Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.[1]
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails the January 11, 2006 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 84236 which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioners against the respondents
and declared as valid the real estate mortgage and certificate of sale. Also assailed is
the April 12, 2006 Resolution[4]which denied the motion for reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On March 17, 1997, petitioners received from the bank the amount of P1 million
as additional working capital evidenced by a promissory note[6] and secured by a real
estate mortgage[7] in favor of the bank covering several real properties situated
in Santiago City.[8]
Due to the failure of petitioners to pay the obligation, the bank foreclosed the
mortgage and sold the properties at public auction.[9]
On August 19, 1999, petitioners filed a Complaint[10] for nullity of real estate
mortgage and sheriffs certificate of sale[11] with prayer for damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 35-2779, against the bank and respondent Sheriff Mayo dela Cruz (sheriff)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Branch 35.[12] Petitioners alleged
that the bank, without their knowledge and consent, included their properties covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-225131 and T-225132,[13] among the list of
properties mortgaged; that it was only when they received the notice of sale from the
sheriff in August 1998 that they found out about the inclusion of the said properties; that
despite their objection, the sheriff proceeded with the auction sale; and that the auction
sale was done in Santiago City in violation of the stipulation on venue in the real estate
mortgage.[14]
The bank, in its Answer,[15] denied the material allegations of the Complaint and
averred that since petitioners were collaterally deficient, they offered TCT Nos. T-
237695, T-237696, T-225131 and T-225132 as additional collateral;[16] that although the
said properties were at that time mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), the
bank accepted the offer and caused the annotation of the mortgage in the original copies
with the Register of Deeds with the knowledge and consent of petitioners;[17] and that
when petitioners obligation to PNB was extinguished, they delivered the titles of the four
properties to the bank.[18]
On October 21, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision[19] declaring the real estate
mortgage void for lack of sufficient consideration. According to the RTC, the real estate
mortgage lacks consideration because the loan contract was not perfected due to the
failure of the bank to deliver the full P3 million to petitioners.[20] The RTC also found the
bank guilty of fraud and bad faith, thereby ordering it to pay petitioners moral and
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. The RTC ruled:
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[21]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. The CA said that based on the
promissory note and the real estate mortgage contract, the properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-225131 and T-225132 were mortgaged to secure the loan in the amount of P1
million, and not the P3 million loan applied by petitioners.[22] As to the venue of the
auction sale, the CA declared that since the properties subject of the case are
in Santiago City, the holding of the auction sale in Santiago City was proper[23] pursuant
to Sections 1[24] and 2[25] of Act No. 3135.[26] The CA likewise found no fraud or bad faith
on the part of the bank to warrant the award of damages by the RTC, thus:
xxxx
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[27]
On February 1, 2006, petitioners moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the
same in its Resolution dated April 12, 2006.[28]
Issues
(A)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN ANNULLING OR REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF
BRANCH 35, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF SANTIAGO CITY
THEREBY IN EFFECT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FILED BY
THE PETITIONERS AGAINST RESPONDENTS SOLIDBANK
CORPORATION AND SHERIFF MAYO DELA CRUZ.
(B)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING VALID THE
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE EXECUTED BETWEEN THE
PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENT SOLIDBANK CORPORATION
AND IN SUSTAINING THE VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATE
OF SALE ISSUED BY RESPONDENT SHERIFF MAYO DELA
CRUZ.
(C)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MISAPPRECIATING THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF BRANCH
[29]
35, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF SANTIAGO CITY.
Simply put, the core issue in this case is the validity of the real estate
mortgage and the auction sale.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners echo the ruling of the RTC that the real estate mortgage and certificate
of sale are void because the bank failed to deliver the full amount of the loan. They
likewise impute bad faith and fraud on the part of the bank in including TCT Nos. T-
225131 and T-225132 in the list of properties mortgaged. They insist that they did not
sign the dorsal portion of the real estate mortgage contract, which contains the list of
properties mortgaged, because at that time the dorsal portion was still blank;[30] and that
TCT Nos. T-225131 and T-225132 were not intended to be included in the list of
mortgaged properties because these titles were still mortgaged with the PNB at the time
the real estate mortgage subject of this case was executed.[31]Moreover, they claim that
they delivered the titles of these properties to the bank as additional collateral for their
additional loans, and not for the P1 million loan.[32]
The bank denies petitioners allegations of fraud and bad faith and argues that the real
estate mortgage which was properly notarized enjoys the presumption of regularity.[33] It
maintains that TCT Nos. T-225131 and T-225132 were mortgaged as additional
collateral for the P1 million loan.[34]
Our Ruling
Under Article 1934[35] of the Civil Code, a loan contract is perfected only upon the
delivery of the object of the contract.
In this case, although petitioners applied for a P3 million loan, only the amount
of P1 million was approved by the bank because petitioners became collaterally deficient
when they failed to purchase TCT No. T-227331 which had an appraised value
of P1,944,000.00.[36] Hence, on March 17, 1997, only the amount of P1 million was
released by the bank to petitioners.[37]
Upon receipt of the approved loan on March 17, 1997, petitioners executed a
promissory note for the amount of P1 million.[38] As security for the P1 million loan,
petitioners on the same day executed in favor of the bank a real estate mortgage over the
properties covered by TCT Nos. T-237695, T-237696, T-237698, T-143683, T-143729,
T-225131 and T-225132. Clearly, contrary to the findings of the RTC, the loan contract
was perfected on March 17, 1997 when petitioners received the P1 million loan, which
was the object of both the promissory note and the real estate mortgage executed by
petitioners in favor of the bank.
unsubstantiated.
Petitioners claim that there was fraud and bad faith on the part of the bank in the
execution and notarization of the real estate mortgage contract.
We do not agree.
There is nothing on the face of the real estate mortgage contract to arouse any
suspicion of insertion or forgery. Below the list of properties mortgaged are the signatures
of petitioners.[39] Except for the bare denials of petitioner, no other evidence was
presented to show that the signatures appearing on the dorsal portion of the real estate
mortgage contract are forgeries.
Likewise flawed is petitioners reasoning that TCT Nos. T-225131 and T-225132
could not have been included in the list of properties mortgaged as these were still
mortgaged with the PNB at that time. Under our laws, a mortgagor is allowed to take a
second or subsequent mortgage on a property already mortgaged, subject to the prior
rights of the previous mortgages.[40]
As to the RTCs finding that the x x x bank acted in bad faith when it made it
appear that the mortgage was executed by the [petitioners] on June 16, 1997, when the
document was acknowledged before Atty. German, x x x when in truth and in fact, the
[petitioners] executed said mortgage sometime in March, 1997 x x x, we find the same
without basis. A careful perusal of the real estate mortgage contract would show that the
bank did not make it appear that the real estate mortgage was executed on June 16, 1997,
the same day that it was notarized, as the date of execution of the real estate mortgage
contract was left blank.[41] And the mere fact that the date of execution was left blank
does not prove bad faith. Besides, any irregularity in the notarization or even the lack of
notarization does not affect the validity of the document. Absent any clear and
convincing proof to the contrary, a notarized document enjoys the presumption of
regularity and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents.[42]
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in sustaining the validity of the real
estate mortgage as well as the certificate of sale.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed January 11, 2006
Decision of the Court of Appeals and its April 12, 2006 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No.
84236 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Facts: Spouses Palada applied for a 3M loan with the respondent Solidbank. Petitioners received
the amount of 1M and secured the same with a deed of real estate mortgage of several
properties in favor of the respondent. Due to failure of the petitioners to pay their obligation,
Solidbank foreclosed said properties covered by the mortgage and sold the same. Petitioners
filed for declaration of nullity of the mortgage upon the ground, among others, that the loan
contract was not perfected because the bank delivered only 1M instead of the whole loan amount
of 3M.
Held: Yes, the loan contract was perfected. Under Article 1934 of the Civil Code, a loan contract
is perfected only upon the delivery of the object of the contract. In this case, although
petitioners applied for a P3 million loan, only the amount of P1 million was approved by the bank
because petitioners became collaterally deficient when they failed to purchase TCT No. T-227331
which had an appraised value of P1,944,000.00. Hence, on March 17, 1997, only the amount of
P1 million was released by the bank to petitioners.
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property donated
shall revert to any of the children, or their heirs, of the DONOR expressly
designated by the DONEE in a public document conveying the property to the
latter; or
(b) In absence of such an express designation made by the DONEE before her
death or remarriage contained in a public instrument as above provided, the title to
the property shall automatically revert to the legal heirs of the DONOR in
common.
That the said parcel of land was donated unto me by the said Jose Hemedes, my
deceased husband, in a deed of DONATION INTER VIVOS WITH
RESOLUTORY CONDITIONS executed by the donor in my favor, and duly
accepted by me on March 22, 1947, before Notary Public Luis Bella in Cabuyao,
Laguna;
That the donation is subject to the resolutory conditions appearing in the said deed
of DONATION INTER VIVOS WITH RESOLUTORY CONDITIONS, as
follows:
(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property donated
shall revert to any of the children, or their heirs, of the DONOR expressly
designated by the DONEE in a public document conveying the property to the
latter; or
(b) In absence of such an express designation made by the DONEE before her
death or remarriage contained in a public instrument as above provided, the title to
the property shall automatically revert to the legal heirs of the DONOR in
common.
That, wherefore, in virtue of the deed of donation above mentioned and in the
exercise of my right and privilege under the terms of the first resolutory condition
therein contained and hereinabove reproduced, and for and in consideration of my
love and affection, I do hereby by these presents convey, transfer, and deed unto
my designee, MAXIMA HEMEDES, of legal age, married to RAUL
RODRIGUEZ, Filipino and resident of No. 15 Acacia Road, Quezon City, who is
one of the children and heirs of my donor, JOSE HEMEDES, the ownership of,
and title to the property hereinabove described, and all rights and interests therein
by reversion under the first resolutory condition in the above deed of donation;
Except the possession and enjoyment of the said property which shall remain
vested in me during my lifetime, or widowhood and which upon my death or
remarriage shall also automatically revert to, and be transferred to my designee,
Maxima Hemedes.
Maxima Hemedes, through her counsel, filed an application for registration and
confirmation of title over the subject unregistered land. Subsequently, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (0-941) 0-198[5] was issued in the name of Maxima
Hemedes married to Raul Rodriguez by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna on June
8, 1962, with the annotation that Justa Kausapin shall have the usufructuary rights
over the parcel of land herein described during her lifetime or widowhood.
It is claimed by R & B Insurance that on June 2, 1964, Maxima Hemedes and
her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the subject
property in its favor to serve as security for a loan which they obtained in the
amount of P6,000.00. On February 22, 1968, R & B Insurance extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay the loan even after it
became due on August 2, 1964. The land was sold at a public auction on May 3,
1968 with R & B Insurance as the highest bidder and a certificate of sale was
issued by the sheriff in its favor. Since Maxima Hemedes failed to redeem the
property within the redemption period, R & B Insurance executed an Affidavit of
Consolidation dated March 29, 1974 and on May 21, 1975 the Register of Deeds of
Laguna cancelled OCT No. (0-941) 0-198 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 41985 in the name of R & B Insurance. The annotation of usufruct in
favor of Justa Kausapin was maintained in the new title.[6]
Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima
Hemedes, Justa Kausapin executed a Kasunduan on May 27, 1971 whereby she
transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes, pursuant to the
resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by her late
husband Jose Hemedes. Enrique D. Hemedes obtained two declarations of real
property - in 1972, and again, in 1974, when the assessed value of the property was
raised. Also, he has been paying the realty taxes on the property from the time
Justa Kausapin conveyed the property to him in 1971 until 1979. In the cadastral
survey of Cabuyao, Laguna conducted from September 8, 1974 to October 10,
1974, the property was assigned Cadastral No. 2990, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao
Cadastre, in the name of Enrique Hemedes. Enrique Hemedes is also the named
owner of the property in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office at
Calamba, Laguna.
On February 28, 1979, Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium
Realty and Construction Corporation (Dominium). On April 10, 1981, Justa
Kausapin executed an affidavit affirming the conveyance of the subject property in
favor of Enrique D. Hemedes as embodied in the Kasunduan dated May 27, 1971,
and at the same time denying the conveyance made to Maxima Hemedes.
On May 14, 1981, Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia
Brewery, Inc. (Asia Brewery) who, even before the signing of the contract of lease,
constructed two warehouses made of steel and asbestos costing about
P10,000,000.00 each. Upon learning of Asia Brewerys constructions upon the
subject property, R & B Insurance sent it a letter on March 16, 1981 informing the
former of its ownership of the property as evidenced by TCT No. 41985 issued in
its favor and of its right to appropriate the constructions since Asia Brewery is a
builder in bad faith. On March 27, 1981, a conference was held between R & B
Insurance and Asia Brewery but they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.
On May 8, 1981, Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to Asia
Brewery wherein she asserted that she is the rightful owner of the subject property
by virtue of OCT No. (0-941) 0-198 and that, as such, she has the right to
appropriate Asia Brewerys constructions, to demand its demolition, or to compel
Asia Brewery to purchase the land. In another letter of the same date addressed to
R & B Insurance, Maxima Hemedes denied the execution of any real estate
mortgage in favor of the latter.
On August 27, 1981, Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a
complaint[7] with the Court of First Instance of Binan, Laguna for the annulment of
TCT No. 41985 issued in favor of R & B Insurance and/or the reconveyance to
Dominium of the subject property. Specifically, the complaint alleged that
Dominium was the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of the
February 28, 1979 deed of sale executed by Enrique D. Hemedes, who in turn
obtained ownership of the land from Justa Kausapin, as evidenced by the
Kasunduan dated May 27, 1971. The plaintiffs asserted that Justa Kausapin never
transferred the land to Maxima Hemedes and that Enrique D. Hemedes had no
knowledge of the registration proceedings initiated by Maxima Hemedes.
After considering the merits of the case, the trial court rendered judgment on
February 22, 1989 in favor of plaintiffs Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes, the
dispositive portion of which states
II
III
IV
VI
VII
II
III
RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE ON
(sic) THE AFFIDAVIT OF REPUDIATION OF JUSTA KAUSAPIN
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SHE IS A BIAS (sic) WITNESS
AND EXECUTED THE SAME SOME TWENTY-ONE (21) YEARS AFTER
THE EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE IN FAVOR OF
MAXIMA.
IV
VI
When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not
understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the
contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.
Article 1332 was intended for the protection of a party to a contract who is at a
disadvantage due to his illiteracy, ignorance, mental weakness or other
handicap.[23] This article contemplates a situation wherein a contract has been
entered into, but the consent of one of the parties is vitiated by mistake or fraud
committed by the other contracting party.[24] This is apparent from the ordering of
the provisions under Book IV, Title II, Chapter 2, section 1 of the Civil Code, from
which article 1332 is taken. Article 1330 states that -
Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the subject
property in favor of R & B Insurance to serve as security for a loan which they obtained.
R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay the loan even.
The land was sold at a public auction with R & B Insurance as the highest bidder. A new title was subsequently
issued in favor the R&B. The annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin was maintained in the new title.
Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin executed a
“Kasunduan” whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes, pursuant to the
resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by her late husband Jose Hemedes. Enrique
D. Hemedes obtained two declarations of real property, when the assessed value of the property was raised.
Also, he has been paying the realty taxes on the property from the time Justa Kausapin conveyed the property
to him. In the cadastral survey, the property was assigned in the name of Enrique Hemedes. Enrique
Hemedes is also the named owner of the property in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office at
Calamba, Laguna.
Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation (Dominium).
Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery, Inc. (Asia Brewery) who made
constructions therein. Upon learning of Asia Brewery’s constructions, R & B Insurance sent it a letter informing
the former of its ownership of the property. A conference was held between R & B Insurance and Asia Brewery
but they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.
Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to Asia Brewery asserting that she is the rightful owner of the
subject property and denying the execution of any real estate mortgage in favor of R&B.
Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a complaint with the CFI for the annulment of TCT issued in favor of
R & B Insurance and/or the reconveyance to Dominium of the subject property alleging that Dominion was the
absolute owner of the land.
EN BANC
MAPA, J.:
November 14, 1885, Don Jorge Enriquez, as heir of his deceased parents, Antonio
Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva, whose estates were at that time still
undistributed, by public instrument sold to Don Victoriano Reyes his interest in
both estates, equivalent to a tenth part thereof, for the sum of 7,000 pesos. The
deed was executed in this city before Don Enrique Barrera, a notary public, who
certified in the document that the vendor received the said consideration at the time
of the execution of the instrument.
By another instrument executed April 15, 1886, before the same notary, Don
Enrique Barrera y Caldes, Don Victoriano Reyes sold to Doña Carmen de la
Cavada this interest in the estate of Don Antonio Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca
Villanueva, which by the deed above referred to, he had acquired from Don Jorge
Enriquez for the same consideration of 7,000 pesos, which money he received
from the purchaser in the presence of the notary, who so certifies in the deed itself.
The purchaser, Doña Carmen, was the wife of Don Francisco Enriquez, who was
the executor and administrator of the testamentary estate of Don Antonio Enriquez
at the dates of the execution of the two above mentioned.
