Professional Documents
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JUSTIN BIEBER
Plaintiff, Civil Case No. 27112011
For Damages
- versus -
JUNE’S SUPERMARKET.
Defendant.
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Plaintiff Justin Bieber (hereinafter “Justin”) filed the present action for damages against
Defendant June’s Supermarket (hereinafter “June’s Supermarket”). Marcus attributes the
injuries suffered by his minor son to June’s Supermarket’s gross negligence in failing to make its
premises safe for customers, thereby making it liable under Art. 2176 and Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code. Defendant maintains that whatever injuries and expenses were incurred by the Beiber
family can be attributed to Justin’s failure to supervise his child.
2. While Justin was looking for a certain snack item, Clay’s attention was captured by a small
red ball that was rolling on the floor. Being but a child of tender years, possessed of the
immature disposition of individuals of that age, it was no surprise that clay chased after the ball
down the aisle and away from Justin.
3. It was at this point that Clay suddenly slipped and fell because he had stepped on a wet
section of the aisle. Bleach cleaner had seeped out from a bottle located on a nearby shelf and
had formed a puddle on the floor.
4. Justin immediately rushed to his son’s side. Clay was crying in pain and holding his back.
5. Justin called for help since there were no store clerks around. Johnny Bravo (hereinafter
“Johnny”), the supermarket supervisor eventually came over from another aisle in order to help
out.
6. There were no signs and devices that would warn shoppers that an area of the floor was wet.
There were no nearby cleaners or janitors wiping up the liquid. In fact, the only nearby June’s
Supermarket personnel was Johnny in the next aisle and even he seemed unaware that a
hazard existed on the other side of the shelves.
7. With the aid of Johnny, Justin managed to bring his child to the St. Joseph’s Hospital where
Clay was attended to by Dr. Christine Javier. Clay was subjected to an x- ray and it was
discovered that surgery was necessary in order to restore the position of a fractured bone in
her backbone.
8. Said surgery in fact took place and Clay was thereafter required to stay overnight at the
hospital for purposes of pain management and care. He was discharged the following day.
9. Clay recovered the full use of his hand only after a period of 6 weeks. In that span of time, he
moved with discomfort and difficulty, unable to use her hands.
10. Since the date of Clay’s injury and even during her recuperation period, Justin suffered the
mental anguish, fright and serious anxiety of a Father who was confronted with the injury of a
beloved child.
11. In addition to the physical suffering suffered by Clay and the mental and emotional strain on
Justin, they were further aggrieved because they had to spend P22,840.00 in doctor’s fees,
hospitalization expenses, and medicine, as evidenced by receipts, marked as ANNEX ____.
12. On the other hand, June’s Supermarket, through Johnny, claims that it exercised proper
diligence in making the premises safe and that ultimately Justin was the one who failed to
supervise Clay. It denied liability for all damages.
ISSUES
Given the foregoing facts and circumstances, the following issues are presented for discussion:
1. Whether or not June’s Supermarket may beheld liable for the commission of a quasi delict
under Art. 2176 and Art, 2180 of the Civil Code.
ARGUMENTS
I. June’s Supermarket is liable for the commission of a quasi delict that was the proximate
cause of Mandy’s injuries.
A. The proximate cause of the injuries that Clay suffered was the negligence of June’s
Supermarket employees.
1. Art. 2176 provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done.” In the case
of Child Learning Center, Inc. v. Tagorio (G.R. No. 150920, Nov. 25, 2005), the Supreme
Court stated that “in order to establish a quasi-delict case under this provision, the
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the
plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose
acts he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence and damages incurred.” (supra)
2. All three conditions obtain in the present case.
3. It is undisputed that Clay broke her back when she slipped and fell on a puddle
of liquid cleaner that was on the floor of June’s Supermarket’s premises. It was the
presence of this liquid cleaner that was the proximate cause of Clay’s injury. Proximate
cause is defined as “that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.” (Ramos v. C.O.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 184905, Aug. 28,
2009). It is submitted that Clay would not have fallen and broke her back if she had not
slipped on the bleach.
4. The question now is, whether or not his act of slipping on the liquid cleaner an
accident or is the cleaner’s presence on the floor an act of negligence that may be
attributed to June’s Supermarket’s employees? If the proximate cause was an accident,
clearly no liability can attach to June’s Supermarket. On the other hand, if the proximate
cause is the latter’s negligence, it may properly held liable under the provisions of the
Civil Code.
