Foucault for Historians

Author(s): Jeffrey Weeks

Source: History Workshop, No. 14 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 106-119
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4288433
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106

Foucault for Historians

by Jeffrey Weeks
Few modernwritershave had a morecontroversialand ambiguousimpactthan the
Frencnwriter,MichelFoucault.Condemnedby manyorthodoxMarxists,especially
in Britain,as an arch-idealist,his workhasbeenreceivedneverthelesswithbafflement
by thepurveyorsof conservativeintellectualorthodoxy.Andyet, simultaneously, few
thinkers,evenof thoseimportedfromFrance,havehada moreunsettlingimpacton
contempor-rythought,especiallythe workof left intellectuals.Thisinfluencecan be
tracedin a whole series of disciplinesand politicalpractices,from sociology and
economics, to feminism and sexual politics, from socialist (and sometimesanti-
socialist)politicaltheoryto thewritingsofforms of history.Hisactualconclusions,his
deploymentof evidence,his generalisations from a minimalor specialisedamountof
material,can be and have beenquestioned.But his own challengeto thepracticeof
historicalinvestigationcannoteasilybe shirked;and it has to be understoodbeforeit
can be effectivelyrespondedto. Thisessayis an attemptto aid thatprocessof under-
standing.
 Foucaultfor Historians 107

'The purpose of history.. . Nis

not to discover the roots of
our identity but to commit
ourselves to its dissipation.'

INTELLECTUALFORMATION

Foucaultis currentlyprofessorof the historyof systemsof thoughtat the Collegede

Francein Paris.' Thepointis not theprestigeof thetitle,butthecarefuldelimitationof
hisareasof interest;not historyof thoughtor of ideasbutof 'systemsof thought'.The
centralconcernof Foucaulthas been with the rulesthat governthe emergenceand
reproductionof suchsystems,structuresof the mindwhichcategorisesociallife and
thenpresentthe resultto us as truth.Thereis a richdiversityin hispublications:from
his earlystudiesof psychologyand madness,throughthe birthof modernmedicine
andthe sciencesof man, to the analysisof moderndisciplinaryformsanda projected
sixvolumeHistoryof Sexuality.Beneaththisdiversitytherehavebeentwo controlling
concerns:exposingthe conditionsfor the emergenceof modernformsof rationality,
especiallythe 'humansciences';and comprehendingthe complexmutualinvolve-
mentsof powerand knowledge.Theexplicitorganisationof hisinvestigationsaround
the notion of powerhas been apparentonly since the late 1960s,in the wake, as he
makesclear,of the dramaticeventsin Francein 1968.It wasthe academy,supposedly
neutralhome of knowledge,whichprovidedthe sparkfor the GeneralStrike,and it
wasin theacademythattheeffectsof 1968weremostvisible.Therehasthereforebeen
a newinflectionof hisworksincethen, butconcernwithknowledgeandpowercan be
seen as an implicitpreoccupationof all his researchesfrom the beginning.It is this
daubleinterest- in formsof rationality,andwiththe analysisof power- whichgives
his workits distinctivetone.
Givenhis challengeto the notion of an autonomous,individual'authorship'2 he
wouldbe the last personto denythat his thoughthas beenformedwithinthe spaceof
contemporarypreoccupations.The intellectualtrends from which his work has
emergedhavebeenmanifold.Followinghisphilosophyteacherat the Sorbonne,Jean
Hyppolite,he grappledwith the totalisingp;hilosophical claims of the heritageof
Hegel,and in the end rejectedthementirelyin favourof a deepscepticismaboutthe
claimsof philosophy,inheritedfromNietzsche.3At thesametimehe rejectedSartrean
phenomenologyand in particularthe concentrationon individualconsciousnessand
on the constitutive,creative,individual.Onthe otherhand,Foucaultcannotbe easily
assimilatedinto the formsof structuralismwhichreplacedexistentialismas the major
intellectualvogue in Francein the 1960s.He had in commonwiththe loose unityof
108 History WorkshopJournal

structuralism,a desireto displaceindividualconsciousness,to investigateinsteadthe

'positive unconscious' of knowledge, the hidden imperativesstructuredlike a
language,on whichsocialformsarebuilt.4Butagainstthe claimsof structuralism to
haveproduceda theoreticalsystemwhichcould 'scientifically'understandeverything
from kinshipstructuresto the literarytext, Foucaultasked:how has this intellectual
systembecomepossible,andwhathavebeenits effects?Thesewerealsothe questions
he askedof psychoanalysisand Marxism;systemswhichhaveshapedFoucaultintel-
lectuallybut whose scientificpretensionshe has soughtto puncture.A rejectionof
theseclaimsto truthdid not, however,lead Foucaultto underestimatetheirsignifi-
cance.Muchof his work,fromthe earlyMadnessand Civilisationto the recentIntro-
ductionto TheHistoryof Sexualitycanbe seenas a history(orto usehisownterm,an
'archaeology')of the emergenceof psychoanalysisas a discipline.5Butit is the condi-
tionsof thisemergence(in, for example,the religious'confessionalmode',in thecate-
goricalseparationof madnessand reason,in the rise of sexologicalinvestigations),
andthe effectsof the resultingpsychoanalyticinstitution,not thetruthor otherwiseof
the theoryof the unconscious,whichpreoccupiesFoucault.
His attitudeto Marxismis evenmorecomplex.Likemanyof his generationin the
1940sandearly1950she wasa Communist,buthis breakcamewithhis recognitionof
the repercussionsof the 'Lysenkoaffair', wherethe insightsof biologicalscience
concerninginheritancewereapparentlyto be subordinatedto the partylinelaiddown
in Moscow.6Here Foucaulthad an earlyperceptionof the intricateinvolvementsof
knowledgeandpower.Heretoo he hada feelingthatMarxismwasitselfanauthoritar-
ian discoursewhichimposedmeaning,whileclaimingto be the truth. Later,in the
1970sFoucaultprovedreluctantto distinguishhimselffrom the 'newphilosophers'
andthe 'newright'in France,who sawMarxismas inherentlypoisonedfromthe days
of its 'master-thinkers',
and who rejectedall socialismsas potentiallyauthoritarian.7
EvidentlyFoucaultrejectsthe Althusseriannotionthat Marx'sworkcan be seenas a
scientificbreakthrough(oran 'epistemicbreak').Simultaneously,however,he recog-
nises the major innovativesignificanceof Marxas the initiatorof what he termsa
'discursivepractice',a set of social, economicand politicalactivities,governedby a
seriesof rulesof exclusionanddelimitation,whichhavehadrealeffects.Moreover,he
is unwillingto rejectMarxismout of hand, eitheras a politicalphilosophy,or as a
traditionof historicalexploration.Indeed,