The plaintiffs demand that these deeds be declared null and void, as well as the
contracts evidenced thereby, apparently solely so far as they refer to the estate of
Don Antonio Enriquez, no mention being made of the estate of Doña Ciriaca
Villanueva in the complaint. This relief is prayed for upon the following grounds:
(1) Because the said contracts were executed without consideration, it being
alleged with respect to this matter that Don Jorge Enriquez did not receive any
consideration for the sale made by him in favor of Don Victoriano Reyes, and that
the latter did not receive any sum whatever as a consideration for the sale in turn
executed by him in favor of Doña Carmen de la Cavada. Upon this ground the
plaintiffs contend that the deeds in question were consummated and were executed
for the purpose of deceiving and defrauding Don Jorge Enriquez and his family.
(2) Because Don Victoriano Reyes, the purchaser under the first deed, merely
acted as an intermediary at the request and instance of Don Francisco Enriquez for
the purpose of subsequently facilitating the acquisition by Doña Carmen de la
Cavada, his wife, of the hereditary share of Don Jorge Enriquez, the real acquirer
being Don Francisco Enriquez, the executor and administrator of the estate of Don
Antonio Enriquez. The conclusion of the plaintiffs is that as such executor Don
Francisco Enriquez was unable to acquire by his own act or that of any
intermediary the said hereditary portion of Don Jorge Enriquez under the
provisions of paragraph 3 of article 1459 of the Civil Code.
(a) The evidence introduced by the plaintiffs is not sufficient to authorize the
conclusion that there was no consideration for the sales referred to in the
complaint. It is true that Victoriano Reyes testified that he paid nothing to Don
Jorge Enriquez, and received nothing from Carmen de la Cavada as consideration
for either of the sales. But against this statement is the testimony of the notary, Don
Enrique Barrera y Caldes, before whom both contracts were executed, and that of
the defendants Francisco Enriquez and Doña Carmen de la Cavada, who expressly
affirm the contrary; and more especially the statement is contrary to the recitals of
the deeds themselves, which confirm the statements of the witnesses last referred
to. The deeds clearly and expressly recite the fact of the receipt by the respective
purchasers of the stipulated price or consideration of 7,000 pesos at the time and
place of the execution of the deeds.
These instruments having been executed with all the formalities prescribed by the
law, they are admissible as evidence against the contracting parties and their
successors with respect to recitals made therein by the former (Art. 1218, Civil
Code.) Their evidentiary force can not be overcome except by other evidence of
greater weight, sufficient to overcome the legal presumption of the regularity of
acts and contracts celebrated with all the legal requisites under the safeguard of a
notarial certificate. This presumption has not been rebutted in the present case, in
which the evidence against it, consisting of the sole testimony of Don Victoriano
Reyes, which, moreover, is expressly controverted by that of the other witnesses at
the trial, involves the improbable conclusion that the witness, as well as Jorge
Enriquez, from whom the plaintiffs derived title, the notary public, and the
attesting witnesses to both instruments consented to the commission of the grave
crime of falsification of public documents — for this would be the result were the
statements of the said Victoriano Reyes true — without having any interest in so
doing or expecting to derive any benefit from the commission of the crime, the
plaintiffs not having alleged or proven the existence of such an interest on their
part. It appears, on the contrary, from the testimony of Victoriano Reyes himself
that he received no compensation for his participation in the matter.
With respect to Jorge Enriquez, the conclusion, still more improbable if possible,
would be that he had voluntarily and spontaneously taken part in the commission
of a grave crime, which not only was not of the slightest benefit to himself, but the
commission of which is supposed to have had for its object the causing of harm to
him. The allegation is that the purpose of the crime was to deprive him, without the
slightest compensation, of his paternal and maternal inheritance, which according
to the complaint was the only possession of himself and his numerous family. This
is the most inexplicable and improbable aspect of the facts alleged in the
complaint. It is beyond comprehension, and we can not believe that Jorge
Enriquez, who according to the plaintiffs was absolutely without means of support
for himself and his family, would convey to another his large interest in the estate
without receiving any consideration therefor, and that to do this he would commit
the grave crime of falsification. To justify this conclusion it would be necessary to
suppose that Jorge Enriquez was absolutely devoid of intelligence or that he was
the victim or error, violence, intimidation, or fraud. But these are circumstances
which counsel for the plaintiffs have not demonstrated or even sought to
demonstrate.
An examination of the evidence leads us to the conclusion that the payment of the
consideration of 7,000 pesos expressed in the two deeds in question was actually
and really made, and that the allegation of the plaintiffs that the contracts of sale
evidenced by these deeds were made without consideration is unfounded.
At all events the action of which the plaintiffs might have availed themselves for
the purpose of having those contracts declared void upon the ground, even
admitting hypothetically that there was no consideration, is barred by the statute of
limitations, inasmuch as from the date of those contracts down to the death of
Jorge Enriquez, which occurred July 6, 1891, more than five year had passed and
more than fifteen before the filing of the complaint on January 9, 1902, nothing
having been done in the meantime on the part of the plaintiffs or the person under
whom they claim to interrupt the running of the statute. The action of nullity only
lasts four years, counted from the date of the consummation of the contract, when
the action is based, as in this case, upon the absence of consideration. (Art. 1301 of
the Civil Code.)
The contract of sale is consummated by the delivery of the purchase money and of
the thing sold. "When the sale is made by public instrument the execution of the
instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the
contract, unless from the instrument itself the contrary intention clearly appears."
(Art. 1462, par. 2, Civil Code.) And article 1464 provides that "With respect to
incorporeal property [to which class the hereditary right which was the object of
the contracts in question pertains], the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 1462
shall govern." In the deeds of sale executed by Victoriano Reyes in favor of Doña
Carmen de la Cavada we find the following: "In consequence he (the vendor) by
virtue of this title cedes and conveys all rights which he has or may have to the part
of the inheritance which is the object of this sale, to the end that the purchaser, in
the place and stead of the vendor, may exercise all the acts of ownership
corresponding to her right, to which end by means of the delivery of this instrument
and of his other title deeds he makes the transfer necessary to consummate the
contract, which upon his part he declares to be perfect and consummated from this
date."
In view of this clause and for the legal provisions above cited, it is evident that the
delivery of the things sold was effected by the mere execution of the deed of sale;
and it appearing from the deed itself that the consideration was delivered to the
vendor at the time, and the contrary not having been sufficiently proven, the
conclusion follows that the sale was consummated them and there, and that from
that time the period of four years fixed by law for the prescription of the action of
nullity must be counted in this case.
(b) The thing sold in the two contracts of sale mentioned in the complained was the
hereditary right of Don Jorge Enriquez, which evidently was not in charge of the
executor, Don Francisco Enriquez. Executors, even in those cases in which they
administer the property pertaining to the estate, do not administer the hereditary
rights of any heir. This right is vested entirely in the heirs, who retain it or transmit
it in whole or in part, as they may deem convenient, to some other person
absolutely independent of the executor, whose authority, whatever powers the
testator may have desired to confer upon him, do not and can not under any
circumstances in the slightest degree limit the power of the heirs to dispose of the
said right at will. That right does not form part of the property delivered to the
executor for administration.
This conclusion having been reached, we are of the opinion that article 1459 of the
Civil Code, cited by the plaintiffs to show the alleged incapacity of Don Francisco
Enriquez as executor of the will of Don Antonio Enriquez, to acquire by purchase
the hereditary right of Jorge Enriquez, has no application to the present case. The
prohibition which paragraph 3 of that article imposes upon executors refers to the
property confided to their care, and does not extend, therefore, to property not
falling within this class. Legal provisions of a prohibitive character must be strictly
construed, and should not be extended to cases not expressly comprised within
their text.
Consequently, even upon the supposition that the executor, Don Francisco
Enriquez, was the person who really acquired the hereditary rights of Jorge
Enriquez, the sale in question would not for that reason be invalid, the executor,
Don Francisco Enriquez, not being legally incapable of acquiring the hereditary
right in question as the plaintiffs erroneously suppose.
This being so, the question as to whether the money paid by Doña Carmen de la
Cavada for the purchase of the said right was her sole and exclusive property, or
whether it was the property of her husband Don Francisco Enriquez, or whether it
was the property of the community of goods existing between them, is absolutely
unimportant, for, be the fact as it may, the conclusion must always be that the
incapacity to purchase, alleged as one of the legal grounds upon which the
complaint rests, does not exist.
Enough has been said to show that the action brought by the plaintiffs is devoid of
foundation. It is not, therefore, necessary to decide the other questions raised by
the parties at the trial.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the complaint dismissed, without
costs in either instance. So ordered.
FACTS: Don Jorge Enriquez as heirs of his deceased parents (Don Antonio Enriquez and Dona
Ciriaca Villanueva , whose estates were at that time still undistributed, by public document sold
to Don Victoriano Reyes his interest in both estates. The deed was executed before Don
Enrique Barrera, a notary public. Another instrument was executed before the same notary
public where Don Victoriano Reyes sold to Dona Carmen the interest in the estates which he
had acquired from Don Jorge Enriquez. The purchaser, Dona Carmen was the wife of Don
Francisco Enriquez (defendant) who was the executor and administrator of the testamentary
estate of Don Antonio Enriquez at the time the two deeds were executed.
The plaintiffs demand that these deeds be declared null and void, as well as the
contracts evidenced thereby. Apparently solely so far as they refer to the estate of Don Antonio
Enriquez, no mention being made of the estate of Dona Ciriaca Villanueva in the complaint.
The plaintiffs contended that the deeds in question were consummated and were
executed for the purpose of deceiving and defrauding Don Jorge Enriquez and his family. The
conclusion of the plaintiffs was that as such executor Don Francisco was unable to acquire by
his own act or that of any intermediary the said hereditary portion of Don Jorge under the
provisions of Article 1459, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON Don Francisco Enriquez as executor and administrator of estate of Don Antonio is
incapacitated to acquire by purchase the hereditary right of Jorge Enriquez.
RULING: NO! The thing sold in the two contracts of sale mentioned in the complaint was the
hereditary right of Don Jorge Enriquez, which evidently was not in charge of the executor Don
Francisco Enriquez. Executors, even in those cases in which they administer the property
pertaining to estate, do not administer the hereditary rights of any heirs. This right is vested
entirely in the heirs who retain it or transmit it in whole or in part, as they may deem
convenient, to some other person absolutely, whatever powers the testator may have desired
to confer upon him, do not and cannot under any circumstances in the slightest degree limit
the power of the heirs to dispose of the said right at will. That right does not form part of the
property delivered to the executor for administration.
Further, Article 1459 of the Civil Code has no application to the present case. The
prohibition which Article 145, paragraph 3 imposes upon executors refers to the property
confided to their care and does not extend, therefore, to property not falling within this class.
Consequently, even upon the supposition that the executor (Don Francisco) was the person
who really acquired the hereditary rights of Don Jorge, the sale in question would not for that
reason be invalid, the executor not being legally incapacitated of acquiring the hereditary right
in question as the plaintiffs erroneously suppose.
The action brought by the plaintiffs is devoid of foundation.
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the
production and submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a
case for declaration of nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental
fitness as a husband.
On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their
children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his
family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant
drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to
undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely
duties. To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and
Josielene got to the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while
another gave him an injection. The marriage relations got worse when the police
temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and released her only after
the case against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no longer be
repaired.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by
physician-patient privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the
opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action of certiorari before the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913, imputing grave abuse of discretion
to the RTC.
On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielene’s petition. It ruled that, if courts
were to allow the production of medical records, then patients would be left with
no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their
physicians would be kept confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies,
but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that,
although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached
the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his alleged
forcible confinement.
Question Presented
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the
ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient
communication.
Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital
records of Johnny’s confinement, which records she wanted to present in court as
evidence in support of her action to have their marriage declared a nullity.
Respondent Johnny resisted her request for subpoena, however, invoking the
privileged character of those records. He cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules
of Evidence which reads:
xxxx
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the
admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are
offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as
independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the
patient’s health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the
offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made
immediately after the offer is made.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after
notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena
duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a
request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital
records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that
Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to
their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is
about non-disclosure of privileged matters.
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any party
showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order
any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by
or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit
entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for the
purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time,
place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and
may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. (Emphasis supplied)
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the
documents to be disclosed are "not privileged."
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not
privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be
regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot
in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their
professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the
hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.
3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before
the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact
attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he
should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records. Josielene
invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides:
SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the
remainder admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or
record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be
inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in
evidence.1âwphi1
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny
had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated
above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of
his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case
when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would
again be premature.
For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying
Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Petitioner wife filed against respondent husband a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, with the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her, claiming that
respondent husband failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally
deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
Respondent husband claims that it was the wife who failed in her duties. And that he initially agreed to marriage
counseling to save their marriage, but upon arriving at the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while
another gave him an injection. He attached a Philhealth Claim Form to his answer as proof that he was forcibly
confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. However, that same form carried a physician's handwritten note that
the husband suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.
Based on the physician's handwritten statement, petitioner wife requested for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum addressed to Medical City, for the production of the Husband's medical records. The husband opposed,
arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. The request of the wife was denied by
the trial court. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Did the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the
husband's hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient
communication?
Held:
No. The issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is premature. Petitioner wife made the request before trial started. She
will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering her
husband's hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that the husband may
opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.
It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital
records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section
1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides: x x x
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are “not
privileged.”
Petitioner wife, of course, claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the
“testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the
physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined” regarding their professional
conversation. The privilege, according to her, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the
physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that the
physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him— would be
to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these
information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify
on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
EN BANC
KAPUNAN, J.:
These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which
the workings of the contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal
process are based — the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship.
The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the law profession
a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other
calling. In this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the
mantle of protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the
performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on
July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Presidential Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG
Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus
Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."1
Among the dependants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala,
Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan,
Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private
respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the
ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients,
which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business
associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services
where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More
specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm
delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity
holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered
in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares.
In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm
acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and
business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and
private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and
acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with
the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.2
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the
following allegations:
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a
separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the
alleged ill-gotten wealth.7
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the
exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b)
submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the
submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its client
covering their respective
shareholdings.9
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate
compliance by private respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the
latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to
respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989
reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No.
33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as
Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and
Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf
of private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-
examination of the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG
Case No. 33. 10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not
refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client
involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the
client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. 11
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the
identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and
that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers
cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until
they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege;
the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been
impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein.
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same
conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for
exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated
November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make
the disclosures required by the PCGG.
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same
was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed
the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following
grounds:
II
III
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must
be based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to
the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal
protection of the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of
the March 18, 1991 resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan.
Thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113,
assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same grounds
averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the
identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e, their principal, and
that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers
cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until
they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been
impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein. (Emphasis ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third
Division, entitled "Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on
Good Government" respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko,
manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish
through the ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco;" that "it
was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those subscription
payments in corporations included in Annex "A" of the Third Amended
Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of
assignment, some in the name of particular persons; some in blank.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants
in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities
and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously,
petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as
leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the
PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid
cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third
Amended Complaint.
II
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct
and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client
which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very
high degree of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is required by reason of necessity and
public interest 23 based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice
in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. 24
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust
and confidence than that of attorney and client, or generally speaking,
one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously
guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality
and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a
corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that
confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice
of the rights of the party bestowing it. 27
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure
enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code
specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any
communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course
of professional employment." 28Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of
Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be
withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear
of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the
full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to
the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by
the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the
great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the
bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less
does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner
of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that
of his client.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the
door to a whole spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed
by limited information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-
client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists
between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a
dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that
in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not
as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to
disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has
been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a
client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a
general rule, know his adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who
his opponent is." 32 He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown
forces. 33
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the
client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought
the lawyer's advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a
lawyer to divulge the name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of
the relationship was so closely related to the issue of the client's identity that the
privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an election
official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to
violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony,
the attorney revealed that she had advised her client to count the votes correctly,
but averred that she could not remember whether her client had been, in fact,
bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's
identity before a grand jury. Reversing the lower court's contempt orders, the state
supreme court held that under the circumstances of the case, and under the
exceptions described above, even the name of the client was privileged.
U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig,35 involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is
privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of
the client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for
which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the
activities of the "Sandino Gang," a gang involved in the illegal importation of
drugs in the United States. The respondents, law partners, represented key
witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued
summons to Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and
information regarding payment received by Sandino on behalf of any other person,
and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and
circumstances of the case, held:
A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may
be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a
strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would
implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal
advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680. While in Baird
Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the rule also
reflects federal law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception
applies to this case.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is
privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass
v. Terminal Cab Corporation,37 prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a
lawyer's claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client because
this would expose the latter to civil litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was
riding, owned by respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose
owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against defendant corporation
and the owner of the second cab, identified in the information only as John Doe. It
turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary
examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the
name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of the insurance
company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that he
was involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the
man was the owner of the second cab. The state supreme court held that the reports
were clearly made to the lawyer in his professional capacity. The court said:
That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance
company had hired him to defend its policyholders seems immaterial.
The attorney is such cases is clearly the attorney for the policyholder
when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence
contemplating that it would be used in an action or claim against
him. 38
It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of the second
cab came to the attorney in this case as a confidential communication.
His client is not seeking to use the courts, and his address cannot be
disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action pending against him
as service of the summons on him has not been effected. The
objections on which the court reserved decision are sustained. 39
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,40 the lawyer involved was
required by a lower court to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a
certain transaction. The purpose of the court's request was to determine whether the
unnamed persons as interested parties were connected with the purchase of
properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to
the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer's refusal to divulge the names of
his clients the court held:
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless,
by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that
would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime,
the client's name is privileged.
