Ardet ante oculos opulentissimum regnum ...

Venetian Reports about the Ottoman Conquest

of the Bosnian Kingdom, A.D. 1463*
Emir O. Filipovit (Sarajevo)

The events which unfolded during the months of May and June of 1463,
culminating with the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia and the decapitation of
the last Bosnian King Stjepan Tomasevic, left a deep impression on contem-
poraries. The magnitude of this occasion even persuaded some of them to
write more or less detailed accounts expressing their views of the whole sit-
uation. These documents provide us with plenty of diverse interpretations to
examine and consequently, if we do lament the lack of sources for other ar-
eas and periods of medieval Bosnian history, the case for the demise and
collapse of the Bosnian Kingdom is very much different in that regard. 1 The
available narrative accounts, diplomatic correspondence and brief records in
chronicles which describe the fall of Bosnia can easily be categorised on the
basis of their Ottoman, Byzantine or Western origin.2 However, despite the

I would like to express my gratitude to prof. dr. Dubravko Lovrenovic and doc. dr.
Edin Radusic for reading draft versions of this paper and for their valuable and con-
structive comments. I would also like to thank colleague Dejan Zadro for all his help
and support.
1 At present there is no detailed critical study completely devoted to the Ottoman
conquest of Bosnia in 1463, even though many articles and book chapters have
dealt with the matter at length. Cf. S. CIRKOVIC, Istorija srednjovekovne bosanske
driave. Beograd 1964, 307-341; M. SUNJIC, Osvrt na ocjene uzroka propasti sred-
njovjekovne bosanske driave. Radovi Hrvatskog drustva za znanost i umjetnost 2
(1994) 25-33; IDEM, Unistenje srednjovjekovne bosanske driave, in: Bosna i Herce-
govina od najstarijih vremena do kraja Drugog svjetskog rata. Sarajevo 1998, 83-
96; S. M. D2A.iA, Ideoloski i politoloski aspekti propasti bosanskoga kraljevstva 1463.
godine, in: Konfesionalnost i nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine - Predemancipacijs-
ko razdoblje 1463-1804. Mostar 1999, 251-257; D. LOVRENOVIC, Na klizistu povijesti
- Sveta kruna ugarska i Sveta kruna bosanska 1387-1463. Zagreb-Sarajevo 2006,
341-360.
2 The Hungarian diplomatic correspondence and the reports of the Roman Curia are
discussed by D2A.iA, Ideoloski i politoloski aspekti 251-257. Ragusan sources have
been treated on a number of occasions, cf. F. RAtKl, Dubrovacki spomenici 0 od-
nosaju dubrovacke obcine naprama Bosni i Turskoj godine razspa bosanske
kraljevine. Starine JAZU 6 (1874) 1-18; C. TRUHElKA, Dubrovacke vijesti 0 godini
1463. Glasnik Zema/jskog muzeja XXII (1910) 1-24; D. KOVAtEvlC, Pad bosanske
srednjovjekovne driave po dubrovackim izvorima. Godisnjak Drustva istorilara
Bosne i Hercegovine 14 (1963) 205-220. A brief overview of the Byzantine accounts
can be found in I. GOlDSTEIN, Bizantski izvori 0 osmanskom osvajanju Bosne 1463.
136 Emir O. Filipovic

amount of materials at our disposal we must still be extremely cautious and

critical whilst dealing with these sources. Many of them have been created
outside of Bosnia, often very far from the site where the original incidents
occurred. Some of them only convey rumours which circulated at the time,
while other descriptions offer a distorted and wrong picture of the events.
Among the Western sources Venetian reports stand out as most objec-
tive and reliable, although not the most detailed or comprehensive. They
merely describe the military operations and do not try to explain the back-
ground or causes for the conquest, nor the quick fall of Bosnia. Even though
these reports constitute second hand information, they can still be consid-
ered trustworthy because Venice operated as a focus point where almost all
the Circulating knowledge could be gathered and combined for the benefit
of the Signoria. The importance of the Venetian reports also lies in the fact
that they offer a fascinating insight into the difficult position of the Bosnian
Kingdom, trapped between the Ottoman hammer and the Hungarian anvi!/
but that they also portray a clear representation of the Ottoman danger
th
which faced Europe in the 15 century.
The significance of the Venetian diplomatic correspondence substantially
increases if we take into consideration the fact that no such reports or let-
ters about the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia can be found in the rich collec-
tions of the State Archives of Dubrovnik (Ragusa). This institution holds the
greatest number of important documents for the study of various aspects of
medieval Bosnian history and reports of this kind were supposed to be kept
in the collection Lettere e Commissioni di Levante, which contains the politi-
cal and diplomatic communications and instructions for Ragusan envoys re-
siding with the various governments in the Balkans and neighbouring lands.4
Other information from Dubrovnik about the plight of Bosnia in 1463 is
scarce and omits some of the more crucial details, failing to mention the
capture, detainment or the death of the Bosnian King, for instance.
Apart from the evident quality of the descriptions they supply us with,
the Venetian reports also present a reflection of the good relations which

godine, in: Zbornik radova 0 fra Andelu Zvizdovicu. Fojnica-Sarajevo 2000, 229-
237. The Ottoman sources, of which ~Ikpa~azade and Tursun Beg are the most
prominent and thorough, tend to place a special emphasis on justifying the military
actions of the Sultan. R. KREUTEL (ed.), Vom Hirtenzelt zur hohen Pforte. FrOhzeit
und Aufstieg des Osmanenreiches nach der Chronik "OenkwOrdigkeiten und Zeit-
laufe des Hauses Osman" vom Oerwisch Ahmed, genannt A~ik-Pa~a-Sohn. Graz-
Wien-Koln 1959, 231-235; TURSUN BEG, The History of Mehmed the Conqueror
(trans. H. INAlCIK - R. MURPHEV). Minneapolis 1978, 50-53; G. ElEZOVlt, Turski izvori
za istoriju Jugoslovena. Ova turska hronicara iz 15. veka. Brastvo XXVI/41 (1932)
32-34,63-70.
3 LOVRENOVlt, Na klizistu povijesti 213.
4 KOVAtEVlt, Pad bosanske srednjovjekovne drzave 208.
 Ardet ante ocu/os opu/entissimum regnum 137

existed between the Signoria and the Bosnian royal court. Diplomatic inter-
actions between these two countries began in 1326, after the territorial ex-
pansion of the Bosnian state in the first half of the 14th century, and its sub-
sequent arrival on the Adriatic coast. Through dynamic military campaigns
and conquests, the ruler of Bosnia, Ban Stjepan 11 Kotromanic, extended his
rule to the coastal area between the rivers of Cetina and Neretva, thus be-
coming a neighbour to Venice. 5 The political and diplomatic ties were soon
followed by economic and cultural exchange. 6 The intense commercial trade,
along with credit and currency circulation, had a reflection on material cul-
ture as well, through import of decorative and utility objects: cloth, glass
vessels, pottery, jewellery and weapons. 7 Using poor relations between the
Bosnian Kingdom and Ragusa at the time, in 1404 the Venetians managed to
obtain an official royal charter with many benefits from King Ostoja. 8 A new
phase of relations, which brought Venice even closer to Bosnia, started
when the Republic of St. Mark took Spalato and secured its rule over the
coastal towns of Dalmatia. 9 The Senate wrote to the King Stjepan Ostojic on
h
the t of April 1421 declaring that semper sua serenitas inveniet nostrum
dominium dispositum venire ad illam ligam et unionem que sit utilis et bona
pro sua serenitate et nostro dominio. 1o These good relations were a prereq-
uisite for the same charter issued by King Ostoja to be repeated during the
reign of King Tvrtko 11 in 1422 and later again by King Tomas in 1444.11 The
Adriatic Balkan hinterland steadily became a Venetian sphere of interest be-
cause of its many rich mineral resources and precious metals, especially sil-