It is impossibleat the presenttimeto writehistorywithoutusinga wholerangeof

conceptsdirectlyor indirectlylinkedto Marx'sthoughtand situatingone's self
withina horizonof thoughtwhichhas beendefinedand describedby Marx.One
might even wonderwhat differencethere could ultimatelybe betweenbeing a
historianand beinga Marxist.8

It is the totalisingambitionof Marxismthathe rejects,not necessarilyits localclaims

and commitmentsand insights.Not surprising,his positivepoints of referenceare
those writerswho haverisenup againstthe normsandcertaintiesof westernrational-
ism, writerssuch as the erotic, surrealistnovelistGeorgesBataille,and the poet and
philosopherFriedrichNietzsche.In his appreciationof Bataillewe canalreadyseehis
fascinationwiththe themeof sexualityas transgression,a themewhoseemergencehe
was to beginto tracelaterin TheHistoryof Sexuality.He was alreadyawareof the
disruptiveanddecisivepowerassignedto sexuality'to the degreeit is spoken',a signi-
ficancethatderivesfromthevoidformedby 'thedeathof God'. Sexuality,he suggests,
 Foucaultfor Historians 109

is the moderndeity.9ButNietzsche,as the referenceto the 'deathof God' suggests,is

an even more significantpoint of departurefor he was, as Foucaultonce put it, the
creatorof the spaceof contemporarythought.WhatNietzscheand Foucaulthavein
commonis a desireto investigatethe 'varioussystemsof subjugation',the 'hazardous
play of dominations'which are maskedby the high flown generalisationof philo-
sophy.'0For Foucault,as for Nietzsche,the will to powerdominatesa chaoticand
pluralisticworldand knowledgeis its handmaiden.As Nietzscheput it:

In so far as the word 'knowledge'has any meaningat all, the worldis knowable:
but it can be interpreteddifferently;behindit liesno meaningbut rathercountless
meanings - 'Perspectivism'. Ii

The implicationis that thereis no singletruthto 'reality'but endlessperspectiveson

the truth, each theoryconstructingits own realityand truths,underthe workingsof
power.Foucaultadoptsthis 'perspectivism' andwithit a radicalscepticismaboutthe
ultimateclaimsof knowledge.
This preoccupationwith the illusorynatureof the claims of knowledgepartly
explainsFoucault'sinterestin a differentset of intellectualconcerns,representedby
the philosophersandhistoriansof science,andespeciallyhis teachers,GastonBache-
lardand GeorgeCanguilhem.Whatconcernshim hereis the statusof scienceand of
scientificcategories.Foucaultnotes the correspondencebetweenthe concernsof
Bachelardand Canguilhemand the FrankfurtSchool of Marxistsof the inter war
years:

Inthehistoryof the sciencesin France,as in Germancriticaltheory,it is a matterat

bottomof examininga reason,the autonomyof whosestructurescarrieswithit a
historyof dogmatismand despotism-a reason, consequently,which can only
havean effectof emancipationon conditionthatit managesto liberateitselffrom
itself.12

It is this attemptto liberatesciencefrom itself that drawsFoucaultto the workof

Bachelardand Canguilhem.Foucaultlearnedfrom his mentorsthat the historyof
sciencesis the historyof the wayin whichspecificscientificdiscoursesconstructtheir
ownwaysof delimitingtruthfromfalsity.Thisdoesnot meanthatthereis no progress
in science,or in the discoveryof the empiricalworld;what is at stakethoughis the
belief that sciencenecessarilyis basedon the progressiveuncoveringof whatis true.
That is not the guidinglight of scientificmethod,whateverits claims.Knowledgeis
constitutedby rupturesin previousways of thinking,and on this the influenceof
Bachelardhas been particularlysignificant.Foucaultis concerned,in other words,
with discontinuitiesin thought,and with the impactthese ruptureshave had on the
delimitationof truth.Not surprisingly he hasbeencalleda historianof discontinuity,a
descriptionwhichhowever,he denies:

