Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 109–119

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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

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Thomas Reid’s Newtonian Theism: his differences with the classical arguments
of Richard Bentley and William Whiston
Robert Callergård
Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Reid was a Newtonian and a Theist, but did he found his Theism on Newton’s physics? In opposition to
Received 20 November 2008 commonplace assumptions about the role of Theism in Reid’s philosophy, my answer is no. Reid prefers
Received in revised form 21 September 2009 to found his Theism on a priori reasons, rather than on physics. Reid’s understanding of physics as an
empirical science stops it from contributing in any clear and efficient way to issues of natural theology.
In addition, Reid is highly sceptical of our ability to discover the efficient and final causes of natural phe-
Keywords: nomena, knowledge of which is essential for natural theology. To bring out Reid’s differences with clas-
Thomas Reid
sical Newtonian Theists Richard Bentley and William Whiston, I examine their use of the law and force of
William Whiston
Richard Bentley
general gravitation, and reconstruct what would be Reidian objections.
Physics Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Theism
Isaac Newton

When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

1. Introduction
Thomas Reid was convinced that Newton’s physics gives a true
account of the world; the Principia and the Opticks establish the basic
laws governing bodily motion and light beyond any reasonable
doubt.1 Reid was also convinced that Newton’s philosophy of science
gives an adequate account of the nature of empirical science; it tells us
what to search for and what to leave alone, how to search, and how to
justify our discoveries.2 Besides these two convictions, Reid was also
convinced that Newton’s physics is the natural and unique outcome
when Newton’s philosophy of science is applied to the study of nature.
Not to waste a useful term on any of these beliefs in particular, let
‘Newtonian’ apply to anyone affirming all of them.
Reid was also a Theist. He believed that some time ago the world
was created out of nothing by the will of an all-powerful, all-know-
ing, and necessarily existing being, who, after the act of creation, pre-
serves and governs the world, and who provides through wisdom
and goodness what is necessary for the well-being of living crea-
tures, and on account of all this, is worthy of worship.3
Now, let ‘Newtonian Theism’ refer to the view that Newton’s phys-
ics is true and supports Theism over alternatives such as Deism, Atheism,
Epicureanism, Aristotelianism, or any Mechanist systems. Famous
Newtonian Theists included Isaac Newton, Richard Bentley, Samuel
Clarke, George Cheyne, William Derham, and William Whiston.
Whatever their details or differences were, and whatever other argu-
ments they may have used in support of Theism, they all believed
that Newton’s discoveries in physics made the case for Theism deci-
sively easier. In their view, not only had Newton’s superior physics re-
placed that of Descartes once and for all; the victory spilled over into
theology as well.
The way I have defined my terms, a Newtonian need not neces-
sarily be a Theist, and anyone who is both a Newtonian and a

E-mail address: Robert.Callergard@philosophy.su.se

1
Reid took Newton’s discovery of the law of gravity to be physical and not merely mathematical (Callergård, 2005).
2
Neither in physics nor in philosophy of science did Reid follow Newton slavishly. He rejected the common appeal of scientists to the simplicity of nature, as exemplified in
Newton’s comment to the first of his Regula Philosophandi (Newton, 1999 [1687], p. 794). He also rejected Newton’s suggestion (ibid., p. 108) that force laws may explain all
natural phenomena. See Callergård (2006), pp. 82 ff.
3
For most Newtonian Theists it was important to emphasize God’s active role in ‘preserving’ and ‘governing’ the world after the act of creation. This often amounts to the
further claim that God acts ‘in the world’ (apparently as opposed to being ‘absent’; their target were Deists). In what follows we will see how both Bentley and Whiston insist on
God’s ‘constant’ activity to make the force of general gravity work, which to them implies God’s ‘presence in’ the world.

