SPECIAL ARTICLE
Land Acquisition and Beyond
The Farmers’ Perspective
Dhanmanjiri Sathe
Farmers have a complex relationship with their land:
losing it means losing an entire way of life. A survey of
the original inhabitants of Maan, a village near Pune
where land was acquired for an information technology
park and industrial estates, found that the process of
acquisition was both attractive and scary for the farmers
involved. Almost 70% of the respondents were willing to
sell their land under different conditions. They were
bitter about the escalation of land values after
acquisition. What farmers want is a share in the future
appreciation of land.
Research assistance by Atul Kotagal and funding from the Centre for
Social Sciences and Humanities, Savitribai Phule Pune University, are
gratefully acknowledged.
Dhanmanjiri Sathe (dhan.sathe@gmail.com) teaches at the Savitribai
Phule Pune University.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13
L
and acquisition, arguably a major issue in India’s political
economy, needs to be examined from all angles. In this
paper, we study the process of land acquisition in Maan
village, around 20 km from Pune. Almost half the land in this
village was acquired between 2000 and 2006. In 2006, follow-
ing a protest movement, acquisition came to a standstill. We
discuss how much land was acquired, how many families lost
how much land, the compensation paid, the willingness or
otherwise of the farmers to sell the land, and how the compen-
sation money was used. Then we review the protest movement
in Maan and the reasons behind it.
Farmers have a layered and complex relationship with their
land. Not surprisingly then, acquisition of land is an important
event in a farmer’s life and in the history of a village. More
often than not, it means either partial or complete annihilation of
the village—the village simply ceases to exist as land acquisition
proceeds. Hence, the term commonly used for land acquisition
by the villagers is “loss of land.” Losing one’s land implies losing
an entire way of life. No wonder there is a tone of wretchedness
when the term is used. Strictly speaking, this phrase can be
used only when absolutely no compensation has been paid.
However, a no-compensation situation has become rare in India,
making the phrase “loss of land” a bit of a misnomer. Nonethe-
less, we will stick to this terminology and use the phrase as the
villagers use it.
We study this village that is about to disappear because its
journey into extinction may be a revealing one. Further, there
could be policy implications for the manner in which land
could be acquired and compensation paid—from the viewpoint
of the villagers themselves.
The story of Maan begins with the establishment of an infor-
mation technology (IT) park in the adjacent village of Hinjewadi,
2.9 km away from Maan. Infosys was the first occupant of the
Hinjewadi IT park and has its second largest facility worldwide
there. The land (100 acres of gairan or grazing grounds) was
acquired in 2000, after the Mumbai–Pune Expressway was
built, and the project was called the Rajiv Gandhi Infotech
(RGIT) Park Phase I (Sathe 2014). This development took place
under the Maharashtra government’s special economic zone
(SEZ) policy, passed in 2001. The SEZ policy was a part of larger
changes in perception at the central and state levels. The Indian
government had started to favour the policy of promoting such
zones. “In 2000 the government replaced the old EPZ [Export
Processing Zone] regime by a new scheme of Special Economic
Zones (SEZs) with several lucrative incentives/benefits that
59
SPECIAL ARTICLE
were not available in the earlier scheme” (Agarwal 2006: 4533).
The purpose was to give a big push to exports, employment
and investment in the SEZs. The development of a village was
never an objective of the SEZ policy.
In Maharashtra all land for the purpose of industrialisation
is acquired by one government body, namely, the Maharashtra
Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC). This is different
from some other states such as Uttar Pradesh that have more
than one government agency acquiring land. MIDC officials in-
formed us that the process of land acquisition is not affected
by the final use of land: there is no difference between acquisi-
tion of land for an SEZ or an industrial park, for instance.
The distance between Hinjewadi and Maan being small, as
RGIT Park Phase I was completed, more phases were announced
following demand from investors, say MIDC officials. Thus,
RGIT Park Phases II, III and IV reached Maan one after the
other. RGIT Phase I in Hinjewadi was an SEZ. Phase II was not
an SEZ, and Phase III is again an SEZ. Phase IV is expected to
be an SEZ but acquisition has not proceeded in this phase.
