TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHI MING TSOI VS CA 2

SANTOS VS CA 3
REPUBLIC VS CA 4
DE CASTRO VS DE CASTRO 5
CARLOS VS SANDOVAL 5
REPUBLIC VS IYOY 7
MARCOS VS MARCOS 7
SY VS CA 8
BESO VS DAGUMAN 9
ARAES VS OCCIANO 10
REPUBLIC VS DAYOT 11
ANONUEVO VS INTESTATE ESTATE OF JALANDONI 11
HEIRS OF DELGADO VS HEIRS OF RUSTIA 13
BORJA-MANZANO VS JUDGE SANCHEZ 15
DINO VS DINO 15
BAYOT VS CA 17
GARCIA VS RECIO 19
ABLAZA VS RP 20

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CHI MING TSOI vs. CA
FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the
Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced
by their marriage contract. After the celebration
they had a reception and then proceeded to the
house of the Ching Ming Tsoi’s mother. There they
slept together on the same bed in the same room
for the first night of their married life.
Gina’s version: that contrary to her expectations
that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy
making love that night of their marriage, or having
sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however
just went to bed, slept on one side and then turned
his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual
intercourse between them that night. The same
thing happened on the second, third and fourth
nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private
place where they can enjoy together during their
first week as husband and wife they went to Baguio
City. But they did so together with Ching’s mother,
uncle and nephew as they were all invited by her
husband. There was no sexual intercourse between
them for four days in Baguio since Ching avoided
her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by
just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living
room.
They slept together in the same room and on the
same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their
marriage) until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But
during this period there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. Gina claims that she
did not even see her husband’s private parts nor
did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for
medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag.
Results were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a
virgin while Ching’s examination was kept
confidential up to this time.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a
closet homosexual as he did not show his penis.
She said she had observed him using an eyebrow
pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his
mother. She also said her husband only married
her to acquire or maintain his residency status here
in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
Ching’s version: he claims that if their marriage
shall be annulled by reason of psychological
incapacity, the fault lies with Gina. He does not
want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that
he loves her very much (2) that he has no defect on
his part and he is physically and psychologically
capable (3) since the relationship is still very young
and if there is any differences between the two of
them, it can still be reconciled and that according
to him, if either one of them has some
incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not
be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina
there was no sexual contact between them. But,
the reason for this, according to the defendant,
was that everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him
and whenever he caresses her private parts, she
always removed his hands.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of
the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as
VOID the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina
on May 22, 1988. No costs.
The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal
of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable
but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the
Family Code is “to procreate children basedon the
universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
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senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill this marital obligation is equivalent
to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the
wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual
love, respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is
actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno,
120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared
with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the
cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I
could not have cared less.” This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has
nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.
Leouel Santos vs Court of Appeals
Facts: Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met
Julia Rosario Bedia in Iloilo City. In September
1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with
Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to their son in 1987.
Their marriage, however, was marred by the
frequent interference of Julia’s parents, as averred
by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarreled
about as to, among other things, when should they
start living independently from Julia’s parents. In
1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse
despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months later, she
and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return
home in 1989. She never went home that year. In
1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to
a military training. During his stay, he desperately
tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an
effort to at least have his wife come home, filed a
petition to nullify their marriage due to Julia’s
alleged psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted
that due to Julia’s failure to return home or at least
communicate with him even with all his effort
constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia filed an
opposition; she said that it is Leouel who is
incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that
there is no collusion between the two. Leouel’s
petition is however denied by the lower and
appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is
attendant to the case at bar.
HELD: No. Before deciding on the case, the SC
noted that the Family Code did not define the term
“psychological incapacity”, which is adopted from
the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less
specificity than expected, has been designed to
allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC
did not give any examples of PI for fear that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law. The term “psychological incapacity” defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be
of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
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must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands
aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because
the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the
factual settings presented. The factual settings do
not come close to to the standard required to
decree a nullity of marriage.
