SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
They
(G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976)
Facts:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued
Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the
interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of
such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for the exercise by the
President of his present powers.20 days after or
on 22 September 1976, the
President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previos
Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provis
ions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the
manner of voting and canvass of votes in
"barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to
the national referendum-plebiscite of 16
October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential
Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of
Presidential Decree 991.On the same date of
22 September 1976, the President issued
Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions
to he submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The
Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that
the people's continued opposition to
the convening of the interim National Assembly
evinces their desire to have such body abolished
and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim
legislative body, which will be submitted directly
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of
October 16.The Commission on Elections was
vested with the exclusive supervision and
control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976,
Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.Sanidad, father
and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar
as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree
1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise,
control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-
Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976.
contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutionsthere is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to
proposeamendments to the new Constitution.
As a consequence, the Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional
or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another
action for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted
by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional
Convention,asserting that the power to propose
amendments to, or revision of the Constitution
during thetransition period is expressly
conferred on the interim National Assembly
under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Still another petition for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5October
1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and
Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714,
to restrain
the implementation of Presidential Decrees rela
tive to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite
of October 16.
Issue:
Whether the President may call upon a
referendum for the amendment of
the Constitution.
Held:
Section 1 of Article XVI of the
1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that
"(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by the National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2)
The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-
thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention or, by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit the question of calling such a
convention to the electorate in an election."
Section 2 thereof provides that "Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
later than three months a after the approval of
such amendment or revision." In the present
period of transition, the interim National
Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions
is conferred with that amending power. Section
15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The
interim National Assembly, upon special call by
the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority
vote of all its Members, propose amendments to
this Constitution. Such amendments shall take
effect when ratified in accordance with Article
Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two
periods contemplated in the constitutional life of
the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of
transition. In times of normalcy, the amending
process may be initiated by the proposals of the
(1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a
Constitutional Convention called by a vote of
two-thirds of all the Members of the National
Assembly. However the calling of a
Constitutional Convention may be submitted to
the electorate in an election voted upon by a
majority vote of all the members of the National
Assembly. In times of transition, amendments
may be proposed by a majority vote of all the
Members of the interim National Assembly upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister. The
Court
in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that
the incumbent President is vested with that
prerogative of discretion as to when he shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly.
The Constitutional Convention intended to leave
to the President the determination of the time
when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly, consistent with the
prevailing conditions of peace and order in the
country. When the Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention voted on the
Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the
fact that under the same, the incumbent
President was given the discretion as to when he
could convene the interim National Assembly.
The President's decision to defer the convening
of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the
peoplethemselves. In the plebiscite of January 1
0-
15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973C
onstitution was submitted, the people voted ag
ainst the convening of the interim NationalAsse
mbly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the
Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated
their sovereign will to withhold the convening of
the interim National Assembly. Again, in the
referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed
question of whether the interim National
Assembly shall be initially convened was
eliminated, because some of the members of
Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were deemed a
utomatically members of the interim National
Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that
referendum of January, 1973 the people had
already resolved against it. In sensu
striciore, when the legislative arm of the state
undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual
function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when
engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is
exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by
the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines,
that power is provided for in Article XVI of the
1973 Constitution (for the regular National
Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory
Provisions (for the interim National Assembly).
While ordinarily it is the business of the
legislating body to legislate for the nation by
virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of
theConstitution is not legislative in character. In
political science a distinction is made betweenc
onstitutional content of an organic character and
that of a legislative character. The distinction
,however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being
the case, approval of the President of
any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The
prerogative of the President to approve or
disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of
legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the
Constitution.
Occena vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs.
National Treasurer [GR 56404]
En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 dissents in
separate opinion, 1 on official leave
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition
proceedings against the validity of three
Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments, goes further than
merely assailing their alleged constitutional
infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A.
Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar
and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention that framed the present
Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather
unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the
assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the
fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid,
and in force and effect when the Batasang
Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions
were promulgated and filed, respectively.
Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the
force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution.
In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for
prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its
ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a
vote of six to four. It then concluded: "
This being the vote of the majority, there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution
being considered in force and effect."
Such a statement served a useful purpose. It
could even be said that there was a need for it.
