task is to ascertain if there is competent or
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case to sustain the indictment or support a
verdict of guilt.
- In criminal cases, the grant of demurrer amounts to an acquittal and the dismissal order
may not be appealed as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
- It may reviewed through certiorari under Rule 65, but the trial court must be shown to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as
where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial
was a sham and thus, rendering the assailed judgment void.
- The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused
its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.

Sec. 24. Reopening.

At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or
upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
The proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order grating it.

Re: Complaint Against Ofelia Pinto

- She had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion filed by the accused-movant to reopen the
said case as the CAs decision, which affirmed the accused-movants conviction, had
become final and executory. Judge Pintos conduct was contrary to the clear language of
Sec. 24, Rule 119, which provides that the reopening of a criminal case may only be availed
of at any time before finality of the judgment of conviction.
- In other words, a motion to reopen a criminal case is not the proper procedural recourse
when there is already a final judgment of conviction. This rule is consistent with the
doctrine of finality of judgment.
o The doctrine of finality of judgment, which is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice, dictates that at the risk of
occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final and executory at
some definite date set by law.
- Judge Pinto should have respected the final decision of a higher court, instead of replacing
it with her now decision. A judge cannot amend a final decision, more so where the
decision was promulgated by an appellate court.

Cabarles v. Maceda
- Sec. 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for
reopening a case:
o The reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction.
o The order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion
o The order is issued only after a hearing is conducted
o The Order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice
o The presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated
within 30 days from the issuance of the order.
 - Generally after the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed
to offer rebutting evidence only. However, the Court may allow new evidence upon their
original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court.
o A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both
parties had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is
rendered, and even after promulgation but before finality of judgment.
- However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case, Sec. 24 requires that a hearing
must first be conducted.
o Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order without notice and hearing and
without giving the prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their
position on the matter. The issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a
hearing, is contrary to the express language of Sec. 24, Rule 119.
o The cross-examination of Pedrosa does not amount to a waiver of Cabarles
objection. To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal.

Rule 120. Judgment

- Minute resolution - does not violate Rule 120, Sec. 1
- Memorandum decisions - portions of the memoranda/memorandum of the party,
incorporated by such reference. Before, the Court allowed that.
- The CA is still a reviewer of facts.
- The dispositive portion of a decision is the executory portion of a decision. In the body,
the Judge may discuss the rights, but if the dispositive portion fails to place that, then it
cannot be executed.
- RA 8315:
o Substitute names of victims of rape and other similar offenses that will expose
them to humiliation, substitute them with fictitious names or initials.
o Protocol also in all cases involving minors, victims and accused alike. Not only
names, but also places of residence or other information that will give reader an
idea on the identity of the minor.

Sec. 1. Judgment definition and form.

Judgment is the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged and the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must
be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him
and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based.

Tan v. Ramirez
- For purposes of Rule 120, Sec. 1, the Court held that RTC did not conform to the
requirements of the 1987 Constitution and the Rules of Court. Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the
1987 Constitution and Sec. 1, Rule 120 provides that a decision, judgment, or final order
determining the merits of the case shall state, clearly and distinctly, the facts and the law
on which it was based. Administrative Circular No. 1 of Jan. 28, 1988 reiterates this
requirement and stresses that judges should make complete findings of facts in their
decisions, scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of evidence presented,
and avoid the tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts
from which such conclusions are deduced.
- The RTC Decision did not distinctly and clearly set forth nor substantiate the factual and
legal bases for its affirmance of the MCTC decision. It contained no analysis of the
evidence of the parties no reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions. Judges
must inform the parties to a case of the legal basis for their decision, so that if a party
appeals, it can point out to the appellate court the points of law to which it disagrees.
Sec. 2. Contents of the judgment.
If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and
(4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the
accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate civil action has been reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Bacolod v. People
- In this case, however, the Court needs to correct the penalty the RTC imposed on the
petitioner. The indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor in its medium period,
as minimum to 16 years of RT was legally erroneous.
o The information specifically alleged that the house was burned by the accused was
an inhabited dwelling. PD 1613 provides that the penalty to be imposed if the
property burned is an inhabited house or dwelling is from RT to RP. Not being
composed of 3 periods, such penalty should be divided into 3 equal portions of
time and each portion forms one period of the penalty.
But since RP is indivisible, it becomes the maximum period, leaving RT to
be divided into two in order to fix the medium and minimum periods.
- Furthermore, another substantial detail left out by the RTC and by the CA pertained to
the civil liability to be assed against the petitioner in favor of the Spouses Cogtas as owners
of the burned house. Having pronounced the petitioner guilty of committing arson, a crime
against property, the RTC and CA were bound to have then adjudged him civilly liable to
compensate the Spouses Cogtas for their substantial economic damage and prejudice as
the owners of the house. The RTC briefly discussed the economic loss, but surprisingly
omitted any award from the decretal portion. The unfair omission must be rectified.
o In the records was testimony given by Architect Gabriel F. Abear to the effect that
the Spouses Cogtas would need to spend P869,590.00 to restore their burned
dwelling to its condition before the crime. In the absence of a showing that such
amount had been actually expended in a manner capable of substantiation by any
document or receipt, Abears valuation remained a mere estimate, and could not
be the measure of an award for actual damages.
- It is stressed both RTC and CA disregarded their express mandated under Sec. 2, Rule 120
to have the judgment, if it was of conviction state:
o the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the
accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its
commission;
o the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice,
or accessory after the fact;
o the penalty imposed upon the accused; and
o the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of
the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.
- Their disregard compels the Court to act as we now do lest the Court be unreasonable
seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the
 correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court,
as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any
time a matter of law and justice.
- We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the
parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts.

