From Decreation To Bare Life Ricciardi

FROM DECREATION TO BARE LIFE: WEIL, AGAMBEN, AND THE IMPOLITICAL
Author(s): ALESSIA RICCIARDI

Source: Diacritics, Vol. 39, No. 2, NEGATIVE POLITICS (summer 2009), pp. 75-84, 86-93
Published by: Johns Hopkins University Press
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FROM DECREATION TO
BARE LIFE
WEIL, AGAMBEN, AND THE IMPOLITICAL
ALESSIA RICCIARDI
SimoneWeil'scareermaybe dividedintotwoparts.The first, moreovertly politicalpe-

riodencompasseshercriticalandpracticalinvolvement withMarxismand syndicalism;
thesecondphasefallsafter1934andis moreresponsive tomystical concerns. Thismove-
mentawayfrominstitutional andideologicalquestionsandtowardreligiousissuesoffers
manyreadersan opportunity to castherthought as paradigmatic of a "negativepolitics"
that,withoutbeingapathetic,cannotbe reconciledwiththeusual themesof political
thought.Consequently, Weil has attainedsomething of thestatusof a museforseveral
"impolitical" thinkers. In Italy,the two most important theorists of biopolitics,Roberto
Esposito and GiorgioAgamben, have evoked Weil's ideas, albeit whilepursuingvery
differentphilosophicalagendas:namely, an affirmative, communitarian readingof the
biopoliticalfor the former versus an apocalyptic exposé of the category's juridicalunder-
pinningsfor the latter.Her influence on is
Esposito particularly notable in his Categorie
dell'impolitico the
[Categoriesof Impolitical ] and Terza persona[ Third Person]. By con-
trast,Weil's in
presence Agamben'swriting is subliminal or,we mightsay, disavowed.
AlthoughAgambenwrotehis dissertation on Weil's politicalphilosophy, his pub-
lishedwritings containfewexplicitreferences to herwork.He mentions herin passing
in The End of thePoem: Studiesin Poeticsas one of thefavoritethinkers of theItal-
ian novelistElsa Morante[102]. Otherwise, however, he does not acknowledge Weilby
nameeven when,in thecourseof reflections on thetopicof potentiality thatrepresent
a crucialfocusof his own project,he appearsto be reinterpreting hersignature theory
of decreation. Although it is truethat the concept has itsroots in an ancientCatharistic-
Kabbalistictradition andthatPéguy,Blanchot,andLévinasmakeuse of itin theirwork,
Weil shouldbe creditedwithhavingbeen firstto recognizetheterm'simportance for
present-day readers.It is notmyintention to simplify the relation between Weil's and
Agamben'sthinking, butrather, through a closereadingofkeypassagesofWeil'sGravity
and Grace andAgamben's"Bartleby, or On Contingency," to suggesthowtheirdistinct
inflections
ofa sharedcriticallanguagemaycorrespond todifferent viewsofthecontem-
poraryoperations ofpower.
As Lelandde la Durantaye hasobserved,thegenealogyofAgamben'snotionofpotential-

itycanbe tracedbacktoWeil'sdevelopment ofthetheory ofdecreationinhernotebooks
[22-23]. WhydoesAgambennotacknowledge hissource,giventheimportance ofWeil's
contributionson thetopic?De la DurantayehastilyproposesthatWeil'sconceptofdecre-
ationis too dialecticalforAgamben'sphilosophy. Is Agamben'sfailureto acknowledge
Weilnecessary tomaintain theinternal
consistencyofhisownlineofreasoning? To what
diacritics 39.2(2009)75-93© 2012bytheJohns

Volume Press
University
Hopkins
extentareWeil'saccountoftheimpoliticai andAgamben'sowninterpretation ofnegative
politicsincompatible, given that they share an emphasis on the notion of decreation and
thepervasiveness of malignpower?In thisconnection, it willbe usefulto considerthe
crucialplaceheldbythecategory offorceinWeil'sworkvis-à-visAgamben'scelebrated
figuresof "bare life" and homo sacer. Although Weil'sthought hingeson an idiosyncratic
equivocation with regard to whether force is a natural or a social phenomenon, herand
Agamben'srespectivephilosophicalcosmogonies on this pointfinallymay seen to
be
harmonize. if
Indeed, Agamben startswith a strictly juridicalproblematic, he endsup on
accountofhisownpessimistic interpretation ofbiopoliticsatthesamepointfromwhich
Weilcommences herowninquiry, namelyin a domainwherethenaturalandthepolitical
havebecomeindistinguishable.1
One important pointon whichWeilandAgambenagreeis theirskepticism ofMarx-
istdoctrine. Boththinkers believethattherevolutions ofthemodernerainvariably have
been shipwrecked on theimpossibility of reachingthe wished-for "statelesssociety"
without reproducing theverymethodsof oppressionthatsuchpoliticaluprisings origi-
nallyaim to overthrow [Agamben,Homo Sacer 12]. Indeed,Weil basicallydedicates
theentiretextof Oppressionand Libertyto reinforcing thisbleakviewof ourhistorical
conditions. Yetinthecontext ofheroeuvreas a whole,shemaybe seen,unlikeAgamben,
tooffer an argument thatincludesa pars construens. In herlastwork,TheNeedforRoots,
she setsoutto imaginealternatives to a worldof perpetualforce,ultimately embracing
an ethicalcommitment to pragmatic interventions in society.As DominickLaCapraob-
serves,thehorizonofAgamben'sview insteadrepresents "an ecstatic,anarchist utopia
thatremainsterraincognita andwhoserelevanceto ourproblemsorcommitments is left
utterlyblank"[155]. Mightwe considerWeil'sworkas a helpfulcorrective to whatsev-
eralcriticsconsiderAgamben'spoliticalhyperboles [LaCapra136]?
Of course,Weil'sthinking itselfhasbeenreceivedattimeswithsuspicion.2 In an es-
sayin TheNew YorkReviewofBooksoccasionedbythepublication in EnglishofWeil's
SelectedEssays, forexample,Susan Sontagmayhave made ceremonious professions
of admiration fortheFrenchintellectual, yetdid notrefrain froma tartdismissalof her
philosophy: "I cannotbelievethatmorethana handful of . . . readers. . . reallyshareher
ideas" [par.4]. Putoffin particular by Weil's rejectionof Judaismand sweepinggener-
alizationsregarding theevil of theRomanEmpire,Sontagperceivedsuchpositionsas
symptomatic ofWeil'sdeep-rooted radicalism, whichin theAmericancritic'seyescon-
sortedwitha tastefortheextreme inartandthought thatwas typicalofourmoderntimes,
our
aligning sensibility with Nietzsche rather than Goethe.Even a genuineadmirerof
Weilsuchas T. S. Eliot,whiledescribing heras "a womanofgenius,ofa kindofgenius
akinto thatofa saint,"was forcedto concedethat"shecouldbe unfairandintemperate;
certainly she committed some astonishing aberrations and exaggeration" [vi-vii].Weil
has hadherunequivocalsupporters, however, such as Albert Camus who called her"the
onlygreatspirit of our times" and edited several volumes of her work for Gallimard
afterherdeath[Rosen301-19]. More recently, in Categoriedell'impolitico, Esposito
has identified Weil's workas a crucial,exemplary instanceof the"impoliticai," which
might be defined as a kind of with to
negativethinking respect institutional, ideologically
1Antonio "
NegriarguesthatAgamben's offixingtheindistinctiveness
project oflifeandpolitics
,
between homeandcity "
, zoe andbios ultimatelyhas theeffect thebiopolitical,
ofneutralizing
denyingitsstatus
as a distinct andrendering
concept, ituseless
fromtheperspectiveofproductive
force[121-22].
2Itisnoaccidentthata recent collection
ofessaysonWeilbearsthetelling
titleTheRelevanceof
theRadical.(SeeRozelle-Stone andStone.)
76 diacritics/summer2009
formalized politics,a skepticism thatnevertheless eschewsnihilism[201-44].3In Terza
persona, he treatsWeil's insistenceon theimpersonalas a steptowarda moreethical
politicsandbiopolitics[122-26].
It shouldbe notedthatEspositooffersa morebenign,deconstructive interpretation
of thebiopoliticaldomainthanAgambendoes and,unlikeAgamben,givesWeil an ex-
plicit,strategic role in his theory. WhereasEspositomay help to "rescue"Weil from
accusationsof mysticalradicalism, Agambenhas acquiredsomething of a reputation as
a provocateur anda mysticin hisownright, especially sincethe publication of his three
mostcontroversial books,HomoSacer, Remnants ofAuschwitz, and StateofException.
In LaCapra'sopinion,Agambenfollowsa paththatleads onlyto increasingly bombastic
theoretical claims:"Agambenhas recently risentoprominence inthefieldofcriticalthe-
ory,andthereis a sensein whichhe seemsconstrained to raisethestakesor 'up theante'
is
(which alreadyastronomically in
high) theoretically daring,jarringlydisconcerting
claimsifhe is to makea significant markas a majortheorist" [133]. On theotherhand,
has
NegribelievesthatAgamben notcompletely abandoned the taskofassessingforceas
"a positiveidea ofredemption" butwavers in attitude between a "nocturnal aspect"and
"creativeupsurgesofbeing"[117].However,Negri convinced Agamben'sinclina-
is that
tiontowardmysticism overascesisresultsin his defining resistancein termsof passive
contemplation rather thanactiverebellionandultimately betraysan inability to "see the
ofchallengesandcreativedispositifs "
worldfromthestandpoint [125].4
One of theadvantagesof Weil's philosophy, by contrast, is thatherstyleof mysti-
cismalwaysresultsin someformofethicalascesisor self-discipline. Far frominsisting
on pure,sublimepotentiality, herpoeticsof passivityanddecreation paradoxically aims
at theethicalreintegration ofthesubjectandtheworld.5In thissense,bydecreating any
reference to theletterofWeil'sthought in hisownwriting, Agambenmaymissa chance
toovercomehisownnihilism. AccordingtoLaCapra,he thusadheresto a viewpoint that
oftenseemsto regardaporiaand paradoxesas if theywerethepremisesof enjoyment
[147].Weilinsteadwelcomedcontradiction as an opportunity toexerciseepistemological
andethicalhumility. In thislight,itis important to understand thecriticaldifferences be-
tweenWeil'sandAgamben'srespective notionsofdecreation andtheethicalandpolitical
implications of theirpositions.As a way of gettingat thisquestion,I will examinethe
symbolic roles theyascribein theirown workto twoverydifferent narrativesof decre-
ation:HermanMelville's"Bartleby, theScrivener"in Agamben'scase and theGrimm
brothers' fairytale,"The Six Swans,"inWeil's.
3Itisfairtosay,as Timothy "' wasnota