5 For a general view of the relations between Bosnia and Venice, cf. M. ~UNJlt, Prilozi
za istoriju bosansko-venecijanskih odnosa 1420-1463. Historijski zbornik XIV (1961)
119-145; B. HRABAK, Venecija i Bosanska drzava. /straiivanja 12 (1989) 407-505; M.
~UNJlt, Venezia e gli ultimi re della Bosnia (1420.-1463.). Radovi Hrvatskog drustva
za znanost i umjetnost 3 (1995) 45-54. The most thoroughly researched and ex-
haustive study on this subject is M. ~UNJlt, Bosna i Venecija (odnosi u XIV. i XV. st.).
Sarajevo 1996. Unfortunately, the plans for the Italian translation of this book have
never realised.
6 Cf. D. KOVAi:EVlt-KoJlt, Ekonomske veze i kulturni uticaji izmedu bosanske drzave i
talijanskih gradova u XIV i XV vijeku. Godisnjak Drustva historicara Bosne i Hercego-
vine 35 (1984) 35-44.
7 Cf. V. BIKlt, Venetian Influences in the Eastern Adriatic Hinterland, in: The Heritage
of the Serenissima - The Presentation of the Architectural and Archeological Re-
mains of the Venetian Republic. Koper 2006, 201-211.
8 ~. UUBlt, Listine 0 odnosajih izmedju Juinoga Slavenstva i Mletacke republike, Vol.
V. Zagreb 1875, 39-41 (= UUBlt, Listine).
9 M. ~UNJlt, Postupni uspon bosansko-venecijanskih ekonomskih odnosa u XV
stoljecu. Radovi Hrvatskog drustva za znanost i umjetnost 1 (1993) 9-42.
10 UUBlt, Listine VIII 84-85. Cf. ~UNJIC, Prilozi za istoriju 120.
11 UUBIt, Listine VIII, 202-205; IBIDEM IX, 189-190.
138 Emir O. Filipovic

ver, but the Venetians were also interested in other commodities as well,
whether buying or selling. 12
The basis of these good exchanges between Venice and Bosnia was also
conducted by a pragmatic and political outlook. Venice was not, under any
circumstance, interested in taking administrative control of those territories
which did not directly contribute to the safety of their maritime trade, and
this principle excluded the possibility of a clash with the Bosnian Kingdom,
with which it remained in sincere relations until its demise in 1463.13
Apart from the successful trade, commercial growth and development,
th
the first half of the 15 century was also the period of intensified Ottoman
activity in Bosnia. The first Ottoman raid in the Kingdom was recorded in
1386, and since then similar forays and expeditions were repeated often
with the same goal of acquainting with the terrain, and weakening of the
local ruling elites. 14 The reality of the Ottoman presence was manifested
through their practice of effectively allying themselves with the nobility and
aiding them in their mutual political struggles. A fundamental change in their
attitude towards Bosnia came with the battle in the region of lasva, in the
central areas of the country, when the joint forces of the Bosnians and Ot-
tomans defeated the army of Hungarian King Sigismund. 15 This victory ena-
bled the Ottomans to strengthen their positions in the Kingdom, exerting a
far greater influence on the domestic Bosnian affairs, while also successfully
managing to impose a heavy tribute on the Bosnian rulers and their subjects.
Slowly but steadily, the Ottoman grip on Bosnia tightened through con-
sistent and methodical military operations coupled with their successful ex-
ploitation of internal discord and disorder within the Kingdom itself.16
With imminent threats to its independence coming from the Hungarian
and Ottoman sides, Bosnia had to make Venice the permanent focus of its
foreign policy. Since there were not too many amicable states in their sur-

12 D. KOVAtEvIC, Trgovina u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni. Sarajevo 1961, 24-25, 93-97. Cf.

M. SUNJIC, La circolazione di persone e merci delta Bosnia medievale verso if Medi-
terraneo, in: Prodotti e tecniche d'oltremare nelte economie europee secc. XII-
XVIII, ed. S. CAVACIOCCHI. Prato 1998, 781-784.
13 SUNJIC, Venezia e gli ultimi re delta Bosnia 45.
14 Cf. D. TOSIC, Bosna i Turci od Kosovske do Angorske bitke. Zbornik za istoriju BiH 2
(1997) 85-97; M. SPREMIC, Turci i Balkansko poluostrvo u XIV i XV veku. Jugos/ov-
enski istorijski casopis 1-2 (1966) 37-49; H. INAlCIK, Ottoman Methods of Conquest.
Studia Is/arnica 2 (1954) 103-129.
15 D. LOVRENOVIC, Bitka u Lasvi 1415. godine, in: Raukarov zbornik. Zagreb 2005, 275-
295.
16 Cf. M. SPREMIC, Turski tributari u XIV i XV veku. Istorijski g/asnik 1-2 (1970) 9-59; H.
SABANOVIC, Pitanje turske vlasti u Bosni do pohoda Mehmeda 11 1463 g. Godisnjak Is-
toriskog drustva BiH VII (1955) 37-51; D. KOVAtEvIC, Prifog pitanju bosansko-turskih
odnosa. Godisnjak Drustva istoricara BiH XI (1961) 257-263.
 Ardet ante ocu/os opu/entissimum regnum 139

roundings, and due to long lasting strained relations with the rulers of Hun-
gary, the Republic of St. Mark was the only neighbouring power from which
Bosnia could have genuinely expected any help.17 The Kings of Bosnia at-
tempted to get reassurance and provisions from Venice on many occasions.
They informed her of the news about the Ottomans, pleading for military,
material and even diplomatic aid. The Ottoman danger made the Bosnian
King Tvrtko 11 feel unsecure in his own land and forced him to pursue some
immediate help. The royal chamberlain (protovestiarios) Restoje Milohna
was entrusted to send an official envoy to Venice, on the King's behalf, with
an incredible offer, suggesting that the Doge assumes the administration
and government of the Bosnian Kingdom. The envoy was also to enquire
whether the King could send his belongings to Venice, and if he could freely
come to the areas ruled by Venice in the case of necessity.18 The answer,
st
formulated on the 21 of February 1442, was full of assurance for the King,
maintaining that he was free to come to Venetian territory with his family
and escort for the benefits of higher security, and that he could send his
possessions there as well. However, the Venetians almost ignored the offer
to rule the Bosnian Kingdom, kindly stating only their appreciation and re-
sponding with best wishes that the King would remain in his Realm.19
This was not the last attempt of the Bosnian rulers to offer their King-
dom to Venice. The successor of King Tvrtko 11, his nephew, King Tomas, also
resorted to this measure on a number of different occasions. In fact, shortly
after assuming power in 1444, Tomas proposed that Venice should receive
his Kingdom in the case he was assaulted by the Ottoman Sultan, Hungarian
King, Serb Despot, or any other person from whose attacks he could not de-
fend himself. He was also ready to concede all his regions and silver mines
which Venice could assume straight away. The answer he received briefly
indicated: non intendimus loca sua accipere, and that even though the Turk
is an infidel, Venice is thus far with him in peace. 20

17 SUNJIC, Prilozi za istoriju 119-120.

18 Quod prudenti viro Jacobo testa de Tragurio / qui hoc venit pro parte Restoie Cam-
erarij Serenissimi domini Regis Bossine et ut pridie re/atum fUit huic consilio per
Serenissimum dominum Ducem, dicit ipsum dominum regem Bossine, optare, et nos
rogare, vt consentiamus, quod possit quando opus sibi videbutur, mittere in a/iqua
terrarum nostrarum hauere suum, et persona/iter etiam venire, cum familia sua, Et
of/ert nobis iIIud regnum regendo nostro domine, pa/am vel ocu/te, vt nobis placet,
et vel/et arma et alias munitiones de /ocis nostris posse habere etc.; in: J. VALENTINI,
Acta Albaniae Veneta, p. 11, t. XVII. Munchen 1973, 174-175 (= AAV II/XVII). Cf. SUN-
JIC, Prilozi za istoriju 125.
19 AAV II/XVII, 175. Cf. SUNJIC, Venezia e gli ultimi re della Bosnia 48.
20 ... quam quam Teucer in/idelis sit, tamen secum hucusque sumus in pace, sed de ipso
parum dubitandum est, cum sit sperandum, mediante divino auxilio et provisionibus
per christianos ordinatis, quod exibit de Grecia.; in: AAV Ill/XVIII, 124, 126; N. IORGA,
140 Emir O. Filipovic

