Professional Documents
Culture Documents
cases if implied the acts of the parties must clearly demonstrate their intent to dissolve the
old obligation as the moving consideration for the emergence of the new one.
Novation -Implied novation necessitates that the old obligation is completely superseded by the new
- Substitution or change of an obligation by another, which extinguished or modifies the first, one.
either changing its object or principal condition, or substituting another in place of the debtor -Test of incompability, each one having an independent existence, if they CANNOT and are
or subrogating a third person in the right of the creditor. IRRECONCILABLE, the subsequent obligation would also extinguish the first.
-Extinctive novation have the twin effects of first, extinguishing an existing obligation and
Principal Conditions in the NCC second, creating a new one in its stead.
– should be construed to include a change in the period to comply with the obligation, Four essential requisites:
-which change in the period would only be partial novation, since the period merely affects the 1. A previous valid obligation
performance, not the creation of the obligation. 2. An agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract
3. The extinguishments of the old obligation
*No Diffence in Civil and Common Law Concepts of Novation 4. The birth of a valid new obligation
- Between the civil and common law, with reference to the extinguishment of one obligation b. Partial or modificatory – this is also termed imperfect or improper novation
by the creation of another, there seems to be no difference. the old obligation is merely modified; thus, it still remains in force
- In order to extinguish one obligation by the creation of another, the extinguishment must be except insofar as it has been modified.
made to clearly appear. Should there be any doubt as to whether the novation is total or partial, it
shall be presumed to be merely modificatory.
*Dual purpose or function of novation
- Novation is a juridical act of dual function in that at the time it extinguishes an obligation = it In GENERAL ―requisites for novation‖
creates a new one in lieu of the old. 1. The existence of a VALID old obligation
If the old obligation is VOID or NON-EXISTENT
NOTE: There is nothing to novate
While a true or proper novation extinguishes an obligation, a partial, modificatory or imperfect If the old obligation is voidable
novation merely modifies the old obligation. Novation is still possible provided the obligation has not yet been annulled
―Obligation may be MODIFIED by…‖ 2. The intent to extinguish or to modify the old obligation
Moreover, since a new or modified obligation arises, novation ―does not operate as an absolute by a substantial difference
but only as a relative extinction. (the extinguishment or modification itself is a result of novation)
Kinds of NOVATION 3. The capacity and consent of all the parties (except in the case of expromision,
1. According to its object purpose where the old debtor does not
a. Real or Objective – (changing the object or the principal conditions of the Participate)
obligation)
b. Personal or Subjective (Change of Persons) Example: In a contract where X is the creditor and Y is the debtor, if Y enters into a
Substituting the person of the debtor contract with Z under which he transfers to Z all his rights under the first contract,
(Expromision or Delegacion) together with the obligations thereunder, but such transfer is not consented to or
Subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor approved by X, there is no novation. X can still bring his action against Y for the
(change of creditor may be by agreement – ―conventional subrogation‖ or by performance of their contract or damages in case of breach.
operation of law – ―legal subrogation‖)
c. Mixed (Change of object and parties) 4. The vaidity of the new obligation
NOTE:
2. According to the Form of its Constitution If the new obligation is subject to a suspensive condition, sich as the obtaining of
a. Express some signatures, and the condition does not materialize, such new obligation never
b. Implied –when the two obligations are essentially incompatible with each other became valid or effective, so NO novation has resulted.
3. According to its extent or effect If the contemplated new obligation is embodied in a mere draft, which is unsigned
a. Total or extinctive novation – when the old obligation is completely extinguished and therefore NOT consented to, no new obligation is created because of the
NOTE: absence of novation.
-Novation of a contract may either be extinctive or modificatory, much being dependent on the
nature of the change and the intention of the parties *Novation is NOT one of the means recognized by the RPC whereby criminal liability
-Extinctive novation is NEVER presume; there must be express intention to novate can be extinguished
- The role of novation may only be either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt i. When a pubic instrument is executed to confirm a valid contract, whether oral or in a
on the true nature of the original basic transportation, whether or not it was such that its breach private instrument.
would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a j. When payment of the purchase price for certain trucks is made by the execution of a
deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to. promissory note for said price.