No one is more of a continuistthan I am: to recognisea discontinuityis never

anythingmorethanto registera problemthatneedsto be solved.13

But it is preciselythat problemwhichguideshis workand givesit its historicalinter-

est.
110 History WorkshopJournal

FOUCAULTAS ARCHAEOLOGIST

It shouldbe obvious from what has been said so far that Foucault'shistoryis of a
curioussort. He rejectsthe claimsto a 'scientifichistory'offered by both Marxism,
and Rankeanpositivism:both makeclaimsto truthwhichareas dubiousas thoseof
otherformsof knowledge.Butthereis, nonetheless,a vitallyimportantpointof refer-
ence for Foucaultin a greattraditionof historiography,the FrenchAnnalesschool.
At the beginningof The Archaeologyof Knowledgehe evokes the work of
Annales,and particularlythatof FerdinandBraudel.14 Thisis an approachto history
whichhas stressedthe studyof changein materialcivilisationoverperiodsas longas a
millennium,as wellas thelayeredandoverlappingtimescalesof historicaltransforma-
tion. The Annales influenceis evidentin his advocacyof what he calls a 'general
history'as opposedto a 'totalhistory'."4Totalhistory,he observes,attemptsto draw
all phenomenarounda singlecausativecentreor spiritof a societyor civilisation.The
same form of historicalinfluence is then seen to be operatingon all levels, the
economic,the social,thepolitical,thereligious,withthe sametypesof transformation
and influencesplaying on all these levels. Generalhistory, on the other hand, is
concernedwith 'series,segmentations,limits, differencesof level, time lags, anach-
ronisticsurvivals,possibletypesof relation'.Theaimis not howeverto offer simplya
jumble of different histories, nor the investigationof analogies or coincidences
betweenthem. Nor is it a simplerevivalof crudepositivism,of 'one damnthingafter
another'.Thetaskproposedby generalhistoryis preciselyto determinewhatformsof
relationmaylegitimatelybe madebetweenthe variousformsof socialcategorisation,
but to do this withoutrecourseto any masterschema,any ultimatetheoryof causa-
tion. So thetaskof historicalinvestigationis not to fishfor the 'real'historythatglides
silentlyunderthe surface,or rulesbehaviourbehindmen'sbacks,butto addressitself
to thesesurfaces,whicharethe 'real'in thewaywelivesocialrelationsthroughthegrid
of meaning and language. This points to the importanceof questioningthe
'document'.Pasthistories,Foucaultargues,havebeenconcernedto readdocuments
for theirhiddenmeanings,to transformthemonumentsof the pastintodocuments.In
our own time, by contrast,historyis that whichtransformsdocumentsinto monu-
ments.Hencehistoryaspires'to the intrinsicdescriptionof the monument',to be, in
his terms, an 'archeology'.'5What he is doing here is distinguishinghimself from
attemptsto understandtheemergenceof ideasteleologicallyin termsof theiroriginsin
pre-existingideas, or in termsof theirmaterialroots, as simplereflectionsof some-
thingmorerealbehindthem. Inthe firstplace,whatFoucaultseeksis 'anarchaeology
of knowledge',an understandingof the conditionsfor the emergenceof particular
formsof knowledge,for thegrammarwhichallowsthoseusingtheconceptsto recog-
nisewhatthey are sayingas beingtrueor false. He is interestedindeedin the rulesof
formationof an objectof discourse.Therearethreetypesof rule:'surfacesof emerg-
ence' (thosesocial/culturalareas,suchas the family,socialor religiousgroup,work
situationin which a discoursemakes its appearance);'authoritiesof delimitation'
whichgovernswhatcanbe said,suchas themedicalprofession,law, thechurches;and
'gridsof specification',systemsaccordingto whichdifferenttypesof socialcategoris-
ation, suchas madness,could be specifiedand relatedto eachother.
If his first concernis with an archeologyof knowledge,his second is with the
'genealogy'of particulardisciplines,theirspecificformsof descent,emergenceand
transformation.Thereis no singlecausethat can explainwhat subsequentlyoccurs,
but thereare momentsof 'eruption'in the complexand 'endlesslyrepeated'playof
 Foucaultfor Historians 111

power.It is preciselyherethathe is ableto engagein theexplorationof theconnections

betweenpowerand knowledge,for it is throughknowledgethat poweris operative.
And discourseis the point of juncturebetween knowledgeand power, the form
throughwhichpower-knowledge operates.
Thirdly,Foucaultis concernednot with the analysisof the past for its own sake,
but withthe discoveryof whathe describesas the tracesof the present.History,for
Foucault,is a 'curativescience'.Archaeologyis a diagnosisof the present,and 'the
purposeof history,guidedby genealogy,is not to discovertherootsof ouridentitybut
to commitourselvesto its dissipation'.16
Foucault'swork is concernedwith the constitutionthroughdiscourseof those
disciplineswhich since the eighteenthcenturyhave delimitedthe boundariesof the
economic,the sexual,the medical,the familial,the disciplinary.He is not sayingthat
moreconventionalhistoriesareof no useor aremaderedundantby his own methods.
Whathe locatesis a specificareaof concernwhichhasnot hithertobeeninvestigated,a
historyof the discursiverealm.
But whatis discourse?Put at its simplestit is a linguisticunityor groupof state-
mentswhichconstitutesand delimitsa specificareaof concern,governedby its own
rulesof formationwithits own modesof distinguishing truthfromfalsity.'7Foucault
is attemptingto reconstructregularitiesthat underscoreeverydiscursiveformation,
the anonymoushistoricalrules that form its unique emergence.These are what
Foucaultterms'discursivepractices'.Thesesetsof regularitiesdo not coincideneces-
sarilywith individualworks even if they are manifestedin individualproduction.
Insteadthey are more extensivethan individualworksand serveto regroupa large
numberof them.Theydo not necessarilycoincideeitherwitha scienceor a discipline,
but arean assemblyof a numberof diversedisciplinesor sciences.
Foucault'snotion of discursivepracticesbreaksawayfromthe separationof the
linguisticfrom the social. Discursivepractices,he argues,areembodiedin technical
processes,in institutions,and in patternsof general behaviour.The unity of a
discourse,therefore,doesnot derivefromthe factthatit describesa 'realobject',but
fromthe socialpracticesthat actuallyformthe objectaboutwhichdiscoursesspeak.
The 'social'is constitutedthroughthesepractices.