In November of 1460, a new embassy requested of Venice to take Bosnia

in her protection, and defend her from the Turks,21 but as on all the previous
occasions, the plans and hopes of the Bosnian King did not materialise. The
Venetians responded with empty words and meaningless phrases that they
confide in the goodness of God, the King's virtues, wisdom and magnanimi-
ty, that they hope and expect that he would be able to preserve and main-
tain his Kingdom, as hitherto, and as his predecessors did before him. 22 De-
spite again avoiding to send actual provisions, Venice did still envision Bosnia
as an important outpost worthy of protecting, so she attempted to assist
and support the Bosnian cause in Rome where the Venetian messenger pre-
sented the extent of the situation and worked on persuading the Pope to
organize some sort of resistance. In a letter sent to its messenger in Rome
th
on the 8 of December 1461, Venice indicated its concern that, unless help
was to arrive qUickly, the Bosnians would be forced to switch to the Otto-
man side, take up their weapons and turn them against other Christians. 23
King Tomas died in 1461 and was succeeded by his son Stjepan
Tomasevic. In Venice and on the Papal Curia, the coronation of the new King
revived hopes in the possibility of a common resistance to the Turks.24 Al-
ready by October, the Venetians chose a messenger to congratulate the new
King on his ascent to the throne and to express condolences for the death of
his father. 25 The young monarch also tried to move quickly warning Venice
and the Pope about the Ottoman danger, attempting to convince them
about the necessity of a common military action in form of a crusade. In the
widespread diplomatic contacts of the time, there is no information about
exchanges and communications between the Hungarian and Bosnian courts.

Notes et extra its pour servir a I'Histoire des Croisades au xve siecle, Vol. Ill. Paris
1902, 154. Cf. ~NJIC, Venezia e gli ultimi re della Bosnia 49. Venice would take a
similar stance in many circumstances later on. For example, in December of 1462
they stated that Conditiones nostre cum Turcho tales sunt, ut conservationi status
nostri, salutique subditorum et /idelium nostrorum necessario providendum sit.; in:
R. LOPEZ, " principio dell a guerra Veneto-Turca ne11463. Archivio Veneto ser. 5, vol.
XV(1934)49,n.13.
21 I. NAGV - A. NvARV (eds.), Magyar Diplomacziai emh~kek - Matyas Kiraly korab61
1458-1490, Vol. I. (Monumenta Hungariae Historica IV). Budapest 1875, 80 (= NAGV
- NvARV, MHH IV). Cf. SUNJIC, Venezia e gli ultimi re della Bosnia 51.
22 Circa partem oblationis, status sui, regrotiamur plurimum Cels. Sue; nec videtur
nobis honestis et decentibus causis aliud posse dicere, at vero con/idimus in
bonitate divino, et in multo virtute, sapientia et magnanimitate sua, quod quando
casus accideret, statum suum conservare et manutenere volet, sicut hucusque fecit
et sicuti etiam per superiora tempora Serenissimi progenitores sui semper focere
studuerunt.; in: NAGV - NvARV, MHH IV 88-81.
23 SUNJIC, Venezia e gli ultimi re della Bosnia 52; IDEM, Bosna i Venecija 350.
24 S. CIRKOVIC, Herceg Stefan Vukcic-Kosaca i njegovo doba. Beograd 1964, 245-246.
25 LJUBIC, Listine X 179, 18l. Cf. SUNJIC, Bosna i Venecija 343.
 Ardet ante oculos opulentissimum regnum 141

It seems that neither the King, nor the most potent magnate of the Kingdom,
Duke Stjepan Vukcic Kosaca, sought any aid from Hungary. They both re-
sorted to contacting Venice first.26 It appeared, as the Duke wrote to the Si-
gnoria, that the Turks seem to be more fearful of her than of all the other
Christians. 27 On the 13 of November 1462, his messengers informed Venice
th

that the Sultan, having learned of the close contacts between the Duke, the
Venetians and the Pope, commanded him that these associations should be
broken off immediately - tu non habi a far niente cum la signoria de Venexia
ne cum el Papa. Duke Stjepan Vukcic Kosaca responded that those relations
were very old, that his father and uncle held Venice for their masters, and
that he intends it to remain that way.28
King Stjepan Tomasevic also alerted Pius 11 that the Turkish onslaught
was coming, and that Mehmed "will aim at Italy, which he aspires to rule".
The King had warned the Pope that the defence of Christendom depended
on defending Bosnia first, because, as he stated, after him, the Sultan will
attack Hungary and the Venetian province of Dalmatia, and then he will
march across Carniola and Istria to attack Italy which he intends to rule, es-
pecially Rome. He expects himself to be first on the line, but if he is not
helped, Hungarians, Venice and Italy will taste the same doom which the en-
emy intended for them. He did not miss the opportunity to remind the pon-
tiff that his father, Stjepan Tomas, predicted the fate of Constantinople to
his predecessor, Pope Nicholas V, and the Venetians, but that they did not
believe him.29
Apart from the King's requests and pleas, in the beginning of March
1462 Duke Stjepan Vukcic also sent his ambassadors to tell Venice what he
himself had heard. Namely, he found out in great secrecy, through some of
his associates and friends of the Sultan's house - amici de caxa del Turcho-
that the Sultan intended to march against Albania and Bosnia that summer.30

26 lOVRENOVIC, Na klizistu povijesti 353, 357.

27 Aviso etiam a la signoria vestra, che el gran Turcho ha mazor paura de quel/a, che
de tutti Christiani.; in: LJUBIC, listine X 192; NAGV - NvARV, MHH IV 101. Cf. ~UNJIC,
Bosna i Venecija 348-349.
28 Et io Ii respusi, che mio padre e mio barba sempre ha habudo per suo signori Ii Veni-
tiani, et cussi anche io Ii voio haver per mie signori.; in: LJUBIC, listine X 228; NAGV-
NvARV, MHH IV 170. Cf. ~UNJIC, Bosna i Venecija 354.
29 Pii 11 commentarii rerum memorabilium que temporibus suis contigerunt (ed. A. VAN
HECK), Vol. 11. Citta del Vaticano 1984, 684-685. It has to be noted that this excerpt
stems from a text in which Pope Pi us 11 changed not only the formulations, but also
the substance and essence of the letter the King sent him. Cf. lOVRENOVIC, Na kliz-
istu povijesti 343, n. 6.
30 ... et questo mostra havere havuto in grande secreta da alchuni sui benevoli et amici
de caxa del Turcho, e per questo domanda adjuto.; in: V. MAKUSCEV, Monumenta
142 Emir O. Filipovic

Almost a full year later, the King similarly received assured and certain news
of the imminent Ottoman danger, and tried to warn the Venetians as well as
the Pope. His informants told him about Ottoman plans to conquer Bosnia
that summer, so he sent his messengers to notify Venice about this in Feb-
ruary of 1463. The King's representatives conveyed the message that the
Bosnian royal house will always be in great friendship with Venice and that
the King has a trusted source which informed him of the Turkish intention to
occupy and ruin his Kingdom. He hoped Venice would realize that this would
consequently cause great damage to its state. Apart from this, he also re-
quested weapons and asked that Venice send her messenger to the Pope in
an attempt to petition for a crusade. 31 He complained that the tribute he is
paying to the Sultan has already drained his resources and he suggested
straightforward military action, without delay, because it was clear that the
Turk was growing each day because of the Christian silence - e questo se
vede chiaramente, el Turcho se fa ala zornada piu grande per taxer i Chris-
tiani. 32
The Venetian response to this "adventurous" alliance proposal was re-
markably blunt and they refused to accept the King's requests for concrete
military action against the Turks. 33 Their answer was very much reserved and
seemed like it was a part of a well-rehearsed routine since they repeated
almost everything what was said many times before. They acknowledged the
value of the information he supplied them with, and praised him for the love
and devotion he showed to their state. However, they responded that Ven-
ice is at present in peace with the Turks, even though she is aware of their
deceitful nature and that she still has to be constantly prepared with her
powerful fleet for a serious attack. The Venetians encouraged the King to
hold out and stated that they believed that Bosnia would be able to defend
itself if its forces were to unite. They also promised to send a messenger to
Rome, Germany and Hungary with the aim of seeking aid and assistance, and