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110 R. Callergård / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 109–119
Theist need not necessarily be a Newtonian Theist. In this paper I
investigate whether and in what way Reid is a Newtonian Theist.
Comparison with arguments by Richard Bentley and William
Whiston reveals that, at the very least, Reid conceives the support
of Newton’s physics for Theism differently. While Bentley and
Whiston try to show that details in modern physics and astron-
omy, as based on Newton’s theory of gravitation, provide powerful
arguments for the truth of Theism, Reid is outspokenly reluctant to
draw conclusions about final causes on the basis of astronomical
and physical fact. He is also a skeptic about our ability to discover
and identify any of those efficient causes that, in his opinion, must
lie behind natural phenomena.
Behind this stance lies most certainly Reid’s effort to demarcate
physics from metaphysics and theology, distinguishing subject
matters, kinds of evidence, and kinds of explanation. For Reid,
arguments which end in conclusions about the Deity are not part
of natural science. In the writings of the classical Newtonian The-
ists, however, the lines between questions of physics, metaphysics,
and theology are consistently unclear, as they pursue arguments
for Theism on the basis of their understanding of general gravita-
tion. In contrast, Reid cares about demarcation issues, and he
avoids using the power, law, or force of gravitation in direct argu-
ments for Theism. Reid’s Newtonianism, in particular his under-
standing of what he takes to be a correct Newtonian philosophy
of science, makes Newtonian Theism a less successful enterprise
for him.
On the whole, Reid’s Theism seems more firmly based on meta-
physical considerations than on empirical and scientific results of
the day. That there are laws of nature governing the world, that
every event is directly or indirectly caused by an agent, and that
every contingent fact is dependent on the will of some agent, are
all fundamental pillars of Reid’s Theism. Newly discovered empir-
ical facts play a lesser role for Reid. It is not his view, however, that
discoveries made in empirical sciences are irrelevant to theology.
Reid believed in the possibility of natural theology, and he argued
that the argument from design is valid, sound, and gets more con-
vincing the more we learn about nature through natural science
(Reid, 2002a, pp. 508 f.). The scientific study of nature is, for Reid,
a prime way by which we come to apprehend the wisdom and de-
sign of the Almighty. There are reasons therefore to call Reid a
Newtonian Theist. But the way of support runs differently for
him, compared with classical Newtonian Theism. The version of
the design argument that Reid defends does not contain any pre-
mises that properly belong to physics—it is solely an affair of nat-
ural theology. It appears also that the few times Reid is explicit
about the impact of reading the Principia on his own religious
thinking, the emphasis is on aesthetic apprehension and judgment,
rather than rational argument.
Reid’s philosophy is often seen in the light of his identity as the
most prominent critic of the philosophy of David Hume, and as a
defender of traditional views on morals, metaphysics and knowl-
edge. Since Hume was a critic of the use of science in support of
religion, and Reid defended the legitimacy of the design argument
and natural theology in general, besides being a supporter of New-
ton, it is near at hand to associate Reid’s views with those of the
first generation of Newtonian Theists, who were targets of Hume’s
criticism.4 As I hope to show, however, Reid had reasons of his own
to be critical of their use of Newton’s physics.
4
According to Dale Tuggy, Reid was a ‘unique anti-medieval early modern Theist, perhaps the last great Newtonian Theist’ (Cuneo & van Woudenberg, 2002; Tuggy, 2004, p.
289). Implicit in Paul Wood’s claim that Reid ‘firmly believed that Newton had demonstrated the existence of a providential God and of immaterial agents active in nature’, is a
close connection to the concerns of the early Newtonian Theists (Wood, 1995, p. 31). See also Callergård (2006), Ch. 6.
5
See Cohen & Smith, ‘Introduction’, in idem (2002), pp. 8–9.
6
Newton’s Regulae Philosophandi no. 4: ‘In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly
true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions. This rule should be followed so that
arguments based on induction may not be nullified by hypotheses’ (Newton, 1999, p. 796).
In Sections 2 and 3 below, I discuss Newton and Reid’s views
about the relation between physics and theology. In Section 4 a
passage from one of Richard Bentley’s Boyle lectures is considered,
in which divine activity is inferred from premises found in physics,
and I suggest what Reid’s response ought to be. In Section 5 we
take a look at Reid’s account of the argument from design, after
which in Section 6 we go on to consider Reid’s cautionary remarks
about attributing final causes to facts of nature generally, and in
Section 7 for laws of nature specifically. In Section 8 I turn to Wil-
liam Whiston, another great Newtonian Theist, and try to find
those spots in his theistic inferences where Reid would not follow
suit. Section 9 summarizes and concludes.
2. Autonomy of experimental philosophy: Newton
In this section I consider some well known features of Newton’s
philosophy of science from a particular perspective, namely, the
autonomy of experimental philosophy as against theology and
metaphysics.
As a student of nature, Newton strived in two directions. He
strived to mark out a notion of experimental philosophy according
to which laws of nature are discovered and proved by means that
are peculiar to that discipline, and in such a way as to leave these
discoveries unaffected by any disconcerting voices coming from
other areas of discourse.5 At the same time Newton tried to inte-
grate these results in a larger context of metaphysics and theology.
Beginning with the first ambition, Newton was anxious to point
out that some of his discoveries in mechanics and optics had been
proved beyond doubt (‘deduced from phenomena’) and that objec-
tions that had been raised against these discoveries on the basis of
metaphysical or any other preconceptions were not to the point. It
is in this context that his remarks on hypotheses belong. Some
truths about nature can be established beyond reasonable doubt
by observation and experiment, even though we do not know their
microphysical or metaphysical causes, and if thus established they
should be left standing, unless new empirical data give reason to
call them in question.6 Having established the law of gravity, New-
ton went on to admit he had not been able to explain why gravity
acts the way it acts. But he insisted that he would not work out a
hypothesis merely for the sake of supplying one. This is the signifi-
cance of his famous words:
I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the rea-
son of these properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypotheses.
For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be
called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or
physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no
place in experimental philosophy. (Newton, 1999, p. 943)
Notice that Newton does not ban the search for the cause of
gravity; positivist interpretations of Newton are in conflict with
the fact that Newton searched for causes of gravity all his life. A
more reasonable interpretation is that any cause of gravity that as-
pires to be added to our great textbook of physics must be ‘de-
duced from phenomena’. What Newton insisted on then was that
whatever the cause might be, the law of gravity has already been
proven beyond any reasonable doubt as far as experimental data
go: ‘And it is enough that gravity really exists and acts according
to the laws that we have set forth and is sufficient to explain all
 R. Callergård / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 109–119
the motions of the heavenly bodies and of our sea’ (ibid.). In effect
then, Newton demarcates experimental philosophy from other
areas of discourse in the sense that it discovers and proves its con-
clusions on its own.
Besides this first endeavor Newton also tried to integrate his
empirical discoveries in a larger context of theology and metaphys-
ics. It is telling that in the very same section of the Principia in which
he defends his empirical conclusions from objections coming from
other quarters—the General Scholium at the end of the third
book—he spends even more time spelling out his notion of God as
a Governor of the world, relating God to space, time, and material ob-
jects, and claiming that the solar system (‘this most elegant system’;
ibid., p. 940) must owe its origin from the design of an intelligent and
powerful being. Equally in the Queries of the Opticks, as in much of
his unpublished papers, where he discusses the nature of matter,
light, forces, power and causation, Newton moves smoothly be-
tween experimental philosophy, metaphysics, and theology in an
attempt to understand everything, if only a little.
Newton’s two efforts at demarcation and integration do not
necessarily give rise to any inconsistency, but they do call for some
clarification about the taxonomy of different cognitive disciplines.
A change Newton made in the concluding General Scholium be-
tween the second and third editions of the Principia indicates that
he felt the need for clarification in this respect. In the second edi-
tion he had written: ‘To treat of God from phenomena is certainly a
part of experimental philosophy’ (ibid., p. 943). In the third edition,
however, he changed ‘experimental’ to ‘natural’, to say instead: ‘To
treat of God from phenomena is certainly a part of natural philos-
ophy’ (ibid.; Cohen, 1999, p. 274). This change suggests that New-
ton might have had a distinction in mind between ‘experimental
philosophy’ and ‘natural philosophy’ where the former is an empir-
ical science concerned with establishing laws of nature, and where
the latter connotes a wider but still largely empirical subject mat-
ter which studies at least some aspects of God, and in which the
argument of design plays an important role.7
3. Demarcation of physics: Reid
Newton’s demarcation safeguards physical conclusions from
criticism coming from other quarters, but it does not prohibit
physics from supporting conclusions in other areas of discourse.
Reid is more radical.
Reid would have rejected Newton’s claim that experimental
philosophy studies God, as at best misleading, and he would
have appreciated Newton’s change between the second and third
editions as implying an important distinction. With Reid’s own
preferred terminology natural theology deals with efficient
causes, final causes, and some aspects of God, while the sole
aim of physics is to discover laws of nature without entering
upon issues of theology or metaphysics. With this division in
hand, the question to ask is how physics might contribute to
natural theology. In answer to this question it turns out that
Reid demarcates physics in a way that seems to rule out any
such contribution. Four points make what I will refer to as Reid’s
‘demarcation of physics’.
First, Reid denies that physics deals with or discovers efficient
causes, writing, ‘supposing natural philosophy brought to its ut-
most perfection—it does not discover the efficient cause of any
7
Gabbey (2002), pp. 332 f. See also the interesting draft to a preface for the second edition of Principia, in Cohen (1999), p. 54. For a recent and useful discussion of these issues,
see Janiak (2008), Ch. 2.
8
Also: ‘I can see nothing in a physical cause but a constant conjunction with the effect. Mr. Crombie calls it a necessary connection; but this no man sees in physical causes’
(Reid, 2002b, p. 234). See also Reid (1872), p. 526b.
9
‘The laws of nature are the most general facts we can discover in the operations of nature’ (Reid, 1997, p. 125); ‘general facts which we call Laws of Nature’ (Reid, 2002b, p.
141).
10
In this general claim ‘object’ must be taken in a wide sense. It is a dogmatic principle of Reid that material objects cannot be active.
111
one phenomenon in nature’ (Reid, 1872, p. 527a). This view is
not surprising given Reid’s analysis of efficient causation: To be
the efficient cause of an event, an entity needs to be endowed
not only with the power to initiate that event but also with the
power to refrain. This implies that an efficient cause must be able
to deliberate, which in turn implies some level of intelligence, wis-
dom, and foresight (Yaffe, 2004, esp. Ch. 2). The full significance of
denying physics any grasp of efficient causation becomes clear
when it is realized that this is the only intelligible notion of causa-
tion Reid can find. Efficient causation or agency, and nothing else,
is causation in the proper sense of the word. He is critical of vague
and ill conceived notions of natural objects having causal powers:
‘Even the great Bacon seems to have thought that there is a latens
processus, as he calls it, by which natural causes really produce their
effects, and that in the progress of philosophy, this might be dis-
covered’ (Reid, 2002b, p. 243; original emphasis). The substitute
for causation in physics is laws of nature, and Reid takes it to be
one of Newton’s great achievements to have realized the impor-
tance of the distinction between laws and causes. After criticizing
Bacon, Reid continues:
But Newton, more enlightened on this point, has taught us to
acquiesce in a law of nature, according to which the effect is pro-
duced, as the utmost that natural philosophy can reach, leaving
what can be known of the agent or efficient cause to metaphys-
ics or natural theology. (Ibid.; original emphasis)
Secondly, Reid also dispenses with ‘necessity’:
Modern philosophers know that we have no ground to ascribe
efficiency to natural causes, or even a necessary connection
with the effect. But we still call them causes, including nothing
under the name but priority and constant conjunction.
(Ibid.)8
The influence of Hume is acknowledged in a letter to James
Gregory:
What D. Hume says of causes, in general, is very just when
applied to physical causes, that a constant conjunction with
the effect is essential to such causes, and implied in the very
conception of them. (Reid, 2002b, p. 180)
Reid’s adoption of a ‘constant conjunction’ notion of physical
causes complies with his voluntarism. Things happen the way it
pleases God they should happen according to law. Laws are general
statements that tell us what, in fact, goes with what, but they do
not imply that things must be that way. For Reid laws are contin-
gently true general facts about the world.9
Thirdly, Reid denies that physics is concerned with whether ob-
jects are passive or active in processes of nature (ibid., pp. 126,
180: 5–8). It is not that there are no truths about things being ac-
tive or passive, because Reid firmly holds that ‘Every object which
undergoes any change must be either active or passive in that
change’ (Reid, 1872, p. 525b).10 But whether an object is passive
or active in a process is a question of metaphysics. It is a persistent
theme in Reid’s letters to Kames that Kames laments and complains
that Newton’s physics does not account for the ultimate sources of
motion, while Reid explains again and again that that is simply not
the business of physics:
112 R. Callergård / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 109–119

The distinction your Lordship makes between moving and being
moved belongs not to Physics but Metaphysicks. In Physics you
may use the active or the passive Verb as you like best. (Reid,
2002b, p. 127)
Fourthly, it is Reid’s view that explanation within physics con-
sists in nothing else than demonstrating that a single event or a
class of phenomena is the necessary consequence of known laws
of nature. Reid acknowledges other kinds of explanation such as
explanation from efficient causes (telling who did something)
and explanation from final causes (telling for what reason, design,
or end, an act was performed). But none of these are in his view
reducible to physical explanation, and they belong to other areas
of discourse (ibid., pp. 142 f.).
In view of these four points it seems impossible for physics to
produce or support by itself any purely theological or metaphysical
doctrine; physics simply does not speak about things divine and
necessary. Physics starts from observation of familiar phenomena,
and proceeds by establishing general law-like connections, which
by further experiment lead up to the formulation and discovery
of laws of nature, the evidence for which always remain inductive.
By his emphasis on the need for hard experimental and observa-
tional work, and his criticism of the misuse and dangers of hypoth-
esizing, Reid in effect puts Newton (to whom, besides Bacon, Reid
attributes most of his philosophy of science) in the empiricist tra-
dition in the philosophy of physics, a tradition which has been
either strongly critical of metaphysics and theology, or has strived
to keep physics clearly demarcated from other disciplines. Reid’s
demarcation of physics makes a fundamental part of his Newtoni-
anism, as I defined that term above, and this is indeed a primary
sense in which Reid was a devoted Newtonian, a sense that needs
to be isolated from other senses in which he might have been a fol-
lower of Newton.11 Reid’s Newtonian Theism, however, is not a nec-
essary outcome of his Newtonianism. That is why I defined
‘Newtonian Theism’ so as to imply the view that Newton’s physics
is true, but not to imply any particular philosophy of science and
methodology. Most Theist followers of Newton did not share Reid’s
acute sense of methodology and issues of demarcation.
4. Bentley’s inference of divine participation via the force of
gravity
How does Reid’s demarcation work when applied to typical
arguments of Newtonian Theists? In this section I discuss some
features of Richard Bentley’s Boyle lectures, given in 1692, and in
a later section William Whiston will be considered for the same
purpose.
In his seventh Boyle lecture Richard Bentley argues that to ex-
plain gravitational phenomena a principle is required that is essen-
tially distinct from inert matter. A persistent point of departure for
the project of Newtonian Theism reads:
‘Tis utterly inconceivable, that inanimate brute Matter (without
the mediation of some immaterial Being) should operate upon
and effect other Matter without mutual Contact; that distant
Bodies should act upon each other through a Vacuum without
the intervention of something else by and through which the
action may be conveyed from one to the other. (Bentley, 1976
[1692], pp. 28–29)12
The reasoning among Newtonian Theists might vary from here,
but they usually concur in two conclusions. The principle required
to explain gravity or gravitational phenomena (the power or force
of gravity) is assumed to be, let’s say, ‘non-mechanical’ in the sense
of not being derivable from, or explained by, the three ‘mechanical’
laws of motion stated in Principia. This principle is also assumed to
be ‘non-material’ in the sense that it cannot be reduced to any pri-
mary properties of matter.13 A crucial step in their reasoning re-
mains, however, which is that the power of gravity is a principle
which is, if not spiritual itself, at least under the direct control of
God, not only in the obvious sense of God’s authorship and supervi-
sion, but in the sense that God executes actions to keep gravity a-
going after creation, day by day. Gravitational phenomena require
God’s active participation everywhere and always. This is how Bent-
ley makes the desired inference:
Gravity we understand to be a constant Energy or Faculty
(which God has infused into Matter) perpetually acting by cer-
tain Measures and (naturally) inviolable Laws; I say, a Faculty
and Power: for we cannot conceive that the Act of Gravitation
of this present Moment can propagate itself or produce that of
the next. But ‘tis otherwise as to the Transverse Motion [i.e. uni-
form motion in a straight line]; which (by reason of the Inactiv-
ity of Matter and its inability to change its present State either
of Moving or Resting) would from one single Impulse continue
for ever equal and uniform, unless changed by a Gravitating
Power. (Bentley, 1976, p. 26)
If I understand this rightly, Bentley thinks that a body moving
uniformly in a straight line is a body whose velocity at a certain
time and place can be wholly explained by what happened in pre-
ceding times, and whose velocity in the next instant can be pre-
dicted from what went before. If it be asked why a body moves
at all (if it does so absolutely) an explanation would have to refer
to the act of a being with the power to initiate new motion. But
that initiation might very well have happened in the days of crea-
tion, as Deists would have it. For a body orbiting a central body,
however, the case is different. ‘We cannot conceive’, writes Bent-
ley, ‘that the Act of Gravitation of this present Moment can propa-
gate itself or produce that of the next’. Bentley thinks that the
power of gravity is exerted again and again, and that it differs in
this respect from the power of inertia. That is, since the power of
gravity adds force continuously as a body falls to the ground, and
thus increases its speed, it is assumed that this is due to repeated
numerically distinct exertions of force on the body.14 The motor of

11
For this reason I disagree with Yaffe’s portrait of the ‘Newtonian’ aspect of Reid’s philosophy (Yaffe, 2004). Yaffe takes Reid’s idea of Newtonian natural science to include or to
be intimately integrated with issues of natural theology and metaphysics: ‘The devoted Newtonian also describes the metaphysical structures that must underlie the fundamental
principles according to which phenomena unfold. Thus, for Reid, to be a Newtonian is not to be a narrow empiricist; experience provides the basis for much of what one is
licensed to assert about the world, but the Newtonian must also determine what must be true, what the structure of the world must be like, if experience is to be subsumed under
law’ (p. 5). ‘Reid took the postulation of active powers, and an account of their distribution and nature, to be part of what a complete Newtonian science produces’ (p. 8). For much
the same reason I find the description of Reid as a ‘Providential naturalist’ (Brookes, 1997) unconvincing as it does not sufficiently appreciate Reid’s efforts of demarcation.
12
See also Newton’s fourth letter to Bentley, in Newton (2004).
13
Insofar as Newtonians thought of gravity as a universal property of matter, it was typically thought of as being ‘superadded’ to matter, rather than as being a ‘necessary’,
‘inherent’, ‘essential’, or ‘primary’ quality of matter. See Newton’s fourth letter to Bentley, in Newton (2004).
14
It is a matter of speculation whether Bentley is misled by Newton’s mathematical analysis of centripetal force, in which the sides of a polygon is used to approximate the orbit
of a planet, and the centripetal force, the quantity of which Newton is trying determine, is assumed to be exerted as a series of impulses on the planet, one impulse for each side of
the polygon, each of which pushes the planet out of its path along one side of the polygon to the next side. What Newton is trying to find, however, is the continually acting
centripetal force, which he determines by increasing the number of sides of the polygon and diminishing the sides indefinitely, letting an infinite number of impulses approach
the force that ‘acts uninterruptedly’ (Newton, 1999, p. 445). Be that as it may, Bentley’s argument does not seem compelling anyway, since any ‘addition’ of force on a body falling
towards the earth, that makes it accelerate, may be continuous as well as discrete. If it is continuous it might only require one exertion of power, which lasts, and not a series of
actions.
 R. Callergård / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 109–119
these exertions, the ‘constant Energy or Faculty’, is what makes
physics imply Theism.
Now, there are two points on which Reid would depart. First
point: Reid agrees that to explain gravitational phenomena a prin-
ciple is required which is essentially distinct from matter. Matter is
essentially inert and a body will not change its state of motion or
rest unless influenced by an external force, which Reid says is
‘immaterial’. But where can we go from here? It is significant
and complies with his demarcation of physics that Reid is unwill-
ing to jump to any spiritual conclusion on the mere ground that
Newton’s physics distinguishes between inert matter and im-
pressed force. To see this point let us turn for a moment to Reid’s
combat with Joseph Priestley’s dynamic conception of matter,
which says that matter is constituted by forces of attraction and
repulsion. For Priestley, it is a virtue of such a conception that it
would make it possible to dispense with the problem of interaction
between matter and mind that haunts dualist ontology. Now, one
of the main targets of Reid’s writings on Priestley is his material-
ism. It is Reid’s view that the materialistic monism that Priestley
advocates is incompatible with Newton’s physics, but not because
Newton’s physics assumes the dualism of matter and mind (minds
or spirits do not play any role in the Principia anyway), but because
it is based on the ontological distinction between matter and force.
In Newton’s physics the gravitational force of a central body is im-
pressed on inert satellites to bring them out of the tangential path
they would otherwise take.15 The question is what the notion of an
immaterial force impressed on inert matter implies to Reid? Having
claimed that modern physics assumes an immaterial principle be-
sides inert matter, he writes:
To prevent misunderstanding of the Term immaterial I would
observe that the terms material & immaterial being contradic-
torily opposed must according to the principles of Logic include
between them every thing that exists. For every thing either is
matter or is not matter which is all that I mean by immaterial.
Some may be apt to think that what is immaterial must be
endowed with thought and Intelligence. But this I take to be
mere Prejudice. (Reid, 1995, p. 219)
In other words, Newton’s physics implies an ontological divi-
sion between inert matter and impressed force, but this division
should not be confused with that between matter and mind. Bent-
ley, however, assumes that the exertion of gravitational force im-
plies divine activity—a direct exertion of divine power, which is
not implied by the phenomena of bodies changing their position
as they move uniformly in a straight line.16 For Bentley, accelera-
tion implies intelligence and divine activity in a way that uniform
motion or rest does not.
Second point: Bentley relies heavily on the assumption that there
is an essential difference between the three laws of motion, the
mechanical laws, on the one hand, and the law of gravity, on the
other, in what they ontologically imply. Indeed, it is essential to his
overall argument against Deists and Mechanists to grant them that
a universe that consists only of bodies in uniform rectilinear motion,
and any motion produced by collision, is a universe that would be
well explained by mechanical laws plus the assumption of an initial
push by a Deity. But this is not our universe since gravitational phe-
nomena cannot be explained mechanically. It is a tacit assumption of
Bentley’s argument that the law of gravity introduced by Newton
cannot be explained by mechanical principles, and, that the new
15
Reid does not take seriously the possibility of explaining gravity by mechanical means, that is, by contact action, except when he expresses his skepticism about our limited
insights into the manner of gravity’s cause or production, and wants to keep all options alive.
16
Reid would indeed agree that the exertion of gravitational force requires an agent with superior intellectual power, but he does not make the conclusion that the force of
gravity itself is divine, or more importantly, he does not argue from the nature of gravity to the reality of God’s activity. For all Reid knows, the force of gravity might be a mindless
and unintelligent instrument of God.
17
Newton believes in, sanctions, and supports arguments of design. It is difficult, however, to find him anywhere performing an argument of design. Notable places of claims
without performance are the Principia, (Newton, 1999, pp. 940, 942), the Optics, (Newton, 1979, p. 402), and letters to Bentley (Newton, 2004, pp. 94 ff.).
113
physics introduces properties of bodies that are not reducible to pri-
mary qualities of matter. And he further infers (fairly quickly indeed)
that this extra mechanical power of gravity is a spiritual and ulti-
mately divine principle. For Bentley then, once the law of gravity
has been established, the road to Theism is inevitable.
Now, apart from the fact that Reid never uses such a division
among laws in arguments for Theism, there are reasons why he
doesn’t and why he shouldn’t, having to do with what he takes a
law of nature to be. There are two sides to this point, one theolog-
ical and one scientific. The theological point is that, for Reid, any
law of nature reflects God’s will and intention to order the world
in a certain way. There is no reason therefore why Reid should find
the law of gravity more compelling as an argument for Theism,
than the mechanical laws of motion. Bentley, however, clearly as-
sumes that Cartesian physics, with its mechanical laws but without
a law of general gravity, does not give sufficient ground for a theist
conclusion, even though it involves laws of nature.
The scientific point is that the constant conjunction approach to
physical causation and laws, which Reid inherits from Hume and
Berkeley, implies restrictions on what can be known about under-
lying reasons, causes or mechanisms. Since a law of nature merely
states that certain types of events follow other types of events reg-
ularly, there is nothing in what these laws state that informs us
about the manner of production. In this respect there is no differ-
ence between the law of gravity and the law of inertia. These laws
have been established beyond doubt by empirical means, and they
are clearly stated in the Principia, and yet their deeper causes are
unknown to us. We might explain a law indeed, but according to
Reid, this merely means that we deduce it from some other laws.
Physics will not tell us anything further. All in all, Reid has no rea-
son to found his Theism on the law of gravity any more than on
other laws.
5. The argument from design
If physics is silent about key issues of theology and metaphys-
ics, perhaps the argument from design affords a bridge on which
truths of physics might travel to issues of theology and metaphys-
ics. Arguments from design were arguably the preeminent tools of
Newtonian Theists. I say ‘arguments’ since the style, form, and con-
tent of these arguments involving design, intentions, and different
sorts of Godly intervention, vary considerably and are difficult to
assemble under a particular and obvious form of reasoning.17 How-
ever, in his Essays on the intellectual powers of man, Reid defends the
validity and soundness of such arguments, and in doing so he gives
them a particular form, and this is what matters for us. The question
to ask is how physics contributes to natural theology in Reid’s ver-
sion of the design argument. It is Reid’s express belief that the argu-
ment of design gets more and more convincing as the natural
sciences develop. It has, he writes ‘[this] peculiar advantage, that it
gathers strength as human knowledge advances, and is more con-
vincing at present than it was some centuries ago’ (Reid, 2002a, p.
509; 1981, p. 15). The progress of knowledge referred to here is what
Reid elsewhere refers to as the ‘reformation of science’ (i.e. what we
call the scientific revolution), the grandest part of which consists of
the work of Newton (Reid, 2002b, p. 163; see also Callergård, 2006,
pp. 11 f.). The connection through the argument of design between
natural theology and this recent progress in natural science qualifies
114 R. Callergård / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 109–119
Reid as a Newtonian Theist. The point I wish to make in this section
is that in Reid’s version of the argument of design there are no pre-
mises of physics, and that therefore, such arguments are solely an af-
fair of natural theology.
This is the principal passage:
The argument from final causes, when reduced to a syllogism,
has these two premises: First, That design and intelligence in
the cause may, with certainty, be inferred from marks or signs
of it in the effect. This is the principle we have been considering,
and we may call it the major proposition of the argument. The
second, which we may call the minor proposition, is, That there
are in fact the clearest marks of design and wisdom in the works
of Nature; and the conclusion is, that the works of Nature are
the effects of a wise and intelligent cause. One must either
assent to the conclusion, or deny one or other of the premises.
(Reid, 2002a, p. 509)
It is plain here that, if any part of the argument is affected by
physics, it is not the major premise; it is a first principle of neces-
sary truth, the epistemic status of which cannot be affected by
empirical evidence (ibid., pp. 507 f.). It is on the minor premise,
then, that new discoveries must have their effect. But in the way
Reid describes the minor premise, there is no mentioning of any-
thing but facts of design or marks of design. Plain physical facts,
as based on ordinary perception or physical experiment, are no
part of this kind of argument.
It is unfortunate that Reid does not discuss explicitly the role
of physics for the argument of design, and the evidential condi-
tions for design judgments such as ‘This object O has the mark
M of design’. It is clear though, that singular design judgments
have a lot in common with judgments made in ordinary percep-
tion. For instance, they are made directly (without reasoning)
and they are as convincing and certain as any. In correspondence
with Lord Kames, Reid agrees that the means by which we come
to the conclusion that something is designed for a certain end is
more to be likened with perception and feeling than with
reasoning.
I cannot help thinking that such a work as the Iliad, & much
more an Animal or Vegetable body must have been made by
express design and counsel employed for that end. And an
Author whom I very much respect [i.e. Kames] has taught me,
‘That we form this conclusion, not by any process of Reasoning,
but by mere Perception & Feeling’. And I think that conclusions
formed in this manner, are of all others most to be trusted. It
seems to me as easy to contrive a machine that should produce
a variety of Epick Poems and Tragedies, as to contrive laws of
Motion by which unthinking particles of Matter should coalesce
into a variety of Organized Bodies. (Reid, 2002b, p. 77)18
If design properties are as easily detected, and detected in much
the same way, as other properties detected by perception, it is
understandable why little attention is paid among Newtonian The-
ists (including Reid) to the inference from the ordinary properties
of a natural object to its marks of design.
There are reasons to believe, however, that Reid’s description of
the minor premise is precisely what he intended; physical facts are
no part of arguments of design. For instance, design properties are
neither among the properties Reid discusses in chapter XVII, ‘Of
primary and secondary qualities’ nor among those discussed in
chapter XVIII, ‘Of other objects of perception’, in the Essays on the
intellectual powers. Although Reid points out that he is not ‘pre-
tending a complete enumeration’ in the latter chapter, design
properties do not fall in any of the classes he discusses, namely,
18
Reid refers here most probably to Kames (2005), Vol. II, Essay VIII.
‘1st, Certain states or conditions of our own bodies. 2nd, Mechani-
cal powers or forces. 3rd, Chemical powers, 4th, Medical powers or
virtues. 5th, Vegetable and animal powers’. So even if Reid would
count design properties as ‘objects of perception’ it is clear that
he makes some distinction among such objects, a distinction that
is consonant with his demarcation of physics. In fact, design prop-
erties are treated elsewhere in the Essays on the intellectual powers,
in the ‘Essay of Taste’, together with properties of beauty, grandeur,
and the sublime (Reid, 2002a, Ch. VIII, ‘Essay of taste; for design see
pp. 606 ff.).
What is more, whether or not Reid would count design properties
as objects of perception, it is clear that, for all its certainty and direct-
ness, which makes it resemble ordinary perception, he regards the
evidence of design as a species of evidence of its own:
As to final Causes, they stare us in the face wherever we cast our
Eyes. I can no more doubt whether the Eye was made for the
purpose of seeing, & the Ear of hearing, than I can doubt of a
Mathematical Axiom. Yet the Evidence is neither Mathematical
Demonstration nor is it Induction. (Reid, 2002b, p. 143)
Consequently Reid points out to Kames that the search for final
causes belongs to metaphysics or natural theology, and not to nat-
ural philosophy or physics. The business of natural science is
from particular facts in the material World, to collect by just
Induction the Laws that are less general, and from these the
more general as far as we can go. And when this is done, natural
Philosophy has no more to do. It exhibits to our view the grand
Machine of the material World, analysed as it were, and taken
to pieces; with the connections and dependencies of its several
parts, and the Laws of its several Movements. It belongs to
another branch of Philosophy to consider whether this Machine
is the work of Chance or of Design, & whether of good or of bad
Design . . . Whether you call this branch of Philosophy, natural
Theology, or Metaphysics, I care not; but I think it should not
be confounded with natural Philosophy, and neither of them
with Mathematics. (Ibid., pp. 142 f.)
To conclude, Reid’s view of the matter seems to be this. Rather
than saying that our knowledge about physiology and physics are
premises in an argument from design, it seems more correct to say
that natural theology takes advantage of discoveries made in nat-
ural science in order to form judgments of its own about ends, pur-
poses, or final causes. These judgments are formed through a
distinct kind of evidence, and they are employed in the argument
of design.
6. Caution about final causes
Arguments from design or from final causes depend thus on
premises cooked by Natural Theology on a stove of physics. The
theologian/metaphysician conceives and interprets facts of physics
through a special faculty of the mind that yields evidence of design,
and it is thus the responsibility of the theologian/metaphysician,
and not the physicist, to justify these premises. This leads us to
the question what those facts are which allow us to infer justifiably
(or to ‘see’ or ‘perceive’) design properties. While we have seen that
Reid does not use physics directly to argue for Theism, he might
still find Bentley’s and Whiston’s efforts agreeable, taking them
to be legitimate arguments within natural theology and metaphys-
ics. The success of such arguments will still depend on inferences
from physical fact to design fact, allowing here for a liberal use
of ‘inference’, or better perhaps, they will depend on conclusions
about design made under, and partly justified by, certain facts
and circumstances known by ordinary perception.
 R. Callergård / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 109–119 115

Reid is both generous and restrictive about assigning final
causes. For very obvious cases of design, such as that of a beauti-
fully written poem or the structure of the human eye, he is
generous:
In a word, final Causes, good final Causes, are seen plainly every
where; in the Heavens and in the Earth, in the constitution of
every animal, and in our own constitution of body & of Mind.
And they are most worthy of observation, and have a Charm
in them that delights the Soul. (Reid, 2002b, p. 143)
His lectures on Natural Theology abound in examples of design
collected from various branches of science (Reid, 1981).19 As to less
clear and obvious cases, however, which would require some reason-
ing to be settled, Reid’s advice is one of caution and restrictions. In
this and the next section I want to draw attention to a letter written
by Reid in the autumn 1782 to Lord Kames, all about final causes. In
the first half of the letter Reid makes five cautionary remarks about
assigning final causes, and these are followed, in the second part of
the letter, by a discussion about the final causes for laws of nature.
This letter reveals differences in principles and attitudes towards
Theistic reasoning between Reid on the one hand and Richard Bent-
ley and William Whiston on the other.
The letter begins:
A final Cause is a hymn of Praise to the Creator of the World, and
therefore every good Man will delight in discovering final
Causes. Yet there is some Caution necessary in this delightful
task. (Reid, 2002b, p. 154)
These are his five cautionary remarks:
(a) There is no final cause for what is ‘necessary and no Matter
of choice’ (ibid., pp. 154–155). According to Reid only what is
dependent on someone’s will can have a final cause; contingent
truths can, but necessary truths like 2 + 2 = 4 (Reid’s example)
cannot have final causes.
(b) There is no final cause for what is false (ibid., p. 155). This
may seem an obvious remark, but it bears considerable signifi-
cance. A persistent complaint Reid directs towards philosophers
and scientists of his time is that explanations are too often put
forward on false or too slight evidence, and sometimes for
things that are not even true. For Natural Theologians, whose
arguments of design depend on facts of physics, Reid’s words
of warning must therefore be highly relevant. They had better
do their physics homework correctly before drawing any extra
physical conclusions. This point illustrates well the order of
Reid’s priorities.
(c) ‘Neither can we hope to find the final Cause of every real
Constitution of Nature. It is evident, our Eyes were given us to
see, & our Ears to hear. But there are many things in the Struc-
ture of both Organs, of which we know not the Cause. And I
humbly think, that when a final cause cannot be made manifest
and palpable, we should be very modest in assigning it’ (ibid.).
It is not clear from these lines whether the reason not to expect
or hope to find a final cause for every physical fact is to be
found in the world or in ourselves. One side of the message is
no doubt a combination of sound scientific caution with reli-
gious piety; know thy limits. As we will see below, there is rea-
son to consider the possibility that Reid does not think there is
a particular final cause for every physical fact or ‘constitution of
nature’.
(d) We cannot find a final cause for things that can be either
way, like the planets going eastwards and not westwards
(Reid’s example; ibid.).
(e) Finally, we should not assign ‘trifling causes’ like the nose
being made for holding glasses (ibid.).20
We are now prepared to see how these remarks work for Reid,
and how they would provide stumbling blocks for Whiston’s theis-
tic inferences.
7. Final causes for laws of nature
The second half of the autumn 1782 letter is concerned with
whether the laws of inertia, gravity, and acceleration have final
causes. What Reid’s letter to Kames shows is that he is less willing
to attribute final causes to laws of nature and their consequences,
compared with Whiston. From the first cautionary remark above
we saw that, for Reid, necessary truths do not have final causes.
He points out that if the three laws of motion are necessary conse-
quences of the nature or essence of matter, then they are necessary
truths themselves; they are logically deduced from necessarily true
premises stating the essence of matter. If this is the case (which
Reid says he is inclined to believe) then there are no final causes
for these three laws. We would better ask, Reid writes, why God
created matter instead of asking why there is a law of inertia.21
About the law of gravity Reid does not think it is a necessary conse-
quence of the essence of matter, and he reckons there is a final cause
for it pointing out that ‘its manifold uses are obvious’ (Reid, 2002b, p.
156, letter 78).
Having set out these preliminaries, Reid turns to the law of
acceleration, that is, the law that a body accelerates if it falls freely
towards a central body. It turns out that Reid is adamant not to
attribute a final cause for this law. His reason is that this law is a
necessary consequence of the laws of inertia and gravity, which
makes it physically explained (Reid, 2002a, p. 102). ‘But supposing
that there are good reasons for ordaining these two Forces in Nat-
ure [inertia and gravity], there is no need for any other Reason for
the acceleration of falling bodies, because it follows necessarily
from the Forces mentioned’ (Reid, 2002b, p. 156, letter 78). Note
that the reason Reid denies this law a final cause is not that it is
a necessary truth. It is not, since it is deduced from two laws of nat-
ure out of which one is reckoned by Reid to be a contingent truth.
The law of acceleration is a contingent truth and a necessary
consequence of laws of nature, and as such there is no need to
think that there must be a final cause for it. But to be such a

19
At one point Reid even goes so far as to say, ‘Every object we can contemplate exhibits to us marks of wisdom’ (Reid, 1981, p. 16). This is perhaps the place to remark that
Reid’s lectures on natural theology are for several reasons difficult to work with. Besides there being no reliable edition of them, and their being handed down only through the
hands of students, the greatest difficulty is that Reid, not always, but still too often, and in a way uncharacteristic of him, seems to avoid philosophical difficulties. The primary aim
of these lectures is apparently not to inquire into difficult things, but rather to make sure that the students leave the lectures with their faith unshaken.
20
Kames’s letters to Reid are not extant, but nothing indicates that they were discussing Bentley or Whiston. Their exchange was triggered by Kames’s objection to Newton’s
mechanics, that it does not reveal the underlying and ultimate causes or reasons of motion. In his ‘On the laws of motion’ (Henry Home, Lord Kames, 1754) he argues that bodies
have inherent active powers that make them keep acquired motion and gravitate. It is a persistent theme of their exchange that Reid has to explain to Kames that Kames’s
expectations of physics are wrong, and it is in response to Kames’s worries that Reid presents most clearly his demarcation of physics. It may fairly be said that Kames wanted to
be a Newtonian Theist, but having fully understood the parameters of Newtonian physics, and the limits imposed by Reid’s interpretation of the same, he could not be, and thus
his constant conflict. There is a point in saying that, from Reid’s point of view, Kames had a better insight as to the nature (and limits) of Newton’s physics than had Bentley and
Whiston (an insight that did not make Kames happy).
21
Reid usually thinks of laws of nature as contingently true general propositions describing constant regularities in the natural world. Here, however, he reckons with the
possibility that the three laws of motions are necessary truths being consequences of the essence of matter.
116 R. Callergård / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 109–119

consequence, whether it is a general truth like the law of acceler-
ation, or a particular truth about the moon being at place p at time
t, is simply to be physically explained. This strongly suggests a
view according to which facts that are physically explained do
not necessarily have final causes of their own.22 This would not
run into conflict with Reid’s further view that every contingent fact
is dependent on some agent’s will and action. Although every action
by an agent implies a final cause for which that action is taken, it
does not follow that each and every consequence of that action is in-
cluded in the final cause of that action. Even if each and every fact
about planetary times and positions are dependent on God’s action,
this neither implies a specific final cause, nor a specific action on
God’s part, for each and every fact. It only implies at least one deci-
sion, and at least one action, to let the world run according to general
laws.23
8. William Whiston’s theistic inference
Before Newton left Cambridge for London, he arranged for his
assistant William Whiston (1667–1752) to be his successor as
Lucasian Professor of Mathematics. Whiston held the chair from
1702 to 1710, when he was banned from the university due to
his subordinationist views on the Trinity. During his time in Cam-
bridge he gave the Boyle lectures of 1707 (Force, 1983). A prolific
writer in science and theology, and a passionate follower of New-
ton, Whiston is a useful object of comparison for the purpose of
this paper; Reid and Whiston both knew well the mathematics
and physics of the Principia, both purport to follow closely in the
footsteps of Newton, and both are Newtonian Theists according
to my definition.
In his Astronomical principles of religion: natural and revealed of
1717, Whiston presents an elaborate book-length argument, the
aim of which is to show what is ‘properly the Religion of a genuine
and considering Astronomer; or what are properly the Astronomi-
cal Principles of Natural and Reveal’d Religion’ (Whiston, 1983, p.
xxx). Part of Whiston’s reasoning consists of an inference from
physical fact to a theistic conclusion, which will be my next sub-
ject. It is too big an undertaking to reconstruct here the whole of
Whiston’s theistic inference, and perhaps also too easy to find
questionable steps in it, but I will start by giving the reader an
overview and a sense of the general argument. It will suffice for
my purpose then to pick out some steps in it, where, I believe, Reid
would disagree.
The overall strategy of the book is to show, in the first half (part
I–V), that modern astronomy implies Theism, and in the second
half (part VI–IX), that Biblical prophesies and descriptions of
worldly events agree with modern astronomy. Biblical and astro-
nomical accounts of worldly events are mutually supporting
(Force, 1983).24 Parts I to III of Astronomical principles deal with rel-
atively uncontroversial matters of physics and astronomy; there are
continuous references in the margin to corresponding propositions
in Newton’s Principia. Part I gives a systematic presentation of New-
ton’s mechanics, and part II gives an overview of basic facts of
astronomy. The aim of part III is to show that modern astronomy
as based on Newton’s physics is a certain and not merely probably
true account of the universe.25 The proof consists in an argument
for the truth of the Copernican system, and an argument to show
that the theory of general gravitation is what explains it. In the
course of this last argument Whiston, like Bentley before, claims that
the power of gravity cannot be explained by mechanical laws, and he
goes on to claim, with reference to the impossibility of action at dis-
tance, that gravity must be due to a ‘superior Agent, ever moving all
Bodies after such a manner, as if every Body did Attract, and were
Attracted by every other Body in the Universe, and no otherwise’
(Whiston, 1983, p. 46). We should not read into this claim about a
superior agent a Reidian notion of agency, which implies intelligence
and deliberation. Whiston, like Bentley and Newton, often uses
‘agent’ in a broader sense that does not exclude there being material
agents (Newton, 2004, fourth letter to Bentley, p. 102f). It is, there-
fore, only in part IV that Whiston infers Theism, that is, the conclu-
sion that some natural phenomena imply an intelligent, providential
and ever acting cause.
Part IV consists of twenty-nine brief paragraphs and a final re-
mark, in the space of only ten pages. The first seven paragraphs
prepare for the rest by laying down that any phenomenon that can-
not be explained by mechanical laws must be explained through
the law of gravity, and nothing else. In §§ 1 to 4 Whiston argues
that while rest or uniform motion of material bodies can be ex-
plained by mechanical laws, acceleration and motion in curved
lines cannot be explained that way; the actual motions of the uni-
verse are totally dependent on the power of gravity. In §§ 5 to 7 it is
stated that there is no evidence whatsoever of the existence of a
subtle matter or a plenum, and that observations show that heav-
enly bodies do not meet resistance in space. In the paragraphs that
follow it is then to be understood that the bare law of gravity is
what supplements the mechanical laws to explain heavenly
phenomena, and nothing else.26 And it is then, during the course
of the subsequent paragraphs to be understood that, whenever the
law of gravity does explain phenomena, this will imply, somehow,
theism.
Paragraphs 8–19 all have the same structure. A contingent fact
about the solar system is picked out and described, followed by a
brief hint of an argument, which in turn is followed by one and
the same phrase to end the paragraph, namely, ‘is no way owing
to any Mechanical Cause, or Necessity whatsoever; but entirely
to free Choice, Prudence, and Judgment’. It is plain that each para-
graph does not by itself present a complete and valid argument,
and we may safely assume that Whiston would agree to some

22
Presumably God might conceive a separate final cause for something that would have happened anyway by laws of nature, for instance, an evil king being timely struck by a
meteorite. But for most cases, innumerable physical facts about the positions of bodies in space, it is near at hand to think that no such special intention is needed. Interestingly,
Whiston discusses, towards the end of A new theory of the Earth, the methodological problems involved in explaining natural events sometimes by godly intervention and
sometimes by natural causes, where the latter are supposed to be clear instances of godly action as well (Whiston, 1696, pp. 218 ff.).
23
Pursuing this line of reasoning it seems clear that the law of acceleration is not obviously ‘a rule according to which the agent acts’, which is how Reid explains the theological
side of laws of nature (Reid, 1872, p. 527). The law of acceleration is not a basic law, but merely a consequence of actions taken in making basic laws true. The line of
interpretation I pursue here might conflict with Yaffe’s account of laws, rules, and characters (Yaffe, 2004, Ch. 4). Yaffe’s analysis interestingly suggests that, for Reid, a law is a
resolution of God to act consistently’. The crucial question is whether every instance of either a basic or a derivative law requires a particular action. In other words, how many
actions does it take for God to make a basic law true, and how many actions does it take in addition to make a derivative law true?
24
Whiston made a name for himself with A new theory of the Earth, from its original to the consummation of all things (1696), in which modern physics is used to explain the
Deluge. It was very much appreciated by Newton and Locke.
25
‘In order to let the Reader see the Certainty of our present System of Astronomy, and to prepare the way for his entire Satisfaction, as to the noble Inferences that shall
hereafter be drawn from the same, I shall now attempt, not only to prove the foregoing System, in all its Parts, to be very probable, and so preferable to any other Hypothesis; but
to Demonstrate it to be really true and certain; and this after so familiar a manner, that ordinary Mathematicians may easily apprehend the Force of each Argument, and see the
Evidence for the several Conclusions all along’ (Whiston, 1983 [1717], p. 26).
26
Whiston and Bentley’s theistic inference depends on the assumption that there are no alternative ‘natural’ causes in between mechanical laws and gravity, no intermediate
power, law, being, substance, or force. In this they were far more dogmatic than Newton, who speculated about ether and fundamental active principles more basic than forces of
gravity and magnetism. Reid is critical of intermediate entities, mostly because it is left unclear whether such entities have or have not intelligence and volition enough to be
agents.
 R. Callergård / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 109–119
reconstruction. From a Reidian point of view, however, there are
already deep problems with these inferences.
Let us start with § 8, which reads thus:
Since the particular proportion that pertains to the Power of
Gravity, I mean that of the duplicate of the Nearness of Bodies,
is not any necessary Result from the Nature of Matter, or any
Laws of Motion in the world; it is plain that this Proportion is
no way owing to any Mechanical Cause, or Necessity whatso-
ever; but entirely to free Choice, Prudence, and Judgment.
(Whiston, 1983, p. 82)
The contingency picked out is the squaring of the distance, ‘d2’,
in the law of gravity, F = g(m1m2/d2). Since it was settled before
that gravity cannot be explained by mechanical laws, Whiston
here draws the conclusion that this part of the law of gravity is
not a necessary consequence of anything except God’s fiat. Now,
from what we learned before about Reid’s qualms about assigning
final causes for laws of nature, it is near at hand to suggest that
he would respond as follows: It is not plain that this fact about
the ‘constitution of nature’ has a particular final cause. This is
because it may very well be that this proportion is a necessary
consequence of the nature of matter and thus a necessary truth
itself (at least Whiston has not proved anything to the contrary),
or that it is a necessary consequence of some laws, in which case
it has, as Reid wrote in his 1782 letter to Kames, ‘no need for any
other Reason’ (Reid, 2002b, p. 156). In either case it is unreason-
able to assign a final cause. Remember also that in the same letter
Reid writes that the law of gravity most probably is designed for
a certain end and not deducible from mechanical laws, so he
would not object so much to the conclusion Whiston wants to
make. The trouble is that Reid does not think we ought to draw
this conclusion, however true it is and desirable it would be to
do so. We are neither in the position to be sure what the final
cause would be for the squaring of the distance, nor to be sure
it has a final cause at all. What is more, we are neither in the
position to ascertain that there is an agent that directly acted to
make that fact true, nor to be sure who that agent would be.
Whiston, on the contrary, estimates his arguments to be as con-
clusive as any, and his whole argument rests on the assumption
that we can know that some contingencies are dependent on
the volition, reasons and actions of a Deity.27
Note also that, on pain of circularity, Whiston can not save his
case by reference to Reid’s views that all contingent truths are
dependent on some being’s will, or that every change in nature re-
quires an action for a reason by some agent. It would obliterate the
point of Whiston’s argument, namely, to start out with the premise
that some phenomena imply decisions and activity of an agent in a
way that some other phenomena do not imply the same, and end
in a theistic conclusion.
It is understandable why the theistic inferences of Whiston
and Bentley have little appeal to Reid, however much he sympa-
thizes with their desired conclusions. According to Reid, we know
a priori that every change in nature implies an action for a reason
by some agent, and that every contingent truth is dependent on
some agent’s will and action. At the same time, we know by
empirical enquiry that there are mechanical laws of motion and
the law of gravity. What we do not know, however, is which of
these laws are the direct outcomes of God’s volition and which
are mere necessary consequences of basic laws. Whiston’s theistic
conclusion relies on the assumption that he knows for certain
27
If it were objected at this point that Whiston has not assigned any particular final cause—that his claim is only that a Deity acted for this particular relationship to obtain—let
us remember that from Reid’s point of view he has. It is principle of Reid’s theory of action that whenever an agent acts to accomplish something there is a reason or a final cause
for which the agent chooses this course of action rather than anything else. See Yaffe (2004), Ch. 2.
28
In § 10 Whiston points to the adjustment of the direction of the planets projectile motion, which makes their orbits close to circular and thus ‘fit for the Habitation of animals’,
and in the following paragraphs he considers a variety of contingencies in the solar system (Whiston, 1983, p. 83).
117
that the law gravity implies direct divine activity, and it relies
on his confidence that he can pick out certain facts of the solar
system that decidedly are the outcome of divine volition and
intention.
To illustrate this point let us turn to § 9:
Since all Bodies are equally capable of Rest, and of all Degrees of
Velocity whatsoever; but are in their own Nature no way deter-
mine’d to any of them; that nice Adjustment there is of the pro-
jectile Velocity to the Attractive Power through the whole
Universe; whereby the Planets both primary and secondary
revolve nearly in Circles, and the Comets nearly in Parabola’s,
is no way owing to any Mechanical Cause, or Necessity whatso-
ever; but entirely to free Choice, Prudence, and Judgment.
(Whiston, 1983, p. 82)28
Paragraphs 9–12 all concern ‘nice adjustments’ in the solar sys-
tem, by which is meant initial adjustments at the moment of cre-
ation to set planets perfectly in their intended orbits, (and not
those divine interventions to hinder the solar system from collaps-
ing or getting out of shape, which Newton suggested and which so
famously annoyed Leibniz). Whiston’s argument starts from the
premise that bodies, in principle, can have any place and velocity
in space, and that the particular place and velocity of a body are
due to causes that are external to it. The next step is to notice that
the particular set up of the solar system requires a ‘nice adjust-
ment’ in order to stay in shape, or ‘fine-tuning’ to use a contempo-
rary term. For instance, without the particular proportion between
the force of gravity and the tangential force directing a particular
planet or satellite, the shape of its orbit would have been consider-
ably different. Therefore it must have been intended to work pre-
cisely the way it actually works.
Many objections may be raised against this part of Whiston’s
general argument. It suffices here to let it illustrate the contrast
between his and Reid’s different outlooks. Let us first note that,
neither one being a dabbler in physics, Whiston and Reid would
most probably agree that those laws of nature that Newton
presents in the Principia physically explain motions of bodies,
by way of calculations and demonstrations such as would be
found in any handbook of Newtonian mechanics. Now, besides
being indispensable for such calculations, for Whiston, the law
of gravity is in addition the springboard for his Theist conclusion.
But here is what ought to be Reid’s objection: To explain a fact in
physics is nothing more than demonstrating that it is a necessary
consequence of some laws of nature, and this holds for general
facts as well as particular. The particular facts picked out by
Whiston may very well be explained by physical laws, just as
much as the law of acceleration is physically explained by the
laws of inertia and gravity, that is, by being deduced from these
laws. As far as physics goes then, these facts can be physically
explained, and by Reid’s demarcation of physics they do not
reveal to us anything extra-physical. But what is more, in Reid’s
view all basic laws are the result of some intention and action
of God, and all contingent facts are dependent, directly or indi-
rectly, on the will some agent. Considering then Reid’s reluctance
to assign final causes, and his skepticism about knowledge of
efficient causes, Whiston’s concluding phrase ‘is no way owing
to any Mechanical Cause, or Necessity whatsoever; but entirely
to free Choice, Prudence, and Judgment’, as applied to some facts
about the solar system, but not all, can have little appeal to Reid. In
any case, he does not need it for his Theism.
118 R. Callergård / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 109–119

9. Conclusion Through a ‘noble and uncommon union of science and admira-

The project of the early Newtonian Theists was to show that
Newton’s physics supports Theism over alternatives, their argu-
ments depending on interpretations of details in modern physics
and astronomy. I hope to have shown that Reid had principled
reasons to be less confident about such arguments, reasons that ex-
plain why he avoided using the theory of gravitation in arguments
for Theism. Unfortunately Reid never took issue with his Newto-
nian Theist predecessors, but the following passage from a letter
to Lord Kames can be seen as an effective comment on their efforts:
As to Efficient Causes, I am afraid, our Faculties carry us but a
very little way and almost onely to general Conclusions. I hold
it to be self evident that every production an every change in
Nature must have an Efficient Cause, that has power to produce
the Effect. And that an Effect which has the most manifest
marks of Intelligence, Wisdom, and Goodness, must have an
intelligent, wise & good Efficient Cause. From these and some
such selfevident Truths, we may discover the principles of nat-
ural Theology, and that the Deity is the first Efficient Cause of all
Nature. But how far he operates in Nature immediately, how far
by the Ministry of Subordinate Efficient Causes, to which he has
given Power adequate to the task committed to them, I am
afraid our Reason is not able to discover, and we can do little
else than conjecture. We are led by Nature to believe ourselves
to be the Efficient Causes of our own voluntary Actions, and
from Analogy we judge the same of other intelligent Beings.
But with regard to the Works of Nature, I cannot recollect a sin-
gle instance wherein I can say with any degree of assurance,
that such a thing is the Efficient Cause of such a Phenomenon
of Nature. (Reid, 2002b, p. 143, § 14)29
Without a single instance of an identified efficient cause of a
natural phenomenon it is understandable why Reid does not erect
his Theism on physical premises.
Perhaps then, Reid is not much of a Newtonian Theist at all?
From his account of the argument from design, his skepticism
about knowledge of efficient causes, and his cautionary remarks
about ascribing final causes, it seems at least that his ways of
support are not the straightforward rational arguments of Bent-
ley and Whiston. Are there other ways by which physics might
support theology, where knowledge of the former results in in-
sights in the latter? Reid is not very communicative about this
issue, but there are clues. One is to be found, I believe, in the
preface to Reid’s Essays on the intellectual powers of man, which
he ends by quoting Edmund Burke speaking about the value of
scientific studies:
If a discourse on the use of the parts of the body may be consid-
ered as a hymn to the Creator; the use of the passions, which are
the organs of the mind, cannot be barren of praise to him, nor
unproductive to ourselves of that noble and uncommon union
of science and admiration, which a contemplation of the works
of infinite Wisdom alone can afford to rational mind . . . This ele-
vation of the mind ought to be the principal end of all our stud-
ies, which, if they do not in some measure effect, they are of
very little service to us. (Reid, 2002a, p. 15)30
tion’ yielding an ‘elevation of the mind’, scientific knowledge be-
comes a ‘hymn to the Creator’.31 In line with this conception a
second clue gives us a glimpse of the way in which the study of
the Principia affected Reid himself:
When we consider what a prodigious variety of effects depend
upon the law of gravitation; how many phenomena in the
earth, sea, and air, which, in all preceding ages, had tortured
the wits of Philosophers, and occasioned a thousand vain
theories, are shown to be the necessary consequences of this
one law; how the whole system of sun, moon, planets, primary
and secondary, and comets, are kept in order by it, and their
seeming irregularities accounted for and reduced to accurate
measure; the simplicity of the cause, and the beauty and
variety of the effects, must give pleasure to every contempla-
tive mind. By this noble discovery, we are taken, as it were,
behind the scene in this great drama of Nature, and made to
behold some part of the art of the divine Author of this
system, which, before this discovery, eye had not seen, nor
ear heard, nor had it entered into the heart of man to conceive.
(Reid, 2002a, p. 531)
This is arguably the principal step from science to theology. As
noted before, beauty, grandeur, and design are all treated in the Es-
say of Taste that concludes the Intellectual powers. Admiration,
devotion and solemnity are emotions raised by the grandeur,
beauty, and design of the creation that can be apprehended
through the study of Newton’s Principia. The phenomenon of uni-
versal gravitation is, Reid writes,
the most wonderful that natural Philosophy ever presented to
the human Mind. That every particle of Matter should have a
tendency towards every other particle, regulated by precise
Mathematical Ratios, according to the position, distance, and
Quantity of Matter of the several particles; so that every
impulse of Gravity is felt, as it were, through the whole System
of Matter, & every Motion of the least part moves the whole;
This gives a most Stupendous view of the Material System as
the work of one Intelligent Being whose wisdom & skill infi-
nitely exceed ours. (Reid, 2002b, p. 136f)
I suggest then that, as a Newtonian Theist, Reid shifted part of
the burden of directing our attention to the Deity through the
study of nature, from our rational and scientific powers, to our
powers of aesthetical apprehension and judgment.
Acknowledgements
This paper is the result of work on Thomas Reid’s philosophy of
physics that has been supported by Åke Wibergs Fond and Birgit och
Gad Rausings Fond för Humanisisk Forskning. Part of the content of
this article was presented at the Fourth International Reid Sympo-
sium held at Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, in Septem-
ber 2007, and also at the American Philosophical Association
Pacific Division meeting in Pasadena, March 2008. I am thankful
for comments received on these occasions and also for comments
received from Marcel Quarfood, Henrik Bohlin, Peter Myrdal, Dug-
ald Murdoch, and an anonymous reviewer.

29
The significance of the following passage from Essay on active powers should now also appear in clear light: ‘Upon the theatre of nature we see innumerable effects, which
require an agent endowed with active power; but the agent is behind the scene. Whether it be the Supreme Cause alone, or a subordinate cause or causes; and if subordinate
causes be employed by the Almighty, what their nature, their number, and their different offices may be—are things hid, for wise reasons without a doubt, from the human eye. It
is only in human actions, that may be imputed for praise or blame, that it is necessary for us to know who is the agent; and in this, nature has given us all the light that is
necessary for our conduct’ (Reid, 1872, 527ab).
30
The passage is from Burke (1990[1757]), Pt I, Sect. XIX.
31
The theme of a ‘hymn to the creator’ occurs again later in the Essays (p. 509: 10–18) where Reid makes the point that scientific truth is a condition for such a hymn.
 R. Callergård / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41 (2010) 109–119 119

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