Republic vs CA and Molina
FACTS: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo
Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth
to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of
“immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early
stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency
to spend time with his friends and squandering his
money with them, from his dependency from his
parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving
his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in
1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner
thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City.
Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The
couple is separated-in-fact for more than three
years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of
her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a
social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did
not present any evidence as he appeared only
during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991,
the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied
the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision.
Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting
personalities should be construed as psychological
incapacity
HELD:The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the
Civil Code Revision Committee intended to
liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on
personal and family rights, and holding
psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental
and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the
other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the
long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage; where said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats
the very objectives of marriage, warrants the
dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of
Appeals, where psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is
celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In
the present case, there is no clear showing to us
that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,”
if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code, removing any visages of it
being the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
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expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3)
The incapacity must be proven existing at the time
of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity
must be clinically or medically permanent or
incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough;
(6) the essential marital obligation must be
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code
as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to
225 of the same code as regards parents and their
children; (7) interpretation made by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and
the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the
State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and
reversed and set aside the assailed decision;
concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
De castro vs De Castro
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent met and became
sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married,
thus they applied for a marriage license with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first sexual
relation sometime in October 1994, and had
regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the
couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license had already expired.
Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu
of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit
dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been
living together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The couple got married on the same date,
with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to
their respective homes and did not live together as
husband and wife.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is valid.
HELD: Under the Family Code, the absence of any
of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any
of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the
evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented
an affidavit stating that they had been living
together for more than five years. However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of
the affidavit when she was asked during cross-
examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be
considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the
marriage license requirement for a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The aim of this
provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for a
marriage license. In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there
was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could
push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were
not exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Carlos vs Sandoval
Facts: Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels
of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died
intestate. He was survived by respondents
Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II.
Upon Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land were
registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In
August 1995, Carlos commenced an action against
respondents before the court a quo. In his
complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage
between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity
in view of the absence of the required marriage
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license. He likewise maintained that his deceased
brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive
father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the
properties covered by such certificates of title,
including the sums received by respondents as
proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
HELD: The grounds for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment
is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have
applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on
judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided.
Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings
or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the
trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place
in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may not be filed by any party outside of
the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured
spouse may file a petition forannulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the
belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only
inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and
not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of
the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased
spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against
the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended
to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of
their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the
law. They can still protect their successional right,
for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory
or intestate heirs can still question the validity of
the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding
for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not
apply to cases already commenced before March
15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within
the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the
new Rule which became effective on March 15,
2003 is prospective in its application.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case
against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage
in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962.
Which law would govern depends upon when the
marriage took place.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is
the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as
to who may bring an action to declare the marriage
void. Does this mean that any person can bring an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in
force at the time the respondents were married, or
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even in the Family Code, there is no specific
provision as to who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who
can demonstrate “proper interest” can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest and must be based on a cause of action.
Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the
children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.
Republic vs Iyoy
Facts: The case is a petition for review by the RP
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
on certiorari praying for thereversal of the decision
of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the
judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of
Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null
and void based on Article 36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-
Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In
1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she
sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce
papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married
an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the
Philippines on several occasions, during one she
attended the marriage of one of her children
inwhich she used her husband’s last name as hers
in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s acts
brought “danger and dishonor” to the family and
were manifestations of her psychological
incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the
certification of the recording of their marriage
contract, and the invitation where Fely used her
newhusband’s last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus
was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and
thatsince 1988 she was already an American citizen
and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the
evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it was
affirmed in the CA.
Issue: Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per
se constitute psychological incapacity?
Held: The evidences presented by the respondent
fail to establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article.”
Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a
divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty
even before the celebration of marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”
Marcos vs Marcos
FACTS: Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in
1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the
husband failed to provide material support to the
family and have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of
the marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos
has psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the
marriage null and void under Article 36 which was
however reversed by the Court of Appeals
ISSUES: 1. Whether personal medical or
psychological examination of the respondent by a
physician is a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence
presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.