historica Slavorum meridionalium vicinorumque populorum, Vol. 11. Belgradi 1882,

157.
31 El serenissimo re de Bossina supplica a la iIIustrissima signoria vostra
commemorando caxa sua esser stada sempre in grande amicitia cum la signoria
vostra et senza alguna differentia. Adesso constretto de graude pericolo et
desegno, el Turco fa contra de lui con deliberation occupar el suo regno,
dechiarando tal occupation esser summamente contra el stado vostro. E questo
creda la signoria vostra certamente, el Turco haver usado con la sua bocha propria
in questa forma con uno suo conseier intrinsico, el qual ha dato notitia cautamente
al re de Bossina ... ; in: LJUBIC, listine X 237-238. Cf. SUNJIC, Venezia e gli ultimi re del-
la Bosnia 53; SUNJIC, Bosna i Venecija 357.
32 LJuBlc, listine X 238. Cf. SUNJIC, Bosna i Venecija 357.
33 LOPEZ, 11 principio della guerra Veneto-Turca 52.
 Ardet ante oculos opulentissimum regnum 143

they agreed to send him ballistae and gunpowder, but not the archers he
sought.34
The King's information was not completely overlooked in Venice and she
soon engaged in a mission to assemble a military coalition herself. Already,
rd
on the 3 of March, the Venetians wrote to their ambassador in Rome en-
trusting him to inform the Pope about the danger which loomed over Hun-
gary and Bosnia and to be of assistance to the Bosnian messengers who will
be arriving there shortly to deliver the information regarding the Ottoman
menace. The Venetians urged the Pope to start working against the Turks,
and not much later, on the 1ih of the same month, they sent letters to the
Czech, Polish, and Hungarian Kings, as well as to the Duke of Bavaria, en-
couraging them to take up arms. They advised them to prepare their armies
for battle against the Turk and to hastily finish the work of this most pious
enterprise. 35
Despite all the encouraging words he was getting from the West, the
Bosnian King still tried to prepare for the worst-case scenario - leaving of
Bosnia and moving to Venetian territory.36 The events were already pro-
gressing in the manner he predicted and he still did not have any guaranteed
assistance from the powers he relied on.
The information supplied to the Venetians by the King and his messen-
gers must have been in some way corroborated by Venice's own people en-
gaged in commercial or political activities in the Balkan hinterland. This is
evident from the fact that the reports which the Venetian Signoria sent out,
alerting its friends and allies about the events in Bosnia, were not just specu-
lation. They were formed on the basis of precise knowledge and information
from the ground supplied by an intricate network of diplomats and inform-
ants in the proximity of the described situations. The Venetian government
thanked the reporters for the news they sent. Thus, they praised their envoy
th
to Hungary on the 15 of January, commending his prudence and diligence
for notifying them about all the events in those parts. 37 The reports and let-
ters she sent out to others were mostly based on the intelligence she re-
ceived from subordinate counts of Dalmatian towns who were in a far better

34 Licetque esse videamur in pace cum Turco, attentis tamen conditionibus et perjidis
modis suis paravimus et paramus continue potentissimam c/assem nostram cum
gravissimis nostris impensis ut possimus pravis conceptibus eiusdem Turchi, pro
quanto semper poterimus, obviare, quoniam de eo non est nostro iuditio confiden-
dum.; in: UUBIC, Listine X 236; NAGV- NvARV, MHH IV 188-190. Cf. l. PASTOR, The His-
tory of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages, Vol. Ill. London 1894, 314;
SUNJIC, Bosna i Venecija 357.
35 UUBIC, Listine X 238-239; NAGV - NvARV, MHH IV 193-194. Cf. LOPEZ, 11 principio della
guerra Veneto-Turca 51.
36 SUNJIC, Bosna i Venecija 349-350.
37 UUBIC, Listine X 233.
144 Emir O. Filipovic

position to collect new facts. In Ma~ they commended the Count of Sebenico
for informing them,38 and on the i of June Venetians wrote to Ser Andreas
Venerio, the Count of Spalato, thanking him for reporting de novis Turcho-
rum et Bossine, demanding of him not to spare costs for messengers and
boats so that he could properly and constantly keep them up to date. 39 Un-
fortunately, very few of these accounts have been preserved and published.
In the heritage of Lajos Thall6czy, held in the Hungarian National Museum in
Budapest, Vladimir (:orovic found a transcript of an excerpt from a contem-
porary report of the Count of Spalato sent to the Doge on the 11th of June
1463. The Count testified that through various different means he learnt of
the news that the Turks captured Bobovac and many other castles and for-
tresses, and that they have already arrived at Jajce, the second most im-
portant town in the Kingdom. From there the Sultan sent a part of his army
to pursue the King to one of his fortresses called Kljuc where the King re-
mains stationed. 40
All these reports can be considered worthy source materials, however, a
far more detailed account of what befell Bosnia in 1463 was provided by the
Count of Trogir. He was well informed of the events in his vicinity, and sent
th th
around ten reports to Venice, from May 29 to June 24 , and their exten-
sive concepts were discovered and published by Marko Sunjic.41 One of the
main reasons for the reliability of these reports, which reached Venice be-
fore the one from Spalato, is that Nicholas Testa, a distinguished diplomat of
the Bosnian Kingdom and a close associate of the two last kings of Bosnia,

38 IBIDEM 245.
39 IBIDEM; NAGV- NvARV, MHH IV 208.
40 Per molte et diverse vie ho saputo el prefato (Turcho) havere havuto Bobovaz cum
molte altre castel/e et forteze, iI quali tucti loghi se hanno dato. Et per dicto signore
Turcho a tucti e stata data la fede et viculi (?) osservata. E venuto dicto Turcho con-
tra )aiza, el secondo megliore loco che havesse el re de Bossnia, et ha mandato
parte del exercito suo contra uno casteI/o del dicto re, chiamato Cluz, in quale loco
se dice essere la persona del predicto re et tiense fermo, hauera tucto. Dubitasse
successivamente sia per venire contra Ragusi marinamente perche molto se dubita
che el duca Stefano sia accordato cum el Turcho et cum 10 fiolo d' esso duca. QueI/o
voglia dire queste cose et quante le importi a tucta la Christianita la Vostra Signoria
per la sua summa sapientia... Del Ban Paulo per quante de qui se sente et dice lui
cerca de accordarse cum el Turcho per mezo de Ladislao figliolo del prefato duca et
questi giorni die mandare el suo cancel/ero al prefato Ladislao.; in: V. COROVlt, His-
torija Bosne - Prva knjiga. Beograd 1940, 557.
41 M. SUNJlt, Trogirski izvjestaji 0 turskom osvojenju Bosne (1463). Glasnik arhiva i
drustva arhivskih radnika Bosne i Hercegovine 29 (1989) 139-157. Even though he
remains one of the more complete and reliable sources for the Ottoman conquest
of Bosnia, the Count of Trogir was still accused in Venice for being too lazy with his
reports. Although, he did start reporting approximately ten days after the Ottoman
military operations began in Bosnia.
 Ardet ante oculos opulentissimum regnum 145

was in fact a native of Trogir. He was present in Bosnia during the Ottoman
entry into the country and the King sent him on a mission to inform Venice
about the situation and to try to get help. On his way there he arrived in
th
Trogir by the 29 of May, with complete and reliable information. Testa told
the Count of Trogir that the Sultan had sent the bassam Romanie onto Bob-
ovac, ubi rex ipse consuevit co"ocare Thesaurum suum. He also reported
that the Ottomans attacked the fortress day and night, while the defenders
defended bravely and resolutely. He also said that Bobovac could not hold
out longer if the Hungarians or others were not to help. He summed up his
account with a farsighted statement that if Bosnia was to stay alone in this
unequal war, the Turks would capture Bobovac, whose importance is such
that with it the whole of Bosnia would become Turkish.42
The Count wanted to be kept informed even after the Bosnian emissary
left for Venice, so he sent spies to follow the actions of the Ottoman forces.
rd
On the 3 of June he was informed of the peiora nova that Bobovac fell. He
also knew that Turks captured Travnik, Vinac, Novi and Jezero, and that they
have encircled Jajce. The next day he knew that the Bosnian King was be-
sieged in the fortress of Kljuc, where he was captured, and that he was taken
to Jajce in order to demoralize its defence and help the Turks to take the
city. Otherfortressessurrendered in the same manner. 43
When the Venetians heard about the outcome of the Sultan's actions
they became aware of the immediate danger posed by the further Ottoman
expansion and had reason to worry greatly since the conquest of the Bosni-
an Kingdom exposed not only the Dalmatian towns, then ruled by Venice,
but also the Adriatic ports of Italy.44 The collapse of Bosnia led to extreme
terror being spread everywhere,45 and Venice now found itself directly in the
way of the Ottoman military threat. The implications were far reaching as
we". Having seized Bosnia in 1463, Mehmed the Conqueror found an answer
to the Venetian economic monopoly by opening a new and direct land route
with Florence through the Balkans and Dubrovnik. 46 The Venetians instantly
set about on a diplomatic and military mission to inform their allies and
friends about the Bosnian demise, to alarm them of the Ottoman peril, and
to try and organize some sort of military campaign. The panic felt in Venice