In Baird vs. Korner,42 a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of
certain undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed
taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal charges were brought against
them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect
and the taxes understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not
they violated tax laws and sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility
that they had. No investigation was then being undertaken by the IRS of the
taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum
of $12, 706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another
amount of money representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check
for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the
payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the
lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that
he did not know their names, and declined to name the attorney and accountants
because this constituted privileged communication. A petition was filed for the
enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's repeated refusal to name his clients
he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him
to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined
income taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation into that
client's income tax liability pending. The court emphasized the exception that a
client's name is privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the legal
services rendered that the disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to possible
investigation and sanction by government agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to
the general rule. Here money was received by the government, paid
by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient
amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The
names of the clients are useful to the government for but one purpose
— to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it
may check the records for that one year or several years. The
voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers
that more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously
paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes,
though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be
the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of
guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed — to
advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should be done. 43
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could
qualify as exceptions to the general rule.
For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the
privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the
client seeks legal assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client
relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to
be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such
revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction. 45
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service
sought was duly establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The
key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes
petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients
indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the
financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in
question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among
others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's
shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and
parcel of petitioners' legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an
integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear
that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which
legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in
the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would
obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where
none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, "that would inevitably
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . . crime." 47
An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the
services of an attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around
the law for the purpose of committing illegal activities and a case where a client
thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults his
attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because
the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the
exception because whether or not the act for which the client sought advice turns
out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to
evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible
action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked
or used as a shield for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution
may not have a case against the client in the second example and cannot use the
attorney client relationship to build up a case against the latter. The reason for the
first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice
on the commission of a crime. 48 The reason for the second has been stated in the
cases above discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for which the
attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that
"under such conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an
attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but
the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be
made the basis of a suit against his client." 49 "Communications made to an
attorney in the course of any personal employment, relating to the subject thereof,
and which may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the relation in
which the parties stand to each other, are under the seal of confidence and entitled
to protection as privileged communications."50 Where the communicated
information, which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible
criminal activity but there would be not much in the information known to the
prosecution which would sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the
client would open up other privileged information which would substantiate the
prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so inextricably linked to the
subject matter itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception,
applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the
privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal
advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be
eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings51 and Tillotson v. Boughner.52 What these cases unanimously seek to
avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing
expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative source of information available to the prosecutor
which do not depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily
available source of information in the building of a case against the latter.
Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as the one which
exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy
prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. When the
nature of the transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer,
such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner
attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to
disclose the latter's identity which in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes
a strict liability for negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client,
including confidentiality, loyalty, competence, diligence as well as the
responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to make decisions
have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy
v. Boon,54 the US Second District Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm
that it breached its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's former agent in
closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client hesitated in proceeding
with the transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled that
breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special breed of
cases that often loosen normally stringent requirements of causation and damages,
and found in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley
P.A. v. Scheller55 requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this
case, a contingent fee lawyer was fired shortly before the end of completion of his
work, and sought payment quantum meruit of work done. The court, however,
found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to pressure his client into
signing a new fee agreement while settlement negotiations were at a critical stage.
While the client found a new lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the
client to settle for less than what was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of
fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon56 famously attributed to
Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilioof an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US Court found that the
lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.
Such are the unrelenting duties required by lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because
the law, which the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual
and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to accept respondents'
position without denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled by
Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such
scope to realize the spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other
does one plunge so deep in the stream of life — so share its passions
its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? . . . But
that is not all. What a subject is this in which we are united — this
abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we see
reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of all men that have been.
When I think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to
speak of the law as our mistress, we who are here know that she is a
mistress only to be won with sustained and lonely passion — only to
be won by straining all the faculties by which man is likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their
clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the
facts of the instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the
client's name is not privileged information.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein,
including herein petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each
other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the financial and
corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM and others and that through insidious means and machinations,
ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investment
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March
1987. The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr.
Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies
to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees
and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as
instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and
authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the
Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but
worse, to submit to the PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer
relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of
its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact
from petitioners a link "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict the (client) of a crime."
III
To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing
of the suit in the respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG should
conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as species apart from the rest
of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which made
substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial
distinctions exist from the records of the case at bench, in violation of the
equal protection clause.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to
take its full course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to
suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion
in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as a
means of coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow
the case to continue with respect to them when this Court could nip the
problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust
situation which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real
and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads.
It should not be allowed to continue a day longer.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
The legal profession, despite all the unrestrained calumny hurled against it,
is still the noblest of professions. It exists upon the thesis that, in an orderly
society that is opposed to all forms of anarchy, it so occupies, as it should,
an exalted position in the proper dispensation of justice. In time, principles
have evolved that would help ensure its effective ministration. The
protection of confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship is one, and it
has since been an accepted firmament in the profession. It allows the lawyer
and the client to institutionalize a unique relationship based on full trust and
confidence essential in a justice system that works on the basis of
substantive and procedural due process. To be sure, the rule is not without its
pitfalls, and demands against it may be strong, but these problems are, in the
ultimate analysis, no more than mere tests of vigor that have made and will
make that rule endure.
I see in the case before us, given the attendant circumstances already
detailed in the ponencia, a situation of the Republic attempting to establish a
case not on what it perceives to be the strength of its own evidence but on
what it could elicit from a counsel against his client. I find it unreasonable
for the Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach the trust reposed on
them and succumb to a thinly disguised threat of incrimination.
Accordingly, I join my other colleague who vote for the GRANT of the
petition.
In the case below, the PCGG decided to drop or exclude from the complaint
original co-defendant Raul Roco because he had allegedly complied with the
condition prescribed by the PCGG, viz., undertake that he will reveal the
identity of the principals for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in PCGG Case No. 0033. In short, there was an
agreement or compromise settlement between the PCGG and Roco.
Accordingly, the PCGG submitted a Third Amended Complaint without
Roco as a defendant. No obstacle to such an agreement has been insinuated.
If Roco's revelation violated the confidentiality of a lawyer-client
relationship, he would be solely answerable therefor to his principals/clients
and, probably, to this Court in an appropriate disciplinary action if
warranted. There is at all no showing that Civil Case No. 0033 cannot
further be proceeded upon or that any judgment therein cannot be binding
without Roco remaining as a defendant. Accordingly, the admission of the
Third Amended Complaint cannot be validly withheld by the
Sandiganbayan.
Are the petitioners, who did not file a formal motion to be excluded but only
made the request to that effect as a rider to their Comment to the Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint, entitled to be excluded from the Third
Amended Complaint such that denial thereof would constitute grave abuse
of discretion on the Sandiganbayan's part? To me, the answer is clearly in
the negative.
It, indeed, appears that Roco has complied with his obligation as a
consideration for his exclusion from the Third Amended Complaint. The
Sandiganbayan found that
These are the pieces of evidence upon which the Sandiganbayan founded its
conclusion that the PCGG was satisfied with Roco's compliance. The
petitioners have not assailed such finding as arbitrary.
The ponencia's observation then that Roco did not refute the petitioners'
contention that he did not comply with his obligation to disclose the identity
of his principals is entirely irrelevant.
In view of their adamantine position, the petitioners did not, therefore, allow
themselves to be like Roco. They cannot claim the same treatment, much
less compel the PCGG to drop them as defendants, for nothing whatsoever.
They have no right to make such a demand for until they shall have
complied with the conditions imposed for their exclusion, they cannot be
excluded except by way of a motion to dismiss based on the grounds
allowed by law (e.g., those enumerated in § 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). The
rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to
exclude a party. It is merely aground for disqualification of a witness (§ 24,
Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may only be invoked at the appropriate
time, i.e., when a lawyer is under compulsion to answer as witness, as when,
having taken the witness stand, he is questioned as to such confidential
communicator or advice, or is being otherwise judicially coerced to produce,
through subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, letters or other documents
containing the same privileged matter. But none of the lawyers in this case is
being required to testify about or otherwise reveal "any [confidential]
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional employment." What they are being
asked to do, in line with their claim that they had done the acts ascribed to
them in pursuance of their professional relation to their clients, is to identify
the latter to the PCGG and the Court; but this, only if they so choose in order
to be dropped from the complaint, such identification being the condition
under which the PCGG has expressed willingness to exclude them from the
action. The revelation is entirely optional, discretionary, on their part. The
attorney-client privilege is not therefor applicable.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any abuse of discretion when it
denied the petitioners' prayer for their exclusion as party-defendants because
they did not want to abide with any of the conditions set by the PCGG.
There would have been abuse if the Sandiganbayan granted the prayer
because then it would have capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, and
oppressively imposed its will on the PCGG.
Again, what the petitioners want is their exclusion from the Third Amended
Complaint or the dismissal of the case insofar as they are concerned because
either they are invested with immunity under the principle of confidentiality
in a lawyer-client relationship, or the claims against them in Civil Case No.
0033 are barred by such principle.
Even if we have to accommodate this issue, I still submit that the lawyer-
client privilege provides the petitioners no refuge. They are sued as principal
defendants in Civil Case No. 0033, a case of the recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth. Conspiracy is imputed to the petitioners therein. In short, they
are, allegedly, conspirators in the commission of the acts complained of for
being nominees of certain parties.
This privilege is well put in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
The majority seeks to expand the scope of the Philippine rule on the lawyer-
client privilege by copious citations of American jurisprudence which
includes in the privilege the identity of the client under the exceptional
situations narrated therein. From the plethora of cases cited, two facts stand
out in bold relief. Firstly, the issue of privilege contested therein arose in
grand jury proceedings on different States, which are preliminary
proceedings before the filing of the case in court, and we are not even told
what evidentiary rules apply in the said hearings. In the present case, the
privilege is invoked in the court where it was already filed and presently
pends, and we have the foregoing specific rules above-quoted. Secondly, and
more important, in the cases cited by the majority, the lawyers concerned
were merely advocating the cause of their clients but were not indicted for
the charges against their said clients. Here, the counsel themselves are co-
defendants duly charged in court as co-conspirators in the offenses charged.
The cases cited by the majority evidently do not apply to them.
Hence, I wish to repeat and underscore the fact that the lawyer-client
privilege is not a shield for the commission of a crime or against the
prosecution of the lawyer therefor. I quote, with emphases supplied, from 81
AM JUR 2d, Witnesses, § 393 to 395, pages 356-357:
There are many other cases to the same effect, for the rule
is prostitution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not
be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication
made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy
or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but
which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to
disclose at once in the interest of justice. In accordance with this rule,
where a forged will or other false instrument has come into possession
of an attorney through the instrumentality of the accused, with the
hope and expectation that the attorney would take some action in
reference thereto, and the attorney does act, in ignorance of the true
character of the instrument, there is no privilege, inasmuch as full
confidence has been withheld. The attorney is then compelled to
produce a forged writing against the client. The fact that the attorney
is not cognizant of the criminal or wrongful purpose, or, knowing it,
attempts to dissuade his client, is immaterial. The attorney's ignorance
of his client's intentions deprives the information of a professional
character as full confidence has been withheld. (H.C. Underhill, A
Treatise on the Law of Criminal Case Evidence, vol. 2, Fifth ed.
(1956), Sec. 332, pp. 836-837; emphasis mine).
Various reasons have been announced as being the foundation for the
holdings that communications with respect to contemplated criminal
or fraudulent acts are not privileged.
If the client does not frankly and freely reveal his object and intention
as well as facts, there is not professional confidence, and therefore no
privilege. Matthews v. Hoagland (NJ) supra. See to the same
effect Carney v. United R. Co. (1920) 205 Mo App 495, 226 SW 308.
The court in McMannus v. State (1858) 2 Head (Tenn) 213, said; "It
would be monstrous to hold that if counsel was asked and obtained in
reference to a contemplated crime that the lips of the attorney would
be sealed, when the facts might become important to the ends of
justice in the prosecution of crime. In such a case the relation cannot
be taken to exist. Public policy would forbid it."
And the court in Lanum v. Patterson (1909) 151 Ill App 36, observed
that this rule was not in contravention of sound public policy, but on
the contrary, tended to the maintenance of a higher standard of
professional ethics by preventing the relation of attorney and client
from operating as a cloak for fraud.
WIGMORE explains why the identity of a client is not within the lawyer-
client privilege in this manner:
1. Name or identity.
At the present stage of the proceedings below, the petitioners have not
shown that they are so situated with respect to their principals as to bring
them within any of the exceptions established by American jurisprudence.
There will be full opportunity for them to establish that fact at the trial where
the broader perspectives of the case shall have been presented and can be
better appreciated by the court. The insistence for their exclusion from the
case is understandable, but the reasons for the hasty resolution desired is
naturally suspect.
We do not even have to go beyond our shores for an authority that the
lawyer-client privilege cannot be invoked to prevent the disclosure of a
client's identity where the lawyer and the client are conspirators in the
commission of a crime or a fraud. Under our jurisdiction, lawyers are
mandated not to counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of
Professional Responsibility) and to employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01, Canon 19, Id.). And
under the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer must steadfastly bear in
mind that his great trust is to be performed within and not without the
bounds of the law (Canon 15, Id.), that he advances the honor of his
profession and the best interest of his client when he renders service or gives
advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact
compliance with the strictest principles of moral law (Canon 32, Id.). These
canons strip a lawyer of the lawyer-client privilege whenever he conspires
with the client in the commission of a crime or a fraud.
In their Answer, petitioners alleged that the legal services offered and made
available by their firm to its clients include: (a) organizing and acquiring
business organizations, (b) acting as incorporators or stockholders thereof,
and (c) delivering to clients the corresponding documents of their equity
holdings (i.e., certificates of stock endorsed in blank or blank deeds of trust
or assignment). They claimed that their activities were "in furtherance of
legitimate lawyering."
Petitioners refused to comply with the PCGG conditions contending that the
attorney-client privilege gives them the right not to reveal the identity of
their client. They also alleged that lawyer Roco was excluded though he did
not in fact reveal the identity of his clients. On March 18, 1992, the
Sandiganbayan denied the exclusion of petitioners in Case No. 33. It held:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the
identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their principal,
and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to the debated. The ACCRA lawyers
cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until
they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege;
the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been
impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein.
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same
conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for
exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated
November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make
the disclosures required by the PCGG.
II
III
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must
be based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to
the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal
protection of the law.
The petition at bar is atypical of the usual case where the hinge issue
involves the applicability of attorney-client privilege. It ought to be noted
that petitioners were included as defendants in Civil Case No. 33 as
conspirators. Together with Mr. Cojuangco, Jr., they are charged with
having ". . . conspired and confederated with each other in setting up,
through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate
framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM,
COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CICI and more than twenty other coconut levy
funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation
shares and the institutionalization through presidential directives of the
coconut monopoly." To stress, petitioners are charged with having conspired
in the commission of crimes. The issue of attorney-client privilege arose
when PCGG agreed to exclude petitioners from the complaint on condition
they reveal the identity of their client. Petitioners refused to comply and
assailed the condition on the ground that to reveal the identity of their client
will violate the attorney-client privilege.
Prescinding from these premises, our initial task is to define in clear strokes
the substantive content of the attorney-client privilege within the context of
the distinct issues posed by the petition at bar. With due respect, I like to
start by stressing the irreducible principle that the attorney-client privilege
can never be used as a shield to commit a crime or a fraud. Communications
to an attorney having for their object the commission of a crime ". . . partake
the nature of a conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge such
communications, but under certain circumstances it might become the duty
of the attorney to do so. The interests of public justice require that no such
shield from merited exposure shall be interposed to protect a person who
takes counsel how he can safely commit a crime. The relation of attorney
and client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting crimes." 6 In
the well chosen words of retired Justice Quiason, a lawyer is not a gun for
hire.7 I hasten to add, however, that a mere allegation that a lawyer
conspired with his client to commit a crime or a fraud will not defeat the
privilege.8 As early as 1933, no less than the Mr. Justice Cardozo held
in Clark v. United States9 that: "there are early cases apparently to the effect
that a mere charge of illegality, not supported by any evidence, will set the
confidences free . . . But this conception of the privilege is without support .
. . To drive the privilege away, there must be 'something to give colour to the
charge;' there must beprima facie evidence that it has foundation in fact." In
the petition at bar, however, the PCGG appears to have relented on its
original stance as spelled out in its Complaint that petitioners are co-
conspirators in crimes and cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege. The
PCGG has agreed to exclude petitioners from the Complaint provided they
reveal the identity of their client. In fine, PCGG has conceded that petitioner
are entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege if they reveal their client's
identity.
Assuming then that petitioners can invoke the attorney-client privilege since
the PCGG is no longer proceeding against them as co-conspirators in crimes,
we should focus on the more specific issue of whether the attorney-client
privilege includes the right not to divulge the identity of a client as
contended by the petitioners. As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege
does not include the right of non-disclosure of client identity. The general
rule, however, admits of well-etched exceptions which the Sandiganbayan
failed to recognize. The general rule and its exceptions are accurately
summarized in In re Grand Jury Investigation,10viz:
The federal forum is unanimously in accord with the general rule that
the identity of a client is, with limited exceptions, not within the
protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege. See: In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F. 2d 666, 670-71 (5th Cir.
1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 651 F. 2d 199, 204 (5th
Cir. 1981); Frank v. Tomlinson, 351 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1082, 86 S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966); In re
Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982); In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d
363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600
F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979).
