Calder vs.
Bull  That no man should be compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to
Doctrine: prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal/criminal statues not civil.
Chase, J
Facts
 1779 Normand Morrison executed a will in favor of Bull and wife, his
grandparents.
 1793 The Court of Probate of Hartford disapproved of the will and refused its
recording.
 Calder and Wife claim their rights as the wife is heiress to N. Morrison as a
physician after the disapproval of the will. By existing laws of Connecticut, wife is
said to have the rights as heiress(not explained how).
 1795 The Legislature of Connecticut passed a resolution or law(May) setting
aside the first negative decree of the court of Probate for Hartford, granting a new
hearing and appeal within 6 months. The new hearing in the Court of Probate now,
approved the will and ordered its recording(July) .
 1795 (Aug) An appeal was had in the Superior Court of Hartford, and in 1796,
The superior court of Hartford affirmed the decree of the Court of Probate.
 And still in 1796, An appeal was gained in the SC of errors of Connecticut who
in June of that year, adjudged, that there were no errors.
 Since it was more than 18 months since the decree of the Court of Probate,
Caleb Bull and Wife were barred of all right of appeal by a statute of Connecticut. But
their will was indeed affirmed so why bother?
 But the plaintiffs Calder and wife had a reason to appeal because the
effect of the resolution was divest the right that accrued to Calder and wife
when the court of Probate denied the will of Norman Morrison. (remember:
the new hearing approved the will affirmed by the superior court and SC of Errors)
 The plaintiffs Calder and wife petitioned the SC and contended that the
resolution made by Connecticut was an ex post facto law, prohibited by the
constitution, therefore, void. The court then had power to declare such law void.
The court will answer the contention of the plaintiffs but whether the Legislature of any of
the States can revise and correct, by law, a decision of any of its Courts of Justice will not
be answered now as the case doesn’t go that far. This is only important if the state’s
constitution does not prohibit the correction or revision. But the ponente gave his opinion.
Plaintiffs argue that the Legislature of Connecticut had no constitutional power
to make the resolution (or law) in question, granting a new hearing, etc
 The ponente said that without giving opinion at this time, whether the court had
jurisdiction to decide that any law made by Congress contrary to the constitution is
void. He is fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction to determine that any law
of any state legislature contrary to the consti is void.(before Marbury cguro to!) And
if they had problems with the laws contrary to State charters or consti, it is within
the state court’s jurisdiction.
Issue
WON the resolution of the Connecticut Legislature is an ex post facto law. NO
 It is accepted that all the people-delegated powers of the Fed. Gov’t are
defined, and it has no constructive powers. So, all the powers that remain in the
State Gov’t are indefinite(trivia:except in Masachusetts). (ex. establishment of the
courts of justice and justices)
 But the Constitution was established for justice, gen. welfare, liberty and
protection of their persons and property from violence. These purposes and
determinants of the nature and terms are the reasons why the people enter into the
social compact. Although not expressly said, they restrain the absolute power of the
legislature(nature of free Republican gov’t). Any act in violation of the social compact
is not a rightful exercise of legislative authority.
refrain from acts which the laws permit.1
 The prohibition against their making any ex post facto laws was introduced for
greater caution because when they were under Great Britain, laws under the
denomination of bills of attainder or bills of pains and penalties were passed. These
acts were legislative and judicial power. (ex. treason when they aren’t in other times
and one witness even when the law required two, all for the “safety of the
kingdom”). SECs 9 and 10 of the US Consti provided this prohibition(see patterson
below for text).
 The prohibition is not to pass any law concerning, and after the fact; but that
the Legislatures of the several states, shall not pass laws, after a fact done by a
subject, or citizen, which shall have relation to such fact, and shall punish him for
having done it.
 This is an additional bulwark in favour of the personal security of the subject, to
protect his person from punishment by legislative acts, having a retrospective
operation. BUT NOT to secure the citizen in his private rights, of either
property, or contracts. If the prohibition of ex post facto laws included personal
rights then why the need for other prohibitions in making only gold and silver the
legal tender and not to pass laws impairing obligations in contracts which are
retrospective. (Wouldn’t it be superfluous?)
 The restriction against ex post facto law was to secure the person of the subject
from injury from such law, enumerated to be laws that:
1. makes an action, which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes it
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed
3. changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law
annexed to the crime, when committed
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different,
testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offence, in order to convict the offender
 Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective(this is the
prohibited); but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law.
 Every law that takes away, or impairs, rights vested, agreeably to existing laws,
is retrospective and unjust, but not all, take for example a pardon. There is a
difference in making an unlawful act lawful and one making it a crime. ( ex post facto
meaning taken by ponente from Wooddeson, Blackstone; Massachusetts’, Maryland’s
