Alfredo M. De Leon v. Hon. Benjamin B.

Esguerra
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
Melencio-Herrera, J.

Facts:
Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and other petitioners were elected as
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal in the Barangay elections of May
17, 1982 under the Barangay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, de Leon received a
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra
on February 8, 1987. It replaced de Leon with Florentino G. Magno as the new Barangay
Captain and replaced the Barangay Councilmen as well. De Leon and the other petitioners
maintained that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 determined their office terms to be until
Jun1 7, 1988. The ratification/n of the 1987 Constitution also removed the OIC Governor’s
authority to replace them. Esguerra contends that the Provisional Constitution allowed
such replacement as long as it was made on or before February 25, 1986. The issue is
whether the OIC Governor still had the authority to replace petitioners

Held:
Even though the Memorandum was dated December 1, 1986, the court considered
February 8, 1987 to be its effectivity date, since this when it was signed. While this is still
within the prescribed period in the Provisional Constitution, the 1987 Constitution took
effect on February 2, superseding all other constitutions, when it was ratified by a
plebiscite. Section 27 of Article XVIII provided for this provision. Therefore, the Provisional
Constitution was no longer applicable. Sec. 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which
agrees with the Barangay Election Act of 1982, now governs the issue. thus, de Leon and
other petitioners may continue in their term.
Javellana v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. L36142 March 31, 1973

Facts:
On March 16, 1967, the Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2 and Resolution
No. 4, creating a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution.
These were implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, which was for the election of delegates
for the Convention. Thus, the 1971 Constitutional Convention officially began on June 1,
1971. On September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the
entire Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its
Proposed Constitution. The next day, the President issued Presidential Decree No.73, which
is an order for setting and appropriating funds for a plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution that was drafted by the Convention. On December 7,
1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Philippine
Treasurer and the Auditor General, to stop them from implementing P.D. No. 73, on the
grounds that the President did not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and
appropriate funds to it since this power is lodged exclusively in Congress and that there was
no proper submission to the people of the Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973,
because there was no freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and that there was no
sufficient time to inform the people of its contents. On December 23, 1972, the President
announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the
Proposed Constitution. The Court then refrained from deciding the aforementioned case.
On January 12, 1973, a petition was filed for the case to be decided not later than January
15, 1973. The next day, the Court issued a resolution ordering the respondents to file an
answer not later than the noon of January 16, 1973. When the case was being heard, the
Secretary of Justice, upon the President’s instructions, delivered a copy of Proclamation No.
1102, which had been signed by the President earlier that morning. Proc. No. 1102 declares
that the Citizen Assemblies referendum was conducted and its result shows that more than
95% of its members are in favor of the new Constitution and that there was no need for a
plebiscite because the Citizens Assemblies’ vote should be considered instead. President
Marcos then certified and proclaimed that the Proposed Constitution had been ratified and
as a result, came into effect. On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a case against the
Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, and Finance, to stop
them from implementing any of the provisions of the Proposed Constitution not founded in
the 1935 Constitution. He alleged that the respondents acted in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the Proposed Constitution, that the President is without authority to create
the Citizens Assemblies, that the Citizens Assemblies do not have power to approve the
Proposed Constitution, that the President cannot proclaim the ratification of the Proposed
Constitution, and that the election held to ratify such was not a free election and must be
null and void. The issues are whether the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 involves a
justiciable question, whether the Proposed Constitution has been ratified in consonance
with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, whether the people consented to the Proposed
Constitution, whether the parties are entitled to any relief, and whether the Constitution is
already in force.
Held:
Six members of the Court held that the issue of the validity of Proclamation NO. 1102 is a
justiciable question since the Court may inquire whether there was actually approval by the
people and whether Article XV of the 1935 Constitution was complied with. Consequently,
six members of the Court held that the Proposed Constitution was not validly ratified in
accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, since this required an election held in
accordance with law using only qualified and duly registered voters. For the third issue, no
majority vote was reached by Court, but four members agreed that the people had already
accepted the 1973 Constitution. Next, six members of the Court voted to dismiss the
petition, denying petitioners of relief. Lastly, four members of the Court voted that the
Constitution was in force because of the people’s acceptance of it, with two voting
oppositely, and four being undecided. Thus, because of the six voted dismissing the petition
in the fourth issue, there was no more judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect.
Arturo M. Tolentino v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971
Barredo, J.

Facts:
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 was created by two resolutions of the Congress as a
constituent assembly convened for calling a convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution, particularly Resolutions 2 and 4 which were held on March 16, 1967 and June
17, 1969 respectively.
Its first formal proposal began on September 28, 1971. The Organic Resolution 1 amended
Section One of Article V of the Philippine Constitution to lower the voting age from twenty-
one years to eighteen years of age and that it would only valid if a plebiscite was held
approving it.
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC informed the Convention that it would hold the
plebiscite. On October 7, 1971, the Convention approved a resolution to permit the
delegates to campaign for the ratification of Organic Resolution 1.
Arturo M. Tolentino is petitioning to restrain Commission on Elections from holding the
plebiscite on November 8, 1971.
The intervenors, however, questioned the jurisdiction of the courts on the matter. The issue
is whether the judicial branch has jurisdiction over the matter and whether holding a
plebiscite for Organic Resolution No. 1 was within the powers of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971.

Held:
The court has decided since before that the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can determine the proper distribution of powers between different
departments. Hence, the courts have jurisdiction over this issue.
With regard to the second issue, it is known that the Constitution is of great importance.
Thus, any amendments to it should be done with great care and consideration. The
Constitution itself states that amendments are only valid if an election is held where the
people can vote. This presupposes that in a Constitutional Convention, all amendments
must be combined and included in only one election, so that the people may look at these
ratifications in relation to each other. Even Organic Resolution No. 1 states that its
amendments are without prejudice to any part of the Constitution. Therefore, the plebiscite
cannot be held and all actions leading to the resolution are null and void.
Manuel B. Imbong v. Jaime Ferrer, Lino M. Patajo, and Cesar Milaflor
G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970
Makasiar, J.

Facts:
On March 16, 1967, the Constituent Assembly passed Resolution No. 2 which called for a
Constitutional Convention composed of two delegates from each representative district
who shall have the same qualifications as Congressmen, to be elected on the second
Tuesday of November, 1970. The Congress then enacted Republic Act No. 4914
implementing Resolution No.2 and restating its provisions. On June 17, 1969, the
Constituent Assembly passed Resolution No. 4, amending Resolution No. 2 by providing
that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates allocated among the existing
representative districts according to their respective inhabitants provided that the
representative district have at least two delegates with the same qualifications as members
of House of Representatives. On August 24, 1970, the Congress enacted Republic Act No.
6132, implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914. Manuel
B. Imbong, a member of the Bar and taxpayer interested in running for delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, is questioning the constitutionality of Par. 1, Sec. 8 (a) of R.A. No.
6132. The issue is whether R.A. No. 6132 is constitutional, particularly Paragraph 1 of
Section 8 (a), since it prejudices Imbong’s rights as a candidate.

Held:
The constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress, and not as a
Constituent Assembly is upheld because the Resolutions implemented in R.A. No. 6132
were first approved by the Constituent Assembly. The Congress also has the authority to
enact implementing details in such resolutions. Par. 1, Sec. 8 (a) of R.A. No. 6132, on the
other hand, bans all political parties or organized groups from supporting or assisting
delegate candidates. The restriction in this section was determined to be so narrow that the
basic constitutional rights themselves have not been violated. Furthermore, such provision
was placed in R.A. No. 6132 to eliminate current occurrences in elections where delegates
are elected because of the aid and resources of organizations. The purpose of the delegates
is to sufficiently represent the people and this purpose is defeated if organizational support
is allowed. The prayer in this petition is then denied and R.A. 6132 cannot be declared
unconstitutional.
Charito Planas v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. L-35925 January 22, 1973
Concepcion, C.J.

Facts:
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was
amended by Resolution No. 4, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. While the Convention was in session on
September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire
Philippines under Martial Law. The Convention approved the Proposed Constitution on
November 29, 1972, and the next day the President issued Presidential Decree No. 73,
submitting to Filipinos for ratification or rejection the Proposed Constitution by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds for it. The plebiscite was set on January
15, 1973. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed this case against the Commission on
Elections, among others, urging them not to implement Presidential Decree No. 73. He
claimed that it had no force of effect as law, because the calling of the plebiscite, among
other related actions, are lodged exclusively in Congress, and the submission to the people
was improper, there being no freedom of speech nor sufficient time to inform the people of
its contents. On December 17, 1972, the President issued an order temporarily suspending
the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 to allow free and open debate on the Proposed
Constitution. On December 23, the postponement of the plebiscite was announced. The
following issues are whether Presidential Decree No. 73 was political in nature, whether
the Constitutional Convention has authority to make a Constitution that would supersede
the present one, whether the plebiscite and appropriation of funds are valid and whether
there can be a plebiscite under Martial Law.

Held:
The first issue is justiciable because the courts have already previously passed upon the
constitutionality and acts of the Executive. The 1935 Constitution also provides for the
authority of the Supreme Court to address such issue. The Constitutional Convention was
also deemed legally free to suggest any amendment it may deem fit to purpose, except
those that are inconsistent with what is now known. As regards to the plebiscite, the
Supreme Court did not give an answer because the plebiscite had been postponed. As per
the fourth issue, it was held to be in relation to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102, which
had not been explicitly questioned. Therefore, there must be a reasonable amount of time
given to Planas to discuss the issue.
Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. L-44684 October 12, 1976
Martin, J.

Facts:
On September 2, 1976, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies to resolve the issues
of martial law. On September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1031,
amending the previous decree by providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
barangays applicable to the referendum-plebiscite. The President also issued Presidential
Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be used in the referendum-plebiscite, which asked
if the people wanted martial law to be continued, and if they approved of the amendments
to the Constitution. On September 27, 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad
commenced Prohibition for Preliminary Injunction to make P.D. Nos. 991 and 1031
ineffective in terms of the proposed amendments to the Constitution, and P.D. No. 1031 in
terms of the responsibility of the Commission on Elections with the Referendum-Plebiscite.
Both petitioners reasoned that the President had no authority to propose amendments
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The issues are whether Presidential Decree Nos.
991, 1031, and 1033 are political questions, whether the President of the Philippines can
propose amendments to the present Constitution, and whether the proposed amendments
were within the time allowed for a sufficient and proper submission to the people.

Held:
Regarding the justiciability of the issue raised, the Court rules that both the proposal and
ratification of the Constitution raise judicial questions. The new Constitution states that the
Supreme Court en banc may decide on all cases involving constitutionality of laws, treaties,
and executive agreements. As for the amending process for the new Constitution, the 1973
Constitution states that proposals to amend the Constitution may only come from the
interim National Assembly. Therefore, the President has nothing to do with proposition or
adoption of the amendments of the Constitution. Thirdly, the Court rules that the period
from September 21 to October 16 is sufficient for free discussions on the referendum-
plebiscite issues. There are no provisions in the new Constitution specifying when exactly
the plebiscite may be held. Also, since the Constitution is of great import and addresses
issues relevant as of now, any alterations to it must be decided upon as quickly as possible.
The Court then voted on whether to dismiss the petition. As the majority voted to dismiss,
the petitions were declared dismissed.
Lawyers League For A Better Philippines v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.
G.R. No. 73748 May 22, 1986

Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 declaring that
she and Vice President Laurel were assuming power. This was followed by Proclamation
No. 3, issued on March 25, 1986, providing the basis for their assumption of power. It stated
that the new government was chosen through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people with the assistance of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines. The issue then is
whether the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Held:
The issue being addressed is a political question. Therefore, only the people may judge
whether the new government is legitimate. It was clearly shown that the Filipinos were
accepting of the Aquino government. Furthermore, it is a de jure government and the
community of nations has recognized its legitimacy as well.

Philippine Bar Association v. Commission on Elections

140 SCRA 455 January 7, 1986

Facts:
Batasang Pambansa 883 called for a special election for President and Vice-President on
February 7, 1986. This was enacted after the Batasang Pambasa received a letter from
Marcos stating that he was vacating his position as President only when such election was
held and the winner proclaimed and qualified by taking his oath ten days after his
proclamation. Petitions were filed for the prohibition for Batasang Pambansa 883 because
President Marcos’ letter did not create the actual vacancy required in the Constitution,
specificallt in Section 9, Article 7. The issue is whether Batasang Pambansa 883 is
constitutional.

Held:
The Court rules that the issue is a political question and not a justiciable one. Only the
people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election can decide whether they want
to give the incumbent president a new mandate or elect a new president. Furthermore, the
Court’s deliberation resulted in the majority voting to dismiss the petitions.
Prof. Merlin M. Magallona v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 187167 July 16, 2011
Carpio, J.

Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines. RA 5446 corrected typographical errors and reserved the drawing of baselines
around Sabah in North Borneo. In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA
9522 to make it compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea. RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints
around the Philippine archipelage and classified adjacent territories as regimes of islands
whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. The petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA 9522 because it reduces Philippine maritime territory and opens the
country’s waters, particularly the Kalayaan Island Group and Scarborough Shoal, to
maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, both of which undermine Philippine
sovereign power, and national security for the second reason. The issue is whether RA
9522 is unconstitutional.

Held:
RA 9522 is a baseline law created to mark out specific basepoints for measuring the zones
mentioned, making it merely a statutory mechanism for UNCLOS III parties to identify their
limits. The baselines drawn under RA 9522 also only copy those of RA 3046, except for a
few changes made to comply with UNCLOS III’s limitations. These changes actually
increased the Philippine total maritime space because of the optimizations made.
Furthermore, the Kalayaan Island Group and Scarborough Shoal are still considered part of
the Philippines in RA 9522. However, they are not included in the baseline because they are
quite far from the shape of the Philippine archipelago, a provision of international law. RA
9522 did not repeal RA 5446 as well, keeping intact the claim of the Philippines to Sabah.
Sovereignty over waters cannot prohibit travelling vessels to pass through innocently either
because that is a customary international law. Congress passed this law in order to
determine and protect Philippine maritime space. The petition is then dismissed.
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Court of Industrial Relations
G.R. No. L-32052 July 25, 1975
Fernando, J.

Facts:
The private respondents, employees of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration,
rendered overtime services in excess of their regular eight working hours per day. PVTA
failed to compensate them for these overtime services in accordance with Commonwealth
Act NO. 444. When they requested for compensation, PVTA denied the allegations and
asserted their lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. However, the judge of the
Court ordered the payment of overtime services. PVTA asked for the reversal of such
decision on the basis that the Court of Industrial Relations is going beyond its jurisdiction
as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from Commonwealth Act No.
444. The issue is whether PVTA performs governmental functions, making it exempt from
Commonwealth Act. No. 444.

Held:
The enactments creating PVTA’s corporation shows that it performs governmental and not
proprietary functions. There seems to be no constitutional obstacle prohibiting the
government from pursuing lines of endeavor formerly reserved for private enterprise. The
concept of laissez faire is rejected in order for the government to be able to cope more with
social economic and social problems. However, this cannot stop the Court from assuming
jurisdiction in the case. Previous jurisprudence has determined that the Court of Industrial
Relations has jurisdiction over cases on unfair labor practices of government-owned or
controlled corporations. PVTA cannot assert that it is exempted from the Eight-Hour Labor
Law as well, since its provisions clearly include PVTA’s employees in overtime
compensation. The decision of the Court is then affirmed.
Conchita Romualdez-Yap v. The Civil Service Commission and The Philippine National Bank
G.R. No. 104226 August 12, 1993
Padilla, J.

