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Abunado vs People of the Philippines

Facts: In 1967, Narcisa Arceño married Salvador Abunado. Later, Arceño left for Japan
to work there. She returned in 1992 but Abunado was nowhere to be found as he left
the family home. Arceño was able to locate Abunado but when she did, Abunado was
already cohabiting with somebody else. Further, Arceño also discovered that in 1989,
Abunado married a certain Zenaida Biñas.
In January 1995, Abunado filed an annulment case against Arceño. In May
1995, Arceño filed a bigamy case against Abunado. Both cases proceeded
simultaneously and independently in different courts.
In 1999, the marriage between Arceño and Abunado was annulled. In 2001, Abunado
was convicted by the trial court for bigamy.
Abunado now questions the judgment of conviction against him as he alleged that the
annulment case he filed against Arceño was a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
filed against him by Arceño. Hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have
been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abunado is correct.

HELD: No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not
only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if
Abunado eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the
point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage
was annulled. In short, all the elements of bigamy were present – the nullity of the prior
marriage is immaterial.
Cojuangco, Jr. vs Palma
Adm. Case No. 2474 September 15, 2004

Facts: Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in
office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.
Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala and Cruz Law Offices
(ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. He hired
respondent as his personal counsel. Consequently, respondent’s relationship with
complainant became intimate. On June 22, without the knowledge of complainant’s
family, respondent married Lisa, the complainant’s daughter in Hongkong. Complainant
came to know that, a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested
from his (complainant’s) office and airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over
in Hongkong; b) respondent misrepresented himself as bachelor in the Hongkong
authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and c) respondent was married to
Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children. Complainant filed for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa. The complainant contented that
with the moral ascendancy of the respondent over Maria Luisa and his
misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a
second marriage, respondent succeeded in inducing and beguiling her into marrying
him. Without complying with the requirements of the Philippine law that he should first
obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and that the
“advice” of Maria Luisa’s parents should first be obtained she being only twenty-two (22)
years of age, respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her in Hongkong in
June 22, 1992 by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong authorities that he is
a “bachelor.”
The respondent contented that “….. and that it is contrary to the natural course of things
for an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely loves.”

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of respondent to Ma. Luisa is void ab initio.

Held: To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.
Respondent admits that he married Luisa in Hongkong representing himself as a
bachelor; however, he claimed that the marriage certificate stated a condition no
different from the term “spinster” with respect to Luisa. There is no question that
respondent as a lawyer well versed in the law knew fully well that in marrying Maria
Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting
marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima. The Certification from the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at the Cardial’s
Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand, the Certificate of Marriage from the
Deputy Registrar of Marriages in Hongkong proves respondent’s subsequent marriage
with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondent’s second
marriage was confirmed. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second
marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he
married her, he cannot be charged with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted
mind and a brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the man and
woman are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity. How could
respondent perform these obligations to Lisa when he was previously married to
Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest thing he could have done was to
walk away.
Furthermore, (not stated in the case) under Article 35 paragraph 3 of the Family Code,
“a marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void ab initio except those covered
by the preceding chapter”. Though the marriage was solemnized in Hongkong, the
intrinsic validity of the marriage is governed by the national law of the contracting
parties. In the case at bar, since both of the parties are Filipinocitizens, the validity of
their marriage shall be governed by the Philippine law. Under the Philippine law,
absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage shall make the marriage void
ab initio. Their marriage was contracted without the valid marriage license, thus, the
marriage of respondent and Ma. Luisa is void ab initio.
Reyes vs Pearlbank Securities