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HELD: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for
declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidencepresented.
There is no requirement, however that the
respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditionsince qua non for such
declaration.Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may
haveresorted to physical abuse and abandonment,
the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on hispart. There is
absolutely no showing that his “defects” were
already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they areincurable.Verily, the behavior of
respondent can be attributed to the fact that he
had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for
aperiod of more than six years. It was during this
period that he became intermittently drunk, failed
to give material and moral support,and even left
the family home.Thus, his alleged psychological
illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equallyimportant, there
is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.In sum, this Court cannot
declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure
of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychologicalincapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her
failure to observe the guidelines outlined inMolina.
SY v CA
Facts: On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and
Fernando Sy got married at the Church of Our Lady
of Lourdes in Quezon City. After some time,
Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Two children
were born out of the marriage. Frederick, their son
went to his father’s residence. Filipina filed for legal
separation.
The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership
of gains and granted the custody of their children
to her.
Later on, Filipina was punched at the different
parts of her body and was even choked by him
when she started spanking their son when the
latter ignored her while she was talking to him.
The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical
injuries only. A new action for legal separation was
granted by repeated physical violence and sexual
infidelity. Filipina then filed for the declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage citing
psychological incapacity.
The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her
petition. On her petition to this Court, she assailed
for the first time that there was no marriage
license during their marriage.
Issues: 1) Whether or not the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the
time of the ceremony; and
2) Whether or not private respondent is
psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its
absolute nullity.
Ruling: The date of celebration of their marriage on
November 15, 1973, is admitted both by
petitioner and private respondent. The pieces of
evidence on record showed that on the day of
the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage
license. A marriage licenseis a formal requirement;
its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In
addition, the marriage contract shows that
the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was
issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner
nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
The marriage license was issued on September
17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took
place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable
conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license. Under
Article 80 of the Civil Code. those solemnized
without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, are void ab initio. This is
clearly applicable in this case.
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity
of private respondent need no longer detain the
Court. It is mooted by the conclusion that the
marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab
8
initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their
marriage was solemnized.
BESO VS. DAGUMAN
Facts: Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty
and Abuse of Authority by Beso. In the Complaint-
Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, the
complainant charged judge with solemnizing
marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of
negligence in not retaining a copy and not
registering the marriage contract with the office of
the Local Civil Registrar with the following facts:
(a) On August 28, 1997, the complainant and
complainant’s fiancée, Bernardito A. Yman, got
married under the solemnization of the respondent
in the respondent’s residence in Calbayog City,
Samar;
(b) That after the wedding, Yman abandoned the
complainant;
(c) That when Yman left, the complainant inquired
to the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding her
Marriage Contract. The complainant found out
that her marriage was not registered;
(d) The complainant wrote to the respondent to
inquire and the former found out that all the copies
were taken by Yman and no copy was retained by
the respondent.
The respondent averred with the following
rationale:
(a) Respondent solemnized the marriage because
of the urgent request of the complainant and
Yman. He also believed that being a Filipino
overseas worker, the complainant deserved more
than ordinary official attention under present
Government policy;
(b) Respondent was also leaning on the side of
liberality of the law so that it may be not too
expensive and complicated for citizens to get
married;
(c) Respondent’s failure to file the marriage
contract was beyond his control because Yman
absconded with the missing copies of the marriage
certificate.
(d) Respondent, however, tried to recover custody
of the missing documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an
evaluation report dated, August 11, 1998 found the
respondent Judge “…committed non-feasance in
office” and recommended that he be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000).
Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondent
solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction;
(2) Whether or not the respondent committed
negligence by not retaining a copy and not
registering the complainant’s marriage before the
office of the Local Civil Registrar.
Held: (1) Yes. The judge solemnized a marriage
outside of his jurisdiction. Article 7 of the Family
Code provides that marriage may be solemnized
by, “Any incumbent member of the judiciary with
the court’s jurisdiction”. In relation thereto,
according to Article 8 of the Family Code, there are
only three instances with which a judge may
solemnize a marriage outside of his jurisdiction:
(1.1) when either or both the contracting parties is
at the point of death;
(1.2) when the residence of either party is located
in a remote place;
(1.3) where both of the parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect.