42 SUNJIC, Trogirski izvjestaji 146-147.

43 IBIDEM 148-149.
44 H. J. KISSlING, Venedig und der Islamische Orient bis 1500, in: Venezia e iI Levante
finD al secolo XV, Vol. I, ed. A. PERTUSI. Firenze 1973, 375; K. M. SETTON, The Papacy
and the Levant (1204-1571). Vol. 11: The Fifteenth Century. Philadelphia 1978, 240.
45 PASTOR, The History of the Popes III 314; LOPEZ, 11 principio della guerra Veneto-
Turca 55.
46 H. INALCIK, An Outline of Ottoman-Venetian Relations, in: Venezia - Centro di medi-
azione tra oriente e occidente (secoli XV-XVI): Aspetti e problemi, ed. H. BECK - M.
MANOUSSACAS - A. PERTUSI. Firenze 1977, 87-88.
146 Emir O. Filipovic

as a reaction on the news coming from Bosnia was evident from the instruc-
th
tions given on the 10 of June 1463 to ser Bernardo Guistiniano, a special
envoy in Rome. This was considered an issue of grave importance for the
salvation of the Christian faith and he was singled out to present to the Pope
and the Cardinals the infelicia nova about the Turkish conquest of Bosnia
whose King was captured. 47 The significance of this problem was mirrored in
the words with which the Signoria told the proweditore of Zara on the 12th
of June 1463 that the Turks, enemies of the whole of Christendom, captured
Bosnia, lithe gate of Italy".48
Venetians also sent reports to their Captain-General (capitaneo generali
th
maris) Alvise Loredan on the 13 of June informing him that the Turks took
49
Bosnia. A day later they wrote a letter to their messenger in Rome, when it
was not yet known that the Bosnian King was killed but only that he remains
in Turkish slavery. In this communication the Venetians underlined the fact
that they have been informed through the various letters they have been
sent that the most bitter enemy, in his insatiable lust for power, penetrated
into Corbavia and the land of the Counts of Senj, slaughtering, robbing, mur-
dering and burning many fires. 50 The Venetian Ambassador was instructed to

47 Ad officium nostrum pertinere cognoscimus eo presertim, que maximi ponderis sunt

od salutem christane religionis Pontifici Maximo nota facere. Nuntiamus itaque
vobis, non sine gravi animi nostri molestia, Turchum perfidum crucis hostem, per eo,
que multis modis habemus cum potentissimo exercitu Regnum Bossine insultasse,
jamque intercepisse potiorem partem Regni ipsius, ac loco et oppida principalia.
Quin immo etiam al/atum est, Regem ipsum Bossine in miserabilem captivitatem
Turchorum devenisse cum totali exterminio rerum iIIarum, sicut per exempla
Iitterarum, nuper 0 nobis acceptarum, que vobis mittimus his implicita, videre
poteritis, volumus igitur et mandamus vobus, quod receptis presentibus, presentiam
Romani Ponti/icis adire curetis, signi/icando sibi infelicia novo ejusmodi... ; in: NAGV-
NvARV, MHH IV 211. Cf. PASTOR, The History of the Popes III 315.
48 Bosna porta Italiae de Thurcibus, hostibus inimicissimis totius Christanitatis ... occu-
pata est.; in: G. RAzs6, Die TOrkenpolitik Matthias Corvinus'. Acto Historica Academ-
iae Scientiarum Hungaricae 32/1-2 (1986) 13, n. 34.
49 Mo per che 01 presente semo facti certi, el Turco esser intrado nela Bossina, et tuta
queI/o ha subiugado et prexo el suo re, et ancha forsi procedera piu oltro 0 i danni
nostri ... ; in: LJUBIC, Listine X 247; NAGV - NvARV, MHH IV 218-219.
50 Postea multis modis variisque scribentium Iitteris certiores facti sumus, non solum
Regnum Bossine per hinc sevissimum crucis hostem occupatum fuisse, verum etiam
ipsius regni regem captum et in miserabilem Turcorum servitutem abductum fuisse,
ita ut de Regno, de Rege, deque tot Christi fidelibus iam actum esse certissimum dici
potest. Res quippe horrenda et omni commiseratione dignissima. Frequentibus
quoque Iitteris nuntiatum est nobis, acerrimos hostes istos pro suo insaciabili
Iibidine dominandi penetrasse in partes Corbavie et per loco etiam comitum Segne,
strages, rapinas, cedes et incendia plurima comisisse. Que omnia quantum
magni/acienda sint, quantumque chrisiane saltui conducant, quid ultra
insolentissimus hostis facile sibi spondeat pro magnitudine rerum tacendum potius
 Ardet ante oculos opulentissimum regnum 147

describe the further advances of the Ottomans and the forthcoming danger
which threatened Italy. He was also supposed to declare the resolution of his
government to resist the enemy until the very end of its powers. 51
The letter sent on the same day, the 14th of June, directly to the Pope in
Rome about Bosnia is much more distressing and paints a rather grim pic-
ture. The Venetians told the pope that a mighty Turkish army invaded and
destroyed Bosnia with fire, iron and murder, subjected its inhabitants to tor-
ture and divided them as spoils. Some of the fortresses and castles he gained
by force and others by treason. They knew that the King was being detained
in miserable captivity, which cannot be said without pain and tears. The little
what was left of that Kingdom, and it was not much, could be effortlessly
captured since the land remains completely without governance. Their
sources told them that the Turkish forces advanced all the way to the Coast,
to Senj and even entered Corbavia. By reaching the Coast, they are already
knocking on the doors of Italy - ad hostium et fores Ita lie. The Venetians
were in absolutely no doubt that the Pope was aware of the magnitude of
the disaster.52
On the same day, a letter of similar content was sent to the Florentines
inviting them to battle against the Turks with a most late call to action. The
Venetians again spared no words to describe the horrors which befell Chris-

quam recensendum putamus. Quando quidem Italie hostia amodo sibi pateant,
utque dudum machinatus est, in excidium eversionemque christiane religionis
explere posse conetur.; in: I..JUBlt, Listine X 250; NAGY- NYARY, MHH IV 218.
51 PASTOR, The History of the Popes 111315.
52 Ecce Venerande Crucis infenstissimus inimicus, omnibus undique coactis copiis, per-
inde atque nemo inter Christianos reliquus sit, qui ejus cupiditati atque impetui vel
possit vel ve/it occurrere, regnum Bossine est agressus, fines ejus passim populatur,
incendio, ferro, cedibus cuncta devastat; incolas misere divexat, atque in
direptionem et predam suis satelitibus dat, potiora regni, atque munitiora castella
et oppida, partim vi et armis, partim deditione jam cepit, Regem ipsum, quod sine
dolore et lacrimis ne cogitari quidem animo debet, fede ac misere captum habet.
Quicquid superesse videtur illius regni, quod parum est, tale est, ut facillime occu-
pari possit, ruptis jam reseratisque claustris, dissipatis regni custodibus, occupatis
minutioribus oppidis, capto denique Rege, jam aditus undique ad insinuandum se se
in Christiane ditionis precordia hosti accerrimo patefacti sunt, nec est, quod cupidi-
tiatem ejus sistat, nisi armis et vi perpropere obviam eatur. Jam hostilis exercitus,
superatis regni Bossine finibus, ad littora usque Segne, id est ad hostium et fores
Italie infestis armis gloriabundus irrumpere non est veritus. Hec pro magnitudine
c1adis ad aurea usque beatitudinis vestre increbuisse non dubitamus ... Dubitare non
possimus, quin magnitudo cladis et finitimi ac prope urgentis acerbitas periculi, cor
piissimum santitatis vostre zelo domus dei comedat atque incendat, et ad ea provo-
cet atque invitet, que iamdiu conceperat animo, et ventura sapienter providerat.
Jam beatissime pater apparatibus, viribus, expeditione celeri et facto indigent res.;
in: I..JUBlt, Listine X 250-251; NAGY- NYARY, MHH IV 217.
148 Emir O. Filipovic