Facts: (Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
petitioner Anthony T. Reyes prays for the reversal of the 26 October 2005 Decision and
7 February 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in Anthony T. Reyes v. Secretary of
the Department of Justice and Pearlbank Securities, Inc., docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
90006, ruling that the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to charge petitioner Reyes with the
crime of falsification of commercial and private documents) PEARLBANK, domestic
corporation, is engaged in the securities business. On the other hand, Westmont
Investment Corp (WINCORP), a domestic corporation, operates an investment house.
Among the services of WINCORP is the arranging and brokering of loans. Anthony
Reyes, petitioner, was the ex-VP for Operations and Administration of WINCORP.
PEARLBANK alleged that it received letters from persons who invested in WINCORP
demanding payment of their matured investments, which the latter failed to pay.
According to the investors, WINCORP informed them that PEARLBANK was the
borrower of their investments, the latter having failed to make good of its borrowings. As
proof of their claims, the investors presented Confirmation Advices, SPA and
Certifications signed and issued by WINCORP. PEARLBANK denied having any
outstanding loan with WINCORP. For its part, PEARLBANK wrote Antonio Ong,
WINCORP President, demanding explanation of the said controversy. PEARLBANK
alleged that the act of WINCORP constituted falsification of commercial and private
documents. While PEARLBANK admitted obtaining loans from WINCORP, it alleged
that the accounts were settled thru an offsetting arrangement. WINCORP failed to heed
to PEARLBANK‘s demand of explanation, prompting the latter to file complaints with the
SEC against Ong and several John Doe for full and accurate accounting of the
investments of WINCORP and PEARLBANK‘s alleged loan to WINCORP and/or its
investors.Juanita Tan, PEARLBANK‘s Treasurer, also filed a complaint on behalf of the
company, for falsification by private individuals of commercial and private documents
before the DOJ. Named as the respondents of the complaint were directors and officers
of WINCORP (IS No. 2000-1491). In answer to the complaint before the DOJ,
WINCORP thru Ong, explained that the two companies, upon application of
PEARLBANK, had a credit line arrangement. Pursuant to this, PEARLBANK was able to
obtain thru the brokerage of WINCORP, loans from several lenders/investors for which
the former issued promissory notes. Ong and three others filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of probable cause or suspend the proceedings due to the existence of a prejudicial
question involving the SEC cases. Thereafter, DOJ Prosecutor Rances issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of Information for falsifications of commercial and
private documents by private individuals against Reyes, Ong, Briones, Lucena, Espiritu
and Tamundong. The Infromations were then filed with the MTC of Manila. Ong,
Briones, Espiritu and Tamundong filed MRs reiterating its motion to dismiss or suspend
the proceedings. The MRs were denied by the prosecutors. While the others appealed
to the DOJ Secretary, petitioner Reyes filed a petition for review. A joint resolution was
then issued by Undersec. Gutierrez reversing the assailed resolution, thereby
dismissing the complaints before the DOJ. On MR by PEARLBANK, DOJ Sec.
Datumanong reversed the resolution of Gutierrez, consequently, reinstating the finding
of probable cause to charge petitioner and other respondents. Aggrieved, Petitioner
Reyes and the other officers filed MRs, but these were all denied. Petitioner Reyes
appealed to the CA, contending, among others the existence of prejudicial question of
the SEC and criminal complaint. CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: WON the two cases before the SEC (now pending before the RTC of Makati)
are prejudicial questions which have to be resolved before the criminal cases may
proceed.

RULING: No. Under the ROC, a criminal action may be suspended upon the pendency
of a prejudicial question in a civil action.
A prejudicial question is defined as one which arises in a case the resolution of which is
a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal. It has 2 elements, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. The principal issue to be resolved in the criminal cases is
whether or not petitioner committed the acts referred to in the Informations, and whether
or not these would constitute falsification of commercial and private documents under
the law. In contrast, the issues to be resolved in the SEC cases are: (a) whether or not
Tankiansee is entitled to the accounting and disclosure, is entitled to be furnished
copies of the records or documents demanded from WINCORP, is liable to Tankiansee
for damages; and (b) whether or not PEARLBANK has loan obligations with WINCORP
or its stockholders, the subject Confirmation Advices and other related documents
should be declared to be without force and effect or if PEARLBANK is entitled to be
relieved of the legal effects thereof, and are liable for damages to PEARLBANK as a
consequence of this alleged fraudulent scheme. A cursory reading of the above-
mentioned issues would show that, although apparently arising from the same set of
facts, the issues in the criminal and civil cases are clearly different from one another.
Furthermore, the issues in the civil cases are not determinative of the issues in the
criminal cases. That PEARLBANK does have outstanding loans with WINCORP or its
stockholders/investors is not an absolute defense in, and would not be determinative of
the outcome of, the criminal cases. Even if the RTC so rules in the civil cases, it would
not necessarily mean that these were the very same loan transactions reflected in the
Confirmation Advices, Special Powers of Attorney and Certifications issued by
WINCORP to its stockholders/investors, totally relieving petitioner and his other co-
accused from any criminal liability for falsification.
PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010

FACTS: On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an


action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings
before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a
key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in
the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is
not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of
Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be
declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal casebecause prior to
the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide
had already been committed.

ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide
against petitioner.

HELD: No. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide, which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.”
However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the
offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this
case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as
a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally
liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that “the
judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between
the spouses is concerned x x x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the
judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x
a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may
still produce legal consequences.” In fact, the Court declared in that case that
“a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.”
In re: Atty. Bucana
A.M. No. 1637 July 6, 1976

FACTS: Spouses Gonalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon entered into an agreement
whereby in case anyone of them will remarry, both parties offer no objection and waive
all civil and criminal actions against them. This agreement was notarized by Notary
Public Rufilo D. Bucana. This prompted Mrs. Angela Drilon Baltazar to send a letter
before the SC to subject Atty. Bucana to disciplinary action knowing that the subject of
the agreement is contrary to law because it sanctions an illicit and immoral purpose.
Upon order of the SC, Atty. Bucana submitted his explanation saying that indeed the
spouses went to his office and asked that the document be notarized. He, however,
vehemently refused to notarize it. He then placed the document on his desk. A week
later, he found that the document was lost in his table and the same was already
notarized as per his file copies in the office. He asked his Secretary to look for the
spouses but they could no longer be found. He added that he inadvertently notarized
the same in view of the numerous documents on his table and at that time he was
emotionally disturbed as his father (now deceased) was then seriously ill. His
contentions were corroborated by two witnesses.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Bucana should be held liable.