Garces v. Hernandez, Jr.

- Rule 120, Sec.2 provides:
o In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
o In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist.
- A trial court is to state whether the prosecution absolutely failed to prove his guilt or merely
failed to prove his guilt, and shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.
- From the position of the decision of the trial court, the Court finds that the acts or
omissions from which the civil liability of respondents might arise did not exist.

Zafra v. People
- However, there is a need to correct the penalties imposed on the petitioner. He was
convicted of 18 counts of malversation. Pursuant to Art. 48 of the RPC, the penalty for
each count of complex crime is that prescribed on the more serious offense to be imposed
on its maximum period. Falsification is penalized with prision mayor, while malversation is
from prision correccional to RT to RP.
o To determine the maximum periods of the penalties, we must be guided by the
rules provided under Art. 217, and Art. 65 of the RPC.
The penalties prescribed under Art. 217 should be divided into 3 periods,
with the maximum period sign the penalty properly imposable, except in
any instance where the penalty for falsification would be greater than that
of malversation.
o Under Sec. 1 of the ISL, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender
consisting of a maximum termed a minimum term.
o Reclusion perpetua, RT, RP, Prision Mayor.
- One more omission by the CA and the RTC concerned a matter of law. This refers to their
failure to decree in favor of the Government the return of the amounts criminal
misappropriated bytes accused. Even if he was sentenced to a fine, it is not the same thing
as finding him civilly liable for restitution, which the RTC and CA should have included
in the judgment. Furthermore, the amounts to be returned shall earn interest of 6% per
annum.

Sec. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses.

When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are
charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the
findings of fact and law in each offense.

People v. Lindo
- Two offenses were charged -> Rape under Art. 266-A, par. 1 and Rape as an Act of Sexual
Assault, under Art. 266-A, par. 2.
 o Accused was charged with having carnal knowledge of AAA who was below 12 at
that time.
o And for committing an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or objects not the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
o The two instances of rape were proven.
- Two offenses were charged, a violation of Sec. 13, Rule 110 that only one offense or crime
can be charged in one single Information.
- But, Sec. 3, Rule 120 also states that:
o When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but
the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of
as many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense,
setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense.
o As accused-appellant fail to file a Motion to Quash the Information, he can be
convicted of two counts of rape.

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.

When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and
that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or
of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

Ricalde v. People
- Rape under the second paragraph of Art. 266-A is known as instrument or object rape,
gender free rape, or homosexual rape.
o The trial court found that XXXs straightforward, unequivocal and convincing
testimony sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an act of sexual assault
by inserting his penis into XXXs anal orifice. There was no showing of ill motive
on the part of XXX to falsely accuse petitioner. The Court of Appeals accorded
great weight to the trial courts findings and affirmed petitioners conviction.
o Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 5, of Rule 120 provides for the variance doctrine.
o In Sumingwa, the accused was charged with qualified rape, but was convicted for
the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness since there was no penetration nor
attempt to insert his penis to the victims vagina.
o In the instant case, there was no variance between what was charged and what was
proven during trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all
elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault.
The slightest penetration into ones sexual organ distinguishes an act of
lasciviousness from the crime of rape.
Even the tongue, but only if it is inserted into the vagina.
For a man, it can be the anal orifice. The degree of penetration is not
important. The gravamen is the violation of the victims dignity.