tendom. They explained how the cruellest and most violent enemy of the
Christian name, the Turkish ruler with his instinct of rapacity and his inexo-
rable hatred of the Catholic faith, was brought to such gluttony as if there is
no one among the Christian rulers who would dare to stand opposed to his
aspirations. They spoke how he gathered troops from all sides and how he
attacked the Bosnian Kingdom with a large composed army, passing through
the land pillaging and ravaging it entirely. He treated the population horribly,
some he killed ruthlessly, others he took into captivity, and he expelled the
rest out of the country forcing them to escape. The Venetians explained that
the Sultan took some of the bigger and better fortresses and settlements of
the Kingdom through the use of armaments, while the others were gained
by treason, and how he occupied almost the whole Kingdom with fire, de-
struction, defeat and weapons. Trying to hold back the pain and the tears,
they told them how the King himself is deviously being held captive and
monstrously treated. But even unsatisfied with such triumphs, striving for
further conquests and more spacious lands, promising his army even more,
the Sultan was not afraid to arrogantly bring his weapons to the seashore in
Senj, to the very gate and entrance of Italy.s3
The Venetian Doge Cristoforo Moro (1462-1471) summed up this letter
with the most dramatic words: In front of our eyes burns the richest King-
dom. The most dangerous enemy is attacking and threatening, the fiercest
opponent and the most gluttonous despiser of the deeds and estates of
Christianity, who will be able to reach everywhere and who will dare to try
everything without obstruction, and who will not find the limits to his rapaci-
ty and his unbridled passion for ruling anywhere else if Christians do not

53 Saevissimus atque acerrimus christiani nominis hastis, Turcharum princeps suae

cupiditatis impulsu et in catholicam fidem inexorabili odio, eo insolentiae venit, ut
quasi nemo inter principes christianos sit, qui suis conatibus occcurrere vel velit vel
domum audeat. Undecimque coactis copUs et numeroso instructo exercitu regnum
ipsum Bossinae est aggressus et usque quaque populabundus discurrens cuncta
vastavit: incolas faede habuit, quandoquidem presertim truculenter caesis, prae-
serim in servitutem redactis, reliquis exteritis, fugatis et fusis, majora munitioraque
regni castella et oppida, alia expugnavit et vi caepit, alia deditione accepit ... Incen-
dio, ruinis, stragibus, ferro universum pene regnum occupavit. Regem ipsum, quod
sine dolore et lacrymis referre non possumus, captivum misere detinet et foedissime
tractat. Nec tanta c/ade contentus, ut qui ad ampliora contendit ac majora viribus
spondet suis, ad litora usque Segnae, id est ad hostium pene et fores Italiae infestis
armis gloriabundus irrumpere non est veritus.; in: V. MAKUSCEV, Monumenta histori-
ca Slavorum meridionalium vicinorumque populorum, Vol. I. Varsaviae 1874, 532-
534; G. MOLLER, Documenti sulle relazioni delle citta Toscane coli' Oriente Cristiano
e coi Turchi finD all'anno MDXXXI. Firenze 1879, 199.
 Ardet ante oculos opulentissimum regnum 149

forestall his intentions with arms and weapons, with reasonable agreement
and enthusiasm, promptly and strongly meeting his predation. 54
Based on the knowledge about the events in Bosnia which the Venetians
had at their disposal, it is sufficient to say that these descriptions offer an
intense and passionate representation of the devastation which followed
the Ottoman military operations in Bosnia. They use strong motifs to de-
scribe the degree of terror which spread throughout the Christian world, but
the sole purpose of these letters was not only to inform, but rather to raise
awareness, to strike fear in those who read their words and open their eyes
to this impending danger. The Venetians aimed to explain that the Sultan is
not yet willing to stop his advance, that he is intent on conquering Italy and
that everybody needs to help them in their endeavour of preventing this. In
spite of these persuasive warnings the Florentines still proved the most ob-
stinate opponents of the Crusade and they expressed their disapproval of
the war much more openly. The Milanese envoy, writing on the 11th of June
1463 said that in Florence it was considered a misfortune that the Turks
have conquered Bosnia; but it is not thought to be bad luck that the Vene-
tians should have met problems. 55
On the 14th of June Venice also took direct measures to secure its own
possessions in Dalmatia which were now open to Ottoman attack. They noti-
fied their Captain of the Gulf, that, according to their sources, the Turks, hav-
ing taken and subjugated the King of Bosnia and occupied the Kingdom, in-
tend to come against their provinces. They advise speedy preparation for
any danger that might come and order him to protect the towns of Dalmatia
with his galleys.56
The information about the fall of the Bosnian Kingdom was spreading
fast and through different means. Many refugees from Bosnia came to Italy
carrying with them news of their misfortune and hardship. Cardinal Frances-
co Gonzaga wrote two letters to his father Count lodovico Gonzaga of Man-
nd st
tua, one on the 22 of June 1463 from Rome, and the second one on the 1
of July from Tivoli. In the first letter he stated that on the 1ih of June a ship
came to Ancona from Sibenik (Sebenico) full of people from Bosnia fleeing
from the Turks. Among them were four Bosnian nobles who said that the
Turk came to Bosnia with 200 000 soldiers, that he had quickly captured

54 Ardet ante oculos opulentissimum regnum, urget et instat infestissimus hostis et

rerum atque opum christianitatis ut inimicus acerrimus, itaque contemptor inso-
lentissimus, cui omnia adire cuncta tentare impune licebit, nec inveniet usquam
,suae cupiditatis et effrenae dominandi libidinis terminos nisi manu et armis, nisi
consilio et animis, ejus cogitatus christiani preveniant, et tantae insolentiae festina-
to atque potenter obviam eant.; in: IBIDEM.
55 B. BUSER, Die Beziehungen der Mediceer zu Frankreich wahrend der Jahre 1434-
1494. Leipzig 1879, 113. Cf. PASTOR, The History of the Popes III 322, 343.
56 UUBlt, Listine X 252.
150 Emir O. Filipovic

Bosnia with its King and Queen, and that the whole of Schiavonia was in
fear, and that many, escaping slavery, left their homes. The Turkish camp
was a day away from Sebenico, which forced many to come to Ancona in
order to evade Turkish imprisonment. He also said that news from Venice
arrived that the Hungarians beat the Turks, killing around 40 000 of them,
and besieging others in a fortress. The Venetian ambassador sought help
from the Pope. 57 In the other letter sent from Tivoli, Cardinal Gonzaga ex-
pressed the worry, shared by many others at that time, that unless the Turk
was strongly opposed immediately, that he could take a great part of Italy in
less than a year and a half.58
th
The Venetians also sent a letter on the 28 of June describing the de-
struction and the fall of Bosnia to the King of Portugal inviting him to take up
arms. They told him in detail about the Sultan's insolence and his lust for
power, and the horrible ways of his army. Not content with the many victo-
ries he won previously, he also attacked the Kingdom of Bosnia with a
mighty hand, and his soldiers destroyed it, burned it and divided it as spoils.
As for the King, which cannot be overlooked without great grievance and
pain, the letter informed him that he is being held captive, even though we
know from other historical sources that the King was killed on the Sultan's
orders during the first half of June. 59 The Venetians, who suffer such great
calamities, informed the King of Portugal that they would spare neither
wealth nor life in this holy expedition. Having themselves already prepared
40 triremes, they encouraged him to piously come to aid Christian salvation
and to ward off the common enemy.60
The Venetian government also sent news to the Roman Emperor Freder-
ick Ill, informing him about its military preparations. It stated its unrest "be-
cause of the sad news about the calamity of the Kingdom and King of Bos-
nia", appealing for unity of Christian rulers under the leadership of the
Pope. 61 The information which Venice supplied about the events in Bosnia,