A CRITIQUEOF ESSENTIALISM

Madness,the ostensiblesubjectof Foucault'sfirstmajortext, and sex, the apparent

themeof hismostrecent,seememinentlynaturalobjectsto study.Therearecommon-
sensicaldefinitionsof theirnature,anduntoldtextsdetailingtheirabundantmanifes-
tations.A historyof thesephenomena,therefore,it mightbe supposed,couldonlybe
a historyof attitudestowardthem. Butit is Foucault'smaintaskpreciselyto question
the naturalnessand inevitabilityof these historicalobjects. Their pre-existenceas
naturalunchangingobjectsis not to be takenfor granted.All hisworkis basedon this
assumptionbut it becomesincreasinglyexplicitas his workdevelops.InMadnessand
Civilisationhe does not, of course,claimthat phenomenato whichthe termmadness
canreferneverexisted.On the contrary,in thisworkthereis a strongromanticnatur-
alism,whichgivesthe impressionthatFoucaultis posingthe truthof madnessagainst
the falsity of reason. But even here the main concernis with the way reasonwas
conceptuallyseparatedfromunreason,to providethe conditionsfortheemergenceof
modernpsychiatricmedicine.It is the socialcategorisationwhichunifiesthe disparate
112 History WorkshopJournal

phenomenaknowncollectivelyas 'madness'.By the time he comesto writethe first

volumeof TheHistoryof Sexualitythe lingeringnaturalismhasdisappeared. 19Inthis
book, sex, far frombeingtheobjectto whichsexualdiscourserefers,is a phenomenon
constructedwithinthe discourseitself. He does not, of course,denythe existenceof
the materialbody, withits desires,aptitudes,potentialities,physicalfunctionsandso
on, but he arguesthat the historian'stask is to rereadthe discursivepracticeswhich
makethem meaningfuland whichchangeradicallyfrom one periodto another.So,
for example,he writes,

We have had sexualitysincethe eighteenthcenturyand sex sincethe nineteenth.

Whatwe had beforethatwas no doubtthe flesh.20

Thenotionof 'theflesh'wasbasedon a christiandistinctionbetweenthebodyandthe

spiritwhile the modernconceptsof sex and sexualityare based on notions of the
naturaland overpoweringforce of the instinctswhichconstitutethe essenceof the
individual.Modernsexuality,unlikethe christianidea of the flesh, is constitutiveof
our individuality:sexhas becomethe truthof our being.
Thetaskof historicalinvestigationis theunderstanding
of theprocessesof categor-
isationwhich make phenomenalike sex sociallysignificant,and whichproducethe
formsof knowledgewhichprovidethe focusfor socialregulationandcontrol.Whatis
trueof madnessandsexualityis alsotrueof otherobjectsof discourse.Modernmedi-
cine, for instance,produceda new objectof observationand treatment,'the body',
whichwas constitutedthrougha host of socialpractices- military,and economicas
wellas medical- whichdisplacedconceptsrelyingon theold languageof humoursand
harmonies.The 'medicalgaze' as it emergedat the end of the eighteenthcenturywas
anchoredon a newobjectwhichnow took on the inevitabilityof 'naturalness'.2'
Muchof Foucault'sworkrevolvesaroundthiscrucialperiodof thelateeighteenth
century.Herewe see the riseof the modernasylumandthe emergenceof the medical
gaze,thebirthof the prisonandtheconstructionof theapparatusof sexualregulation.
But also, and most cruciallyto Foucault'sproject,this periodsaw the birthof the
humansciences,with'man'as its centralobject. Inclassicalthought,Foucaultargues,
manas an objectof knowledgedid not exist.Thehumansciencesthereforewereborn
'whenman constituteshimselfin Westerncultureas both that whichmust be con-
ceivedof and that whichis to be known'.22 The pineteenthcenturysaw the birthof
biology,the studyof manas an organism,politicaleconomy,the studyof manas an
economicproducerand philology,the studyof manas a languagemaker.Insteadof
regardingthese appearancesas no more than the progressiverefinementof pre-
existingdisciplines,Foucaultarguesthattheyactuallyconstitutedquitedifferentsets
of objects,new objectsoccupyingnew spacesof knowledge.Thereoccurredin other
wordswhatFoucaulttermsin TheOrderof Things(althoughthephraseis droppedin
subsequentworks)the emergenceof a new 'episteme'.
A problemwith Foucault'sargumenthereis that the changesin formsof know-
ledgeseemto havebeenwilledneitherindividuallynorcollectively;theyareproducts,
it seems,of knowledgeitself. The 'Man', in otherwords,who emergesin late eight-
eenthcenturythoughtis a creationof discourse,and not a creativebeingin his own
right.He does not speak.Insteadhe is spoken.Thisquestionhas invitedthe criticism
of Foucaultas an anti-humanist.Man,he writes,'is probablyno morethana kindof
rift in the orderof things' and The Orderof Thingsends with an almost mystical
conceptionof the 'end of man'.23But it has to be saidthat this displacementof the
 Foucaultfor Historians 113

'constitutive'individualdoes not necessarilyimplya rejectionof humanistvalues.