Phase I has companies like Infosys, Tata Consultancy Services
(TCS) and Tech Mahindra; Phase II is dedicated to manu-
facturing industrial products such as automobiles, chemicals
and pharmaceuticals. Phase III is mainly focused on IT
companies and housing.
In 2015, Maan had one five-star hotel, and 15 middle- and
lower-level hotels. Two big residential complexes have come
up in Maan called Megapolis and Le Royale. Megapolis is
sprawled over 150 acres, with a Pawar Public School (owned
by Supriya Sule, politician Sharad Pawar’s daughter), a hospi-
tal and other amenities, built by two major local builders
(Bhosale Builders and Kumar Builders).
The land acquired in Maan was physically contiguous to the
land acquired in Hinjewadi. There was no other criterion for
acquisition. As a result, the families were randomly affected
by land acquisition: there was no purposiveness in their selec-
tion and they may or may not have economic or social charac-
teristics in common. There was no other design, either on the
part of MIDC that acquired the land, or the villagers themselves.
Further, landownership in Maan showed some typical features
of landholdings in India. First, a single plot was found to have
many owners. Second, a farming family had land not in just one
place in the village but spread over various parts of the village.
This phenomenon is known as “division–subdivision” and
“fragmentation” of land. This pattern of landownership had
important implications as acquisition proceeded.
The acquisition in Maan occurred under the Maharashtra
Industrial Development (MID) Act 1961, passed in 1962.
Data from Sample Survey
To answer the questions that we have raised above, we con-
ducted a survey of all original inhabitants of Maan—about
805 families. However, 27 families refused to respond1 and, so
our sample size became 778 families, which had 4,081 people.
The survey was conducted from June 2013 to August 2013 by
teams consisting of one male and one female investigator,
both with rural backgrounds, to decrease respondent bias. The
60
interviews were held in the privacy of the respondents’ homes.
Our purpose was to get quantitative as well as qualitative data.
We also used the personal interview method. A large number
of visits to Maan threw up several observations. The author
made around 50 to 55 trips to Maan from 2011 to 2015. We
interacted with the local inhabitants, the sarpanchs (past and
present) and various officials at the gram panchayat, including
the gram sevak or village development officer.
Findings on Land Acquisition
According to the gram panchayat website (www.grampan-
chayatmaan.org), the total area of Maan is 5,200 acres, of
which the MIDC area constitutes around 30%. The villagers say
that almost 50% of the land has been acquired, which means
that the remaining 20% of land has been acquired by private
entities (builders, industrial units, retail food outlets, shop-
keepers). However, some senior knowledgeable people from
the village say that around 2,981 acres (57%) have been ac-
quired by the MIDC and private entities. The sale to private en-
tities has been occurring even after the protest movement of
2006 (explained below). It is somewhat difficult to get an ac-
curate estimate of land that is not with the villagers as the
gram panchayat data are not updated and different people
have different estimates. As a rough estimate, we can say that
around half the land is not with the villagers.
Focusing on our sample, we can see from Table 1(A) (p 61)
that around 11.6% of the families lost all their land, while 34%
lost some part of their landholdings. Hence, almost half the fami-
lies (46%) have lost all or some part of their land. However,
34% still have some land. This is because of the pattern of
landownership in any village in India, where most families
have portions of land scattered over various locations in a vil-
lage. Table 1(B) (p 61) shows that for our sample as a whole,
land lost was equal to 1,850 acres. This is 61% of what the villag-
ers themselves say they have lost, and more than what MIDC
has acquired. There is some discrepancy here and in the above
paragraph with respect to the total land sold, but we presume
that this is inevitable because people remember and recall dif-
ferently and sometimes they also deliberately avoid providing
accurate information.
Most of the families in our sample (around 88%) sold their
land to MIDC (Table 1C, p 61). The remaining sold it to private
companies or private builders. This is how it happened: when
the land to be acquired under RGIT Phases II and III was declared,
some builders approached the owners of the land which was
contiguous to these phases. The owners of these plots decided
to sell their land to these private entities. Further, the average
land lost per family turned out to be 5.16 acres.