Facts:
Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working for the Philippine National Bank on September
20, 1972. After several promotions, she became Senior Vice President of the Fund Transfer
Department in 1983. While on leave, Executive Order No. 80 was approved on December 3,
1986, authorizing the restructure and rehabilitation of PNB. Because of this, the Fund
Transfer Department was abolished and its functions transferred to the International
Department. Yap was informed of her separation from the service in a letter dated January
30, 1987. She appealed to the Civil Service Commission who upheld the validity of her
separation from service. Yap then claimed that her separation from service was illegal and
done in bad faith for numerous reasons. The issue is whether Yap’s separation from service
was done in bad faith

Held:
It has been held previously that reorganizations are carried out in good faith if they are for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. PNB’s reorganization
streamlined the numbers of the workforce, including Yap’s position, because of the critical
financial situation of the bank. Furthermore, she may have been given special treatment in
the previous regime due t her relation to Mrs. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos. Thus, her
removal from the position, which she may have acquired for that reason, is not considered
bad faith. The restoration of the Funds Transfer Department was made four years after only
because of the bank’s growth after its reorganization. Yap did not express any desire to
continue being employed while she was on leave as well. RA No. 6656 cannot be invoked
either because it took effect on June 15, 1987 after PNB’s reorganization had already been
implemented. These all prove that PNB abolished the Funds Transfer Department in good
faith, affirming the original decision.
Co Kim Cham v. Eusebio Valdez Tan Keh and Arsenio P. Dizon
G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945
Feria, J.

Facts:
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied Manila City. The Philippine
executive Commission, a civil government, was organized by Order No. 1, which was issued
on January 23, 1942 by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces in the Philippines.
The Chairman of the Executive Commission issued Executive Orders No. 1 and 4, in which
the Philippine courts under the Commonwealth were continued with the same jurisdiction
while conforming with the instructions given in Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942
concerning the exercise of legislative, judicial, and executive powers. On October 14, 1943,
the Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but there were no substantial changes
made to the previous arrangements made. On October 23, 1944, General Douglas
MacArthur issued a proclamation declaring that all other laws, regulations, and processes
of other governments in the Philippines other than that of the Commonwealth were null
and void and without legal effect. Co Kim Cham is petitioning for the proceedings in civil
case No. 3012, initiated during the Japanese occupation, be continued. Judge Arsenio P.
Dizon refused to continue proceedings on account of General MacArthur’s proclamation
that such processes were now invalid. The issue is whether civil case No. 3012 may proceed
even though it was initiated during Japanese occupation.

Held:
The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines both fall under
the second kind of de facto government, one that is established and maintained by military
forces invading enemy territory in the course of war. In political and international law, this
makes their judicial acts, which were not political, good and valid even after reoccupation of
American and Filipino forces. Such actions were only made to maintain the whole social life
of the community. As for General Mac Arthur’s proclamation, it cannot be said that it was
his intention for governments formed under Japanese occupation were included in the
governments considered null and void. If his words were constructed to mean otherwise,
this would cause the endangerment of many great public interests. Furthermore, the
pending proceedings during Japanese occupation may be continued during the
reoccupation by American and Philippine forces because an established law continues until
changed by a competent legislative power, as long as they are not political in nature. Judge
Dizon is now ordered to recognize and continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012.

The Government of the Philippine Islands v. El Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorras de Manila
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
Trent, J.

Facts:
About $400,000 were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by
inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions as donations for the earthquake victims of the
Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. On October 6, 1863, a central relief board was appointed
to distribute the money contributed. They allotted $363,703.50 to the various sufferers
named in its resolution, dated September 22, 1866. The list of allotments was published in
the Official Gazette of Manila on April 7, 1870. On February 1, 1833, the Philippine
Government directed its treasurer to give to the Monte de Piedad $80,000 of the relief fund
in installments of $20,000 each. Various petitions have been made by those entitled in the
list of allotments to recover from Monte de Piedad the $80,000 along with interest. The
Attorney General representing the Philippine Islands filed a claim for the return of the
$80,000. Monte de Piedad answered that the Philippine Government could no longer act on
this because there was a change of sovereignty. The issue is whether the Philippine
Government could take legal action against Monte de Piedad.

Held:
When the Philippines received its independence, the prerogatives of the Spanish crown
were passed onto the State. Therefore, their government acquired sovereignty. The
Philippine Government is not a mere nominal part because it has to exercise its sovereign
functions and powers in protecting public interests. Furthermore, the government has a
responsibility to protect those who cannot protect themselves, which is the doctrine of
parens patriae. It can then represent the claimants of the $80,000 by filing a suit against
Monte de Piedad. The original decision of reclaiming the sum is then affirmed.
Melchora Cabanas v. Francisco Pilapil
G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974
Fernando, J.

Facts:
Florentino Pilapil, deceased, had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, Melchora
Cabasas. The deceased insured himself and named his child as beneficiary, with his brother
as trustee during her minority. When he died, the proceeds were paid to the brother. The
mother filed a complaint on October 10, 1964, when Millian was ten years old, seeking the
delivery of the sum. The brother referred to the terms of the insurance policy for retaining
the amount paid him. The issue is whether the child is entitled to her father’s insurance.

Held:
Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code explicitly state the conditions applicable in this case.
The insurance proceeds are rightfully the beneficiary’s, who is a minor under the custody
and under the roof of her mother. Said property then belongs to the mother as well. There is
no ambiguity in these provisions, and so they must be upheld. The State is also acting as
parens patriae in ensuring the best interests of the minor in question, a vulnerable member
of society. The Constitutional provision that the State must strengthen the family unit also
pushes the Court to decide in favor of the mother. The original decision is affirmed.
Ramon Ruffy, et al. v. The Chief of Staff, Philippine Army, et al.
G.R. No. L-533 August 20, 1946
Tuason, J.

Facts:
Ramon Ruffy was the Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary garrison
stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941. On February 27, 1942,
Major Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of surrendering to Japanese forces and led a
guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. Other officers and civilians joined
him. The Bolo Area was part of the 6th Military District, one of the districts the Philippine
Army was divided into before the war. Colonel Jurado then effected a change in command
where he replaced Major Ruffy with Capt. Esteban P. Beloncio. On October 19, 1944, Col.
Jurado was slain by the petitioners. They then withdrew from the 6 th Military District. The
issues are whether the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was
committed and whether the 93d Article of War is constitutional

Held:
The suspension of all laws and regulations governing the existence of the Philippine Army
because of enemy occupation of the Philippines is only applicable to those who were not in
active duty. The 2d Article of War includes Major Ruffy and other petitioners because they
became members of the 6th Military District by their acceptance of appointments as officers
in the Bolo Area. As for 93d Article of War, which punishes murder by those subject to
military law with death or life imprisonment at the discretion of the court martial, it was
determined that courts martial are simply executive agencies aiding the President as
Commander in Chief of the military in maintaining the discipline and government of the
Army. Thus, the petition is dismissed.
Anastacio Laurel v. Eriberto Misa
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

Facts:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that a Filipino citizen
giving an enemy aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for
the crime of treason found in Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. He gave reasons that
the sovereignty of the Philippine government and the allegiance of its citizens were
suspended at the time and that there was a change of sovereignty upon the proclamation of
the Philippine Republic. The issue is whether absolute allegiance was suspended during the
Japanese occupation, making Laurel exempt from Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.

Held:
The sovereignty of the legitimate government is not transferred to the enemy occupier. It is
only the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of territory
that is given up to the enemy occupant. Therefore, absolute allegiance is not abrogated nor
severed. Laurel is then liable for the crime of treason in Article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code because he made the offense to the Philippine government and to the Philippine
people. His petition is denied.
The People of the Philippine Islands v. Gregorio Perfector
G.R. No. L-18463 October 4, 1922
Malcolm, J.

Facts:
On August 20, 1920, Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate,
discovered that certain documents containing testimony record given by witnesses in the
investigation of oil companies, disappeared from his office. Shortly after, he informed the
Philippine Senate in a special session about the loss of the documents and the steps taken
by him to discover the culprit. On the following day, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr.
Gregorio Perfecto, published an article accusing the Senate members of stealing such
documents and of being robbers in general. The Senate took the necessary steps which
resulted in the filing of an information in which the article in question was set out and
alleged to be a violation of Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, which contains provisions
on the defamation of persons of authority. Perfecto was found guilty in two courts.
However, he questioned the validity of Article 256, saying that it was no longer applicable.
The issue is whether Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is still in force

Held:
Statutory construction dictates that new statutes that clearly cover the subject matter of
older acts, then such acts are deemed repealed by necessary implication. The Libel Law is a
complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel in that it discusses even the topic of
Article 256. Moreover, the change of sovereignty from Spanish to American governance
created new demands. The original intent of the law, which was to respect a Minister of the
Crown is no longer applicable. Under the new Constitution, which was shaped by American
principles, every man is to be respected and high official positions are no longer immune
but viewed as merely susceptible to free plunder. The judgment is then reversed and
Perfector is acquitted.
Bernardita R. Macariola v. Hon. Elias B. Asuncion
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
Makasiar, J.

Facts:
Civil Case No. 3010 was a complaint for partition filed against Bernardita R. Macariola
concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, father of the plaintiff and
defendant. Judge Elias B. Asuncion decided on the matter and a project of partition was
submitted to him. It was not signed by the parties themselves but only by their respective
counsel. One of the properties mentioned was divided among the plaintiffs. Lot 1184-E, one
of the portions of said property, was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon on July 31, 1964. On March
6, 1965, he and his wife sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife. Both
couples subsequently conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to “The
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.” Bernadita R. Macariola charged Judge
Elias B. Asuncion with “acts unbecoming a judge” on August 9, 1968, claiming that Judge
Asuncion violated the Article 1491 of New Civil Code, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce,
Section 3 of R.A. 3019, Section 12 of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics. The issue is whether Judge Asuncion violated the provisions mentioned.

Held:
Article 1491 of the New Civil Code is only applicable to the sale or assignment of a property
that is still pending in litigation. Judge Asuncion bought Lot 1184-E after the case was
settled and from an uninvolved party, namely Dr. Galapon. Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce cannot be applied to the case because it is no longer legal due to the change of
sovereignty from Spain to the United States. As for Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019, Judge
Asuncion cannot be held liable under it because his participation in the business of the
involved corporation has no relation with his judicial office. Neither did the corporation
gain undue advantage from this transaction. Civil Service Rules on the other hand do not
apply to members of the Judiciary, as they have a different set of laws covering them. Canon
25, however, proves the impropriety of Judge Asuncion’s actions, in that his personal
investment was apt to be involved in litigation in court. However, he withdrew such
investment quickly enough once he realized that it contravened Canon 25. Therefore, he is
only reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

William F. Peralta v. The Director of Prisons

G.R. No. L-49 November 12, 1945
Feria, J.

Facts:
William F. Peralta was convicted of the crime of robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment
by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in Ordinance No. 7 by
the Republic of the Philippines during Japanese occupation. Peralta filed a petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that the Court created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political
instrument of the Japanese Imperial Army for purposes against the Philippines and the
United States, making it null and void ab initio and that the provisions of Ordinance No. 7
are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The isssues
are whether the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and its
summary procedure are valid and whether the sentence of life imprisonment is valid.

Held:
International Law states that the criminal jurisdiction adopted by an invader is drawn
entirely from the law martial, which can be asserted through special tribunals defined by
the conquering state or through ordinary authorities of the occupied district. The creation
of said Court is then considered valid because it was created by a governmental
instrumentality of the invader. The altering of penalties to make them heavier, this case
included, was also determined to be within the power of the occupant state, since it was
demanded by military necessity and necessary for control of the country. However, after the
restoration of the Commonwealth Government, this punitive sentence ceases to be valid
because it punishes a crime of political complexion. The writ of habeas corpus is then
granted.
Ancieto Alcantara v. The Director of Prisons
G.R. No. L-6 November 29, 1945
Feria, J.

Facts:
Ancieto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less
serious physical injuries. Upon appeal, the sentence was modified to an indeterminate
penalty from four months and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three years, nine
months, and three days of prison correccional. He commenced serving his sentence on June
23, 1945. Alcantara is now questioning the validity of this decision on the grounds that the
Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was only a creation of the Republic of the Philippines
during Japanese occupation and that it was not authorized by Commonwealth No. 3 to hold
sessions in Baguio. He filed a petition for habeas corpus on this basis. The issue is whether
the judgments of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon are valid.

Held:
As determined in previous jurisprudences, the governments established during Japanese
occupation were considered good and valid even until after the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government. The Court of Appeals that existed before Japanese occupation
continued to exist during the Japanese occupation. Thus, there was no substantial change in
its nature and jurisdiction. Also, Alcantara’s sentence has no political complexion, meaning
it was not made to favor the enemy occupant, making it good and valid as well. The writ of
habeas corpus is denied.
Verisimo Vasquez Vilas v. City of Manila
220 U.S. 345 April 3, 1911
Lurton, J.

Facts:
Vilas , along with two other plaintiffs, are creditors of the City of Manila as it existed before
the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States by the Treaty of Paris in December
10, 1898. Actions were brought against the city to compensate them for the money they
lent it on the basis that it is the same juristic person liable for the obligations of the old city.
The Supreme Court denied relief, asserting that the present municipality is a totally
different corporate entity no longer liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. The
issue is whether the present municipality is liable for the obligations of the city incurred
before the cession of the Philippines to the United States.

Held:
The argument that the obligations of the old city of Manila were extinguished upon the
extinction of Spanish sovereignty is not valid. Municipal corporations have dual characters,
that of government and that of private or business in character. When sovereignty is
transferred to another state, only the governmental character is involved. The private
aspect remains as before in order to secure good order, peace, and prosperity in the
community. There is no reason for the new municipal corporation not to take up the
obligations of its old counterpart as it also succeeded its property and rights. The plaintiffs
are then entitled to relief.
Mariano E. Garcia v. The Chief of Staff
G.R. No. L-20213
Regala, J.

Facts:
On December 1, 1961, Mariano E. Garcia filed a case against the Chief of Staff among other
administrative officers, to collect a sum of money. In July 1948, he had suffered injuries
while in military training at Camp Floridablanca. He filed his claim under Commonwealth
Act 400 to the Adjutant General’s Office. On May 2, 1957, he received a letter from the office
disallowing his claim for disability benefits, with the reason that the Commonwealth Act
400 had already been repealed by Republic Act 610, which took effect on January 1, 1950.
The case was dismissed on March 2, 1962. The issue is whether the Chief of Staff and other
administrative officers can be sued.

Held:
A claim for the recovery of money against the government should be filed with the Auditor
General because the State cannot be sued without its consent. Furthermore, no recourse to
court can be had until all administrative remedies have been exhausted. Actions against
administrative officer should not be entertained if superior administrative officers could
grant relief. Garcia has done none of this; thus, the dismissal of his complaint is affirmed.
Victoria Amigable v. Nicolas Cuenca and Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972
Makalintal, J.

Facts:
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City.
No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at
the back of the certificate. Without prior negotiation, the government used a portion of said
lot for the construction of the Mange and Gorordo Avenues. On March 27, 1958, Amigable’s
counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting for the payment of the used
portion of the lot. The Auditor General disallowed it in his 9 th Indorsement dated December
9, 1958. On February 6, 1959, Amigable filed a complaint against Nicolas Cuenca as
Commissioner of Public Highways and the Republic of the Philippines. Her complaint was
dismissed on the basis that the court had no jurisdiction because the government has not
given its consent to be sued. She then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The issue is
whether Amigable may sue the government for relief of the use of her property.

Held:
It was held that where the government takes away property from a private landowner for
public use without a legal process of expropriation or negotiation, the landowner may sue
the government without violating governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
Since Amigable’s certificate of title does not have an annotation favoring the government,
she is still the owner of the lot. However, since restoration of the lot is not feasible at the
time, only damages may be awarded to her.
Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. The Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 91359 September 25, 1992
Grino-Aquino, J.

Facts:
Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) filed a complaint to render
Sections 4 and 17 of R.A. No. 5487 null and void, claiming that they violate the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in
restraint of trade. On May 12, 1986 PADPAO executed a memorandum ficing the minimum
monthly contract rate per guard. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition for
not following the memorandum and recommended its expulsion from PADPAO and the
cancellation of its license. The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and recommendations.
Because of this, PADPAO did not issue a certificate of membership to VMPSI when it
requested one. VMPSI wrote the PC Chief requesting to disregard PADPAO’s findings and
consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license. No reply was made, and VMPSI filed
a case against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA. The issue is whether VMPSI’s complaint against
the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent

Held:
PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are governmental instruments for regulating the organization and
operation of security guard agencies among others. Hence, they cannot be sued without the
Government’s consent, especially since VMPSI is also seeking a huge sum of damages that
the State did not consent to appropriate necessary funds for. Furthermore, the State may
only be sued when it enters into a business contract. In this case, the governmental
agencies were performing their legal functions. Therefore, they cannot be sued.
Carmen Festejo v. Isaias Fernando
G.R. No. L-5156 March 11, 1954
Diokno, J.