5. An accident pertains “to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence
attaches to the defendant. On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would do.” (Jarco Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 129792, Dec. 21, 1999)
6. Applying the law to the present case, it is clear that Mandy’s injury was not
caused by accident. As earlier mentioned, Mandy broke her back because she slipped
and fell due to liquid cleaner that was seeping from a bottle located on the supermarket
shelves. Clearly, the liquid should not have been on the floor as common sense would
indicate that it posed a threat to even the most careful of individuals walking past.
Anybody could have slipped and fallen on the cleaner.
7. The mere presence of the cleaner on the floor already negates June’s
Supermarket’s claim that it exercised proper diligence in making its premises safe. Based
on its past experience as admitted by Johnny, similar accidents have previously
occurred. Thus, it could have easily foreseen that such an accident could happen again.
Failure to take the proper precautions in guarding against such a mishap is an act of
negligence on the part of June Supermarket’s employees.
8. Specifically, Johnny, as store supervisor, could have been more vigilant in
patrolling the aisles for spills or the presence of similar hazards. He failed the test for
determining whether a person is negligent that was laid out by the Supreme Court in the
case of Philippine National Construction v. CA (G.R. No. 159270, Aug. 22, 2005). The test
in that case requires a person to act as a prudent man in a similar position and fails to
take the proper precautions against foreseeable harm. He has already had 5 years of
experience in handling the incidents of the supermarket and yet he did nothing.
9. Moreover, signs and warning devices which would inform shoppers that a
hazard was present were noticeably absent. This oversight evidences even the want of
ordinary care on the part of Johnny and the other supermarket employees.
10. Johnny and the other employees’ negligence in patrolling the aisles and
placing proper warning signs/devices is further supported by the fact that, as earlier
mentioned: 1) similar accidents often happen, and 2) they knew that children often
accompany their parents to the supermarket. Having advance notice of these facts, they
cannot now claim that Clay’s injury was an unforeseeable accident.
B. June’s Supermaket may be held liable for the negligent acts or omissions of its
employees under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
11. Art. 2180 provides that “the obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is
demandablenot only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.” Said article further provides that “the owners and managers
of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
12. Applying the foregoing to the present case, it is clear that Johnny and other
employees on duty that day were at that time in the service of June’s Supermarket,
performing their regular functions and duties.
13. In order to escape liability for its employees’ negligent acts, June’s
Supermarket must show that it observed “the diligence of a good father of the family”
to prevent the damage.
14. Unfortunately, June’s Supermarket has failed to show that it exercised such
degree of diligence in supervising Johnny and the other employees. The testimonies on
record do not show that it was store policy to take extra precautions against spills and
other mishaps which occur in the ordinary course of a supermarket business. The
testimonies on record also indicate an absence of institutional concern for the safety
and well being of children that they knew often accompanied their parents in the store.
In fact, Johnny testified that children were the sole responsibility of their parents. While
this may be true to a certain extent, considering that Art. 209 of the Civil Code provides
that authority over minor children are with the parents, June’s Supermarket could have,
by exercising ordinary care, prevented or at least minimized the possibility of mishaps
occurring. The prevention and removal of hazards like the cleaner on the floor is a duty
that falls squarely within its area of responsibility. Moreover, children cannot be held to
the same exacting standards of diligence that are attributed to an adult. Children of
tender years like Clay, are obviously at greater risk from hazards. Despite June’s
Supermarket knowledge and awareness of children’s presence on its premises, it did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in making sure that it took extra
care to supervise and instruct its employees in minimizing the risk.
15. All told, it is evident that all the conditions of a quasi delict obtain in the
present case: Clay suffered an injury which in the ordinary course of events would not
have happened had it not been for the negligence of June’s Supermarket employees in
preventing the occurrence of spillages and other ordinary store incidents and
subsequently, in not promptly cleaning up the spilled liquid syrup and in not placing
signs and other warning devices. June’s Supermarket itself was liable for the acts of its
employees because it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in
making sure that it was company policy to take precautions against foreseeable
accidents, including those that would involve children. Assuming there was such a policy
it was negligent in supervising its employees to ensure that they adhered to such
standards and policies.
C. Even assuming there was also negligence on the part of Marcus, such was only
contributory and will not negate the award of damages.
9. The proximate cause of Clay’s injury and the Beiber family’s subsequent
suffering is still June’s Supermarket negligence.
10. Hence, June’s Supermarket should still be primarily liable for the payment of
damages.
11. Assuming Justin should have taken greater care in looking after Clay, this still
does not make her negligence the proximate cause because an accident would still not
necessarily have occurred without the efficient intervening cause of the liquid on the
floor.
12. Contributory negligence, if there is any, will only serve to reduce the
damages that may be recovered by Justin.
PRAYER
Other just and equitable remedies under the circumstances are likewise prayed for.
Copy furnished:
ATTY. GIGI HADID
Counsel for Defendant