The compensation paid by MIDC was `6,40,000 per acre and
this matches farmers’ responses (Table 1D, p 61). For an addi-
tional payment, a house of 200 sq ft was also available to those
who had lost their home. The average price paid by the private
entities was somewhat higher at `7,40,000 per acre than that
paid by MIDC (but there was no option of buying a house in this
deal). Discussions with the villagers revealed that the “real” price
of an acre of land was around `8,000– `10,000 in 1999. In view
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 SPECIAL ARTICLE

of this, the price paid by MIDC can be called very handsome— is clear from Table 2(B) that almost 90% were pressurised by
more than six times the market price (not deflated due to stamp MIDC or the government—the gram sevak or others.
duty or other considerations). This is actually higher than Next, we tried to find out how they were pressurised. We
the four times the market rate stipulated under the Right to tried to look into the pressurising “techniques” that the MIDC/
Fair Compensation and Transparency in the Land Acquisi- government used. We asked, “How were you pressurised?” We
tion, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (LARR) Act, Govern- also tried to probe with questions such as “How exactly was it
ment of India, 2013. done? What channels were used to pressurise you?” and there
However, 41 families got no compensation at the time of the were multiple answers to each of the questions.
survey. This happened because either their ownership papers There are several ways in which the land losers recount the
were not in order or some families refused to take the stipu- same phenomenon. Many villagers said they were not asked,
lated amount and approached the court for enhanced settle- but notices were sent to them. These notices stated that this
ment (as the MID Act allows). Not surprisingly, most of the land has been earmarked for an SEZ, and villagers will have to
respondents knew that the amount paid by MIDC was less than sell their land. Then some villagers said that the 7/12 utara
the amount paid by private entities. However, it needs to be (land record) was stamped without them knowing about it. A
pointed out that the value of land increased only after MIDC section responded that “one day our land was measured and
acquired the land and started developing the infrastructure within a few days cheques were sent to us; we did not even
on it. Further, we can note from Table 1(F) that around 63% of know what was happening.” Another response was that
the land was dry, which reflects the fact that agriculture was “everyone was selling land, so we thought that we should also
quite poor in this village. However, the acquisition of dry land sell or later on we could lose.” The first part of the statement
happened more by chance than by design as the only criterion implies that we have to be with the group. The second part of this
used in acquisition of this land was its proximity to RGIT statement is more important because it shows the fear that if
Phase I. left alone they would suffer even more. There is herd behaviour
here. “We did not have any idea what was happening,” was
Were the Landholders Intimidated into Selling Their Land? another common response. Finally, some people were prom-
Now we turn to issues related to loss of land. We find from ised jobs and this was what made them agree to sell the land.
Table 2(A) that almost 90% say they sold their land unwillingly. It However, there is another side to this narrative. In our per-
Table 1: Loss of Land and the Compensation sonal discussions with the land losers we
(A) Effect of Land Acquisition (B) Quantity of Land Sold (in acres) found that a large number of them felt that
Lost/Sold All Lost/Sold a Own Some Never Owned Not Given Total Average Land Total Land
Part/Parts Now and Any Sold Per Family Sold land acquisition would bring “development” to
Never Sold the village. Since most had some contact with
91 267 306 112 2 778 5.16 1,850 Pune, they felt that the village would become
(11.69) (34.31) (39.33) (14.39) (0.25) (100)
like Pune. Therefore, the allure of “moving
(C) Sold Land to Whom (D) Average Compensation Received for
Land Per Acre (`)
ahead” was also present. The assurance of jobs
Govt/ Midc Private Entity Any Other Don’t Know Total MIDC Private Entity made the proposition attractive.