Baird, supra, 279 F.2d at 633. The identity of the Baird taxpayer was
adjudged within this exception to the general rule. The Ninth Circuit
has continued to acknowledge this exception.
Another exception to the general rule that the identity of a client is not
privileged arises where disclosure of the identity would be tantamount
to disclosing an otherwise protected confidential communication. In
Baird, supra, the Ninth Circuit observed:
Id., 279 F.2d at 632. Citing Baird, the Fourth Circuit promulgated the
following exception:
NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965). Accord: United
States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1975); Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951,
83 S.Ct. 505, 9 L.Ed.2d 499 1963); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d
663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783 (2d
Cir. 1944). See also: Chirac v. Reinecker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat) 280, 6
L.Ed. 474 (1826). The Seventh Circuit has added to
the Harvey exception the following emphasized caveat:
United States vs. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976
(emphasis added). The Third Circuit, applying this exception, has
emphasized that it is the link between the client and
the communication, rather than the link between the client and the
possibility of potential criminal prosecution, which serves to bring the
client's identity within the protective ambit of the attorney-client
privilege. See: In re Grand Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978
(Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469, 473 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1979). Like the "legal
advice" exception, this exception is also firmly rooted in principles of
confidentiality.
I join the majority in holding that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion when it misdelineated the metes and bounds of the attorney-
client privilege by failing to recognize the exceptions discussed above.
Be that as it may, I part ways with the majority when it ruled that petitioners
need not prove they fall within the exceptions to the general rule. I
respectfully submit that the attorney-client privilege is not a magic mantra
whose invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure drape he who invokes it with
its protection. Plainly put, it is not enough to assert the privilege.11 The
person claiming the privilege or its exceptions has the obligation to present
the underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the privilege.12 When
these facts can be presented only by revealing the very information sought to
be protected by the privilege, the procedure is for the lawyer to move for an
inspection of the evidence in an in camera hearing.13 The hearing can even
be in camera and ex-parte. Thus, it has been held that "a well-recognized
means for an attorney to demonstrate the existence of an exception to the
general rule, while simultaneously preserving confidentiality of the identity
of his client, is to move the court for an in camera ex-
parte hearing.14 Without the proofs adduced in these in camera hearings, the
Court has no factual basis to determine whether petitioners fall within any of
the exceptions to the general rule.
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners have not adduced
evidence that they fall within any of the above mentioned exceptions for as
aforestated, the Sandiganbayan did not recognize the exceptions, hence, the
order compelling them to reveal the identity of their client. In ruling that
petitioners need not further establish the factual basis of their claim that they
fall within the exceptions to the general rule, the majority held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to
the general rule. Here money was received by the government, paid
by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient
amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The
names of the clients are useful to the government for but one purpose
— to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it
may check the records for that one year or several years. The
voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers
that more tax or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously
paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes,
though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be
the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of
guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed — to
advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should be done.
In fine, the factual basis for the ruling in Baird was properly established by
the parties. In the case at bar, there is no evidence about the subject matter of
the consultation made by petitioners' client. Again, the records do not show
that the subject matter is criminal in character except for the raw allegations
in the Complaint. Yet, this is the unstated predicate of the majority ruling
that revealing the identity of the client ". . . would furnish the only link that
would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime." The silent implication is unflattering and unfair to petitioners who
are marquee names in the legal profession and unjust to their undisclosed
client.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I respectfully register a qualified dissent from the majority opinion.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), raised a complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB) against
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and TeodoroRegala and his partners in the ACCRA law firm, for the recovery of alleged ill-
gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033),
entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."
During the course of the proceedings, PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private
respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom
he acted as nominee/stockholder.
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, ACCRA lawyers requested that PCGG similarly grant the same
treatment to them as accorded Roco. The PCGG has offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco
but the ACCRA lawyers have refused to disclose the identities of their clients. ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for
certiorari, invoking that the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion:
In subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who acted to the strict application of the law of agency
In not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.
In not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers
from revealing the identity of their client(s) and other information requested by PCGG.
In not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just
grounds and with due consideration to equal protection of the law
ISSUE
Whether or not client’s identity in a case involving and acquiring companies allegedly sourced from ill-gotten wealth is
privileged and disclosure of such is unethical.
RULING
The court held that the client identity in this case is privileged. As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not
be shrouded in mystery. This general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the
said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant
case falls under the first and third exception.
The attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in the Rules of Court provides thedisqualification by reason of privileged
communication. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court further emphasizes the importance of maintaining client confidence.
Furthermore, this duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Canon 15 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client.
The Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby annulled and set aside.
SECOND DIVISION
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and
a parents right not to testify in a case against his children.
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in
the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee,
Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-
Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K.
Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children).
In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu),
supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that
Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and
had a relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius
children with Lee (collectively, the Lees other children) claimed that they, too,
were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After conducting
such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:
The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the
Lees other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and
Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the
time. Another of the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old
mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words, by
the hospital records of the Lees other children, Kehs declared age did not coincide
with her actual age when she supposedly gave birth to such other children,
numbering eight.
On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two
separate petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City[2] in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of live
birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other children, the name Keh and
replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mothers name.
In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request
for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lees
presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu
moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated Section
25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma
Lees stepmother.[3] On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for
being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and
that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she
was Emma Lees mother.
Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh childrens motion for reconsideration,
they filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a decision, [4] setting
aside the RTCs August 5, 2005 Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces
tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or
unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA
also held that Tius advanced age alone does not render her incapable of
testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that
she would be unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner
Emma Lee failed to do.
The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in
ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case
that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth
of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Kehs daughter.
Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad
testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable and
oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral
examination concerning the Lee-Keh childrens theory that she had illicit relation
with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children.
Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of
Appeals[6] that the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action for correction
of entries in the certificates of birth of Lees other children, Emma Lee
included. The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the suit was to establish
the fact that Lees other children were not children of Keh. Thus:
But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to
come to court and testify: a) considering her advance age, testifying in court would
subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would violate her
parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.
Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to
badgering by adverse counsel. The trial courts duty is to protect every witness
against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially true where the
witness is of advanced age.[8]
2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her
stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Evidence, which reads:
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because
the rule applies only to direct ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected
by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her
stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:
SO ORDERED.
The Facts and the Case
Spouses (Lee) and Keh entered the Philippines in the 1930sas immigrants from China. They had 11
children. In 1948, Leebrought from China a young woman (Tiu), as housemaid.Respondent Lee-Keh’s
children believed that Tiu left the household andhad a relation with him.Shortly after Keh died in 1989,
the Lee-Keh children learned thatTiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other children)
claimedthat they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the
(NBI) to investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report it
is notKEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probablyTIU CHUAN. The NBI found, for
example, that in the hospitalrecords Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age whenshe
supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering eight.On the basis of this report, the
respondent Lee-Keh children filed twoseparate petitions, one of them before the (RTC) for the deletion
fromthe certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’sother children, the name Keh
and replace the same with the nameTiu to indicate her true mother’s name.In April 2005 the Lee-Keh
children filed with the RTC an ex parterequest for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to
compelTiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case. However, later on, the subpoena was
quashed by the RTC as it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule130 of the Rules of Court, the rule
on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother.
CA rendered a decision setting aside the RTC’s Order on the ground that only a subpoena ducestecum,
not a subpoena adtestificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4,
Rule 21 of the Rules of CivilProcedure. The CA also held that Tiu’s advanced age alonedoes not render
her incapable of testifying. The party seekingto quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that
shewould be unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something thatpetitioner Emma Lee failed to do.
ISSUE:Whether or not court may compelTiu to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent
Lee-Kehchildren filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that
she is not Keh’s daughter.
HELD:Under Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence “No personmay be compelled to testify
against his parents, other directascendants, children or other direct descendants.”The afore-quoted rule
is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal
cases.
Butthose who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extendthe prohibition to all kinds of actions,
whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendantsor
descendants.
In Emma Lee vs. Court of Appeals, the person (TIU) who invokes thefilial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner EmmaLee.
The SC declared that the privilege cannot applyto them because the rule applies only to "direct"
ascendantsand descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.A stepdaughter has no
common ancestry by her stepmother .Relative thereto, Article 965 of the New Civil Code provides:
“Thedirect line is either descending or ascending. The former unites thehead of the family with those
who descend from him. The latter bindsa person with those from whom he descends.”
EN BANC
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
II
...
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[30]
Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the
complaint and duly established by evidence during trial, the allegation in the
complaint regarding her age was not clearly proved.
In the very recent case of People v. Pruna,[31] we set the guidelines in
appreciating age either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of
the victim.
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was
presented and offered in evidence to prove Cynthias age. The statement in the
medical certificate showing Cynthias age is not proof thereof, since a medical
certificate does not authenticate the date of birth of the victim. Moreover, pursuant
to Pruna, Glorias testimony regarding Cynthias age was insufficient, since Cynthia
was alleged to be 16 years old already at the time of the rape and what is sought to
be proved is that she was then 18 years old. Moreover, the trial court did not even
make a categorical finding on Cynthias minority. Finally, the silence of Artemio or
his failure to object to the testimonial evidence regarding Cynthias age could not
be taken against him.
It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible
and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital
offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and
evidence.[32] Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient proof of Cynthias minority,
Artemio cannot be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death
penalty. He should only be convicted of simple rape and meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
As regards the civil liability of Artemio, the awards of moral damages in the
amount of P50,000 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 are
insufficient. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of
rape,[33] should also be awarded. In simple rape, the civil indemnity for the victim
shall not be less than P50,000.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac,
Tarlac, in Criminal Case No. 9375 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification
that that accused Artemio Invencion y Soriano is held guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim Cynthia Invencion the sums
of P50,000 as indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary
damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, and Corona, JJ., on leave.
THIRD DIVISION
PANGANIBAN, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.
SUSAN RAMIREZ,
Respondent. Promulgated:
October 14, 2005
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness
stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel
raised no objection.
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
COURT:
xxx
COURT:
xxx
DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
xxx
Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the
source of that scent?
A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline
in the house of my sister (and witness pointing to the person of
the accused inside the court room).
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that
person, if you know?
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.
Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify
him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point
him?
A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked
his name, he gave his name as Maximo Alvarez.[4]
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting
aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court.
The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against
her husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for
offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are
backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support
of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility
which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails.
In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury
based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security
and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing
but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy
home.[12]
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the
truth before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent
exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even
against the objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court
in Francisco[14]), it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals Decision of May 31, 1996 and
Resolution of December 9, 1996.
On February 7, 1990, herein petitioner-appellant Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson),
in his capacity as creditor, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo
City a petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 4497, for the settlement of the
estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy (the deceased) who died on January 10, 1990. Sanson
claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount of P603,000.00 and
to his sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of P360,000.00.[1]
Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles
Montinola (Angeles) later filed separate claims against the estate, alleging that the
deceased owed them P50,000.00 and P150,000.00, respectively.[2]
By Order of February 12, 1991, Branch 28 of the Iloilo RTC to which the
petition was raffled, appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the deceased, as
administratrix of his estate, following which she was issued letters of
administration.[3]
During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and
Jade Montinola, wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified on the
transactions that gave rise thereto, over the objection of the administratrix who
invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court otherwise known as
the Dead Mans Statute which reads:
Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she had a
transaction with the deceased which is evidenced by six checks [4] issued by him
before his death; before the deceased died, Celedonia tried to enforce settlement of
the checks from his (the deceaseds) son Jerry who told her that his father would
settle them once he got well but he never did; and after the death of the deceased,
Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for payment but were dishonored [5] due
to the closure of his account.[6]
Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she
knew that the deceased issued five checks[7] to Sanson in settlement of a debt; and
after the death of the deceased, Sanson presented the checks to the bank for
payment but were returned due to the closure of his account.[8]
Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and
mother-in-law Angeles, testified that on separate occasions, the deceased
borrowed P50,000 and P150,000 from her husband and mother-in-law,
respectively, as shown by three checks issued by the deceased,[9] two to Angeles
and the other[10] to Eduardo Montinola, Jr.; before the deceased died or sometime
in August 1989, they advised him that they would be depositing the checks, but he
told them not to as he would pay them cash, but he never did; and after the
deceased died on January 10, 1990, they deposited the checks but were dishonored
as the account against which they were drawn was closed,[11] hence, their legal
counsel sent a demand letter[12] dated February 6, 1990 addressed to the deceaseds
heirs Melicia, James, Mini and Jerry Sy, and Symmels I & II but the checks have
remained unsettled.[13]
The administratrix, denying having any knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the claims, nevertheless alleged that if they ever
existed, they had been paid and extinguished, are usurious and illegal and are, in
any event, barred by prescription.[14] And she objected to the admission of the
checks and check return slips-exhibits offered in evidence by the claimants upon
the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are disqualified under the Dead
Mans Statute.
Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade, the
administratrix asserted that they are inadmissible because Jade is the daughter-in-
law of claimant Angeles and wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., hence, she is
covered by the above-said rule on disqualification.
At all events, the administratrix denied that the checks-exhibits were issued by
the deceased and that the return slips were issued by the depository/clearing
bank.[15]
After the claimants rested their case, the administratrix filed four separate
manifestations informing the trial court that she was dispensing with the
presentation of evidence against their claims.[16]
Finding that the Dead Mans Statute does not apply to the witnesses who
testified in support of the subject claims against the estate, the trial court issued an
Order of December 8, 1993,[17] the dispositive portion of which reads:
II.
III.
IV.
the Court of Appeals set aside the December 8, 1993 Order of the trial court, by
Decision of May 31, 1996, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and another order is
entered dismissing the claims of:
1. Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00;
4. Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00 against the estate of the
deceased JUAN BON FING SY.
No pronouncement as to costs.
With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners argue that since the
administratrix did not deny the testimony of Jade nor present any evidence to
controvert it, and neither did she deny the execution and genuineness of the checks
issued by the deceased (as well as the check return slips issued by the clearing
bank), it was error for the Court of Appeals to find the evidence of the Montinolas
insufficient to prove their claims.
The administratrix counters that the due execution and authenticity of the
checks-exhibits of the Montinolas were not duly proven since Jade did not
categorically state that she saw the filling up and signing of the checks by the
deceased, hence, her testimony is self-serving; besides, as Jade had identical and
unitary interest with her husband and mother-in-law, her testimony was a
circumvention of the Dead Mans Statute.[24]
The administratrixs counter-argument does not lie. Relationship to a party has
never been recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the credibility of
the witness orsubject only to well recognized exceptions none of which is here
presentthe admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of relationship to a
party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution in the assessment of a
witness testimony but is not necessarily a negative element which should be taken
as diminishing the credit otherwise accorded to it.[25]
Jades testimony on the genuineness of the deceaseds signature on the checks-
exhibits of the Montinolas is clear:
xxx
Q: Showing to you this check dated July 16, 1989, Far East Bank and Trust
Company Check No. 84262, in the amount of P100,000.00, is this the
check you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There appears a signature in the face of the check. Whose signature is
this?
A: That is the signature of Mr. Sy.
Q: Why do you know that this is the signature of Mr. Sy?
A: Because he signed this check I was . . . I was present when he signed
this check.
xxx
Q: Showing to you this check dated September 8, 1989, is this the check
you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know that this is his signature?
A: I was there when he signed the same.
xxx
Q: Showing to you this Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No.
84262 dated July 6, 1989, in the amount of P50,000.00, in the name of
Eduardo Montinola, are you referring to this check?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Whose signature is this appearing on the face of this check?
A: Mr. Sys signature.
Q: Why do you know that it is his signature?
A: I was there when he signed the same.
x x x[26] (Emphasis supplied)
The genuineness of the deceaseds signature having been shown, he is prima
facie presumed to have become a party to the check for value, following Section 24
of the Negotiable Instruments Law which reads:
Since, with respect to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the prima
facie presumption was not rebutted or contradicted by the administratrix who
expressly manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence
against their claims, it has become conclusive.
As for the administratrixs invocation of the Dead Mans Statute, the same does
not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their
assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
xxx
The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so
as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not
included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a
conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no
active part therein.
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose
behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In
transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are
commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be
excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties,
there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will
be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the
Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidencethe
checks.
As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of
Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each others claim against the deceased are
not covered by the Dead Mans Statute;[28] besides, the administratrix waived the
application of the law when she cross-examined them.
The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals
in its decision on review, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest,
from testifying in each others favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the
deceased.
But Sansons and Celedonias claims against the same estate arose from separate
transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonias claim. And
Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sansons claim. One is not thus
disqualified to testify on the others transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Mans Statute proscribes is the admission
of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the
deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony.[29] Since the
separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-
documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
This brings this Court to the matter of the authenticity of the signature of the
deceased appearing on the checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia. By Celedonias
account, she knows the signature of the deceased.
xxx
Q: Showing to you these checks already marked as Exhibit A to E, please
go over these checks if you know the signatures of the late Juan Bon
Fing Sy? on these checks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Insofar as the amount that he borrowed from you, he also issued checks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And therefore, you know his signature?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x[30]
Sanson testified too that he knows the signature of the deceased:
xxx
Q: I show you now checks which were already marked as Exhibit A to G-1
Saquin, please go over this if these are the checks that you said was
issued by the late Juan Bon Fing Sy in favor of your sister?
A: Yes, these are the same che[c]ks.