Campbellcogently fineessay, Foucault
arguesinhisvery
:
person Idolatry and theImpersonalinRoberto Third
Esposito's Person,"that defini-
Esposito's
tionofthe"impoliticar passesthrough ofWeil's
thestrictures original thinking.
4 A moment earlierin thisessay,NegritellinglyobserveshowAgamben leavesthereaderin
a bleakposition : "Ifyouwishforsomething will
new,you find iton the marginsofbeing.The
eventwillbe mystical ratherthana hardascesiswithin being.Youwillbe leftwithvisionand
contemplation rather andconstruction;
thanactivity inplaceofenjoyment.
ecstasy, Onceagain,
weseeherehowtheheight is interpreted
ofresistance byAgamben thanas a
rather
as passivity
rebellion, represented byBartlebyratherthan Malcolm X, byhomo sacer than
rather theslave
ortheproletariat "
[123].
5It is no accident thatEspositogivestoan entire chapterofCategorie thetitle
dellimpolitico
"Politicadell'ascesi"
[189-244].
FromDecreationto Bare Life/AlessiaRicciardi 77
2
ParablesofDecreation
The factthatWeiloffers severaldefinitions ofdecreation can makeitdifficult forreaders

to squaretheobscurity of herideas with"thebrilliant self-assertiveness" of herproject
of truth-telling [Carson171]. Weil's seminaldefinition occursin Gravityand Grace:
"Decreation:to makesomething createdpass intotheuncreated. Destruction: to make
something createdpass intonothingness. A blameworthy substitutefordecreation" [78].
Rootingheridea ofdecreation in an actoforigination or naturalization thatsheopposes
to theannihilatory workof "destruction," she precludesanypossibility of a systemati-
callynihilistic readingofherposition.6 In linewithherexperience ofmystical revelations
at theend of the 1930s,she seemsin theidea of decreation to affirm thepossibility of
graceattainedthrough a rigorousmeasureof self-denial. As she presentsit,decreation
amounts toabolishing theselfso thatGodcanbe everything. Thisprocessofself-purgation
occurs,however, notthrough an actofwillbutrather as theresultofgracerealizedinthe
workof attention. Attention, notwill,was forWeiltheprayerof thesoul,as it was for
Malebranche.Siân Miles definesWeil's notionof decreationas "an impersonal instru-
mentality" in responseto theimageof "theblindman'sstick"proposedbythephiloso-
pherherself in hernotebooks[35].
EspositoinvokesWeil'sthought as a firstprinciplein Categoriedell'impolitico and
Terzapersona. In a chapterof theformer, entitled"Politicsof Ascesis,"he extolsher
achievement ofdelineating theimpolitical inthenotionofdecreation, whichWeildefines
as an "activepassivity"in accordancewiththeideal of a passivepoweror potentiality.
Ofparticular importance tohisargument is Weil'srejection ofvoluntarism in Waitingfor
God [Attente de Dieu] and theexaltation of themysticalobedienceexemplified by Lao
Tse and theBhagavatGita [Categorie209]. Seen in thislight,decreation wouldappear
to coincidewiththestateof mindthatensuesfromreceptiveattention or waiting[at-
tente],whatwe mightthinkof as desirewithoutan object.Such a conditionrepresents
notthepassivityof inertiabutrathera suspensionof thinking thatis "permeableto the
to
object,"according Esposito[Categorie211]. On this reckoning, decreation does not
lead to indifference butrather toWeil's"impolitical" principle of "action non agissante,"
theconviction articulatedin La connaissancesurnaturelle thatphilosophy mustbecome
praxis.We oughttonoticehowidiosyncratic thisnotionofpraxisis inherthought. In her
latework,Weilmethodically the
emphasizes objective,impersonal of
aspect philosophy
at theexpenseofthesubjective, personaldimension. Consequently, sheredefines action
in termsof liberation fromone's own subjectivity, thusexaltinga stateof passivitythat
maybe saidto respondto necessity. ForEsposito,themostimportant questionraisedby
Weilis howwe can achievethisideal of actionas "passivepower"[potenzapassiva], a
questionthatclearlyhas implications forlaternotionsofpotentiality [Categorie214].
It is notso easy,however,to dispelwhatwe mightcall thenegativehalo of ascet-
ismfromWeil'sthought, as sheherselfcharacterizes thelogicof decreation in religious
termsas God's "waitingforouracceptancenotto exist"[Gravity 78]. The negationat
theheartof thisformulaappearsto anticipate Agamben'sparadoxicalinterpretation of
6Evenher herthought
as unfortunately
nihilistic
first
biographer,
Jacques Cabaud,regarded ,as he
ina radiointerview
confessed inthe1960s.Indeed, Weil's
notion
ofdecreationis questionablein
many Forexample
respects. , inelucidating
theconcept,shedoesnothesitate
toexpress herthought
inwhattodaymightbelookeduponwith somejustification
as extremely
datedandsexist terms: "A
very woman
beautiful wholooksatherreflection inthemirrorcanverywellbelievethatsheisthat.
Anuglywoman knows "
thatsheis notthat [Gravity79].
potentiality as thepotential nottobe,although thetwothinkers ultimately adopttwovery
different pointsof view,as we shallsee.7Moreover,shortlyafterdrawingthecontrast
betweendecreation anddestruction in Gravity and Grace, shefallsbackon thelanguage
of nothingness to explainherphilosophical ideal. The imitation of Christ,she declares,
shouldbringus to a kenosisor an emptying ourselvesoffalsedivinity thatallowsus "to
becomenothing. . . once we haveunderstood we are nothing"[80]. She even seemsto
evokethe"darknightof thesoul" of St. Johnof theCrosswhenshe typifies decreation
as "thedeathofthesoul" [86]. In keepingwiththisemphasison penitence as thebasisof
ethicalexperience, sheadds:"It is necessaryto uprootoneself.To cutdownthetreeand
makeofita cross,andthentocarryiteveryday"[86]. In otherpassagesofherexposition
of decreation, she underscores theurgencyof withdrawal fromone's egoisticimpulses
in order"torespectthetêteà tête"betweenGod andhisbeings[88],to assure"thatGod
maymakecontactwiththebeingswhomchanceplaces in mypathandwhomhe loves"
[88],andtoeliminate the"I" whointerposes herselfas an "unwelcomethird. . . withtwo
