United Alloy Philippines Corporation (UniAlloy) v.

United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)

G.R.no. 179257, November 23, 2015

Facts:

UniAlloy, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading on

wholesale basis of alloy products entered into a Lease Purchase Agreement (LPA) with UCPB which is a
domestic bank corporation. The parties stipulated that UniAlloy would purchase the leased properties
upon expiration of the lease.

August 27, 2001, UniAlloy filed a complaint against respondents, alleging that through
misrepresentation and manipulation, respondent Jakob Van (Chairman of UniAlloy) took foil control of
the management and operation of UniAlloy and with connivance with the others obtained fictitious
loans purportedly for UniAlloy; that UCPB demanded the payment of said loans, and that it unilaterally
rescinded the LPA. UniAlloy prayed that judgment be issued:

1. Ordering the annulment and/or reformation of the promissory notes;

2. Nullifying UCPB’s unilateral rescission of the LPA;
3. Enjoining UCPB from taking possession of leased premises; and
4. Ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay nominal and exemplary damages.

UniAlloy also prayed for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Respondent Jakob
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of : improper venue, forum-shopping, litis pendentia, and for
being a harassment suit. He argued that the LPA specifically provides that any legal action arising
therefrom should be brought exclusively in the proper courts of Makati, that the complaint did not
disclose the pendency of Civil case no. 2001-156. He further averred that what UniAlloy sought to enjoin
was already fait accompli.

Respondent UCPB and Chua (Vice-president of UCPB) also filed a motion to dismiss based on: 1.
Improper venue and 2. Lack of authority of the person who verified the complaint as no secretary’s
certificate or a board resolution was attached thereto.

RTC granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds of:

1. Improper venue
Considering that the Promissory notes sought to be annulled were issued pursuant to a credit
agreement which, in turn, stipulates that any legal action relating thereto shall be initiated
exclusively in the proper courts of Makati.
2. Forum shopping; and
For failure to disclose the pendency of civil case no. 2001-156
3. For being a harassment suit.

UniAlloy filed with the CA (Manila) a petition alleging Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
and asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA granted the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, but no injunction was actually issued. CA refrained from taking further action.
Subsequently the records were forwarded to CA CDO, CA CDO then denied the motion of UniAlloy
 Madrigal Transport v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation

G.R. no. 156067, August 11, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner filed a petition for voluntary insolvency before the RTC and subsequently filed a
complaint for damages against Madrigal for nonfulfillment of a contract concerning a joint venture
agreement with Lapanday. Petitioner was then declared by the insolvency court as insolvent. The
respondents then filed a motion to dismiss the action for damages on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action which the court granted, that upon the filing of the petition for voluntary insolvency,
petitioner lost the right to institute complaint for damages, that the exclusive right to prosecute the
actions belonged to the court-appointed assignee.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, then subsequently filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA.

CA issued a resolution requiring petitioner to explain why its petition should not be dismissed outright,
on the ground that the questioned orders should have been elevated by ordinary appeal, nonetheless
since the issue is purely legal, the same was treated as one for review. This was then challenged by the
respondents. The CA issued a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari. The CA opined that an order
granting a motion to dismiss was final and thus proper subject of an appeal, not certiorari.

Furthermore, even if the petition could be treated as an appeal, it would still have to be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction, according to the CA. the appellate court held that the issues raised by the petitioner
involved pure questions of law that should be brought to the SC.

The petitioners then appealed to the SC alleging that the CA committed an error in ruling that the order
of the lower court granting the respondent’s motion to dismiss are not proper subjects of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. According to the petitioners, since the dismissal is without prejudice and that an
appeal cannot be had for an order dismissing an action without prejudice, hence the proper remedy would
be under rule 65.

Issue:

Whether or not Certiorari under Rule 65 is available as a remedy for an order granting a motion
to dismiss.

Held:

NO. An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not an interlocutory order
because proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore the
remedy if the plaintiff is to appeal the order.

The provision is clear. Dismissals on the aforesaid grounds constitutes res judicata. However, such
dismissals are still subject to a timely appeal. For those based on other grounds, the complaint can be
refiled. Section 5, therefore, confirms that an appeal is the remedy for the dismissal of an action.

As to the jurisdiction of the CA, the issue raised there posted only questions of law, the issue involved an
error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, properly the subject of an appeal. Appeal, not certiorari was the
correct remedy to elevate the RTC’s order granting the motion to dismiss. The appeal, which would have
involved a pure question of law, should have been filed with the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 2 (c)
of Rule 41 and Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
 Ana De Guia San Pedro v. Asdala

G.R. no. 164560, July 22, 2009

Facts:

Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for Accion Reinvindicatoria, Quieting of
Title and Damages, with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Private respondents alleged that
the property has an assessed value of 32, 100 and with malice, evident bad faith, claimed that the
petitioners claimed that they were the owner of the said property.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter as the subject of the
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence should not have been brought before the MTC.