and North Carolina’s Constitutions, or forms of Government same as one or two of
the enumerated)
 The prohibition contemplated the fact not to be affected by subsequent law, was
some fact to be done by a Citizen, or Subject. Citing Justice Raymond calling stat. 7
Geo. 1st. stat. 2 par 8, ex post facto because it affected contracts for South Sea
Stock made before the statute.
 In the present case there is no fact done by the plaintiffs, that is
affected by the resolution of the Connecticut. The 1 st decree of the court of
probate was given before the resolution and in that’s sense, they lost what
they were entitled to were it not for the resolution. And the decree was the
only fact that which the resolution affected, this is not within the intention
of the law to be prohibited.
 The framers of the prohibition didn’t intend to include vested rights, or else the
provision “that private property should not be taken for public use without just
compensation” is superfluous/unnecessary. Why need specific prohibition?
 Anyway, the resolution (or law) alone had no manner of effect on any right
whatever vested in Calder and wife. The Resolution combined with the new hearing,
and the decision, in virtue of it, took away their right to recover the property in
question. But when combined they took away no right of property vested in Calder
1 The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they may declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases, but they can’t change innocence to punishable guilt or
violate the rights in contracts and private property.(I don’t know why the ponente said this, when he debunked it anyway)
 and wife; because the 1st decree against the will did not vest in or transfer any
property to them. Because a vested right means that, that person has the power to
do certain actions, possess things according to the law of the land.
 If any one has a right to property such right is a perfect and exclusive right; but
no one can have such right before he has acquired a better right to the property,
than any other person in the world: a right, therefore, only to recover property
cannot be called a perfect and exclusive right. (I think the will was more excl and
perfect as it was valid)
Then Justice Chase is of the opinion that the petition is void. Judgment affirmed.
Patterson, J.
The Connecticut Consti is made up of usages.(I think this means ancient and uniform
practice) He recognizes that eversince the Connecticut Legislature had been able to do
judicial acts(like granting of new trials. Even though in 1762 they imparted this to the
courts, they still retained this right. The imparting didn’t annihilate their power, instead it
only shred the jurisdiction. So the resolution could be seen both ways, either a judicial or
legislative act.
But for the purpose of answering the petition of the plaintiffs, WON the resolution was
an ex post facto law. We will look at this as a judicial act(remember ex post are
legislative).
Using Judge Blackstone’s description 2 and the constitutions of Masachussets3 ,Delaware4 ,
North Carolina 5 and Maryland6, we see that the prohibition of ex post facto laws
applies only in penal statutes.
The 1st Art. in Sec 9 of the US Consti says “No state shall pass any bill of
attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts.” The
framers couldn’t have intended it to include the laws on obligation of contracts
since they had needed to specify it too.
Iredell, J.
He concurs in the result. He dissents only to the reasons used. He argues that the act
of the resolution granting a new hearing couldn’t be legislative. It is definitely judicial. But
supposing it is legislative, it still falls in the prohibition. And even if the court can’t
adjudged it to be void, because they can claim that they acted within their constitutional
power contrary to natural justice. And even if they acted out of their authority, which is
entirely void, the court won’t act on such a delicate and awful nature until it is clearly and
urgently needed.
He also subscribes to the belief that the prohibition only applies to criminal/penal
statues. Because apparently the framers of the constitution intended for Private civil rights
to succumb to Public use.
Still he also finds that there is no case. Because, 1st. if the act of the Legislature of
Connecticut was a judicial act, it is not within the words of the Constitution; and 2nd.
even if it was a legislative act, it is not within the meaning of the prohibition.
Cushing, J.
2 'There is, says he, a still more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws, ex post facto, when after an action, indifferent in itself, is committed, the Legislator, then, for the first time,
declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it. Here it is impossible, that the party could foresee that an action, innocent when it was done, should be
afterwards converted to guilt by a subsequent law; he had, therefore, no cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining, must, of consequence, be cruel and unjust.
3 'Laws made to punish for actions done before the existence of such laws, and which have not been declared crimes by preceding laws, are unjust, oppressive, and inconsistent with the fundamental principles
of a free government.'
4 'That retrospective laws punishing offences committed before the existence of such laws, are oppressive and unjust, and ought not to be made.'
5 'That retrospective laws, punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them
ought to be made.'
6 'That retrospective laws, punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust, and incompatible with liberty; wherefore no ex post facto law
ought to be made.'
There is no problem in the case, in whichever way, they didn’t commit any wrong. If
the resolution is taken to be a judicial act then it is not touched by the FEDERAL
constitution. IF it seen as a legislative act, it is within the ancient and uniform practice of
the state of Connecticut.
Judgment Affirmed.
Lochner vs. New York [1905]
 Plaintiff in error is charged for violating Sec. 110, Art. 8, Chapter 415, Laws of
1897 otherwise known as the Labor Law of the State of New York in wrongfully &
unlawfully requiring & permitting an employee working for him to work more than
60hrs. in one week. Plaintiff in error runs a bakery business & employee involved is a
baker.
 Statute provides that “no employee shall be required/permitted to work more
than 10hrs. per day.” Such is equated to “no employee shall contract/agree to work
more than 10hrs./day.” It’s mandatory in all instances. Statute prohibits such even if
an employee wants to do so to earn extra money.
Issue: WON the statute is unconstitutional. – YES
Ratio: It interferes w/the liberty of person or the right of free contract between employer
& employees by determining the hours of labor in the occupation of a baker without any
reasonable ground for doing so.
 Gen. right to make a contract in relation to one’s business is a liberty
protected by the 14th amendment7 w/c also protects the rt to purchase or to sell
labor.
 However, states have police power w/c relates to the safety, health,
morals & gen. welfare of the public. This power enables the states to regulate both
property & liberty and to prevent the individual from making certain kinds of
contracts and in these instances, the 14 th amendment cannot interfere. And when the
state’s legislature in its exercise of its police power enacts a statute such as the one
challenged in this case, it’s impt to determine w/c shall prevail – rt of individual to
work at the time of his choice or rt of state to prevent the individual from laboring
beyond the time prescribed by law.
 But then, there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power of
the state. The question asked to test the validity of the exercise: “Is this a fair,
reasonable & appropriate exercise of the police power of the state or is it an
unreasonable, unnecessary, & arbitrary interference w/the rt of the individual to his
personal liberty, or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor w/c may seem to
him appropriate/necessary for the support of himself & his family?”
 This law does not in any way affect any other portion of the public so
it can’t be said that it’s done in the interest of the public. It’s a law pertaining to the
health of the individual as a baker. But clean & wholesome bread does not depend on
the length of hours a baker spends at work. Limiting their working hours does not
come w/in the police power of the state.
 Mere assertion that a law slightly relates to public health can’t make it
valid automatically. It must have a more direct relation as a means to an end & the
end itself must be appropriate & legitimate before it can be held to be valid w/c
interferes w/a personal liberty.
 The trade of a baker is not an alarmingly unhealthy one that would
warrant the state’s interference w/rts to labor & contract. As a matter of fact, it’s
never been regarded as an unhealthy one. Besides, almost all occupations more or
less affect the health. There must be more than the mere possibility of some small
amount of unhealthiness to justify legislative interference. To say that a man who’s
not overworked is more likely to be clean and thus producing clean output would be
only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust, and incompatible with liberty; wherefore no ex post facto law unreasonable & arbitrary considering that it’s quite impossible to discover the
7
No state can deprive any person of life, liberty or property w/o due process of law.
 connection between the no. of working hours & the healthful quality of the bread
made by the baker.
Holding: Petition dismissed. Decisions of lower courts reversed. Case remanded to the
County Court for further proceedings not inconsistent w/this opinion.
Harlan, dissenting (White & Day join him):
 Liberty of contract may, w/in certain limits, be subjected to regulations to
promote gen. welfare or to guard the public health, morals or safety.
 A Federal/state legislative enactment can only disregarded/held invalid if it
plainly, palpably & beyond question in excess of legislative power. Otherwise, any
doubt as to its validity must be resolved in favor of its validity & the courts must
keep their hands off, leaving the legislature to meet the responsibility for unwise
legislation. The burden of proof is upon those who assert the statute to be
unconstitutional.
 This statute aims to protect the physical well-being of workers in bakery &
confectionery establishments. Working beyond 60hrs/week may endanger their
health. The court cannot inquire on the wisdom of the legislation. The court can only
inquire whether the means devised by the state have a real/substantial relation to
the protection of health. In this case, the Justice believes that the means used is
related to the end it seeks to accomplish. He believes it does not invade
constitutionally mandated rights. Court goes beyond its functions in annulling this
statute.
 Remember that statute is limited to workers in bakery & confectionery
establishments. The air they constantly breathe is not as pure & healthful as that to
be found in other establishments or outdoors. He cites Prof. Hirt’s treatise on the
“Diseases of the Workers” and the paper of another writer w/c support his belief that
the trade of a baker is an unhealthy one. (see p. 100-101 for text)
 State is not amenable to the judiciary in respect of its legislative enactments
unless clearly inconsistent w/the US Constitution.
Holmes, dissenting:
 Case is decided upon an economic theory w/c a large part of the country does
not entertain.
 State constitutions & laws may regulate life in many ways w/c some may find as
injudicious (unwise), tyrannical & w/c interfere w/the liberty to contract. Ex. Sunday
laws, usury laws, prohibition of lotteries. The liberty of a citizen to do as he likes so
long as he does not interfere w/liberty of others to do the same is interfered w/by
school laws, Post office, every state/municipal institution w/c takes his money for
purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not.
 But a Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory such
as paternalism or laissez faire. It’s made for people of fundamentally differing views.
And not because we find an opinion novel or shocking, we can already conclude that
it’s conflicting with the US Consti.
 General propositions don’t decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a
judgment/intuition subtler than any articulate major premise. Every opinion tends to
become a law.
 “Liberty” in the 14th amendment is perverted if we use it to prevent the natural
outcome of a dominant opinion (the statute in this case) unless a rational & fair man
would admit that the statute would infringe fundamental principles as we traditionally
understand them. A reasonable man might think that the statute is a proper measure
on the score of health.
 My take: he thinks the statute is reasonable & he believes any reasonable man
would see that. Ergo, unreasonable yung majority. Hehe…please read the dissent
since the Dean mentioned that it’s one of the most important dissenting opinions in
US history. Pa-explain na rin sa kin. It’s too profound for my simple but beautiful pa
rin mind. Hehe. 
People v. Pomar
 The Prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed a complaint against defendant
Julio Pomar for violation of sec. 13, in connection of sec. 15 of Act. No. 3071 of the
Philippine Legislature which essentially orders employers to give pregnant women
employees 30 days vacation with pay before & after confinement.
 Defendant was found guilty of violating said statute by refusing to pay his pregnant
employee, Macaria Fajardo, P80.
 Pomar demurred the complaint alleging that the facts therein complained did not
constitute an offense. As the demurrer was overruled, he answered and admitted all
the allegations trial but contended that the provisions of Act No. 3071 were illegal,
unconstitutional and void
 The lower court convicted him of crime as charged
Issue: WON said Act was adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of the police
power of the state
 NO. Said section 13 was enacted in the exercise of its supposed police power for the
purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in “factory, shop or
place of labor of any description,” and insuring to them reasonable support for 1
month before and 1 month after their delivery.
 Definitions of police power are generally limited to particular cases and examples,
which are as varied as they are numerous. But from all the definitions, the SC
concluded that it is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of
police power than to exactly mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise
by the legislative department of the government.
 The Court in this case has to choose between police power and the liberty to
contract, much like in the case of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of
Columbia. In that case, the court held that the Minimum Wage Act was void on the
ground that the right to contract about one’s own affairs was a part of the liberty of
the individual under the constitution, and while there was no such thing as absolute
freedom of contract, and it was necessarily subject to a great variety of restraints,
yet none of the exceptional circumstances, which at times justify a limitation upon
one’s right to contract for his own sevices, applied in the particular case. Such may
be said in the case at bar and the SC so holds.
 The right to liberty includes the right to enter into contracts and to terminate
contracts. The statute violates liberty of contract w/o due process. It takes into
account only the welfare of the employee but fails to consider periods of distress in
the business.
 It further fails to consider the fact that payment for labor depends upon the type of
labor.
 The statute prescribes a sum of money to insure subsistence, health and morals of
pregnant employee. The statute creates a mandatory term in any contract entered
into by employer. It violates right to enter into contract upon terms which parties
may agree to.
 The court further explained that the state, under the police power, is possessed with
plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and
safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the
organic law and providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to
justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression. The
legislature has no authority to pronounce the performance of an innocent act criminal
when the public health, safety, comfort, or welfare is not interfered with.
 Sec. 13 has deprived every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a
factory, shop or place of labor of any description w/in the Philippine Islands, of his
right to enter into contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee
may agree upon.
 The state, when providing by legislation for the protection of the public health, the
public morals or the public safety, is subject to and is controlled by the paramount
authority of the constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights
 secured or guaranteed by that instrument or interfere w/ the execution of the powers
and rights guaranteed to the people under the Constitution.
NDC v. Phil. Veterans
Facts:
 Involves the constitutionality of PD 1717, which ordered the rehabilitation of the
Agrix Group of Companies to be administered mainly by the National
Development Company.
 Section 4(1) of PD 1717 provides that all mortgages and other liens presently
attaching to any of the assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby
extinguished.
 July 7, 1978 – Agrix execute in favour of private respondent Philippine Veterans
Bank (PVB) a real estate mortgage over 3 parcels of land situated in Los Banos.
During the existence of the mortgage Agrix went bankrupt.
 PVB filed a claim with the Agrix Claims Committee for the payment of itts loan
credit. New Agrix and National Development Company invoked Sec. 4(10) of
PD 1717.
 PVB took steps to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage, prompting the
petitioners to file a second case with the same court to stop the foreclosure.
 Trial court – annulled the entire PD 17171.
o Exercise of legislative power was a violation of the principle of
separation of powers
o Impaired the obligation of contracts
o Violated the equal protection clause
Issues:
1. WON PD 1717 violates the due process and equal protection clause of the
constitution?
 Petitioner argues that property rights are subject to regulation under the police
power for the promotion of the common welfare. They contend that the
inherent power of the state may be exercised at any time for this purpose as
long as the taking of the property right, even is based on contract, is done with
due process of law.
 The court held that a legislative act based on the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
a. The interest of the public should justify the interference of the state
b. Means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
 In this case the public are not sufficiently involved to warrant the interference of
the government with the private contracts of Agrix. the record does not state
how many here are of such investors, and who they are, and why they are
being preferred to the other creditors of Agrix with vested property rights.
 Public interest has not been shown. It has not been shown that by the creation
of the New Agrix and the extinction of the property rights of the creditors of,
Agrix the interests of the public as a whole, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, would be promoted or protected.
 The decree is oppressive. The right to property in all mortgages, liens,
interests, penalties and charges owing to the creditors of Agrix is arbitrarily
destroyed.
 The right to property is dissolved by legislative fiat without regard to the private
interest violated
 In extinguishing the mortgage and other lien, the decree lumps the secured
creditors with the unsecured creditors and places them on the same level in the
prosecution of their respective claims.
 Under the equal protection clause, all persons of things similarly situated must
be treated alike, both in the privileges conferred and the obligations imposed.
In this case, persons differently situated are similarly treated, in disregard of
the principle that there should be equality among equals.
2. WON PD 1717 violates section 10 of the bill of rights? YES
 It is true that the police power is superior to the impairment clause, the
principle will apply only where the contract is so related to the public welfare
that it will be considered congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in
the interest of the greater number.
 The contract of loan and mortgage executed by the Agrux are purely private
transactions and have not been shown to be affected with public interest,
PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not being in conformity with the
traditional requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction of the
mortgage and other liens constitutes taking without due process of law and violation of
the equal protection clause.
People vs. Nazario
Plaintiff: People of the Phils.
Accused-appellant: Eusebio Nazario
Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Quezon
Sarmiento, J.
Facts:
Petitioner is charged with violation of municipal ordinances in Pagbilao, Quezon. He
refuses to pay taxes on the operation of the fishponds he leased from the gov’t. asserting
that said tax measures are 1) ambiguous and uncertain, 2) unconstitutional for being ex
post facto laws and 3) applies only to owners or overseers of fishponds of private
ownership and not to lessees of public land.
Said ordinances, Ordinance # 4 (1955), Ordinance # 15 (1965) and Ordinance # 12 (12
(1966) provides as follows:
Ord. # 4: Sec. 1. “Any owner or manager of fishponds … within … Pagbilao, Quezon, shall
pay a municipal tax in the amount of Php 3 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per
annum.”
Ord. # 15: Sec. 1(a) “For … owners or managers of fishponds within … this municipality,
the date of payment of municipal tax … shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years
starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries.”
Ord. # 12: Sec 1: “Any owner or manager of fishponds … within … Pagbilao shall pay a
municipal tax in the amount of Php 3 per hectare or any fraction thereof per annum
beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before
the year 1964.”
The trial court held that the appellant violated the assailed ordinances. So this appeal.
Issue:
1) WON the Pagbilao municipal ordinances are unconstitutional (vague or ex post
facto)? No
2) WON the ordinances apply to the accused? Yes
Ratio:
The Court finds that Eusebio Nazario violated Pagbilao’s tax ordinances.
1) A statute or act may be said to be vague if it lacks comprehensible standards that men
“of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.” It is repugnant to the Constitution because 1) it violates due process because
it fails to accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid, 2) it gives law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying it out.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face and not just an imprecisely phrased
legislation, which can still be saved by proper construction or a legislation, which may
appear to be ambiguous, but is applicable if taken in the proper context or applied to
certain types of activities (ex. US Uniform Code of Military Justice prohibits “conduct
unbecoming an officer and gentleman”, such a phrase, taken in a military context, is not
ambiguous because there are already military interpretations and practices in place that
provide enough standards on what is permissible conduct.) The assailed ordinances
cannot be said to be tainted by vagueness because it clearly provides what activity is to
be avoided and to whom the law applies.

As evident from the provisions themselves, the appellant falls within its coverage. As the
operator and financier of the fishponds and employer of the laborers therein he comes
within the term “manager.” Though the gov’t owns the land, it never had a share in the
profits so it is only logical t hat he shoulders the burden of the tax.

As to the appellants claim that the imposition of the tax has to depend upon an uncertain
date yet to be determined (“3 years after the approval of the fishpond” by the Bureau of
Fisheries) and upon an uncertain event (“if the fishpond started operating before 1964”),
it is merely a problem in computation.

The liability for the tax accrues on Jan. 1, 1964 for fishponds already in operation, this
amendment (Ord # 12) to the earlier ordinances served only as an amnesty to delinquent
fishpond operators and it did not repeal the mother ordinances (Ords. # 4 & 15). For
fishponds not yet in operation on Jan. 1, 1964, Ord # 15 applies, and it provides that for
new fishpond operators, the tax accrues 3 years after their approval by the Bureau of
Fisheries.

The contention that the ordinances were ex post facto laws because Ord # 12 was passed
on Sept 19, 1966 and yet it takes effect and penalizes acts done from the year 1964 has
no merit. As explained in the previous paragraph, Ord # 12 merely served as an amnesty
to delinquent taxpayers, it did not repeal the mother ordinance (Ord # 4) which was
already in effect since May 14, 1955 and as the act of non-payment of the tax was already
penalized since 1955 it is clear that Ord # 12 does not impose a retroactive penalty.

Appellant also assails the power of municipal gov’ts to tax “public forest land.” As held in
Golden Ribbon Lumber Co. Inc v City of Butuan local gov’ts taxing power do not extend to
forest products or concessions under RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act), which also prohibits
municipalities from imposing percentage taxes on sales.

But the tax in question is not on property, though it is based on the area of the
fishponds, they are actually privilege taxes on the business of fishpond maintenance. They
are not charged against sales, which goes against the decision in Golden Ribbon Lumber
Co. Inc but on occupation, which is allowed under RA 2264. Also fishponds are not forest
lands although they are considered by jurisprudence as agricultural lands so necessarily
do not produce the forest products referred to in the prohibition of RA 2264.

Held: Appeal is DISMISSED.

Balacuit vs. CFI

 Agustin vs. Edu
Action: Action for prohibition
Facts:
Petitioner assails Letter of Instruction No. 229 which provides for the mandatory use of
early warning devices for all motor vehicles. Petitioner owns a Volkswagen Beetle
equipped with blinking lights that could well serve as an early warning device. He alleges
that the statute:
1. violates the provision against delegation of police power
2. immoral – will only enrich the manufacturer of the devices at the
car owner’s expense
3. prevents car owners from finding alternatives
Petitioner prays for a declaration of nullity and a restraining order in the
meantime.
On the other hand, respondents’ answers are based on case law and other
authoritative decisions of the tribunal issues.

Issues:
1. WON LOI 229 is constitutional (due process)
2. WON LOI 229 is an invalid delegation of legislative power, as far as
implementation is concerned

Held:
1. Yes. Respondents assert that LOI 229 is backed by factual data & statistics,
whereas petitioner’s conjectural assertions are without merit. The statute is a
valid exercise of police power in so far as it promotes public safety, and
petitioner failed to present factual evidence to rebut the presumed validity of
the statute. Early warning devices have a clear emergency meaning, whereas
blinking lights are equivocal and would increase accidents. The petitioner’s
contention that the devices’ manufacturers may be abusive does not invalidate
the law. Petitioner’s objection is based on a negative view of the statute’s
wisdom-something the court can’t decide on.

2. No. The authority delegated in the implementation is not legislative in nature.

Respondent Edu was merely enforcing the law forms part of Philippine law. PD
207 ratified the Vienna Convention’s recommendation of enacting road safety
signs and devices. Respondents are merely enforcing this law. Moreover, the
equal protection under the laws contention was not elaborated upon.

Wherefore: Petition is dismissed. Judgment immediately executory.

Teehankee, dissenting:
The rules and regulations outlined by the LTO Commission does not reflect the
real intent of LOI229.
1. Effectivity and utility of statute not yet demonstrated.
2. public necessity for LOI not yet shown
3. big financial burden on motorists
4. no real effort shown to illustrate less burdensome alternative to early warning
device
5. imperative need to impose blanket requirement on all vehicles
-people still drive dilapidated vehicle
-need for sustained education campaign to instill safe driving
The exercise of police power affecting the life , liberty, and property of any person is till
subject to judicial inquiry.