Q: Do you know the signature of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And these signatures are the same signatures that you know?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x[31]
While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully
discharged the quantum of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence which reads:
not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a
comparison[32] with the naked eye of the deceaseds signature appearing on each of
the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas with that of the checks-exhibits of the
Sanson siblings all of which checks were drawn from the same account, they
appear to have been affixed by one and the same hand.
In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence,
substantiated their claims against the estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence
had shifted to the administratrix who, however, expressly opted not to discharge
the same when she manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of
evidence against the claims.
WHEREFORE, the impugned May 31, 1996 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and another rendered ordering the intestate estate of
the late Juan Bon Fing Sy, through Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, to pay:
1) Felicito G. Sanson, the amount of P603,500.00;
2) Celedonia S. Saquin, the amount of P315.000.00;[33]
3) Angeles Montinola, the amount of P150,000.00; and
4) Eduardo Montinola, Jr., the amount of P50,000.00.
representing unsettled checks issued by the deceased.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito
D. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant
alleged that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of
public document against her, a former client, based on confidential information
gained from their attorney-client relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards while respondent is a
Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).[1]
Complainants husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled Ruben G. Mercado
v. Rosa C. Francisco, for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial
court, and the dismissal became final and executory on July 15, 1992.[2]
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On
February 7, 1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as
collaborating counsel for complainant.[3]
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of
Counsel,[4] informing the RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel
for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action
against complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled
Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado, and docketed as I.S. No.
PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public
document) of the Revised Penal Code.[5] Respondent alleged that complainant
made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and
Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said
Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and
that their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally
married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied
using any other name than Rosa F. Mercado. She also insisted that she has gotten
married only once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that
are pending before or decided upon by other tribunals (1) libel suit before the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City;[6] (2) administrative case for dishonesty,
grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, pursuit of
private business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil
Service rules and regulations, and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, before the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and
Corruption;[7] (3) complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service before the Office of the Ombudsman,
where he was found guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month
suspension without pay;[8] and, (4) the Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2)
of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before the
Sandiganbayan.[9]
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of
public document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and
information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent
Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action
against respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification,
respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client
relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where
he alleged that the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and
irrelevant because all the allegations leveled against him are subject of separate
fact-finding bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not
grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven
otherwise.[10] He also states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty
of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month
without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found
guilty, only of simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith.[11]
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the
falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and
in no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of
respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to him
as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was
said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two
daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are
accessible to anyone.[12]
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[13]
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but
complainant failed to appear in both. Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R.
Datiles thus granted respondents motion to file his memorandum, and the case was
submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.[14]
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of
investigating commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the
rule on privileged communication between attorney and client, and recommending
his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and
recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She
stated that after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for
those who have wronged her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various
criminal and administrative cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the
tribunals where these cases are pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the
respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the
complaint or desistance by the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief
Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment
proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for
falsification of public document against his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client
and the rule on attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is
in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special
powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly
confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and
confidential nature that is required by necessity and public interest.[15] Only by
such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his
confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal
advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of
justice.[16] Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a
client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount
importance to the administration of justice.[17] One rule adopted to serve this
purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his clients
secrets or confidence and not to abuse them.[18] Thus, the duty of a lawyer to
preserve his clients secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-
client relationship,[19] and continues even after the clients death.[20] It is the glory of
the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a man
may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights
in any litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyers tongue is tied from ever
disclosing it.[21] With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his
attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the ascertainment and
enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the clients cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the
factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be
waived.[22]
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31
January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2
March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed
the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May
2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court
in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The
RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC):
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or
city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months
prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he
may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section
5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any
of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife,"
in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their
marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition
of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a
right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of
Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to
void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides
that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be
absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of
Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a
bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-
existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to
nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article
413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree
of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or
annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries
in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage"
and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to
cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to
annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court
"gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper
venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the
concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to
dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative
to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have
"immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding
because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the
other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only
said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal
of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x
x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza
v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in
Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has
no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such
as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional
ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification
against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under
Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate
dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the
petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated
through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected
that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one
in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity
of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree,
in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil
status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure
to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons"
in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words,
"[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese
Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand,
Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in
a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
I.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its
provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will
litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were
reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original
cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent
with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution
of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3
of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant
to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence
such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As
noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse
not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the
right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a
spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under
Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the
substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any
case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by
limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized
by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the
wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the
one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from
the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which
penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution
for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of
nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue
on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only
share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the
suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as
the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially
declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this
Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the
petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define
the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference
between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the
option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or
her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and
(2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the
foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by
default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already
"presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent
event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the
civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of
the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1âwphi1
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to
address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under
Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and
the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107,
Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
Spouses Meliton Grabiles and Leona Calderon (the Grabiles) were the original
registered owners of a 2,933-square-meter lot in Rosario, La Union.[1] After a
number of successive transfers the lot was eventually sold to petitioner Baguio
Trinity Developers, Inc. on January 3, 1994, resulting in the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title T-38340 in its name.
It appears, however, that in 1985 Anastacio Laroco and Leona Javier filed a
reconstitution proceeding before Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Agoo, La Union, covering the Grabiles original title. But for some reasons, the
RTCs order of October 20, 1986 directed the reconstitution of the title in the name
of one Maria Bernal. This order was annotated on the Grabiles Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) 1082 issued by the Register of Deeds of La Union.
Three years later from the time the RTC dismissed the complaint or on
December 20, 2007 petitioner Baguio Trinity filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of the reconstitution orders that the RTC of Agoo, Branch 31, issued on
October 20, 1986 and October 28, 1986, impleading the Ramos and Nepa heirs.
Baguio Trinity claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to order reconstitution for
the Grabiles title since this was not lost. Further, the Grabiles could not have
authorized anyone to institute the proceedings on their behalf since they had been
long dead. Thus, the orders should be annulled for lack of jurisdiction.
On May 8, 2008 the CA[3] dismissed the petition on the grounds that it failed to
attach a) a certified copy of the RTC Order dated October 20, 1986, and b) copies
of the affidavits of witnesses and the documents, and the pleadings filed during the
reconstitution proceedings, the notices of hearing, and the titles issued to
petitioners predecessors-in-interest in support of petitioners cause of action.
Further, petitioner paid insufficient docket fees.
Petitioner Baguio Trinity filed a motion for reconsideration and attached a copy of
the affidavit of Cresencio Aspiras, their immediate predecessor, together with
copies of reconstituted titles issued to previous owners to show the chain of
ownership before Baguio Trinity acquired title to the property. It also paid the
deficiency in the docket fees and explained that a certified true copy of the assailed
Order cannot be obtained because the records were destroyed during the July 16,
1990 earthquake per RTC Certification of November 14, 2007.
But the CA denied petitioners motion of November 7, 2008, citing Section 4, par. 2
of Rule 47 which provides that a certified copy of the judgment or final order shall
be attached to the original copy of the petition. The mandatory tenor of the
requirement, said the CA, precluded Baguio Trinitys submission of some other
copy of such judgment or final order.
In any event, the CA held that the petition was barred by laches since Baguio
Trinity had notice of the reconstitution orders as early as 1995 when it filed an
action (the first that it filed) for declaration of nullity of titles and damages before
the MTC, a wrong court. Baguio Trinity filed its action to annul the orders of
reconstitution with the CA only on December 21, 2007 or 12 years after that court
affirmed the RTC order dismissing the complaint (the second action filed) before
the RTC of Agoo, Branch 32.
Because the CA denied petitioner Baguio Trinitys motion for reconsideration of its
ruling in its resolution of April 24, 2009, petitioner has taken recourse to this
Court.
The Issue
The only issue before this Court is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing
petitioner Baguio Trinitys action for annulment of judgment a) by reason of its
failure to comply with the requirement of submission of certified true copies of the
assailed RTC orders; and b) on ground of laches.
One. In denying the petition before it, one of the grounds the CA gave was
that petitioner Baguio Trinity failed to attach to its petition for annulment of
judgment a certified copy of the judgment or final order, which requirement is
mandatory. Without it, the court would have no bases to form a decision. Besides,
said the CA, petitioner could have obtained a certified copy of the same from the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) which is usually furnished a copy, just as
petitioner was able to secure a copy of the October 28, 1986 Order from the
LRA. The Register of Deeds is also usually furnished a copy of such order.
Evidently, when Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provided that a
certified copy of the judgment or final order or resolution shall be attached to the
original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the
petitioner, it wanted to ensure that the Court is shown a genuine copy of the
challenged judgment or final order before it acts on the petition.
The Court is aware of the necessity of mandating strict compliance with procedural
rules. Here, however, the 1990 earthquake resulted in the loss or destruction of the
RTC records of the case. The administration of justice cannot stop to grind because
of such loss and no one should suffer or benefit from it.
And who can issue a certified copy of the lost orders? The answer is that it can be
issued by the public officer in custody of the original of the document. [4] Here, it is
the clerk of court of the RTC that issued the challenged reconstitution orders. But
the clerk of court issued a certification, conformably with Section 28 of Rule 132,
that the relevant records are no longer available having been lost to an
earthquake. That the record custodian could no longer issue a certified copy should
not of course prevent an aggrieved party from pursuing his petition. The rules
allow such party to submit appropriate secondary evidence.
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence provides that when the original
document has been lost and its unavailability has been established, a party may
prove its contents by a copy or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Copies of the
challenged reconstitution orders from the LRA or the Register of Deeds are of
course available to petitioner Baguio Trinity. But it could just as validly submit
faithful copies of its challenged reconstitution orders, authenticated by a verified
statement that these are copies of the original orders. The Baguio Trinity
did. Consequently, the CA had no valid reason denying its petition for failure to
attach a copy of the assailed reconstitution orders.
Notably, the respondent Ramos and Nepa heirs have not questioned the
authenticity of the submitted copies. At any rate, the Court notes that petitioner
Baguio Trinity attached certified machine copies of the assailed Orders supplied by
the LRA as annexes to the present petition.
Two. The CA also dismissed petitioners action for annulment of final orders on the
further ground that such action is already barred by laches. The CA pointed out
that petitioner Baguio Trinity learned of the reconstitution orders as early as
1995. Still, the action for the annulment of those orders was filed only 12 years
later on December 21, 2007.
The RTC of Agoo ordered the reconstitution of the Grabiles title when, if
Baguio Trinitys allegations were to be believed, the original of such title actually
existed and had since been replaced through subsequent sales, terminating their
ownership of the property. As things now stand, two sets of titles covering the
same property, one based on transactions emanating from the original and another
based on the reconstituted titles exist. One has to give way to the other.
Petitioner Baguio Trinity initially brought an action to annul the
reconstituted versions of the Grabiles title before the MTC of Rosario, La Union,
on September 14, 1995 but that court dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction
and opined that it should be filed with the RTC.
Baguio Trinity finally filed before the CA an action for annulment of the
reconstitution orders on the ground that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to issue
them. It is not right for the CA to dismiss such action by reason of laches simply
because no inaction is evident on Baguio Trinitys part. In fact, it had been an
unintentional object of relay between the lower courts which contributed to the
delay in the proceedings.
The petition for annulment alleged serious charges which if true can
invalidate respondents title. Such title had been subjected to two reconstitution
proceedings that could have divested the true owner of title over his property. The
conflict between the two sets of titles has to be resolved. The present standoff
cannot remain indefinitely under a titling system that assures the existence of only
one valid title for every piece of registered land. Evidently, laches cannot bar an
action sought to relieve such intolerable standoff.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and sets aside the Court of
Appeals Resolutions dated May 8, 2008 and November 7, 2008 and directs such
court to hear and decide the merits of the petition for annulment of judgment.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
REYES, JJ.
BONIFACIO NATIVIDAD,
represented by PHILIP M.
NATIVIDAD,
Respondent. Promulgated:
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
dated 20 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 82160 affirming with modification
the Decision[2] of Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, in Civil Case No. 1165-G and its Resolution[3] dated 16 April 2007 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Subsequently, a case for Partition with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 781-
G, was filed before the RTC of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33, by Tirso Medina
against the co-owners of Lot 1199, among whom are Gorgonio Medina and
Bonifacio Natividad. Bonifacio Natividad had likewise already bought the share of
Dominica Medina in the land.
The parties entered into a compromise agreement which they submitted to the
Court. On 20 November 1989, the RTC approved the agreement and rendered its
decision based on the same.[6] The Compromise Agreement as quoted by the Court
reads:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
xxxx
On 8 October 1991, the trial court issued an order supplementing its decision
dated 20 November 1989 which reads in part:
Lot 1199-A with an area of 371 sq. ms., which lot now corresponds to
Lot No. 4 adjudicated to Tirso Medina;
Lot 1199-B with an area of 371 sq. ms., which lot now corresponds to
Lot No. 5 adjudicated to Pacifico Ruiz;
Lot 1199-C with an area of 371 sq. ms., which lot now
corresponds to Lot No. 6 adjudicated to Gorgonio Medina;
Lot 1199-D with an area of 482 sq. ms., which lot now
corresponds to Lot No. 1 adjudicated to Bonifacio Natividad;
Lot 1199-E with an area of 372 sq. ms., which lot now
corresponds to Lot No. 2 adjudicated to Heirs of Maria Medina; and
Lot 1199-F with an area of 372 sq. ms., which lot now
corresponds to Lot No. 3 adjudicated to Vivencio M. Ruiz; that in this
subdivision made by the geodetic engineer, there was no change in the
designation of the particular places adjudicated to the parties, except
the change in areas allotted after the actual survey made.
WHEREFORE, finding the motion to be in order, the Court
resolves to grant the same and hereby orders, that:
Bonifacio, thru Philip, filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars[12] praying that
an order be issued by the court directing Abiel Medina and Veronica de Guzman to
give the names and present addresses of all the heirs of Gorgonio Medina. Said
motion was opposed.[13] In an order dated 15 October 2001, the trial court granted
the motion.[14]Defendants complied with the courts order and submitted the names
and addresses of all the heirs of Gorgonio Medina.[15]
On 7 January 2002, Bonifacio filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Complaint with prayer that summons upon eight heirs be made through
publication.[16] The Amended Complaint impleaded all the heirs of Gorgonio
Medina (petitioners herein). In said amended complaint, a special power of
attorney[17] dated 21 September 2001allegedly executed by Bonifacio Natividad in
the State of Washington, United States of America, and acknowledged before
Phyllis Perry, a Notary Public of the State of Washington, USA, was attached
authorizing Philip Natividad to:
In an Order dated[18] 30 January 2002, the trial court approved the motion
and admitted the Amended Complaint. It directed the issuance of the
corresponding summons, the same to be published in a newspaper of general
circulation for three consecutive weeks. As to plaintiffs authority to sue, the trial
court ruled that said issue had been settled by the special power of attorney
attached to the Amended Complaint.
During the Pre-Trial, the parties stipulated the following facts and issues:
b. TCT No. 230248 came into being by virtue of the decision in Civil
Case No. 781-G, a case of partition among Gorgonio Medina and his
co-heirs decided by RTC Branch 33.
d. The land subject of the deed of sale is not the one covered by TCT
No. 230248.
Issues:
1. Whether the deed of sale of sale may be given effect
notwithstanding the fact that the subject thereof is different from the
portion covered by TCT No. 230248.
The parties manifested that after they shall have filed their respective memoranda,
the case shall be submitted for decision.
In its decision dated 10 December 2003, the trial court ruled in favor of Bonifacio
Natividad. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
On the issue of Philip Natividads authority to represent his father, the court ruled
that it was convinced that Philip was authorized to represent his father by virtue of
a notarized special power of attorney executed by Bonifacio attached to the
amended complaint. It explained that the document was a public document as
defined under Section 20, paragraph (a) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the
same having been notarized by a notary public for the State of Washington,
USA. In the absence of any evidence to show that said special power of attorney
was falsified, it was sufficient authority for Mr. Natividad to represent his father.
The trial court likewise ruled that the deed of absolute sale executed by Gorgonio
Medina in favor of Bonifacio Natividad may be given effect notwithstanding the
fact that the portion of Lot 1199 specified as its object was different from the
portion adjudicated to Gorgonio Medina. It declared that the 1/3 portion of the land
covered by TCT No. NT-230248 shall be deemed the object of the deed of sale. It
agreed with Bonifacio that what was sold by Gorgonio Medina to him (Bonifacio)
was his share, right and participation in the land known as Lot 1199. At the time of
the sale, Lot 1199 was not yet divided. Gorgonio Medina specified a portion
of Lot 1199, expecting that portion to be adjudicated to him, but his expectation
did not materialize because a different portion was adjudicated to him during the
partition. It added that justice demanded that a portion of what was adjudicated to
him be considered as the object of the deed of sale.
The trial court further ruled that prescription and laches did not set in. Since there
was an express trust created between Gorgonio Medina and Bonifacio Natividad,
the action to compel the defendants to convey the property to Bonifacio did not
prescribe. It explained that it is only when the trustee repudiates the trust that the
prescriptive period of 10 years commences to run. In the instant case, Gorgonio
Medina (trustee) repudiated the trust on 5 July 1993 when TCT No. NT-230248
was issued in his name. Thus, the filing of the complaint on 11 June 2001 was well
within the ten-year prescriptive period.