In this case, non of the three instances is present.
(2) Yes. The judge committed
negligence. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Family
code, such duty to register the marriage is the
respondent’s duty. The same article provides,“It
shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the
marriage… to send the duplicate and triplicate
copies of the certificate not later than fifteen (15)
days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar
of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the
local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer
transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The
solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the
quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the
original of the marriage license, and in proper
cases, the affidavit of the contracting party
9
regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a
place other than those mentioned in Article 8.”.
The recommendation of the OCA stands.
ARANES vs. OCCIANO
Facts: On Feb 17, 2000, Judge Salvador Occiano,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnized the
marriage of Mercedita Mata Arañes and
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
marriage license at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
When Orobia died, the petitioner’s right to inherit
the “vast properties” of Orobia was not recognized,
because the marriage was a null. She also cannot
claim the pension of her husband who is a retired
Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against
respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so
much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
In his Comment, respondent judge averred that he
was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15
February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the
parties on 17 February 2000. He was assured that
all the documents were complete, thus he agreed
to solemnize the marriage in his sala. However, on
17 February 2000, he acceded to the request of
Arroyo that he solemnize the marriage in Nabua
because Orobia had a difficulty walking and could
not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan. Before
starting the ceremony he discovered that the
parties did not possess the requisite marriage
license, thus he refused to solemnize the marriage
and suggested its resetting to another date.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties,
the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions
for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the
marriage out of human compassion. He also feared
that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the
physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from
a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the
necessity for the marriage license and admonished
the parties that their failure to give it would render
the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
respondent judge that they would give the license
to him in the afternoon of that same day. When
they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it
up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the
same reassurance that the marriage license would
be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court
of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Respondent judge
vigorously denies that he told the contracting
parties that their marriage is valid despite the
absence of a marriage license. He attributes the
hardships and embarrassment suffered by the
petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her
Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001
confessing that she filed the complaint out of rage,
and she realizes her own shortcomings. She
attested that respondent judge initially refused to
solemnize her marriage and that it was because of
her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
solemnized the same.
From the records, petitioner and Orobia filed
their Application for Marriage License on 5 January
2000 to be issued on 17 January 2000. However,
neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it. Also, the
Civil
Registrar General and the Local Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur has no records of the marriage. On
8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of
respondent judge so the latter could communicate
with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage
license. The LCR informed the judge that they
cannot issue the same due to the failure of Orobia
to submit the Death Certificate of his previous
spouse.
Issue: Whether or not the Judge erred in
solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction
and without the requisite marriage license.
Ruling: Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to
solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
10
long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while
it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating officialto administrative
liability.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, may
not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on
marriage. Respondent judge should also be faulted
for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. Marriage which preceded the
issuance of the marriage license is void, and that
the subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer
the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent
judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance
of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite
the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This
Court has consistently held in a catena of cases
that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating
respondent from disciplinary action
WHEREFORE,Judge Salvador M. Occiano,
is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
Republic vs. Dayot
FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the
Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit
that they had lived together for at least 5years. On
August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a
certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees
of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.
Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy
against Jose and an administrative complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand,
Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a
sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa
is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license
requirement.
HELD: CA indubitably established that Jose and
Felisa have not lived together for five years at the
time they executed their sworn affidavit and
contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living
together only in June 1986, or barely five months
before the celebration of their marriage on
November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates
a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the
allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an
exception to the requirement for a marriage
license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers
to a quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s
marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that
an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.
The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe
and may be raised any time.
AÑONUEVO VS. Intestate Estate of JALANDONI
THIS CASE IS ABOUT LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF
MARRIAGE. BIRTH CERTIFICATE STATING THAT
ONE’S PARENTS WERE MARRIED ESTABLISHES THE
11
PRESUMPTION THAT INDEED THEY WERE
MARRIED.