317 35 5 1 358 6,67,480 7,40,000 Interestingly but not surprisingly, almost 50%
(88.50) (9.8) (1.4) (0.3) (100) did not feel they were being cheated of good
(E) Whether Compensation Paid by Govt-MIDC Is Less (F) Category of Land Sold compensation at that time (Table 2C). Equally
than Private Entity
Yes No Don’t Know Total Dry Wet Fallow Total unsurprisingly, more than 80% now feel (at the
301 41 `16 358 242 136 6 384 time of the survey) that they were cheated of a
(84.1) (11.45) (4.45) (100) (63) (35.4) (1.6) (100) good compensation (Table 2D). From Table 2(E)
Figures in brackets indicate percentages. we can perceive that around 77% did not fully
grasp the meaning of loss of land at the time.
Table 2: Responses to Acquisition of Land
(A) Did You Sell the Land on Your Own? (B) Who Presurrised You to Sell Land? In some ways, we could sense—and many
Yes, Sold on No, Not Given Total Govt MIDC Not Given/ Total reported explicitly—that they did not know
My Own Pressurised Not Applicable
what was happening at the time, and what
due to Govt Rules
36 321 1 358 161 158 39 358
would happen in the future. Since they were
(10.1) (89.6) (0.3) (100) (44.97) (44.13) (10.9) (100) encountering this kind of phenomenon for the
(C) Households That Felt Cheated of Good (D) Households That Feel Cheated of Good
first time and they were not aware of anything
Compensation at That Time Compensation Now like it elsewhere, there was a kind of non-
Yes No Not Given Total Yes No Not Given Total comprehension of the process and its implica-
181 176 1 358 297 59 2 358
tions. Over the years, as the author has been
(50.56) (49.16) (0.28) (100) (82.96) (16.48) (0.56) (100)
visiting the village since 2011, one can discern
(E) Households That Comprehended Full Meaning of Land Loss Then
that the understanding of the phenomenon
Yes No Not Given Total
80 276 2 358
has substantially improved in Maan (and pos-
(22.35) (77.09) (0.56) (100) sibly across India). This can be considered a
Figures in brackets indicate percentages. significant achievement of various protest
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 61
SPECIAL ARTICLE

movements across India, the role of non-governmental organi- daughters, sisters and sons, with 54 families spending under
sations (NGOs), and media coverage of these issues. this head. Next came family expenses and family consump-
As news of the acquisition spread in the village, the atmos- tion, with 27 families spending on this. Around nine families
phere changed. There was apprehension, hope and fear about had to spend on account of illnesses in the family. Nineteen
what was to happen. Everyone started saying, “We are going families spent on a vehicle (four-wheeler, two-wheeler or rick-
to lose our land.” shaw). One person responded that he bought vehicles for his
Quite disturbingly, very few of the landowners felt they daughters. Vehicles can be used for consumption purposes or
could do anything about it. This implies a one-way relationship for productive purposes. Five respondents said they had spent
between citizens and the government, with the former accept- a certain amount of the money they received on the education
ing whatever the government decrees. At that stage, there was of sons and daughters.
no idea that farmers could reject acquisition. The impression Interestingly, 37 families had used some money to buy land
we got was that the situation was one of fait accompli. in nearby villages. Nine families had used the money to
This perception was not entirely wrong. Legally, they did improve the land they were holding in other parts of Maan,
not have the right to refuse the land acquisition, but they and this took the form of buying a tractor, installing a pipeline,
could, under the MID Act, approach the court (as 41 families sinking a bore well, and so on. Two families had started busi-
did) for higher compensation. Most did not even think going nesses (it was not clear what kind of business had been start-
to court was an option. They had little experience of these ed), while one person had started an eatery. Two families had
matters at the time. This became clear as we talked to the land bought a tanker each and an excavator and these were being
losers. On the other hand, it is also true that they were happy used for construction activities going on in the village. Two
with the compensation package then and so there was no need families had started brick kilns. Ten families reported that
to go to court. they had built rooms with the compensation money received
On the whole, it was a tricky situation that elicited ambivalent and were getting rents on those rooms. However, this may be
responses. The land acquisition was attractive and scary at the an underestimate, as there were many instances when we felt
same time. Attractive because the compensation offered was that the families were not willing to talk about room renting
perceived to be “satisfactory” then, and modern jobs were (while their neighbours were giving information). Seventeen
promised, and scary because the future was unknown and families had repaid their loans, while only four families said
land which is very crucial for various reasons, was being lost. they had invested the money in a bank. Eleven families said
From Table 3 we can further discern the views of respondents they had lost money in court cases and two said they were
about the future sale of land. We see that around the same duped by local leaders or agents. Only one person admitted
percentage (41% to 44%) agree and disagree with the 2006 that he had lost money gambling. In the village, we were told
gram sabha resolution about not selling the land. Interestingly, repeatedly that compensation money has been squandered in
69% say they are willing to sell land under better conditions. gambling, drinking and dance bars, but this was explicitly ac-
This is a clinching argument in favour of what has happened cepted, not surprisingly, in only one case in the formal survey.