On 20 November 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court. It disposed of the case as follows:
The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court, but ruled that the trust
established between the parties was an implied or constructive trust, and not an
express trust. It added that what should be conveyed to Bonifacio Natividad was
only 1/3 of 270 square meters or 90 square meters, and not 1/3 of 371 square
meters since what was sold to him was only a part of one of the two portions
owned by Gorgonio Medina in the entire lot. Finally, it declared that the contention
that the Complaint should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action,
considering that the Special Power of Attorney executed abroad by Bonifacio
Natividad in favor of his son was not properly authenticated before a consular
officer, put a premium on technicalities at the expense of substantial
justice. Litigation, it said, should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits
and not on technicalities.
Among the issues raised by petitioners the last is what we shall first
tackle. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals committed a very grave error
in not finding that the respondent was without any cause of action. Petitioners
argue:
Not being the real party in interest, and being deemed to have
brought the action on his own, Philip M. Natividad has no cause of
action.[32]
The trial court was convinced that Philip Natividad was authorized by his father
(Bonifacio) in this case by virtue of the special power of attorney that the latter
issued. The special power of attorney, it claims, is a public document, the same
having been notarized by a notary public of the State of Washington, USA. It said
that there being no evidence showing that said document had been falsified, the
same was sufficient authority for Philip to represent his father. The Court of
Appeals considered the fact that the special power of attorney was not properly
authenticated before a consular office to be a mere technicality and could not be
the basis for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action.
On his part, respondent said the notarized special power of attorney which
he appended to the complaint is a public document. It carries with it the
presumption of regularity and any suspicion on the authenticity and due execution
thereof cannot stand against said presumption absent evidence which is clear and
convincing.
Considering that the record of the case does not disclose any
compliance with the provisions of Section 25, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court on the part of the petitioner, the special power of attorney in
question is not admissible in evidence. As such, Mrs. Priscilla L. Ty
cannot lawfully prosecute the case against the private respondents in
the name of her principal as her authority through a special power of
attorney had not been duly established in evidence. The litigation was
not commenced by the real party-in-interest or by one duly authorized
by the said party.
This being so, the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals never acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the real party-in-interest Angelita Lopez. For lack of the
requisite jurisdiction, all the proceedings in the said courts are null
and void ab initio. All proceedings therein should be and are hereby
set aside.
In the case under consideration, the supposed special power of attorney involved
was executed and acknowledged before Phyllis Perry, a Notary Public of the State
of Washington, USA. This being the case, a certification or authentication, as
required by Section 25 (now Section 24), Rules of Court, by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
any other officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office, is
required. A notary public in a foreign country is not one of those who can issue the
required certificate.
The records are bereft of evidence showing that there was compliance with Section
25 (now Section 24). Non-compliance therewith will render the special power of
attorney not admissible in evidence. Not being duly established in evidence, the
special power of attorney cannot be used by Philip Natividad to represent his
father, Bonifacio Natividad, in this legal action against the petitioners. It is thus
clear that this case was not filed by the real party-in-interest (Bonifacio) or by one
duly authorized by said party. Not being a real party-in-interest and sans the
authority to pursue the case, Philip Natividad could not have validly commenced
this case. The special power of attorney executed before a notary public in a
foreign country without the requirements mentioned in Section 25 (now Section
24) of the Rules of Court cannot be admitted in evidence before Philippine courts.
Both lower courts and respondents contention that the lack of consular
authentication is a mere technicality that can be brushed aside in order to uphold
substantial justice, is untenable. The failure to have the special power of attorney
authenticated is not merely a technicality -- it is a question of
jurisdiction. In Lopez, we pronounced that jurisdiction over the person of the real
party-in-interest was never acquired by the courts. As a result, all proceedings in
the lower courts were declared null and void ab initio and thus set aside.
In the case before us, the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Bonifacio Natividad. Following our
pronouncement in Lopez, all proceedings before these courts are voided and set
aside. In light of this, we find no need to discuss the other issues raised.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
Appellee,
Members:
PUNO, Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
ELIZAR TOMAQUIN,
x--------------------------------------------------------
---x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Once again, the Court is confronted with the issue of the admissibility of an
extrajudicial confession. This appeal particularly involves the question of whether
a barangaycaptain who is a lawyer can be considered an independent counsel
within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
saying he has a headache. At the behest of Rico Magdasal, the group transferred to
Lorega proper. A few minutes later, they heard Rustica Isogan shouting for help as
the latter heard Jaquelyn[3] Tatoy, her goddaughter, asking for help. Isogan got two
flashlights and they proceeded upstairs to Jaquelyns house. The first to go up was a
certain Moises, followed by the brothers Rico and Romy Magdasal, while Noel
and Cardo remained downstairs. Rico noticed that the hinge and the walling of the
main door were damaged, as if it were kicked open, and only the light in the
kitchen was turned on. Rico also saw a black shoe on the stairs and another in
the sala, which he claims belong to appellant. When they went into the kitchen,
they saw Jaquelyn bloodied and sprawled face-up on the floor, with her head inside
a plastic container. Jaquelyn was brought to the hospital, where she expired. A
neighbor later found a tres cantos with blood on it by the stairs, which Rico also
identified to be appellants.[4] A certain Rey got the black pair of shoes and tres
cantosfor safekeeping which were later turned over to Policeman Tariao of the
Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station. The person who turned over the objects
to Policeman Tariao was not identified.[5]
...
Pangutana: Palihog isulti ang imong ngalan inong man ang tanan nga
circumstacia o rmay kalambigitan sa imong pagkatawo,
sa imong grado, imong trabaho, imong pinuy-anan ug
uban pa?
Tubag: Ako si Elizar Tomaquin kinsa nagdala sa bansagon o apelyedo
sa akong mama sanglit dili man kasado and akong mama
ug papa. Ang apelyedo sa akong papa, Cabagui ug and
akon angga Hapon. Ako 19 anyos ang panuigon, ulitawo
ug kasamtangan nga nagpuyo sa Brgy Lorega proper
duol sa kapilaya San Roque apan ako lumad nga taga Bo.
Tunga, Moalboal, Cebu diin didto ano nakatungha sa
grade six.
Pangutana: Kinign nia karon dinhi nga sapatos itom nga nakuha didto
so hagdan sa balay nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy human siya
nakit-i nga patay, unsa may imong ikasulti niini?
Tubag: Mao kana ang akong sapatos nga nabiyaan didto sa ilang
hagdan human sa hitabo ug gain sa akong pagdagan
akong napatiran kadtong ilang container.
On the witness stand, appellant did not deny that he had a drinking spree
with Rico Magdasal and three other persons. His version of the incident is that it
was Rico who committed the crime and not him. Appellant testified that Rico
asked his help in stealing the television set from the Tatoys residence. When
Jacquelyn saw them, she ran towards the kitchen but she did not reach it as Rico
had stabbed her on the back with the tres cantos. Appellant claims that it was Rico
who owns the tres cantos, as well as the pair of shoes, left inside Tatoys
house. Afraid of what happened, appellant went home to Wilson Magdasals house
and slept there. He was awakened the next morning by barangaytanod Julius
Yosores who kicked him. Yosores also boxed and poked a gun at him. Appellant
claims that Rico and Edgar Magdasal maltreated him in the presence
of barangaycaptain Atty. Fortunato Parawan when he was brought to the latters
house. He was made to admit committing the crime because Rico has a family
while he is single.[10]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 18) (RTC for
brevity) rendered its decision on October 24, 1997, convicting appellant of the
crime of Murder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations,
accused Elizar Tomaquin is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPERTUA, with the accessory penalties of the law;
to indemnify the heirs of Jaquelyn Tatoy in the sum of P50,000.00 and
to pay the costs. The accused is, however, credited in full during the
whole period of his detention provided he will signify in writing that
he will abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The rule is that when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any
language other than the official language (Filipino or English), if there is an appeal,
that exhibit should be translated by the official interpreter of the court, or a
translation should be agreed upon by the parties, and both original and translation
sent to this court.[14] In this case, there is no official translation of appellants
extrajudicial confession in the Filipino or English language. If the Court were to
strictly follow the rule, then appellants extrajudicial confession should not have
been admitted by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
Nevertheless, considering that appellant did not interpose any objection
thereto, and the parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned
appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document
was written,[15] such extrajudicial confession was appropriately considered by the
trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
As stated at the outset, the crucial issue in this case is whether or not the
extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, with the assistance of Atty.
Fortunato Parawan, is admissible in evidence against him. There is no need at this
point to secure an official translation of the confession to English.
...
Simply put, Atty. Parawan, as barangay captain, is called upon to enforce the law
and ordinances in his barangay and ensure peace and order at all times.
In People vs. Culala,[18] the Court reiterated the rule that a municipal
attorney cannot be an independent counsel because as a legal officer of the
municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the
municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including
the maintenance of peace and order, and it was seriously doubted whether he can
effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of
interests. Thus, the Court held that he is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who
cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations.[19]
This is reiterated in People vs. Taliman,[20] and People vs. Velarde,[21] where
we further ruled that a municipal mayor cannot likewise be an independent counsel
as required by the Constitution.
Q When you said Cap what did he mean by that word Cap.
A Being a Barangay Captain.
Q After the accused told you that you were his counsel of
choice. What did you do next if any?
A I informed Elizar Tomaquin that do you know what will be the
implication of your admission, you will be imprisoned.
Q After you asked him whether he knew of the implication of his
confession that could be because of that confession. What was
his reaction?
A Yes Cap. I know. And then I told him as follows: Because of this
confession you will be imprisoned.
Q And what did he say after you told him again that if he would
execute that affidavit of confession he would surely be
imprisoned?
A No I even continue that why did he do that?
Q But did you stay there until the whole taking of the confession was
over?
A Yes I was there in the presence of two persons coming from my
Barangay.
...
Q When you arrived and saw Mr. Monilar with the accused as an
Attorney did you immediately inquire what had happened
before you arrived like; Did you start the investigation? did you
inquire from that from Mr. Monilar?
A He was already preparing this top portion here.
INTERPRETER:
...
Q And that means to say that when he prepared this from the top most
portion to that portion immediately right before the typewritten
name Elizar Tomaquin and Atty. Fortunato Parawan you were
not around. Correct?
A I was not around but we have already a conversation earlier with
Monilar.[26]
Records also show that appellant was presented to SPO2 Monilar in the
morning of December 16, 1996. When appellant intimated that he was willing to
confess and requested the presence of Atty. Parawan, SPO2 Monilar called up
Atty. Parawan and informed him of appellants decision. Atty. Parawan arrived at
the Ramos Police Station only at 2:00 in the afternoon.[27] By the time Atty.
Parawan arrived, the investigation had already started and SPO2 Monilar had
already asked and elicited information from appellant. Worse, Atty. Parawan
merely observed during the entire investigation and failed to advise or explain to
appellant the questions being propounded by SPO2 Monilar. He did not even
bother to ask appellant if the extrajudicial confession he was about to execute was
being voluntarily given.
...
Q You are telling this Court now Atty. Parawan that before the
Barangay Tanods could explain to you the circumstances of his
arrest you already started to ask questions like; Why did you
have blood in your pants. Where is your t-shirt you
wore. Where did you get that information since you were not in
the house of Jaqueline Tatoy when she was killed?
A It was like this. I heard that the victim suffered multiple stab
wounds. So when I saw blood stains with all probability it
might come from the victim. It was conclusion something like
when I saw that t-shirt stained with blood.
Q So you mean to this Court that you already reached the conclusion
of mine (sic) that Elizar Tomaquin one of your constituents in
the Barangay was already on your conclusion in mine (sic) the
killer of Jacquilyn Tatoy before your tanods turned it over to
the police for investigation. Is that what you are telling Atty.
Parawan?
A It is somewhat like that. That is why I ordered my tanod to bring
him to the Homicide.[28]
The Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively
safeguarded appellants rights as an accused during the investigation when he
himself entertained the suspicion that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, and
naturally, he would want appellant to admit having committed it.
It was posited that appellant cannot challenge Atty. Parawans qualification
as a competent and independent counsel because he was his choice.
...
Q But as experienced attorney you know very well that when you
assist a suspect in the police station and the circumstances he
was arrested the best assistance a lawyer could give is would be
to tell the accused to remain silent. Would you agree?
...
A It did not occur to my mine (sic) that time.[31]
In this regard, it may not be amiss to repeat the declaration of the Court
in People vs. Deniega,[32] stressing the role of the courts in ascertaining that
extrajudicial confessions meet the exacting standards of the Constitution:
For one, appellants act of leaving the drinking session at 1:00 in the morning
does not establish appellants whereabouts at the time the crime was
committed. There is nothing in the testimony of Rico Magdasal and the other
prosecution witnesses that will show if appellant indeed went to Jaquelyns house
after he left the group. No one saw him enter or leave her residence. If at all, what
was proved is that appellant was found by the barangay tanods sleeping at home in
the afternoon of the same day.
Prosecution witness Armando Zabate testified that the pair of black shoes
and tres cantos were given to a certain Rey for safekeeping. These were later
turned over to a Policeman Tariao of the Ramos Police Station. Zabate, however,
did not identify the person who turned over the objects to the police.[36] There was
no showing who turned over those articles to the police and Rey was not presented
to identify if these were the same pair of shoes and tres cantos found in Jaquelyns
house and turned over to the police.Policeman Tariao was not called to the witness
stand so as to confirm if those articles were the same evidence turned over to him
and later presented in court. Ordinarily, it would not be indispensable for the
prosecution to allege and prove every single fact of the case. But in this case, the
pieces of evidence are crucial to the prosecutions case. Also, the fact that a civilian
obtained and received the evidence, the possibility that the integrity of these
articles could have been compromised cannot be ignored. The Court even noted
that during his direct examination, SPO2 Monilar was confused as to whether the
pair of shoes presented in court was the same ones that were turned over to the
police. It turned out that the marking he made on the shoes were washed off
because at one time, the shoes fell in the canal located in front of the police station
and they had to clean and wash the shoes![37] Such sloppy handling renders the
chain of custody of those pieces of evidence dubious, and damaging to the
prosecutions case.
And even if appellant did own the pair of shoes and tres cantos, the fact that
it was found in the scene of the crime merely proved that he was in the residence of
Jaquelyn at some point in time. But it does not prove when particularly he was
there, his authorship of the crime or his motive for being
there. While the motive of an accused in a criminal case is generally held to be
immaterial, not being an element of the crime, motive becomes important when, as
in this case, the evidence of the commission of the crime is purely
circumstantial.[38]
The Court also has serious misgivings on the probative value of the
white sando shirt that appellant was allegedly wearing at the time of stabbing
Jaquelyn, which Edgar Magdasal later found bloodstained among the soiled
clothes.
First, when appellant was asked by the barangay tanods about the shirt he
was wearing, he told them that it was in Wilson Magdasals house. According
to barangay tanodArmando Zabate, it was Edgar Magdasal who found the shirt,
somewhat wet and bloody, among the soiled clothes.[42] Edgar Magdasal, however,
was not presented to testify as to where he found the shirt, the state the shirt was in
when he found it, and how he knew that it was the shirt worn by appellant.
The same ruling applies with regard to the bloodstains found on the tres
cantos.
Appellant enjoys in his favor the presumption of innocence until the contrary
is proven. Proof of the guilt of the accused should not be tainted with
ambiguity. Although appellants defense is weak, conviction must come from the
strength of the prosecution's evidence and not from the weakness of the defense. In
this case, the prosecutions evidence is not strong enough to justify a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[46] Acquittal, therefore, is inevitable.
SO ORDERED.
Supreme Court
BaguioCity
FIRST DIVISION
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA,C.J.,Chairperson,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR.,JJ.
Promulgated:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must rigidlytest the States evidence
of guilt in order to ensure that such evidenceadheres to the basic rules of
admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such
evidence. Nothing less is demanded of the judge; otherwise, the guarantee of due
process of law is nullified.The accused need notadduceanythingto rebut evidence
that is discredited for failing the test.Acquittal should then follow.
Antecedents
That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997 and
for sometime prior thereto, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being then a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.,
Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total sum
of P131,286.97 from several customers of said company under the
express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver
the collection to the said company, but far from complying with her
obligation and after a reasonable period of time despite repeated
demands therefore, and with intent to defraud the said company, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the
said collection to the said company but instead, did, then and there
willfully unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid amount
of P131,286.97.
Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the information. At pre-
trial, no stipulation of factswas had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea
bargaining.Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecutions first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was
the branch manager of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc. (Footluckers) in
Dumaguete City since October 8, 1994; that petitioner was an employee of
Footluckers, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she became a sales representative;
that as a sales representative she was authorized to take orders from wholesale
customers coming from different towns (like Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia,
Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect
payments from them; that she could issue and sign official receipts of Footluckers
for the payments, which she would then remit; that she would then submit the
receipts for the payments for tallying and reconciliation; that at first her volume of
sales was quite high, but later on dropped, leading him to confront her; that she
responded that business was slow; that he summoned the accounting clerk to
verify; that the accounting clerk discovered erasures on some collection receipts;
that he decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan;
that he learned from a customer of petitioners that the customers outstanding
balance had already been fully paid although that balance appeared unpaid in
Footluckers records; and that one night later on, petitioner and her parents went to
his house to deny having misappropriated any money of Footluckers and to plead
for him not to push through with a case against her, promising to settle her account
on a monthly basis; and that she did not settle after that, but stopped reporting to
work.[2]
The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan,
whomFootluckers employed as its store auditor since November 16, 1995 until her
resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go had requested her to audit
petitioner after some customers had told him that they had already paid their
accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstandingbalances for them; that
she first conducted her audit by going to the customers in places from Mabinay to
Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor; thatshe discovered in the
course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in
the possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the
duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that upon
completing her audit, she submittedto Go a written report denominated as List of
Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in
Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997 marked as Exhibit A; and
that based on the report, petitioner had misappropriated the total amount
ofP131,286.92.[3]
After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a
demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the intention to do so, and instead
rested itscase.The Prosecution and Defense submitted their respective memoranda,
and submitted the case for decision.[6]
On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted
not to present evidence for her defense the Prosecutions evidence remained
unrefuted and uncontroverted,[7]rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty
of estafa, to wit:
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC denied the motion
on May 7, 2004.[9]
Issues
Insisting that the RTCs judgment grossly violated [her] Constitutional and
statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her
because, while the charge against her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code, the evidence presented against her and upon which her
conviction was based, was falsification, an offense not alleged or included in the
Information under which she was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and that said
judgment likewise blatantly ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules on
admission of evidence in that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court
were all private documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not
proved in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
petitioner has directly appealed to the Court via petition for review on certiorari,
positing the following issues, to wit:
Ruling
Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her Constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation when: (a) it held that the
information did not have to allege her falsification of the duplicate receipts, and (b)
when it convicted her of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Codeby relying on the evidence on falsification.