57 L. PASTOR, Ungedruckte Akten zur Geschichte der Papste I. Freiburg 1904, 184.
58 IBIDEM 185.
59 Cf. F. BABINGER, Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit. Weltensturmer einer Zeiten-
wende. Munchen 1953, 238; T. STAVRIDES, The Sultan of Vezirs. The Life and Times
of the Ottoman Grand Vezir Mahmud Pasha Angelovic (1453-1474). Leiden 2001,
149.
60 IJUBIC, Listine X 258.
61 D%rem, quem maiestas vestra animo concepisse videtur ob mo/estissimum et in-
faustum nuntium ca/amitatis regni et regis Bossine, nos facile agnoscimus. Quis en-
im christiano charactere insignitus non ex animo do/eat? quis temperare /acrymis
possit, si videat christianos partim imaniter a barbaris trucidari, partim in servi-
tutem fedissime trahi, et pro hostis impurissimi libidine indignissima queque pati?;
in: E. FERMEND2IN, Acta Bosnae potissimum ecclesiastica cum insertis editorum doc-
umentorum regestis ab anno 925 usque ad annum 1752. Zagreb 1892, 254. The let-
 Ardet ante ocu/os opu/entissimum regnum 151

and the threat and danger which loomed over Italy were also echoed in let-
rd
ters sent by others. For instance, on the 3 of July Pope Pius 11 wrote to Bo-
logna stating his disappointment and remorse that the Sultan occupied Bos-
nia and captured the King, not failing to mention that the Turks came to the
gates of Italy.62
There were certainly many more similar reports sent about the fall of
Bosnia, but they were either lost or remain unpublished and undiscovered.
Judging by the content of those presented here, they all contained general
information about the Ottoman peril, described the fate of the Bosnian
Kingdom and the capture of its King, and invited their allies to take up arms
in a Holy crusade against the Turks. The Venetians wasted little time in their
effort to portray the scale of the destruction and present the bad news to
the widest possible audience, so their letters were composed and written
according to a characteristic template, which changed little during the
course of a month, even though they must have been aware of new infor-
mation. For example, these reports were not updated with the news that
the Bosnian King was beheaded, despite the fact that this occurred during
the first days of June. Nevertheless, apart from these omissions which can
be supplemented with data from other documents and narrative accounts,
the letters still represent valuable resources for the study of the Ottoman
conquest of Bosnia.

The general view in historiography was that Venice did not do anything for
the Christian cause to try and stop the conquest of Bosnia and many histori-
ans pointed the blame at Venice for waiting with its arms crossed. 63 But at
that time Venice had a great interest in keeping peace with the Ottomans
because of its possessions in the Aegean. The Republic did its best to avoid
any kind of armed conflict and tried not to do anything which would provoke
the Sultan to take up arms. Thus she often had to reply to the endless pleas
of the Bosnian King with hollow words, stating that he is in favour with the
Signoria, that she is willing, within her own means, to fulfil his wishes, that
she herself does not believe the devious Turk, that she confides in divine in-
tervention for the defence of his land, etc. She promised to work on getting
assistance, but despite all the promises, it was unrealistic to expect any kind

ter is also published in K. HORVAT, Novi historijski spomenici za povjest Bosne i

susjednih zemalja. G/asnik Zema/jskog muzeja XXI (1909) 2-3.
62 Turcus, ut taceamus innumerabi/es c/ades, quos miseris christianis per hos annos
ullo obstaculo in Pe/oponessa, Achaya et in omni Grecia intu/erit, navissime Bosne
regnum occupavit et capto Rege (quod lugendum est) u/terius impetus sui conatus
extendit, superatisque Bosne c/austris in lIIyricum usque et prope Da/matie littora,
hoc est ad Italiae portas, g/oriabundus arma intulit.; in: MAKUSCEV, Monumenta his-
torica Slavorum meridionalium I 309. Cf. FERMENOlIN, Acta Bosnae 254-255.
63 lOPEZ,1I principio della guerra Veneto-Turca 55. Cf. SUNJlt, Bosna i Venecija 370.
152 Emir O. Filipovic

of serious help from the Western states because of the disintegrated nature
of their own relations.
Some sources testify of the quick manner in which the Bosnian Kingdom
was conquered. Thus, the Count of Trogir wrote that Bosnia fell in a few
days - in paucis diebus - not only without a single cannon shot, but also
without a sword being drawn out of its scabbard - sine ictu non tamen
bombarde ymo sine evaginatione unius ensis.64 A country believed to be able
to withstand many years was swallowed up in uno haustu, in less than a
month. 65 King Matthias of Hungary mirrored these views and wrote to pope
Pius 11 on the 2ih of January 1464 that Bosnia fell and that the Sultan won
even before he drew his sword out of the scabbard - prius forte quam edux-
isset gladium, vicit. He justified this by stating that the Ottomans conquered
Bosnia through betrayal and not by the strength of its arms.66
These contemporary accounts from reliable sources led some historians
to reach conclusions and views about the religious discord and betrayal of
the heretic population, as the principal cause for the fall of Bosnia. They re-
minded us that Bosnia was internally undermined and collapsed so suddenly
that not even Hungary, which was much closer to Bosnia than Venice, had
any time to help her. Therefore, they conclude, Bosnia fell with a whisper
and without any resistance whatsoever. 67 This view completely disregards
the hostility of the Hungarians towards Bosnia and the trust and hopes that
the Bosnian rulers pinned on Venice. Beside this, new research and a recon-
sideration of the available sources have already dispelled these ideas and
put to rest theories of authors who attributed the fall of the Bosnian King-
dom to the heretics of the Bosnian Church. Rumours of betrayal spread ex-
clusively from Roman and Hungarian sources which have a tendency to por-
tray the conquest in this manner, because of the defeats of their own diplo-
macies and politiCS with regard to Bosnia. Consequently, only King Matthias
and Pope Pius 11 mention infidelity and treason as noteworthy causes for the
Bosnian demise, and the necessity for an ideological scapegoat was ap-
peased by pointing the blame at the members of the Bosnian Church. Other

64 SUNJIC, Trogirski izvjestaji 157.

65 From the funeral elegy of Bernardo Bembo for Bertoldo d'Este in 1463. Cf. LOPEZ, 11
principio della guerra Veneto-Turca 52.
66 V. FRAKNOI (ed.), Mathiae Corvini Hungariae Regis epistolae ad Romanos Pontifices
dat~ et ab eis accept~ (Monumenta Vaticana historiam regni Hungari<l! iIIustran-
tia 1/6). Budapest 1891, 26; L. THALL6czv - S. HORVATH, Jajcza (bansag, var es varos)
tortenete 1450-1527 (Magyar Tortenelmi Emlekek 1/40). Budapest 1915, 14.
67 Cf. LOPEZ, 11 principio della guerra Veneto-Turca 52, 55; COROVIC, Historija Bosne
559-560.
 Ardet ante oculos opulentissimum regnum 153