Facts:
Isaias Fernando, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, obtained without authority
from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur and without the knowledge and consent of
Carmen Festejo, portions of three parcels of land belonging to her. Festejo filed a suit
against Fernando, alleging that her lands must be returned to her. The issue is whether
Fernando can be sued in the performance of his duty as a government official

Held:
It was held that a public officer or employee who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction
and without authorization of law may be made personally liable in a civil suit. The facts and
evidence proves that Fernando exceeded his rightful boundaries. Furthermore, Article 32 of
the Civil Code also states that any public officer or employee who violates the right and
liberties of another person is liable for damages. Fernando is then ordered to award
damages to Festejo.
Philippine National Railways v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 70547 January 2, 1993
Melo, J.

Facts:
A passenger express train of Philippine National Railways collided with a passenger bus of
Baliwag Transit, Inc. on August 10, 1974. Baliwag Transit, Inc. alleged that the proximate
cause of the collision was the negligence and imprudence of PNR, due to the absence of
instruments alerting vehicles that a train was about to pass, and its locomotive engineer,
Honorio Cabardo. PNR answered that the proximate cause was actually the negligence and
imprudence of the bus driver, Romeo Hughes, since he did not stop to check before passing,
a violation of Section 42 of R.A. 4136. Nor did he listen to bypassers and passengers
shouting and warning him. The issue is whether Baliwag Transit, Inc. and PNR could be
held accountable for the collision

Held:
Evidence was shown that Hughes actually took the necessary precautions in traversing the
track. Cabardo, on the other hand, should have foreseen the poor visibility of slippery road
due to light rain and lowered his speed. The lack of crossing bar, signal light, or flagman was
also considered negligence on the part of PNR. Therefore, it is Cabardo and PNR who are
held responsible for the collision. As for the PNR’s accountability, it was decided that even
though a State has immunity from suit, the government abandons its sovereign capacity
when it enters into a commercial business. PNR can then be sued due to negligence.
Hon. Ramon J. Farolan, Jr. v. Court of Tax Appeals
G.R. No. 42204 January 21, 1993
Romero, J.

Facts:
On January 30, 1972, SS Pacific Hawk arrived at the Port of Manila carrying 80 bales od
screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading. Bagong buhay paid the duties and taxes
worth P11,350.00 through the Bank of Asia on February 1, 1972. The Office of the Collector
of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment and founf that the shipment had been
undervalued greatly. Because of this, the Collector of Customs forfeited the subject
shipment in favor of the government. On August 20, 1976, Bagong Buhay filed a petition for
the release of the questioned goods denied by Court. The goods were ordered to be
released on June 2, 1986. However, only 64 out of the 80 bales were secured. Among these,
about 26, 504 yards were in bad condition. Bagong Buhay then demanded the Bureau of
Customs to be ordered to pay for the 43, 050 yards it lost. The issue is whether the Collector
of Customs may be held liable for the 43, 050 yards it lost.

Held:
It was decided that the Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages since
this would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Commissioner of Customs would
be ordered to pay for the damages, which would ultimately fall on the government to fulfill,
turning it into a suit against the State. instead, the Collector of Customs is directed to
recomputed the customs duties.
Bureau of Printing v. The Bureau of Printing Employees Association
G.R. No. L-15751
Gutierrez David, J.

Facts:
A complaint was filed by the Bureau of Printing Employees Association alleging that Serafin
Salvador and Mariano Ledesma were engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with
employees of the Bureau of Printing in the exercise of their right to self-organization and
the pursuance of their union activities. Salvador and Ledesma countered that the Bureau of
Printing has not juridical personality to sue and be sued because it is an agency performing
governmental functions. The issue is whether the Bureau of Printing can be sued.

Held:
Many jurisprudences have said that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and
determine complaints for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or corporations not
organized for profit. Also, as an office of the Government, the Bureau of Printing cannot be
sued because any action against it would be against the Government itself. The complaint
for unfair labor practice is then dismissed.
The Holy See v. Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
Quiason, J.

Facts:
Lot 5-A is a parcel of land located in Paranaque, Metro Manila and registered under the
name of the Holy See. Said Lot is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D. All three lots were sold to
Ramon Lincup, assigning his right to the sale to Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. however,
because the squatters refused to vacate the lots, a dispute arose as to who had the
responsibility of clearing it of squatters. The Holy See proceeded to sell its lot to Tropicana.
Starbright filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land and
specific performance and damages against the Papal Nuncio, the Holy See’s Philippine
representative. The issue is whether the Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

Held:
According to international law, a sovereign cannot be made a respondent in the courts of
another sovereign without its consent. However, this only applies with regard to public acts
and not private acts. Lot 5-A was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila not for commercial
purpose, but for the use of the Holy See to construct the official residence of the Papal
Nuncio. This right is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Also, the Holy See only sold the lot because the squatters living thereon made it difficult to
use for its original purpose. Therefore, the Holy See has sovereign immunity from suit as it
was performing public acts in the process of selling the land.

Khosrow Minucher v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Arthur Scalzo

G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003
Vitug, J.

Facts:
An Information for violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 was filed against Khosrow
minucher and Abbas Torabian. Arthur Scalzo, a special agent for the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On January
8, 1988, the two were acquitted. On August 3, 1988, Minucher filed a civil case for damages
against Scalzo for trumped-up charges of drug trafficking. Scalzo asserted that he was
immune from suit as he was a diplomatic agent of the United States. The issue is whether
Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity.

Held:
It was sufficiently established that Scalzo indeed worked for the U.S, Drug Enforcement
Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the
country. This entitles him to diplomatic immunity as long as it is proven that he was acting
within the scope of the performance of his duties. The activities he conducted in the
surveillance, capture and testimony against Minucher shows that he was acting within this
scope. He is then entitled to the state immunity from suit.
Ernesto L. Callado v. International Rice Research Institute
G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995
Romero, J.

Facts:
Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the International Rice Research Institute on
April 11, 1983. On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back, he figured in an accident. After preliminary
investigation, it was found that he had been driving under the influence of liquor at the time
of the accident. IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to Callado on December 7, 1990.
Callado filed a complaint on December 19, 1990 for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, and
indemnity pay. IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter on January 2, 1991 to inform him that it enjoys
immunity from legal process because of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620. The
Labor Arbiter, however, cited an Order issued by the Institute stating that in all cases of
termination, it would waive its immunity. The issue is whether IRRI waived its immunity
from suit in an employer-employee relationship.

Held:
Article 3 of P.D. NO. 1620 provides the provisions for IRRI’s immunity from suit. In it is
stated that only the Director-General may relinquish or abandon this immunity. Although
IRRI made provisions regarding its waiver of immunity from suit in employee terminations,
such provisions provided that the waiver is purely discretionary on the part of IRRI. His
petition is then dismissed.

Department of Agriculture v. The National Labor Relations Commission, et al.

G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993
Vitug, J.

Facts:
The Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract on April
1, 1989 for security services. Another identical contract, save for monthly rate increase of
the guards, was made on May 1, 1990. Guards were then deployed in the various premises
of the Department. On September 13, 1990, several guards of the Agency filed a complaint
for underpayment and non-payment of wages and allowances against the Department and
the Agency. They were found jointly and severally liable for the payment of such claims. On
July 18, 1991, the Labor Arbiter ordered the execution of the judgment against their
property and several motor vehicles were taken from the Department. The Department
then asserted that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over it, making his decision null and
void. The issue is whether the Department of Agriculture may avail of its immunity from
suit.
Held:
The doctrine that the state may not be sued without its consent recognizes that the State
may give its consent at times. In this case, the possibility of a suit was opened when the
State entered into a contract. Suits arising from monetary liability arising from such
contract, whether express or implied, gives rise to the State’s consent. However, the money
claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit as stated in Commonwealth Act No.
327. The writ of execution is then nullified.

Republic of the Philippines v. Pablo Feliciano and Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 70853 March 12, 1987
Yap, J.

Facts:
Pablo Feliciano owned a parcel of land with four lots in Tinambac, Camarines Sur. On
November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for
settlement purposes, a tract of land in Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur. Feliciano
asked that his land be exempt from the action. On August 29 1970, a decision was made for
only Lot 1 of the land to be considered Feliciano’s private property. Lots 2, 3, and 4 were
reverted to public domain. Feliciano filed a complaint against the Republic of the
Philippines for the recovery of ownership of a parcel of land. The issue is whether the
Republic of the Philippines may be sued for recovery of property.

Held:
A suit against the recovery of property is an action directed against a specific party or
parties. Feliciano, in his actions, has sued the Republic without its consent. The State’s
sovereign immunity does not permit this. Furthermore, the complaint involves the private
land belonging to Feliciano and not any lands owned by the State. The complaint against the
Republic is then dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Amante P. Purisima

G.R. No. L-36084 August 31, 1977
Fernando, C.J.

Facts:
Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. sued the Rice and Corn Administration for breach of contract.
The Administration filed a motion to dismiss on September 7, 1972, alleging that Judge
Amante P. Purisima failed to apply the non-suability of the State without its consent. The
issue is whether the Rice and Corn Administration is covered by the non-suability of the
State.

Held:
The Constitution itself states that State may not be sued without its consent. In order for
consent to be considered, the State must act through a duly enacted statute. Therefore,
whatever counsel the Rice and Corn Administration agreed to has no binding force on the
government.

E. Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands

G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
Trent, J.

Facts:
E. Merritt, who was riding on a motorcycle, was hit by the General Hospital ambulance in
Taft Avenue when it suddenly turned without sounding any whistle or horn. Merrit was so
severely injured that it seemed he had little hope to live and his physical and mental
condition depreciated noticeably from before. This affected his current projects in
construction and his business partnership and contract. When a complaint was filed, the
trial court ruled in favor of Merritt. Both parties appealed, with Merritt asking for a higher
amount of damages, and the Government questioning its own liability for the collision
The issue is whether the Government of the Philippines should be made liable for damages
as a result of the collision.

Held:
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, authorizes Merritt to sue the Philippine
Government to fix the responsibility for the collision and to determine the amount of
damages he is entitled to. The government does not concede its liability to Merritt, but
simply waives its immunity from suit to remedy a preexisting liability. Furthermore, the
driver of the ambulance was not an agent, officer, or employee included in representing the
State. Hence, the judgment is reversed, and the issue as to whether the Government intends
to make itself liable does not rest with the court but with the Legislature.

Fernando A. Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. and Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-6060 September 30, 1954
Paras, C.J.

Facts:
On February 3, 1951, Fernando A. Froilan filed a complaint against Pan Oriental Shipping
Co., alleging that he purchased the vessel FS-197 from it for P200,000, paying P50,000 as
down payment and agreeing to pay the balance in installments. To secure payment, Froilan
executed a chattel mortgage of the vessel. For various reasons, one of which was the non-
payment of installments, the Shipping Commission took back the vessel and cancelled the
contract. Upon appeal, the Cabinet restored his original contract with the Shipping
Commission. Froilan repeatedly demanded the possession of the vessel but the Commission
refused to do so. On November 10, 1951, the Government of the Philippines filed a
complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan had failed to pay the Shipping Commission.
The Commission then made a counterclaim against the Government, obligating it to return
the vessel. The issue is whether the Government may be sued.

Held:
By filing its complaint in intervention, the Government waived its right of non-suability. The
immunity from suit of the State does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its
own courts. However, when it avails of this right, the State surrenders its privileged
position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The defendant then automatically
acquires the claims he might have against the State.

Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991
Narvasa, J.

Facts:
On July 21, 1987, the Presidential Commission on Good Government filed a case in behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines against several private respondents, including Bienvenido R.
Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago. The complaint was for reconveyance, recersion,
accounting, restitution and damages. After several motions from both the PCGG and
Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two Resolutions on September
29, 1989, one denying reconsideration and the other reiterating the permission to serve the
amended interrogatories on PCGG. The PCGG then contended that both order should be
nuillified because they were made with grave abuse of discretion due to excess of
jurisdiction. The issue is whether the Sandiganbayan exceeded its jurisdiction in
promulgating the two Resolutions.

Held:
It is the duty of each contending party to present all relevant facts known to him to the
court. When the PCGG brought suit in behalf of the Government, it brought itself within the
operation and scope of all the rules governing civil actions. The PCGG cannot then claim
immunity of suit because it waived this privilege when it filed a case in court. Its petition to
nullify the two Resolutions is then denied.

Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service and Bureau of Customs
G.R. No. L-23139 December 17, 1966
Bengzon, J.P., J.

Facts:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. Leoville in November
1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment arrived in the
Port of Manila on April 10, 1963 and was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre
Service, a unit of the Bureau of Customs. It later delivered only three cases of the shipment
to the broker of the consignee. On April 4, 1964, Mobil filed a suit against the Customs
Arrastre and the Bureau to recover the value of the undelivered case along with other
damages. The issue is whether the Bureau of Customs and the Customs Arrastre Service
waved its rights of immunity from suit in delivering the shipment.

Held:
If a non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to a non-corporate
government entity’s governmental function, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity from
suit. Waiver of immunity is not lightly inferred. Since the delivery of shipment was a
function of theirs, a waiver was not constituted. Furthermore, The Bureau of Customs is
part of the Department of Finance, having no personality of its own except that of the
government. In suing it, Mobil is suing the government without its consent. The complaint
against the Bureau and the Customs Arrastre is then dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973
Fernando, J.

Facts:
On July 3, 1961, a decision was made in a special proceeding in favor of P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd.,
Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation. On June 24, 1969, Honorable
Guillermo P. Villasor issued an Order declaring the decision final and execution. This was
followed by a Writ of Execution on June 24, 1969. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served
notices of garnishment with several banks, dated June 28, 1969 on the money due the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to cover the amount in the Writ of Execution. The Republic
of the Philippines filed a petition challenging the validity of the order on the ground that it
Judge Villasor exceeded his jurisdiction in granting an issuance against the properties of the
AFP. The issue is whether Judge Villaflor acted in excess of his jurisdiction in granting the
issuance of the alias writ of execution.

Held:
What Judge Villaflor did was not in conformity with the Constitution, since it states that the
State may not be sued without its consent. There is no legal right as against the authority
that makes the laws the right depends on. Government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment because the use of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The Order and the Writ of
Execution by Judge Villasor is then nullified and set aside.

Philippine National Bank v. Hon. Judge Javier Pabalan

G.R. No. L-33112 June 15, 1978
Fernando, Actin C.J.

Facts:
A writ of execution was issued on December 17, 1970 by Judge Javier Pabalan against
Philippine National Bank. Following this, a notice of garnishment of the funds of the
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration was made. PNB proceeded to question the writ
of execution and the notice of garnishment on the basis of non-suability of a state. The issue
is whether the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration can be seized.

Held:
When the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity
Thus, government owned and controlled corporations have personalities distinct and
separate from the Government. They are given all the powers of a corporation under
Corporation Law. Since the PVTA is a government owned and controlled corporation, its
property may then be seized according to Jusge Pabalan’s issuance.

Pedro Syquia v. Natividad Almeda Lopez

G.R. No. L-1648 August 17, 1949
Montemayor, J.

Facts:
Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo Syquia are undivided joint owners of three apartment
buildings in Manila City. In the middle of year 1945, they executed three lease contracts,
one for each apartment, for the United States of America to rent. These were used for
billeting and quartering U.S. Armed Forces officers. In March 1947, General George F. Moore
and Chief Erland Tillam, both from the U.S. Army, were in control of the lease and
occupancy of the three apartments, though they did not occupy any of them. In March 1946,
the Syquias requested the return of the apartment but were refused. On May 11, 1946, the
Syquias requested a renegotiation of the leases but were once again refused with a
contemplation that they would vacate the apartments before February 1, 1972. After being
refused once more, the Syquias served a formal notice on February 17, 1947 for the non-
compliance of Moore and Tillman to vacate on February 1. When they did not comply with
the notice, the Syquias commenced an action for unlawful detainer against Moore, Tillman
and the 64 occupants. The issue is whether Moore, Tillam and the 64 occupants can be sued
for the complaint.