Whatit does meanis that humanistvaluesor a politicalcode cannotbe straightfor-
wardlybuilton a supposedrealhumanessence.The verynotionof a humanessence,
thetruthof specificindividuals,is itselfa productof discourse.Ourideaof individual-
ity is itself a historicalcreation.To understandits history,in Foucault'sterms,is to
understanda dualprocessof subjection:both in the senseof the creationof 'subject-
ivity', and in the senseof beingimprisoned,'subjected',withina discourse.
Foucault'saccountof this subjectionleavesunclearthe relationshipbetweenthe
discursive process which constitutes subjects and the refractoryand resisting
consciousnessof individuals.He doesrecognise,however,thepossibilityof individual
resistanceto 'subjection':theindividualsubjectis not a productof a singlediscourse,
is not trappedin a prisonof dominantmeanings,but is in a sense 'inter-discursive',
withthe potentialityfor challengingand reversingthe formsof definition,deploying
one systemof meaningagainstanother.Theaim thenis not to understandthe human
individualas an unproblematicbiologicalbeing, but to grasp that the individual
subjectacts as a focus of forces:

It'smy hypothesisthatthe individualis not a pre-givenentitywhichis seizedon by

the exerciseof power.The individual,withhis identityand characteristics, is the
productof a relationof powerexercisedoverbodies,multiplicities,movementsof
desires, forces.24

All Foucault'sworkfromthe studyof madnessthroughthe studyof the birthof the

modernsocialsciencesto the investigationof disciplinaryproceduresandtheorganis-
ationof sexualitycanbe seenas addressingthemselvesto thisspecificproblem:how is
the individualconstitutedin modernthoughtand in modernsocialpractice.
Foucault'squestioningof whataregenerallyseenas pre-eminently naturalpheno-
menalikeindividuality,sexualityandso on, hasbeenhelpfulto modernfeminismand
sexualpolitics.If genderand sexualcategoriesarehistoricallyconstructed,and if the
mechanismsof theiremergenceandreproductioncan be understood,theyareopento
transformation.This emphasison historicalconstructioncomplementshis long-
standingcritiqueof the functionalismanddeterminism inherentin manyconventional
analyseson the Left whichseek the hiddencausebehindthe surfaceappearance,the
masterdiscoursewhichexplainsindividualdiscourses.Inplaceof a searchforultimate
causeshe proposesthegenealogicalapproach.Genealogy,he suggests,demandsa vast
accumulationof sourcematerial,'relentlesserudition',anda patientattentionto the
discourseswhich have by and large been ignored, but which in their singularity
constitutewarningsof the emergenceof new ways of conceivingof the world. A
discourseis worthyof studybecauseit mayhavebeenunrealised.25 Theprogrammeof
a discoursemayhavebeenunsuccessful,butthatdoesnot meanit didnot haveeffects.
The unintendedconsequencesof social practicesmay be tracedthroughdiscourses
whichhavelain forgottenand buried.Thusthe aimof the penalreformsof the early
nineteenthcenturymaywellhavebeenliberal,to producea rehabilitated person.The
unintendedeffects of the new prisonsystemwere, on the contrary,restrictiveand
oppressive,creatingratherthan liberatingcriminals.Historydoes not have a set
patternor ultimatetarget;it has no inner necessityof responseto the functional
demandsof new modesof productionor newclassforces.26
Foucaulthelps us to move away from any unthinkingrelianceon a supposed
universalisingcapitaliststrategy,freesus froman abstractdeterminismand froman
114 History WorkshopJournal

equallydeterministicfunctionalism,and returnsus to the probingof the actualrela-

tionshipbetweenone socialformandanother,the actualmechanicsof power.So the
rise of an apparatusof sexuality,a seriesof practicesand institutionsdefiningthe
domainof the sexual,is locatednot in anysinglesocialnecessitybutin a hostof strate-
gies dealingwith relationsbetweenparentsand pedagogicinstitutionsand children,
the relationshipof medicineand scienceto the femalebody, controversiesoverbirth
control and populationpolicies, and the categorisationof perversesexualities.No
singleapproachor necessityis at workin all thesepractices;theyarenot pervadedby
the samemysteriousessenceof sex. In fact, sex is defineddifferentlyin eachpractice.
It wastheworkof medical,psychological,educational,hygienicandeugenicpractices
- articulatedin a new sub-discipline of sexology- whichdefinedthe unityof these
strategiesarounda new conceptof sex as expressiveof basicinstincts.Eachof these
strategiesand practiceshad their own conditions of possibilityand existencein
concretepolitical,economic,social, ideologicalpractices.But no consistentmaster
planhasbeenplayedout, no 'determination in thelastinstance'.Theactualmechanics
of powerat playhaveto be studiedin theirsingularity.
Inall this, thereremainsthe difficultandover-archingproblemof theconnections
betweendiscourses,andtheirarticulationat anyparticularmoment.Foucault'sreluc-
tance to discussthe actualrelationsbetweendiscourses,and betweenthe discursive
andtheextra-discursive, forceshimto relyin manycaseson a verycrudeformof deter-
minism.Thusforexample,in histexton PierreRiviere,theimpactof theFrenchRevo-
lution appearsas a deus ex machina,a hiddenhand whichis offered as an overall
explanationfor the specificeventswhichoccur.27Similarly,in Disciplineand Punish
and in TheHistoryof Sexuality,the impactof capitalismis invokedas a background
factorbut only minimallysketchedin. Paradoxically,a methoddesignedto free us
from determinismin manycases simplyoffers us a mechanisticdeterminismby the
backdoor.Thisis mostobviousin hismostrecentwork.InDisciplineandPunishand
The History of Sexualityhe interpretsthe emergenceof new formsof disciplinary
poweras a responseto theneedto copewithpressureof populationfromthelateeight-
eenth centuryonwards.Now this can appearas simplya continuationof the long
Frenchtraditionof demographicdeterminism,whichhas at least one sourcein the
Durkheimianemphasison moraldensityas beingan explanatoryfactorin the move
frommechanicalto organicsolidarity.28 In fact Foucaultis not arguingthat popula-
tion pressurecausedchanges,but ratherthat the perceptionof the populationas a
problemin specificdiscourseshad importanteffects. Nevertheless,his commentson
the functionof the prisonfromthe 1830sin controllingthe populationcanbe seenas a
latentlyfunctionalistanddeterministicexplanation.Similarly,his suggestionthatsex
is at the heartof the modernplayof powerbecauseits controlprovidesaccessto the
regulationof the populationimpliesthat sexualityis tied to the imperativesof the
socialformationas a whole.In TheHistoryof Sexualitythe possibilityis left openthat
theremightindeedbe a 'need' for the 'repression'of sexuality.But Foucaultleaves
this suggestionambiguouspreciselybecauseof his reluctanceto theorisewhat the
actualrelationshipsarebetweendiscourseand socialformation.