FACTS: RODOLFO DIED. HIS BROTHER FILED AT RTC
PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION. ANONUEVO ET AL
INTERVENED. THEY SAID THEIR MOTHER SYLVIA
WAS DAUGHTER OF ISABEL AND JOHN. BUT AT
THE TIME OF RODOLFO’S DEATH, THEIR
GRANDMOTHER ISABEL WAS THE LAWFUL WIFE
OF RODOLFO BASED ON A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE.
RODOLFO’S BROTHER OPPOSED THEIR
INTERVENTION BECAUSE THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE
OF SYLVIA STATES THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE
MARRIED. THEREFORE ISABEL’S MARRIAGE TO
RODOLFO WAS NULL AND VOID. ANONUEVO ET AL
HOWEVER ARGUED THAT THE ENTRIES IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA COULD NOT BE USED
AS PROOF THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE INDEED
MARRIED. FURTHER, SUCH STATEMENT OF
MARRIAGE IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE IS JUST TO
SAVE FACE AND IS CUSTOMARY.
ISSUE: CAN ANONUEVO ET AL INTERVENE?
RULING: NO. THEY HAVE NO PERSONAL STANDING
TO INTERVENE. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF SYLVIA
WHICH SHOWS THAT ISABEL AND JOHN WERE
MARRIED IS SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT INDEED THEY
WERE MARRIED. THEREFORE ISABEL’S MARRIAGE
TO RODOLFO IS VOID SINCE AT THAT TIME ISABEL
WAS STILL MARRIED TO JOHN. BEING NOT
MARRIED TO RODOLFO, ISABEL AND HER
DESCENDANTS HAVE NO SHARE IN THE ESTATE OF
RODOLFO.
WHILE A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE IS CONSIDERED
THE PRIMARY EVIDENCE OF A MARITAL UNION, IT
IS NOT REGARDED AS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE.[1][47] JURISPRUDENCE
TEACHES THAT THE FACT OF MARRIAGE MAY BE
PROVEN BY RELEVANT EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE.[2][48] HENCE, EVEN A
PERSON’S BIRTH CERTIFICATE MAY BE RECOGNIZED
AS COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN HIS PARENTS. THE REASON “FACE
SAVING/ CUSTOMARY” IS WITHOUT MERIT. THE
COURT CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A
FOLKWAY.
The ruling of the Court:
The second argument of the petitioners is also
without merit. We agree with the finding of the
Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their
siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to
establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of
Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and
their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has
interest in Rodolfo’s estate.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners,
the existence of a previous marriage between
Isabel and John Desantis was adequately
established. This holds true notwithstanding the
fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel
and John Desantis exists on record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the
primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of
marriage.[3][47] Jurisprudence teaches that the fact
of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate.[4][48]
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.[5][49]
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia
precisely serves as the competent evidence of
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As
mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable
entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were
“married” and (b) that Sylvia is their “legitimate”
child.[6][50] In clear and categorical language,
Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks of a subsisting
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws,[7][51] the foregoing entries
are accorded prima facie weight. They are
presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will,
stand as proof of the facts attested.[8][52] In the
case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings
offered no such rebuttal.
The petitioners did no better than to explain away
the entries in Sylvia’s birth certificate as untruthful
statements made only in order to “save face.”[9][53]
They urge this Court to take note of a “typical”
12
practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct
the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a
child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court
cannot countenance.
The allegations of the petitioners, by
themselves and unsupported by any other
evidence, do not diminish the probative value of
the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners
would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a
supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the
usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that
the petitioners would themselves argue that the
document on which they based their interest in
intervention contains untruthful statements in its
vital entries.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the
petitioners and their siblings themselves which,
properly appreciated, supports the finding that
Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John
Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any
proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the
time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to
present evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior
marriage was dissolved results in a failure to
establish that she has interest in the estate of
Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners
and their siblings in the settlement proceedings
cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of
Appeals. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal
is DENIED.