MTC denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, the MTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property of small value.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. The petitioners then by filing a petition for
certiorari appealed with the RTC. RTC upheld the decision of the MTC. The petitioners then filed with the
CA another petition for certiorari, insisting that both the MTC and RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion, but the CA dismissed the petition outright, holding that certiorari is not available to the
petitioners as they should have availed of the remedy of appeal.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the MTC has no jurisdiction over the action.

2. Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it out rightly denied the
petition on the ground that the remedy should have been an appeal.

Held:

1. No. it has been consistently held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title
to, or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.

All civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed 20,000 or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed 50,000 exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs is under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTCs. Clearly, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled that the
MTC had jurisdiction over private respondent’s complaint for Accion Reinvidicatoria.

2. No. the CA acted properly when it dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the
petitioners should have resorted to the remedy of appeal instead of certiorari.

Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave
abuse of discretion.
 Hilario v. Salvador

G.R. no. 160384, April 29, 2005

Facts:

Petitioners filed an action before the RTC against respondent. They allege that they are co-owners
thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession and that the private respondent, constructed his house
thereon without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so.
The Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the
action, that the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land and that it can nevertheless be
surmised by reading the complaint that the assessed value of the land does not exceed 20,000 and as such
falls with the jurisdiction of the MTC.

Petitioners on the other hand opposed the motion, alleging that the court can take judicial notice of the
market value of the property in question and that the motion to dismiss was prematurely filed as the same
should have been filed only when evidence as to the value of the land have been introduced.

RTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss as the action according to it is an action the subject of
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. RTC then rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Private
respondent then appealed the decision to the CA which reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the
recovery of ownership and possession of real property, absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over the action.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held:

No. it bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief
prayed for and the law in effect when the action is filed. The action of the petitioners was an
accionpubliciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real property. An Accion reinvidicatoria is
one for the recovery of possession of real property based on ownership.

The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by
the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of real
property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous
to taxable value.

Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation the assessed value
of the property subject of the complaint. The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or fair
market value of lands. Absent any allegation in the complaint of assessed value of the property, it cannot
thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original action. The evidence adduced which is a tax
declaration stating that the property is valued at 5,950 clearly makes the case under the jurisdiction of
the MTC. Also the claim that the petitioners are also claiming damages over 20,000 is not applicable in
cases involving title to, or possession of real property, or any interest therein.
 Alice Vitangcol and Nroberto Vitangcol v. New Vista

G.R.no. 176014

Facts:

New Vista purchased a property from a certain Milagros De Guzman whom a Special Power of
Attorney was issued by previous owners spouses Alipit. Following the sale, New Vista immediately entered
the subject lot, fenced it. After a decade, New Vista learned that the parcel of land it paid and occupied
was being claimed by petitioners Vitangcol on the strength of a Deed of Absolute Sale. To protect its rights,
New Vista commenced a suit for quieting of title before the RTC.

The Vitangcols moved to dismiss the complaint and New Vista duly opposed. New Vista, before the
Vitangcols could file an answer filed an amendmended complaint, the new complaint however did not
came with the SPA. Vitangcols filed a motion to dismiss on the ground for failure to state a cause of action.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, however, the RTC later on reversed its earlier decision and ordering
that the Amended Complaint states no cause of action and that the claim of the plaintiff in the present
action is unenforceable. The reversal was due to the fact that the SPA was not included in the Amended
Complaint.

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and faulted the RTC for dismissing the complaint. The CA held
that the amended complaint, filed as it were before responsive pleadings could be filed by the defendants,
superseded the original complaint. As thus superseded, the original complaint and all documents
appended thereto, such as the SPA, may no longer be taken cognizance of in determining whether the
amended complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.

Issue:

Whether or not the amended complaint states a cause of action.

Held:

Yes. Lack of cause of action, is however not a ground for dismissal of the complaint through a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16, for the determination of cause of action can only be made during and/or
after trial, what is dismissible via motion to dismiss is failure to state a cause of action.
 Chiang Kai Shek v. CA

G.R. no. L-58028, April 18, 1989

Facts:

Fausta F. Oh, upon reporting for work at petitioner school, where she had been teaching for
almost 33 years, was told that she had no assignment for the next semester. She then filed a complaint
originally against the school but upon motion to dismiss by the school alleging that it cannot be sued, she
then impleaded the school officials to make them solidarily liable.