POWER-KNOWLEDGE

Theseambiguitiesarein largepartexplainedby difficultieswithFoucault'snotionof

powerandpower-knowledge. As Foucaulthimselfputsit, the wholepointof hislater
worklies in a re-elaborationof the conceptof power:
 Foucaultfor Historians 115

I believethat poweris not builtup out of 'wills'(individualor collective),nor is it

derivablefrominterests.Poweris constructedand functionson thebasisof partic-
ularpowers,myriadissues,myriadeffectsof power.It is thiscomplexdomainthat
mustbe studied.Thatis not to saythatit is independentor couldbe madesenseof
outsideof economicprocessesand the relationsof production.29

The last point is a useful antidoteto criticswho accuse Foucaultof idealism.The

messageis not thatproductionis unimportantbut thatthe economicor socialsources
and effects of powercannotbe presupposedbeforethe investigation.
So whatis powerfor Foucault?Poweris not somethingthatcan be heldor trans-
mitted,it is not the possessionof one class (or of one gender)overanother,it is not
embodiedin the stateor anysingleinstitution.It is inherentin all socialrelationships,
and plays upon the inevitableimbalancein all those relationships.Foucaultis not
interestedin some fundamentalprincipleof power,butratherin the mechanismsand
socialpracticesthroughwhichpoweris actuallyexercised.His workoffersan 'analyt-
ics' of power,ratherthana theoryof power.He arguesfor theconstructionof whathe
calls an 'ascendinganalysisof power' startingfrom the specific and infinitesimal
micro-mechanisms, whicheach have theirown historyand theirown development,
theirown trajectory,theirown specifictechniquesand tactics.He is concernedwith
the 'technologies'whichexercisepowerover and investthe body. Here poweris a
positivenot a negativeforce. Whilehis earlierworksawpowerin termsof exclusion,
from the late 1960she beganto analyseit in termsof whatit constructsratherthan
whatit denies.Hisrejectionof the 'repressivehypothesis'in TheHistoryof Sexuality
illustratesthe point.30Farfromthe nineteenthcenturywitnessinga regimeof denial
and repressionin relationto sexuality,Foucaultargues,it witnesseda positiveincite-
mentto discourse,a multipleproductionof sexualitiesin a hostof socialpractices.The
discoveryof the significanceof sex in a multiplicityof areas, from housing and
hygiene,to psychiatryand educationamountedto a constitutionof new forms of
power-knowledge aroundthe body. In Disciplineand Punishhe exploresthe emerg-
ence of new disciplinaryforms of surveillance:control not simplyof the body but
through'thesoul', throughproducingevermoreformsof observationanddiscipline.
In the mid eighteenthcentury,a new objectof powerwas definedfor the firsttime:
societyas a focusof thephysicalwellbeing,healthandlifeof thepopulation.Theexer-
ciseof theselatterfunctions,order,enrichmentandhealthwascarriedout, he argues,
less througha singleapparatusof law, negativein its force, than by an ensembleof
positiveregulatoryandinstitutionalforceswhichin theeighteenthcenturytookon the
generictermof 'police'. The concernwith policingthe populationwas a productof
changesin the constitutionof the labourforcebutmoredirectlyas a resultof thegreat
demographicupswing.Populationbecamea problemto be organisedanddisciplined,
and simultaneouslyan objectof surveillance,analysis,interventionandcodification.
In thiscontextthe bodytook on a newandcrucialimportance:as the bearerof those
qualities,of health,sickness,strengthand weakness,whichwerecrucialto the future
of the societyas a whole. Hencethe emergenceof newformsof control,of whichthe
prison,and the Panopticonas its particularideal form, wererepresentative; and the
newimportanceassignedto the sexualdomain.Thebiologicalfeaturesof the popula-
tion becamerelevantfactorsfor economicmanagementand it becamenecessaryto
ensurenot only theirsubjection(in the dualsenseof subjectiondiscussedabove)but
the constantincreaseof theirutility. Fromthis emergedthe concernwithchildhood,
with the family,with hygiene,and with sexuality.
116 History WorkshopJournal

Muchof thisis fascinatingandconvincing,but the stubbornquestionsrecur:what

are the points of contact betweenthese social entities;is therea principleof artic-
ulationat work betweenthem at any one time;or is therejust a chaos of unrelated
historieswhoseactualconnectionscan neverbe fullyelaborated?Where,aboveall, is
the state?Despitethe stricturesof hismethod,his viewof thestateanditsapparatuses
is a very conventionaland narrowone. As Hussain has noted, Foucaulthas a
commandtheoryof law:he seesthe lawas a set of commandsof the sovereign,which
operates by recommendingand forbidding certain acts under the threat of
punishment.3'But lawscan be as diverseand as disparateas the relationsof power
which Foucaultdescribes.So in playingdown the juridical,negative,functionsof
power,Foucaultreducesthe lawto an instrumentof power.Infocussingon the forms
of powerwithinthe wallsof institutions,he fails to articulatethe relationbetween
theseand the juridicalframeworkof sociallife. Thisover-emphasis on one aspectof
the playof powercan be seenas an attemptto compensatefor the under-emphasis on
the localinvestmentsof powerin previousstudies.Butneverthelessit doesweakenthe
overall analyticalforce of Foucault'sstudies, and leaves him open to justifiable
criticism.