Dela Rosa vs Heirs of Rustia Vda De Guzman
Doctrine: - Although a marriage contract is
considered a primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in
fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage
arises, other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be
enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage.
-Every intendment of the law leans toward
legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact
married. This is the usual order of things in society
and, if the parties are not what they hold
themselves out to be, they would be living in
constant violation of the common rules of law and
propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Always presume marriage.
Facts: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died
intestate and without descendants. Guillermo
outlived Josefa by two years. Petitioners and
respondents are their respective relatives claiming
rights to their intestate estate.
The petition for letters of administration stated
that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were
never married. According to petitioners, sometime
in 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to
Josefa. Josefa and Guillermo eventually lived
together as husband and wife but were never
married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point
out that no record of the contested marriage
existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal
certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the
sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or
unmarried woman.
Josefa was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one
Lucio Ocampo with five other children without the
benefit of marriage. Felisa had another son by way
of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of
the claimants in Josefa‘s estate. But, unlike her
relationship with Lucio Campo which was
admittedly one without the benefit of marriage,
the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa
Delgado’s union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants
because if Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had
been validly married, then their only child Luis
Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of
Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the
latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be
barred by the principle of absolute separation
between the legitimate and illegitimate families.
Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis
Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit
13
from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they
would all be within the illegitimate line.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid marriage
between Guillermo and Josefa and between Felisa
and Ramon.
Held: The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence: xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage;
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their
cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be
married. Their reputed status as husband and wife
was such that even the original petition for letters
of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de
Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
They make much of the absence of a record of the
contested marriage, the testimony of a witness
attesting that they were not married, and a
baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa
Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a
primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not
always proof that no marriage in fact took place.
Once the presumption of marriage arises, other
evidence may be presented in support thereof. The
evidence need not necessarily or directly establish
the marriage but must at least be enough to
strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the
certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as
Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as
Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no
less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to
Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in
the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public
documents which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. No clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption
of the truth of the recitals therein was presented
by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own
witness whose testimony they primarily relied
upon to support their position, confirmed that
Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived
together as husband and wife." This again could
not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive
proof only of the baptism administered by the
priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of
the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein, such as the alleged single or
unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of
marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law
leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual
order of things in society and, if the parties are not
what they hold themselves out to be, they would
be living in constant violation of the common rules
of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
The marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
Presumptions of law are either conclusive or
disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences
which the law makes so peremptory that no
contrary proof, no matter how strong, may
overturn them. On the other hand, disputable
presumptions, one of which is the presumption of
marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of
sufficient evidence to the contrary.
14
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged
marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The
oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely
on the disputable presumption of marriage even in
the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with
Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis
Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de
Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de
Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado).
All things considered, we rule that these factors
sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption
of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
were never married
Borja- Manzano vs. Sanchez
FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful
wife of the late David Manzano having been
married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel
Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On
March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another
marriage with Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly
stated that both contracting parties were
“separated” thus, respondent Judge ought to know
that the marriage was void and bigamous. He
claims that when he officiated the marriage of
David and Payao, he knew that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years
as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both
left their families and had never cohabit or
communicated with their spouses due to constant
quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage
between two contracting parties who both have an
existing marriage can contract marriage if they
have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34
of Family Code.
HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that
parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other. Considering that both parties has a
subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage
contract that they are both “separated” is an
impediment that would make their subsequent
marriage null and void. Just like separation, free
and voluntary cohabitation with another person for
at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent
Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of
the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage.
DIÑO V. DIÑO
DOCTRINE: Article 50 of the Family Code does not
apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for
the liquidation of the properties of the parties. In
this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code
and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs
the liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
ownership.
FACTS: Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and
Ma. Caridad L. Diño(respondent) got married on 14
January 1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las
Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a
psychological report establishing that respondent
was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which was incurable and deeply ingrained
in her system since her early formative years.