Here, there is NO novation of the contract of sale.
ARTICLE 1292
Article 1293
1. Express and Implied Novation
-According to the manner or form in which the novation has been constituted or made, *Personal or subjective Novation
novation is classified into: There are two kinds of personal or subjective novation:
a. express novation 1. Change of the debtor (passive)
- it is declared in unequivocal terms 2. Change of the creditor (active)
b. implied novation NOTE: a substitution of debtor without the consent of the creditor is binding upon the parties
- complete or substantial incompatibility to the substitution but not on the creditor.
Effect of Insolvency of Non-Fulfillment by New Debtor in Expromision a. When the third person was only an agent, messenger, or employee of the debtor
- This refers to empromision b. When the third person acted only as guarantor or surety
- REASON: c. When the new debtor merely agreed to make himself solidarily liable for the
Why the old debtor will NOT be responsible for the new debtor’s insolvenct or non- obligation
fulfillment – The expromision was brought about without his initiative d. When the new debtor merely agreed to make himself jointly or partly
responsible for the obligation
NOTE: -Here the delegacion is merely with reference to the joint or proportionate
If the substitution is without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor – This article will share.
NOT apply, IOW, the old debtor would be liable.
Article 1296
BUT considering the intent of law, it is believed that the Article would still apply, the old
debtor would still not be liable for the new debtor’s insolvency or non-fulfillment Effect on Accessory Obligation
REASON: REASON:
1. After all, the initiative did NOT come from him - Extinguishment of the principal obligation carries with it the extinguishment of the
2. A contrary conclusion would put him in a worse position that in delegacion, accessory obligation (such as pledges, mortgages, guaranties)
where the liability is only for insolvency and NOT for other kinds of non- NOTE: This article does NOT apply in cases of novation by subrogation of the
fulfillment. creditor.
(b) A promised to give B a car unless X married Y. Later A and B agreed to change the object As between conventional subrogation and assignment of the credit, the latter, insofar
to a precious stone. No mention was made regarding any condition. Is the second obligation as the creditor is concerned, should be preferred, for it has advantages, without the
subject to a resolutory condition? corresponding disadvantages of conventional subrogation. Upon the other hand,
ANS.: Yes, unless the contrary has been provided for in the contract conventional subrogation cannot present any advantage over assignment of credit.
(c) In question (b), supposing under the same facts, X had already married Y before A and B Distinctions between conventional subrogation and assignment of credit
novated their contract, what happens to the new obligation? Assignment of Credit Conventional Subrogation
ANS.: It is as if the new obligation never arose, for a contract that has already been Here, there is mere transfer of Extinguished the obligation
extinguished cannot be novated. the SAME right or credit and creates a new one
Article 1300 (the transfer did NOT
extinguish the credit)
Subrogation Defined This does NOT require the This requires the debtor’s
- Subrogation (extinctive subjective novation by change of the creditor) is the transfer debtor’s consent consent
to a third person of all the rights appertaining to the creditor, including the right to (mere notification to him is
proceed against guarantors, or processors of mortgages, subject to any legal sufficient)
provision or any modification that may be agreed upon. The defect in the credit or The defect of the old
right is not cured simply by obligation may be cured in (NOTE: Examples of such defenses are the following: causes of vitiated consent like force,
assigning the same such a way that the new intimidation, minority, undue influence, error; other causes like prior payment whether total or
(Here, the debtor generally obligation becomes entirely partial; remission; compensation, etc.)
still has the right to present valid
against the new creditor any (Thus, here, there is no right to Second Instance
defense available as against present against the new - When a third person, not interested in the obligation, pays with the express or tacit
old creditor) creditor any defense which he, approval of the debtor.
the debtor, could have set up
against the old creditor. (a) Example: Eubolo owes Luna P1,000,000 secured by a mortgage.
Blesilda, a classmate of Eubolo, and having no connection with the contract at all, paid Luna
Article 1302 the P1,000,000 with Eubolo’s approval. Is Blesilda subrogated in Luna’s place?