A HISTORYOF THE PRESENT

Foucaultis ultimatelyinterestednot in 'the past' as such but in a 'historyof the

present'.The presentis not a homogeneouswholeorganisedarounda singleunitary
focus. Itpresentsa seriesof shiftingproblemseachwiththeirspecifichistories.Andthe
chiefcharacteristic of thepresentisthatweliveina societyof disciplineandsurveillance.
He standsagainstall latter-dayWhighistoriesof progressof which'modernisation
theories'areembodiments:thatthepresentcanbe seenas a culminationof inexorable
progressiveforces, that the liberalpresentis in some way the productof liberating
forcesinherentin modernsociety. In Disciplineand Punishfor instancehe notesthe
changesin penalseverityover the past 200 years,and asks 'Is therea diminutionof
intensity?Perhaps.There is certainlya changeof objective'.32Power might have
changedits form:it mightbe less 'barbarous'in its investmentof thebody. Butit is no
lesspower.He makesthe samepointin relationto sexuality.Thelawmightwellbe less
harsh,sex maybe moreopenlydiscussed.Butsex is stillregulatedandcontrolled,but
now by the moresubtlemeansof medicineandsocialsurveillance ratherthanby brute
interdiction.33 This argumentdoes breakwith easy mythsof progress,but thereare
several problemswith it. The first concernsthe notion, criticalto Foucault, of
normalisation.Whatis not clearis the degreeto whichthisnormalisationinvolvesthe
internalisationof the norms. Does the individualbecome totally disciplinedand
controlled?Foucault'sdisciplinarysocietyoften seemsas all embracingandinevitable
in its effectsas the 'ironcage'of bureaucratisationandrationalisation thatMaxWeber
described.Foucaultseemsto haverealisedthe difficultiesof his positionandin recent
interviewshe haspointedout thecentralimportanceof hisnotionof resistance.Where
thereis power,he haswrittenmanytimes,thereis resistance;in factpowerdependson
resistance.Theimplicationof thisis thatpoweris a constantlymobileforcewhichcan
adjustto pointsof resistancebutsimultaneously thatthe resistancesinflecttheimpact
of power.This is importantbecauseit emphasisesthe significanceof strugglesat the
pointof theimpactof power.Butit hasto be saidthatthisaspectof Foucault'sworkis
undevelopedand ambiguous.
 Foucaultfor Historians 117

Thereis, further,a slippagein Foucault'sconceptof the workingsof contemp-

oraryforms of power. In arguingthat poweris an effect of the operationof social
relations,that it is diffuse,omnipresentandpolymorphous,Foucaultdoes awaywith
anyconceptof a hierarchyof power.It is surelyevidentthat someformsof poweract
as greater'restraints'and limits,or havegreaterproductivepossibilities,thanothers.
The state for instance does have a monopoly of violence. The media is monopolistic.
Capitalists do have more power than workers. Of course Foucault recognises this,
while he rightly refuses to say that one form of oppression is better or worse, more or
less severe than any other. But some powers are more resistant to struggle than others
and what is left vague in Foucault's work is any notion of the political strategies, in the
conventional sense, needed to transform these powers.
This reluctance to propose any grand, strategic political schema is but an aspect of
a wider caution. Like his friend, Gilles Deleuze, he insists on treating theory as a 'box
of tools' to be taken up and used, not offered prescriptively.The role of the intellectual
in modern society is not to offer prescriptiveanalysis but to lay bare the mechanisms of
power:

The intellectual no longer has to play the role of an adviser. The project, tactics and
goals to be adopted are a matter for those who do the fighting. What the intellec-
tual can do is to provide instruments of analysis and at present this is the historian's
essential role ... In other words, a topological and geological survey of the battle-
field -that is the intellectual's role.34

This in turn derives from a perception of the changed political terrain of the past
twenty years, with the emergence of new struggles around gender and sexuality, the
rights of prisoners and mental patients, but also covering a gamut of other social activ-
ities. Foucault does not deny that a grand political strategy is possible or necessary
(although his own political commitments seem to be in the direction of a mild anarch-
ism). But what he does argue is that any such strategy cannot be the product of the
minds of specific intellectuals or leaders but has to be a product of the struggles them-
selves. Hegemony could only be the end product of a multitude of struggles not the
effect of central planning.
Politically, his recognition of the diversity of currentsocial strugglesis healthy. But
the relative political weight or potential of the various struggles - of class, sex, prison-
ers, mental patients and so on - and the nature of the necessary alliances between them
are left studiously vague. It has been left to more conventionally Marxist writers to
attempt to synthesise these insights of Foucault about the operations of power with
more traditional concerns of political mobilisation and strategy.
Similarly, any attempt to construct a Foucauldian social theory is fraught with
difficulties. Although there are a guiding series of concerns in his investigations, ulti-
mately what we are left with is a series of separate studies. And the unanswered ques-
tions are manifold. Is power ultimately irresistible? Are we all ultimately trapped
within a power that is all seeing yet unseen?
This brings us to another problem: Foucault's main concern is with the construc-
tion of subjectivities within discourse. But it is not clear why some individuals recog-
nise themselves within these discourses and others do not. This is a major issue in
trying to understand the historical emergence of sexual identities. Much of Foucault's
recent work has been preoccupied with the construction of sexual categories and their
impact on subjectivities, but it is clear that these discourses work differentially on
 118 History WorkshopJournal

different individuals. What is the relationshipbetween subjectificationwithin

discourseand the individualorganisationof desiresand consequentidentities?
Thisis an areathatFoucaultdeliberatelydoesnot address,andhisattitudetowards
disciplineswhichdo attemptto addressthequestion- pre-eminently psychoanalysis-
is notablysceptical,as we haveseen.At thesametime,thereis a dangerthatallgeneral
categories- menandwomen,heterosexualor homosexual,blackor white,rulingclass
and workingclass- willdisappearcompletelyinto a welterof specificdefinitions.35
The positiveside of this is Foucault'srigorouscritiqueof any simplenotion of
'liberation',whethersocial or sexual. Social relationsare inescapablythe effect of
languageand the ceaselessworkingsof power,and therecan be no escapefrom dis-
coursenoranyendingof power.Whatpoliticalstruggleis inevitablyabout,therefore,
is 'reversediscourses',radicallydifferentdefinitions,differentorganisationsof power
relations.Howandin whatwaythisis to be done, Foucaultleavesvague.Thisis a radi-
cal abstentionfor a 'politicalintellectual'andunlikelyto endearhimto morepassion-
ate progressives.Butif we can neverescapethegridof language,wecanat leastsee its
effects, and hereFoucault'sworkis a valuable,if necessarilypartialguide.