The trial court granted the petition on the ground
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations at
the time of the celebration of the marriage and
declared their marriage void ab initio. It ordered
that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration
of petitioner, modified its decision holding that a
15
 decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be
issued after liquidation, partition and distribution
of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred when it
ordered that adecree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
HELD: Yes. The trial court’s decision is affirmed
with modification. Decree of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial
court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RATIO: The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in
a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to union of parties who
are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner
and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the
following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to
marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and
there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1)
of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section
19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a
decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court
only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code as implemented under the Rule
on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of
Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that
Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only
to marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the
Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45,
the marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of
gains unless the parties agree to
a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since
the property relations of the parties is governed by
absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate,
partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. That is not
the case for annulment of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent
was declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned
in common by petitioner and respondent are the
rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled
that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and
the properties of the spouses should be liquidated
in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
16
“[p]artition may be made by agreement between
the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is
not necessary to liquidate the properties of the
spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
BAYOT vs. CA
FACTS: Vicente and Rebecca were married on April
20, 1979 in Mandaluyong City. On its face, the
Marriage Certificateidentified Rebecca to be an
American citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA. They
had a daughter named Alix, who was born in
California. In 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Rebecca
personally appeared, while Vicente was duly
represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the
Dominican court issued a divorce decree and later
on approved the Agreement executed by the
parties with regard to the settlement of their
property relations under which it was stated that
their only property was that in Acacia Drive,
Muntinlupa City.
Meanwhile, less than a month from the issuance of
the divorce decree, Rebecca filed with the RTC
Makati a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage which Rebecca, however, later on
withdrawn. In March 2001, Rebecca filed another
petition, this time before the RTC Muntinlupa, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the
ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity. Rebecca also sought the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains with application
for support pendente lite for her and Alix.
Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of
lack of cause of action and that the petition is
barred by the prior judgment of divorce. To the
motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an
opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as
affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak
of. Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim
contracted another marriage, filed adultery and
perjury complaints against Rebecca who on the
other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and
concubinage.
RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss and
granted Rebecca's application for support
pendente lite, ruling that the divorce judgment
invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a
matter of defense best taken up during actual trial.
Vicente thus filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA, which court effectively dismissed Rebecca’s
case for failure to state a cause of action, and
reversed the orders the RTC. The CA held that
because of the divorce decree, Rebecca had no
cause of action against Vicente for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
ISSUES: 1) Whether petitioner was a Filipino citizen
at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in
the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996
2) Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if
so, what are its consequent legal effects?
HELD:1) There can be no serious dispute that
Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained
her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen
and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective
repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her
American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña,
Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed
in this American territory granting American
citizenship to those who are born there; and (3)
she was, and may still be, a holder of an American
passport.
Furthermore, under extant immigration rules,
applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship
require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of
Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive
Order No. 292, also known as the 1987
Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III,
Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to
"provide immigration and naturalization regulatory
services andimplement the laws governing
citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens."
Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of
Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the
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Bureau is required. Pertinently, Bureau Law
Instruction No. RBR-99-002 on Recognition as a
Filipino Citizen clearly provides that No
Identification Certificate shall be issued before the
date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and
any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau
pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall
prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.
Thus, this clearly suggests that prior to said
affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet
recognized as a Filipino citizen.
2) The divorce decree and the decree approving
the Agreement on the property relations of Vicente
and Rebecca are both valid. First, at the time of the
divorce, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later
recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented
herself in public documents as an American citizen.
At the very least, she chose, before, during, and
shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship
to govern her marital relationship. Second, she
secured personally said divorce as an American
citizen, as is evident in the text of the divorce
decrees. Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca
was bound by the national laws of the United
States of America, a country which allows divorce.
Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and
Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement executed after the divorce decree was
rendered Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca was valid.
Garcia v. Recio: a foreign divorce can be recognized
here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a
fact and as valid under the national law of the alien
spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was
clearly an American citizen when she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed
in any of the States of the Union, the presentation
of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce
decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted
by both parties. And neither did they impeach the
jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the
validity of its proceedings on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law,
albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do
so. The same holds true with respect to the decree
of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court
explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata
to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment
had been given ample opportunity to do so on
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
...........