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect when the
information was filed in the RTC, contained the following provisions on the proper
manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in the information, to
wit:
The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the
accusation in the informationshould never be taken for granted by the State. An
accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the
complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in
the complaint or information would be violative of the Constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.[11] Indeed, the accused cannot
be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or
necessarily included in the information filed against him.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(d) That the offended party made a demand on the offender for the
delivery or return of such money, goods or other personal
property.[12]
It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the
crime charged in the [i]nformation is merely [e]stafa and not
[e]stafa [t]hru [f]alsification of documents, the prosecution could
not prove falsification. Such argumentation is not correct. Since
the information charges accused only of misappropriation
pursuant to Art. 315, par. (1b) of the Revised [P]enal Code, the
Court holds that there is no necessity of alleging the falsification
in the Information as it is not an element of the crime charged.
II
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in the information?
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of
petitioner as Footluckers sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded
having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from
the customersor remitted by petitioner to Footluckers.This means that persons
other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives,
inclusive,and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the
receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers
corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of
the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries
effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the
veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners misappropriation or
conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that
opportunity rendered theentire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay,
and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and
untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made toSection 36
of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to
those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The
personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting
testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft
ofpersonal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose
because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a
witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the
extrajudicial source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the
information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined
and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony thendepends not upon
theveracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the
information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested because
the declarant is not standing in court as a witness andcannot, therefore, be cross-
examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter
into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile
any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that
she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the
burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.[19] Thus, the rule against hearsay
testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.[20] The testimony may have been given under oath and
before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.[21]
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is
offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor
becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as
evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-
examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to
prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted,
the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution
witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this
testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but
merely to show that the accused uttered those words.[22] This kind of utterance
ishearsay in character but is not legal hearsay.[23]The distinction is, therefore,
between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does
not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the
hearsay rule applies.[24]
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only
rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from
consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing
party to cross-examine the originaldeclarant claiming to have a direct knowledge
of the transaction or occurrence.[25]If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be
denied because the declarant is not in court.[26]It is then to be stressed that the right
to cross-examine the adverse partys witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is
essential to the administration of justice.
III
Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as evidence
Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite their being private
documents that were not duly authenticated as required by Section 20, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
have been admitted;[30] or (d) when the document is not being offered as
genuine.[31]
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not tally with
the original receipts, do you have copies of these receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but its not now in my
possession.
Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this Honorable
Court, can you assure this
(Next Page)
(Next Page)
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature rather,
of the accused in this case appears?
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.
ATTY. ABIERA:
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting the
original receipts Your Honor, because its quite voluminous,
so we will just forego with the testimony of the witness but
we will just present the same using the testimony of
another witness, for purposes of identifying the signature
of the accused. We will request that this signature which
has been identified to by the witness in this case be marked,
Your Honor, with the reservation to present the original
copy and present the same to offer as our exhibits but for the
meantime, this is only for the purposes of recording, Your
Honor, which we request the same, the receipt which has
just been identified awhile ago be marked as our Exhibit A
You Honor.
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit A.
ATTY. ABIERA:
And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit A-1.
(Next Page)
COURT:
Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. A-1. What is the number of
that receipt?
ATTY. ABIERA:
Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that: received
from Cirila Askin.[32]
xxx
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No.
20441was subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough Guivencan. However,the
Prosecution did not establishthat the signature appearing on Exhibit B was the
same signature that Go had earliersought to identify to be the signature of
petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy (Exhibit A). This is borne out by the
fact that the Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as the marking nomenclature for the
machine copyof the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 for all
intents and purposes of this case, and used the same nomenclature to referinstead
toan entirely differentdocument entitled List of Customers covered by ANA
LERIMA PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March 16-
20, 1997.
COURT:
ATTY. ZERNA:
(Next Page)
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
A. Yes.
A. Miss Patula.
A. Yes.
ATTY. ZERNA:
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit B-4 and the
signature as Exhibit B-4-a.
COURT:
Mark it.[33]
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
A.Yes.
A.Ms. Patula.
ATTY. DIEZ:
The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, office
record.
COURT:
WITNESS:
A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that and
showed it to the customers for confirmation.
COURT:
Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you copied
that amount in the ledger and you had it confirmed by the
customers, what was the result when you had it confirmed
by the customers?
WITNESS:
A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a balance
of P10,971.75.
Q. Do you have a-whats the basis of saying that the balance of this
customer is still P10,971.75
(Next Page)
ATTY. ZERNA (continuing):
COURT:
A. No, Maam.[35]
Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the original and
the duplicate, will you please enlighten the Honorable
Court on that discrepancy which you said?
A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully paid. Her
ledger shows a zero balance she has fully paid while in the
original
(Next page)
WITNESS (continuing):
COURT:
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing that it
has already a zero balance?
A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the original
receipt she has still a balance.
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
The confirmation sheet ---
COURT:
The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the receipt in
your earlier testimony? Is that what you referred to as the
receipts, the original receipts?
Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said showed that
that particular customer still has a balance of Ten Thousand
something?
Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered in the
ledger?
A. Yes.[36]
In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions evidence, it should
come as no surprise that petitioners counsel interposed timely objections. Yet, the
RTC mysteriously overruled the objections and allowedthe Prosecutionto present
the unauthenticated ledgers, as follows:
ATTY. ZERNA:
CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION
Q Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us several ledgers.
Where is it now?
A It is here.
Q Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina Cadilig, how
much is her account in your office?
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to answer the
question, let me interpose our objection on the ground
that this ledger has not been duly identified to by the
person who made the same. This witness will be
testifying on hearsay matters because the supposed
ledger was not identified to by the person who made the
same.
COURT:
Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I think they
were already duly identified by this witness. As a matter of
fact, it was she who brought them to court
(Next Page)
COURT (cont.):
ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the entries is
not this witness, Your Honor. How do we know that the
entries there is (sic) correct on the receipts submitted to
their office.
COURT:
Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that. Let the
witness answer.
WITNESS:
COURT:
ATTY. ZERNA:
She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she is the
auditor of Footluckers.
COURT:
I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where those
entries were taken. So, you answer the query of counsel.
xxx
ATTY. DIEZ:
COURT:
Q (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who prepared
the entries on those ledgers, is she still connected with
Footluckers?
COURT:
Alright proceed.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ZERNA:
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.[37]
The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment of the Prosecutions flawed
presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the instructions of the
rules earlier quoted, as well as withSection 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court,which contains instructions on how to prove the genuineness of a
handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as follows:
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the
execution or signing of the documents,the Prosecution surely did not
authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably with the
aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were
inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That was the onlyfair and just
result, as the Court held in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and
Wires Corporation:[38]
Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the application
of the hearsay rule by also terselystating that the ledgers were prepared in the
regular course of business.[40]Seemingly, the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping mannerof
justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to show
the concurrence of the several requisites before entries in the course of business
could be excepted from the hearsay rule. The requisites are as follows:
(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer;
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;
The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of every
criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the States evidence of guilt in order to
ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic rules of admissibility before
pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence. The
failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the guarantee of due of process of law
in favor of the accused, who had no obligation to prove her innocence. Heracquittal
should follow.
IV
the recoveryof any amount still owing in favor of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
Promulgated:
October 11, 2010
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN,
Respondent.
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DECISION
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from
employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the
probationary period.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a complaint[2] for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as
the local recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and
the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor
Arbiters decision by Resolution[4] of January 26, 2004. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration having been denied by Resolution [5] of April 22, 2004, they
appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry,
being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the
immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her
failure to meet the performance rating within the one-year period as required under
Kuwaits Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal should not be
liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.
By Decision[6] of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC
Resolution.
In brushing aside petitioners contention that they only acted as agent of the
Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the
appellate court noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall
assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of
an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign
principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
employment.
As to Ikdals liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic
Act No. 8042, the Migrant and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, corporate officers,
directors and partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and
solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for money claims and damages
awarded to overseas workers.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondents
employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed
by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it
was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor
Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding the present case.
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws
are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a government agency which is
immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held
jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more
so since the Ministrys liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction
was not acquired over it.
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to
protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.[9] Verily, to allow petitioners
to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the
judicial determination of the foreign principals liability before petitioner can be
held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the
parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their respective
obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they
must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party
invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
xxxx
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for
whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied)
Respecting Ikdals joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same
is in order too following the express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
MARISSA R. UNCHUAN, G.R. No. 172671
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus -
TINGA,
BRION, JJ.
ANTONIO J.P. LOZADA, ANITA LOZADA
and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF CEBU CITY, Promulgated:
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DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review are the Decision[1] dated February 23, 2006 and
Resolution[2] dated April 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No.
73829. The appellate court had affirmed with modification the Order[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 10 reinstating its
Decision[4] dated June 9, 1997.
Sisters Anita Lozada Slaughter and Peregrina Lozada Saribay were the
registered co-owners of Lot Nos. 898-A-3 and 898-A-4 covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 53258[5] and 53257[6] in Cebu City.
The sisters, who were based in the United States, sold the lots to their
nephew Antonio J.P. Lozada (Antonio) under a Deed of Sale[7] dated March 11,
1994. Armed with a Special Power of Attorney[8] from Anita, Peregrina went to
the house of their brother, Dr. Antonio Lozada (Dr. Lozada), located at 4356
Faculty Avenue, Long Beach California.[9] Dr. Lozada agreed to advance the
purchase price of US$367,000 or P10,000,000 for Antonio, his nephew. The Deed
of Sale was later notarized and authenticated at the Philippine Consuls Office. Dr.
Lozada then forwarded the deed, special power of attorney, and owners copies of
the titles to Antonio in the Philippines. Upon receipt of said documents, the latter
recorded the sale with the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Accordingly, TCT Nos.
128322[10] and 128323[11] were issued in the name of Antonio Lozada.
Pending registration of the deed, petitioner Marissa R. Unchuan caused the
annotation of an adverse claim on the lots. Marissa claimed that Anita donated an
undivided share in the lots to her under an unregistered Deed of
Donation[12] dated February 4, 1987.
Antonio and Anita brought a case against Marissa for quieting of title with
application for preliminary injunction and restraining order. Marissa for her part,
filed an action to declare the Deed of Sale void and to cancel TCT Nos. 128322 and
128323. On motion, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
For her part, Marissa testified that she accompanied Anita to the office of
Atty. Cresencio Tomakin for the signing of the Deed of Donation. She allegedly
kept it in a safety deposit box but continued to funnel monthly rentals to
Peregrinas account.
1. Plaintiff Antonio J.P. Lozada is declared the absolute owner of the properties
in question;
2. The Deed of Donation (Exh. 9) is declared null and void, and Defendant
Marissa R. Unchuan is directed to surrender the original thereof to the Court for
cancellation;
3. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is ordered to cancel the annotations of the
Affidavit of Adverse Claim of defendant Marissa R. Unchuan on TCT Nos. 53257 and
53258 and on such all other certificates of title issued in lieu of the aforementioned
certificates of title;
4. Defendant Marissa R. Unchuan is ordered to pay Antonio J.P. Lozada and
Anita Lozada Slaughter the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages; exemplary damages
of P50,000.00; P50,000.00 for litigation expenses and attorneys fees of P50,000.00; and
SO ORDERED.[13]
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND VIOLATED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS WHEN IT FAILED TO RESOLVE PETITIONERS THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR.
II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT MAY AND SHOULD REVIEW THE
CONFLICTING FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN ITS
OWN DECISION AND RESOLUTIONS ON THE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION, AND
THAT OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.
III.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF
DONATION EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER IS VOID.
V.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT ANITA
LOZADAS VIDEOTAPED STATEMENT IS HEARSAY.[15]
Simply stated, the issues in this appeal are: (1) Whether the Court of
Appeals erred in upholding the Decision of the RTC which declared Antonio J.P.
Lozada the absolute owner of the questioned properties; (2) Whether the Court
of Appeals violated petitioners right to due process; and (3) Whether petitioners
case is barred by laches.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court violated her right to due
process when it did not rule on the validity of the sale between the sisters Lozada
and their nephew, Antonio. Marissa finds it anomalous that Dr. Lozada, an
American citizen, had paid the lots for Antonio. Thus, she accuses the latter of
being a mere dummy of the former.Petitioner begs the Court to review the
conflicting factual findings of the trial and appellate courts on Peregrinas medical
condition on March 11, 1994 and Dr. Lozadas financial capacity to advance
payment for Antonio. Likewise, petitioner assails the ruling of the Court of
Appeals which nullified the donation in her favor and declared her case barred by
laches. Petitioner finally challenges the admissibility of the videotaped statement
of Anita who was not presented as a witness.
On their part, respondents pray for the dismissal of the petition for
petitioners failure to furnish the Register of Deeds of Cebu City with a copy
thereof in violation of Sections 3[16] and 4,[17] Rule 45 of the Rules. In addition,
they aver that Peregrinas unauthenticated medical records were merely falsified
to make it appear that she was confined in the hospital on the day of the
sale. Further, respondents question the credibility of Dr. Fuentes who was neither
presented in court as an expert witness[18] nor professionally involved in
Peregrinas medical care.
In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterates the rule that a
notarized and authenticated deed of sale enjoys the presumption of regularity,
and is admissible without further proof of due execution. On the basis thereof, it
declared Antonio a buyer in good faith and for value, despite petitioners
contention that the sale violates public policy. While it is a part of the right of
appellant to urge that the decision should directly meet the issues presented for
resolution,[21] mere failure by the appellate court to specify in its decision all
contentious issues raised by the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe
appellants contentions is not sufficient to hold the appellate courts decision
contrary to the requirements of the law[22] and the Constitution.[23] So long as the
decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary findings of facts to
warrant its conclusions, we cannot declare said court in error if it withheld any
specific findings of fact with respect to the evidence for the defense.[24] We will
abide by the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed,[25] and all matters within an issue in a case were laid down before the
court and were passed upon by it.[26]
In this case, we find nothing to show that the sale between the sisters Lozada
and their nephew Antonio violated the public policy prohibiting aliens from owning
lands in the Philippines. Even as Dr. Lozada advanced the money for the payment
of Antonios share, at no point were the lots registered in Dr. Lozadas name. Nor
was it contemplated that the lots be under his control for they are actually to be
included as capital of Damasa Corporation. According to their agreement, Antonio
and Dr. Lozada are to hold 60% and 40% of the shares in said corporation,
respectively. Under Republic Act No. 7042,[27] particularly Section 3,[28] a
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least 60% of
the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of
the Philippines, is considered a Philippine National. As such, the corporation may
acquire disposable lands in the Philippines. Neither did petitioner present proof to
belie Antonios capacity to pay for the lots subjects of this case.
Now, as to the validity of the donation, the provision of Article 749 of the
Civil Code is in point:
ART. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be
valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must
satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a
separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done
during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall
be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in
both instruments.
When the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be
valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement
is absolute and indispensable.[34] Here, the Deed of Donation does not appear to be
duly notarized. In page three of the deed, the stamped name of Cresencio Tomakin
appears above the words Notary Public until December 31, 1983 but below it were
the typewritten words Notary Public until December 31, 1987. A closer examination
of the document further reveals that the number 7 in 1987 and Series of 1987 were
merely superimposed.[35] This was confirmed by petitioners nephew Richard
Unchuan who testified that he saw petitioners husband write 7 over 1983 to make it
appear that the deed was notarized in 1987. Moreover, a Certification[36] from Clerk
of Court Jeoffrey S. Joaquino of the Notarial Records Division disclosed that the
Deed of Donation purportedly identified in Book No. 4, Document No. 48, and Page
No. 35 Series of 1987 was not reported and filed with said office. Pertinent to this,
the Rules require a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered
and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question
in dispute, to account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made
by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties
affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration
did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the
document shall, as in this case, not be admissible in evidence.[37]
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals dated January 31, 2000 in the case entitled "Lamberto T. Chua vs. Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia
Sunga" and of the Resolution dated May 23, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners
Lilibeth Sunga and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter collectively referred to as petitioners).
