PAULA T. LLORENTE, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.

LLORENTE
November 23, 2000

FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after,
he left for the US where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother
and a child was born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce in California, which later on
became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties
will be given to his second marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the
proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the
motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be
declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Law shall apply.

RULING:
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As
stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce
obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law since the divorce was contracted after he
became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

345 SCRA 592 – Civil Law – Application of Laws – Foreign Laws – Nationality Principle – Effects of Foreign Divorce
Succession – Last Will and Testament of an Alien
In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula Llorente got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo
became an American citizen.
In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered that Paula was already living illicitly with Ceferino Llorente (brother of
Lorenzo). Ceferino and Paula even had a son.
Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula agreed in writing Lorenzo shall not
criminally charge Paula if the latter agrees to waive all monetary support from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the United States.
In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula was represented by an American counsel. The divorce was granted and in
1952, the divorce became final.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno. They had three children.
In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate to Alicia and their children (nothing for Paula). In 1983, he went to court
for the will’s probate and to have Alicia as the administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo died.
Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate.
The trial court ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce he obtained abroad is void. The trial court ratiocinated that Lorenzo
is a Filipino hence divorce is not applicable to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES: Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be recognized.
HELD: Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American citizen in 1943. Hence, when he obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he
is already an American citizen. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides:
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws relating to family rights, duties, or status are no longer applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce
decree he obtained abroad must be respected. The rule is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to determine the effects of the divorce as to the successional rights of
Lorenzo and his heirs.
Anent the issue on Lorenzo’s last will and testament, it must be respected. He is an alien and is not covered by our laws on succession. However, since the
will was submitted to our courts for probate, then the case was remanded to the lower court where the foreign law must be alleged in order to prove the
validity of the will.

FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.

Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself
against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being
an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between
him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725.
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under
Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.

However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship,
and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid.

HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the
date of the filing of his application to run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725
are:

(1) filing the application;

(2) action by the committee; and

(3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved.

It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the
oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, supra

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. She stated in the COC that she
is a resident of the place for seven months. Private respondent Montejo subsequently filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification on the ground that
Imelda failed to meet the constitutional requirement of one-year residency. COMELEC granted the Petition for Disqualification, holding that Imelda is deemed
to have abandoned Tacloban City as her place of domicile when she lived and even voted in Ilocos and Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda is deemed to have abandoned her domicile of origin

HELD:

An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residence in different places. Residence implies a factual relationship to a given
place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-
permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion that “she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places” flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully
made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election purposes.

TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy
Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman
of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served
as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in
an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political
Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her
actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.

Aquino v COMELEC (1995)

Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly
created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284
Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The
Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with
38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of
Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for
lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the
electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the previous constitutions but also under the
1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the
interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short
of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion,
Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be
a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to
establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a
resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in
transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at
bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the
congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such
determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another
forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a
threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable
laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly
created political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s district
in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner
out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate
or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such
new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of
the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this
particular lease agreement cannot be better.
Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
Commission on Elections, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and JuanitoIcaro, Respondents

Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.:

The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing
a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the
majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in an election.
When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that
giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.

FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents
Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution,
should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution.

HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not
just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that
he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter
of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that
his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract
maybe indicative of petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City, it does notengender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of
one’soriginal domicile.

Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makatiis a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully
effecta change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actualchange of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond withthe purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of
originshould be deemed to continue.