It is essential that there should be an opportunity
to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court
clearly provide that with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a
foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and,
as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel,
personally secured the foreign divorce while
Vicente was duly represented by his counsel in said
proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce
decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican
Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind
both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly
recognized as a Filipino citizen will not, standing
alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen
on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the
outset, in determining whether or not a divorce
secured abroad would come within the pale of the
country's policy against absolute divorce, the
reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at
the time a valid divorce is obtained.
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Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce Decree: Given the
validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca,
the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this
jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce
decree obtained, the marital vinculum between
Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed.
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage,
Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's
obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for
instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca. The
divorce decree in question also brings into play the
second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code,
which provides that if the divorce capacitates the
alien spouse to marry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the
twin elements for the applicability of the second
paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
Both elements obtain in the instant case. As to the
property settlement embodied in the parties’
Agreement which was affirmed by the divorce
court, since Rebecca has not repudiated the same,
she is thus estopped by her representation before
the divorce court from asserting that her and
Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their
family home in Ayala Alabang.
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly
clear that Rebecca lacks cause of action to file the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity because
there is no more marriage to be dissolved or
nullified.
However, the Court does not lose sight of the legal
obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the
needs of their daughter, Alix. The issue of back
support, which allegedly had been partly
shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a
separate civil action for reimbursement. In this
way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be
proved as well as the earning capacity of both
Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus
determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering
that support includes provisions until the child
concerned shall have finished her education.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED on the ground of mootness. RTC
Decision and CA Resolution areAFFIRMED.
GARCIA-RECIO v. RECIO
FACTS: Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was
married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen,
in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. On May
18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court. On June 26, 1992,
respondent became an Australian citizen and was
married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio,
a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City.
In their applicationfor a marriage license,
respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On
his Answer, Rederick contended that his first
marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he
was legally capacitated to marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the
couple’s wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending , respondent was
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able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage
had irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of
Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground
that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage
of the couple thus there was no more marital union
to nullify or annul.
ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to
be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.
RULING: 1st issue:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere
presentation of the divorce decree of
respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the
divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by
an Australian family court. However, appearance is
not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
2nd issue:
Australian divorce decree contains a restriction
that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before
this decree becomes absolute (unless the other
party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the
divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the
trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso factorestored respondent’s
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court
a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The
Court mentioned that they cannot grant
petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void because of the question
on latter’s legal capacity to marry.
ABLAZA V. REPUBLIC
DOCTRINE: The plaintiff must be the party who
stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the
real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can
demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the action.
FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in
the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license
being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having
been solemnized without a marriage license. He
insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties
acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest; and that any
person, himself included, could impugn the validity
of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila
at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano,
due to the marriage being void ab initio.
On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the
petition on the ground that petition is filed out of
time and that petitioner is not a party to marriage.
Motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal order
of the RTC on the ground that the action must be
filed by the proper party, which in this case should
be filed by any of the parties to the marriage.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a real party in
interest inthe action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother?
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HELD: Yes. The applicable law when marriage was
contracted between Cresenciano and Leonila on
December 26, 1949, is the old Civil Code, the law in
effect at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the
parties to the marriage as having the right to
initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had
absolutely no application to the petitioner. The
case was reinstated and its records returned to RTC
for further proceedings.
Ratio:
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SCexplicitly provides the limitationthat a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish
between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil
Code. This specifically extends only
to marriages covered by the Family Code, which
took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a
procedural rule that is prospective in application,
is confined only to proceedings commenced after
March 15, 2003.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed
himself to be, then he has a material interest in the
estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely
affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a
brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory
heir, has the right to succeed to the estate of a
deceased brother under the conditions stated in
Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The
plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law
that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a
“proper interest” can file the action. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action.
When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest,
the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of
cause of action.

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