People v. Pareja
- Pareja was charged and convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault. Thus, rape could
be committed in two ways:
o sexual intercourse
o instrument or object rape
- Under 266-A, par.2, rape by sexual assault is inserting penis into anothers mouth or anal
office or any instrument or eject into the genital or anal office of another person.
 o AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, on Dec. 2003, inserted his penis
into her anus. However, since the charge in the Information was rape through
carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault, even
though it was proven during trial.
o This is due to the material differences and substantial distinctions between the two
modes of rape.
Thus, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-
versa.
o Consequently, to convict him of rape by sexual assault when what was charged
with was rape through carnal knowledge will violate his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him. Thus, he may
be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under the variance
doctrine embodied in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 5, Rule 120.
o Thus, even though the crime charged against Pareja was for rape through carnal
knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without
violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime
of rape.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.

An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

Asistio v. People
- The test to determine whether an offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included i
the other is provided under Sec. 5, Rule 120.
o An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included
in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter.
o The first offense for which petitioner was acquitted does not necessarily include
and is not necessarily included in the second offense. The Information for
Falsification alleged that petitioner falsified such report in relation to the sales
profits of the Coke Products, in violation of Art. 172. The Information for
violation of Sec. 46 of RA 6938 that being such officer and director of the
cooperative, petitioner willfully acquired personal interest or equity adverse to it,
in violation of her duty and of the confidence reposed upon her.
o There is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes
of falsification and of violation of Sec. 46 of RA 6938. As neither of the said crimes
can be said to necessarily include or is necessarily included in the other, the third
requisite for double jeopardy to attach a second jeopardy is for the same offense
as the first is absent.

Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment.

The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge
of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is
absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
 If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place
of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court
promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the
bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only
be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision.
If the accused tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him
shall be served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket
and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the
court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence
was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days
from notice.

Salvador v. Chua
- As the Sec. 6, Rule 120 expressly states, the promulgation of the judgment may be done in
absentia. He is allowed a period of 15 days from notice of judgement within which to
appeal, otherwise the decision becomes final. The accused who fail to appear loses the
remedies available:
o Filing of a motion for new trial or for reconsideration (Rule 121)
o An appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).
o However, the Rules of Court permits him to regain his standing within 15 days if
he surrenders AND his filing of a motion for leave to court to avail himself of the
remedies, stating the reason for his absence.
Under Sec. 6, Rule 120, the personal presence of the petitioner at the
promulgation was mandatory because the offense he was found guilty was
not a light felony or offense. He was charged with and actually found guilty
of estafa. The promulgation was on March 30, and he had until April 14 to
meet the mandatory requirements of Sec.6. He filed a Motion for Leave to
file a Notice of Appeal, and attached a medical certificate issued by Dr.
Paulo David, but he did not establish that his absence has a justifiable cause
as Dr. David impugned the credibility of the certificate.
Even assuming he had suffered hypertension, he did not fulfill the
other requirement which is to surrender himself to the trial court.

Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan
- Sec. 6, Rule 120 provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the said judgment.
o Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may
be pronounced in the presence of the counsel for the accused or the latters
representative, the accused is required to be present at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment. Notice of the schedule of promulgation shall be made
to the accused personally or through the bondsman or warden and counsel.
 o The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of the accused
despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their
last known address or through counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the
accused if the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without
justifiable cause.
o If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable
cause, the accused shall lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against
the judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled
date of promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible
remedies against the judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present
themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the
remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration
- Sec. 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away substantive rights; it merely
provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.
o It bears stressing that the provision on which petitioners base their claim states
that [a] petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed
within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment.
In Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, we enunciated that the term
may denotes a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. Those
granted this opportunity may choose to exercise it or not. If they do, they
must comply with the conditions attached thereto.
o Aside from the condition that a motion for reconsideration must be filed within
15 days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment, the movant must also
comply with the conditions laid down in the Rules of Court, which applies to all
cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan.
o Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of
the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of
the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of
promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail
themselves of the remedies against the judgment.
- It is incumbent upon the accused to show justifiable cause for their absence at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
o It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court also provides the
remedy by which the accused who were absent during the promulgation may
reverse the forfeiture of the remedies available to them against the judgment of
conviction.
o In order to regain their standing in court, the accused must do as follows:
surrender and
file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, stating the reasons
for their absence, within 15 days from the date of the promulgation of
judgment.
o Clearly, the convicted accused are the ones who should show that their reason for
being absent at the promulgation of judgment was justifiable.
o Thus, unless they surrender and prove their justifiable reason to the satisfaction of
the court, their absence is presumed to be unjustified.
Petitioners did not surrender within 15 days from the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction. Neither did they ask for leave of court to avail
themselves of the remedies, and state the reasons for their absence. Even
if we were to assume that the failure of Jaylo to appear at the promulgation
 was due to failure to receive notice thereof, it is not a justifiable reason. He
should have filed a notice of change of address before the Sandiganbayan.