betrothed lovers"[89] .
As AnneCarsonrightly pointsout,Weil'sdoctrinein manywaysevokesthemysti-
cism of themedievalFrenchhereticMarguerite Porete,who died in 1310 and whose
treatiseon divineloveentitled TheMirrorofSimpleSoulscalls forthe"annihilated soul"
torenounceeverything butGod,"torender backtoGod whatGod hasgivenher"[Carson
167]. In Carson'ssuggestive phrasing, Weil imaginestherelationbetweenGod and the
self-interested believeras an exampleofjealousy,which"is a dancein whicheverybody
movesbecause one of themis alwaysextra- threepeople trying to siton two chairs"
[168-69]. Decreationon thisview represents "an undoingof thecreaturein us" [179].
Preciselybecauseoursubjectivebeingis whatstandsin thewayofcommunion withthe
divine,Weilinsistson self-effacement andyearns"to see a landscapeas itis whenI am
notthere. . . WhenI am in anyplace,I disturbthesilenceof heavenand earthby my
breathing and thebeatingof myheart"[Gravity89; ellipsisin orig.].She contendsthat
bytakingsuchself-effacement to itsultimate extreme, itbecomespossibleto achievea
reversaloftheobjectiveinthesubjective, ofpositiveandnegative, lowerandhigher:"So
we havetodie inordertoliberatea tiedup energy, in ordertopossessan energywhichis
freeandcapableofunderstanding thetruerelationship of things"[Gravity 81]. Through
thisdialecticalreversal,we mayfreeourselvesfromthe"inverted" conditionof sininto
whichwe arebornandlearn"not[to]wishforthedisappearance of anyofourtroubles,
butgraceto transform them"[Gravity81, 82]. For Weil,theacceptanceof "physical
sufferings (and privations)" by "menof courage"providesan imperfect imageof the
"completely passive manner" of those penitents who have gainedinsight "thetrue
into
of
relationship things" and thus into their proper relation to God, a knowledgethatallows
themto "be a testimony, livedandfelt,ofhumanmisery"[Gravity 82]. In herview,even
"pleasure,happiness, prosperity . . . likewise bear testimony to human misery"[Gravity
82]. To live bythislessonis thetaskthatshe assignsus, theinstrumental horizonof the
otherwise passiveprocess ofdecreation: "We must become nothing, we must go downto
thevegetative level; it is then that God becomes bread" [Gravity 83]. This instrumental-
ismshouldnotresultina viewofothercreatures as ends,butrather ina recognition ofthe
essentialnatureof all createdthingsas intermediaries thatare connectedto one another
andto theircreator:"Theyareintermediaries leadingfromone to theother,andthereis
no endto this.Theyareintermediaries leadingto God" [Gravity 200].
7Paradoxically, Weil's
whocharacterizes
itisEsposito ina manner
decreation thatis notdissimilar
from thatemerges
thedefinition inAgamben's Weil's
essay.Interpreting concept,
Esposito considers
it"anactivity
thatcannotberesolved andthatremains
inaction, . . .potential"
[Categorie 209].
In Weil'sfavorite parableof decreation, whichshe returns to repeatedly from1925
untiltheend of herlife,suchself-abnegation indeedservesa relationalpurpose.In the
Brothers Grimm'sfairytale,"The Six Swans,"an evil stepmother transforms six broth-
ers intoswans.Theirsistercan return themto theirhumanformonlyby consenting to
sew together six shirtsforthemoutof starwort whilenotspeakingor laughingforsix
years,a taskthatshe fulfills graciously amidtheworstkindof harassment andpersecu-
tionfromthestepmother. Indeed, afternumerous complicated events, thesister is about
to be burnedat thestake,butshe bringsherhandiwork withherand completesthesix
shirtsshortly beforeherexecutionis orderedto takeplace at theendoftheallottedsix-
yearperiod.8 In thesister'sreadinessto die as a martyr toherduty, Weilsees a parableof
decreation, interpreting thesister'srenunciation oflanguageandendurance ofall adver-
sitiesin orderto save herbrothers as an actof passiveresistance to theevil stepmother.
According toWeil,to actin silence,albeitpassively,is theonlywayto acquireeffective
power[Pétrement 80; cf.Esposito,Categorie214]. The storyencapsulates Weil'sthink-
ingin numerouswaysincludingin itsregressivegenderpolitics,as it places thesister
in thesortof subservient role thatWeil seemedcomfortable withand indeedglorified
throughout mostofherlife.9Throughsilentwork,a category thattoWeilis intrinsically
almostholy,thesistermakesthingshappen.
Agamben'sdefinition ofdecreation is theculminating pointofhisessay"Bartleby, or
On Contingency"; he eventitlesthethirdandfinalsection"The Experiment, or On De-
creation." In thefinalparagraphs oftheessay,he likenstherefusalto workbyMelville's
character Bartleby, whois a "law-copyist" bytrade,to "theinterruptionofwriting [that]
marksthepassageto thesecondcreation, in whichGod summonsall hispotential notto
be" [270]. He elaborateson thisnotionofthe"potential nottobe" withthefollowing par-
adox:"The creationthatis nowfulfilled is neithera re-creation
noran eternalrepetition;
it is, rather,a decreation in whichwhathappenedand whatdid nothappenarereturned
to theiroriginary in
unity themindof God" [270]. Invokingtheparabolicdescription
of Gabrielonce authoredby "a PersianNeoplatonist," whichimaginesthe archangel
equipped with a of
wing purelight that his
represents "BeingwithGod" and a wingof
shadowthatis "turnedtowardnon-Being," Agambenfurthermore declares:"Decreation
is theimmobileflight sustained by the black wing alone. Atthiswing'severybeating, the
actualworldis ledbacktoitsrightnottobe; all possibleworldsareledbacktotheirright
toexistence"[270-71].Whereas"decreation" forWeilnamestheactofself-sacrifice that
allowsus to assumeourproperrelationto ourfellowintermediaries andthusto God,for
Agambenthetermsignifies a moreambivalent hovering betweentheactualandthepos-
sible, between Being and non-Being.
De la Durantaye succinctly differentiates betweenWeil'sandAgamben'spositions:
Decreationis . . .forAgambennotwhatitwasforWeil.It does notinvolveshed-

dingor decreating someinauthentic aspectofourselves-an aspectthatis the
fruitoferror and sin- so as to create.In Weil'shands,decreation
is essentially
dialectical-an antithetical moment thatis partoftheprocessofcreation.For
Agamben , however ; it is something else- somethingthatbringsthecontingent
uwhatcouldhavebeenbutwas not"- intoview" [23]
81am a streamlined
giving summaryofthetale,as Weilonlymakesreference
toitsnucleus.
In its
original
form, thestory a morecomplex
follows courseinwhichthesisterbecomesqueenwhile
sewingtheshirts a prince
after fallsinlovewithherdedication,onlytosee herinfant
children
kidnappedbytheevilstepmother.
9WeshouldnotethatWeilwas
opposedtoa politics
basedonthevindication which
ofrights, she
as tooaggressive
regarded andincompatiblewiththerestofherthinking.
De la Durantaye rightly emphasizesthatdecreation forAgambenis a thought experiment
aimedat proving"thepotential notto be," whichaccordingtoAgambenis the"cardinal
secret"ofAristotle's approachto thequestionofpotentiality in book ThetaoftheMeta-
physics[Agamben,"Bartleby"245]. Without the potential to be, potentiality
not always
already would have passed intoactuality, jeopardizingin so doingthephilosophical con-
sistency of God's act of creation:"In its deepestintention, philosophy is a firmassertion
of potentiality,theconstruction of an experienceof thepossibleas such" ["Bartleby"
249]. On theotherhand,Weilequatescontingent possibility withthe"merelyparticular"
andinsistson ourneedto payattention to the"completeness ofbeing"[Gravity197].
Although Weil'stheory of decreation does notprivilegetheroleof contingency per
se, she shareswithAgambena basic skepticism withrespectto will and necessityas
conduitsto decreation.10 As we haveseen,decreation in hereyesis nota questionofwill
butrather of grace:"All absolutely puregoodnesscompletely eludesthewill.Goodness
is transcendent. God is Goodness"[Gravity 93]. In thislight,graceperhapsmaybe said
to represent a formof supernatural contingency, albeitone imbuedwithethicalor moral
meaning.ForWeil,it is preciselyin thissensethat"possibility impliesnecessity":". . .
[W]e have to discernthecases in which,althoughit does notappearso clearlyat first
sight,thepossibility impliesa necessity. We mustactinthesecases andnotintheothers"
[Gravity 91].11Whilewe fallpreyto chanceon theplaneof immanence, we nonetheless
mayachievecertitude regarding thenecessaryorderof thetranscendent plane.12On this
view,theagonizedcontingency ofourbeingintheworldbecomesinandofitselfan argu-
mentforfaith:"Contradiction aloneis theproofthatwe arenoteverything. Contradiction
is ourwretchedness, andthesenseof ourwretchedness is thesenseof reality"[Gravity
148]. In otherwords,contradiction is an "experimental ontologicalproof'and nothing
lessthana "testofnecessity"[Gravity 151, 152]:"We cannotbysuggestion obtainthings
whichareincompatible. Onlygrace can do that" [Gravity 153].
Incompatible conditionsforWeil becomepossibleor obtainablesolelybecause of
thedevotionthatwe manifest through grace,whereasforAgambensuchconditions sug-
gestper Duns Scotus an of
ontology contingency in the face of which we most fully
experience ourownautonomy:
As Duns Scotusmakesclear,thefactis thatifthereis a contradiction between

twoactual opposedrealities(beingP and not-being P), nothingkeepsa thing
frombeing actual and, at thesame time, maintaining potentialnottobe or to
its
be otherwise.. . .Accordingtothelapidary formulawithwhichhe expressesthe
onlypossiblemeaningof human freedom , "he whowillsexperiences hiscapac-
notto "
will vultse non
ity [expertitur qui posse velie].["Bartleby"262]
In spiteoftheethicalandpsychological
dissimilarityof theirviews,WeilandAgamben
holdin common that a
involves
decreation renunciation oftheprincipleofreason.How-
forAgamben
ever,ifsucha renunciation in
results a liberationfrom bothBeingand not
10"Ourethical hasoften
tradition sought toavoidtheproblem byreducing
ofpotentiality, ittothe
themes ofwill
and Not what
necessity. " you do, can butwhat youwant todo or must do,is itsdomi-
nanttheme" "
[Agamben, Bartleby 254].
11Ina chapterdedicatedtotheimportance ofchance,Weil
forexample writes:"Thebeings I love
chance " a rhetoricnotfarfrom Freud's
arecreatures.Theywerebornby 160].Adopting
[Gravity "
in "OnTransience," shealsoprovestobesensitive ofchance: Thevulnerability
totheaesthetics
ofpreciousthings becausevulnerability
is beautiful ofexistence"
is a mark [Gravity161].
12ThatWeilidentifieschancewithchaosmorethanwith becomes
potentiality clearinTheNeedfor
Roots,where shelistsorder goalofa possiblenewcoming
as thefirst civilization.
Beinginviewofa newontology ofthepossible["Bartleby" 259],itimpliesforWeila re-
cuperation of,and a renewal of our engagement with, God's creation.Indeed,as sheputs
it,"human lifeis impossible . . . our life is impossibility, absurdity" [Gravity147, 148].
The distancebetweenAgambenandWeilperhapsmaybestbe measuredby comparing
theirchosennarrative exemplarsof decreation. WhereasWeil exaltstheself-sacrificial
laborof thesisterin "The Six Swans,"Agambenemphasizestherefusalby Melville's
Bartleby ofhisemployer'srequeststo perform hisjob, a rebuff thathe deliverswiththe
celebrated refrain "I wouldprefer notto."Although Bartleby'sstoryendsgrimly withhis
on of
jailing charges vagrancy and his eventual death he
by starvation, comes Agam-in
ben'seyesto embodythepotential notto be. Accordingly, theItalianphilosopher reads
Bartleby'sdemisein a relatively optimistic veinas a sortof ontologicalvictory. In the
courtyard oftheprisonwherehe is confined, Melville'sprotagonist representsa creature
who"knowsperfectly well 'whereitis'" and whoinhabitsa place that,as Agambenre-
mindsus,hisformer employer typifies as "notso sad a place. . . . Thereis skyandthere
is grass"[271].13
In otherwords,the discrepancy betweenAgamben'sinterpretation of Melville's
shortstoryandWeil'sreadingoftheBrothers Grimm'sfairytalemaybe summarized as
thedistinction betweentwodivergent viewsof therelationbetweentheindividualand
theworldofethicalworkoraction.IfAgamben'soutlookidealizesthetriumph ofcontin-
gencyandtheinoperative, Weil'sextols"themysticism of work"andthemoresubdued
triumph of "reality"in a relationalworld,because,as she putsit,"love needsreality,"
invoking withthelatterterma notionof centralimportance in herwork[Gravity114].14
So we mightconcludethatAgambenis rightnottociteWeilinhisremarks on decreation,
as he seemsto havein minda fundamentally different notion,an experience thatis more
a philosophical experiment thana spiritual orethicalcommitment. In responsetoAgam-
ben'spreference fora politicsofpassivity overrebellion, Negriobservesdamningly that,
particularly inAgamben'slaterwritings, "resistance is . . . represented byBartleby rather
thanMalcolmX, byhomosacer rather thantheslave or theproletariat" [123]. Withre-
spect to this we
point, may conclude that the sister in "The Six Swans" providesa better
modelof politicalengagement in as muchas she respondsto a moralchallengeor duty
through thepurposeful activity ofwork,rather thanthrough visionandcontemplation.
Yet we also mayfindit difficult to resistthetemptation to viewWeilherselfat the
endof herlifein Englandas a figurewho startlingly conjuresup theimageof Bartleby
in a number oftantalizing ways. As several biographies havenoted,WeilfledtheUnited
Stateswhereherparentshadfoundrefuge, in
arriving EnglandinNovember1942tojoin
Charlesde Gaulle'sbranchoftheFrenchResistanceknownas theFreeFrench.It is well
established, however, thatherplanofforming a platoonoffrontline nurseswas dismissed
by de Gaulle himself, who,uponlearning of the idea,reportedly exclaimed,"Butshe is
13Inhisreading ofMelville's "

,Agamben
story noticeablyskipsthesections where Bartleby'scalm
disdain"crystallizes
intoa moreassertive as when his rote "
" form ofrefusal, forexample replyof I
would prefernotto inanswer tothenarrator'squestionschanges tothemoredirect"Atpresent
I prefer
togivenoanswer"[.Melville 57].Agamben furthermore dismisses asfeebly psychological
thenarrator'sjustification
forBartleby'sbehavior
inhisexperience as a clerkintheDead Letter
OfficeinWashington, DC, ufromwhich hehadbeensuddenly removed bya changeintheadmin-
istration" 73].Indeed,itmight
[Melville seemthat,at theendofthetale,thenarrator stresses
"
totheunfulfilled " theseletters tointervene inhuman
Bartleby'ssensitivity potentialities
of affairs
andcalamities.Thestoryfamously tone:"Onerrands
endsina regretful oflife,theseletters
speed
todeath. AhBartleby!Ahhumanity" [Melville
74].
14Weil'sloveofreality " "
maybemeasured againstherdisdainfor illusionandhercommitment to
distinguishbetweentheimaginaryandtherealinthespiritual realm. SeeGravity 101.
mad!" [duPlessixGray194];herrequeststoparachute intooccupiedFranceto assistthe
underground fighterswere met withsimilarreactions.With victoryin sightat theendof
1942, the Free French beganconsidering post-war conditions.De Gaulle assignedWeil
thejob ofresponding to suggestionsfromFranceregarding theshapecivilsocietymight
takeaftertheliberation, a taskthatshe fulfilledby writingThe Needfor Roots, a po-
lemicagainstthepoliticsofindividualism andindividualrightsandin favorofdutyand
spiritualobligationsthatFrancinedu PlessixGraydescribesas a visionof "a Christian
socialistUtopia"[201]. Yet in 1943,whileworkingin England,Weil grewdespondent
at thefeelingof beingreducedto therankof a simpleclerkand increasingly refusedto
identifywiththeFrenchResistance.She beganto eat less and less and finallycollapsed
andwas hospitalized withtuberculosis.Recounting Weil's situationas sheneareddeath,
du PlessixGraycharacterizes herattitudeat thetimeas "one of apathyand detachment
ratherthanactiveself-destruction" [208]. In theend,it maybe said thatWeil's lack of
worldliness,herpallor,andanorexicstarvation makehernothing sis-
less thana spiritual
terofBartleby, whomMelville'snarrator describesas "pallidlyneat,pitiablyrespectable,
incurably forlorn"[45-46].
andAnonymity
Impersonality
Althoughthe notionof decreationin Agamben'sphilosophyis substantially different

fromWeil's,thereis one aspectof herthinking thatAgambenshares,especiallyin what
is arguablythemostoptimistic andpolitically forward-looking ofhisworks,namelyThe
ComingCommunity [Negri117].I am thinking ofWeil's stresson theethicalimportance
of impersonality,whichEspositoexploresat lengthin Terzapersona.In hismorerecent
work,itshouldbe noted,Agambenappearsto moveawayfromhisearlyenthusiasm for
and
impersonality anonymity, instead devoting himself to analyzing the riskof desub-
imposedbya régimeofdispositifs
jectification (suchas cell phones,television, personal
computers, to colonizetheordinary
etc.)thatthreatens livesofhumans.15 In TheComing
Community , however, he maybe said to ascribeto beingnotonlya nihilistic gravitybut
also powerin theformof Spinozistvitaltensionsthatcross"theedge of death,"to cite
Negri'smemorable characterization
[117]. Returning to "Bartleby, or On Contingency,"
we oughtto noticethatAgambenelaborateson thisidea of beingas powerwhenhe
proposesthatdecreation involvesan "anthropological change"resulting in thetransfor-
mationofthesubjectinto"a generichomonymous being"[260]. As he presentsit,decre-
ationthusbelongstoa genealogyofpoeticandphilosophical "experiments without truth"
our
thatchallenge accepted conditionsof existence because "they call intoquestionBeing
itself,beforeor beyonditsdetermination as trueor false" [260]. His examplesof such
experiments, whichincludethewritings of Melville,the Swiss authorRobertWalser,
Cavalcanti,Dante,Condillac,Kleist,Rimbaud,and Heidegger,all enactexperiencesof
desubjectificationin whichthefirst-person "I" ofthought is replacedwithan inessential
"thirdperson,"as Agambenputsit à proposof Dante's assertion mi son un Rim-
baud's"je estunautre," andseveralothercases [Agamben,"Bartleby"260].
In TheComingCommunity, Agambeninsistson thepivotalrolesof anonymity and
impersonality in our experience,thelatter of which is a notion as
that, Esposito recent-
ly arguesin TerzaPersona, is crucialto understanding Weil's thought. For bothWeil
15SeeAgamben
Checos'èundispositivo?
andAgamben,"impersonality" impliesrespectfor,ratherthanrejectionof,singularity.
Agamben dubs thisimpersonalbeing-to-comethe"whatever"or quodlibetbeing,ex-
at
plaining the of
verybeginning The ComingCommunity thattheLatinphrasequodlibet
ensoriginally
meant,
. . . not"being,itdoes notmatter which," butrather"beingsuchthatitalways

matters.". . . TheWhatever inquestionhererelatestoa singularitynotinitsin-
with
difference respect to a common property (to a concept,
forexample:being
red, beingFrench,beingMuslim),butonlyin itsbeingsuchas itis. Singularity
is thusfreedfromthefalse dilemmathatobligesknowledge to choosebetween
theineff abilityoftheindividualand theintelligibility
oftheuniversal.[1]
In a morearrestingly Weilianformulation, Agambenidentifies singularitywith"theLov-

able,"an attribute thatemergeswhen"being-such , whichremainsconstantly hiddenin
thecondition ofbelonging('thereis anx suchthatitbelongsto/) andwhichis innoreal
waya predicate, comesto lightitself'and thusstandsrevealedas "whatever youwant,
thatis,lovable"[Community 2] . Consideredfroma sociopolitical perspective,theimper-
sonalityof the"whateversingularity" seemsto possesstheanarchicpotential to elude,
to subvert,andto opposetheorganizedpowerof thestate,as Agambencontendsin the
sectionof thebook dedicatedto theprotests in TiananmenSquarein 1989,demonstra-
tionsthathe observeswereeffective forthemostpartby virtueof theirlack of specific
demands[Community 85-86].
For his Frenchpredecessor, however,theabandonment of thepersonas a juridical
andspiritual category is a necessarystepon thewaytowardnotthevindication ofrights,
whichcan be accomplished onlythrough force,butrather theconfidence thatjusticewill
prevail.In Weil's thought, thesingularity of thehumanbeing,heruniquecharacter, is
whatemergesby embracing theimpersonal, whichis whatall humanbeingsshare.As
Weilsees it,farfrombeingthedomainof desiresand wishes,theimpersonal is thees-
sentialdimensionof ourexistence,whichis subjectto dutyand obligationsas theonly
certaintraitsď unionamonghumanbeings.In thissense,as Espositosuggests, thecom-
munity imaginedby Weil is founded on the of
concept duty[Terzapersona 126]. In a
typical conflationof the religious and the political,Weilin theessay"HumanPersonal-
ity" declaresthat the
only impersonal or theanonymous is sacredandonlyinthenameof
thesacred,rather thanof legalrights, canjusticebe obtained.16 By contrast,
Agamben's
community is foundednotonlyon an elusiveontologicalor religiousimperative, but,
in a somewhat unexpected turn,on thecheerfulness of a newformof socialityin which
evenadvertising andpornography appearto be premisedon "a commonand absolutely
exposedsingularity" [Community 50, 64-65].
SincehumanbeingsinAgamben'seyeshaveno essenceordutytorealize,theironly
ethicalimperative is toexperience theirownpotentiality byrefusing toreducetheirpow-
ernotto be to whatAgambenrefersto as a "substance," by which he meansa historical,
or
spiritual, biological essence or foundational principle[Community 43-44]. Although
in certainrespectshe maybe said to followWeil's lead as to theimportance of theim-
personal, Agamben at the same time the
deprives category of the characteristics
thatshe
regarded as itsmost essential: specifically,itsclaim on our ethical attention
and mystical
intensity.
16AnEnglishtranslation" " canbe

of HumanPersonality foundinMiles49-78.Onthisquestion
,
seeEsposito,
Terzapersona124.
4
FromForcetoBareLife
As we havenoted,Agambenmakesno reference to SimoneWeilin hisdevelopment of

theconceptof decreation in thelastsectionof "Bartleby, or On Contingency." Evenhis
celebratedtheoryof homosacer, whichappearsto derivegenealogically froma legal
doctrine formulated byPompeius Festus in On theSignificance of Words as "theunpun-
ishability of his killingsand the ban on his is an
sacrifice," notwithout important con-
ceptualrelationship to Weil's thought, specificallyto heremphasison theidea of force
[HomoSacer 73].17It mightevenbe said thatthehostilereceptions thatthewritings of
bothhaveencountered haverevolvedaroundsimilarcriticisms, notwithstanding thefact
thatAgamben'sresearchis moreexplicitly politicalandjuridical.In bothcases,skeptical
readersobjectto whattheyregardas thedistasteful fatalismof an ahistorical scenario
thatdeniesthepossibility of progressin thefaceof theeternally recurring specterof a
malignant sovereignty.18
UnlikeAgamben,Weil also has been attackedforherunwillingness to distinguish
betweennaturalandpoliticalforce.AthanasiosMoulakis,forexample,thinks thatWeil's
inability to distinguish societyfromnatureultimately precludedherfromdevelopingan
effective pars construens forherphilosophy[155]. Yet we mightarguein thewakeof
Catherine Malabou's recentworkthattheprofileof thecontemporary victimsof social
traumashas changedin sucha way thattheirmodern-day conditionis preciselyto be
deprivedof anyrolein meaningful politicaldialecticor,in otherwords,to be consigned
to a territory whereit is impossibleto distinguish betweenthenaturaland thepolitical
[Malabou260]. Weil's equivocations on thegenealogyof forceoughtto be considered
in thislightnotas a symptom ofhernaïveté,butofheralmostprophetic criticalacuity.
Agamben,who tracesthecontemporary formsand practicesof politicaland legal
powerbackto theirpointsof originin ancientRome,refusesto embraceeventhemod-
eratehistorical structuralism offered by Foucault'stheoryof different "epistemes."The
Italianphilosopher prefers instead to sustain a pessimisticnotion ofbiopolitics, thusrun-
ning the riskof naturalizing the notion of power as well. Agamben seems to be waryof
thisriskwhenhe writesinHomoSacer that"oncemodernpoliticsentersintoan intimate
symbiosis withbarelife,itlosestheintelligibility thatstillseemstous tocharacterize the
juridico-politicalfoundation of classicalpolitics"[120]. In thiswork,Agambenfamously
definesbarelifeas thecorrelative ofthecondition ofhomosacer."Barelife... is thelife
ofhomosacer (sacredman),whomaybe killedand yetnotsacrificed ' .
[8]
Itis wellknownthataftergrowing disenchanted withsyndicalism duetoherpercep-
tionofitsbureaucratic character,WeilturnedagainstMarxismas a doctrine andcameto
believethattheoppressiveeffects of forcewerenotlinkedto a specificsocioeconomic
order.In "Reflections Concerning theCauses of Libertyand Social Oppression," how-
ever,Weilascribesmeritto Marxismwhenitperforms whatshe considerstheessential
17Offundamental toAgamben's
importance concept ofbarelife isBenjamin's
, ofcourse, notionof
blosseLeben.
18Itis thatWeil, whoregarded theRomanEmpire as a precursor wasada-
noteworthy ofNazism,
mantly opposedtotheRoman which
juridicaltradition, inheropinion wasresponsible
forhaving
transformedhuman beingsintothings. In thissense,Agamben's focuson thelegalcategory of
homosacermaybesaidtoconfirm Weil's prejudice.Weilfeltthatitwaswrong topraiseRome for
having givenus thenotionoflegalrights, becausesuchrights weredefined intheempire'slegal
codeprimarilyintermsofan owner's right touse and abuse property,which meant
chiefly slaves.
Formoreonthistopic, see Weil,"La personne etle sacré."
taskof revolutions:"theemancipation notof menbutof productive forces"[42]. She
providesan accountofforcein thesameessaythatin somerespectsimplicitly beginsto
anticipatethetenorofAgamben'sreflections on barelifein Homo Sacer. Her analysis
ofthe"fatality"of powerthatdetermines therelationbetweenthosewhocommandand
thosewhoobey,forexample,culminates in a recognitionofthelatteras individuals who
"haveneverceasedtobe goadedtoworkbysomeoutsideforceandon painofalmostim-
mediatedeath"["Reflections" 65, 79-80].19As itis forAgamben,thought forWeilseems
to representtheonlyfeasibleremedyto thebare lifeof excessiveforce;yetfarfrom
suggesting thevitacontemplativa of potentiality,"thought" in Weil's lexiconappearsto
be synonymous with"freedom" in thesensethatit allowsus to deducewhat"sequence
of means"willprovemosteffective in reachingourdesiredends ["Reflections" 85]. As
we willsee,thedivergence betweentheviewsofWeilandAgambenon thisscorecorre-
spondstothoroughly differentattitudes withrespecttothenecessity ofengagement with
contemporary social and politicalconditions and our for
hopes resisting oppression.In
fact,as Žižekrightly the of
putsit, implication Agamben'sanalysis of homo sacer "is not
the
thatwe shouldfightfor inclusion of the excluded, but thathomo sacer is the'truth'
ofall ofus" [125].
AfterFrance'ssurrender to Germany in 1940 andin thewakeofherexperienceas a
workerin thefactories ofAlsthom, Renault,andCarnaud,theconceptofforceinWeil's
writing appearsto namea setofconditions thatevenmorecloselyapproximates theab-
jectionofbarelife.Iftheimplicitthreat ofdeathunderliesherdefinition in
offorce "Re-
flectionsConcerning theCauses of Libertyand Social Oppression,"as AlexanderIrwin
observes[52-53], she makesthisthreatexplicitin "The Iliad, or thePoem of Force"to
sucha degreethatthephenomenology offorcedelineatedintheessayclearlyprophesies
Agamben'semphasison thedeathcampas thenomosof modernity. Aptlysummarizing
thisphenomenology in theopeningsentencesof theessay,Weil writes:"The truehero,
thetruesubject,thecenterof theIliad is force.Forceemployedby man,forcethaten-
slavesman,forcebeforewhichman'sfleshshrinks away.... To defineforce- itis thatx
"
thatturnsanybodywhois subjectedto itintoa thing [3]. Beyondtheforcethatdirectly
kills,Weilrecognizesa diversified continuum ofprocessesforthesubjugation ofhuman
beingsto a dehumanized state:
How muchmorevariedin itsprocesses, howmuchmoresurprising in itseffects

is the. . .forcethatdoes notkill,i.e.,thatdoes notkilljustyet.It willsurelykill,
itwillpossiblykill,orperhapsitmerely hangs,poisedand ready,overthehead
of the creature it can kill,at anymoment, whichis to say at everymoment. ...
Fromitsfirstproperty ( theabilityto turna humanbeingintoa thingby the
simplemethodofkillinghim)flowsanother, quiteprodigioustooinitsownway,
theabilityto turna humanbeingintoa thingwhilehe is stillalive. ... A man
standsdisarmedand nakedwitha weaponpointingat him;thispersonbecomes
a corpsebeforeanybodyor anything toucheshim.Y'lliad' 4-5]
WhatmakestheIliad a uniquelyenduring poeticachievement or simply"a miracle,"as

that"springsfromthesubjections
Weilputsit,is itseloquencein voicingthebitterness
19Aswehaveseen, NegriraisesthequestionofwhyAgamben focusesonthecondition ofhomo

sacerratherthanonthatoftheslaveorthehistorical
example a
of revolutionary such as Malcolm
X whenconsidering powerandforms
constituted ofresistance thatinWeil's
. Itis significant writ-
offorceis ambiguous,
ings,evenifthenotion thatshecitesas examples
thefigures ofitsvictims
slavesandwarriors-
andforemost,
are,first thatare,inotherwords,
categories moreinherently
than
political theonechosenbyAgamben.
of thehumanspiritto force"[33] or,in otherwords,theepic's seemingly inexhaustible
capacity to evoke "the natureof force,"whichis "the of
power converting a manintoa
thing"[26].
Weilexpoundson thisparadoxicalnatureof forceto transform a livinghumanbe-
ing intoa thing in anotherarresting
passage that in
presages important waysAgamben's
definitionsof theMuselmann["theMuslim"]in Remnants ofAuschwitz as "themoving
threshold in whichmanpassedintonon-man"[47] and in Homo Sacer as "an absolute
indistinctionof factandlaw,of lifeandjuridicalrule,and of natureandpolitics"[185].
Examiningat lengththedebasement of thedefenseless"stranger"
who is thrown at the
mercyofa warrior, sheremarks:
. . . [H]isfleshhas lostthatveryimportant property whichin thelaboratory

distinguishes livingfleshfromdead- thegalvanicresponse.Ifyougivea frog's
leg an electricshock, ittwitches. Ifyouconfront a humanbeingwiththetouch
or sightofsomething horribleor terrifying , thisbundleofmuscles,nerves , and
fleshlikewisetwitches. Aloneofall livingthings , thesuppliantwe havejustde-
scribedneither quiversnortrembles. . . . Pushed,they fall.Fallen,theylie where
theyare. . . . No, theyare anotherhumanspecies,a compromise betweena man
and a corpse.Theidea ofa person'sbeinga thingis a logicalcontradiction. Yet
whatis impossiblein logicbecomestruein life.["Iliad" 6, 8]
RecallingPrimoLevi's reflections onthefigure ofderMuselmann inthecamps,Agamben

confronts us withtheimageof"a beingfromwhomhumiliation, horror, andfearhad so
takenawayall consciousness andall personalityas tomakehimabsolutely apathetic. ...
Muteandabsolutelyalone,he has passedintoanotherworldwithout memory and with-
outgrief.. . . Can one sayitis purezoei Nothing'natural'or 'common,'however, is left
in him;nothing animalor instinctual remainsin his life"[HomoSacer 185]. By claim-
ing thatthecamp represents thenomosof modernity, Agambenevidentlyascribesan
emblematic value to boththehistorical factof thecampsas well as to thefigureof the
Muselmann[HomoSacer 166-88];inthisexactsense,Western politicsis forAgambena
biopoliticsfrom itsveryinception[Homo Sacer 181]. In Weil'scase as well,ourhistori-
cal actionsultimately becomeinextricable fromthebiologicalnecessities ofoursurvival,
for"suchis theempireofforce,as extensiveas theempireofnature"["Iliad" 10].Andit
is intermsofthislogicthatWeil'sandAgamben'spositionsbecomecongruent, as nature
andpoliticsinbothcases becomeindistinguishable.
A politicsthatconcernsitselfonlywithbarelifecannotbe classical,suggests Agam-
ben,as itnowconfronts the"absoluteimpossibility" of adjudicatingbetweentheruleof
law and thestateof exceptionand thuscannotadvancebeyond"thedecisionconcern-
ing theunpolitical"[HomoSacer 173]. Along similarlines,we mightsay thatWeil's
approachin heressay on theIliad and "Reflections Concerning theCauses of Liberty
and Social Oppression"is "unpolitical" or impoliticainotin thepositivesenseof a de-
constructive questioning of acceptedpoliticalcategories,whichEspositocalls forin his
seminalCategoriedell'impolitico, butin a moretragicfashion.For Weil's perspective
ensuesfroma uniquelypessimistic understanding of whatitmeansto be human,a con-
victionthat"superhuman virtue"wouldbe requiredto achieveeven"a moderate use of
force"["Iliad" 20]. In hereyes,thebrutality of warhas become,froman anthropologi-
cal standpoint, thenorm,justas thestateof exceptionhas becomethejuridicalnormin
Agamben's view. The onlygenuinespace of reliefemergesas theresultnotso muchof
a morecreativepolitics,butrather ofrare"moments of grace"["Iliad" 30] in whichthe
murder of a familymemberor friend"no longercriesoutforvengeance"["Iliad" 29].
Yetevensuchmiraculous visitations ofpeace onlysucceedin reminding us "withsharp
what it is thatviolence has killed and will kill Iliad" Like
regret again" [" 30]. Agamben,
Weilsees ourmortality underthisshadowof violenceas havingnothing to do withthe
redemptive or propitiatory purposeof sacrifice, as theparadigmatic examplesof human
natureon whichWeildwellsarevictimsforwhom"no comforting fictionintervenes; no
of Iliad" . to thiscondition of
consolingprospect immortality" [" 4] According her, living
like a captivebeforeexecution,of havingabandoned"even thefeelingof anger"[10],
persistsinmoremutedfashionintomoderntimesthrough theexperience oftheindustrial
worker whosewaitfordeathmerelyhasbeenprotracted inthenameofincreasedproduc-
tivity.In thissense,it is Weil(and notBataille,who was so committed to an eroticized
notionofsacrifice) whomostfullyforeseestheproblematic encapsulated byAgambenin
thenotionofbarelife.
Withthisnotion,Agambenindeedseemsto extendmanyof theimplications and
claimsofWeil'sidea offorce,bothof whichrepresent theahistorical of
premise nega-a
tivepolitics."In thelongrunall forceoriginates in nature," as Weilputsitinthe"Reflec-
tionsConcerning theCausesofLibertyandSocial Oppression"[63]. The ambivalenceof
Weil'stheory offorcebetweenthenaturalandthesocialmakesitan evenless politically
"pure"construct thanAgamben'saccountof theprimalsceneof self-contradiction sur-
rounding PompeiusFestus's interpolation of homosacer intoRomanlaw [HomoSacer
71-74]. For thisreason,it is alwayseasierto come to gripswithWeil's philosophyin
moralrather thanpoliticalterms,as RichardH. Bell has noted[30]. At anyrate,in both
Weil's andAgamben'sthought, thebasic social modelis groundedin theexperienceof
lifeunderthethreat ofa violentdeaththatcategorically is deniedsacrificial meaning.For
Agambenas forWeil,therevolutionary proposition of Marxismis undonebythismore
primitive reality, accordingto whichtheMuselmannand theprisoner of warhavemore
paradigmatic powerthanthelaborer, as whatis mostcruciallyat stakeintheviewofboth
thinkers is notclass conflict. It is noteworthy thatAgambenin The ComingCommunity
discussesthe"globalization" ofthebourgeoisiein so faras no othersocioeconomicclass
makesan appearancein his thinking. Indeed,he shareswithWeil thefirmbeliefthat
politicsshouldhavenothing to do withparties,classes,orrights;boththinkers areespe-
ciallycriticalof attempts to claimprivilegedlegal rightsforthecitizen.20 For example,
Agambenregardsanydiscussionof rightsà proposof barelifeto be utterly vainin as
muchas ourcontemporary biopolitical contextnowrepresents "a spaceinwhichbarelife
andthejuridicalruleenterintoa threshold of indistinction," where"thenormalorderis
de factosuspended"andthepoliceacquirethepowertocommitatrocities withsovereign
impunity [Homo Sacer 174]. Discussing theIliad, Weil similarly observes thatin a world
"wherethereis no roomforreflection, thereis noneeitherforjusticeor prudence"[14].
She moreovercontendsthattheveryconceptof rightsis divisiveand thatit wouldbe
wiserto speakoftheindividual'sduties.
In Needofa RealisticFormofLife
of hertheoryof forcewitha
Near theend of herlife,Weil followedthe articulation
renewedcommitment to mysticism Althoughwe mayquestiontheulti-
and spirituality.
20Tobetter onthecategories
Weil'sreliance
understand thanthoseof
offorceandjusticerather
and
party class
, see 40-43
Roots and Bell21.
matepoliticalefficacy ofwhatIrwindefinesas "hermysticalanthropology" [70],Weil's
insistenceon attention, education,
receptivity, and decreation aims at achievinga form
of relationalitythatit wouldbe wrongto define,as MaryDietz does, as "antipolitical"
[120-25]. T. S. Eliot addressedthisclaimin his introductionto TheNeedforRoots, in
which,afterobserving thatshe"might have become a saint," concludesthatshewas
he
"moretrulya loveroforderandhierarchy thanmostofthosewhocall themselves Con-
servative,and moretrulya loverof thepeoplethanmostof thosewho call themselves
in theearlymonthsof 1943 beforeherdeathin Augustof
Socialist"[vi,viiii]. Written
thatyear,TheNeedforRootsrepresents Weil'sefforttolocatea remedy forthecondition
of uprootedness, whichrevealsa certainair de famillewithAgamben'snotionof bare
life,throughthesearchfora morecontemporary languageorformoflifeinwhichhuman
dignityandjusticemayprevail.
The depthof herskepticism regarding thesuggestion thatthescientific,secularhu-
manismofmodern-day Westernculturemayprovidethefoundation ofa morejustsociety
perhapscanbestbe gaugedbythepeculiarly equivocaltonewithwhichsheconsiders Hit-
ler'sdictuminMeinKampfthat"forcereignseverywhere andsupreme overweakness":21
Hitlerhas clearlyperceivedtheabsurdity oftheeighteenth century conception,

stillinfavortoday , and whichalreadyhas itsrootsin Descartes.For thelast
twoor threecenturies , people have believedthatforcerulessupremeoverall
naturalphenomena , and at thesame timethatmencan and shouldbase their
mutualrelationsuponjustice Thisis a flagrant
absurdity. It is inconceivable
thateverything in theuniverseshouldbe entirely subjectedto theruleofforce
and thatMan shouldbe able toescape theeffects ofthis.. . .
Thereis onlyonepossiblechoicetobe made.Eitherwe mustperceiveat workin

theuniverse, alongsideforce, a principleofa different
kind, or else we mustrec-
as the
ognizeforce being unique and sovereign ruleroverhumanrelationsalso.
In thefirstcase, oneplaces oneselfin radicaloppositionto modernscienceas

foundedbyGalileo,Descartes,andseveralothers Inthesecondcase,oneplac-
es oneselfinradicalopposition tothehumanism whicharoseintheRenaissance,
triumphed in1789 ,and . . . servedas forthewholeoftheThirdRepublic.
inspiration
Thephilosophy whichhas inspiredthislaical spiritandpoliticalradicalismis

founded at thesame timeon thisscienceand thishumanism , whichare,as can
be seen,manifestly
incompatible witheach other. [Roots241]
Because of hersense of thephilosophicalincoherence of a universethatis governed

simultaneously by the laws of forceand "a principle a different
of kind,"Weil sharply
dismissestheutilitarian and liberalview thatforcemaybe redeemed,on entering the
socialdomain,through itstransformationinto"an automatic of
producer justice"[Roots
243]. In hereyes,justicemustbe an alternativeto force,notitscorollary.
The Frenchphilosopher howeverwas nota professional pacifistand did notdeign
to grapplewiththemessinessof themodernhumanand politicalcondition.22 In an ex-
tremely matter-of-fact
tone, Weil triesin The Need for Roots to imaginewaysof "re-
27It mustbe notedthatinthesame

" pagesWeilunfortunately
creditsHitlerwithan undeserved
flashofgenius" [Roots242].
22"Pacifismis onlycapableofcausingharmwhena confusion arisesbetweentwosortsofaver-
sion;theaversiontokill,andtheaversiontobekilled.
Theformeris honorable
butveryweak;the
almost toacknowledge "
latter, impossible , butverystrong[Roots161].
establishing theworkingclass by theroots,"initiatives thatrejectthe"working-class
imperialism" of Marxismor theruthlessness of capitalism, as neither capitalismnorso-
cialismcan be thecure [73, 152]. She is particularly incisivein exposingthecolonial
mentality underlying themoderndiscussionoftheworkingandunderprivileged classes,
andthroughout thebookprovesto be a harshcriticof colonialism,whichshe identifies
as one of themaincauses of "uprootedness" together withnationalism, thedegradation
ofjustice,theidolizationof money,and,lastbutnotleast,a lackofreligiousinspiration
[219]. Characterizing herlanguagein theend as morerealisticthanmystical, Esposito
suggests that Weil's brand of the"impoliticai"encouragesnota renunciation of action,
butrather a renewaloftheeffort to acteffectively[Categorie215-17]. UnlikeAgamben,
whotakeshiscue fromCarlSchmitt, Weildoes notpursueherinsistence on thecategori-
cal importance offorceandwarto thepointofembracing thetheological-political as the
ultimatepoliticalcategory.
Espositoshrewdly remarks thatevenWeil's mysticism is incompatible withthedi-
the
mensionof theological-political, thanks to her decisive of
rejection idolatry[Catego-
rie 234-35]. Morethanbeinga glorification of thepotentiality notto be or a disguised
versionof the the
theological-political, impoliticaiaspect of Weil's thoughtis indeed
linkedto her"realism,"a category thatshe never tiresof praising in herwritings as the
signofan effective orproductive relationto theworld. Hers is a in
politics, other words,
inspirednotbytheimagination, a categorythatshedespised,norbyideology,butrather
bythelow-key, understated searchfor"thegood" or "theuseful"[Roots200]. Although
"thegood" may notlook like themostobviousideal of a revolutionary new society
in so faras it refersback to thelocus classicusof Aristotelian ethics,Weil's choiceof
wordaptlyreflects heremphasison modesty ofjudgment orself-moderation. She maybe
seento havereachedtheconclusion,less through a prioriapplicationof principles than
through a posterioriobservation ofexperience, oftheneedforan impoliticai politicsthat
respondstothecatastrophes ofcontemporary history withsomething moreliketherepu-
diationof social extremes calledforby Biagio De Giovannithanthedeconstructive re-
fractionofmeaningpracticed bya criticsuchas Esposito.23 To achievetheimpoliticai in
herpreferred sensemeantforWeil,as we mayrecall,"to uprootoneself'in ordertobear
thecrossofourobligations to one another on a dailybasis [Weil,Gravity 86]. Uprooting
theselfin responseto thecollectiveneed forrootswas our supremeresponsibility, as
Weilsaw it.It was withthisresponsibility inmindthatsheaspiredintheendtomoderate
theclaimsofherownphilosophical vocation,to makeherpeace withdwellingincontra-
diction,and,byacceptingthelessonsof humility andreality, to embracethetruth of the
edictthat"love needsreality"[Weil,Gravity114].
23BiagioDe Giovanni wayas the "counterpoint"

in a morelimited
theimpoliticai
defines
[uncontrappunto]
of to
resistancethe
history
oftwentieth-century andviolence
totalitarianism [59].
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FROM DECREATION TO BARE LIFE: WEIL, AGAMBEN, AND THE IMPOLITICAL

Author(s): ALESSIA RICCIARDI

WEIL, AGAMBEN, AND THE IMPOLITICAL

SimoneWeil'scareermaybe dividedintotwoparts.The first, moreovertly politicalpe-

As Lelandde la Durantaye hasobserved,thegenealogyofAgamben'snotionofpotential-

diacritics 39.2(2009)75-93© 2012bytheJohns

3Itisfairtosay,as Timothy "' wasnota

FromDecreationto Bare Life/AlessiaRicciardi 77

The factthatWeiloffers severaldefinitions ofdecreation can makeitdifficult forreaders

FromDecreationto Bare Life/AlessiaRicciardi 79

Decreationis . . .forAgambennotwhatitwasforWeil.It does notinvolveshed-

As Duns Scotusmakesclear,thefactis thatifthereis a contradiction between

FromDecreationto Bare Life/AlessiaRicciardi 81

13Inhisreading ofMelville's "

Althoughthe notionof decreationin Agamben'sphilosophyis substantially different

FromDecreationto Bare Life/AlessiaRicciardi 83

. . . not"being,itdoes notmatter which," butrather"beingsuchthatitalways

In a morearrestingly Weilianformulation, Agambenidentifies singularitywith"theLov-

16AnEnglishtranslation" " canbe

As we havenoted,Agambenmakesno reference to SimoneWeilin hisdevelopment of

How muchmorevariedin itsprocesses, howmuchmoresurprising in itseffects

WhatmakestheIliad a uniquelyenduring poeticachievement or simply"a miracle,"as

19Aswehaveseen, NegriraisesthequestionofwhyAgamben focusesonthecondition ofhomo

FromDecreationto Bare Life/AlessiaRicciardi 87

. . . [H]isfleshhas lostthatveryimportant property whichin thelaboratory

RecallingPrimoLevi's reflections onthefigure ofderMuselmann inthecamps,Agamben

FromDecreationto Bare Life/AlessiaRicciardi 89

Hitlerhas clearlyperceivedtheabsurdity oftheeighteenth century conception,

Thereis onlyonepossiblechoicetobe made.Eitherwe mustperceiveat workin

In thefirstcase, oneplaces oneselfin radicaloppositionto modernscienceas

Thephilosophy whichhas inspiredthislaical spiritandpoliticalradicalismis

Because of hersense of thephilosophicalincoherence of a universethatis governed

27It mustbe notedthatinthesame

23BiagioDe Giovanni wayas the "counterpoint"

FromDecreationto Bare Life/AlessiaRicciardi 91

Agamben,Giorgio."Bartleby, or On Contingency." Potentialities:CollectedEssays in

FromDecreationto Bare Life/AlessiaRicciardi 93

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