Lopez vs. Esquivel Jr., G.R. No.
168734 , 24 April 2009
Facts: Hermogenes Lopez (Hermogenes) was the father of the Lopez
siblings. During Hermogenes lifetime, he applied with the Bureau of Lands
for a homestead patent over a parcel of land in Antipolo
After ascertaining that the land was free from claim of any private person,
the Bureau of Lands approved Hermogenes application.
Hermogenes submitted his final proof of compliance with the residency
and cultivation requirements of the Public Land Act.
As a matter of course, the aforesaid parcel of land was surveyed by a
government surveyor and the resulting plan H-138612 was approved by
the Director of Lands
The Director of Lands, thereafter, ordered the issuance of the homestead
patent in Hermogenes name. The patent was subsequently transmitted to
the Register of Deeds of Rizal for transcription and issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title[9] in Hermogenes name.
Unaware that he had already been awarded a homestead patent,
Hermogenes sold
the same to Ambrocio Aguilar (Aguilar) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale
Years later, it was allegedly discovered that the subject property was
erroneously included in survey plan H-138612 of Hermogenes
property. The subject property supposedly formed part of the land owned
by Lauro Hizon (Hizon), which adjoined that of Hermogenes.
Hermogenes executed a Quitclaim over his rights and interests to the
subject property[14] in Hizons favor.
Hizon, in turn, sold the subject property to Esquivel and Talens, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land
Hermogenes died
The Lopez siblings, as Hermogenes heirs, filed an action with the RTC for
the cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale xecuted between
Hermogenes and Aguilar
In a Decision[17] dated 5 February 1985, the RTC declared the aforesaid
Deed of Absolute Sale null and void ab initio as it was made in violation of
Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act
RTC Decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision[18] dated 18 August 1987 in CA-G.R. CV No. 06242.
In a Resolution[19] dated 13 April 1988, this Court denied Aguilars appeal,
docketed as G.R. No. 81092, for being filed late.
on the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land executed by
Hizon in their favor, Esquivel and Talens filed an Application for
Registration of the subject property with the RTC of Antipolo
he Lopez siblings filed an opposition to the application in LRC Case No. 93-
1211, asserting, among other grounds, that: (1) they did not know the
persons and personal circumstances of Esquivel and Talens who were not
the formers adjoining property owners; (2) the subject property, which
Esquivel and Talens sought to have registered, was already titled under the
Torrens system and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No.
207990 to No. 207997[20] in the names of the Lopez siblings; and (3) Tax
Declaration No. 04-10304 of Esquivel and Talens covering the subject
property was spurious. The Lopez siblings also moved for the dismissal of
LRC Case No. 93-1211 invoking the final and executory Decision[21] dated 5
February 1985 of the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in Civil Case No.
463-A, which affirmed Hermogenes title to the 19.4888-hectare land, that
included the subject property.
RTC rendered its Decision[
on 4 April 1995 in LRC Case No. No. 93-1211, granting the Application for
Registration of the subject property filed by Esquivel and
Talens. Accordingly, the Lopez siblings filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the said RTC judgment. Acting on the Motion of the Lopez siblings, the
RTC issued an Order[23] dated 23 May 1996 in which it corrected several
errors in its earlier decision
The RTC also stated in the same Order that it could not direct the
amendment of the TCTs in the names of the Lopez siblings, to exclude
therefrom the subject property which was adjudged to Esquivel and
Talens, as the RTC was sitting only as a land registration court. The RTC,
thus, advised Esquivel and Talens to file an action for reconveyance of the
subject property and only when Esquivel and Tales succeed in such action
can they subsequently cause the registration of the subject property in
their names.
Following the advice of the RTC, Esquivel and Talens filed with the RTC of
Antipolo a Complaint[24] for Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of
the subject property against the Lopez siblings.
In their Complaint, Esquivel and Talens alleged that when the Lopez
siblings had the land they inherited from Hermogenes registered, they
included the subject property, which Hermogenes already conveyed to
Hizon in the Quitclaim
Hence, the subject property was erroneously included in TCTs No. 207990
to No. 207997, issued by the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila,
in the names of the Lopez siblings. The subject property is presently
occupied and in the physical possession of the Lopez siblings.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the Lopez siblings denied
all the allegations of Esquivel and Talens. As their special defenses, the
Lopez siblings called attention to the non-compliance by Esquivel and
Talens with Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
on non-forum shopping, considering that there was another case before
the RTC of Antipolo also involving the subject property and the issues on
the genuineness and validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered
Land he Lopez siblings further averred that the cause of action of Esquivel
and Talens was already barred by the statute of limitations and laches
since they failed to assert their alleged rights to the subject property for 25
years.[27] The Lopez siblings additionally interposed that the Quitclaim
involving the subject property, invoked by Esquivel and Talens, was
ineffective, because by the time it was executed by Hermogenes in favor of
Hizon on 29 November 1965, Hermogenes had already sold his entire
19.4888-hectare land, of which the subject property was part, to Aguilar
on 31 July 1959. The Lopez siblings finally argued that the said Quitclaim
was a nullity as it contravened Section 17[28] of the Public Land Act, as
amended.[29]
RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case 96-4193, granting the prayer of
Esquivel and Talens for the reconveyance and recovery of possession of
the subject property.
The RTC held that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1959 between
Hermogenes and Aguilar was already declared null and void ab initioby a
court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, the Lopez siblings were
estopped from asserting said Deed to defeat the rights of Esquivel and
Talens to the subject property. The RTC also ruled that Esquivel and Talens
were not guilty of laches because as early as 1986, they had declared the
subject property in their names for taxation purposes. Moreover, in 1993,
Esquivel and Talens filed before the RTC an application for registration of
the subject property, LRC Case No. 93-1222, where they obtained a
favorable judgment. The RTC lastly found that the action for reconveyance
of Esquivel and Talens was not yet barred by prescription as it was instituted
within the 30-year prescriptive period.
The Lopez siblings filed an appeal of the aforementioned RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals
the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the appeal of the
Lopez siblings and affirming in toto the RTC Decision. The appellate court
ruled that the Lopez siblings are barred by the doctrine of estoppel in
pais from challenging the Quitclaim executed by Hermogenes over the
subject property in favor of Hizon on the ground that Hermogenes no
longer owned the subject property at that time.
The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision filed by the
Lopez siblings was denied by the Court of Appeals

The Lopez siblings are presently before this Court seeking the resolution
The Lopez siblings aver that a deeper analysis of the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals will reveal the latters utter disregard for or deviation
from the law of the case set by this Court in its Decisions in Santos v. Court
of Appeals,[33] Group Commander, Intelligence & Security Group, Philippine
Army v. Dr. Malvar,[34] andLopez v. Court of Appeals,[35] where the issue on
the validity of the homestead patent granted to Hermogenes, father of the
Lopez siblings, was already passed upon. In these three Decisions, the
Court already declared the homestead patent awarded to Hermogenes
valid. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in applying the rule on
estoppel in disregard of the doctrine of law of the case.
Issue: Whether or not the court is correct
Held: Yes. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal. It is a term applied to an established rule that
when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the
lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the
law of the case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which
such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court.[38] Thus, the court reviewing the succeeding appeal will not re-litigate
the case but instead apply the ruling in the previous appeal. This enables the
appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently which
would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were
to be litigated anew in the same case and upon any and subsequent
appeal.[39]
Given the foregoing, it is apparent that the Decisions of this Court
in Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, cited by the Lopez siblings in their instant
Petition, cannot be regarded as the law of the case herein. The law of the
case applies only when (1) a question is passed upon by an appellate court,
and (2) the appellate court remands the case to the lower court for further
proceedings; the lower court and even the appellate courts on subsequent
appeal of the case are, thus, bound by how such question had been
previously settled. It must be emphasized, therefore, that the law of the
case finds application only in the same case between the same parties.
The Petition at bar is without question separate and distinct
from Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, although they may all involve, in varying
degrees, the homestead patent granted to Hermogenes over the 19.8222-
hectare land, which included the subject property. First, Santos, Cabuay,
and Lopez, directly tackled the validity of the homestead patent granted to
Hermogenes over the 19.8222-hectare land; while, in the instant case, the
validity of the homestead patent thus granted to Hermogenes is no longer
in issue, but it is alleged herein that said patent erroneously included the
subject property. Second, to recall, the instant Petition originated from Civil
Case No. 96-4193, the Complaint for Reconveyance and Recovery of the
subject property filed by Esquivel and Talens against the Lopez siblings
before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73. In no instance was a question
or issue in Civil Case No. 96-4193 ever been previously raised to an appellate
court. Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, did not pass upon any question or issue
raised before this Court from Civil Case No. 96-4193. And thirdly, despite the
fact that all these cases may have common antecedent facts and sometimes
involved the same personalities, the Lopez siblings (herein petitioners) and
Esquivel and Talens (herein respondents) were not parties
in Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez.
Noel Rubber VS Esquivel (di ‘to kasama sa case list pero consolidated case
kasi ‘to sa Lopez case)
Facts: A Petition for Annulment of Judgment was filed with the Court of
Appeals by Nordec Phil., a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines; and Dr. Malvar, President and General Manager of
petitioner Nordec Phil
The Lopez siblings, Esquivel, and Talens, were named respondents in CA-
G.R. CV No. 91428 (and also herein), being the parties in Civil Case No. 96-
4193, wherein the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, rendered the Decision dated 11
January 2001, which Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar was seeking to have
annulled by the Court of Appeals. Atty. Sergio Angeles (Atty. Angeles) and
Atty. George A. Ang Cheng (Atty. Ang Cheng) were similarly impleaded as
respondents in said petition before the appellate court on account of their
involvement as counsels for the parties in Civil Case No. 96-4193.
In its Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193, the RTC
granted the action for reconveyance of the subject property to Esquivel
and Talens. The subject property, however, was already supposedly sold by
Lopez siblings to Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar.
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar alleged in their Petition for Annulment of
Judgment that the Lopez siblings, the successors-in-interest of
Hermogenes, were the registered owners of 15 parcels of land situated at
Overlooking, Sumulong Highway
Beginning 20 April 1994, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar purchased the afore-
mentioned lots from the Lopez siblings and their assigns, namely, Atty.
Angeles and Rogelio Amurao (Amurao),[49] as evidenced by several Deeds
of Absolute Sale and Deeds of Conditional Sale. Immediately after making
such purchases, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar introduced large scale
improvements on the subject property, among which were several
business establishments[50] with a cost of no less than P50,000,000.
when the subject property was involved in Civil Case No. 96-4130 heard
before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, entitled Heirs of Elino Adia v.
Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, it was Atty. Angeles who represented and
protected the interest of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar in said case by filing
a Motion to Dismiss.
In Cabuay, Jr., wherein Dr. Malvar and the Lopez siblings were named the
respondents in the Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the Validity and
Forceful Effect of the Two (2) Final and Executory but Conflicting Decisions
of this Court involving the subject property, it was also Atty. Angeles who
appeared for Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar.
Atty. Angeles again informed Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that there was
another case filed against the Lopez siblings involving the subject
property. The said case was the action for reconveyance filed by Esquivel
and Talens, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-4193 before RTC of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 73, but which was already, by then, the subject of an appeal
before the Court of Appeals
Atty. Angeles, however, belittled this most recent case involving the
subject property, and even showed to Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar the
Motion to Resolve Appeal dated 2 August 2004, which he filed in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70200, together with the Brief for the Lopez siblings. Yet, Nordec
Phils. and Dr. Malvar conducted their own inquiry, and were surprised to
discover that the Decision rendered by the RTC on 11 January 2001 in Civil
Case No. 96-4193 was actually adverse to their rights and interest; and
despite this, they were neither impleaded nor represented therein. Even
Atty. Angeles, the supposed counsel for Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar, did
not lift a finger to protect their rights in said case.
Further intensive investigation revealed to Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar that
the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was
rendered under circumstances amounting to extrinsic fraud and lack or
denial of due process, insofar as said Decision adversely affected their rights
and interests to the subject property. Among the circumstances which
allegedly amounted to extrinsic fraud and lack or denial of due process, were
described by Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar as follows: (1) when Esquivel and
Talens instituted Civil Case No. 96-4193, they personally and through their
caretakers, already knew that Nordec Phils. and Malvar already bought and
took possession of the subject property, but Esquivel and Talens, through
their counsel Atty. Ang Cheng deliberately failed to implead Nordec Phils.
and Dr. Malvar; and (2) Atty. Angeles, who was supposed to protect the
rights and interests of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar, as their counsel, had an
adverse personal interest in the subject property as he unconscionably
taken, by way of champertous attorneys fees, almost the whole of the
19.4888-hectare land inherited by the Lopez siblings from Hermogenes.
Given the foregoing circumstances and the unsuccessful attempt of Nordec
Phil. and Dr. Malvar to intervene in CA-G.R. No. 70200, Nordec Phil. and Dr.
Malvar opted to file with the Court of Appeals a Petition to annul the
Decision dated 11 January 2001 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193,
granting the reconveyance of the subject property to Esquivel and Talens.
Court of Appeals issued its assailed Resolution dismissing the Petition of
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar. According to the said Resolution, the RTC
Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193 could not be the
proper subject of the said Petition for Annulment of Judgment given that
the very same decision was still pending appeal before this Court in G.R.
No. 168734 and, thus, was not yet final and executory. In addition, should
the Court of Appeals take cognizance of such a Petition, it could result in
contrary and inconsistent rulings by the appellate court and this Court.
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar filed a Motion for Amendment and/or
Reconsideration of the dismissal of their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428,
but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar then filed the instant Petition assailing the
Resolutions of the CA
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar insist that since Rules 37, 38 and 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on motion for new trial, petition for relief,
and appeal, respectively, simply mention judgments or final orders,
without making any distinction as to whether or not the same is final and
executory; it should follow that where only the words judgments or final
orders are similarly used in Rule 47 on annulment of judgments, then such
words should be understood to also refer to all judgments or final orders,
regardless of whether they are final and executory.
Issue: whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their Petition for
Annulment of Judgment for being premature since the judgment sought to
be annulled is still the subject of a Petition for Review before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 168734, and is not yet final and executory.
Held: No. The ordinary remedies of a motion for new trial or reconsideration
and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available
only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is
rendered. In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to
the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot make use of a
petition for relief from judgment.[52] Indubitably, Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar cannot avail themselves of the aforesaid ordinary remedies
of motion for new trial, petition for relief from judgment, or appeal, because
they were not parties to the proceedings in Civil Case No. 96-4193 in which
the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001 sought to be annulled was
rendered. Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar also cannot seek the annulment of
the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory
judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted
to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on only two grounds:
extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person
need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only
essential that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained
by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected
thereby.[53]
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only
if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his
entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not
to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The
overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having
his day in court.[54]
It is, thus, settled that the purpose of a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there
will be a renewal of litigation. If the judgment sought to be annulled, like in
this case, is still on appeal or under review by a higher court, it cannot be
regarded as final, and there can be no renewal of litigation because the
litigation is actually still open and on-going. In this light, the arguments of
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that the judgments or final orders need not be
final and executory for it to be annulled must fail.
This Court, therefore, finds no error in the dismissal by the Court of
Appeals of the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by Nordec Phil. and
Dr. Malvar, on the ground of prematurity. Given that the 11 January
2001Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was still pending appeal
before this Court, the Court of Appeals could not take cognizance of the
Petition for annulment of the same judgment, for if it had done so, then it
would risk promulgating a ruling which could be contrary to and inconsistent
with the ruling of this Court on the appeal of the judgment.
Triumph International vs. Apostol and Opulencia, G.R. No. 164423, 16
June 2009
Facts: Ramon L. Apostol (Apostol) was hired as assistant manager by
petitioner Triumph International was holding the same position until TIPIs
termination of his employment
Ben M. Opulencia (Opulencia) was hired as a warehouse helper by TIPI and
was the companys warehouse supervisor at the time of the termination of
his employment
Apostol was the immediate superior of Opulencia.
TIPI conducted an inventory cycle count of its direct and retail sales in its
Muoz warehouse.
The inventory cycle count yielded discrepancies between its result and the
stock list balance
Consequently, Leonardo T. Gomez (Gomez), TIPIs Comptroller, issued a
memorandum addressed to Virginia A. Sugue (Sugue), TIPIs Marketing
Services Manager Direct, and R.S. Silva, Marketing and Sales
ManagerRetail, requesting for a reconciliation of the discrepancies.
Sugue issued a memorandum addressed to Gomez, explaining that the
discrepancy could be attributed to pilferage of finished goods at the
warehouse of Opulencia, TIPIs Warehouse Supervisor.
Two days later, Sugue sent a show-cause letter to Apostol, TIPIs Assistant
Manager-Warehouse and Distribution, requiring him to explain in writing
the negative variance based on the inventory cycle count. The letter also
placed Apostol on leave with pay, pending the investigation being
conducted by TIPI. Sugue issued a similar letter to Opulencia.
Apostol sent a letter-memorandum to Sugue, explaining that the negative
variance was due to pilferage of finished goods by Alfred Hernandez, a
security consultant of TIPI. Apostol also objected to his being placed on
leave with pay. On the same day, Gomez issued a memorandum addressed
to Sugue, stating that in the reconciliation of stock development report
against stock list, he noted that significant adjustments were made by
Opulencia and approved by Apostol.[
Gomez asked Sugue if she approved such adjustments,[5] and at the same
time, requested the latter to direct Opulencia and Apostol to explain the
adjustments.
Apostol issued a memorandum[6] addressed to Sugue, copy furnished
Gomez, explaining the significant adjustments
or his part, Opulencia explained in another memorandum of the same date
that the adjustments were made to address the problem of variances
between the stocklist balance and the actual stocks. These were covered
by the usual stock adjustment reports which were approved by the Asst.
Manager-Warehouse and Distribution [i.e., Apostol].[7] Opulencia wrote
Sugue a separate letter-memorandum objecting to his being placed on
leave with pay.
Sugue also required Apostol to show cause, within 24 hours, why he should
not be terminated by TIPI for loss of confidence.
TIPI conducted administrative investigations TIPI, through Sugue, served
notices to Apostol and Opulencia, stating that their employment had been
terminated for committing infractions of the companys rules and
regulations. Specifically, Apostol was found to have committed Offense No.
3 (Fraud or willful breach by an employee of the trust reposed in him by
the Company) and Offense No. 25 (Using, uttering or saying profane,
indecent, abusive, derogatory and/or indecorous words or language
against the employer or supervisor), while Opulencia was found to have
committed Offense No. 3 only.
Apostol and Opulencia filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of salaries and other benefits against TIPI.
the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint for lack of
merit.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Apostol and Opulencia filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was
denied by the NLRC.[14]
Apostol and Opulencia filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the
Decision of the NLRC.
the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, reversing and setting aside the
NLRC Decision.
TIPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied by the Court of
Appeals
Hence, this appeal.
TIPI contends that a reevaluation of the factual findings of the NLRC is not
within the province of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. TIPI asserts
that the Court of Appeals can only pass upon such findings if they are not
supported by evidence on record, or if the impugned judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts which circumstances are not present in this case.
TIPI also emphasizes that the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter concurred in their
factual findings which were based on substantial evidence and, therefore,
should have been accorded great weight and respect by the Court of
Appeals.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Court of Appeals neither
exceeded its jurisdiction nor committed error in reevaluating NLRCs factual
findings since such findings are not in accord with the evidence on record
and the applicable law or jurisprudence.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it
reversed the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC by
reevaluating the evidence on record
Held: we held that the proper vehicle for such review is a Special Civil
Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and that the case
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine
of the hierarchy of courts.[20]Moreover, it is already settled that under
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7902,[21] the Court of Appeals pursuant to the exercise of its original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari is specifically given the power to
pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues. [
However, equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials,
who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their
jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the
courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.[23] But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing
that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on
record, they may be examined by the courts.[
In this case, the NLRC sustained the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter. Thus, these findings are generally binding on the appellate court,
unless there was a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in
disregard of the evidence on record. Questioned in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, these factual findings were reexamined and reversed by the
Court of Appeals for being not in accord with the evidence on record and
the applicable law or jurisprudence.[25] To determine if the Court of Appeals
reexamination of factual findings and reversal of the NLRC decision are
proper and with sufficient basis, it is incumbent upon this Court to make its
own evaluation of the evidence on record.
Heirs of Maura So vs. Obliosca 542 SCRA 406, 28 January 2008
Facts: Pantaleon Jomoc was the owner of a parcel of land
Upon his death, the property was inherited by his wife, brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces (collectively referred to as the Jomoc heirs).
The respondents, Lucila Jomoc Obliosca and Abundia Jomoc Balala, sisters
of the deceased, and Elvira Jomoc, a niece, were among those who
inherited the property.
the Jomoc heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute
Sale of Registered Land2 in favor of petitioner, Maura So, over the property
for P300,000.00. However, the three respondents and Maura So failed to
affix their signatures on this document. Moreover, the document was not
notarized. Nonetheless, petitioner made a partial payment of P49,000.00
petitioner demanded the execution of a final deed of conveyance but the
Jomoc heirs ignored the demand.
petitioner filed a Complaint3 for specific performance against the Jomoc
heirs to compel them to execute and deliver the proper registerable deed
of sale over the lot. The Jomoc heirs, except for the respondents, were
impleaded as defendants.
the Jomoc heirs executed again a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Absolute Sale of Registered Land4 in favor of the spouses Lim Liong Kang
and Lim Pue King for P200,000.00.
The spouses Lim intervened as defendants
trial court decided the case in favor of the petitioner.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision with the modification that the
award of damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation was deleted.
The defendant heirs and the spouses Lim filed separate petitions for
review with the Supreme Court which petitions were later consolidated.
The Court rendered a Decision5 in these consolidated cases upholding
petitioner’s better right over the property.6 The decision became final and
executory
petitioner filed a motion for execution of the said decision. The
respondents opposed the motion on the ground that they did not
participate in the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Absolute Sale of Registered Land and they were not parties to the case.
Despite the opposition, the trial court granted the motion for execution.
The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court
denied the same.
the trial court issued an Order granting the motion for execution and
divesting all the Jomoc heirs of their titles over the property.7 Accordingly,
the Register of Deeds cancelled the title of the Jomoc heirs and issued a
transfer certificate in favor of the petitioners
All the Jomoc heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the
said order of the RTC. They alleged that herein respondents were not
parties to the case, therefore, they should not be bound by the decision
therein and be deprived of their right over the property.
the CA dismissed the petition, holding that respondents were bound by the
said decision. The CA ratiocinated that respondents were aware of the
pendency of the case, yet they did not intervene, and that the case is
barred by res judicata. Respondents elevated the case to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari.
The court denied the petition on the ground: the contract of sale between
the heirs of Pantaleon Jomoc and the private respondent Maura So, even if
not complete in form, so long as the essential requisites of consent of the
contracting parties, object and cause of the obligation concur, and they
were clearly established to be present, is valid and effective between the
parties.
As for the issue of res judicata, this Court had occasion to rule that herein
private respondent had the right to compel the heirs of Pantaleon Jomoc
to execute the proper public instrument so that a valid contract of sale of
registered land can be duly registered and can bind third persons. In effect,
this Court had already determined the right of private respondent to a
proper registerable deed of sale which petitioners seek to challenge again
in this Petition. A party cannot avoid the application of the principle of bar
by prior judgment by simply varying the form of the action or by adopting a
different mode of presenting its case or by adding or dropping a party
The resolution became final and executory
respondents also filed a complaint for legal redemption against petitioner
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental.
Respondents posited therein that, since they did not sell their shares in the
property to petitioner, they remained co-owners, who have the right to
redeem the shares sold by the other heirs. They prayed that they be
allowed to exercise their right to redeem their co-heirs’ shares and that
petitioner execute all papers, documents and deeds to effectuate the right
of legal redemption.
RTC resolved the case in favor of the respondents (APRIL 27 DECISION)
RTC granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
the RTC issued an Order10 granting respondents’ motion for
reconsideration and reinstating the April 27, 1994 Resolution which was
resolved in favor of respondents.
acting jointly on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and respondents’
Compliance/Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, the RTC
rendered a Resolution,11 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
and granting respondents’ motion for execution.
petitioner, later substituted by her heirs, filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of judgment, particularly the September 7, 1994 Order, which
reinstated the RTC’s April 27, 1994 and November 14, 1994 Resolutions,
which denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
CA denied the petition, holding that the remedy of a petition for
annulment of judgment is no longer available since petitioner Maura So
had already filed a petition for review with this Court assailing the same
orders of the trial court.
Apparently, prior to the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment
with the CA, petitioner Maura So filed a petition for review
on certiorari13 with this Court assailing the same RTC Order and
Resolution.
In a Minute Resolution the Court denied the petition for failure to
sufficiently show that the questioned judgment is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion and for being the wrong remedy.
The court denied the motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Minute
Resolution became final and executory on September 1, 1998.16
the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of its decision
denying the petition for annulment of judgment.17 Petitioners then filed
this petition for review
Issue: Whether on not there should be annulment of judgment
Held: Yes. annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character,
allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other
adequate remedy.
Thus, it may not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the
remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those
remedies through his own fault or negligence.
We, therefore, agree with the CA that the remedy of a petition for
annulment of judgment is no longer available to petitioners since their
predecessor-in-interest, Maura So, had already availed herself of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Further, none of the grounds for annulment of judgment, namely, extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction, is present in this case.
Petitioners argue that the RTC acted without jurisdiction when it rendered
the Resolution which recognized respondents’ right to redeem the
property because this, in effect, amended the Decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860, and the Resolution in G.R. No.
110661, which sustained the sale of the property to Maura So.
Petitioners clearly confused lack of jurisdiction with error in the exercise of
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority
to decide a case, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all
other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction.
And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction
are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an
appeal.21 The error raised by petitioners pertains to the trial court’s
exercise of its jurisdiction, not its lack of authority to decide the case. In a
petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner
must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute
lack of authority to hear and decide the case. On this basis, there would be
no valid ground to grant the petition for annulment of judgment.
well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land.22 The reason for this is that
litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party, through a mere subterfuge,
be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle
of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the
judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become
final on some definite date fixed by law.24 The only exceptions to the
general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which
render its execution unjust and inequitable.25 Again, none of these
exceptions is present in this case.
Notwithstanding these principles, however, the higher interests of justice
and equity demand that we brush aside the procedural norms. After all,
rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than defeat substantial
justice, and should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. Rules
of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice; they are promulgated to aid the court in the effective dispensation
of justice. The Court has the inherent power and discretion to amend,
modify or reconsider a final judgment when it is necessary to accomplish
the ends of justice.26
If the rigid application of the Rules would frustrate rather than promote
justice, it is always within the Court’s power to suspend the Rules or except
a particular case from its operation.27 The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that
which this Court itself has already declared to be final.28
The present case is peculiar in the sense that it involves three final and
executory judgments. The first is this Court’s Decision in G.R. Nos. 92871
and 92860 which upheld the sale of the whole property by the Jomoc heirs,
including the herein respondents, to petitioner Maura So. The second is
the Court’s Resolution in G.R. No. 110661, which sustained the order of
execution of the said decision against the herein respondents despite the
fact that they were not party-defendants in the first case. And the third is
the Court’s Minute Resolution in G.R. No. 118050 which denied Maura So’s
petition for review of the RTC Decision granting respondents’ right to
redeem the property.
It is the third judgment that is apparently in conflict with the two previous
judgments. It rendered final and executory the April 27, 1994 Resolution of
the RTC which recognized the right of respondents, as co-owners, to
redeem the disputed land from Maura So. To recall, the RTC premised its
decision on its finding that respondents did not actually sell their shares in
the property to Maura So because they did not sign the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land in favor of
So; hence, they remained co-owners. This ruling is patently erroneous
because this Court had already pronounced in the first two final and
executory judgments (in G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860, and G.R. No. 110661)
that the whole property had already been sold to Maura So. The RTC was
barred from holding otherwise under the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment.

The doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment" precludes the re-litigation of

a particular fact or issue already passed upon by a court of competent
jurisdiction in a former judgment, in another action between the same
parties based on a different claim or cause of action.29

Obviously, the complaint for legal redemption was deliberately filed by the
respondents with the RTC to circumvent this Court’s previous decisions
sustaining the sale of the whole property to Maura So. The Court cannot
condone this ploy, even if it failed to uncover the same when the case was
erroneously elevated to it directly from the trial court (G.R. No. 118050).

The matter is again before this Court, and this time, it behooves the Court
to set things right in order to prevent a grave injustice from being
committed against Maura So who had, for 15 years since the first decision
was executed, already considered herself to be the owner of the property.
The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and
stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments
would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.