The CFI dismissed the complaint as the school cannot be a party as it has not been incorporated, but the
CA reversed the decision and held that the school is suable and liable.

Issue:

Whether or not a School that has not been incorporated may be sued.

Held:

Yes. It is true that Rule 3, Section 1, of the Rules of Court clearly provides that only natural or
juridical persons may be parties in a civil action, it is also not denied that the school has not been
incorporated. However, this omission should not prejudice the private respondent in the assertion of
Fausta’s claims against the school. The School is governed by Act No. 2706 and being recognized by the
government, it was under obligation to incorporate under the Corporation Law, it appears that it had not
done so at the time the complaint was filed. The petitioner cannot now invoke its own non-compliance
with the law to immunize it from the private respondent’s complaint. As the school itself may be sued in
its own name, there is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, of the Rules of Court, under which persons
joined in an association without any juridical personality may be sued with such associations.
 Lorenzo Shippinf Corp. v. CHUBB and Sons

G.R.no. 147724, June 8, 2004

Facts:

Mayer Steel Pipe loaded several bundles of steel pipes on board the MV London IV, owned by the
petitioner, for shipment to Davao. Petitioner issued a clean bill of lading for the account of the consignee,
Sumitomo Corporation, which in turn insured the goods with respondent Chubb and Sons, Inc.

However, when the steel pipes arrived at Davao, it already had rust formation on top and/or at the sides.
While the cargo then was in transit from Davao to US, consignee Sumitomo send a letter to petitioner
Lorenzo Shipping that it will be filing a claim based on the damaged cargo once such damage had been
ascertained. Due to its heavily rusted condition, the consignee Sumitotmo rejected the damaged steel
pipes and declared them unfit for the purpose they were intended. It then filed an insurance claim with
Chubb and Sons.

Chubb and Sons then filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Lorenzo Shipping. Lorenzo
Shipping then alleged that Chubb and Sons has no capacity to sue before Philippine Courts. The RTC ruled
in favor of Chubb and that Lorenzo Shipping was negligent.

Petitioner then brought the case before the CA, where it alleged that respondent Chubb is a foreign
corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, and is not suing on an isolated transaction. It
contends that because the respondent is an insurance company, it was merely subrogated to the rights
of its insured, Sumitomo, however, is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a
license and does not have capacity to sue before Philippine courts. Since Sumitomo does not have capacity
to sue, then Chubb and Sons could not sue as well.

Issue:

Whether or not Chubb and Sons has capacity to sue before Philippine courts.

Held:

Yes. In the first place, petitioner failed to raise the defense that Sumitomo is a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines without a license. It is therefore estopped from litigating the issue on
appeal especially because it involves a question of fact which this court cannot resolve. Secondly,
assuming arguendo that Sumitomo cannot sue in the Philippines, it does not follow that respondents, as
subrogee, has also no capacity to sue in our jurisdiction. Capacity to sue is a right personal to its holder. It
is conferred by law and not by the parties. Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in
the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does
not have the character or representation he claims. It refers to a plaintiff’s general disabilities to sue, such
as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality, or any other
disqualifications of a party. Respondent does not have any of the said disqualifications, but on contrary it
has satisfactorily proven its capacity to sue, after having shown that it is not doing business in the
Philippines, but is only suing under an isolated transaction. A foreign corporation needs no license to sue
before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction.
 Steelcase, Inc. v. Design International Selections

G.R. no. 171994, April 18, 2012

Facts:

Steelcase Inc. a foreign corporation entered orally with Design International Selections, a
domestic corporation in a dealership agreement whereby Steelcase granted DISI the right to market, sell,
distribute, install, and service its products to end-user customers within the Philippines. The business
relationship was then terminated after some time.

Steelcase then filed a complaint for sum of money against DISI alleging that it still has unpaid account.
DISI in the other hand alleged that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that the action be
dismissed because Steelcase lack legal capacity to sue. RTC ruled in favor of DISI, it concluded that
Steelcase, a Foreign Corporation, doing business and not having license to do business, it is barred from
seeking redress from Philippine courts.

Steelcase elevated the case before the CA, but the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue

1. Whether or not Steelcase is doing business in the Philippines without a license, therefore barred
from suing before Philippine courts.
2. Whether or not DISI is estopped from challenging Steelcase’s capacity to sue

Held:

1. No. the rule that unlicensed foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines do not have
the capacity to sue before the local courts is well-established. However, it is also provided that
the phrase doing business shall not be deemed to include mere investment as a shareholder by a
foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do business, and/or the exercise of
rights as such investor; nor having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such
corporation; nor appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which
transacts business in its own name and for its own account.
2. Yes. By acknowledging the corporate entity of Steelcase and entering into a dealership agreement
with it and even benefiting from it, DISI is estopped from questioning Steelcase’s existence and
capacity to sue.