Sec. 7. Modification of judgment.

A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside
before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed,
a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing
his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.

Villareal v. People
- The finality of a CA decision will not the bar the State from seeking the annulment of the
judgment via a Rule 65 petition.
o Rule 120 speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for
probation.
Sec. 7: Modification of judgment
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal,
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served,
or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or
has applied for probation.
o Coupled with Sec. 7, Rule 117 and Sec. 1, Rule 122, it can be culled from the
provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case,
even if the relief being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein.
However, the finality of judgment in Sec. 7, Rule 120 does not confer blanket
invincibility on criminal judgments.
o A petition for certiorari is filed, its crux being whether the court acted in excess of
its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, there is no modification of
judgment.
o Thus, the Court find that the interpretation of Sec. 7, Rule 120 must be that it is
inapplicable and irrelevant where the courts jurisdiction is being assailed through
a Rule 65 petition.
o The orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 have no legal effect as they were
issued without jurisdiction. The trial court that convicted them of homicide was
Branch 121, and not 130. Thus, they committed a fatal error when they file their
probation applications with Branch 130 and not 121.

Sec. 8. Entry of judgment.

After a judgment has become final, it shall be entered in accordance with Rule 36.

Sec. 9. Existing provisions governing suspension of sentence, probation and

parole not affected by this Rule.
Nothing in this Rule shall affect any existing provisions in the laws governing suspension
of sentence, probation or parole.

Rule 121. New Trial or Reconsideration

 - Berry ruling:
o Evidence was discovered after trial
o Such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence
o It is material; not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching
o Evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.

Sec. 1. New trial or reconsideration.

At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of
the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or
reconsideration.

Tadeja v. People
- Sec. 1 of Rule 121 provides that a new trial may only be granted by the court on motion
of the accused, or motu proprio, with the consent of the accused at any time before a
judgment of conviction becomes final.
o In this case, petitioners judgment of conviction already became final and executory
on July 26, 2008. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the trial court for the
conduct of a new trial may no longer be entertained.
o Newly-discovered evidence refers to:
what is discovered after trial
could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence (most important)
is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching
is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.
o The confession of Plaridel does not meet the requisite. IT was only after he and
petitioners had been convicted that he absconded. The contention that his
confession could not have been obtained during trial does not hold water.
o People v. Licayan does not apply as the motion there was granted pro has vice, which
refer to rulings rendered for this one particular occasion. Thus, this cannot be
relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases.

Custodio v. Sandiganbayan
- Under the Rules, a person convicted of a crime may avail of the remedy of new trial before
the judgment of conviction becomes final.
- Courts are generally reluctant in granting motions for new trial on the ground of newly-
discovered evidence as it is presumed that the moving party had ample opportunity to
prepare his case carefully. Such motions are treated with great caution due to the danger
of perjury and the manifest injustice. Thus, the moving part is required to rebut a
presumption that the judgment is correct and that there has been a lack of due diligence,
and to establish other facts essential to warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence.
o It must be shown then: (Berry rule)
The evidence was discovered after trial
That such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
It is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching
Evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if
admitted.
o Threshold question: whether the preferred evidence s newly-discovered evidence
which could not have been discovered by due diligence.
 Temporal one - when it was discovered
Predictive one? - when it could have been discovered
Requirement of due diligence has relevance.
What is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable
diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial,
but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
o Due diligence: time component and good faith component.
o The evidence presented (report) used the same physical and testimonial evidence,
but made their own analysis and interpretation of said evidence. These materials
were available during the trial and there was nothing that prevented the petitioners
from using them at the time to support their theory that it was not the military, but
Galman who killed Sen. Aquino. Petitioners fails to present any new forensic
evidence.
o The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the
defense during the trial of the double murder case, which is not allowed by the
Rules.
o A new trial will only be allowed if the new evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted. A new trial will not be granted if the
new evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching.
-

Section 2. Grounds for a new trial.