It served to clear the atmosphere. It made
manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the
present Constitution came into force and effect.
With such a pronouncement by the Supreme
Court and with the recognition of the cardinal
postulate that what the Supreme Court says is
not only entitled to respect but must also be
obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.
Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were
resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the
fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What
cannot be too strongly stressed is that the
function of judicial review has both a positive
and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly
demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy,
the Supreme Court can check as well as
legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may
not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches
but may also sustain their validity. In the latter
case, there is an affirmation that what was done
cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally
deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this
character suffices. That is the meaning of the
concluding statement in Javellana. Since then,
this Court has invariably applied the present
Constitution. The latest case in point is People
v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago.
During the first year alone of the effectivity of
the present Constitution, at least ten cases may
be cited.
CIR vs CAMPOS RUEVA
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs CAMPOS
RUEDA (Anjie's Version)
October 29, 1971
FACTS:
Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio
Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of
the late EstrellaSoriano Vda. De Cerdeira, liable
for the stun of P161,974.95 as deficiency estate
and inheritance taxes for the transfer of
intangible personal properties in the Philippines,
the deceased, a Spanish national having been a
resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the
time of her death in 1955.
Rueda’s request for exemption was denied on the
ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal
to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code.
Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the
decision denying the claim for tax exemption.
However, respondent denied this request on the
grounds that there was no reciprocity with
Tangier, which was moreover a mere principality,
not a foreign country.
Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression
'foreign country,' used in the last proviso of
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, refers to a government of that foreign
power which, although not an international
person in the sense of international law, does not
impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible
personal properties of our citizens not residing
therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption
from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary
that Tangier should have been recognized by our
Government in order to entitle the petitioner to
the exemption benefits of the last provision of
Section 122 of our Tax Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requisites of statehood or at
least so much thereof as may be necessary for
the acquisition of an international personality,
must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall
within the exemption of Section122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code
DECISION:
Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeals
Ruling.
If a foreign country is to be identified with a
state, it is required in line with Pound's
formulation that it be apolitically organized
sovereign community independent of outside
control bound by ties of nationhood, legally
supreme within its territory, acting through a
government functioning under a regime of law.
It is thus a sovereign person with the people
composing it viewed as an organized corporate
society under a government with the legal
competence to exact obedience to its commands.
The stress is on its being a nation, its people
occupying a definite territory, politically
organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals
within it and maintaining its separate
international personality.
State is a territorial society divided into
government and subjects, claiming within its
allotted area a supremacy over all other
institutions. Moreover, similarly would point to
the power entrusted to its government to
maintain within its territory the conditions of a
legal order and to enter into international
relations. With the latter requisite satisfied,
international law does not exact independence
as a condition of statehood.
This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that
evens a tiny principality that of Liechtenstein,
hardly an international personality in the
traditional sense, did fall under this exempt
category.
Reagan v CIR, 30 SCRA 968
Facts: A question novel in character, the answer
to which has far-reaching implications, is raised
by petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a
civilian employee of an American corporation
providing technical assistance to the United
States Air Force in the Philippines. He would
dispute the payment of the income tax assessed
on him by respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue on an amount realized by him on a sale
of his automobile to a member of the United
States Marine Corps, the transaction having
taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at
Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and
earnestly pressed, that in legal contemplation
the sale was made outside Philippine territory
and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to
tax.
Issue: Whether or not the sale was made outside
the Philippine territory and therefore beyond
our jurisdictional function to tax.
Held: The Court held that nothing is better
settled than that the Philippines being
independent and sovereign, its authority may be
exercised over its entire domain. There is no
portion there of that is beyond its power. Within
its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its
terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both
territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it
has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of its sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its
consent, express or implied, submit to a
restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus
be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power
plenary in character. That is the concept of
sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the
succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of
a state-force due to which it has the exclusive
capacity of legal self-determination and self-
restriction." 7 A state then, if it chooses to, may
refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence.
Its laws may as to some persons found within its
territory no longer control. Nor does the matter
end there. It is not precluded from allowing
another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its
territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that
such areas become impressed with an alien
character. They retain their status as native soil.
They are still subject to its authority. Its
jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not
disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to
the American armed forces by virtue of the
military bases agreement of 1947. They are not
and cannot be foreign territory.
PEOPLE vs GOZO [53 SCRA 476] (G.R. No. L-
36409) Oct. 26, 1973Principle of Sovereignty as
Auto-LimitationFacts:
Loreta Gozo seeks to set aside a judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Zambales,convicting
her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo,
Zambales, requiring a permit from themunicipal
mayor for the construction or erection of a
building, as well as any modification,alteration,
repair or demolition thereof. She questions its
validity, or at the very least, itsapplicability to
her, by invoking due process citing the case of
People v. Fajardo
. She contendthat her house was constructed
within the naval base leased to the American
armed forceslocated inside the United States
Naval Reservation within the territorial
jurisdiction of OlongapoCity and therefore shall
be exempted from the Municipal Ordinance No.
14.
Issue:
WON the property of the Appellant shall be
exmpeted from the application of the
MunicipalOrdinance.
Ruling:
Yes. The appellant’s contention
that because her property was located within
the naval baseleased to the American armed
forces located inside the United States Naval
Reservation, shemust be entitled of the
exemption from complying with the ordanance
was given no merit.Though the property yielded
within the Naval base of US, it is a clear doctrine
that thePhilippines still possesses the
sovereignty over that area
– the accused.
given the record that it is still a partof its
territory. Thus, it can still enforce its
administrative jurisdiction by virtue of its
governmentinstrumetalities which the people
sojourning to that territory must always adhere
andrespect.Citing the case of Reagan vs CIR it
states that,
“By the Agreement, it should be noted,
the Philippine Government merely consents that
the United States exercise jurisdiction incertain
cases. The consent was given purely as a matter
of comity, courtesy, or expediency.The
Philippine Government has not abdicated its
sovereignty over the bases as part of
thePhilippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein.Under the terms of the
treaty, the United States Government has prior
or preferential but notexclusive jurisdiction of
such offenses. The Philippine Government
retains not only jurisdictionalrights not granted,
but also all such ceded rights as the United States
Military authorities for reasons of their own
decline to make use of. The first proposition is
implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty
over the bases; the second from the express
provisions of the treaty."Thus, the Philippine
jurisdictional right might be diminished but will
never disappear. Thismanifests
the principle of Sovereignty as auto-limitation
, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is
the property of a state-force due to which it has
the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination
and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses
to, may refrain from the exercise of what
otherwise is illimitable
competence."WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed
insofar as it found theaccused, Loreta Gozo,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of
Municipal Ordinance No.14, series of 1964 and
sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment incase of insolvency,
and modified insofar as she is required to
demolish the house that is thesubject matter of
the case, she being given a period of thirty days
from the finality of thisdecision within which to
obtain the required permit. Only upon her failure
to do so will thatportion of the appealed decision
requiringdemolition be enforced. Costs against
People vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
[GR 145951, 12 August 2003]
First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur
Facts: Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel
Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus Garcia were all
charged with Malversation through Falsification
of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case 25741. The Information alleged
that Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and
converted for their personal use the amount of
P250,318,200.00 from the funds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). On 12
November 1999, Ramiscal filed with the
Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Motion to Declare
Nullity of Information and to Defer Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest." He argued, inter alia, that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case
because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The
said Urgent Motion was later adopted by Alzaga
and Satuito. The Urgent Motion was denied by
the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated
on 6 January 2000. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion
for Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued on 12
May 2000, the Sandiganbayan sustained
Ramiscal, et. al.'s contention that the AFP-RSBS
is a private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its
earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of
Criminal Case 25741. Upon denial of its Motion
for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the
present special civil action for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the AFP-RSBS is a government-
owned or controlled corporation or a private
corporation and, corollarily, whether its funds
are public or private.
Held: The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential
Decree 361. Its purpose and functions are akin to
those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the
system that manages the retirement and
pension funds of those in the military service.
Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police are expressly
excluded from the coverage of The GSIS Act of
1997. Therefore, soldiers and military personnel,
who are incidentally employees of the
Government, rely on the administration of the
AFP-RSBS for their retirement, pension and
separation benefits. For this purpose, the law
provides that the contribution by military
officers and enlisted personnel to the System
shall be compulsory. Its enabling law further
mandates that the System shall be administered
by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines through an agency, group,
committee or board, which may be created and
organized by him and subject to such rules and
regulations governing the same as he may,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of
National Defense, promulgate from time to time.
Moreover, the investment of funds of the
System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the
approval of the Secretary of National Defense.
The funds of the AFP-RSBS, except for the initial
seed money, come entirely from contributions
and that no part thereof come from
appropriations. While it may be true that there
have been no appropriations for the
contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the
Government is not precluded from later on
adding to the funds in order to provide
additional benefits to the men in uniform. The
above considerations indicate that the character
and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with
public interest. As such, we hold that the same is
a government entity and its funds are in the
nature of public funds.
Manila International Airport Authority vs CAGR
No. 155650, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA
591Facts:Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy International
Airportlocated at Paranaque City. The Officers of
Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to real
estate taxdelinquency. MIAA then settled some
of the amount. When MIAA failed to settle the
entire amount, theofficers of Paranaque city
threatened to levy and subject to auction the
land and buildings of MIAA,which they did. MIAA
sought for a Temporary Restraining Order from
the CA but failed to do so withinthe 60 days
reglementary period, so the petition was
dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with
theSupreme Court a day before the public
auction, MIAA was granted with the TRO but
unfortunately theTRO was received by
the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the
public auction.MIAA claims that although the
charter provides that the title of the land and
building are withMIAA still the ownership is with
the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also
contends that it is aninstrumentality of the
government and as such exempted from real
estate tax. That the land and buildingsof MIAA
are of public dominion therefore cannot be
subjected to levy and auction sale. On the
other hand, the officers of Paranaque City claim
that MIAA is a government owned and
controlled corporationtherefore not exempted
to real estate tax.Issues:Whether or not MIAA is
an instrumentality of the government and not a
government owned andcontrolled corporation
and as such exempted from tax.Whether or not
the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the
public dominion and thus cannot be the subject
of levy and auction sale.Ruling:Under the Local
government code, government owned and cont
rolled corporations are notexempted from real
estate tax. MIAA is not a government owned and
controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA
should either be a stock or non stock
corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation
for its capital is not divided into shares. It is not
a non stock corporation since it has no members.
MIAA is aninstrumentality of the government
vested with corporate powers and government
functions.Under the civil code, property may
either be under public dominion or private
ownership. Thoseunder public dominion are
owned by the State and are utilized for public
use, public service and for thedevelopment of
national wealth. The ports included in the public
dominion pertain either to seaports or airports.
When properties under public dominion cease to
be for public use and service, they form part
of the patrimonial property of the State.The
court held that the land and buildings of MIAA
are part of the public dominion. Since theairport
is devoted for public use, for the domestic and
international travel and transportation. Even
if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its
operation and for regulation and does not
change the character of the land and buildings of
MIAA as part of the public dominion. As part of
the public dominion the landand buildings of
MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To
subject them to levy and public auction
iscontrary to public policy. Unless the President
issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport
land and buildings from public use, these
properties remain to be of public dominion and
are inalienable. As longas the land and buildings
are for public use the ownership is with
the Republic of the Philippines.
Manila International Airport Authority vs CAGR
No. 155650, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA
591Facts:Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy International
Airportlocated at Paranaque City. The Officers of
Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to real
estate taxdelinquency. MIAA then settled some
of the amount. When MIAA failed to settle the
entire amount, theofficers of Paranaque city
threatened to levy and subject to auction the
land and buildings of MIAA,which they did. MIAA
sought for a Temporary Restraining Order from
the CA but failed to do so withinthe 60 days
reglementary period, so the petition was
dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with
theSupreme Court a day before the public
auction, MIAA was granted with the TRO but
unfortunately theTRO was received by
the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the
public auction.MIAA claims that although the
charter provides that the title of the land and
building are withMIAA still the ownership is with
the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also
contends that it is aninstrumentality of the
government and as such exempted from real
estate tax. That the land and buildingsof MIAA
are of public dominion therefore cannot be
subjected to levy and auction sale. On the
other hand, the officers of Paranaque City claim
that MIAA is a government owned and
controlled corporationtherefore not exempted
to real estate tax.Issues:Whether or not MIAA is
an instrumentality of the government and not a
government owned andcontrolled corporation
and as such exempted from tax.Whether or not
the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the
public dominion and thus cannot be the subject
of levy and auction sale.Ruling:Under the Local
government code, government owned and cont
rolled corporations are notexempted from real
estate tax. MIAA is not a government owned and
controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA
should either be a stock or non stock
corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation
for its capital is not divided into shares. It is not
a non stock corporation since it has no members.
MIAA is aninstrumentality of the government
vested with corporate powers and government
functions.Under the civil code, property may
either be under public dominion or private
ownership. Thoseunder public dominion are
owned by the State and are utilized for public
use, public service and for thedevelopment of
national wealth. The ports included in the public
dominion pertain either to seaports or airports.
When properties under public dominion cease to
be for public use and service, they form part
of the patrimonial property of the State.The
court held that the land and buildings of MIAA
are part of the public dominion. Since theairport
is devoted for public use, for the domestic and
international travel and transportation. Even
if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its
operation and for regulation and does not
change the character of the land and buildings of
MIAA as part of the public dominion. As part of
the public dominion the landand buildings of
MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To
subject them to levy and public auction
iscontrary to public policy. Unless the President
issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport
land and buildings from public use, these
properties remain to be of public dominion and
are inalienable. As longas the land and buildings
are for public use the ownership is with
the Republic of the Philippines.
Valmonte Vs Belmonte
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for
mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke
their right to information and pray that
respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners
the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru
the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish
petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the
public records for the subject information On
June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet
received the reply of the Government Service
and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General
Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a
reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free
to do whatever action necessary within the
premises to pursue our desired objective in
pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as
citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS
records on behest loans given by the former First
Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law
granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality
as regards the documents subject of this
petition. His position is apparently based merely
on considerations of policy. The judiciary does
not settle policy issues. The Court can only
declare what the law is, and not what the law
should be. Under our system of government,
policy issues are within the domain of the
political branches of the government, and of the
people themselves as the repository of all State
power. The concerned borrowers themselves
may not succeed if they choose to invoke their
right to privacy, considering the public offices
they were holding at the time the loans were
alleged to have been granted. It cannot be
denied that because of the interest they
generate and their newsworthiness, public
figures, most especially those holding
responsible positions in government, enjoy a
more limited right to privacy as compared to
ordinary individuals, their actions being subject
to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used
here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract, and
already a consummated contract, Considering
the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further
that government-owned and controlled
corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the
people, the Court is convinced that transactions
entered into by the GSIS, a government-
controlled corporation created by special
legislation are within the ambit of the people's
right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings. Although citizens are
afforded the right to information and, pursuant
thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them
a right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
in their desire to acquire information on matters
of public concern.
Cabanas v Pilapil Digest
Facts:
1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and
indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He
likewise indicated that if he dies while the child
is still a minor, the proceeds shall be
administered by his brother Francisco.
Florentino died when the child was only ten
years old hence, Francisco took charge of
Florentino’s benefits for the child. Meanwhile,
the mother of the child Melchora Cabañas filed
a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of
money in her favor and allow herself to be the
child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms
of the insurance policy and contended that as a
private contract its terms and obligations must
be binding only to the parties and
intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere
by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms
of the insurance policy?
YES.
The Constitution provides for the strengthening
of the family as the basic social unit, and that
whenever any member thereof such as in the
case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest
be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has
been filed should resolve according to the best
interest of that person.

The uncle here should not be the trustee, it

should be the mother as she was the
immediate relative of the minor child and it is
assumed that the mother shows more care
towards the child than an uncle.

It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept

that the judiciary, as an agency of the State
acting as parens patriae, is called upon
whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one
who is a minor to accord priority to his best
interest. It may happen, family relations may
press their respective claims. It would be more in
consonance not only with the natural order of
things but the tradition of the country for a
parent to be preferred. it could have been
different if the conflict were between father and
mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother
asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens
patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity
of her plea.