in Maan since the acquisition. However, what did not emerge in the formal survey was re-
Table 3: Views on Future Sale of Land
vealed in many personal interactions, and in
(A) Agree with Gram Sabha Resolution That No More (B) Will Sell Land under Better Conditions many cases such squandering of resources
Land Should Be Sold caused great personal suffering and anguish,
Yes No Can’t Say Not Given Total Yes No Na Not Given Total
especially to women.
320 347 104 7 778 538 49 186 5 778
We also note at this stage that the use of
(41.13) (44.60) (13.37) (0.90) (100) (69.15) (6.30) (23.91) (0.64) (100)
Figures in brackets indicate percentages. money by willing sellers of land was the same
as non-willing sellers.
How Was the Money Used? Personal interactions gave us the impression that the bigger
On the whole, 358 families lost all or part of their land. Of farmers had probably benefitted more than smaller ones. This,
these, 41 (11%) have still not received either partial or full of course, stands to reason as they owned more land, had more
compensation. This is mainly because the ownership of the social capital, and could use the compensation money to increase
land is disputed, or they have approached the courts for better their future income streams. Their consumption needs, such
compensation. We have analysed the manner in which the as for housing, weddings or healthcare, were possibly already
compensation amount was used. First, we find that it was used taken care of and so they could invest in economic activities.
in different ways, so we cannot arrive at a percentage distri-
bution with respect to end-use of the money. As expected, Protest Movement and Later
there were consumption and production demands on the money In 2005 alone, official data suggest that China had over 60,000 local dis-
received. Of the consumption activities, the highest share was turbances, often provoked by attempts to put agri-land into industrial or
residential use. (Banerjee et al 2007: 1487)
taken up by 189 respondents, who had used the money for
building a house. This underlines the dire need for housing Since then the Chinese government has not published any
schemes for the rural poor such as the Indira Awaas Yojana. The data. This reveals that land acquisition is a contested issue not
second largest use of money was for the wedding expenses of only in India but also in China.
62 april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Protest movements against land acquisition have spread
across India, though we do not have any numerical estimates
of such movements. Almost all political parties, when they
have been in opposition, have tried to make an issue of land
acquisition. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi, even when his
party was in power at the centre, tried to agitate against land
acquisition at locations such as Niyamgiri and Bhatta Parsaul.
Some interesting studies in this area are Jenkins et al (2014)
where they have put forth results from 11 states, Nilsen (2010),
Ray (2008), Kumar (2011), and Mohanty (2007).
We have earlier discussed some aspects of the protest move-
ment of Maan in detail (Sathe 2014). In that article, we have
put forth the genesis of the movement, strategies used by the
agitators, and the fallout of the protests on the villagers. Due
to the protest movement, land acquisition was stopped in 2006
and RGIT Phase IV has not commenced since then.
In Maan, we have seen that landowners were initially
not completely against land acquisition, but as Phase III was
completed, there was a lot of disgruntlement over the compen-
sation package and lack of jobs. This happened over a period
of time. The monetary compensation that seemed high for
Phase II started to look very meagre later. As mentioned earlier,
the price of one acre of land was `8,000– `10,000 in 1999 and
the compensation was more than `6 lakh. However, MIDC was
selling land to industry at even higher rates. Further, there
were hardly any jobs available in Table 4: Households That Got a
return for land (Table 4). There- Job in Return for Land
fore, the farmers agitated in 2006, Yes No Not Given Total
5 351 2 358
and since then acquisition for (1.4) (98.04) (0.56) (100)
Phase IV of RGIT has been stalled. Figures in brackets indicate
We have argued that the story of percentages.