Held:
Private citizens recovering the possession of their property may sue individuals, officers
and agents of the Government who are illegally withholding them, although the
Government will not be included as a party-defendant. However, the lessee in the lease
agreements was the U.S.A. since the rentals were paid by its Government and the lease was
for government purposes. Moore, Tillman, and the occupant army officers had no
intervention in the execution of the lease agreements, nor in the refusal to vacate the
premises. Since the U.S. Government did not give its consent to be sued, and the filing of suit
was not even approved by the Philippine Government, the case is dismissed.

United States of America v. Hon. V.M. Ruiz

G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985
Abad Santos, J.
Facts:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. In May 1972, the United
States invited the submission of bids for the repair of an offender system and typhoon
damage in the naval base. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and
submitted bids. The company then received two telegrams from the U.S. requesting it to
confirm its price proposals and for its bonding company’s name. in June 1972, the company
received a letter from the Department of Navy of the U.S., stating that they would not be
paid for the projects because of previous unsatisfactory performance. The projects would
instead be awarded to other parties. The company sued the U.S. to allow them to perform
the work on the projects and if this was not possible, to be paid damages. The U.S.
questioned the jurisdiction of the court, since the U.S. was a foreign sovereign, which has
not given her consent to this suit. The issue is whether the United States could be sued.

Held:
Even though State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent, this only applies to governmental acts and not private, commercial, and
proprietary acts. The United States entered into a contract through its agency at Subic Bay
in the pursuit of its sovereign functions. The projects were integral to the naval base which
functions at the highest order of the U.S. Government. The case against the U.S. is then
dismissed.

Dale Sanders, and A.S. Moreau, Jr. v. Hon. Regino T. Veridiano II

G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988
Cruz, J.
Facts:
Dale Sanders was the Special Services Director of the U.S Naval Station in Olongapo City. A.S.
Moreau, Jr. was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said
station. Anthony M. Rossi and Ralph L. Wyers were American citizens with permanent
residence in the Philippines, who were both employed as gameroom attendants in the
Special Services Department. On October 3, 1975, they were advised that their employment
had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time, effective October 18,
1975. They protested this and instituted grievance proceedings. The hearing officer
recommended their reinstatement to permanent full-time status. Sanders disagreed with
the recommendation in a letter to Moreau on May 17, 1976, stating that the two were
difficult employees. On November 7, 1975, Moreau sent a letter to the Chief of Naval
Personnel explaining the change of Rossi and Wyer’s employment status and requesting
concurrence. The two filed for damages on November 8, 1976 for libelous imputations in
the letter against Moreau and Sanders in their personal capacity. However, Moreau and
Sanders contended that the court had no jurisdiction over them. The issue is whether
Sanders and Moreau were performing their official duties in doing the acts they were sued
for.

Held:
The acts for which Moreau and Sanders are being called to account were performed in the
discharge of their official duties. Sanders’s letter was written in reply to a request from hi
superior, and Moreau’s letter dealt with departmental problems and recommendations.
Given this, they were being sued as officers of the United States Government. The mere
allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity does not
remove immunity from suit if his actions were governmental in purpose. Thus, the case
against Moreau and Sanders is dismissed.

United States of America v. Hon. Eliodoro B. Guinto

G.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990
Facts:
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S.
Air Force, solicited bids for contracts for barbering services. Robert T. Valencia,
Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. Del Pilar submitted their bids. Ramon Dizon won the
bid over the objection of the three, who claimed that he had made for four facilities,
including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not included. The three complained to the
Philippine Area Exchange, who explained through Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse
that the Civil Engineering Concession had not been awarded to Dizon because of the
solicitation. He was already operating this concession and the expiration had been
extended, the solicitation of which would only be availably by the end of June. On June 30,
1986, the private respondents filed a complaint to compel PHAX to cancel the award to
Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the concessions, and to allow them by a writ of
preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions. Reeves and Smouse filed to
oppose the writ since it was a suit against the U.S.A, which had not waived its non-suability.
The issue is whether the U.S. Government had waived its non-suability by entering into a
contract for barbering services.

Held:
The barbershops in question are merely commercial enterprises, not facilities demandable
in the official functions of American servicemen. Neither are they for free. Reeves and
Smouse cannot then apply immunity from suit, since this is only applicable to contracts
entered into for sovereign acts or governmental purposes. Thus, the request for a writ of
preliminary injunction is granted.

United States of America v. Hon. Rodolfo D. Rodrigo

G.R. No. 79470 February 26, 1990

Facts:
Fabian Genove, a cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in
Baguio City, allegedly poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables
served to customers. Anthony Lamachia, the club manager, suspended him and referred the
case to a board of arbitrators provided for in the collective bargaining agreement, who
unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. This was effected on March
5, 1986. Genove filed a complaint for damages against Lamachia, among others. On March
13, 1987, Lamachia and other defendants, joined by the U.S.A., moved to dismiss the
complain on the basis that officers of the U.S. Air Force were immune from suit for acts
done in their official capacity. The Court denied this motion. The issue is whether the
actions of Lamacha and other defendants were part of their official capacity.

Held:
The restaurant services being managed by Lamachia are those of a business enterprise
undertaken by the U.S. government in its proprietary capacity. This is because American
servicemen do not avail these services for free in their membership in the Armed Forces. It
is also not exclusive to servicemen, but to the general public as well. Since immunity from
suit is only applicable to government officers who were sued in the fulfillment of their
official duties, non-suability is not applicable in this case. However, the complaint is still
dismissed because of the definitive finding of Genove’s guilt. Though suable, the
Government is not liable, as it was only proper to terminate his employment.
Laudencio Torio v. Rosalina Fontanilla
G.R. No. L-29993 Ocotber 23, 1978
Munoz Palma, J.

Facts:
On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution
No. 159, resolving to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21-23,
1959. Resolution No. 182, which created the 1959 Malisiqui Town Fiesta Executive
Committee, was also passed. Jose Macaraeg, the Chairman of the subcommittee on
entertainment and stage, supervised the construction of the stage for the “zarzuela.” This
performance was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railrad
Company in Caloocan. The troupe, one of which was Vicente Fontanilla, arrived on January
22 for the performance. Many people used the stage before the “zarzuela” began. However,
the stage collapsed in the middle of the play, pinning Fontanilla beneath. He was taken to
the San Carlos General Hospital where he died the following day. His heirs filed a complaint
against the Municipality of Malasiqui and its Council to recover damages. The Municipality
invoked that it was a public corporation performing sovereign functions, one of which is the
holding of a town fiesta. The issue is whether the celebration of a town fiesta is a
governmental function.

Held:
The holding of a town fiesta is considered to be a private or proprietary function. Section
2282 of the Revised Administrative Code only gives the municipality the authority to hold a
fiesta but does not impose upon it this duty. It is then simply a special benefit and not for
the general welfare of the community. The fact that no profit is generated from such event
does not make it governmental. Furthermore, negligence was found in the construction of
the stage because it braces and posts were not complete and only P100 was used for its
construction. The Municipality cannot evade the liability caused by Jose Macaraeg since he
was their agent. He was only acting on their orders. The original decision was then
affirmed.
Leonardo Palafox, et. al v. Province of Ilocos Norte
G.R. No. L-10659 Jan. 31, 1958

Facts:
Sabas Torralba was a chauffer of the District Engineer of the Provincial Government of
Ilocos Norte. On September 30, 1948, he was driving the freight truck along the National
Highway in compliance with his duties when he ran over Proceto Palafox. Torralba was
prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence, which he pleaded guilty to and was
accordingly sentenced. Palafox’s heirs then filed civil action against the Province, the
District Engineer, the Provincial Treasurer, and Torralba. The case was dismissed against all
defendants except Torralba. The issue is whether Ilocos Norte is liable for Torralba’s actions

Held:
Liability cannot be attached to the State for Torralba’s negligence because he is not a special
agent of the Government within the scope of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. The doctrine of
respondeat superior also states that the municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers
or agents if they were performing governmental functions. Torralba was in the function of
his duties when he ran over Palafox, making the Province and other defendants immune
from suit. The original judgment is affirmed.
Arthur D. Lim v. Honorable Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002
De Leon, Jr., J.

Facts:
In January 2002, personnel from the Armed Forces of the United States started arriving in
Mindanao to take part in Balikatan 02-1 with the Philippine military. These are the largest
combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops, simulating joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On February 1, 2002, Arthur D.
Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition attacking the constitutionality of the joint
exercise, which was joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA.
The Terms of Reference were presented to the Senate on February 7, 2002 and approved
five days later. The petitioners contended that the Mutual Defense Treaty was only for the
purpose of armed attacks be an external aggressor against one of them and that the Abu
Sayyaf in Basilan was not considered an external aggressor that warrants US military
assistance. American soldiers were also not allowed to engage in combat operations in
Philippine territory according to the Visiting Forces Agreement of 1999. The issue is
whether the deployment of U.S. troops in Mindanao is unconstitutional.

Held:
The VFA gave continued relevance to the MDT despite the passage of years. The VFA
permits U.S. personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in activities. Though these
words are ambiguous, their meaning may be retrieved from the intention of the agreement,
which was to give a leeway to both parties in negotiation. Thus, the Balikatan exercises are
supported by the VFA. However, the Constitution does not express a welcoming view
towards foreign military presence in the country, nor foreign influence in general. It also
allows the Supreme Court to provide final judgments in cases where the constitutionality of
international agreements are concerned. The Balikatan exercise has not called for
correction on the Court’s part; therefore, the petition is dismissed.
Maximo Calalang v. A.D. Williams, et al.
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Laurel, J.

Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its Resolution of July 17, 1940, recommended to the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along certain streets in Manila City at
certain times, in pursuance with Commonwealth Act No. 548. In August 1940, the Director
indorsed the approval of the recommendation with a few minor changes, which the
Secretary approved of as well. The Mayor of Manila and its Chief Police enforced the
adopted rules and regulations. Maximo Calalang, as a private citizen and taxpayer of Manila,
questioned the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 548 because it allows undue
delegation of legislative power and prayed for a writ of prohibition. The issue is whether
this Act violates the constitutionality of separation of powers.

Held:
The provisions complained of does not give legislative power to the Director and the
Secretary but simply allows them to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in the Act, which is to promote safe transit and to minimize heavy traffic.
The delegated power is not the determination of the law but the ascertainment of facts and
circumstances that will adhere to the law. The request for a writ of prohibition is then
denied.
Justa S. Guido v. Rural Progress Administration
G.R. No. L-2089 October 31, 1949
Tuason, J.

Facts:
Justa G. Guido’s land, situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, just outside the north Manila
boundary, consisted of two adjoining lots and was part commercial. It was expropriated by
the Rural Progress Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo. Guido filed a petition for
prohibition to prevent this, on four grounds, the most important of which was that the land
was commercial and therefore not included within the provisions of Commonwealth Act
539. The issue is whether the expropriation of Guido’s land is constitutional.

Held:
Act 539 was approved because of Section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution, which
authorizes the Congress to expropriate lands upon payment of just compensation. Though
the main intention of this provision is for social justice, it does not mean division of
property or equality of economic status but equality of opportunity, political rights, and
treatment before the law. Also, since there is no fixed line of demarcation as to what
constitutes lands for public use, it is decided that the land in question here is not sufficient
for public convenience. The petition is then granted.
Hon. Isidro Carino v. The Commission on Human Rights
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
Narvasa, J.

Facts:
On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, about 800 public school teachers,
undertook mass concerted actions to emphasize their plight because of the alleged failure
of public authorities to address grievances that had been brought to their attention many
times. The teachers, through their representatives, were served with an order of the
Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal. However, the mass
actions continued into the week, with even more teachers joining in. The eight private
respondents, who were teachers involved in the rallies, were administratively charged on
the basis of the principal’s report and also preventively suspended pursuant to Section 41
of P.D. 807. The teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the
Commission on Human Rights to complain about their sudden replacement as teachers
without their notice and for reasons unknown to them. The issue is whether the CHR may
take cognizance of the case and grant relief.

Held:
It is declared that the CHR has no such power because the Constitution imparted this power
only to courts or quasi-judicial agencies. Upon creating it, the 1987 Constitution gave it
powers and functions, only one of which is similar to adjudication. This is the investigation
of complaints on all forms of human rights violations. Investigation and adjudication are
different in that investigating does not pass judgment or finally settle the matter being
investigated. Hence, the CHR is prohibited from hearing and resolving the case.
Robert T. Meyer v. State of Nebraska
262 U.S. 390 June 4, 1923
McReynolds, J.

Facts:
Robert T. Meyer was an instructor in Zion Parochial School. On May 25, 1990, he taught the
subject of reading in the German language to Raymond Parpart, a ten-year old child who
had not attained and successfully passed the eighth grade. Meyer was tried and convicted
for violating a state law forbidding the teaching of foreign languages in Nebraska. The
statute was created to make the English language the mother tongue of all the children,
even foreigners, reared in Nebraska. However, it was also argued that such law was a
restriction to the rights of citizens and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
exceeding the power of the State. The issue now is whether the statute infringes the liberty
of Meyer in dissonance with the Fourteenth Amendment.

Held:
Determination by the legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is
subject to the supervision by the courts. Since education has always been regarded in
American society as essential. Meyer’s knowledge of the German language and his
impartation of this knowledge to students cannot be outside the liberty of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Also, though it is highly advantageous if all citizens had understanding of the
English language, this cannot be forced by methods in conflict with the Constitution. The
original judgment is then reversed.
Walter M. Pierce v. Society of Sisters
268 U.S. 510 June 1, 1925
McReynolds, J.

Fact:
The Society of Sisters is an Oregon corporation organized in 1880, whose functions are to
care for orphans, educate the youth, establish and maintain schools, and acquire necessary
property. The Compulsory Education Act of 1922,which mandated children from 8-16 years
of age to attend public schools, caused the withdrawal from its schools of children who
would otherwise continue, which caused their income to decline. The Society alleges that
such Act conflicts with the rights of parents to choose the kind of education their children
will have, the right of the child in choosing the school, and the right of schools and teachers
in engaging in their business and profession. Restraining orders were then issued to
prevent the Act from being enforced. The issue is whether the Compulsory Education Act of
1922 is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment that guarantees non-deprivation of a
person’s rights without due process of law.

Held:
While there is no question as to the power of the State in reasonably regulating all schools,
the enforcement of the Act in question encroaches on the lawful rights of parents, teachers,
and children without reasonable purpose. These rights were guaranteed by the
Constitution and cannot be disturbed by legislations without reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State. The decision to prohibit the Act’s enforcement
is then affirmed.
Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. Roberto Rey C. San Diego
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
Cruz, J.

Facts:
Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a graduate of the University of the East with a Bachelor’s degree
in Zoology. He took the National Medical Admission Test three times and failed in all them.
when he applied to take it again, he was rejected on the basis that three successive failures
on the test would not allow a student to take it once again. He filed for a petition for
mandamus, invoking his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education.
He was then allowed to take the NMAT on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his
petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong granted the petition, allowing him to take the exam.
The issue is whether the NMAT’s rule on the number of allowable tests is constitutional.

Held:
The practice of medicine has always been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting
the health and safety of the public. Thus, the regulation of admission to the ranks of those
authorized to study and practice medicine is done to maintain the high quality of doctors
produced for the eventual benefit of social and economic development. The rules of the
NMAT are for the protection of the public from potential effects of incompetence and
ignorance in the medical field. They do not actually oppose Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution. The State’s human resources must be applied wisely to promote common
good and an individual sense of satisfaction. Therefore, the decision is reversed.
Francisco Virtouso, Jr. v. Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan
G.R. No. L-47841 March 21, 1978
Fernando, J.