ANS.: Yes, because although not interested in the obligation, she nevertheless paid
Legal Subrogation off Luna with the approval of the debtor. (Art. 1302, No. 2).
- Under the old code, the word ―legal‖ was not present.
- It was inserted here for the sake of clarity (b) If in the above example, Blesilda, who is Luna’s friend, paid her only P700,000 for the
extinguishment of Eubolo’s debt, but the payment was made without the express or tacit
First Instance approval of Eubolo, what would be Blesilda’s rights, if any?
- When a creditor pays another creditor who is preferred, even without the debtor’s ANS.: There is no legal subrogation here because there was no express or implied
knowledge‖ approval of Eubolo. Therefore, all that Blesilda can recover is P700,000 for this is
the amount with which she is supposed to be REIMBURSED (a giving back to her
of what she had DISBURSED). If Eubolo does NOT pay, Blesilda cannot have the
(a) Example: Ligaya has two creditors: Gloria, who is a mortgage creditor for P1,500,000, and mortgage foreclosed. For, as has been said, there has been no subrogation here.
Solita, who is an ordinary creditor for P600,000. Solita, without Ligaya’s knowledge, paid Third Instance
Ligaya’s debt of P150,000 to Gloria. Here Solita will be subrogated in the rights of Gloria. - When, even without the knowledge of a debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment
This means that Solita will herself now be a mortgage creditor for P1,500,000, and an of the obligation pays, without prejudice to the effects of confusion as to the latter’s
ordinary creditor for P600,000. If Ligaya fails to pay the P1,500,000 debt, Solita can have the share.
mortgage foreclosed (that is, the property can be sold at public auction, with Solita being paid (a) Examples of persons ―interested:‖
from the proceeds thereof). 1) a guarantor
2) the owner of the property mortgaged as security for the debtor’s debt
(NOTE: The answer will be the SAME if Solita paid with Ligaya’s knowledge.)
(b) Example of the Third Instance:
(b) Suppose in the abovecited example, Solita paid Gloria only P1,300,000 for Ligaya’s total D owes C P1,000,000 secured by a mortgage and by a guaranty of G. If G, even
indebtedness (Gloria agreed because of friendship), how much, concerning this debt, may without D’s knowledge, pays C the P1,000,000, G will be subrogated in C’s place.
Solita successfully recover from Ligaya? But of course the guaranty is extinguished. This is what the law means when it says
ANS.: The whole P1,500,000 because concerning this debt, Solita steps completely that there is legal subrogation ―without prejudice to the effects of confusion as to the
into the shoes of Gloria. latter’s (payor’s) share in the obligation.‖ (Art. 1302, par3
(c) Suppose in problem (b), Solita paid the P1,300,000 to Gloria without Ligaya’s knowledge, (c) Is a solidary debtor included in the scope of ―a person interested?‖
but it turns out that at said time of payment, Ligaya’s debt had already been reduced to 1) Strictly speaking, NO, because when the solidary debtor pays the whole
P300,000 (because of a prior partial payment), how much can Solita successfully recover obligation to the creditor, solidary obligation itself is extinguished. Therefore, it
from Ligaya concerning this debt? cannot be truly said that said solidary debtor steps completely into the shoes of the
ANS.: Only said P300,000 because this is only the extent to which Ligaya had been creditor. Moreover, although the other solidary debtors must reimburse him, this
benefi ted. It is Solita’s fault that she did not fi rst inform Ligaya of her intention to obligation to reimburse is not solidary, but merely joint, except of course that they
pay. Solita’s remedy now would be to recover the excess amount from Gloria. are all proportionately liable in the meantime for the insolvency of one of them.
(NOTE: In legal subrogation caused by payment to a preferred creditor, may the debtor set up 2) In another (―loose‖) sense, the solidary debtor may be said to fall under the
against the new creditor defenses which he, the debtor, could have set up against the old category of an ―interested person‖ in that he steps in a way into the shoes of the old
creditor? creditor, since he would be entitled to COLLECT reimbursement, but of course he
ANS.: Yes, for after all, the subrogation took place by operation of law. This effect cannot collect the whole amount anymore in view of the ―effect of confusion (or
differs from the effect of CONVENTIONAL subrogation where the debtor gave his merger) as to his share.‖ (See Art. 1217, Civil Code).
consent.)