Maan has unfolded in three phases (Sathe 2014: 77). In the first
phase, we find that the farmers were not particularly unwill-
ing to sell land. In the second phase, farmers protested and
were unwilling to sell their land. In the third phase, farmers
wanted to sell the land but asked for much “better” compensa-
tion packages. They also spoke of wanting to develop the land
on their own. This is a new development, wherein landowners
say they will build rooms, apartments or warehouses on their
own and give them on rent. This is true not only of Maan;
there are many other cases where such a trajectory is apparent
(for example, Bhatta Parsaul in Uttar Pradesh and Khed–
Shivapur in Maharashtra).
When we discussed this issue with officials at MIDC, we got
some interesting responses. The junior officers said that MIDC
would go ahead and acquire land for RGIT Phase IV, but senior
officials felt that the issue had been politicised and so MIDC
may prefer not to acquire the land. In any case, Maan is
expected to be joining the Pune Municipal Corporation soon,
and then the rest of the remaining land would become non-
agricultural and all kinds of industrial units and housing can
come up on it.
In our personal interactions with the villagers, one could
sense their strong antagonistic sentiments. The villagers said
that MIDC is more an agent for the builders than an intermedi-
ary. They felt betrayed by the government and added that the
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13
SPECIAL ARTICLE
“government is a cheat, they say one thing and do another. At
that stage, we could not imagine what would happen to us and
to the village. Now we know better. They buy in acres from us
and sell in square feet. We have become bekar [a term that
literally means unemployed but also signifies ‘of no worth’]
from all sides—no land, no jobs, no satisfactory work.”
The villagers also felt that “there is too much money in the
village. Relationships have weakened. Unemployment is high
even amongst the educated” (the money comes out of rents
that the families earn from the rooms they have built for mi-
grant labour, an issue not covered here).
The acquisition of land for Phase IV was stalled after agita-
tions in 2006. This has meant a lot of trouble for the farmers.
Since the land has been stamped with the 7/12 utara, banks
and credit societies refuse to advance any loan against it. So,
farmers have to take loans from private moneylenders, who
charge extremely high interest rates. If farmers are unable to
repay the loan, the land can fall into the hands of the money-
lender. Further, as the land has been earmarked for an SEZ, the
farmers have lost the right to dig wells or to build makeshift
structures on their land. In frustration, some also said, “Take
the stamps from the 7/12 utara and put it on us, then you [the
government] will be happy.”
If 7/12 is not stamped, the price of land increases. Some
people have reportedly got the stamps removed by paying
bribes of roughly `6 lakh. Stamps can be removed as the land
has not been acquired for two years after notification, but the
government does not want to do it. Technically, after two years, if
the land is not acquired, it reverts to the owner. The current
market price of land varies between `2 crore and `3 crore per
acre, while the government rate is `88 lakh (Biswas 2013 and
personal interviews).
When examining compensation issues, Banerjee et al (2007)
suggest that we look at the size and form of compensation,
eligibility for compensation, and the credibility of the process.
Applying these parameters to the acquisition in Maan, we
find that the size and form of compensation was probably
acceptable to the people of Maan at the time. Eligibility for
compensation was limited, as only landowners were paid the
amount. The worst performance was probably in the area of
credibility. There was no engagement with communities even
in the beginning. Engagement decreased further in the later
stages, and there was a complete breakdown in communica-
tion by 2006.
On 16 October 2013, the then Union Agriculture Minister
and Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) President Sharad Pawar
visited Maan to inaugurate the new gram panchayat office and
the new building of the zilla parishad school which had been
developed by IT major Infosys (Times of India 2013). In his
speech to the villagers, he said that the village had lost favour
with the state government because of the agitation of 2006
and refusal to give land. However, since the land has been
stamped, the farmers are also stuck as they cannot get loans or
do anything with the land. He suggested a way out of this
limbo: he would help the farmers get back control over their
land, but the farmers had to promise not to sell their land to
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builders. He said that Maan should be developed along the
lines of Magarpatta and Nanded city. However, it is not at all
clear why the land should not be sold to builders, in principle.