Facts:
Francisco Virtouso, Jr. filed an application for the writ of habeas corpus for plea of liberty on
February 23, 1978 on the grounds that the Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan did not
meet the Constitutional standard to ascertain whether there was probable cause when a
warrant of arrest was issued against him and that the bail imposed upon him was excessive
at P16,000 for alleged robbery of a TV set. On March 8, 1978, the Judge answered that there
was no impropriety in the preliminary examination leading to the issued warrant of arrest
and that the bail was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide. The writ of
habeas corpus was issued on March 15, 1978. The issue is whether the preliminary
examination and excessive bail was indeed in violation of the Constitution.

Held:
Upon intensive questioning by the Court, it was discovered that Virtouso is only seventeen
years old, entitling him to the protection and benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
He can then be provisionally released on recognizance in the court’s discretion. The right to
immunities of an individual is even more important during a period of martial law, where it
becomes a mode of coping with grave emergency situation as intended by the Constitution.
Furthermore, excessive bail must be prohibited because it would negate the constitutional
right of bail itself. Based on these reasons, the petition of Virtouso is granted.
Juan Antonio Oposa v. Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
Davide, Jr., J.

Facts:
The numerous petitioners filed a complaint as minors, through their parents, against
Honorable Fuglencio S. Factoran, Jr., the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, voicing their concern for the preservation of the country’s virgin
tropical forests and the numerous effects of its destruction. They then prayed for judgment
to be rendered in ordering the Secretary to cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from perpetrating such agreements. Petitioners also
asserted that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State. Also, the Secretary’s continued refusal to cancel
said agreements is contradictory to the Constitutional policy to protect and conserve the
environment. On June 22,1990, Secretary Factoran filed to dismiss the complaint since the
petitioners had no cause of action against him and that the issue raised was a political
question. The issue is whether the petitioners have a cause of action for their complaint as
it pertains to their right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

Held:
The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is the DENR’s duty, as stated
in its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987. A
denial or violation of this right gives rise to a cause of action. Based on the allegations, it can
be seen that there is a claimed violation of petitioners’ rights. Furthermore, Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution states that judicial power includes settling controversies
involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable. Even though Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution states a non-impairment of contracts clause, a timber license
agreement is not a contract but a privilege, which is not included in such clause. It can then
be revoked if it is against public interest or welfare. The petitioners are then allowed to
amend their complaint to add the holders of the agreements as defendants.
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Guillermo Carague
G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991
Gancayco, J.

Facts:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation and P155.3 Billion
appropriated under the General Appropriations Act, while the appropriation for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to almost P27.02 Billion. The
automatic appropriation for debt service, which amounted to P86.8 Billion, was authorized
by P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. Teofista T. Guingona, Jr. and Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., Senators of the Philippines, seek for the declaration of the unconstitutionality
of the mentioned Presidential Decrees and to restrain disbursement of the 1990 budget for
debt service. Hon. Guillermo Carague, the Secretary of Budget and Management, and Hon.
Rozalina S. Cajucom, the National Treasurer, contended that the petition involves a political
question. The issue is whether the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990
budget is constitutional.

Held:
Section 5, Article XIV of the Constitution provides the highest budgetary priority to
education for the reason that the quality of teachers was diminishing due to low income. It
is then clear that the distribution of the 1990 budget is inconsistent with the Constitution.
However, since 1985, the educational budget has tripled to improve public school facilities
and the compensation of teachers was doubled. Having already complied with the
provision, Congress decided in good judgment to provide an appropriation that would
reasonably service the enormous debt, since the survival of the economy was at stake. The
Court then finds the debt appropriation to be constitutional. As for the three Presidential
Decrees, Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution states that all existing decrees remain
operative until amended, repealed, or revoked. The payment of debts and loans acquired
during the Marcos era does not cease to exist with a change of authority. Since there is no
strict set of rules in appropriating budgets, it may be determined by the Congress. This
makes it a political question. The petition is then dismissed.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
Sarmiento, J.

Facts:
The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc., a firm that recruits male and female
Filipino workers for overseas placement, filed a petition challenging the Constitutional
validity of Department Order No. 1 of the Department of Labor and Employment. The Order
temporarily suspended the deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers. The
PASEI also invoked the discrimination against females with similar skills, the violation of
the right to travel, and the invalid exercise of lawmaking power. The issue is whether
Deparment Order No. 1 is valid under the Constitution.

Held:
Official acts have a presumed validity in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
contradicting it. Though the Order applies only to female contract workers, it does not
unduely discriminate between the sexes. In fact, such Order seeks to protect Filipina
workers from the exploitative working conditions usually seen abroad that are not exactly
experienced by male workers. The right to travel is also not violated because the Order only
refers to labor-related travel. Lastly, the exercise of legislative power in this case is not
invalid because the Labor Code grants the DOLE rulemaking powers in the enforcement of
legislations related to it. All these arguments show that the Order was in consonance with
the Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution, which affords protection to all forms of labor.
The petition is then dismissed.
Wigberto E. Tanada v. Edgardo Angara
G.R. ????? Date?
Panganiban, J.

Facts:
On April 15, 1994, Rizalino Navarro, the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry,
representing the Philippine Government, signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations in Marrakesh, Morocco. On August 12 and 13,
1994, the Philippine Senate received two letters from the Philippine President stating that
the Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions are now submitted to the Senate for its concurrence to Section
21, Article VII of the Constitution. On December 9, 1994, the President certified the
immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution concurring in the ratification of the WTO
Agreement. On December 19, 1994, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 97, concurring the
same ratification. On December 29, 1994, a petition was filed for the nullification of the
concurrence of the Senate in the President’s reatificiation of the WTO Agreement and for
the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement. The issue is whether the provisions
in the WTO Agreement are against the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:
Even though sovereignty was traditionally absolute on a domestic level, it is still subject to
restrictions voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines as a member of the family of nations.
Treaties inherently limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. Nations may surrender
some aspects of their state power to obtain greater benefits from a convention or pact.
Therefore, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution. The
petition is then dismissed.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
Cruz, J.

Facts:
The Agricultutal Land Reform Code enacted the principles in the 1987 Constitution
allowing the State to distribute agrarian lands more equally. The Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. are invoking the right of retention of land in
Presidential Decree No. 27 to owners of rice and corn land not more than seven hectares as
long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. The Secretary of Agrarian
Reform argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474, removing any right of
retention if such owners own agricultural lands of more than seven hectares or if they
derive adequate income from their family from such lands. The issue is whether P.D. No. 27
is constitutional.

Held:
Where the rights of an individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. Section
1 and Section 9 of Article III of the Constitution afford the common person with a right to
his property, as well as just compensation for his property that is taken for public use. P.D.
No. 27 allowed farmer-beneficiaries to own the lands as soon as they became members in
the farmers’ cooperatives and fully paid for just compensation. All rights acquired in P.D.
No. 27 are also retained by the farmers in R.A. No. 6657. Thus, P.D. No. 27 is constitutional
and all rights under it are retained and recognized. The petitions are then dismissed.
Luz Farms v. Hon. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 86889 December 4,1990
Paras, J.

Facts:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes
raising livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform promulgated the guidelines and procedures in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A.
No. 6657. On January 9, 1989, the Secretary promulgated its Rules and Regulations
implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657. Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in livestock
and poultry business claiming to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3, 11,
16, 17, and 32 of R.A. No. 6657. It filed a petition to declare the laws, guidelines, and rules
unconstitutional, stating the reasons that raising livestock and poultry is not part of
agriculture, excluding them from sharing their products and land. The issue is whether the
inclusion of livestock, poultry and swine raising in R.A. 6657 is constitutional.

Held:
Constitutional construction dictates that when some provisions are ambiguous, the courts
may consider the intent of the framers of the Constitution in retrieving its true meaning.
The transcripts of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 show that the framers never
intended to include livestock and poultry in the word “agricultural.” In fact, the Committee
limited the application of the word to distinguish it from other forms of land. The petition is
then granted, making the questioned laws, guidelines and rules null and void.
Attorney Humberto Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation
G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991
Paras, J.

Facts:
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation was created by P.D. 1067-A dated
January 1, 1977 and granted a franchise in P.D. 1067-B also dated the same, to establish,
operate and maintain gambling casinos in Philippine territory. When it proved to be a
success in garnishing revenue for governmental funds, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2,
1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective. On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under
P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance. Attorney
Humberto Basco, among others, filed a petition questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869 for
being violative of the equal protection clause, local autonomy and state policies in Sections
11, 12, 13 of Article II, Section 1 of Article XIII, and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution. The issue is whether P.D. No. 1869 is constitutional.

Held:
P.D. 1869 does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the law
does not require different situations to be treated in law as though they were the same. The
Constitution also does not absolutely prohibit monopolies unless public interest demands
that it should. As for violations in the other mentioned Sections of the Constitution, these
are only statements of principles and policies. The Congress defines and effectuates such
principles when it passes a law. For P.D. 1869 to be nullified, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, a fact that Basco and other petitioners have not
proven. The only issue left unanswered now concerns the monopolistic tendencies of P.D.
1869, which the Congress will have to answer. The petition is then dismissed.
Hon. RTC Judge Mercedes G. Dadole v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 125350 December 3, 2002
Corona, J.

Facts:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City both started receiving monthly
allowances of P1,260 throught the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod. In 1991, the amount was increased to P1,500. On March 15, 1994,
the Department of Budget and Management issued the Local Budget Circular No. 55,
granting additional allowances to national government officials and employees subject to
conditions. The Circular took effect immediately. The Mandaue City Auditor issued notices
of disallowance to the judges because of the excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55.
Beginning October 1994, their additional monthly allowances were reduced to P1,000 each
and they were asked to reimbursed the money in excess. The judges filed a protest against
the notices of disallowance. The issue is whether the higher rates of allowance may prevail
over the fixed allowance under LBC No. 55.

Held:
Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of
local autonomy is still subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of
supervision by the President. The President and his alter egos may interfere in the affairs
and activities of an LGU if the latter has acted contrary to law. R.A. 7160, the legal basis of
LBC 55, does not set a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances. Therefore, the
DBM went above its power of supervision over LGUs by imposing a prohibition that did not
follow the law it was implementing. The petition is then granted.
Rev. Elly Chavez Pamatong v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004
Tinga, J.

Facts:
Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17,
2003. The Commission on Elections refused to give due course to his certificate in its
Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. This decision was not unanimous, however,
since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain believed he had parties
or movements to back up his candidancy. Even so, the COMELEC declared Pamatong and
thirty-five others nuisance candidates. Sadain maintained his vote for Pamatong, while
Tancangco retired. Pamatong is now seeking to reverse the resolution which allegedly
violates his right to equal access to opportunities for public service under Section 26,
Article II of the Constitution. The issue is whether his constitutional rights were violated in
not allowing him to vote.

Held:
The constitutional provision of equal access to opportunities for public office is not a right,
but a privilege subject to limitations found in the law. The policies in Article II of the
Constitution, which includes this provision, only specifies guidelines for legislative or
executive action. Furthermore, the limitations of the provision are found in the Omnibus
Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452. The prohibition of nuisance candidates
also founds itself in the State’s interest to keep the electoral exercises rational, objective,
and orderly. However, since the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter and must now
turn the case over to the COMELEC for reception of further evidence.
Ma. Carmen G. Aquino-Sarmiento v. Manuel L. Morato
G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991
Bidin, J.

Facts:
In February 1989, Ma. Carmen G. Aquino-Sarmiento, a member of Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board, wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to
examine the board’s records of the voting slips made by the individual board members after
reviewing movies and television productions. The records officer informed her about the
clearance she had to secure from Manuel Morato, an MTRCB chairman, in order to gain
access to the records. Her request was denied by Morato on the ground that such slips are
completely private and personal, thereby needing his consent to be shown first. Sarmiento
countered that the records were public in character and that Morato has no authority to
deny any citizen from examining the board’s records. On February 17, 1989, Morato called
an executive meeting where 17 members voted to make such documents inaccessible to the
public. Sarmiento petitioned for the nullification of this decision. The issue is whether such
action is violative of the constitutional right of access to public records.

Held:
Access to official records and documents similar to that should be made available to
citizens, subject to limitations provided by law. P.D. 1986, which created the MTRCB, states
that it was created to serve public interest. The right to privacy does not belong to a
governmental agency tasked with public duties. Since the voting slips are part of their
official functions, it must be made public to the people it was intended to benefit. The
petition is then granted.
Zacarias Villavicencio, et al. v. Justo Lukban, et al.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
Malcolm, J.

Facts:
Justo Lukban, the Mayor of Manila City, ordered the segregated district for women of ill
repute closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined in
their houses by the police. Midnight of October 25 saw the transfer of about 170 inmates to
patrol wagons from the houses and their placement aboard streamers. They were not told
that they were being taken to Mindanao, nor asked if they wanted to leave Manila. The
vessels reached their destination on October 29. The women were received as laborers by
Francisco Sales, the governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Ynigo and Rafael Castillo. They did
not know that these women were prostitutes expelled from Manila. The relatives and
friends of the women filed a writ of habeas corpus, which was awarded on November 2,
1918. Even with the writ, the women were not brought back by the respondents, who
reasoned that they had no control over the women. The issue is whether there was a law
authorizing what the Mayor did to the women.

Held:
There is no law that allows the Mayor of Manila City or its chief of police to force Philippine
citizens to change their domicile. Instead, there is a law that punishes public officers who
compel any person to change his residence without authorization by law. The law is a
supreme power in the government and public officers are even more compelled to follow it.
Mayor Lukban, in not producing the people required in the writ of habeas corpus, produced
contempt committed in the face of court. Because of this, Lukban is found in contempt of
court and obligated to pay P500 into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court.
Shigenori Kuroda v. Rafael Jalandoni **Laurel v. Misa placement
G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949
Moran, C.J.

Facts:
Shigenori Kuroda was a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines in 1943 and 1944.
He was charged before a Military Commission with having unlawfully disregarded and
failed to control the operations of members of his command, which permitted them to
commit high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners. Kuroda petitioned to
establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines on the
ground that it punishes crimes not based on any law, whether national or international, and
because it is not part of the Hague Convention on Rules and regulations covering Land
Warfare.

Held:
Executive Order No. 68 is founded in Section 3, Article 2 of the Constitution, which states
that the Philippines adopts generally accepted principles of international law. It cannot be
argues that the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention is inapplicable because their
rules and regulations are part of generally accepted principles of international law. Also, the
crimes were committed when the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the U.S,
producing rights and obligations contained in the treaties between both belligerent
countries. These are nor erased by out assumption of sovereignty, since the crimes were
committed against the Philippine people. The Military Commission then has jurisdiction
over this issue.
Lao H. Ichong v. Jaime Hernandez
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
Labrador, J.

Facts:
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” It nationalizes the
retail trade business. Lao H. Ichong, as an alien resident adversely affected by its provision,
brought an action to make the act unconstitutional on the basis that it denies them equal
protection of the laws and deprives them of liberty and property without due process and
that it violates the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution. The issue is whether R.A. No. 1180 is unconstitutional.

Held:
The balancing of police power with the guarantees of due process and equal protection of
laws is essential in any State. Statistics on the retail trade show that there is an ever-
increasing proliferation of aliens in the retail trade. This could lead to almost absolute
control by aliens, curtailing freedom of trade and free enterprise. It is this danger that the
Constitutional Convention intended to curb. The secretive practices aliens resort to in the
control of distribution and their utter disregard for the welfare of customers and nationals
also merit action. By these reasons, R.A. No. 1180 was only upholding the constitutional
provisions meant for the general public. The petition is then denied.
Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion
G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
Melo, J.

Facts:
On January 13, 1977, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
“Precribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a
Foreign Country.” On November 13, 1994, Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
representing the Philippines, signed an Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America.” The
Senate expressed its concurrence in the ratification of the treaty in Resolution No. 11. It
also showed concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph 5, Article 7. On June
18, 1999, the Department of Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign
Affairs for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the U.S. Jimenez filed a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, among others, to prohibit them from performing any act directed to his
extradition. The issue is whether to uphold Jimenez’s due process rights or the
government’s duties under a treaty.

Held:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied when local courts are confronted with situations
where there is a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute. The ideal is to harmonize them, but when this is not achievable, the
local courts must uphold the local law. Due process rights are above international treaties.
The petition for extradition is then dismissed.
In Re: Petition of Arturo Efren Garcia
August 15, 1961
Barrera, J.

Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia is a Filipino citizen, who had taken and finished the course of “Bachillerato
Superior” in Spain and subsequently studied and finished the law course in the Central
University of Madrid. He was allowed to practice law in Spain. He invoked the provision of
the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Philippines
and Spain to allow him to practice law in the Philippines without taking the bar exams.

Held:
It can be discerned from the Treaty’s provisions that it refers to Filipino citizens desiring to
practice law in Spain and vice versa. Garcia is neither of these. The Executive Department
cannot impose itself upon the constitutional right of the Supreme Court to enforce rules for
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. The petition is denied.
Rizal Alih v. Major General Delfin C. Castro
G.R. No. L-69401 June 23, 1987
Cruz, J.

Facts:
On November 25, 1984, more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the
home defense forces raided the compound occupied by petitioners at Gov. Alvarez Street,
Zamboanga City. A bloody shoot-out took place, and the occupants surrendered the next
morning. The identification of sixteen male occupants were recorded and several weapons
and ammunition were inventoried and confiscated. On December 21, 1984, petitioners filed
a petition to recover the articles taken from them as there was no warrant of arrest and to
challenge their identification records as against their right to self-incrimination. The issue
is whether the actions of the marines and defense forces against the occupants were
unconstitutional.

Held:
Section 3 and 4, Article IV, of the Constitution states that citizens have the right to the
security of their property and documents, and that any evidence obtained without proper
procedure is inadmissible in proceedings. The reason that such actions were made because
of superior orders and a previous state of lawlessness in the place is not acceptable.
Superior orders do not supercede the Constitution. The state of hostilities had also already
ceased when the events took place. As for the identification records being self-
incriminating, this only applies to testimonial compulsion. The search is then declared
illegal and the result inadmissible, but the articles shall remain in custodial egis.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora
G.R. No. 141284 August 15, 2000
Kapunan, J.

Facts:
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to
conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression in Metro Manila. The
Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of the PNP, and the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to implement this order. The
PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, made the LOI 02/2000
detailing the manner by which the patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.
It was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. The President
confirmed his previous directive in a Memorandum, dated January 24, 2000, addressed to
the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief, directing them both to coordinate with each
other for the proper deployment of the Marines in assisting the PNP. He also declared that
the service of the Marines in this directive was only temporary in nature and only until the
situation had improved. On January 17, 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed a
petition to annul LOI 02/2000, since it is in violation of Article II, Section 3 and Article XVI,
Section 5 of the Constitution. The issue is whether the President’s directive does not violate
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and civilian character
of the PNP.

Held:
The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement and its participation is appropriately circumscribed. The LOI provides that the
civilian police force directs and manages the deployment of the Marines. The real authority
is still with the head of the civilian institution that is the PNP. Thus, there is no breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. It is made clear that the Marines only offer assistance and do not
actually control the patrols. Also, since the Task Force Tulungan’s institution, no citizen has
complained that any of his rights has been violated. Thus, the petition is dismissed.

The People of the Philippines v. Tranguilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa

G.R. No. L-45892/G.R. No. L-45893 July 13, 1938
Avancena, J.

Facts:
Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa were charged with a violation od Section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1. The two, having reached the age of 20 in 1936, refused to register
in the military service even though they were required. De Sosa reasoned that he is
fatherless and has family members to support, while Lagman has a father to support and
does not wish to kill and be killed. they were both sentenced to one month and one day in
prison. The two filed a petition questioning the validity of C.A. No. 1. The issue is whether
the National Defense Law is constitutional.

Held:
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, allows the requirement of citizens to render military
or civil service. The National Defense Law is only complying with this provision. The
reasons stated by Lagman and de Sosa do not excuse them from this duty. The judgments
are then affirmed.
Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Hon. Jesus B. Garcia
G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994
Kapunan, J.

Facts:
On June 26, 1990, DOTC Secretary Oscar M. Orbos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395
to LTFRB Chairman Remedios A.S. Fernando. It allowed the charging of provincial bus rates
within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for one year. On
December 14, 1990, the LTFRB granted the fare rate increase of six and a half centavos after
the Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines filed an application for fare rate
increase. On March 30, 1992, DOTC Secretary Pete Nicomedes Prado issued Department
Order No. 92-587, which stated that the DOTC had the authority to set rates and fares. On
February 17, 1993, the LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, which stated that
rate changes are subject to prior notice and public hearing. In March 1994, PBOAP
increased the fares by 20%. KMU then filed a petition on March 16, 1994, opposing the
increase. The issue is whether the fare increase by PBOAP is constitutional even though
there was no petition filed for the purpose and public necessity was not proven.

Held:
The authority given by the LTFRB to PBOAP to set a fare range greater than the authorized
existing fare is unconstitutional because it constitutes undue delegation of legislative
authority. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. Simply allowing transport
operators to change the fares at will is extremely inconvenient to the public. Furthermore,
the existence of public convenience and necessity must first be established by evidence in
order to prove that the fare change is indeed needed. The 20% per centum fare increase
imposed by PBOAP is then null and void. The Department Order and Circular Order are also
made invalid for being contrary to laws on fare increase and public necessity.

J. Antonio Araneta v. Rafael Dinglasan

G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Tuason, J.

Facts:
These five cases have the same fundamental question, which challenges the validity of
executive orders of the President in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 671. J. Antonio
Araneta violated the provisions of Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for
houses and lots for residential buildings. He prayed for the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
The issue is whether C.A. No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act has ceased to have any
force and effect, making the Executive Orders created under it unconstitutional.

Held:
Article VI of the Constitution states that any law passed in time of war or other national
emergency lasts only for a limited period. To disregard this would make the law
unconstitutional. Furthermore, it was stated that the law was only for a certain period and
would become invalid unless reenacted. The contemplated period was also given, which
was when it was evident that the Philippines was completely helpless against air attack.
The petitions are then granted.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. v. Vicente Gella
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953
Paras, C. J.

Facts:
Commonwealth Act No. 671, which was approved on December 16, 1941, declared a state
of total emergency as a result of war involving the Philippines and authorized the President
to make rules and regulations for the emergency. Five members held that the Act ceased to
be operative on May 25, 1946. Petitioners seek to invalidate Executive Orders Nos. 545 and
546 issued on November 10, 1952. E.O. No. 545 appropriated P37,850,500 for urgent and
essential public works and E.O. No. 546 set aside P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and
cities visited by natural calamities. The issue is whether E.O. Nos. 545 and 546 are valid.

Held:
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that in times of national emergency, the
Congress may allow the President for a limited period to make rules and regulations for a
declared national policy. The President, however, did not invoke any actual emergencies or
calamities emanating from the last world war. Without this, his veto cannot be of merit. The
two E.O. Nos. are then ineffective.
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
Mayor Pablo P. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation
Cruz, J.

Facts:
In 1992, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation decided to expand its
operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce
Properties Corporation, Inc. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted
Ordinance No. 3353 on December 7, 1992, prohibiting the issuance of business permit to
establishments for the operation of casinos. On January 4, 1993, it adopted Ordinance No,
3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casinos and providing penalties for violations. The
issue is whether the ordinances were valid.

Held:
Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code authorizes local government to prevent gambling
and other prohibited games of chance. Clearly, this only refers to illegal forms of gambling.
The ordinances also go against P.D. 1869, which granted powers to PAGCOR. Furthermore,
municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Ordinances cannot
then contravene a statute. Local councils may only exercise legislative powers that were
given to them by Congress. Since casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869, the ordinances
cannot prevail.

Lucena Grand Terminal, Inc. v. Jac Liner, Inc.

G.R. No. 148339 February 23, 2005

Facts:
JAC Liner, Inc. a common carrier operating buses going to and from Lucena City assailed
City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional because they show invalid exercise
of police power, undue taking of private property, and may be considered as a monopoly.
Ordinance No. 1631 granted the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to establish and
operate a bus-jeepney terminal in Lucena City, while Ordinance No. 1778 prohibited all
other buses, mini-buses, and out-of-town passenger jeepneys from entering the city and
operating. These were allegedly for the purpose of minimizing traffic congestion in Lucena
City. The issue is whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to
achieve its objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.

Held:
Though the Sangguniang Panlungsod’s objective was to prevent the indiscriminate loading
and unloading of bus passengers on the city streets to avoid traffic, the terminals
themselves do not contribute to the problem. If the terminals lack space for all bus drivers
to load and unload passengers, then the terminals must be fixed to accommodate them. it
cannot be said that the act of prohibiting terminals was made possible by the power of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and obstacles in public places to
regulate traffic as well, since the terminals do not encroach on public roads. Ordinance No.
1778 and the part of Ordinance No. 1631 which prohibits other terminals from operating
are then declared null and void.

Lagcao v. Labra
G.R. No. 155746 October 13, 2004

Facts:
The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to Cebu City, one of which was Lot 1029 in Capitol
Hills. In 1965, the Lagcaos bought Lot 1029 on installment basis, but shortly after, the 201
lots were reverted to the Province of Cebu. After the Lagcaos filed a case against the
province and won, the Province of Cebu then made a deed of absolute sale on June 17, 1994
for the Lagcaos. When they acquired the land, they discovered that it was occupied by
informal settlers. They instituted ejectment proceedings against the settlers, which was
granted on April 1, 1988. However, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters asking to
defer the demolition as he was still looking for a relocation site for the settlers. Two orders
were then issued to suspend the demolition for 120 days from February 22, 1999. On June
30, 1999, Ordinance No. 1772 included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized
housing. On July 19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843 authorized the mayor to expropriate Lot
1029 and appropriated P6,881,600 for payment. On August 29, 2000, the Lagcaos filed an
action to declare Ordinance No. 1843 as null and void for being unconstitutional. The issue
is whether such ordinance is contrary to the concept of public use.

Held:
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can only exercise it
when expressly authorized by legislature. While RA 7160 gave LGUs the power to
expropriate, these come with certain limitations: people cannot be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process and people cannot be denied equal protection of laws.
Exercising eminent domain affects a landowner’s right to private property, so it must be
scrutinized well. In this case, there is no good reason stated in the ordinance as to why the
Lagcaos’ property was chosen for the informal settlers. The final judgment in favor of the
Lagcaos in 1998 also shows that there was no basis for this ordinance. The petition is then
granted and Ordinance No. 1843 is considered null and void.

De La Cruz v. Paras
G.R. No. L-42571 July 25, 1983

Facts:
On November 5, 1975, two cases were filed asking for Ordinance No. 84 to be considered
null and void for prohibiting night clubs with hostesses in Bocaue, Bulacan. According to
Vicente de la Cruz, the municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business,
occupation, or calling. They further argued that they had been issued licenses by the mayor,
that they had invested large amounts of money in the businesses, that the night clubs are
well-lit and have no partitions, that they do not allow the hostesses to engage in immoral
acts, that the girls have periodical medical check-ups, and that the crime rate is better in
Bocaue than in other parts of Bulacan. The issue is whether the ordinance is
unconstitutional due to Bulacan’s lack of power to prohibit such and because rights to due
process and equal protection were violated.

Held:
Police power is granted to municipal corporations to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of
its inhabitants. Therefore, ordinances deemed necessary to fulfill these needs are
authorized. In this case, the prohibition of night clubs was in excess of what was needed,
since regulating such would already be enough. The prohibition of night clubs would also
cause those involved to be deprived of employment and income. Ordinance No. 84 is then
declared void and unconstitutional.

White Light Corporation v. City of Manila

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

Facts:
On December 3, 1992, Manila City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed Ordinance No. 7774 into
law. This ordinance prohibited short-time admission and rates in hotels, motels, inns,
lodging houses, pensions houses, and similar establishments in Manila City. On December
15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation filed a complaint for the
ordinance to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. On December 21, 1992, White Light
Corporation, Titanium Corporation, and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation
filed to admit attached complaints that the ordinance directly affects their business
interests. The issue is whether the ordinance is valid.

Held:
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize the use of covered establishments for
illicit sex, prostitution, drug use, and alike. An ordinance is considered valid if it does not go
against the Constitution or any statute, if it is not unfair or oppressive, partial or
discriminatory, does not prohibit but only regulate trade, if it is general and consistent with
public policy, and if it is not unreasonable. In this case, what is being prohibited curtails not
only the rights of petitioners but also of those availing short time access or wash-up rates.
There are many who avail of such without purpose of engaging in immoral acts. Thus, the
petition is granted and the ordinance considered invalid.

U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho

G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

Facts:
In 1919, Act No. 2868 was passed, penalizing the monopoly of palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, and regulating its distribution and sale. On August 1, 1919,
the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice could be sold. On
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against Ang Tang Ho, charging him with selling rice at
an excessive price, in violation of Executive Order No. 53. He illegally sold to Pedro Trinidad
one ganta of rice for eighty centavos. Ang was found guilty, and he appealed to have the
decision reversed since E.O. No. 53 had no force and effect. The issue is whether the
Governor-General has the authority given by the ordinance.
Held:
The provision in the ordinance that the Governor-General can determine the price of rice in
Manila and delegate such power to provincial treasurers in other places of the Philippines
is not compatible with the law that the price of rice must be fixed for the whole Philippine
Islands. The Governor-General is only limited to general laws and special or local laws.
Furthermore, there is no distinction for the grade or quality of rice in the ordinance. The
range by which the price of rice can be called extraordinary is also not made clear. In fixing
the price of rice, the ordinance began to deal with private property and rights, which should
not be encroached upon. E..O. No. 53 is then considered invalid insofar as the Governor-
General’s part in fixing the price of rice and making it a crime to sell rice at a higher price.
Therefore, Ang is considered not guilty and is discharged.

Ynot v. IAC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement and slaughtering
of carabaos, regardless of age, sex, physical condition, or purpose. Restituto Ynot
transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984.
They were confiscated by the police station commander. Ynot petitioned for the
executive order to be declared unconstitutional because it does not give the owner
the right of due process insofar as the confiscation of carabao. He also claims that it
is an improper exercise of legislative power by President Marcos. The issue is
whether E.O. 626-A violates the carabao owner’s right to due process and is a result
of undue exercise of legislative power by the executive branch.

Held:
While the provisions of the Constitution are supposed to be precise and
unmistakable to avoid controversies, the due process clause was left ambiguous to
allow flexibility. This is to make it easy to adapt to every situation. This case shows a
violation of due process and invalid exercise of police power in immediately
confiscating carabaos without the owner first being heard in his defense. There is
also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned in the E.O.
who are given unlimited discretion in the distribution of properties that are taken.
The Executive Order is then null and void.

DAR v. Sutton
G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005

Facts:
The Suttons inherited a land in Aroroy, Masbate, which was devoted exclusively to
cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, they made a voluntary offer to sell their
landholdings to the Department of Agrarian Reform to get some incentives in law.
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock,
poultry, and swine. On December 4, 1990, the Court ruled that livestock and poultry-
raising is not included in agricultural land. The Suttons then filed to withdraw their
offer to sell as their land was exempted from the coverage of CARL. On December 21,
1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Masbate also recommended an
exemption. On December 27, 1993, the DAR issued A.O. No. 9, which provided that
only portions of private agricultural lands used for raising livestock, poultry, and
swine would be excluded from CARL. On September 14, 1995, the DAR Secretary
Ernesto D. Garilao issued an order partially granting the exemption from CARL. The
Suttons, however, wanted their entire landholding to be exempted. They filed an
appeal assailing the validity and constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, which is the
issue.

Held:
Administrative agencies have legislative powers to make rules and regulations,
which were delegated by Congress to them. However, while these rules and
regulations have the force and effect of law, they may still be judged in courts to
make sure that they are constitutional. Clearly the DAR has no power to regulate
livestock farms exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform,
and it has exceeded its power in issuing the A.O. A.O. No. 9 is then considered
unconstitutional and invalid.

Solicitor General v. MMDA

G.R. No. 102872 December 11, 1991

Facts:
In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that
when he was stopped for a traffic violation, his driver’s license was confiscated. On
December 18, 1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a
letter to the Court asking who should enforce the decision of the case and whether
they could seek damages for confiscation of their driver’s licenses. More complaints
were received by the Court regarding the confiscation of their driver’s licenses and
license plates. On May 24, 1990, the MMDA issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing
itself to detach the license plates or tow illegally parked vehicles in Metro Manila.
The issue is whether Ordinance No. 11 is a valid exercise of delegated power to local
governments acting only as agents of national legislature.

Held:
For a municipal ordinance to be valid, it must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute, must not be unfair nor partial, must not prohibit but only regulate trade,
must not be unreasonable, and must be general and consistent with public policy.
The ordinance does not pass this test as it does not conform to existing law,
particularly P.D. 1605 which does not allow the removal of license plates or the
confiscation of driver’s license for traffic violations. As delegates of the Congress,
LGUs must obey them at all times and cannot go against the laws they already
established. Ordinance 11 is then declared null and void.

Boie-Takeda v. De La Serna
G.R. No. 92174 December 10, 1993

Facts:
Presidential Decree No. 851 was promulgated by Labor Minister Blas Ople on
December 22, 1975. It introduced the thirteenth month pay and the employers
exempted from giving it to their employees. On August 13, 1986, President Corazon
C. Aquino promulgated Memorandum Order No. 28, which removed the salary
ceiling of P1,000 a month set by P.D. 851. A routine inspection was conducted in the
premises of Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. on May 2, 1989. When it was found that
Boie Takeda had not been including the commissions earned by its medical
representatives in the computation of their 13th month pay, Labor and Development
Officer Reynaldo B. Ramos called for the correction of underpayment of 13 th month
pay. Boie-Takeda argued that only basic salary was included in the computation,
hence the deduction. Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio de la Serna affirmed the July
24, 1989 Order that the sales commissions earned before the effectivity date of M.O.
No. 28 would be excluded in the computation. The issue is whether M.O. No. 28 goes
against P.D. 851.

Held:
M.O. No. 28 did not supersede P.D. 851. It only modified Section 1 by removing the
salary ceiling. This means that the basic salary contemplated in P.D. 851 applies to
the memorandum. The petition is then granted and the provisions promulgated by
then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon are made null and void.

United BF Homes Associations v. BF Homes

G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999

Facts:
United BF Homeowners Association, Inc. represents all homeowners in the BF
Homes Paranaque Subdivision. BF Homes is the owner-developer of the subdivision.
In 1988, the Securities and Exchange Commission made the BFHI undergo a ten-year
rehabilitation program for payment of obligations to creditors and Banco Filipino.
They appointed Atty. Florencio B. Orendain as receiver. On December 20, 1988, a
memorandum of agreement was made between Orendain, BFPHAI, and CBFHAI,
which was amended on March 1989. Pursuant to this memorandum, UBFHAI was
created on May 18, 1989. On November 7, 1994, a new committee of receivers was
appointed composed of BFHI’s eleven members. On April 7, 1995, the committee of
receivers sent a letter to the different homeowners associations, telling them of
BFHIs rehabilitation and that the BFHI would be responsible for the subdivision’s
security in order to centralize it. UBFHAI filed a petition against BFHI, alleging that
they illegally revoked their security agreement with the previous receiver. On April
11, 1995, the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation prohibited BFHI from
taking over the clubhouse. The issue is whether such rules of procedure is valid.

Held:
The administrative supervision over homeowners association was transferred from
the SEC to Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation in 1979. In this case, the HIGC
went beyond the authority given to it by law in promulgating revised rules of
procedure. The rules deviated from Section 5 of Presidential Decree 902-A by
unduly expanding it. HIGC exercises a very limited jurisdiction over homeowner
disputes. the rules of procedure are then considered invalid.

Lupangco v. CA
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988

Facts:
On October 6, 1986, the Profession Regulation Commission issued Resolution No.
105 as part of its additional instructions to examinees, to all those applying for
licensure examinations in accountancy. It stated that examinees could not receive
any review materials from any schools and review centers or any of its employees.
On October 16, 1986, Lupo L. Lupangco, et al., all reviewees, filed a complaint for
injunction to restrain the PRC from enforcing the resolution and declare it
unconstitutional. The issue is whether Resolution No. 105 is unconstitutional.

Held:
Even though the resolution has a good purpose in preserving the integrity of the
licensure examinations, it is still unreasonable in that it takes away the rights of the
examinee to attend review classes or receive review materials or tips. This infringes
on the examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. it also violates the
academic freedom of the schools concerned. The resolution is then made null and
void.

Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

Facts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for Representative of
the First District of Leyte on March 8, 1995, stating that she had resided there for
seven months. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District
of Leyte filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the Comission on
elections alleging that she did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
Marcos then amended the entry from “seven months” to “since childhood.” The
Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte did not accept said amendment because it
had been filed past the deadline. Marcos then filed the Amended Certificate of
Candidacy with the COMELEC’s head office, along with her answer to Montejo’s
petition: that the “seven months” was an honest misinterpretation which she
remedied with “since childhood” and that she had always maintained Tacloban city
as her domicile. Even with these reasons, COMELEC issued a Resolution
disqualifying Marcos from running for the congressional seat, even though she had
gained more votes than her opponent. The issue is whether COMELEC had the
authority to judge the disqualification of Marcos.

Held:
The 1987 Constitution on the residence qualifications for elective positions actually
means domicile when speaking of “residence” in election law. A person may have
different residences, but according to Article 50 of the Civil Code, the domicile of
natural person’s is their place of habitual residence. Marcos may have resided in
many places over the course of time, but her purposes for residing in such places did
not show intention to abandon Tacloban City, her domicile since she was a minor.
She showed animus revertendi by celebrating birthdays and other important
celebrations, as well as keeping close ties in her domicile. Marcos is then declared
the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Aquino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

Facts:
On March 20, 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Representative of the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In the
certificate, he wrote that he had been a resident in Makati City for ten months. On
April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the
ground that he lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman
which, under the Constitution, should be at least a year before the elections. On April
25, 1995, Aquino amended his certificate to say that he had resided in Makati City
for one year and thirteen days. On May 8, 1995, which was election day, Aquino
garnered more votes than his opponents for the congressional seat. On May 10,
Move Makati and Bedon filed to suspend his proclamation and COMELEC issued an
order suspending it on May 15. The issue is whether COMELEC had the jurisdiction
to determine and judge the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates
after elections, since this was lodged exclusively with the House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal.

Held:
Obtaining the highest number of votes does not automatically vest the position in
the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution states that the
HOR’s electoral tribunal may only judge its members. Therefore, COMELEC still has
jurisdiction over Aquino’s case. Furthermore, Aquino must prove that Makati City is
not only his residence, but also his domicile of choice. He seems not to have proven
this for a fact. Thus, the candidate with the next highest votes may be declared the
winner and member of the HOR.

People v. Jalosjos
G.R. Nos. 132875-76 February 3, 2000
Facts:
Romeo G. Jalosjos is a member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is
pending appeal. Romeo filed a motion to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives on the grounds that the electorate chose him as representative,
obliging him to fulfill the duties of a Congressman. The issue is whether membership
in Congress exempts an accused from statutes and rules that apply to convicted or
incarcerated persons in general.

Held:
Although Romeo cites Article VI, Section 16 of the Constitution, which states that
absent members may be compelled to appear in meetings, he did not provide the
reason why he should be compelled to appear, especially since his absence is
legitimate. He must stay confined for public self-defense. Furthermore, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution dictates that an elective official should not be
treated differently simply because he is a public official. His absence in the HOR will
not be noticed if the other members are there. His petition is then denied.

Trillanes v. Pimentel
G.R. No. 179817 June 27. 2008
Facts:
In July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Makati City to demand the resignation of the President and other major officials.
Later that day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and ordering the AFP to suppress
it. Antonio F. Trillanes IV, among others, was charged with coup d’etat. Four years
later, Trillanes, who remained in detention, won a seat in the Senate commencing on
June 30, 2007. Before beginning his term, Trillanes filed an omnibus motion to be
allowed to attend senate session and related requests. The trial court denied all his
requests by order of July 25, 2007 and by order once again of September 18, 2007.
Trillanes then filed a petition to set aside the two orders on the ground that he was
not yet convicted and that as a senator voted by the people, he should be allowed to
do his work.

Held:
Trillanes does not need to be convicted for some of his rights to be forfeited. The fact
that he was detained during pre-trial makes his rights more limited than those of the
public. The presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of
civil and political rights. Furthermore, election does not obliterate a criminal charge.
The mandate of the people must always yield to the Constitution, which calls for
equal protection. Congress would continue to function well without one of their
members. The petition is then dismissed.

Jimenez v. Cabangbang
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

Facts:
Bartolome Cabangbang is a Member of House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense published an allegedly libelous letter affecting
Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert, and Jose L. Lukban. The publication was an open
letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958. When
Bartolome was summoned, he moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the letter was not libelous and that it was privileged communication. The issue is
whether the publication is libelous and a privileged communication.

Held:
When Bartolome published the letter in several newspapers of general circulation,
he was not performing his official duty, making the communication not privileged.
However, the contents of the letter show that it is not libelous. It simply showed
information about the Armed Forces and intelligence agencies, as well as
recommendations. The complaint is then dismissed.
Osmena v. Pendatun
G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960

Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr. submitted a petition for relief
against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement of
parliamentary immunity, and also asked that the members of such Committee be
stopped from being authorized to require him to provide evidence for his allegations
against the President, or he would be punished. When he was unable to show
evidence for his allegations against the President, he was suspended from office for
fifteen months by the Committee. The issue is whether the resolution violated his
constitutional parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House and that
the House has no power to suspend its members.

Held:
Although Osmena has immunity, it does not protect him from responsibility before
the legislative body when his words and actions become disorderly. For
unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress have been censured, imprisoned, or
expelled by the votes of their colleagues. Furthermore, the Congress now has the
inherent legislative prerogative of suspension that is supported by the Constitution.
The petition is then dismissed.
Adaza v. Pacana
G.R. No. L-68159 March 18, 1985

Facts:
Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of Misamis Oriental in January 30, 1980.
He started his duties on March 30, 1980 after taking his oath of office. On March 27,
1984, Fernando Pacana, Jr., the vice-governor of Misamis Oriental, filed his certificate
for candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections, while Adaza filed
his on April 27, 1984. Adaza won and took his oath of office as a Mambabatas
Pambansa on July 19, 1984. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as
governor of Misamis Oriental before President Ferdinand E. Marcos and started his
duties July 25. Adaza filed a complaint to exclude Pacana from doing so, arguing that
he was elected to stay in such office for six years, or until March 3, 1986. The issue is
whether a governor elected as a Mambabatas Pambansa can exercise both functions
simultaneously and whether a vice-governor who lost in the running of Mambabatas
Pambansa can continue serving as vice-governor and succeed the office of governor
if it is vacated.

Held:
There is a constitutional prohibition against a member of Batasan Pambansa from
holding any other office in the government during his tenure. This can be found in
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Also, vice governors are not among
those included as being on forced leave of absence from office upon filing a
certificate of candidacy in the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 697. Instead, they are
governed by the provision on members of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan. Thus, his
assumption of the office of governor is legal and valid, and supported by Section
204(2) of the Local Government Code. The petition is then dismissed.
Mabanag v. Vito
G.R. No. L-1123 March 5, 1947

Facts:
Three of the plaintiffs are senators and eight are representatives who were elected
on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate because of
alleged irregularities in the election, and the representatives were not allowed in the
lower House for the same reason. A resolution for their suspension was introduced
in the House of Representatives, but a petition was filed to prevent its enforcement
from happening. Because of this, the three senators and eight representatives did
not take part in passing the resolution. If they had been counted, their votes would
have made the necessary three-fourths to prevent its passing. The respondents,
however, argued that the Court no longer had jurisdiction on the conclusiveness of
an enrolled bill or resolution. The issue is whether the Court can take cognizance of
this case and if the resolution was duly passed by Congress.

Held:
The judiciary cannot interfere with political questions, except by express
constitutional or statutory provision. A proposal which leads to ratification of an
amendment is a political question, since Article XV, Section 1 of the Constitution
includes such. The Supreme Court is then bound by the contents of a duly
authenticated resolution or enrolled bill by the legislature. They cannot question the
resolution passed by Congress. The petition is then dismissed.
Sampayan v. Daza
G.R. No. 103903 September 11, 1992

Facts:
On February 18, 1992, Melanio D. Sampayan, among others, who are residents of the
second Congressional District of Northern Samar, filed a petition to disqualify Raul
Daza, their incumbent congressman, from continuing to exercise his official
functions. Their reason stems from his being a resident of the United States since
October 16, 1974 and the fact that he has not renounced this status yet. This is in
violation of Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 and Section 18, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution. On April 10, 1992, Daza commented that although he was
given a permanent residency status in the U.S., he waived this when he returned to
the Philippines on August 12, 1985. The issue is whether he should be disqualified
as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Held:
The petition must be dismissed for several reasons. First, they only sought to remove
Daza in April 6, 1992, when his term ends on June 30, 1992. Second, the jurisdiction
of this case belongs to the House Electoral Tribunal under Article VI, Section 17 of
the 1987 Constitution. Third, a writ of prohibition cannot also be filed for acts
already consummated. The petition is then dismissed for being moot and academic.
Abbas v. The Senate Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 83767 October 27, 1988

Facts:
On October 9, 1987, Firdausi Smail Abbas, among others, filed an election contest
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators in the
May 11, 1987 elections. The Senate Electoral Tribunal was at the time composed of
three Justices of the Supreme Court and six Senators. On November 17, 1987, the
petitioners also filed a motion to disqualify or inhibit the Senator-Members from the
hearing and resolution of the case. The issue is whether it is constitutional to inhibit
all involved senators from participating in the tribunal.

Held:
The Senate Electoral Tribunal is supported by Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution, which states that it must be formed by members of the Supreme Court
and of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The Constitution intended that
both judicial and legislative components participate in deciding all contests relating
to the election. The petition is then dismissed.
Pimentel v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No. 141489 November 29, 2002

Facts:
On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System took effect, promoting proportional
representation in the election of representatives. On May 11, 1998, national
elections were held wherein the winning party-list representatives would become
members of the House. The House then constituted the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the Court of Appeals by electing its representatives to these
two bodies. On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters
addressed to Senate President Blas F. Ople. In it, he requested Ople and Justice Melo
to restructure the CA and the HRET to include the party-list representatives to
conform to Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The issue is
whether the present composition of the HRET and CA violates the Constitution
because the party-list representatives did not participate.

Held:
There is no showing that the party-list groups were prevented from participating in
the election of members of the HRET and CA. Neither was it shown that the House
stopped the party-list representatives from becoming members of such. What was
shown was that the party-list groups refrained from participating in the election
process. Constitutional questions cannot also be heard and resolved by courts
without the fulfillment of several requirements. These requirements were not
fulfilled in the case. The petition is then dismissed.
Sarmiento v. Mison
G.R. No. 79974

Facts:
Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla are taxpayers, lawyers, and professors
of Constitutional Law who seek to prevent Salvador Mison from performing the
functions of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from paying Mison’s salaries. They reason
that Mison’s appointment to the office is unconstitutional because it has not been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution states such, but only explicitly states the need for approval from the
Commission on Appointments for the first group of officers. There is no mention of
the Commission’s consent for the second to fourth groups of officers. The issue is
whether they should be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.

Held:
In looking at the history of the Constitution, it was seen that in the 1935 Consitution,
almost all presidential appointments required the consent of the Commission, but in
the 1973 Constitution, the President could make such decisions without the
Commission’s consent. It is therefore clear that the 1987 Constitution stays in the
middle ground by only requiring the consent of the Commission for the first group of
appointments and allowing the President to appoint those in the second to fourth
group on his own. The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support
this as well. The petition is then dismissed.
Guingona v. Gonzales
G.R. no. 106971 October 20, 1992

Facts:
After the elections on May 11, 1992, the Senate became composed of 15 senators
from LDP, 5 senators from NPC, 3 senators from LAKAS-NUCD, and 1 senator from
LP-PDP-LABAN. At the organization meeting on August 27, 1992 Senator Alberto
Romulo as Majority Floor Leader nominated eight senators from LDP for
membership in the Commission on Appointments. This was objected to by Senator
Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as Minority Floor Leader and Senator John Osmena, in
representation of the NPC. Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed that 8 members come
from the LDP, two from the NPC, and one from the Liberal Party. This proposal was
approved. On September 23, 1992, Guingona filed a petition to prohibit Senate
President Neptali Gonzales (LDP) from recognizing Romulo and Senator Wigberto E.
Tanada (LP) in the Commission of Appointments on the ground that the proposed
compromise was violative of the rule of proportional representation. The issue is
whether their election in the Commission is constitutional.