Article 1303 DIONGZON v COURT OF APPEALS
Effects of Subrogation
- Note that the credit and all the appurtenant rights, either against the debtor, or FACTS:
against third persons, are transferred
- Thus, in a sense the obligation subsists, that is, it has not yet been extinguished or Diongzon was a sales supervisor of Filipro Incorporated now (Nestle Philippines, Inc.). As
paid such, he had authority to allow the withdrawal of Filipro products from its warehouse for
Example of the Effects of Subrogation
delivery to its dealers or customers, to receive payment therefore and remit the same to Filipro
D owes C P1,000,000. G is the guarantor. A stranger S paid C the P1,000,000 with the
consent of D and C. S is now subrogated in the place of C. If D cannot pay the through its depository bank at Bacolod City.
P1,000,000, S
can proceed against the guarantor, G. Base on the finding by Filipro accounting department some delivery orders signed by
Effect of presence of a suspensive condition Diongzon seemed questionable as the quantities ordered were unusually big and seemed
- It is understood that if the transferred credit is subject to a suspensive condition, the abnormal.
new creditor cannot collect until after said condition is fulfilled.
Anacleto Palisoc, area sales manager, was authorized to conduct an investigation of
Article 1304 Diongzon’s withdrawal of goods and remittance of payments. Palisoc contacted the dealers
Partial Obligation – Here, there are TWO creditors: namely: Queensland, Queendies, and Cokins denied having received the goods listed in the
a. The old creditor, who still remains a creditor as to the balance (because only a
partial payment has been made to him) delivery orders signed by the Diongzon.
b. The new creditor who is a creditor to the extent of what he had paid the creditor
Ex. A owes B P500,000. With the consent of both, C pays B P250,000. Now B and C are the Meanwhile, Diongzon approached Rene Garibay, sales representative, and offered his
creditors of A to the amount of P250,000. Suppose A has only P250,000 who should be assistance in the collection of payments for the outstanding delivery orders. The next day
preferred? Diongzon presented to Garibay three checks in payment of the items listed in the invoices
ANS.: B, the original creditor, should be preferred inasmuch as he is granted by the allegedly issued to Queensland, Queendies, and Cokins.
law (Art. 1304, Civil Code) preferential right to recover the remainder, over the
person subrogated in his place by virtue of the partial payment of the same credit. The three checks were deposited with the Security Bank and Trust Company, (Filipros
Preference in the Assets
depository bank). However, upon presentment to the drawee bank (Allied Banking
- The preference is only in the assets remaining with the debtor (not those already
transferred to others). Therefore, the old creditor must assert his claim or preference Corporation), the three checks were dishonored. The first two checks were dishonored because
over the assets only while they are still in the hands of the sheriff who has levied on of apparent difference between the drawer’s signatures thereon and those in the banks
the properties. If done later, the preference given by this article CEASES. files. The third check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Palisoc and Garibay conferred with the dealers of Queensland and Queendies. The latter
claimed that they did not issue the checks nor receive the goods under the delivery orders
signed by Diongzon.
Diongzon acknowledged responsibility and promised to settle the same. He also admitted
having issued the three checks under his account with the Allied Banking Corporation.
However, during trial, Diongzon initially denied that the signatures in the first two checks
were his. Then he argued that the three checks were not issued on account or for value as
required in B.P. Blg. 22. Later, however, he admitted that he issued the third check to replace
the second check which, he insisted, he did not issue.
On appeal, Diongzon claimed that the information charged more than one offense and that the
issuance of the third check as replacement for the second check constituted novation which
thereby extinguished his obligation.
The Court of Appeals rejected Diongzon’s contentions and affirmed his conviction. As the SANDICO vs. PIGUING
Court of Appeals held, novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability and criminal
liability, once incurred, cannot be compromised FACTS:
In 1960, spouses Sandico, Enrico Timbol and Teofisto Timbol, administrator of the estate of
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. deceased Sixta Paras, have obtained a judgment in their favor against the respondent.
ISSUE: The judgment sentenced Desiderio Paras, respondent, to pay a total of P6,000 to plaintiffs as
actual and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.
WON the replacement by a 3rd check for the 2nd check constitutes novation which in effect,
extinguishes obligation; and does novation extinguishes criminal liability. But the parties reached a settlement where the amount of P6,000 was reduced to P4,000.
In 1964, the petitioners demanded for the respondent’s compliance of the portion of the
HELD:
judgment about the reconstruction and reopening of the irrigation canal. Due to the
respondent’s refusal to rebuild and reopen the irrigation canal, petitioner’s filed with
No. There was no novation. And even if there was, petitioner’s liability under B.P. Blg. 22
respondent Judge Minerva Piguing, a motion to declare Paras in contempt of court (Sec. 9
was not thereby extinguished.
Rule 39 of Rules of Court).
It is well-settled that the following requisites must be present for novation to take place: But respondent Judge denied petitioner’s motion, because according to the previous judgment
referred to by petitioners, Paras was only ordered to recognize the easement. Nothing in the
(1) A previous valid obligation;
decision ordered him to reconstruct a canal.
(2) Agreement of all the parties to the new contract; The petitioners then filed for an alias writ of execution which was granted by respondent
judge, however, it was quashed later on when it was proved that the money judgment has
(3) Extinguishment of the old contract; and already been satisfied when respondent paid them P4,000.
(4) Validity of the new one. The petitioners filed this petition for Certiorari, on the grounds that Piguing acted in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, seeking to set aside:
The third requisite, were not proven in this case. As the Court of Appeals held, the transaction
became a personal undertaking of the petitioner when he received the goods for delivery but 1) The order of the respondent judge which denied their motion to declare respondent in
made no delivery thereof either to the credited dealer or to the credit rider . Petitioner had an contempt of court, and;
existing obligation to pay the value of the goods for which the check was issued. This 2) Orders of the respondent judge which granted motion of respondent to set aside the alias
obligation was not extinguished when the check was dishonored and a new agreement was writ of execution.
reached by the two parties to pay in cash its value.
ISSUE:
Nor is novation a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. As held by this Court,
novation may prevent the rise of criminal liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing WON reducing the amount due from the respondent, constitutes waiver of their claim for the
sum of P2, 000 or novation of the money judgment provided for in the Court of Appeals'
of the criminal information in court. In other words, novation does not extinguish
decision
criminal liability but may only prevent its rise.
HELD:
Novation does not apply where the offer to pay by the debtor, and accepted by the creditor,
turns out to be merely an empty promise. In this case, the balance of the check was never paid, YES. Petitioner’s acceptance of the payment of the respondents of the lesser amount of P
as witness Anacleto B. Palisoc testified. 4,000 without any protest or objection constitutes its waiver of their claim for the sum of P2,
000. The acknowledgement of the payment by the petitioners as "in full satisfaction of the
Petitioner violated BP 22 when the check he issued was dishonored. Though he promised to money judgment" completely extinguished the judgment debt and released the respondent
pay its value, the fact remains that at the time it was presented to the drawee bank, it was not from his pecuniary liability.
sufficiently funded. His failure to pay the value of the check within 5 banking days from However, as to whether or not the reduction of the amount due constitutes novation of the
notice of dishonor did not dispute the presumption that he has knowledge of the isufficiency of money judgment, the court ruled in the negative.
the funds.
Novation results in two stipulations, one to extinguish an existing obligation, the other to PEOPLE’S BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (PBTC) VS. SYVEL’S
substitute a new one in its place. Fundamental it is that novation effects a substitution or INCORPORATED, ET.AL
modification of an obligation by another or an extinguishment of one obligation by the
creation of another. FACTS:
ITCAH, there was no new or modified obligation which arose out of the payment of the A credit commercial line in the amount of Php900, 000 was granted to defendant Syvel’s Inc.
P4,000 . On May 1965, defendants Antonio and Angel Syyap executed an undertaking in favor of the
plaintiff whereby they both agreed to guarantee absolutely and unconditionally and without
Additionally, to sustain novation necessitates that the same be so declared in unequivocal the benefit of excussion the full and prompt payment of any indebtedness to be incurred on
terms — clearly and unmistakably shown by the express agreement of the parties or by acts of account of the said credit line.
equivalent import — or that there is complete and substantial incompatibility between the two
obligations. In view of the failure of the defendant corporation to make payment in accordance with the
terms and conditions agreed upon in the Commercial Credit Agreement, plaintiff PBTC started
Therefore, the money judgment was fully satisfied by the payment of the P4,000 but such to foreclose extra-judicially the chattel mortgage.
payment does not constitute a novation.
However, because of an attempt to have the matter settled, the extra-judicial foreclosure was
not pushed thru. As no payment had been paid, an action for foreclosure was eventually filed
in court.
On petition of the plaintiff based on the affidavits, a preliminary writ of attachment was issued
because the defendants are disposing of their properties with the intent to defraud their
creditors. As a consequence of the issuance of the writ of attachment, the defendants, in their
answer to the complaint set up a compulsory counterclaim for damages.
During the pendency of the case defendant Antonio Syyap proposed to have the case settled
amicably. Defendant Syyap requested that the plaintiff dismiss the case because he did not
want to have the goodwill of Syvel’s Inc. impaired and offered to execute a real estate
mortgage on his property in Cavite.
Mr. de las Alas (Vice-President of the PBTC Corp.) consented and so the Real Estate
Mortgage was executed by the defendant Antonio Syyap and his wife Margarita Syyap.
Defendants did not agree with plaintiff’s motion to dismiss which included the dismissal of
their counterclaim and filed instead their own motion to dismiss on the ground that by the
execution of said real estate mortgage, the obligation secured by the chattel mortgage subject
of this case was novated.
As of June 1967, its indebtedness was in total amount of P601,633.01 (principal 568,577.76
and 33,055.25 interest). No part of the amount has been paid by either of the defendants.
ISSUE:
WON the obligation secured by the Chattel Mortgage sought to be foreclosed was novated by
the subsequent execution between petitioner PBTC and Antonio Syyap of a real estate
mortgage.
HELD:
No. Novation takes place when the object or principal condition of an obligation is changed or
altered. It is elementary that novation is never presumed. It must be explicitly stated or there
must be manifest incompatibility between the old and the new obligations in every aspect.
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the real estate mortgage which supports appellant’s CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS
(Syyap) submission. The contract on its face does not show the existence of an explicit
novation nor incompatibility on every point between the old and the new agreements as the FACTS:
second contract evidently indicates that the same was executed as new additional security to
Delfin I. Cruz and Adoracion Cruz are spouses and their children were Thelma, Nerissa, Arnel
the chattel mortgage previously entered into by the parties.
and Gerry Cruz. Upon the death of Delfin, his surviving spouse and children executed a
The pertinent provision of the contract is quoted as follows: notarized Deed of Partial Partition (DPP) by virtue of which each one of them was given a
share of several parcels of land all situated in Taytay, Rizal.
―That the chattel mortgage executed by Syvel’s Inc.; real estate mortgage executed by Angel
and Rita Syyap shall remain in full force and shall not be impaired by this mortgage‖ A day after the execution of the DPP, the same parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) wherein they covenanted and agreed among themselves that they shall alike and
It is clear that a novation was NOT intended. receive equal shares from the proceeds of the sale of any of the lot or lots allotted to and
adjudicated in their individual names by virtue of the DPP.
This Memorandum Agreement was registered and annotated in the titles of the lands covered
by the Deed of Partial Partition. The DPP was subsequently registered and titles were issued in
their names. The annotation pertaining to the MOA was carried in each of the title.
The spouses Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo and Nelson Tamayo were sued by the spouses Eliseo and
Virginia Malolos for a sum of money in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City).
TC condemned the Tamayo spouses to pay a sum of money to the Malolos spouses with 12%
interest per annum from filing of the complaint plus atty. Fees. After the finality of the
decision, a writ of execution was issued.
Enforcing said writ, the sheriff of the court levied upon the land in question and thereafter sold
the properties in an execution sale to the highest bidders, the Malolos spouses. Accordingly,
the sheriff executed a certificate of sale.
Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo failed to exercise her right of redemption within the statutory period and
so the final deed of sale was executed by the sheriff conveying the lands to the Malolos
spouses. The latter asked Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo to give them the owners duplicate copy of the
seven titles of lands in question but she refused.
The spouses moved to compel her to surrender said titles to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for
cancellation. Motion was granted, but Nerissa was adamant. She did not comply with the
order, so the Malolos spouses asked the court to declare said titles null and void.
Petitioners filed a motion for leave to intervene and oppose the motion of the Malolos spouses.
They alleged that they are co-owners of the lands in question.
The lower court rendered a decision for private respondents from which the defendants
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ruled in favor of herein private
respondents, holding that the DPP was not materially and substantially incompatible with the
MOA. The DPP conferred absolute ownership of the parcels of land in issue on Nerissa Cruz-
Tamayo, while the MOA merely created an obligation on her part to share with the petitioners
the proceeds of the sale of the said properties.
ISSUE:
WON the DPP was cancelled or novated by the MOA. QUINTO VS. PEOPLE
HELD: FACTS:
NO. The MOA does not novate, much less cancel, the earlier DPP Quinto was engaged in the business of buying and selling jewelry. She, and private
complainant, Cariaga, started to transact business. It was stipulated in their agreement that
Novation, one of the modes of extinguishing an obligation, requires the concurrence of the Quinto would sell the pieces of jewelry, if not, she would return the same or pay the value
following: thereof. 6months elapsed and Quinto failed to either pay or return the pieces of jewelry. A case
of estafa was filed against Quinto, and she was convicted.
(1) There is a previous valid obligation; (2) the parties concerned agree to a new contract; (3)
the old contract is extinguished; and (4) there is a valid new contract. Novation may be express Quinto admitted that she took some jewelry from Cariaga and sold the same to Mrs. Camacho
or implied. and Mrs. Ramos. Unfortunately, both were unable to pay the whole amount but were allowed
to pay in installments directly to Cariaga instead of paying to Quinto.
Article 1292 of the Code provides: "In order that an obligation may be extinguished by
another which substitutes the same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms ISSUE:
[express novation], or that the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with
each other [implied novation] WoN the agreement between Cariaga and Quinto was effectively novated when Cariaga
allowed Mrs. Camacho and Mrs. Ramos to pay on installments directly to her the amounts due
ITCAB, The Court ruled that the MOA falls short of producing a novation, because it does not from them.
express a clear intent to dissolve the old obligation as a consideration for the emergence of a
new one. HELD:
Petitioners also failed to show that the DPP and the MOA are materially and substantially No.
incompatible with each other. The DPP granted title to the lots in question to the co-owner to
whom they were assigned, and the MOA created an obligation on the part of such co-owner to Novation, in its broad concept, may either be extinctive or modificatory. It is extinctive when
share with the others the proceeds of the sale of such parcels. There is no incompatibility an old obligation is terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes the place of
between the two contracts. The MOA cannot be then construed as a repudiation of the earlier the former; it is merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the extent it
DPP. remains compatible with the amendatory agreement
Petition denied. An extinctive novation results either by changing the object or principal conditions (objective
or real), or by substituting the person of the debtor or subrogating a third person in the rights
of the creditor (subjective or personal).
The changes alluded to by petitioner consists only in the manner of payment. There was really
no substitution of debtors since private complainant merely acquiesced to the payment but did
not give her consent to enter into a new contract
Also, Cariaga's acceptance of Ramos and Camacho's payment on installment basis cannot be
construed as a case of either expromision or delegacion sufficient to justify the attendance of
extinctive novation.
The fact that the creditor receives guaranty or accepts payment from a third person who agrees
to assume the obligation does not constitute an extinctive novation absent an agreement that
the original debtor shall be released from responsibility. Although there was an addition to the
number or persons liable, it does not necessarily imply the extinguishment of the liability of
the first debtor.