sources speak of a valiant struggle and not one of them contemplates

treachery as the sole reason for the quick fall of Bosnia. 68
The fact was that the Bosnian Kingdom was conquered by one of the
strongest and most powerful military forces in history, which had previously
occupied the remains of the Byzantine Empire, Bulgaria, and taken what was
left of the Serbian state, as well as dealing major blows to Wallachia and
Hungary. Stronger states tried to combat the Turks to little success, and
Bosnia, after years of economic and political pressure, finally had to give
way. The economic burden, through the continual paying of large sums of
money for tribute, depleted and exhausted the Bosnian treasury.69 By the
th
time it was finally erased from the political map of 15 century Europe, the
Bosnian Kingdom was exposed to direct Ottoman pressure for 77 years.
News about the events in Bosnia were considered to be infelicia nova
and were not calmly accepted anywhere. The sentiment of the time reflect-
ed the atmosphere felt during the time of the fall of Constantinople, of
which Venice informed Pope Pius 11 by the end of June 1453.70 The loss of the
City was, in the words of Marino Sanudo, the worst news for all of Christen-
dom,71 and a similar reaction was expressed on the news that Mehmed 11
conquered Bosnia as well. The danger caused by the downfall of the King-
dom and the threat it posed to Ragusa and the coast of Dalmatia resounded
greatly throughout Italy. It was believed that the Sultan would not stop his
military advance, and that he would continue further, to the coasts of the
Apennine Peninsula. Bosnia was though to be the gate of Italy, a port for fur-
ther Ottoman advances and this is mirrored in the letter of King Matthias to
the Pope on 11th of July 1464 stating that he captured, through great effort,
Bosnia, which is a key and door for whole of Christendom. 72
After the fall of Bosnia, Mehmed's ambitions and intentions were clear
for all to see; the Turkish danger for Christianity became even greater and
was much more seriously perceived. Thus, Venice attempted to use the frail
"solidarity" of the West to combat the Ottomans. Immediately after she
learnt about the fall of the Bosnian Kingdom, the Republic informed the

68 D~A, Ideoloski i politoloski aspekti 253-257; SUNJIC, Bosna i Venecija 356, 364-
365, 384-385; LOVRENOVIC, Na klizistu povijesti 355-356.
69 SPREMIC, Turski tributari 34-46.
70 LJUBIC, Listine X 13.
71 ... e tu pessima nuova a tutta la Cristianito.; in: L. A. MURATORI (ed.), Marino Sanuto,
Vitce Ducum Venetorum (Rerum ftalicarum Scriptores XXII). Milano 1733, col. 1151.
Cf. D. M. NICOL, Byzantium and Venice. A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations.
Cambridge 1988, 405.
72 Boznam quippe totius Christianitatis, ut ita dicam, clavem et portum, et unde qua-
quaversum in occidentem et septemtrionem aditus patet, gravi mea labore nuper
recuperatum ... ; in: FRAKNOI, Mathiae Corvini Hungariae Regis epistolae 31; THAL-
L6czv - HORVATH, Jajcza 23.
154 Emir O. Filipovic

Pope, who was himself in the process of preparing a crusade, that she was
willing to go to war Therefore, the fall of Bosnia convinced Venice that it was
high time to take military action against the Ottoman Turks. Preparations
started almost straight away.
Melchior de Imola, armorum et in partibus Albanie gubernator generalis,
th
in a letter written on the 19 of July 1463 to Ringarda Manfredi, the wife of
Carlo Gonzaga, states that the Sultan departed Bosnia, leaving behind
around 20000 soldiers distributed in 117 Bosnian forts.73 This situation soun-
ded encouraging and already by the beginning of August 1463, some Bosni-
an nobles who escaped to Venetian territory pleaded with the Senate to
help them regain the Bosnian Kingdom, stating that they have no other ruler
other than the Venetian dominion. If Venice was not to help them, they
seemed to have no other choice but to submit to the Turks. 74 This deter-
mined attitude shows that amongst the Bosnians there was no disposition
for cooperation with Hungary, and that the only alternative to Venetian au-
thority was surrender to the enemy.75 It also shows that despite the initial
blow and disbelief at what had occurred, the consequences of the Ottoman
conquest were not considered permanent and irrevocable.
st
The consul of the Republic of St. Mark in Thessaloniki, from the 21 of
August 1463 sent news that Bosnia had rebelled,16 and this notification must
have been met with great interest in Venice. Already on the 2ih of August, a
messenger was sent to Duke Stjepan Vukcic Kosaca in order to question the
possibility of reconquering Bosnia. The envoy was to pass through Spalato
where he would collect intelligence and information de statu et et condition-
ibus provincie Bossine: he had to find out how many Turks there are in Bos-
nia, how many forts did they capture, how many and which forts are in the
hands of others, which fortresses are out of Turkish reach. Among the other

73 MAKUSCEV, Monumenta historica Slavorum meridionalium 11 26.

74 Quod nobilibus bosinensibus, qui ad nostri dominii presentiaro se contulerunt, sub-
sidium nostrum pro reaquirendo regno Bosine implorantes, iIIudque tom suo quam
aliorum nobilium nomine of!erentes, cum dicant, et eos nobiles et omnes incolas
regni ipsius nul/um alium dominium velie nisi nostrum dominium; et si non admit-
terentur, subigent se ditioni Turcorum.; in: LJUBIC, listine X 261. Cf. CIRKOVIC, Istorija
331.
75 LOVRENOVIC, Na klizistu povijesti 372.
76 El signor turco partito de Bosina vine a Scopia per dover andar deli parseli meio de
andar in Andrinopoli per nove de ongari e per esser le sue zente a/anade lideta
lizenzia infina zomi 40 poi debia esser in ordine ad ogni suo comandamento ... Tuta
la Bosina ha rebel/ado. Fo butade in mar in Zagora galie X sotil et 5 grossi arsilli per
cargar bombarde e cavalli e portarli a Constantinopolli.; in: S. KARPov, Was Trebi-
zond Really Captured by Uzun Hasan after 1461? New Archival Evidences, in: Byz-
antina Mediterranea - Festschrift fur Johannes Koder zum 65. Geburtstag. Wien-
Koln-Weimar 2007, 300.
 Ardet ante oculos opulentissimum regnum 155

information he had to collect, the messenger was also supposed to see what
were the movements in Bosnia and to inform himself about the living condi-
tions of Bosnians who have escaped to Spalato. They were to be persuaded
by good words and kept happy and confident.77
However, according to the plans of the crusaders devised after Venice
and Hungary signed a pact against the Turks, Bosnia was not to be in the Ve-
netian sphere of interest, so they took no military action on that part, which
was left to the Hungarian King Matthias. The offensive started as early as
autumn and Matthias managed to recapture some parts of Bosnia and take
Jajce in the winter of 1463. The Venetian war against the Ottomans was to
last until 1479, during which Venice lost many possessions. Even with great
strains and efforts she could not contain the Ottoman expansion. The peace
concluded in 1479 showed the extent of the Ottoman victory in which the
Turks won Venetian holdings in Albania and Greece, leaving Venice with only
Crete, Corfu and three stations in Morea (Coron, Modon and Nauplia).78
It was thought that Bosnia was only a footnote in the policy and history
of Venice, while, on the other hand, Venice represented a lifeline for Bosnia.
The reports that Venice sent to her allies show that the Republic considered
Bosnia to be strategically important and that she perceived her as an out-
post and shelter from the Ottomans. It is no surprise that the fall of Bosnia,
as the last act in the history of relations between the Bosnian Kingdom and
the Republic of St. Mark, pushed Venice into military action, and the com-
mencement of a long and exhausting war.

77 ... quot in ea Turci sunt, quot loca, et que ab illis occupata tenentur, quot et que in
manibus aUorum et qui sunt, que oppida in provincia ilia ultra Turcos possident, qui
motus sunt in provincia ipsa, que conditio vivendi et cujus auctoritatis ac virium est
unusquisque iIIorum Bossinensium qui Spaletum pro/ugi se receperunt ... 11105 autem
Bossinenses, qui Spaleti sunt, bonis verbis suasos et contentos /acere et tenere pro-
curabis.; in: NAGV - NvARV, MHH IV 234-235. Cf. LOVRENOVlt, Na klizistu povijesti 373.
78 LOPEZ, 11 principio della guerra Veneto-Turca 45-131. Cf. H. INALCIK, The Ottoman
Turks and the Crusades, 1451-1522, in: A History of the Crusades, Vol. VI, ed. K. M.
SETION. Madison 1990, 325-326.
Italy and Europe's Eastern Border
(1204-1669)
Edited by
lulian Mihai DAMIAN, loan-Aurel POP,
Mihailo St. POPOVIC and Alexandru SIMON

£
PETERLANG
Intemationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften