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NAA: A14217, 1903

Series number: A14217

Control symbol: 1903
Barcode: 32085883
Number of pages: 56

Cabinet Memorandum 1903 - Reference copy of The Security Intelligence Planning Document 1994 -
Decision 3504/SEC
5‘ NATIONAL ||| ARCH IVESAustralian Government l o F A u s T R A L | ASTATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DECISION UNDER SECTION 40(5)OF THE ARCHIVES ACT 1983Series: A14217Control Symbol:
1903Barcode: 32085883Title: Cabinet Memorandum 1903 - Reference copy of TheSecurity Intelligence Planning Document 1994 - Decision3504/ SECDecision Maker: Kate RobertsDesignation: Assistant DirectorDate: 1
Ianuary 2018In accordance with requirements of subsection 8(1) of the Archives Act 1983 (Cth)(Archives Act), I am a person authorised by the Director-General, pursuant to anInstrument of Delegation, to make a decision
in relation to access to the requestedrecord.Basis for decisionIn making my decision, I considered:o the content of the record requestedo the relevant provisions of the Archives Act 1983o policy and guidelines of National
Archives of Australia that relate to theaccess examination of Commonwealth records~ information provided by Commonwealth agencies which I have relied uponin formulating my decision.DecisionI have decided that this
item is Open With Exception‘ under section 33(1)(a) of theArchives Act for the reasons set out below.28 folios (1, 8, 9, 10, 12-14, 19, 24- 28, 30-33, 36-40, 44-47, 51 and 52) have beenpartially exempted from public access
and 3 folios (29 and 54-55) have been Whollyexempted from public access. _1
I ‘ NATIONAL ||| ARCHIVESAustralian Government l o F A u s T R A |_ | AThe findings of factsSection 33(1)(a) of the Archives Act provides that:v a record is exempt from public access if it contains information or matter
thedisclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to causedamage to the security, defence or international relations of theCommonwealth.This record contains:0 Information relevant to the capability,
sources, objectives, methods, areas of Dinterests or operations of an Australian intelligence agency. The informationis still regarded as sensitive.Reasons for decision0 Public disclosure of this information could compromise
the activities of anAustralian intelligence agency and impair its ability to carry out its statutoryfunction. It would therefore reasonably be expected to cause damage to thesecurity of Commonwealth.Review of decisionThe
National Archives of Australia (the Archives) carefully examines records beforedeciding to exempt any part of them. As part of that process we may consult with 0other agencies which have expertise on specific national and
international matters.If you do not agree with the decision, you can formally appeal within 28 days ofreceiving:1. by first applying to the Archives for an internal reconsideration of mydecision; and2. if you still do not agree
with the decision, you can apply to theAdministrative Appeals Tribunal for a review.For more information please read the National Archives Fact Sheet 12 What to do ifwe refuse you access (Www.naa.gov.au/ about-
usLpublications/ fact-sheets/fs12.aspx).2
‘ _ _~ \v,. ,, 5F 1' ,,_~,\<. 51:4»C A B I Nsecurity CommitteeCanberra, 5 December 1994E T M I[1]A n {"I '~* I "'-1"'f\.£"\f“'L_/~\1;,l[*»?.;; Q '_,,\'_,Tl.‘l:."i..';i-KI.N U T EN0. 3504 (SEC)Memorandum 1903 - The Security
Intelligence PlanningDocument 1994The Committee endorsed the judgments containedin the Executive Summary to the Security IntelligencePlanning Document 1994.2.rx /\ P"-is Ea,» F’; The Committee noted that ASIO
would consider/\/for Secretary to Cabinet~ 1--’~|1*‘'41-. ..,_//_.-.v,i. .
,. -V-1NO 3504 ( F? ETSEC1jcontinuedLCirculation ListMinistersPrime MinTreasurerMinisterMinisterAttorneyMinisterInternalSecretaryDeputy SeFAS (INT)AS (osxc)FAS (CabiCabinet OFileisterfor Foreign Affairsfor
DefenceGeneralfor Financecretarynet)fficeAddressees OnlycAB:r-:&1' CONFIDENCI; [2]ACow-—-**’Jeremy Newman‘PL/V?Malcolm Haze \Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs & TradeSecretary, Department of
DefenceChief ofthe Defence ForceSecretary, Attorney General's DepartmentSecretary, Department of FinanceDirector-Director-Director-DirectorDirector ’\;in QGeneral, ASIOGeneral, ONAGeneral ASISDIODSDCABlNET
IN CONF!DEN<",[
_$E¢BET AUSTEO CABINET-lN-CONFIDENCE190MEMORANDUM No ____________________________ _,’~ FOR CABINET COPY No .... ..... .2£.;i9.TitleDateOriginatingDepartment(s)Cabinet orMinisterialAuthority
forMemorandumPurpose of“ MemorandumProgram ContextLegislationinvolvedConsultation:. Departmentsconsuhed. ls thereagreement?Cost:. This fiscal year. year 2. year 3. year 4THE SECURITY INTELLIGENCE
PLANNING DOCUMENT1994§\\\1 7 NOV E943 November 1994 OSIC BR/AMSecretaries Comrmttee on Intelligence and Secur1ty(SCIS) /%CM 543 (SEC) of 24 June 1992 endorsed the recommendations of theReport of
the Secretaries Cormnittee on Intelligence and Security(SCIS) on The Australian Intelligence Community in a ChangingIntemational Environment. The Report recommended that a SecurityIntelligence Planning Document
should be developed as a counterpartdocument to be prepared in parallel to the Foreign Intelligence PlanningDocumentTo present the Security Intelligence Planning Document 1994 forMinisters‘ considerationThis
Memorandum contributes to the objectives of the programs of theAustralian Security & Intelligence AgenciesNot ApplicableSCIS (comprising Secretaries of the Departments of the PriméMinister & Cabinet,Defence, Foreign
Aairs & Trade, Finance and Attomey-General‘s, the Chief of theDefence Force and the Directors-General of ASIO and ONA). The Director-General ASIS, the Chairman of the Commonwealth Law EnforcementBoard and the
Commissioner Australian Federal Police were also presentYesNot ApplicableP ‘-(“Y No ....... ......... .PAC:‘ES7%/»¢§\\\This document is the property of the Australian Government and is not to be copied or reproduced-=" ~
1-" c CABlNET—lN-CONFIDENCE ,/W
\-.»SECRET CABINET-IN-CONFIDENCE AUSTEO A2THE SECURITY INTELLIGENCE PLANNING DOCUMENT 1994The 1992 Report of the Secretaries Committee on Intelligence and Security (SCIS) onThe Australian
Intelligence Community in a Changing Intemational Environmentrecommended the development of Foreign and Security Intelligence PlanningDocuments as a medium-to-long term plaming mechanism for the
intelligencecommunity. The documents were to look ahead up to seven years and integratejudgments about changes in the intemational order with decisions about resourcesplanning, including the balance and mix of
capabilities across the intelligence agencies.2. The Security Intelligence Planning Document 1994 is attached to thisMemorandum. The document is directed to setting guidelines for developing Australia'ssecurity
intelligence priorities in the 1990s. It reviews Australia's security intelligencearrangements and revisits relevant assessments and judgements of the 1992 SCISReview. It is focused on the security intelligence community -
primarily the AustralianSecurity Intelligence Organization (ASIO) but also including elements of foreignintelligence, law enforcement and other agencies with which ASIO cooperates in orderto discharge its functions.3. SCIS
recommends that Ministers:(a) endorse the main judgements of the Security Intelligence Planning Document1994 as set out in the Executive Summary to the document: and(b) note the issues addressed in the Security
Intelligence Planning Document 1994.SECRET CABINET-lN-CONFIDENCE AUSTEO
‘ v \ ~C v I V| ‘ -. ‘. ‘ \ , \. \aw‘ \-‘\‘ ., M .M yh ‘a. . .‘ \ t \. ‘w ‘V “‘. / ‘> , \‘ \‘ H‘\<y‘ ‘ \
Llililllil-Ella» 5~5_\)AUS'l‘§ALIA;1-SECRET AUSTEOAustralian SecurityIntelligence OrganizationHLUWLELEKLLLl!JL!Jl!Jl!J\!l‘l!JL!J‘!ll!ll!JllIJ“LUL!J.!il!ilLL'&L!41Executive Summary Conclusions
andRecommendationsSecurityIntelligencePlanningDocumentA1 we P‘°‘§Zml\$C-“E tm\@“‘ ls t !*“$“°'\\éd O‘ mW dozw at be COP M :28C’O:llg\t\\s muss :\:~I'\\\’\Oult3ltEl@\\\9e¢° \n<>‘e $e¢““d_\$5em “Q\lOn[ms . “y\\\e -
Q\\oO<9°‘“lSECRET AUSTEOQt \\w
SECRET AUSTEOExecutive Summary .l. This document is directed to setting guidelines for the development ofAustralia's security intelligence priorities in the late 1990s. It reviews Australia'ssecurity intelligence
arrangements and revisits relevant assessments and judgementsof the 1992 SCIS intelligence review. In doing so it seeks to integrate judgementsabout changes in the international environment with intelligence planning,
programsand resources. It also discusses the mixture of skills and capabilities needed in theAustralian security intelligence community in the late 1990s.2. This is the first of what will be a series of national Security
IntelligencePlanning Documents, to be reviewed every three years.3. Security intelligence allows government to know about and understand securityrisks faced by Australia, and, where appropriate, take steps to manage
those risks.Security relates to clandestine, deceptive or violent political activities short of war thatmay harm Australia - specifically, foreign interference, espionage, sabotage,politically motivated violence, the promotion of
communal violence and attacks onAustralia’s defence system, whether in Australia or not. Security intelligence isresponsive - inuenced by events or issues within Australia or those emerging outsideAustralia - and
predictive, seeking to anticipate resulting risks to Australian security,and to warn of their potential implications. The security environment inuences theway security intelligence organisations do business and emphasises the
need for soundinformation and assessments on overseas developments.4. The subjects of security intelligence interest are generally individuals orindividuals working in groups (terrorist organisations of varying sizes,
intelligenceservices), so coverage is human resource intensive. While technology is helping toimprove collection activities and computers are aiding some analysis, the painstakingbusiness of human intelligence collection
will dominate security intelligence work tothe end_of the 1990s.5. In response to the less immediately threatening, but more complex, securityenvironment which will persist through the 1990s, agencies involved in
securityintelligence will need to be exible in the deployment of existing staff resources,strategically focused and well coordinated. They will also be required to betterintegrate sources of relevant information. By the 1997
SIPD review, the cormnunitywill need to have:- developed a long term strategic focus and goals;~ enhanced the professionalism of staff through recruitment, training anddevelopment programs; andSECRET AUSTEO_
Australian Security Intelligence Organization1
El5!ElE!E!ElElElElElsoElElQCHBBHaa3B.353153l5III6. These security intelligence challenges will require better management of theexisting human resource base. During the next three years the security
intelligencecommunity will also have enhanced its internal capabilities through cross-training andmore exible resource management. Better coordination with cooperating agenciesSECRET AUSTEOput in place responsive
consultation and coordination mechanisms.will be achieved and further consideration given to the use of technology tosupplement human resources. This is unlikely to require resources beyond currentprojected budget
levels up to I997.8. Looking further ahead it is recognised that the Sydney Olympics and visitsassociated with the centenary of Federation may create a need to reallocate resourcesafter 1997. It is expected this can be
handled by further developing strategicmonitoring capabilities and human resource mobility within the community. This willbe an issue for consideration in the first SIPD review in 1997.SECRET AUSTEO__ Australian
Security Intelligence Organizationll[N
C3ElEHE=1=1:1:1:1'3ElElEl=3ElitE,Elit53EbBEJ3355EEl35SECRET AUSTEOCONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSConclusionsAustralia's strategic security outlook9. The end of the Cold War and the emergence
of democratic or more liberalregimes in Central and Eastern Europe have significantly altered Australia's securityenvironment, in many ways for the better. Steps towards broad Israeli-Palestinianagreement have dampened
some of the traditional sources of Middle East tension,including State-sponsored terrorism. In Australia, the threat from violent nationalistgroups has declined.10. A more complex and less predictable security environment
has developed fromissues emerging from the Middle East, Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Theseissues are either directly imported or taken up by elements in Australia with apropensity to respond violently to
overseas developments and events. Many issueswill become particular problems when foreign dignitaries visit or major internationalevents occur in Australia.ll. Priority areas for security intelligence collection and analysis
activity for theremainder of the 1990s will be:- violent ethnic/nationalist, religious, racist and political extremism - theactivities and responses of ethnic, nationalist and religious extremists areviolence.~ international political,
economic and military rivalry - foreign intelligenceservices attempting to obtain covertly protected information, and influenceAustralia-S . ' foreign interference in civil or human rights - foreign intelligence servicesSECRET
AUSTEO Australian Security Intelligence Organization111I
. -in[10]SECRET AUSTEOe proliferation of weapons of mass destmction - foreign intelligence servicesand other agencies of foreign governments assist the development of weaponsof mass destruction in their countries
through covert of Austramlianscientific and technoloiical eiuii or Iv transnational organised crime - as an as ect of foreign interference byPintelligence services and other agencies of countries 0 use criminIalsand their
orianisations to iursue in -A sound understanding of threats emerging from these areas will be necessary toensure relevant security advice is available to government.The Security Intelligence Operating FrameworkI2.
Australia’s security intelligence ‘community’ comprises ASIO together with thevarious elements of the Commonwealth and State administrations with which it needsto cooperate in order to discharge its functions. These
include:- the AFP, ASIS, DFAT, DIO, DSD, and ONA, which each undertake aspects ofcollection, assessment, liaison or prevention responses;- the Attorney-Gcncral's Department, Defence, DEET, DIEA, DPM&C,
ACS,APS and NCA, which hold or obtain secunty related or relevant information,or participate in prevention responses; and ,- State and Territory Police, Ethnic Affairs agencies and other departments.which also hold
security related or relevant information,~or participate inprevention responses.I3. While at the centre of domestic security arrangements ASIO needs to work more .closely with the contributing elements. A common
understanding of the securityprocess, and of each agency's role within it, should be developed.14. Overseas security intelligence exchanges are crucial to monitoring the strategicsecurity environment. Intelligence ows from
AFP, ASIS and ONA liaison, throughDFAT's extensive overseas representation and DIEA contacts. The activities of theseagencies and ASIO's extensive foreign liaison should remain a high priority task.15. While North
America and Britain remain important sources of intelligence,SECRET AUSTEO_ Australian Security Intelligence OrganizationIV
SECRET AUSTEOcontinue to be strengthened, recognising the potential for security risks to emergefrom these regions.16. There has always been an overlap between police and ASIO interest in security-related activities.
In view of the rising importance of transnational crime as an issuewhich can directly affect the integrity of States, and the connection some foreignpowers have established with organised crime, closer interaction with
lawenforcement agencies to identify States using criminals or engaging in criminal orillegal behaviour will be required.Security Intelligence Challengesl7. Progress has been made in refining security intelligence priority
setting andimproving the nexus between customer requirements and collection and analysis.More timely dissemination of information to customers has also been achieved . Butthere is still room for further improvement.
'Strategic managementl8. Often preoccupied with tactical issues and the ‘tyranny of current intelligence‘,the security intelligence community risks not devoting adequate resources to strategicassessments to enable better
planning and resource management.Flexibility19. The nature of the security environment now and for the remainder of the 1990sis such that the security intelligence community must be exible. It needs toinstitutionalise
responsive management systems and create systems able to anticipateand adjust to a rapidly evolving security environment. I20. Areas highlighted as requiring increased exibility include adjusting to newpriorities and inter-
agency cooperation and information exchange. The counter-terrorism structure is exible and is well-suited to cope with change. This is not thecase in counter-espionage and counter-intelligence.People l _21. In the 1990s,
agencies need well educated, knowledgeable and skilledintelligence ofcers who can be flexibly deployed against changing priorities. Somealready have them. Others are less well placed.22. The changeable nature of the
security threat suggests there will be occasionswhen resourcing and skill levels might not be adequate to meet a short term highpriority, or when specialist resources are required across a wider range of highpriorities (eg.,
during the Olympic Games). In developing enhanced strategicSECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence OrganizationV
=1=1=1B:1:12*]9QQ3'‘:1slHE1BEl3'QQQ9QQ53B5]E]'32SECRET AUSTEOmonitoring, attention should be directed to exible priority setting and resourcemobility within the community.23. A key intelligence staffing
requirement in the late l99Os will be for high qualityanalysts able to use sophisticated analytical techniques and modem technology, andunderstand complex specialised subjects, such as proliferation. Specialist
humanintelligence collectors with language skills and technical experts procient in usingand developing contemporary technologies will also be needed.Technology24. The technology used to facilitate intelligence collection,
collation and analysisand the provision of intelligence product is changing rapidly. The application oftechnology to intelligence analysis has been particularly slow to take hold in thecommunity. The establishment of a secure
communications network is urgentlyneeded.powers legislative change.26. The relationship between ASIO, ASIS, DSD and DSTO is sound but needs tobecome stronger. Forums such as the Inter Agency Technical Forum
(IATF) and theInter-Agency Information Technology Forum (IAITF), which include ASIO, ASIS,DSD and DFAT, are necessary. The possibility of duplication of effort and resourcesin technical research and development has
been reduced through such cooperation andefforts should continue.Information management capability27. The utilisation of relevant public media and ofcial information is needed tomaintain and improve the quality and
timeliness of security intelligence advice.28. Specialist database officers will be needed to manage effectively the range ofdatabases. There is potential for agency co-operation with security
intelligencedatabases.Coordination29. While ASIO is the national assessing and primary collecting agency for securityintelligence, it depends on cooperating agencies for information and support inpriority setting. Common
agreement is also needed on a range of developing issuessuch as roles in preventing criminal violence. To ensure coordination in these areas,there should be established a Consultation Committee on Security
IntelligenceSECRET AUSTEO' Australian Security Intelligence OrganizationVI[12]
=1=1C:1:1:1=1:1:1:15|:1‘:1‘J,1O9|:1ElH9I9.5al:35BBB55il1i3ISECRET AUSTEO(CCSI), chaired by ASIO, to ensure security intelligence priorities and harmassessments are better articulated and agreed, and product and
research programs areusefully focused.30. Counter terrorist intelligence coordination is effectively carried out through theSIDC-PAV/SAC-PAV arrangements which have been the subject of recent
review.RecommendationsDirected towards maintaining and enhancing capabilities within ASIO's existingresource base31. Alternative methods of monitoring extremist groups with law enforcementagencies should be
explored. (paragraph 25.)32. Greater attention needs to be paid Australiaand action taken to develop awareness programs.assessmentThis assessment will be presented to SCIS by the end of I995. (para. 37). ASIO in
consultation with other AISA members." Counter-proliferation activity needs to co ' 'in Australia needsto be --36. - ' ntinue at present levels. and an industryinformation program needs to be developed. (para. 45.)37.
Sufficient resources should be allocated to maintain and develop covert sources.(para. 63.)38. Ways of enhancing regional contacts should be explored and opportunities forjoint operations, exchanges, and training
considered. (para. 67.)39. Strategic management capabilities should be strengthened and resources appliedto global monitoring and assessment. (para. 77)SECRET AUSTEO__ Australian Security Intelligence
OrganizationVll
Li‘!SECRET AUSTEO40. Comprehensive monitoring of risks should continue and be enhanced withspecic resources devoted to the task. (para. 79) '41. Technical research and development should continue with attention
paid to the <P="=*- 94>42. The TSU‘s capability should be upgraded in accordance with the SAC-PAVreview, or the police forces take the lead in this area of technology. (para. 96)Directed to enhancing the coordination of
security intelligence activities andrequiring no new resources43. ASIO and law enforcement agencies need to work closely together to identifyStates using criminals to pursue their political and economic interests. (para.
71)44. Law enforcement agencies and ASIO should examine how they might act moreefciently and effectively in response to potential security risks facing foreigninterests in Australia. (para. 73)45. Better training and
development of intelligence staff are needed. Thedevelopment of ASlO's intelligence core competencies should continue, inconsultation with other agencies. (para. 84)46. Cooperative training against agreed intelligence
competencies should beexplored. Secondments and exchanges of staff within the intelligence communityshould be encouraged. The concept of working liaisons with agencies havingspecialist technical competencies and
the recruitment of specialist technical staffshould be explored as options to meet specialist technical advice needs. (para. 85.47. Action should be taken to develop an enhanced language resource base. (para.91) ."-48.
Technological coordination within the community needs to become stronger andconsideration given to sharing facilities. (para. 97)49. The need for a seven day week and limited 24 hour coverage of worlddevelopments of
security intelligence signicance, so as to be able to react morequickly, should be explored. (para. 107)50. A Consultative Committee on Security Intelligence (CCSI), chaired by ASIO,should be established (para. 112-
113).SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence OrganizationVlll
2]=1=1H:1:1:152]:13'‘:1%“J'3:1"JEbllanE.anatatiiElE453:12Bil3sscner AUSTEO I51. The scope for better inter agency coordination to counter foreign interferenceand espionage needs to be examined. (para. 1 18)52. The
Inter Departmental Committee on Foreign Intelligence Operations (IDC-FIO) should be revived. (para. 119)53. To the extent legal constraints permit, the ’community' should exploreopportunities to link security intelligence
data bases. (para. 121)54. Action needs to be taken to ensure the safe transmission, handling and storage ofsecurity information in the community. SPEAKEASY appears to be a suitable securecommunications system for
exchanging security intelligence within Australia, at leastuntil a secure data network can be established. (para. 124)Specic matters to be revisited in the rst review of the SIPD in 199755. Security intelligence and law
enforcement responsibilities relating to theinvolvement of foreign powers in criminal activities should be explored and defined.(para. 48)56. Risk management should be adopted as a basis for a broader security
intelligencecollection system. (para. 82) _57. The functioning of the Inter Departmental Committee on Foreign IntelligenceOperations (IDC-FIO ) should be reviewed. (para. 119)SECRET AUSTEO_ Australian Security
Intelligence OrganizationIX
. ‘ \r \ ‘ ‘ \ ‘F .4 I\ , ‘ \Q1»¢
>/1)\‘\445JIJJI_)I.1\ 5 r '\/, \ ‘ A*~ \."\\‘IxM1./ -Vv. n, ¢,U..'. .:"_) \ ’. é V ' .. ,) ‘.“‘~-‘::“H M r I‘ ‘ T‘ NH ‘ A \ '\]‘§}~:‘ ‘~_“'_‘"‘ _ “‘?\\'§." ~ 3 ',\\ \ '1v
iii’: E‘» aSECRET AUSTEO‘k4U,)\ Australian Security'5‘J>‘>>>>>~,¢<<<<<</."sT“u“L‘* Intelligence Organizationfill? Ihm! and267"!J.;__§ii£13>_>/-I“.4SecurityIntelligencePlanningDocument& weo 9‘ OCR“-A2u“\e“l
.\S<:l‘?*‘llll§\l3el§lZl m-‘\n‘\5 do n\NeQ\\\“ x be COP ‘O\1Q\lllOComtoxs mug\ Y\0_\x\“OU\ 0YP‘e\\.\ge(\C€Come“ .\nO\e<l ‘Nse¢ut'\l‘l “¢\ss@£\‘)S“O\'\_o““gt Qon\zO“°“ 'L»! SECRET AUSTEO
ii13EC13£23332332’l.4.\5JJ)3l4*SECRET AUSTEOContentsl. Introduction ............................................... ..What is security intelligence? ............ ..2. Strategic Security Outlook ....................... ..Asia
........................................... ..Europe including the BalkanRacist extremism in Australia .............. ..Political extremism in Australia ....................................................... ..military rivalry .................................. ..Internation
economic andInterferenceProliferation ......................................... ..Transnational organised crime ........... ..- - - - - » - . - . ~ - . - . . - . - - - . ¢ . . . . - - - . . . . . . - - - - - - - - .--- - - . - - . . . . - - . - - - - - - - - - - - . . . ¢ - - ¢ . - - . . . . -
- - - . . - . . . . - - - - - . - - - . -.-- - . . . - . . . - - - - - - ~ - - - . . - - . . . . - - . . . . - - - - - ~ - - . . . - - - . , . - - - . . - .--Ethnic/nationalist, religious, racist and political extremism ........................ ..The Middle East ...................... ..- - - . - .
- - . . - - - - . . - . - - - - - - . - . - - ~ - ~ - - - ~ > | . - - . . . . - - - . - - - ~ . . . . - - ---S ........................................................ ............................................ ..- . . . - - - . . - - - . . . - - . . ~ - - - | - - . - - . - . - - - - . . - . . ¢ - - - - - - - . - - - - . - ---
3. The Security Intelligence Operating Framework ............................................. ..Contributing agencies in Australian security intelligence ....................... ..The role of ASIO ................................. ..Risk Management
.................. ..Liaison Partnerships....... . ..- ~ - - - - - . . - . ---- . - - - - - - - - - . . . - - . . . - - ~ - - . . - - - - - - - - < - . . - . . . - - - - - - - . . - . - - . ~ - --.1bobo'\1'\1'c:\b1'u1‘>‘r\a.9.lO.12.1314.14.15...........................................................
..16Sources of information - nature and type ..................................... ...17. ............... .. 18Liaison partners .............. .. 18Overseas representation ................................................ ..Role of law enforcement agencies ..... ..4.
Security Intelligence Challenges .............. ..Strategic management ................ .; ..... ..- - - - - - . . . . - . - . . . ---.19. . . - - ' - - - - - - ~ ¢ - - ~ - - - . - - - - - - - - - . . - - . - - . - . . . . - - - - - - - ~ - - . . - -~-19¢ . . - - - - - . » - - . . - ~ - - . .
¢ - - . . . ¢ - v » . . - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - . - - . - ~ - - - - - --- . - ¢ » - - . - . - - - - . . - - . . . . - - . - - - - - - . . . - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - . - - - - . ~ - - - - . ¢ ---Flexibility ......................................................................................................... ..People
.................................................. ..Training .................................... ..Analysis ..................................... ..- ~ . - . - . . . - - - - . . - - . . . . - . . - - ¢ - - - - - - » - - - . - - - - - - . - - - . . - ~ - - » - . ..-~ . - - - . . . - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - . - - - -
- - - ~ - - - . - ~ - - - -IIJIIIDIIIIQIIICollection ........................................................................................... ..Specialist language skills ...... ..Specialist technological andTechnology ......................................... ..engineering skills
......................... ..Adapting to new technologies ........................................................ ..Telecommunications interception .................................................. ..Information technologies (IT)Information management capability
..Coordination ........................................ ... . - - - . . . - - - . . . - - - - . . - - . - . . - | - . . . - - - . . . . - - . . . - . - . . . - - . . . - --.- - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ - . - . . - - - . . . - ¢ - | . . | | . - . . - - - - . . | - . - . - - - - . . - . - - . . - -.-- - - - - - ~ - - - - - | . - - - -
| - - - - - - - - - - ¢ - | » - - - . . - - - . - - - - - - - - Q - - - - - ---2223232424252526262628282930A security intelligence coordination structure ............................. ..3lRelationships with law enforcement and intelligenceagencies
and the sharing of capabilities ...................................... ..SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization33
:3isoai‘Eas§aeaas21SECRET AUSTEO1. Introduction1. This Security Intelligence Planning Document (SIPD) is directed tosetting guidelines for the development of Australia's security intelligencepriorities, requirements
and capabilities. In line with the recommendation ofthe 1992 SCIS review, it is designed to complement the Foreign IntelligencePlanning Document (FIPD) prepared by the Office of National Assessments(ONA). This
document:- reviews the Australian security intelligence community, and revisitsthe assessments and judgements of the 1992 SCIS Review;' looks ahead five to seven years and will be reviewed every threeyears; and~
integrates judgements about changes in the internationalenvironment with resource planning and programs, including theright mix of skills and capabilities within the Australian securityintelligence community.2. It identifies:-
what aspects of the security environment present risks for Australia;- what capabilities will be needed to investigate and analyse themadequately, and advise government about them; and "~ what implications these have for
resources.3. The contribution of agencies to foreign intelligence, such as _ASIO'sthrough special powers operations and overseas information collected inAustralia in the course of pursuing security intelligence functions,
will not beconsidered in this document. It will be addressed in the FIPD. Thiscontribution places demands on resources, and should be included in anyconsideration of activities and resource needs.SECRET AUSTEO -
Australian Security Intelligence OrganizationI
§ii’§ti55iitiiiiiil“ii".l£liJ W1siQ‘as2i32esé>2;asE3SECRET AUSTEOWhat is security intelligence?4. Intelligence warns of emerging threats, reveals opportunities orhighlights uncertainties. ‘Security’ relates to clandestine,
deceptive or violentpolitical activities short of war that may harm Australia. '5. Security intelligence is the defensive aspect of intelligence. Securityintelligence allows government to know about and understand security
risksfaced by Australia, from inside and beyond our borders, predict how they willaffect Australia and, where appropriate, take steps to manage them. lts roleis:~ protecting Australia's survival and wellbeing, guarding
againstviolent or undemocratic challenge, and protecting the government'sdischarge of its legitimate and proper business; and- preserving the individual's right to participate freely and safely inAustralia's democratic
society.6. Security intelligence is concemed with protecting Australia and itsnational interests from those who would harm them, and determining whenthe nation or national interests are at risk. Broadly, these national
interestsencompass:- the physical safety of Australia's citizens and residents, those thegovernment has a duty to protect (for example, diplomats, consularofficials and visiting foreign dignitaries), and their ab‘ilit-y_;to
engageunhindered in normal social and political activity;' the physical integrity of the property belonging to those individuals;~ Australia's national sovereignty and territorial integrity;' the integrity of the political institutions
fundamental to the well-being of our democratic society, and of the unfettered exercise of bAustralia's political independence; and' our economic prosperity, and material and social well-being.SECRET AUSTEOAustralian
Security Intelligence Organization2
Q5525iiZSYE*35:5i~iZ‘iiIii153523£5T5E3‘.53SECRET AUSTEO7. The specific activities against which protection is provided are set outin the ASIO Act. They are foreign interference, espionage, sabotage,politically
motivated violence, the promotion of communal violence andattacks on Australia's defence system, whether directed from, or undertakenin Australia or not. This list has been modified from time to time as new kindsof
security threat have been identied and old concerns have diminished.8. Many of these activities are manifested in the actions of individuals, orof small groups of people acting in clandestine and secretive ways. Whilesome
technical means of obtaining information about such activities can besuccessful, often the most efficient and effective way of obtainingintelligence is through human source operations. This places added humanresource
burdens on the collecting agency. Human intelligence, andconsequently, the demands it imposes, will dominate the security intelligenceenvironment for the remainder of the 1990s.SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security
Intelligence Organization3[Z2]
"B1%?‘E@3'§anQ2E5'ii55§35'255'5S-'35[23]SECRET AUSTEO2.. Strategic Security Outlook9. The end of the Cold War has significantly altered Australia's securityenvironment, in many ways for the better. Progress has
been made towardsMiddle East peace and the rehabilitation of Eastern Europe, thus reducingthe security risk from these areas. State inspired terrorism is also on thedecline as is ideologically based extremism, and threats
from violentAustralian nationalist groups. But troubles and rivalries persist, and may bemagnified as nationalism, territoriality and historical geography, freed fromsuperpower restraints, re-assert their influence over countries
and people.10. During the 1990s, a more complex and less predictable securityenvironment will develop, from issues emerging from the Middle East, South,East and Southeast Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. These
issues willbe either directly imported or taken up by elements in Australian society witha propensity to respond violently to overseas developments and events.ll. Australia's security in the late 1990s will be inuenced by:~
violent ethnic/nationalist, religious, racist and political extremism - inAustralia through the presence here of nationalist and religiousextremist groups and individuals whose activities and responses aredetermined directly by
events in their former homelands in theMiddle East, Asia and Europe, and of extremists of both the racist'right' and post-Cold War ‘left’ (causing politically motivated andcommunal violence and attacks on Australia's defence
system);- international political, economic and military rivalry - in Australiathrough attempts by foreign intelligence services covertly to obtaininformation the Australian. government wishes to protect (espionage),to interfere
with the free exercise of civil or human rights byattempting to inuence the ethnic communities originating from theircountries (sometimes leading to communal violence), and to inuenceAustralia's decision-making (foreign
interference);' attempts by foreign intelligence services and other agencies offoreign governments to assist the development of weapons of massdestruction through the clandestine acquisition of AustralianSECRET
AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization4
S:5Y5113Alilliii§Ei*,tiiiat~_3*5E'3»'552!555SECRET AUSTEOscientific and technological equipment or information (foreign-interference); and- transnational organised crime (as an aspect of foreign interference).12. Many of
these security risks - especially those relating to politicallymotivated and communal violence - will become particular problems whenforeign dignitaries visit. Flowing from Australia's wider and deeperinternational
involvement, such visits have become more frequent in recentyears, demanding increasing security attention and resources, and are likelyto peak with the Sydney Olympics and the centenary of
Federation.Ethnic/nationalist, religious, racist and political extremism13. About three quarters of the world's estimated twenty-seven millionrefugees are in ight from, or have been displaced by, ethnic conicts. Theseconicts
bring with them the potential for international military involvement,world-wide reaction of ethnic communities and the international targeting ofthose communities by incumbent regimes, often by their security andintelligence
apparatuses. Elsewhere, religious divisions cause severe localdisruption, have led to acts of international terrorism, and provide anideological underpinning to nationalist movements. In particular, Islamicextremism, because
of its transnational and often anti-Western nature, poses arisk to international security.14. Individuals and groups with backgrounds and contacts which mightlead to violence are present in Australia and require continual
monitoring.The level and extent of resources applied to specific subjects to gauge theirpotential security risk will vary according to the assessed threat, but willcontinue to be intensive and expensive. However, the exible
allocation ofresources currently devoted to these issues will allow adequate coverageover the next three years.The Middle East _15. It is expected that local Middle Eastern communities and theirsupporters will continue to
react to Australia's involvement MiddleEastern affairs In Eastern terroristAdding to uncertainties is the wild card ofSECRET - AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization5
EiiSE'55E§5i-—JW iiiEiEEQLE8“!a222asaeaas55[25]SECRET AUSTEOIslamic extremism perpetrated by small, diverse groups not previouslyassociated with international terrorism and distant from the Middle East
(forThese potential threats will remain through the 1990s.16. Security risks will also continue to result from the in Australiaof elements of or terrorisa number AustralianA number of groups here look to their respective
homelands oroverseas communities for leadershi , either throu h some type of formalcommunication y leaders being sentto Australia to proselytise and organise the local members or sympathisers.17. There is also a
history of factional struggles between moderate andradical elements for control of the major mosques in Australia which can beexpected to continue. Communal violence is possible.Asial8. The Asian in Australiamore
inuenced Islamic extremism There are substantialMiddle Eastern involvement in wider Asi to bSECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization6
i53as25a55§Z‘52E2a‘“$""“‘U'”2‘Qii:215?}E52§5isSECRET AUSTEO19. These issues could become more relevant to Australia in the 1990s. Thecontinuing flow of Asian migrants will include people carrying oldresentments
or sensitive to the Australian government's stance on issuesrelevant to their country of origin. This could cause violence in the form ofvisitors.Europe including the Balkans20. Ethnic conicts and nationalist tensions in
Eastern Europe, particularlyin the Balkans and Russia's ‘near-abroad’, will have repercussions incorresponding emigre communities in Australia. Military conict and itspotential to spread in the Balkans could add to the
already profoundtensions in the region. Violent nationalism and religious, cultural andlanguage differences provide arguments for ethnic groups to seek self-determination. Age old animosity and blood vendettas between
somereligious and cultural groups, with a history of atrocities and ethnic-cleansingprovide further friction points.21. These tensions will be felt in Australia's ethnic Balkan communities atleast over the next few years. They
are likely to be manifested mainly inirregular peaceful protest, although episodic low-level communal violencecan also be expected from some extreme elements of the community, directedagainst the Australian and foreign
governments and intra-communallyagainst business or religious institutions. 'Racist extremism in Australia g"122. Violent Australian nationalist groups (VANGs) have in the pastcommitted racist attacks, including assaults,
acts of vandalism andharassment. Their activities are currently at a low level following the gaolingof some key leaders. However, the National Action (NA) group is active inAdelaide, with a high intent and capability to
undertake acts of racistviolence.23. Anti-Semitic attacks in Australia, usually during periods of ethnictension in the Middle East or at times of high profile Jewish or Israeli activity,will persist in the l99Os. VANGs have been
linked to some of them.SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization7
iSESii353:5=53Z‘3i522225'22222a2!.1‘E!5.5SECRET AUSTEOReligious or business buildings will remain the primary targets of vandalismor fire-bombing. Areas of large Jewish populations, such as Sydney and
AMelbourne, remain the most likely areas of concern, although Adelaide iscurrently the centre of Australian right wing extremism. Similarly, Asianbusinesses have been targeted by racist groups in Perth and Adelaide.
Thesensitivity of race as an issue means the level of risk posed by the groups willcontinue to be high, requiring continued investigative action by ASIO, inconjunction with law enforcement agencies.Political extremism in
Australia24. In Australia, a small core of extremists remains committed to usingviolence in pursuing issues of concern. The International SocialistOrganisation (ISO) is the primary source of these violence-prone
elements.They are often triggered by significant international, environmental anddefence-related events, and these can be expected to recur sporadically overthe next five to seven years. Violent confrontations between
leftist groupsand right wing extremists such as NA will also continue.25. Continual monitoring of such groups will be required, although ASIOshould explore alternative methods with law enforcement agencies.International
political, economic and military rivalry26. International rivalry is unlikely to decrease in the 1990s and nationaldifferences will be reected in international relationships. Intelligenceservices exist to ensure national governments
remain closely informed on theintentions of their neighbours and others with the power to threaten, ~.~outmanoeuvre or inuence them. Their characteristic means of doing so isespionage. Any information not publicly
available can be the target ofespionage - political, economic, military, technological or security related.27. Economic advantage can be expected to inuence the activity offoreign intelligence services in Australia in the 1990s.
Counter-espionagecapability will need to be able to detect foreign governments usingclandestine means to disadvantage Australia economically.SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization8[Z7]
fiQSSS5SBSSEii5EE3E5EU553E35S5525552°goSECRET AUSTEO29. Many countries,—will continue to modernisetheir armed forces, and differentials in scientific and technologicaldevelopment will encourage increased
intelligence gathering against othercountries. In such circumstances, military intelligence services still seek togain relative advantage by acquiring the military and technological secrets ofother States. Countering this will be
an important activity for securityintelligence in the 1990s.SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization9[23]
Sa_ [3015E SECRET AUSTEO5 a5SiiESii52E55OSSQ Interference with civil or human rightsii“ 40. A priority of foreign intelligence and security agencies is monitoringE and control of dissident groups among ethnic
minorities or politicalopponents, inside and beyond their national borders.5'-~-I.-viiTi.4-'»1.-1B5>1515 developments will need to be monitored and are expected to continue toTl-1-JIi SECRET AUSTEO‘J Australian Security
Intelligence Organization.1 1 l..-d:5
H3SSS5QSSS‘U5lb llt~.I‘i55i3as‘illQ.‘|Qi..-4-_.a3*5;.5.1".4.1_£I__4i__4:55[31]SECRET AUSTEOProliferation42. As technological advances reduce thresholds of development. theproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and exotic delivery systems(W MD) to additional States and even terrorists or criminal organisations willcontinue to be a major issue of security concern. Australia in the 1990s willcontinue to enjoy technological
advantage over many countries intent ondeveloping a WMD capability. In some areas, such as biotechnology,Australia is at the leading edge of technological development.Consequently, proliferators are likely to continue to
see Australia as apotential source of information and material relevant to the development oftheir WMD programs. As well, the potential availability of ssile materialthrough illegal trade, ould reduceweapons development
time. Export control systems will need continualrefinement to concentrate on narrowing areas of critical technology. Illegaltrade in nuclear devices is possible. especially if stateless groups acquire theability to manufacture
them.45. These risks will continue to require resources to monitor and countertheir development. Resourcing at current levels will be adequate, butattention is needed to develop the industry information programs
endorsedby the Non-Proliferation Coordination Group.SECRET AUSTEO2 Australian Security Intelligence Organizationl
‘.3iSSS53SS5‘illE5EE_ll‘lIJll.‘!SE3QBE!it55is55[32]SECRET AUSTEOTransnational organised crime46. Organised crime now crosses national borders, blurs the traditionaldistinction between security intelligence and law
enforcement, and requiresclose coordination between security and law enforcement agencies(examples include the resort to drug-running by terrorist organisations tonance their activity and illegal trafficking in nuclear
materials). Whenforeign powers are involved. transnational organised crime may becomeforeign interference. As such, it will be an issue for security intelligenceagencies through the 1990s.48. In common with other
democratic societies. Australia has experienceddifficulty in drawing a distinction between national law enforcement andsecurity intelligence responsibilities as they relate to international forms oforganised crime. Law
enforcement agencies are addressing the growingproblem, and have primary responsibility for it. Security intelligencehas norole in organised crime, other than in the exchange of information when itcomes to hand in the
course of security investigations. But, whereforeignpowers become involved, including foreign intelligence services, there is asecurity intelligence dimension. This matter would benefit from review in thenext SIPD.SECRET
AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization13
I.3SSS5SBEEZ‘3iE5SEll‘LIJllU.!l5EEES'514SI55[33]SECRET AUSTEO3. The Security Intelligence OperatingFramework49. Australia's security and intelligence agencies and the framework inwhich they operate have been
reviewed several times since 1992. Thesereviews have led to improved coordination arrangements in the areas of50. Overall, the existing arrangements to enable the Australian Governmentto respond to other security risks
have been endorsed. But the ability ofexisting arrangements to respond to the challenges of the securityenvironment and to satisfy security intelligence collection requirements isaffected by the roles of the different
Australian agencies holding relevantinformation. particularly ASIO and its overseas liaison partners.Contributing agencies in Australian security intelligence51. Requirements for security intelligence are also, in many
cases,requirements for foreign intelligence. The two categories overlap; and muchthat illuminates one illuminates the other. For example, the status ofdevelopment programs for weapons of mass destruction is
necessaryinformation for the conduct of Australia's foreign policy, as well as for theinvestigation and resolution of possible cases of proliferation involvingAustralia. The foreign intelligence and security intelligence
communitiescomprise the same core collection and analytical agencies (the Australianintelligence and security agencies - AISA). A different focus, and somedisparity in priorities and areas of investigation, affects this but
does not alterll. ~SECRET AUSTEO14 Australian Security Intelligence Organization
iiHSSBSSSSZ‘5Q55ES“U”5Q5.-=15333'5:2_-5215;-*1[34]SECRET AUSTEO52. Australia's security intelligence ‘community’ comprises ASIO together withthe various elements of the Commonwealth and State
administrations with whichit needs to cooperate in order to discharge its functions. These include:- the AFP, ASIS, DFAT, DIO, DSD, and ONA, which each undertake aspectsof collection, assessment, liaison or prevention
responses; ‘' the Attomey-General's Department, Defence, DEET, DIEA, DPM&C, ACS,APS and NCA, which hold or obtain security related or relevantinformation, or participate in prevention responses; and- State and
Territory Police, Ethnic Affairs agencies and other departments,which also hold security related or relevant information, or participate inprevention responses.The role of ASIO53. For security intelligence, ASIO is the
community's coordinating agency.As the 1992 SCIS report says, ASIO is at the centre of domestic securityarrangements and a key link between foreign and domestic components ofthe Australia's intelligence and security
agencies (AISA). This role is based inASlO's legislation and in its responsibility for coordinating threat assessmentsin relation to politically motivated violence (PMV) and demonstrations.54. ASIO has the specific task of
obtaining, correlating and evaluatingintelligence relevant to security, and communicating that intelligence tothose who need it. As well, ASIO provides protective security advice andparticipates in the Australian counter-
terrorist response structure, especiallythrough its Technical Support Unit (TSU). It is the only Commonwealthagency combining all the functions of: _~ the strategic analysis of security risk;' the collection of security
intelligence; '- the assessment of security intelligence; and~ the protection of the Australian community through activeparticipation in prevention and response counter-measures, and theprovision of protective security
advice.SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization15
3ElSS5!;lSSSS"W5=I5555“o“5‘Q555555555555SECRET AUSTEO55. Realising the full benet of this conjunction of roles would beenhanced by: _- a common understanding of the meaning given to ‘security’;' consultation
among agencies to identify the extent of thecontribution they might make to the security intelligence system; and- improvements to coordination arrangements beyond the counter-terrorist structure, including the setting of
intelligence priorities.Risk Management56. The challenges of the international and Australian securityenvironments in the 1990s require Australia to have in place monitoring andpreventative measures against a wide range
of existing and potential securityrisks. Such a capability is also necessary to manage effectively thedeployment of collection and assessment resources against targets of mostconcern to Australia. As a basis for establishing
security intelligencepriorities, ASIO has adopted a risk management methodology to rank sourcesof security concern. Risk management aims to avert security problems byproviding a framework which represents the true
state of the securityenvironment at any time, by predicting potential threats and resourcingappropriately the necessary preventative measures.57. Risk incorporates threat, but adds the concept of harm and clientinteraction.
These two additional factors affect the priority ranking of risksubjects. Each subject is assessed on the basis of its intention to cause T _-;security harm, and its ability to give effect to its intention. The combinationof intention
and capability constitutes the threat the subject poses toAustralian security. The risk represented is determined by the threat togetherwith an assessment of the harm which would be caused if the threat isrealised. Harm is
determined in consultation with clients - the consumers ofsecurity intelligence advice. Risk, in conjunction with other considerations,determines priority.58. Priority ranking according to risk allows decisions on the basis
ofpriority, concerning the resources to be allocated to each subject. Thehighest will be subject to resource intensive investigation. The listing isreviewed formally every three months, although alterations to priorityrankings
can be made whenever changes in Australia's security environmentSECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization16
PiQSSSSSSS35:I5555“U”5Q555555555555SECRET AUSTEOoccur.59. Those subjects not intensively investigated are monitored. Thisemphasises the contribution other agencies can make to security
intelligenceinformation collection. For example, DFAT's extensive overseas network isparticularly useful as a source of contextualisedrelevant to Australia.60. Important in the monitoring process is coverage of the
globaldevelopments and events of the day and maintenance of overseas contacts.Sources of information - nature and type61. Information needed to assess risks can be obtained from overt or covertsources. In security
intelligence, overt sources include those requiring noprotection at all - such as the public media - and those which, althoughreadily available, require some protection for privacy or other reasons - suchas official goveriunent
information. Covert collection sources includetechnical operations, such as telecommunications interception, and humansources. In most cases collection of both covert and overt information willbe necessary to ll gaps in
understanding.62. Covert sources require time to develop and cannot be simply turned onwhen required. As well, it is generally not possible to cover adequatelyspecic security risks through overt sources. Individuals,
groups andorganisations representing risks to security are, by their nature, secretive andconspiratorial. Much can be gleaned from overt sources of information. Butthey report only what has become publicly known. Covert
sources reportwhat is still being hidden from public view.63. Covert sources are also resource intensive and costly, but they arenecessary if hard core intelligence is to be gained on the plans and activitiesof subjects of
security concern. Therefore, the allocation of appropriateresources over the next three years to the maintenance and development ofcovert sources should continue. But on the basis of minimising cost and risk,and within
the constraints imposed by the imminence and severity of the risk,two principles are followed in deciding between overt and covert sources ofinformation:SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization17
nz9*s5533at53'as:2‘aatEEl-'J'L!J5QaE22iia55-22222aasSECRET AUSTEO' less expensive sources are exploited before the more expensive ; and' less intrusive sources are exploited first.Liaison Partnerships64. ASIO, as
the principal point of security intelligence exchange; has close,direct and regular contact with a large number of overseas security services.Security intelligence also ows from the liaison arrangements of otherAustralian
agencies, such as the AFP, ASIS and ONA, and importantinformation is received through DFAT's extensive overseas representation.Liaison P¢"m@"S—65. The Australian security and intelligence community has
historicallyfocused on the importance of its relations with North American and Britishsecurity and intelligence bodies. Concerns raised in the SCIS Report aboutthe declining relevance of this liaison have proved premature.
Nevertheless,the liaison focus is being broadened as a result of changes in the securityenvironment, most notably those in the former Soviet Union and EasternEurope, coupled with the rising importance of East Asia and
the graduallydiverging priorities of Western countries Sestablishment of liaisonSECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization18
33sHs=_-15SiS5sBO55‘5s5-D_|SOall3'-n55’55El5‘35'S55[33]SECRET AUSTEO68. Traditional liaisons in Europe and North America should not be ignored.Thcy offer a substantial resource on which to draw in advising
otherAustralian agencies on security.()verse>as rcpr'e.s'erzl(1ri0rz70. The location of liaison offices is regularly reviewed, because:Role of law enforcement agencies71. There is an overlap between criminal and security-
related activities. TheSECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence OrganizationI9
iHQiS33HS55055§353‘H3°“Ll;E5E35S5‘#5‘I-4555SECRET AUSTEO1992 SCIS report recommended closer relations between the AISA and(particularly Commonwealth) law enforcement agencies. In view of thepotential
for transnational crime to affect the integrity of sovereign States,and the connection some foreign powershave establishedwith organised crime, the security intelligence iaison an exchangearrangements with such agencies -
subject to general bilateral agreementsand AISA guidelines - may be inadequate for the future. Securityintelligence and law enforcement agencies will need to work closely toidentify where other States are pursuing their
objectives by using criminals orengaging in criminal or illegal behaviour.72. The recent ‘Review of Commonwealth Law Enforcement Arrangements’has set the scene for closer cooperation between Australia's law
enforcementagencies at the federal level by defining each agency's role and establishingsome mechanisms to reduce duplication and lend strategic direction. Thisstress on better coordination coincides with attempts to
improve lawenforcement intelligence, especially strategic intelligence, standards. Bothsteps increase the value to the security intelligence community of liaison andcooperation with law enforcement agencies.73. The
security intelligence-law enforcement relationship is highlightedby the steady increase in demand for threat assessments on foreigndignitaries visiting Australia and on the representatives of foreign countriesresident here.
The increase is partly in response to the resort by protestgroups to low level violence or other unlawful acts to embarrass orinconvenience such visitors or representatives, rather than damage people orproperty. Such
actions can have serious repercussions on Australia's bilateralrelations and harm Australia's national interests. Indonesian complaints inSeptember 1994 about protest activity against its missions in Australia,underpinned by
assertions that Australia had not fullled its obligationsunder the Vienna Convention, are a recent example. Neither AS_IO norAustralia's police services are well-placed to predict when such activity mayborder on violence,
either because of restraints placed on investigative actionor resource commitments to higher priority subjects. Both will need toaddress more efficient and effective action, including the complementarydeployment of
resources.SECRET AUSTEO20 Australian Security Intelligence Organization
3i55SS§Q55505a5'QQ53P5'EliiQ=15a52252-3-25[40]SECRET AUSTEO4. Security Intelligence Challenges74. The SCIS, Hollway, Codd and SAC-PAV reviews highlighted areas ofthe security intelligence infrastructure
needing improvement. Progress hasbeen made in rening priority setting, improving the nexus betweencustomer requirements and collection and analysis and the timelydissemination of information to customers. But
signicant work needs to bedone, particularly in:' intelligence self-reliance;' enhancing the flow of intelligence, and greater communitycooperation, coordination and communication;~ providing for future as well as current
intelligence requirements,including more emphasis on preventing harm;- expanding the use of cheaper, safer information and intelligencesources, including overt sources, and the re-emphasis on humanintelligence rather
than the increasingly expensive and more difficultto obtain technical intelligence;~ maintaining leading edge technological competence in collection andanalytical methodologies; and- developing a well-educated,
knowledgeable and skilled intelligence 'work force. in both sub'ect s ecialisations and professional skills,including languages“ '75. During the next three years, up to the time of the rst SIPD review,security intelligence
agencies should give attention to these issues. Theprincipal tasks are:' strengthening strategic management capacity;- enhancing exibility;SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization21
3i 0i35E‘SS55PL5S5S“"45O52.5=15SS55:15 22SSECRET AUSTEOreviewing recruitment and personnel development policy andpractices;ensuring intelligence ofcers are properly trained and equipped toestablish and
maintain their agencies at the leading edge of relevanttechnological development; and' improving coordination within the AISA and other communityagencies on security intelligence.Strategic management76. For security
and intelligence services, the only adequate response tocurrent and future security changes is to ensure maximum knowledge andunderstanding of security risks and response exibility. This would be bestachieved by
improved strategic management based on assessments of thefuture security environment. This document is a step in that direction, butthere is still room for improvement.77. In particular, long-range security intelligence is
needed to forecastfuture risks. Preoccupation with, and resource commitment to, tactical issuesoften does not permit the capability which allows planning for, andmanagement of future problems. Strategic management
capabilities need tobe strengthened, and resources applied to global monitoring andassessments.78. This is not to diminish the importance of tactical intelligence. A rangeof specific government requirements based on
tactical considerations arenon-negotiable and must always be accorded high priority (for example,security assessing for entry and access. threat assessments and protectivesecurity advice). These can, however, be
managed exibly. But some’ highrisk subjects might be reduced to monitoring coverage only.79. Comprehensive monitoring of risks should continue and be enhanced.Specic resources should be devoted to it, as the Codd
Reviewrecommended.SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security lntelligence Organization
[42]SECRET AUSTEOFlexibility80. The 19905 will require continuing exibility in managing securityintelligence. Resources can be effectively re-directed as experience duringthe last four or five years has shown, in moving
away from a preoccupationwith Soviet espionage, re-assessing the sources of international terrorism,becoming involved in counter-proliferation work and in recognising the linksbetween some foreign intelligence agencies
and organised crime.81. The security environment of the 1990s will be such that the Australiansecurity intelligence community will need to institutionalise changemechanisms, so that the recognition of, and re-orientation
towards, shifts infocus are continuously anticipated and adjustments made.82. The present system of risk management identies high risk subjects ofsecurity concern, and responds rapidly to changes in the risk
environment. Itmight form the basis of a broader security intelligence assessment andcollection system, applying to all agencies involved in security intelligencework. Only then will best use of resources and comparative
advantage inintelligence collection and assessment be achieved. This should be exploredin the rst SIPD review in three years time.People83. Flexibility will also be needed in staffing the security intelligence agenciesand
departments. In the 1990s security intelligence agencies will need to haveavailable well educated and skilled intelligence officers, able to use advancedanalytical techniques and conduct complex intelligence investigations.
A highpriority will be to recruit and train:' competent analysts able to use modern technology and understandcomplex technical subjects, such as proliferation;' competent human intelligence collectors with ethnic community
languageskills; and~ technical experts procient in using and developing contemporarytechnologies in the intelligence environment.SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization23
i3SQ55539QE9093QCB33E3°3‘Iat33333.3553SECRET AUSTEOTraining84. Agencies more and more require the services of intelligence ofcers (thepolice forces, the NCA, DIEA, DFAT, ASIS, ASIO and ONA all have
them),yet there are no commonly agreed competencies. ASIO has begundeveloping a set of core competencies for its intelligence ofcers and isconsulting with other agencies on them. This should continue.
Formalrecognition of the competencies might be sought.85. There is little coordination across agencies in recruiting, training ordeveloping intelligence officers. either for counter-terrorism or in counter-intelligence work,
whether investigative or analytical. The collectors andanalysts need to be highly educated,_with good judgement and well-developed research, writing and people skills. Their training should becoordinated, specialised,
intensive and adequate to the requirements of theirwork. Cooperative training against agreed competencies should beexplored, and economies of scale sought. Increased secondments andexchanges should also be
encouraged, not only within the AISA, but, inspecialist areas such as technology, with agencies like ANSTO.Analysis86. Within identied high priority areas of continuing security interest,intelligence ofcers need to be
encouraged to attain a detailed andspecialised grasp of the culture, politics and domestic and foreign policies ofthe subject. Foreign languages will be a high priority. But a culture alsoneeds to be developed which accepts
the need to move to new subject areasas targets rise and fall in priority. ‘i87. Technical capabilities to counter increased activity in science andtechnology, proliferation and economic intelligence will need to be acquired.This
could be through recniiting officers with appropriate backgrounds intoagencies such as ASIO, or using consultants and seconded ofcers morewidely. Another option might be to develop a working liaison with agencieswhich
possess the skills and knowledge to pursue enquiries in specialistareas, and whose personnel have, or could gain, relevant security clearances.These options should be explored, though preliminary judgement
indicatessome blend would be both cost-effective and serve to enhance thecommunity's capability.SECRET AUSTEO24 Australian Security Intelligence Organization
S5!SSSSSSS'5SSI5BO5S:15SSI5=055555El55555I[44]SECRET AUSTEOCollectioncontactprograms be given to thetypes of officers involved in such a program in view of the sensitivity ofASlO's contact with ethnic
communities and the range of skills, such aslanguage skills. necessary to perform such a role. Less direct means ofthe requirement might includecontacts in the relevant c —would be important in co-tter strategic
appreciations of which communitiesmight contain such elements will help avoid resource wastage.Specialist language skills89. One consequence of a more complex security environment is thepotentially broad range of
cultures. and therefore languages, which will needstudy. This will require an efficient language resource base.90. The need for specialist language skills is extremely important and willgrow in the 19905, both to
communicate with communities of non-Englishspeaking background within Australia and to translate and interpretinformation received from expanding overseas sources. For ASIOreceives mounts o material 1The latter are
usually time criticalfso ,;some reserve foAs Australia91. Options include encouraging current staff to enhance their languagecapabilities, recruiting multi-skilled linguists or generalist intelligence ofcerswith appropriate
language skills, or combining the language capabilities ofthe AISA, other Commonwealth and State and Territory Departments and thepolice forces to form a national database. Each approach involves securityimplications,
long lead times and resources. Action should be taken toadvance consideration of viable options.SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization25
3QS5SSBSSS:1SI5BO33S3SSO5l555555555555SECRET AUSTEOSpecialist technological and engineering skills92. As technological innovations are absorbed by target groups. securityand intelligence agencies need to
understand these advances and counterthem. This will involve recruiting staff with the necessary background, ortraining existing officers to a sufficient level. A particular area of concem iscommunications technology where
the pace of change will continue to berapid. The communications links between ASIO’s offices will need to beupgraded, as will the links between ASIO and the principal agenciesinvolved in Australia's anti-terrorist network.
There will also need to be veryfast communication between Australia and overseas liaison offices. To install,run and maintain these systems specially skilled or trained staff are needed asreliance on technology continues to
increase. The speed of technologicalchange will make it difficult for specialists to keep up with developmentswithout training. The security intelligence community, particularly the lawenforcement agencies and ASIO, need to
develop a strategy to meet thesedemands, which might include contracting out.Technology93. We look to technology to reduce vulnerabilities, improve securecommunications. improve analysis. maintain and improve
collection capabilityand respond rapidly to changed circumstances. But the technology used tofacilitate intelligence collection, collation and analysis and the provision ofintelligence product is changing rapidly. The
application of technology tointelligence has been slow to take hold in theeommuniAdapting to new technologies94. Agencies involved in intelligence work will need to be adept at takingup new technologies that would
signicantly enhance their core business.Theyw’""*"" ‘ s‘ ' ‘ ' "' ‘ " ' ‘work.95. In particular, there needs to be more effective utilisation of new andSECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization26
§Q3ES8B39S3Q35E.33S55J55BI55555555:225SECRET AUSTEOemerging technologies for collection and to support collection and analyticalactivities. Some of those areas include:- unclassified and classified information
networks betweengovernment agencies, such as CD-ROM;' use of computerised analytical tools;- use of magnetic media such as optical and compact disc, for storageand retrieval of files and databases;- digital image
collection, transmission, storage, enhancement andproduction;~ conferencing and video conferencing facilities;~ secure communications (within ASIO through secure network.ADCNET and external, such as
SPEAKEASY);_and1' engineering development productivity tools.96. There should be more complementarity to avoid duplication, as in thecase of the Technical Support Unit (TSU), which has been equalled orsurpassed in
capability by at least two police forces. If it remains true thatthe TSU exists to supplement and enhance the technical intelligencegathering of police technical units, its capability should be upgraded (asrecommended by the
SAC~PAV review). Alternatively, the police shouldagree to take the lead in this area of technology This matter needs earlyresolution.97. Within the AISA, technological coordination between ASIO, ASIS andSECRET
AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization27MW
Q§F!Q333Q3SQBtamitQ5'25CQ% LUBE3B53BB33SECRET AUSTEODSD is sound but needs to become stronger. Forums such as the InterAgency Technical Forum, which includes these agencies and DFAT, and
theInter-Agency Information Technology Forum, are necessary and becomingmore so as the public sector becomes more accountable. Duplication ofeffort and resources in technical research and development is
possible.Greater information exchange and. within the AISA, transparency of researchactivity would reduce this possibility. Some sharing of facilities might also bepossible, particularly of equipment used for technical
collection.Telecornnzunicalions interception98. Telecommunications interception (Tl) remains very effective as part ofan integrated framework of surveillance by both law enforcement andsecurity agencies. Factors which
will make this area much more challengingin the l99Os include reduced real costs of equipment, a greater range ofservice choices, increased public debate on the security of services, and theproliferation of service
providers and of equipment types and manufacturers.99. Within Australia, the Law Enforcement Advisory Committee (LEAC).established under the auspices of AUSTEL, is the main forum for consultationbetween agencies
and telecommunications carriers. LEAC has the potentialto ensure that future difficulties in the area of interception can be minimised.LEAC should continue as an effective forum to provide the framework forachieving both
short and long term cost effective TI capability.Information technologies (IT)100. Computers are now integral to the way governments use and storeinformation. Their importance is going to increase during the next
decade.Consequently, computer hacking for espionage is~a security concern. Todate, only overseas evidence of such activity has been found, althoughAustralia is a potential target in the 1990s. Reported Australian-
basedattempts to hack into and spread viruses through overseas computer sitesserve to indicate the transnational nature of the problem.102. Several overseas security services are interested in bilateral
cooperationSECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization28
SECRET AUSTEOon computer attack activities and on 'defensive' IT issues such as protectionagainst computer hacking and the spread of computer viruses. In view of theconsiderable resources and expertise necessary
to overcome problems in thisfield, inter-agency co-operation and coordination are essential.Information management capability103. The speed of response in Australia to overseas events and the growingtrend for co-
ordinated world wide action by subjects of security concernneeds effective coverage of public media and official information. Officialsources, particularly those of DFAT, provide much information which canhelp to assess
potential security threats. DFAT's extensive representationoverseas will continue to enable wide coverage of world political, economic,cultural and security developments. Similarly, information from overseasservices will
remain important to ASIO's assessment capability.104. But the most signicant development in sources of information hasbeen the increasing importance of public sources. These are becoming morevaluable but also more
demanding to exploit effectively. New ways ofgathering and disseminating information have enabled the public media toexpand and accelerate coverage of international affairs. While the amount ofinformation and possible
sources are increasing. there are avenues forrefining the information available to the analyst.105. Effective use of all available sources of relevant information will beessential to maintain and improve the quality of ASIO's
advice. Virtually allareas of unclassified information, required by the analyst and collector, areavailable through external databases. This includes information on worldevents, demographics, economic developments,
business and telephonerecords, and media summaries. Computer networks such as Internet alsoprovide potential access to an enormous range of data.106. There is much room for improving exploitation of overt
information.The security intelligence community's approach to accessing suchinformation so far has been ad hoc and uncoordinated. ASIO's use of oneon-line news service (Reuters) has shown the potential of such
systems but aco-ordinated strategy is required. Specialist database officers will be neededto manage effectively the range of databases available and to funnelinfonnation to analysts according to requirements.
Improvements in desktopinformation management systems will improve the process further.SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization29
i.BElHSQ335‘3-soHtam3B33inE32‘33333353iE3!SECRET AUSTEO107. Security intelligence agencies should explore the need to move towardsa seven day week and a limited 24 hour coverage of security
intelligencedevelopments so as to react more quickly to events in the rest of the worldthat could affect Australia. This is a field where coordinated arrangements inthe community should result in economies of scale,
minimising the resourceimpact.108. Apart from the publicly available data-bases, there is great potential foragency cooperation with security intelligence databases. Integratedunclassied intelligence/information databases
have been successfully usedin managing security at major events in the US. It is expected that theSydney Games will require a similar approach in agency co-operation ininformation management. The potential dividends
from the co-operative useof databases are better communication of information and intelligence, andcost benefits in reduced duplication of databases and associateddevelopment and maintenance resources required to
sustain an independentcapacity. Opportunities for such cooperation should be explored.Coordination109. There is scope within all government agencies - both Commonwealthand State - to improve inter-agency
cooperation and reduce the duplicationof effort. The areas of interest of different agencies need to be examined.Collecting, analytical and executive agencies and authorities should worktogether, and there needs to be a
nexus between advice and theconsequences that ow from it.110. There is a need not for more reporting on everything, but more andbetter reporting on things that matter. Security intelligence advice should beguided - but
not controlled - by customer requirements. Agencies other thanASIO need to contribute to the development of common perceptions ofsecurity risks. Particular emphasis should be placed on marrying collectionand analysis
priorities with client needs and requirements. Client assessmentsof the potential harm to them and Australia's interests from activitiesprejudicial to security are factors in the assessment of risk and priority inASIO's security
intelligence work.Ill. But how client requirements become known, how they are factoredinto ASIO's risk management system for setting priorities, how and whendifferent subjects are reported on, and how clients can
express their views onASIO's performance, are matters that require development. They need to beSECRET AUSTEO30 Australian Security Intelligence Organization[491 AI
3iiQ§3333El3"3H9-JatQ3ii503.atalQ3EB3EEE353B3SECRET AUSTEOconsidered in the context of expanding ASIO's priority setting to encompassthe security intelligence community as a whole.A security intelligence
coordination structure112. In response to these needs, ASIO should establish a consultative group toallow it access to community views on: -- the security intelligence priorities established through its risk
managementsystem, to reach a common view of the harm posed by risk subjects;- the intelligence advice needs of clients and consumers; and' the relevance of its intelligence product.l 13. This group - a Consultative
Committee on Security Intelligence (CCSI) -willimprove the efciency of the security intelligence community, and the quality ofsecurity intelligence advice going to government. It would promoteunderstanding of the roles and
priorities of different agencies. (For example, therespective roles in preventing communal violence of ASIO, the AFP and State andTerritory police, DIEA and State and Territory ethnic affairs bodies need to beclearly
understood by all parties.) It will also be an important contribution topreparing for projected future high profile international events such as the SydneyOlympics.114. The CCSI structure will allow a better assessment of the
respectivepriorities and responsibilities of the security intelligence community and ofsecurity intelligence priorities. It would provide the strategic management ofAustralia's security intelligence environment for which the SIPD
wasintended to be the foundation stone.l 15. The CCSI would include representatives of all the agencies involved insecurity intelligence. T o ensure harmony between the security intelligenceand foreign and criminal
intelligence structures, and to reect the overlap insubjects of interest and responsibilities between the three areas, the leadagencies should be represented on their respective priority-settingcommittees - the National
Intelligence Committee for foreign intelligence, theCCSI for security intelligence, and the National Law EnforcementIntelligence Committee (NLEIC) for criminal intelligence. These agencies areONA, ASIO and, for criminal
intelligence, the Ofce of Strategic CrimeAssessment (OSCA).SECRET AUSTEO31 Australian Security Intelligence Organization
EQ9itE3BS)Q'3599JQ33‘J‘EU .k'J‘H5E3Elii3=3Q,EQE53SECRET AUSTEOll6. The Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Protection AgainstViolence (SIDC-PAV). and Commonwealth and State and Territoryauthorities
in the Standing Advisory Committee for Commonwealth/StateCooperation for Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV), effectivelycoordinate the handling of counter-terrorist intelligence.117. There have been several reviews
of the counter-terrorism structure inrecent years, and criticisms levelled at it have been, or are being addressed.There is no need at this stage to recommend further changes or to interferewith the reform and re-
arrangement processes already under way.I I8. Countering foreign intelligence operations in Australia is becomingmore important as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction andeconomic or technological
espionage undertaken by non-traditionaladversaries increases, and as the range of countriesforeign interference in Australia widens119. Counter-espionage intelligence was formerly coordinated by the IDCon Foreign
Intelligence Operations in Australia (IDC-FIO), chaired by the(\JIPI._._ A4-' (‘A,.....Za»-. ,...,-I I..a-.IlI._-.--U. ("A.\...-lZ..-4-Z-.- If\(‘If‘\ 1.. 5|... I\........a.---_.4-at |_-' I \ /revived. The committee's progress in canying out its charter
should beassessed in the rst review of the SIPD.SECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization32
E35EBH3933“W99‘99EsoBLU LUI3-3-399'5-3B5 33SECRET AUSTEORelationships with law enforcement and intelligence agencies and thesharing of capabilitiesI20. ASIO, in common with other Australian intelligence
agencies, is tryingto do more with less. The medium term impact of implementing the decisionsmade by Government in response to the Cook inquiry is likely to detractfrom its core business capability by necessitating a shift
of resources. Thereduction in resourcing levels is likely to continue and will lead to an overalllesser capability to cover the increasingly wide range of risks facingAustralia. One way to overcome this is by increased
cooperation betweenthe intelligence agencies and the police forces, something that is alreadyoccurring. bringing benet through shared targeting and resources. Recentexamples that have been successful and point the way
to the future are thecooperation between:' ASIO and AFP on the Sadil investigation;- ASIO and a number of agencies in the operation of the NationalIntelligence Group (NIG) and Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) atnational
anti-terrorist exercises;121. A further example, and one that could prove useful for ASIO-Policethis approach should be explored, especially in relation to Olympicsplanning.122. The continued use of risk management will
determine which subjects ofsecurity interest ought to be given greater coverage. Subsequently, theremay be a need to rely more heavily on information from police forces tounderstand lower risk subjects. The police are
closer to many of the groupsand communities which pose certain kinds of security risks, oftenSECRET AUSTEOAustralian Security Intelligence Organization
3"3H*3'3QB9§El'3atata’E!El3H90at%S!J:15!5!:1'3'33Q3»ISECRET AUSTEOcooperating with elements in them, for example, to limit the possibility ofprotest violence, to better protect Australian and visiting
dignitaries.Whatever the arrangements agreed for greater cooperation, they need to beformalised. The development of service agreements between ASIO and thevarious State police forces would provide a better
delineation ofresponsibilities and further consolidation of the ASIO/police relationship.123. Considerable possibilities exist for cooperation in sharing technicalexpertise, resources and, possibly, linguistic capabilities.124.
Communications are another important aspect offering scope forenhancing cooperation with the police forces. Continual improvement isneeded to systems of communication to enable the timely passage ofinformation. This
ow of information is hampered by a number of policecomponents not having the necessary security cleared personnel, storage forclassified information and secure communications systems. Action needs tobe taken to
ensure the police receive the infomiation they need in a timelyand secure fashion. The establishment of a secure communications networkbetween agencies exchanging security intelligence is urgent, particularly forthe
passage of threat assessments. The SPEAKEASY voice and facsimilesystem appears to provide a solution to this problem, at least until a securedata network can be established.125. Aspects of transnational organised
crime increasingly reinforce the needto strengthen relationships between security agencies and police forces,especially the AFP, which liaises with police forces overseas. Joint taskforces could be established better to
apply scarce resources. Since someoverseas security services prefer service to service liaison arrangements todirect liaison with police, the passage of information is likely to be two way.Criminal information from security
agencies will continue to be sent to ASIOfor on forwarding.SECRET AUSTEO34 Australian Security Intelligence Organization
\, ',./<I ‘ . 11, \\\. 1*‘-"‘; ,‘ M~~VW¢“"1.‘ ‘1“,1‘ \I\''--1
SML NO. /703SECURITYSEE FILE KcA/22:2‘ ,>