The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
a. The errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused have been committed during the trial;
b. The new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could
not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and
which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

Payumo v. Sandiganbayan
- On the propriety of the grant by the Special Fifth Division of the motion for new trial, the
Court finds the same to be devoid of any legal and factual basis.
o Rule 121, Sec. 2 enumerates the grounds for a new trial:
The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused have been committed during trial;
That new and material evidence has been discovered which the
accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment
o During the conduct of a new trial, the testimonies of the prosecution and defense
witnesses were retaken except the prosecution witnesses, Teofilo and Edgar. The
prosecution instead filed a Motion to Admit Former Testimonies of Prosecution
Witnesses. The defense filed no opposition thereto. Thus, the First Division issued
a resolution allowing the adoption of said witnesses testimonies.
Assuming arguendo that the First Division erred in admitting the
testimonies of the Payumos given during the first trial, it still would not
justify a new trial.
An erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the trial court is not a
ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if there are other
 independent evidence to sustain the decision, or if the rejected evidence, if
it had been admitted, would not have changed the decision.
Neither would the presentation in the evidence of the records of the JAGO
warrant a new trial. The records of the JAGO do not meet the criteria for
newly-discovered evidence that would merit a new trial.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may
be granted only if the following requisites are met:
o The evidence was discovered after trial
o Said evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence
o It is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching
o That the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would
probably change the judgment.
It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence
in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial, but
nonetheless failed to secure it.
In this case, such records could have been easily obtained by the
accused and could have been presented during the trial with the
exercise of reasonable diligence.
o The non-presentation of the JAGO records speaks of
negligence.

Dinglasan, Jr. v. CA
- Rule 121, Sec. 2 provides the new grounds for a new trial.
o The requisites for newly-discovered evidence under Sec. 2 are: (Berry rule)
the evidence was discovered after the trial;
such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
with reasonable diligence; and
that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and
is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.
o The threshold question is whether the proffered evidence is in fact a newly
discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence.
o Dinglasan insists that the transmittal letter was discovered recently, but the records
show, otherwise. The appellate court already considered that transmittal letter in
the rendering of its decision. The claim that the alleged evidence sought was
recently discovered is a falsity.

Sec. 3. Ground for reconsideration.

The court shall grant reconsideration on the ground of errors of law or fact in the judgment,
which requires no further proceedings.

Sec. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor.

The motion for a new trial or reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds
on which it is based. If based on a newly-discovered evidence, the motion must be supported by
affidavits of witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given or by duly authenticated
copies of documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence. Notice of the motion for
new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.
Flores v. People
- Sec. 4, Rule 121 provides that:
o The motion for a new trial or reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the
grounds on which it is based. x x x. Notice of the motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.
- Basic in the rule that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant, except those
motions which the court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party.
The notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date
of the hearing, with proof of service. Failure to comply renders the motion defective.
- In this case, Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing,
and thus, his motion was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect. And thus, it was
correctly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan.

Sec. 5. Hearing on motion.

Where a motion for a new trial calls for resolution of any question of fact, the court may
hear evidence thereon by affidavits or otherwise.

Sec. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration.

The effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration are the following:
a. When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities
committed during the trial, all proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall
be set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the
introduction of additional evidence.
b. When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the
evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other
evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall
be taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record.
c. In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original
judgment shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered
accordingly.

People v. Licayan
- The pro hac vice resolution of this Court allows this Court an unusual, though not
unprecedent, task to revisit its own final and executory Decision. A new trial based on
newly discovered evidence may be granted by the Court on motion of the accused, or motu
proprio with the consent of the accused at any time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final.
o The affidavits of Mabansag and Delos Reyes cannot be considered newly-
discovered evidence in that the affiants are the movants co-accused who were
already identified as such during the trial.
o Even after 2 years after the pro hac vice resolution was approved, both the RTC
and CA were still unmoved with the new evidence presented for the accused-
appellants.
o To put things into perspective, the pro hac vice Resolution expressly grants the
effects of Rule 121, Sec. 6b.
In general, the new evidence adduced in the second trial consists in
allegations that 1) the identification of Licayan and Lara by Co and
Manaysay were unreliable, 2) testimonies and affidavits of the recently-
apprehended Mabansag and Delos Reyes ; and 3) testimonies purporting
to establish that Lara was at work in Antipolo during the kidnapping
incident.