1 Biographicaldetailscan be found in A. Sheridan,MichelFoucault,London, 1980.A

full bibliographyof his writingscan be foundin C. Gordon(ed) Power/Knowledge,London,
1980.His majorworksarelistedin note 5.
2 Foucault,'Whatis an author?'in D.F. Bouchard(ed), Language,Counter-Memory,
Practice:SelectedEssaysand Interviews(hereafterLCMP),New York, 1977.
3 See Foucault, 'Orders of Discourse' in Social Science Information, vol. 10, no. 2, April
1971,wherehe paystributeto Hyppolite;and Sheridan,MichelFoucault,pp.4-5.
4 Foucault,TheOrderofThings,AnArchaeologyoftheHumanSciences, London,1970,
p.xi.
5 The mainEnglishtranslationsof his workareas follows:Madnessand Civilisation.A
Historyof Insanityin the Age of Reason,New York, 1965;TheArchaeologyof Knowledge,
London1972;TheOrderof Things,London, 1973;TheBirthof theClinic.An Archaeologyof
MedicalPerception,London,1973;Disciplineand Punish:Birthof thePrison,London,1977;
TheHistoryof Sexuality.Volume1: An Introduction,London,1978.Foran articlewhichlays
particularstresson Foucault'sarchaeologyof psychoanalysis,see AtharHussain,'Foucault's
Historyof Sexuality',m/fnos. 5 and6, 1981.Seealso JohnForrester'scommentsin Language
and the Originsof Psychoanalysis,London, 1980.
6 On Foucault'sreactionto the Lysenkoaffairsee Alex Callinicos,Is thereafuturefor
Marxism?,London, 1982,p.99. Moregenerallysee D. Lecourt,ProletarianScience?TheCase
of Lysenko, London, 1977.
7 See PeterDews,'The"newphilosophers"andtheendof Leftism',RadicalPhilosophy
no. 24, Spring1980,and'TheNouvellePhilosophieandFoucault'in EconomyandSociety,vol.
8, no. 2, May 1979.
8 Power/Knowledge,p.53.
9 'Prefaceto Transgression'in LCMP,p.50.
10 LCMP,p.148. Seealso Power/Knowledge,p.53 and TheOrderof Things,p.263. Fora
discussionof the changinginfluenceof Nietzscheon Foucaultsee Sheridan,MichelFoucault,
p.1 15and ff.
11 Quoted in David Frisby, Sociological Impressionism:A Reassessmentof Georg
Simmel's Social Theory, London, 1981;see TheArchaeology of Knowledge, p. 145; for a discus-
sion of Foucault's'perspectivism'
see Callinicos,p.106.
12 Foucault, 'Georges Canguilhem: philosopher of error', Ideology and Consciousness,
no. 7, Autumn 1980, p.54. See also 'Orders of Discourse'; C. Gordon 'Afterword' in Power/
Knowledge,pp.233-4.
13 Foucault, 'Questions of Method', p.5.
14 TheArchaeologyof Knowledge,p.3ff.
15 TheArchaeology,p.7.
 Foucaultfor Historians 119

16 LCMP,p. 156,p. 162.

17 See Foucault,'Politicsand the studyof discourse',Ideologyand Consciousnessno. 3,
Spring1978.
18 LCMP,p.19.
19 CompareDews, 'TheNouvellePhilosophieand Foucault',p.163.
20 Power/Knowledge,p.211.
21 See TheBirthof the Clinic.
22 TheOrderof Things,p.345.
23 TheOrderof Things,p.387.
24 Power/Knowledge,pp.73-4.
25 On this see Gordon,p.248.
26 See Disciplineand Punish,throughout.
27 MichelFoucault(ed), I, PierreRiviere,havingslaughteredmymother,mysisterandmy
brother... A case of patricidein the 19thCentury,London, 1978.
28 See, for example,EmileDurkheim,TheDivisionof Labour.
29 Power/Knowledge,p.188.
30 See Part Two, 'The RepressiveHypothesis'in The History of Sexuality.See my
commentaryon this in Sex, Politicsand Society.London 1981.See also the reviewby Athar
Hussainreferredto in note 5.
31 AtharHussain,p.176. See note 5.
32 Disciplineand Punishment,p. 16.
33 Fora discussionof thisseemyown Sex,PoliticsandSociety,andStuartHall, 'Reform-
ism and the legislationof consent' in National DeviancyConference,Permissivenessand
Control,London, 1980.
34 Power/Knowledge,p.42.
35 See, for example,the workof the feministjournalm/f whichattemptsto challengethe
idea that feminismaddressesa specific issue, 'the woman question', or 'the conditionof
woman'. It is specificareasof subordination-the domestic,work, psychology,the sexual-
whicharethe realobjectsof feminismandof sexualpolitics,givingriseto a seriesof struggles,
whichmay be unifiedpoliticallybut do not possessany essentialunityin themselves.This, of
course,ignoresthe unitygivenby the historicalcontinuityof thesestruggles.

Our Common History

EditorPaulThompson
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