Held:
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution provides for the creation of a Commission
on Appointments and the allocation of its membership. They must be elected by
each house on the basis of proportional representation. Since the mathematical
representation of the division of political party members produces a fraction of .5, it
is difficult to follow it exactly. The election of Romulo and Tanada is unconstitutional
because it goes over the number required. What the parties may do now is decide
together on who to elect for proportional representation since one party may have
affiliations with another party.
Perez v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija
G.R. No. L-35474 March 29, 1982

Facts:
On May 10, 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos nominated Honorato Perez for
appointment as provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija. However, the nomination was
bypassed upon adjournment when it was sent for confirmation to the Commission
on Appointments on May 18, 1972. Honorato was designated as provincial fiscal the
next day. The Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 146, opposing the
appointment. Honorato officially assumed office on August 14, 1972. The Provincial
Board passed Resolution No 228, ordering the Provincial Treasurer to stop payment
of Honorato’s salaries on August 21. Perez filed a peitition assailing the validity od
the resolutions. The issue is whether the Provincial Board has the power to enact the
resolutions as against the President’s wishes.

Held:
The issue is moot and academic. Honorato filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor
of Cabanatuan City in the January 30, 1980 elections. This filing constitutes
forfeiture of his right to the office of provincial fiscal. This is in accordance with
Section 29 of the election Code of 1978. The petition is then dismissed.
Arroyo v. De Venecia
G.R. N0. 127255 August 14, 1997

Facts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives, who brought suit against
the Speaker of the HOR, the Deputy Speaker, the Majority Leader, the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. They
claim that their violation of the rules of the House is equivalent to a violation of the
Constitution. R.A. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code, came from the HOR and was approved on the third reading on
September 12, 1996 and submitted to the Senate, which was approved on the third
reading on November 17, 1996. The issue is whether the Congress committed grave
abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240.

Held:
It is not seemly for the Court to invade on the prerogative of a coequal department
and set aside a legislative action simply because it thinks that the House has
disregarded its won rules of procedure, or to allow such a case to be judged in the
courts when it can be remedied in the department itself. Interfering in such an issue
would constitute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court as well. the Court
must assume that the House acted in good faith.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

Facts:
Arturo Tolentino and others are questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7716, or the Expanded Value Added Tax Law. Tolentino argues that this revenue bill
did not exclusively come from the House of Representatives as Article VI, Section 24
of the Constitution requires. Even though it originated and passed the three readings
in the House, it did not complete the three readings in the Senate. The issue is
whether the EVAT law is procedurally valid.

Held:
The Court held that the consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to
propose or agree with amendments in the version originating from the House. What
the Constitution requires is that the initiative come from the House of
Representatives. there have been several instances where Senate passed its own
version instead of taking those from the House when it comes to revenue and other
common bills. The bill is then considered valid.
Abakada v. Ermita
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

Facts:
On May 24, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed Republic Act 9337 or
the VAT Reform Act into law. Before it took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order preventing the government from implementing it
because its constitutionality was being questioned. Petitioners allege that granting
the President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by the Congress of its
exclusive power to tax since this delegation is not mentioned in Article VI, Section
28(2) of the Constitution. furthermore, it is argued that VAT is a tax given in the sale
or exchange of goods and services and is not included under the exemption
delegation. The influence of the President provided by law could have also brought
about the present conditions. There are also no guiding standards in law as to how
the Secretary of Finance can make the recommendation. The issue is whether the
President’s act of increasing the VAT rate, along with the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.

Held:
The powers that Congress is prohibited from delegating are those that are strictly
legislative. Those that may be delegated are tariff powers and emergency powers to
the President under the Constitution, those to people at large, those to local
governments, and those to administrative bodies. For it to be valid, the delegation
must be complete and fix a standard. In this case, it is only a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement of the increased rate under the law
is incidental. The operation or non-operation of the 12% rate is outside the control
of the executive. The Secretary of Finance is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine when their expressed will is to take effect. Therefore,
there is no undue delegation of legislative power.
Lidasan v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967

Facts:
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law Republic Act 4790, which
separated several Barrios from Lanao del Sur and formed into the Municipality of
Dianaton. It was only discovered later that some of the barrios included were
actually part of the Municipality of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato. COMELEC
adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, which fixed the former location of the
barrios comprised in Dianaton. On September 7, 1967, the Office of the President
recommended to COMELEC that the operation of the statute be suspended until
clarified. COMELEC responded by declaring that it should be implemented unless
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Bara Lidasan, a resident and
taxpayer of Parang, Cotabato prayed that the R.A. 4790 be declared unconstitutional
and that COMELEC’s resolutions be nullified.

Held:
The usual rule is that where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and
the remainder valid, the valid portion may be separated and upheld. However, if the
parts are so mutually dependent that they cannot be separated, they must all fall
together. The totality of twenty-one barrios was the original intention, not the nine
barrios in the Resolutions made later on. R.A. 4790 is considered indivisible and
must then be totally null and void.
Sumulong v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-48609 October 10, 1941

Facts:
The Commission on Elections adopted a resolution under the authority of Section 5
of Commonwealth Act No. 657. It provided for the appointment of election
inspectors to be proposed by political parties and persons named therein. Juan
Sumulong, the President of Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, one of the parties, seeks to nullify
the resolution on the ground that C.A. No. 657 is unconstitutional because it requires
that a political party must habe polled at least 10% of the total number of votes cast
in the last election to be able to participate in the proposal. He states that this goes
against Article VI, Section 21(1) of the Constitution and this is the issue.

Held:
The COMELEC is a constitutional body. It should not be restricted in such a way that
it will not be able to accomplish its great objective, which is free, honest, and orderly
elections. Unless there are clearly illegal or grossly abusive acts, the court cannot
interfere with its decisions. The COMELEC is in a better standpoint to decide
complex political questions that the courts. The order of the COMELEC is then
affirmed.
Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works and Communications
G.R. No. L-10405 December 29, 1960

Facts:
On August 31, 1954, Wenceslao Pascual, the Provincial Governor of Rizal, filed an
action for declaratory relief on the ground that Antonio Subdivision, the place in
which the feeder road terminals in Republic Act No. 920 would be constructed, was
the private property of Jose C. Zulueta, a Philippine Senate member. Though he
offered to donate such to the municipality of Pasig, no such deed of donation was
made. It was only on December 12, 1953 that Zulueta made a deed of donation of the
four parcels of land for the feeder roads in favor of the Philippine Government. This
was then accepted by the Executive Secretary. The issue now is whether this
constitutes a violation of the Constitution, which prohibits members of Congress
from being directly or indirectly financially interested in contracts with the
Government.

Held:
Though Zulueta argues that laws passed by Congress and approved by the President
can never be illegal because Congress is the source of all laws, this is inconsistent
because of our system of checks and balances. The constitutionality of statutes
requiring the use of public funds is determined by its purpose, which should be the
promotion of public interest. The legality of the appropriation of P85,000 was
dependent on whether the roads were private or public property when the bill was
passed and approved. Since the lands were Zulueta’s at the time these took place, the
appropriation is considered null and void.
Garcia v. Mata
G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975

Facts:
Eusebio B. Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until he became inactive on November 15, 1960, because of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 2332. On June 18, 1955, when R.A. No. 1382 took
effect, Garcia had a little more than nine years of accumulated active commissioned
service in the AFP. On July 11, 1956, when R.A. No. 1600 took effect, his accumulated
active commissioned service grew to more than 10 years. When he retired in 1960,
he did not receive any wages nor was he ever employed in the Government again. On
September 17, 1969, he filed an action to recover money and to be reinstated by the
Secretary of National Defense and the AFP. The court dismissed this, saying that he
fell short of the 10-year requirement in R.A. No. 1382 in order not to be reverted into
inactive status. They also reasoned that the same provision stated in R.A. No. 1600,
which would have been in favor of Garcia, was invalid and unconstitutional. This is
the issue.

Held:
The provisions in paragraph 11 of the Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines are not related to the objective of R.A. No. 1600, which is to appropriate
funds to the government. This violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 of the 1935
Constitution, which provides that bills must have only one subject in order to be
passed as a law. It is then considered unconstitutional, invalid, and inoperative.
Demetria v. Alba
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987

Facts:
Demetrio G. Demetria and other petitioners filed a petition as members of the
National Assembly for Section 44 of the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 or
Presidential Decree No. 1177 to be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it
authorizes the illegal transfer of public moneys and fails to specify the purposes for
the proposed transfer of funds. It also constitutes undue delegation of legislative
powers to the executive. The issue is whether these allegations are correct.

Held:
The prohibition to transfer appropriations is explicit in the 1973 Constitution,
however, it also allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds in
order to give the different branch heads of the Government some flexibility in the
use of public funds and resources. Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 abuses this privilege,
since it allows the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department
to another without first assuring that its purpose is proper. This constitutes undue
delegation of legislative powers, which makes P.D. No. 1177 null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Garces v. Estenzo
G.R. No. L-53487 May 25,1981

Facts:
On March 23, 1976, the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City adopted Resolution
No. 5, reviving the celebration of the feast day of Senor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron
saint of Valencia. It designated the members of nine committees in charge of the
feast and provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the
construction of a waiting shed. On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed
Resolution No. 6 which specified that the Chairman of the fiesta would be the
caretaker of the saint’s image for one year until reelection on the next feast day.
Resolution Nos. 10 and 12 were also passed to authorize a lawyer to file a replevin
case against Father Osmena and to appoint Manuel C. Veloso as representative.
Father Osmena and three others filed for the annulment of the resolutions,
questioning their constitutionality. The issue is whether the resolutions are
constitutional.

Held:
Barrios are given powers provided by law for the performance of particular
government functions. A member’s absence from the barangay council does not
make the resolutions void, since there was a quorum when the resolutions were
passed. The resolutions do not also establish any religion or limit religious liberty.
Public property or funds were not used as well, since private funds were used for the
image. The petition is then denied.
Aglipay v. Ruiz
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

Facts:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts Juan Ruiz announced in the dailies of Manila that
he would order the issue of postage stamps commemorating the celebration of the
Eucharistic Congress in Manila City. Gregorio Aglipay requested Vicente Sotto to
denounce the matter to the Philippine President. Ruiz instead publicly announced
sending designs of the stamps for printing to the United States. Aglipay then sought
for an issuance to prevent Ruiz from selling the stamps commemorative of the Thiry-
third International Eucharistic Congress. The issue is whether the issuance and sale
of the stamps is unconstitutional because public money was appropriated for the
support of a denomination of religion.

Held:
Although what is being prohibited in section 23, Article VI of the Constitution is the
interference of the church with the state, there is also a constitutional mandate for
religious freedom. Ruiz issued the postage stamps under the provisions of Act No.
4502, which allows appropriation of money for the printing of new postage stamps.
This Act does not have a religious purpose. Furthermore, the stamps were not for
the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church as they did not receive any money from it.
Ruiz also only took advantage of the designs to attract tourists. The petition is then
denied.
Lladoc v. CIR
G.R. No. L-19201 June 16, 1965

Facts:
In 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000 in cash to Rev. Fr.
Crispin Ruiz, the predecessor of Rev. Fr. Casimiro LLadoc as parish priest in Negros
Occidental. On March 3, 1958, the Estate filed the donor’s gift tax return. On April 29,
1960, the Commissioner of internal Revenue issued an assessment for donee’s gift
tax against the parish. Lladoc requested the withdrawal of the tax on November 2,
1960, saying that he should not be liable for it since he was not the parish priest
back then. He also asserts that the assessment of gift tax against the Roman Catholic
Church was not valid because it violates the Constitution.

Held:
There is no legal basis to include within the Constitutional exemption taxes for the
use of properties or the exercise of the privilege of receiving properties. Exemptions
from tax payments are highly disfavored in law. Therefore, there must be a clear and
express grant claiming exemption in law. The exemption in Section 22, Article VI of
the Constitution should not mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. It only exempts
from the payment of property taxes used exclusively for religious purposes. What
was taxed upon them was a gift tax for receiving such property. The tax liability is
then upheld, but Lladoc is not obliged to pay for it. The Head of the Diocese must pay
instead.
Arnault v. Nazareno
G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950

Facts:
In October 1949, the Philippine Government bought two estates known as
Buenavista and Tambobong through the Rural Progress Administration. P1.5 million
of the P5 million was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a non-resident American, through his
attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, represented by Jean L. Arnault. On February 27,
1950, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee
investigating the aforementioned estates deal. They sought to determine who was
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction. Arnault was cited in
contempt by the Senate and imprisoned until he answered the questions he refused
to answer. He then filed a petition for habeas corpus questioning the validity of his
detention. This is the issue.

Held:
Even though there is no express provision in the 1935 Constitution empowering the
Congress to make investigations and exact testimony, it is an implied power. It is not
necessary that the legislative body show that every question asked be material to
any proposed legislation. Instead, it must be important to the matter in question at
the time. to deny this power would defeat the purpose of the legislative body as a
source of legislative function. The petition is then denied.
Senate v. Ermita
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006

Facts:
The Philippine Senate, through its various Senate Committees, conducted
investigations requiring the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices including Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Philippine National
Police. The Senate Committee issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as speakers in a public hearing for various matters,
including the railway project, the election fraud, the wire tapping, and the military’s
participation in such scandals. These officials were not able to attend because the
President opposed, with the provision in Executive Order 464, Section 3 requiring all
public officials to gain the President’s consent before appearing in Congress. The
Senate filed a petition to nullify E.O. 464 for being unconstitutional as it allowed the
President to abuse his power.

Held:
The power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. However, the doctrine of
executive privilege is an exemption to the power of inquiry. This is the power of the
government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress,
and is only applicable to information of a sensitive character. Therefore, it must be
first determined whether the requested information is privileged and why it is
considered privileged. In this case, the President did not provide clear reasons as to
why she did not give her consent. Section 2(b) and 3 of E.O 464 are then declared
void.

Miguel v. Gordon
G.R. No. 174340 October 17, 2006

Facts:
Senator Richard J. Gordon requested Philippine Commission on Good Governance
Chairman Camilo L. Sabio and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in
the public meeting conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Sabio declined such invitation
because of another commitment and invoked Section 4(b) of Executive Order No. 1,
which states that members of the Commission cannot be required to testify or give
evidence in any proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. The
issue is whether such provision limits the power of inquiry of the legislature, which
is unconstitutional.

Held:
Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry to any of
the respective Committees of the Senate and the House. However, the Court gives
high regard to the Congress’ power of inquiry because it co-exists with the power to
legislate. E.O. No. 1, Section 4(b) is then considered contrary to Article VI, Section 21
of the Constitution as it limits the Congress’ power of inquiry, A mere provision of
law cannot limit the broad power of Congress in the absence of any constitutional
basis.
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

Facts:
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before the
Senate on the alleged takeover of SOLOIL Inc., the flagship of the First Manila
Managements of Companies. He called for the Senate to investigate on a possible
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee began the investigation and the petitioners were
subpoenaed to appear before the Committee and testify. They refused to, invoking
their rights to due process and the prejudice such act would cause before the
Sandiganbayan. They filed for its prohibition, claiming that the Committee was in
excess of its jurisidiction and legislative purpose. The issue is whether the
Committee has valid legislative purpose.

Held:
The power to conduct formal inquiries and investigations is provided in Sec. 1 of the
Senate Rules of Procedure. They may refer to the implementation or reexamination
of laws or proposed legislations. They may also extend to matters in the Constitution
in Congress or in the Senate. The inquiry being sought does not fall under either of
the reasons. It appears that the investigation would be in better hands if handled by
the courts rather than the legislature.