A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine courts although not
authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and
benefited by said corporation. To put it in another way, a party is estopped to challenge the
personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with
it.
 Spouses Algura v. City of Naga

G.R. no. 150135, October 30, 2006

Facts:

Spouses Algura filed a complaint for damages against City of Naga for an alleged illegal demolition
of their residence. They simultaneously filed an Ex-parte Motion to litigate as Indigent litigants. The RTC
allowed the said motion.

The respondents filed an answer with counterclaim arguing that the petitioners in the complaint had no
cause of action as the boarding house blocked the road’s right of way and was a nuisance per se.
Respondents filed a motion to disqualify Petitioners as indigent litigants, they asserted that in addition to
the more than 3,000 net income of petitioner Antonio Algura as member of the PNP, spouse Lorencita
also had a mini-store and a computer shop on the ground floor of their residence, hence; respondents
concluded that petitioners were not indigent litigants.

RTC then issued an order disqualifying the spouses as indigent litigants on the ground that they failed to
substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal fees and to comply with the 3 rd paragraph
of Rule 141, Section 18 directing them to pay the requisite filing fees.

The court then issued an order giving petitioners the opportunity to comply with the requisites for them
to qualify as indigent litigants, to which the petitioners submitted their compliance. Lorencita Algura
claimed that the demolition of their small dwelling deprived her of a monthly income of 7,000. She and
her family had to rely on her husband’s salary which provided them a monthly amount of 3,500. Also, that
they do not own the real property and that the meager net income from her small sari-sari store and the
rentals of some boarders, plus the salary of her husband were not enough to pay the family’s basic
necessities

RTC then order the denial of the petitioners motion for reconsideration, stating that the pay slip of
Antonio Algura showed that his gross income was 10,474 which amount was over above the amount
mentioned, the rule provides that in order to be considered an indigent litigant, the gross income of the
same should not exceed 3,000 a month and shall not own real estate with an assessed value of 50,000.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC was correct in outrightly denying petitioners to litigate as indigents.

Held:

No. when an application to litigate as an indigent is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits
and supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine of the applicant complies with the
income and property standards prescribed in the present section 19 of Rule 141 that is, the applicant’s
gross income and that of the applicant’s immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly
minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own real property with a fair market value of
more than 300,000. If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property requirements,
the authority to litigate as indigent litigant should automatically be granted.

However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a
hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family as provided under Rule 3, Section
21 of the Rules of Court.
 Ungria v. Court of Appeals

G.R. no. 165777, July 25, 2011

Facts:

Respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for ownership, possession and damages, and
alternative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of
Rosario’s conjugal share with damages against the petitioners.

Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

1. The claim or demand has been extinguished by virtue of valid sale;

2. Action is barred by extraordinary acquisitive prescription;
3. The action is barred by laches; and
4. Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, or filed the case prematurely for failure to resort to prior
barangay conciliation proceedings. And in addition:
5. Plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; and
6. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

RTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the RTC also denied.

Respondents on the other hand, filed a motion to allow them to continue prosecuting the case as indigent
litigants. RTC allowed the respondents for the same, and to which the petiti0ner filed a motion for
reconsideration and clarification on whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to continue to prosecute as
indigent litigants. Petitioner elevated the matter before the CA but the same affirmed the decision of the
RTC.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
2. Whether or not the case should have been dismissed as the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction for
non-payment of the correct Docket fees.

Held:

1. Yes. The respondent has two causes of action, one is for a real action and considering the assessed
value of the subject property was less than 20,000 the case would fall under the jurisdiction of
the MTC, the second being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Clearly, this is a case of
joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of possession of, or any
interest in the real property under contention, but includes an action to annul contracts and
reconveyance which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and, thus properly within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
2. No. the case involved the annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation,
thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the docket fees should not be based on assessed
value of the subject land, but should be based in section 7(b)(1) of Rule 144. A perusal of the
entries in the Legal fees form attached to the records reflected that the amount of 400 was paid
to the clerk of court, together with the other fees, as assessed by the clerk of court. Thus upon
respondent’s proof of payment of the assessed fees, the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over
the complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is terminated.
The RTC was correct to state that since there was no hearing yet, respondents are not in a position
to determine how much is to be charged and that after hearing, the clerk determines the filing
fee is still insufficient, the same shall be considered as lien on the judgment that may be entered.