Most villagers expected that the government would do
“something” for them before the general elections of April–
May 2014 and the assembly election of October 2014. However,
no relief was given to the landowners. As the situation stood in
2015, the landholdings earmarked for Phase IV have their 7/12
utara stamped—which means that the land is going to be
acquired. On the ground though, the land has not been acquired.
Consequently, the farmers who own these lands cannot mort-
gage them to get loans from banks. The farmers face hardships
on this account. The value of the remaining land has risen
sharply. Very high amounts are being offered for these lands,
but the gram sabha has passed a resolution that no more land
is going to be sold. Nevertheless, we found that some owners
were selling their land for as much as `3 crore per acre in
October 2014 (this land is not developed by MIDC; farmers are
selling to private entities).
In the case of Maan, none of the political parties in the state
took any interest or supported the agitations. They have been
silent on this issue. This can happen due to certain constraints,
as Mody (2014) has explained quite perceptively in the case of
Karnataka. She argues that the local leaders may want to sup-
port the agitators for some political mileage. However, if the
state-level politicians have decided to go ahead with the project,
local leaders will not defy them (Mody 2014: 213). This could
be the reason for lack of support to the agitation in Maan.
What the farmers want is a share in the future appreciation
of land. This can be achieved if a certain percentage of the
“developed” land is given back to the farmers. On this developed
land, they want to have a house of their own; and they can start
any economic activity like a shop, eatery, or just build rooms
and rent them out. This ensures them a continuous source of
income which is inflation adjusted. In such a scenario, they do
not become redundant and also have some work to do.
Conclusions
From our discussions with the farmers, we learnt that before
the land was acquired, agricultural activity was of an inferior
quality as the village was rain-fed. Despite this, land means a
great deal to the farmer (Sathe 2011).
We find from our fieldwork and survey that farmers were
somewhat apprehensive about the acquisition of land. Since
they did not know what the scenario would be after acquisi-
tion, they had to be coerced into selling land. However, we
also find that compensation was perceived to be adequate at
the time of initial acquisition. Also, farmers sold their land
with certain expectations (of jobs in the companies, for in-
stance). These expectations were not fulfilled.
As acquisition proceeded, the farmers began to feel that
they had been cheated of a “fair” compensation. This was
mainly because they did not have any share in the apprecia-
tion of the value of the land. At the time of the survey, farmers
were willing to sell land under better compensation packages.
Farmers have also come up with alternatives like wanting to
develop the land on their own.
As already stated, the situation has been such as to elicit
ambivalent responses from the farmers. They have been at-
tracted by the prices offered and also scared. There is anger
and discomfort at what happened to land prices after land ac-
quisition. Much of their negativity stems from that. Hence, the
andolan in 2006 and the continuing deadlock.
It is not that farmers do not want to sell land at all. As we
have argued elsewhere, farmers want to partake of the bene-
fits of industrialisation and urbanisation (Sathe 2011). In fact,
farmers from industrially-advanced regions like Maharashtra
or Haryana are quite keen to shift to a non-agricultural way of
life. We also found that almost 70% of the respondents are
willing to sell their land under different conditions. This is a
clinching argument in favour of land acquisition. Thus, the
manner in which land is acquired, and the compensation
package, is what is important.
One important policy conclusion that emerges from this
study is that a share in the future appreciation of land should
be made available to the farmer. This can be done by giving
a certain percentage of developed land back to the farmer.
The MIDC officers opined that this may not be practical. If
farmers were to be given back 15%, and if around 30%–35%
is required for infrastructure development (like roads and
public amenities), then only 45%–50% would be available for
industrial development. If this assumption is correct, the sug-
gestion given is ethically right and would buy peace in the
long run.

Note
1 The reasons for not responding were varied.
Most of the respondents said they were fed up
of answering questions. Some were angry with
the process of land acquisition as they felt they
had got a raw deal.
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