RULING: Yes. It is unquestionable that the agreement is indeed contrary to law, morals
and good customs. Marriage is an inviolable social institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested for it is the foundation of the family and
of society without which there could be neither civilization nor progress. The contract, in
substance, purports to formulate an agreement between the husband and the wife to
take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relations with another
man, without opposition from either one, and what is more, it induces each party to
commit bigamy. This is not only immoral but in effect abets the commission of a crime.
A notary public, by virtue of the nature of his office, is required to exercise his duties
with due care and with due regard to the provisions of existing law.
Silverio vs Republic

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a biological male who feels
trapped in a male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok,
Thailand. The procedure was successful – he (she) now has a female body. Thereafter,
in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and
his sex (male to female) in his birth certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila
RTC. He wanted to make these changes, among others, so that he can marry his
American fiancé.
The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on
equity; that Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and
should not be in any way taken against him; that there was no opposition to his petition
(even the OSG did not make any basis for opposition at this point); that no harm, injury
or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of
Silverio and [her] fiancé and the realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate
may be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in
existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR
NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was
passed. This law provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in
petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of
Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that
the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon which it is
based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. Under the law,
a change of name may only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-
assignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition
for the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support it. And
not with the civil registry because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a
male hence it was just but right that the entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a
male. The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there
is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex
made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes
sought by Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage
and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second,
there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the
Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code
and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women
which could be substantially affected if Silverio’s petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with
his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.”
REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

Facts: The respondent’s petition was granted by the RTC on January 12, 2005. The
following facts were presented by the respondent to the RTC:
(a) She was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as female in the Certificate of
Live birth.
(b) While growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics because of CAH,
which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics.
(c) Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH and the latter issued a medical certificate. Such
document testified respondent’s claim.
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling had been filed.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the
birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the
ground of her medical condition knows as CAH, and her name from “Jennifer” to “Jeff”,
under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

Held: No. The trial court did not err in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent. The court considered the unique circumstance in this case
where nature had taken its course.

“As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to
Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that
respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's
change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.”
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy
143 SCRA 449

FACTS: Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a
certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of
latter’s former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she
contents that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was
married to another woman before their marriage.

ISSUE: Whether Karl’s marriage with Lilia is void.

HELD: It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with
force because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl
is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl
for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can
remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void under the law.
TY vs. CA
G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000

Facts: Respondent Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March
1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 1977. However, on
August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared
their marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding
was also declared void for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was
issued nullifying his marriage to Villanueva, Reyes wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner,
thru civil rites on April 4, 1979 in Pasay. Three years after, on April 4, 1982, they also
had a church wedding in Makati.
On January 1991, Edgardo filed a case with the RTC of Pasig, praying that his marriage
to Ofelia Ty be declared null and void because they allegedly had no marriage license
when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was
still married to Anna Maria. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was
rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on
April 4, 1979.
Ofelia, in defending her marriage to private respondent, submitted their Marriage
License which was issued in Cavite on April 3, 1979. He did not question this document
when it was submitted in evidence. However, the fact that the civil marriage of Edgardo
and Ofelia took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage
as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that petitioner and
respondent had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.
The Pasig RTC ruled in favor of Edgardo Reyes and declared his marriage to Ofelia Ty
null and void ab initio. Both parties appealed to the CA, which subsequently affirmed the
trial court’s decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to
Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly
contracted.

ISSUE:
1) Is a decree of nullity of the first marriage required before a subsequent marriage can
be entered into validly?
2) May the Family Code be given retroactive effect to the instant case?
3) What is the effect of re-using for a church wedding the marriage license that was 1st
used in a civil wedding 3 years ago?
4) Is petitioner entitled to moral damages as indemnity for her husband’s filing of a
baseless complaint?

HELD: 1) and 2) NO.


The SC held different rulings regarding the matter however, the confusion under the
Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. The rulings in Gomez, Consuegra,
and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 40 of
said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage –
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.

The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals
(1993), the Court held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on
the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86,
99, 147, 148).

However, Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) applied the old rule because of the peculiar
circumstances of the case. The first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality
for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void
since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the
issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held
that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born
before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no
need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered
into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat,
Mendozaand Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of
license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he
could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private
respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of
her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive
effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment
of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.

3) Coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremonywherein petitioner married
private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil
ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Obviously, the
church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the
CA erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical
marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative
defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court
from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the
State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution,
outweighs such technicality.

In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and
formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the
first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the
civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding
of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to
ratify but also to fortify the first.

4) No damages should be awarded in the present case. Petitioner wants her marriage
to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as
legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a
baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.
Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife
damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the
law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover,
our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely
because of breach of a marital obligation. There are other remedies (legal separation, or
prosecution for adultery or concubinage).
Guevarra v. Eala,
AC No.7136, August 1, 2007

Facts: Wife of petitioner, Irene Moje was having an illicit affair with the respondent.
After leaving the conjugal home, petitioner found out that Irene and respondent was
living together in a residential house few blocks away from the church they were
married. Few months thereafter, Irene gave birth to a baby girl and wrote the name of
the respondent as the father in the certificate of live birth.
Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of marriage to Irene and a criminal complaint for
adultery against respondent and Irene.
Petitioner also filed a complaint for disbarment before the IBP-CBD on the ground of
gross immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath which was
dismissed by the IBP Board of Governors due to lack of merit.
Hence, the petition of complaint before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Would an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman constitute
gross immoral conduct?

Ruling: Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on
the surrounding circumstances." The case at bar involves a relationship between a
married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the
affair was carried out discreetly.
Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws. (Vitug v. Rongcal)
Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly
immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of
his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving
of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. (Tucay v. Atty.
Tucay)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice
law.
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the
Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional


Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a
lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law."
BESO VS. DAGUMAN
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, January 28, 2000

Facts: Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority by Beso. In
the Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, the complainant charged judge with
solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy
and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar with
the following facts:
(a) On August 28, 1997, the complainant and complainant’s fiancée, Bernardito A.
Yman, got married under the solemnization of the respondent in the respondent’s
residence in Calbayog City, Samar;
(b) That after the wedding, Yman abandoned the complainant;
(c) That when Yman left, the complainant inquired to the City Civil Registrar to inquire
regarding her Marriage Contract. The complainant found out that her marriage was not
registered;
(d) The complainant wrote to the respondent to inquire and the former found out that all
the copies were taken by Yman and no copy was retained by the respondent.
The respondent averred with the following rationale:
(a) Respondent solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the
complainant and Yman. He also believed that being a Filipino overseas worker, the
complainant deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government
policy;
(b) Respondent was also leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not
too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married;
(c) Respondent’s failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because
Yman absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate.
(d) Respondent, however, tried to recover custody of the missing documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated, August 11,
1998 found the respondent Judge “…committed non-feasance in office” and
recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000).

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction;
and
(2) Whether or not the respondent committed negligence by not retaining a copy and
not registering the complainant’s marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registrar.

Held: (1) Yes. The judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction. Article 7 of
the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, “Any incumbent
member of the judiciary with the court’s jurisdiction”. In relation thereto, according to
Article 8 of the Family Code, there are only three instances with which a judge may
solemnize a marriage outside of his jurisdiction:
(1.1) when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(1.2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
(1.3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case
the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
In this case, non of the three instances is present.
(2) Yes. The judge committed negligence. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Family code,
such duty to register the marriage is the respondent’s duty. The same article
provides,“It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage… to send the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen (15) days after the
marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the
solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing
officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the
original of the marriage license, and in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting
party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned
in Article 8.”.
ARANES vs OCCIANO
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002.

Facts: On Feb 17, 2000, Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnized the marriage of Mercedita Mata
Arañes and Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license at Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
When Orobia died, the petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” of Orobia was not
recognized, because the marriage was a null. She also cannot claim the pension of her
husband who is a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts
and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings.
In his Comment, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan
Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February
2000. He was assured that all the documents were complete, thus he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in his sala. However, on 17 February 2000, he acceded to the
request of Arroyo that he solemnize the marriage in Nabua because Orobia had a
difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan. Before starting
the ceremony he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage
license, thus he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to
another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and
the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out
of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate
the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization,
he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that
their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same
day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the
latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered
to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Respondent judge
vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite
the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment
suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August
2001 confessing that she filed the complaint out of rage, and she realizes her own
shortcomings. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her
marriage and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
solemnized the same.
From the records, petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5
January
2000 to be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed
it. Also, the Civil
Registrar General and the Local Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur has no records of
the marriage. On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so
the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. The LCR informed the judge
that they cannot issue the same due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death
Certificate of his previous spouse.

Issue:Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his
jurisdiction and without the requisite marriage license.

Ruling:Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions,
may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating officialto administrative liability.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent judge should also be faulted for
solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. Marriage which preceded
the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such
license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in
cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority
when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted
in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of
the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action
WHEREFORE,Judge Salvador M. Occiano, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealtwith
more severely.

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