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SAARC: inside & outside

By Anil Nauriya
CHINA IS reported to have expressed a desire to join the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). It appears that Bangladesh has supported the
move. Pakistan and Sri Lanka will no doubt extend support. In spite of the Maois
t insurgency in Nepal, it is doubtful if the Himalayan kingdom will be able to r
esist the idea. Apart from obvious strategic objectives, China would like greate
r access to the markets of India and such other countries as can be reached more
conveniently by land than by the sea route via Singapore.
The suggestion needs to be discussed in all its aspects. It is only with India's
consent that China can hope to enter the consensual SAARC. Should India consent
? There are interesting and perhaps unexpected answers to this question which pr
esent both opportunities and challenges. So far as non-Defence commerce is conce
rned, India may already be China's largest trade partner in South Asia. If the t
wo countries could expand their economic ties it would be a factor for peace in
all of Asia. There are, of course, great possibilities for cooperation with Chin
a in the generation of hydro-electric power in the upper reaches of the Brahmapu
tra but such possibilities are not necessarily SAARC- related.
While scope for expansion of trade and other economic cooperation may be large,
it should also be borne in mind that the Indian and Chinese economies are mutual
ly competitive rather than complementary. The gains, if any, for India from Chin
a joining SAARC would be indirect rather than direct. The India-related reluctan
ce of some countries within SAARC to move ahead with mutual cooperation arrangem
ents could to some extent be reduced if SAARC transforms itself in certain funda
mental ways.
At a time when the West was inclined to shun Beijing, India had taken the lead i
n welcoming China to international forums such as the Afro- Asian meet at Bandun
g in 1955. In its turn, however, China has not been an enthusiastic supporter of
India's involvement with ASEAN or of Indian participation in the so- called Asi
a-Pacific conclaves which have become fashionable in recent years. Indeed, Beiji
ng was instrumental in keeping India out of them. Be that as it may, the Chinese
desire to join SAARC provides India with an opportunity to appraise the future
of the organisation. As at present constituted, the SAARC is not poised to go fa
r. Mutual suspicions, Pakistan's reluctance to give trade concessions to India,
and sectarian conflicts have halted further movement within SAARC. The South Asi
an Free Trade Area and even the South Asian Preferential Trade Area are still fa
r from being realised.
It was in implicit recognition of the fact that SAARC as a whole had reached a c
ul de sac that sub-regional initiatives were launched within it. One of these ce
ntred around Nepal, Bangladesh and India while the other revolved around India a
nd Sri Lanka, with Maldives and Bangladesh as possible inclusions. But there was
little forward movement as the initiatives were seen by Pakistan as efforts to
isolate it. Curious though it may seem, the countries concerned could potentiall
y achieve more outside the framework of SAARC than within it. And there lies the
rub. With SAARC unable to move forward even with its limited focus on trade-rel
ated issues, the South Asian countries have been neglecting the far greater need
for cooperation on matters such as flood control and water management.
Another reflection of the inadequacy of SAARC was the relentless Indian search f
or other regional mechanisms or cooperative arrangements outside the SAARC frame
work. These included first, the Indian Ocean regional initiative (IOR), second,
BIMSTEC, (consisting of Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand) and
third, the Mekong-Ganga initiative (comprising Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand
, Myanmar and India). These incipient groups have substantial long-term economic
potential. The last in particular could bring together in fruitful cooperation
one of the largest combinations of human and natural resources on the planet. Th
e Indian Ocean group is much too disparate and scattered to make a mark in the n
ear future. South Africa has its own African commitments while Australia is stil
l searching for a new definition for itself in the region, and the search will t
ake some time. BIMSTEC and the Mekong-Ganga initiative are the areas in which pr
ogress is likely.
SAARC makes geographical sense and its members share strong historical and deep
cultural and linguistic ties. But it is not, at present, a viable geo-political
group. It lacks a sense of shared purpose. Its members march to the beat of diff
erent drums. That is also why it is not likely, as at present constituted, to ta
ke off economically in the near or medium term.
Into this scenario China wishes to enter. Its induction would change SAARC in on
e essential respect. China is, for all its territorial expanse, really an East A
sian country, which is where the bulk of its population lives. SAARC would then
be transformed, in substance if not in name, into a body for East Asian and Sout
h Asian cooperation. A forum for cooperation between East Asia and South Asia wo
uld be an idea worth examining. Should SAARC transform itself formally into such
a forum, its membership ought to be opened also to other East Asian countries s
uch as Japan, Mongolia and the two Koreas. This could indeed break SAARC out of
its present logjam and breathe new life into it. It would broaden the outlook of
the South Asian regional body and make it aware of its larger Asian identity. I
n the positive atmosphere thus created, even economic cooperation within the Sou
th Asian community could start looking up.
This positive result can, however, be envisaged only in the event of the East As
ian region, consisting of Japan, China, Mongolia, and both or one of the Koreas,
being treated collectively for the purpose of cooperation with the South Asian
community. If China alone were to come into SAARC, this could reinforce the very
mutual suspicions and geo- political differences which have affected the organi
sation so far. By contrast, if the effort is in the direction of greater coopera
tion with East Asia as a whole, the focus could shift decisively towards mutuall
y- beneficial partnerships. It would also be more meaningful for India which wou
ld benefit from great interaction with the economies of North-East Asia, some of
which are more complementary to it than that of China.
The Chinese desire to join SAARC may, however, signal also some other changes in
stance. It is doubtful if China can consistently seek membership of SAARC and c
ontinue simultaneously to oppose Indian participation in Asia-Pacific and ASEAN-
related bodies. More importantly, China must know that it cannot expect entry in
to SAARC or any meaningful participation in it without concomitant settlement of
the Sino-Indian territorial dispute in an amicable spirit. The India-Pakistan e
xample shows how difficult it is to function together within a regional body whe
re such disputes are prone, willy-nilly, to get reflected indirectly even if the
y are not directly within its ambit. It is possible therefore that China may hav
e decided that the time to bury the hatchet has come.
New opportunities may be opening up and it is right to be alert to all the possi
bilities. Yet, in the search for new areas of economic cooperation, whether outs
ide SAARC or within SAARC or by transforming SAARC, there is one thing that must
not be forgotten: India is a large enough economic cooperation area by itself.
What it needs is a resolve and a sense of direction. For example, even so essent
ial a matter as the late Dr. K. L. Rao's scheme for a Ganga-Cauvery link which w
ould transfer waters from water surplus areas to deficit ones has yet to be take
n up. But as the annual Assam floods and the recent Orissa and Bihar floods clea
rly show, the misery of the people has been prolonged enough. Solutions can hard
ly wait until all neighbouring countries join in the effort. Though the need for
them to join remains very important, India must be ready to do what it can on i
ts own.
Political parties and the Central and State Governments must come together to re
move all constitutional and financial constraints upon this major priority. Once
India starts making full use of its own vast economic cooperation area, other s
uch areas will not be far to seek - and the more that come in, the merrier.

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