On June 22, 1992, Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against Lilibeth Sunga Chan
(hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia), daughter and wife, respectively of
the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for "Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting,
Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment" with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of
Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience, respondent and Jacinto
allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER
(hereafter Shellite), under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered his
initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his
counterpart contribution, with the intention that the profits would be equally divided between them. The
partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy (hereafter Josephine), a sister of the
wife respondent, Erlinda Sy. As compensation, Jacinto would receive a manager's fee or remuneration of 10%
of the gross profit and Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits, in addition to her wages and other
remuneration from the business.
Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business on July 8, 1977, its business operation went quite
and was profitable. Respondent claimed that he could attest to success of their business because of the
volume of orders and deliveries of filled Shellane cylinder tanks supplied by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation. While Jacinto furnished respondent with the merchandise inventories, balance sheets and net
worth of Shellite from 1977 to 1989, respondent however suspected that the amount indicated in these
documents were understated and undervalued by Jacinto and Josephine for their own selfish reasons and for
tax avoidance.
Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his daughter,
petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite without
respondent's consent. Despite respondent's repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory,
appraisal, winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply. Petitioner
Lilibeth allegedly continued the operations of Shellite, converting to her own use and advantage its properties.
On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth ran out the alibis and reasons to evade
respondent's demands, she disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount of P200,000.00 and partially
paid the same to respondent. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed respondent that the P200,000.00
represented partial payment of the latter's share in the partnership, with a promise that the former would make
the complete inventory and winding up of the properties of the business establishment. Despite such
commitment, petitioners allegedly failed to comply with their duty to account, and continued to benefit from the
assets and income of Shellite to the damage and prejudice of respondent.
On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in Manila, not the Regional Trial Court in Zamboanga del Norte had jurisdiction over the
action. Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss.
On January 12, 1993, the trial court finding the complaint sufficient in from and substance denied the motion to
dismiss.
On January 30, 1993, petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims, contending that they are
not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and attorney's fees, that
respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As
counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
On August 2, 1993, petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss this time on the ground that the claim for
winding up of partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership affairs, accounting and
recovery of shares in partnership assets/properties should be dismissed and prosecuted against the estate of
deceased Jacinto in a probate or intestate proceeding.
On August 16, 1993, the trial denied the second motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
On November 26, 1993, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the Court
of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32499 questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss.
On November 29, 1993, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to Suspend Pre-trial Conference.
On December 13, 1993, the trial court granted the motion to suspend pre-trial conference.
On November 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit.
On January 16, 1995, this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, "as petitioners
failed to show that a reversible error was committed by the appellate court."2
On February 20, 1995, entry of judgment was made by the Clerk of Court and the case was remanded to the
trial court on April 26, 1995.
On September 25, 1995, the trial court terminated the pre-trial conference and set the hearing of the case of
January 17, 1996. Respondent presented his evidence while petitioners were considered to have waived their
right to present evidence for their failure to attend the scheduled date for reception of evidence despite notice.
On October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. The dispositive of the Decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, as
follows:
(2) ORDERING them to return and restitute to the partnership any and all properties, assets,
income and profits they misapplied and converted to their own use and advantage the legally
pertain to the plaintiff and account for the properties mentioned in pars. A and B on pages 4-5
of this petition as basis;
(3) DIRECTING them to restitute and pay to the plaintiff ½ shares and interest of the plaintiff
in the partnership of the listed properties, assets and good will (sic) in schedules A, B and C,
on pages 4-5 of the petition;
(4) ORDERING them to pay the plaintiff earned but unreceived income and profits from the
partnership from 1988 to May 30, 1992, when the plaintiff learned of the closure of the store
the sum of P35,000.00 per month, with legal rate of interest until fully paid;
(5) ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of the partnership and terminate its business
activities pursuant to law, after delivering to the plaintiff all the ½ interest, shares, participation
and equity in the partnership, or the value thereof in money or money's worth, if the properties
are not physically divisible;
(6) FINDING them especially Lilibeth Sunga-Chan guilty of breach of trust and in bad faith and
hold them liable to the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and,
(7) DIRECTING them to reimburse and pay the sum of P25,000.00 as attorney's (sic) and
P25,000.00 as litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED."3
On October 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, appealing the case to the Court of
Appeals.
On January 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all respects."4
On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
"1. The Court of Appeals erred in making a legal conclusion that there existed a partnership between
respondent Lamberto T. Chua and the late Jacinto L. Sunga upon the latter'' invitation and offer and
that upon his death the partnership assets and business were taken over by petitioners.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that laches and/or prescription did not
apply in the instant case.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that there was competent and credible
evidence to warrant the finding of a partnership, and assuming arguendo that indeed there was a
partnership, the finding of highly exaggerated amounts or values in the partnership assets and profits." 5
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership
existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the absence of any written
document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argues that these courts were
proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged
partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's
Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:
"SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or assignors of
parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, or against such person of
unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind."
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego, Josephine,
should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented
by petitioners.
A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property of real rights are contributed
thereto, in which case a public instrument shall necessary.6 Hence, based on the intention of the parties, as
gathered from the facts and ascertained from their language and conduct, a verbal contract of partnership may
arise.7 The essential profits that must be proven to that a partnership was agreed upon are (1) mutual
contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest in the profits.8 Understandably so, in view of the absence
of the written contract of partnership between respondent and Jacinto, respondent resorted to the introduction
of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership. The crucial issue to settle then is to
whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render inadmissible respondent's
testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.
The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by
death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving
his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.9 But before this rule can be successfully
invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in
prosecuted.
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind."10
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim11 against respondents in their answer before the trial court, and
with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the
"Dead Man's Statute".12 Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or
representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to
occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.13 Moreover, as defendant in the
counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of
the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the
deceased.14
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple reason that she
is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show
that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between
respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her
an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and
not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen."15 Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.
We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that Josephine's testimony lacks probative value because she
was allegedly coerced coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his favor, Josephine merely
declared in court that she was requested by respondent to testify and that if she were not requested to do so
she would not have testified. We fail to see how we can conclude from this candid admission that Josephine's
testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of
respondent.
Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of her testimony
since relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses.16
Petitioners' reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat respondent's claim cannot prevail over the
factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established between
respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the
trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the formation
of partnership, albeit an informal one.
Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial. By the weight of judicial precedents,
a factual matter like the finding of the existence of a partnership between respondent and Jacinto cannot be
inquired into by this Court on review.17 This Court can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by
the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and the appellate court were
correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. 18 It must be also
pointed out that petitioners failed to attend the presentation of evidence of respondent. Petitioners cannot now
turn to this Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the documentary evidence of respondent
when petitioners failed to object to the admissibility of the evidence at the time that such evidence was
offered.19
With regard to petitioners' insistence that laches and/or prescription should have extinguished respondent's
claim, we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the action for accounting filed by respondents
three (3) years after Jacinto's death was well within the prescribed period. The Civil Code provides that an
action to enforce an oral contract prescribes in six (6) years20 while the right to demand an accounting for a
partner's interest as against the person continuing the business accrues at the date of dissolution, in the
absence of any contrary agreement.21 Considering that the death of a partner results in the dissolution of the
partnership22 , in this case, it was Jacinto's death that respondent as the surviving partner had the right to an
account of his interest as against petitioners. It bears stressing that while Jacinto's death dissolved the
partnership, the dissolution did not immediately terminate the partnership. The Civil Code23 expressly provides
that upon dissolution, the partnership continues and its legal personality is retained until the complete winding
up of its business, culminating in its termination.24
In a desperate bid to cast doubt on the validity of the oral partnership between respondent and Jacinto,
petitioners maintain that said partnership that had initial capital of P200,000.00 should have been registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) since registration is mandated by the Civil Code, True,
Article 1772 of the Civil Code requires that partnerships with a capital of P3,000.00 or more must register with
the SEC, however, this registration requirement is not mandatory. Article 1768 of the Civil Code 25 explicitly
provides that the partnership retains its juridical personality even if it fails to register. The failure to register the
contract of partnership does not invalidate the same as among the partners, so long as the contract has the
essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties, and it can be
assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of their contract.26 In the case at bar, non-
compliance with this directory provision of the law will not invalidate the partnership considering that the totality
of the evidence proves that respondent and Jacinto indeed forged the partnership in question.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 1âwphi1.nêt
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. R. No. 171701
Petitioner,
Present:
BRION, J.,
- versus Acting Chairperson,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
MA. IMELDA IMEE R. MARCOS- REYES, JJ.
MANOTOC, FERDINAND
BONGBONG R. MARCOS, JR.,
GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III,
IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, Promulgated:
YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG
CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM,
and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES February 8, 2012
ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review filed by the Republic of the
Philippines assailing the Resolutions[1] issued by the Sandiganbayan in connection
with an alleged portion of the Marcoses supposed ill-gotten wealth.
This case involves P200 billion of the Marcoses alleged accumulated ill-
gotten wealth. It also includes the alleged use of the media networks IBC-13, BBC-
2 and RPN-9 for the Marcos familys personal benefit; the alleged use of De Soleil
Apparel for dollar salting; and the alleged illegal acquisition and operation of the
bus company Pantranco North Express, Inc. (Pantranco).
The Facts
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, the first executive act of
then President Corazon C. Aquino was to create the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG). Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, the PCGG was
given the following mandate:
Sec. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the
President in regard to the following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of
all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the
President may assign to the Commission from time to time.
(c) The adoption of safeguards to ensure that the above practices
shall not be repeated in any manner under the new government,
and the institution of adequate measures to prevent the occurrence
of corruption.
Sec. 3. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
(a) To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order.
(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or
possession any building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or
properties may be found, and any records pertaining thereto, in
order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance
which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise
prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task.
(c) To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent
its disposal or dissipation, business enterprises and properties
taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by
entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until the
transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be
disposed of by the appropriate authorities.
(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of
facts by any person or entity that may render moot and academic,
or frustrate, or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the
Commission to carry out its tasks under this order.
(e) To administer oaths, and issue subpoena requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses and/or the production of
such books, papers, contracts, records, statement of accounts and
other documents as may be material to the investigation
conducted by the Commission.
(f) To hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose
the appropriate penalties, following the same procedures and
penalties provided in the Rules of Court.
(g) To seek and secure the assistance of any office, agency or
instrumentality of the government.
(h) To promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purpose of this order.
Thus, numerous civil and criminal cases were subsequently filed. One of the
civil cases filed before the Sandiganbayan to recover the Marcoses alleged ill-
gotten wealth was Civil Case No. 0002, now subject of this Petition.
On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic and assisted
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion,
Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E.
Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos;
and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong
Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.
On 1 October 1987, the PCGG filed an amended Complaint to add
Constante Rubio as defendant.
Again on 9 February 1988, it amended the Complaint, this time to include as
defendants Nemesio G. Co and herein respondents Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun
Ho, and Yeung Chun Fan.
For the third time, on 23 April 1990, the PCGG amended its Complaint,
adding to its growing list of defendants Imelda Cojuangco, the estate of Ramon
Cojuangco, and Prime Holdings, Inc.[2]
The PCGG filed a fourth amended Complaint, which was later denied by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated 2 September 1998.
31. Defendants Nemesio G. Co, Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and
Yeung Chun Fan are the controlling stockholders of Glorious Sun Fashion
Manufacturing Corporation (Phils.). Through Glorious Sun (Phils.), they acted as
fronts or dummies, cronies or otherwise willing tools of spouses Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos and/or the family, particularly of Defendant Imelda (Imee)
Marcos-Manotoc, in the illegal salting of foreign exchange[4] by importing denim
fabrics from only one supplier a Hong Kong based corporation which was also
owned and controlled by defendant Hong Kong investors, at prices much higher
than those being paid by other users of similar materials to the grave and
irreparable damage of Plaintiff.
Thus, petitioner set forth the following causes of action in its Complaint: [5]
SO ORDERED.
Secondly, the court pointed out that Rolando Gapud, whose deposition was
taken in Hong Kong, referred to her as one directly involved in amassing ill-gotten
wealth. The court also considered the compromise agreement between petitioner
and Antonio O. Floirendo, who disclosed that he had performed several business
transactions upon the instructions of the Marcos spouses.
were not presented in court, nor were they authenticated by the persons who
executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that petitioner failed to provide
any valid reason why it did not present the originals in court. These exhibits were
supposed to show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotok in the media networks
IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three of which she had allegedly acquired illegally.
These exhibits also sought to prove her alleged participation in dollar salting
through De Soleil Apparel.
Finally, the court held that the relationship of respondents to the Marcos
spouses was not enough reason to hold the former liable.
In the matter of the spouses Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta III, the court
similarly held that there was no testimonial or documentary evidence that
supported petitioners allegations against the couple. Again, petitioner failed to
present the original documents that supposedly supported the allegations against
them. Instead, it merely presented photocopies of documents that sought to prove
how the Marcoses used the Potencianos[13] as dummies in acquiring and operating
the bus company Pantranco.
Meanwhile, as far as the Yeungs were concerned, the court found the
allegations against them baseless. Petitioner failed to demonstrate how their
business, Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing, Co. Phils. (Glorious
Sun), was used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show that they themselves were
dummies of the Marcoses. Again, the court held that the documentary evidence
relevant to this allegation was inadmissible for being mere photocopies, and that
the affiants had not been presented as witnesses.
Finally, the court also granted the Demurrer filed by PEA-PTGWO. While
the court held that there was no evidence to show that Pantranco was illegally
acquired, the former nevertheless held that there was a need to first determine the
ownership of the disputed funds before they could be ordered released to the
rightful owner.
Moreover, petitioner asserted that the evidence established that the Yeungs
were dummies of the Marcoses, and that the Pantranco assets were part of the
Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Finally, petitioner questioned the courts ruling that the evidence previously
admitted was later held to be inadmissible in evidence against respondents, thus,
depriving the former of due process.
Inadvertently, petitioner was not able to serve a copy of the motion on
respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr. But upon realizing
the oversight, it immediately did so and filed the corresponding Manifestation and
Motion before the court. Nonetheless, this inadvertence prompted Imee Marcos-
Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr. to file their Motion for Entry of Judgment.
On 2 March 2006, the court issued the second assailed
Resolution,[14] denying petitioners Motion. The court pointed out its reservation in
its Resolution dated 12 March 2002, wherein it said that it would still assess and
weigh the evidentiary value of the admitted evidence. Furthermore, it said that
even if it included the testimonies of petitioners witnesses, these were not
substantial to hold respondents liable. Thus, the court said:
WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient reason to set aside the
resolution dated December 6, 2005, the plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. The plaintiffs Motion and
Manifestation dated January 18, 2006 is GRANTED in the interest of justice.
The Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by defendants Imee Marcos and
Bongbong Marcos is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner raises the same issues it raised in its Motion for Reconsideration
filed before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:[15]
I. THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER
TO EVIDENCE FILED BY RESPONDENTS MA. IMELDA (IMEE) R.
MARCOS AND FERDINAND (BONGBONG) R. MARCOS, JR.,
CONSIDERING THAT MORE THAN PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE
ON RECORD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THEIR CONNIVANCE
WITH FORMER PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND
OTHER MARCOS DUMMIES AND ABUSED THEIR POWER AND
INFLUENCE IN UNLAWFULLY AMASSING FUNDS FROM THE
NATIONAL TREASURY.
II. PETITION PROVED, BY MORE THAN PREPONDERANT
EVIDENCE, THAT RESPONDENT-SPOUSES GREGORIO ARANETA
III AND IRENE MARCOS ARANETA CONNIVED WITH FORMER
PRESIDENT MARCOS IN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRING BUSINESS
INTERESTS WHICH ARE GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT, AND IN A MANNER PROHIBITED UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION AND ANTI-GRAFT STATUTES.
III. RESPONDENTS IMEE, BONGBONG, AND IRENE MARCOS ARE
COMPULSORY HEIRS OF FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS AND
ARE EQUALLY OBLIGED TO RENDER AN ACCOUNTING AND
RETURN THE ALLEGED ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH OF THE
MARCOSES.
Closely analyzing petitioners Complaint and the present Petition for Review,
it is clear that the Marcos siblings are being sued in two capacities: first, as co-
conspirators in the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth; and second, as the
compulsory heirs of their father, Ferdinand E. Marcos.[16]
Petitioner contends that these documents fall under the Rules third
exception, that is, these documents are public records in the custody of a public
officer or are recorded in a public office. It is its theory that since these documents
were collected by the PCGG, then, necessarily, the conditions for the exception to
apply had been met. Alternatively, it asserts that the documents were offered to
prove not only the truth of the recitals of the documents, but also of other external
or collateral facts.[33]
First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of
the documents themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original
documents that could prove petitioners allegations.
Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the
Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule, which mandates that
the evidence must be the original document itself. The origin of the best evidence
rule can be found and traced to as early as the 18th century in Omychund v.
Barker,[34] wherein the Court of Chancery said:
The judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is but one
general rule of evidence, the best that the nature of the case will admit.
The rule is, that if the writings have subscribing witnesses to them,
they must be proved by those witnesses.
The first ground judges have gone upon in departing from strict rules, is an
absolute strict necessity. Secondly, a presumed necessity. In the case of writings,
subscribed by witnesses, if all are dead, the proof of one of their hands is
sufficient to establish the deed: where an original is lost, a copy may be admitted;
if no copy, then a proof by witnesses who have heard the deed, and yet it is a
thing the law abhors to admit the memory of man for evidence.
Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the
originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the court should admit
these documents as secondary evidence absent the testimony of the witnesses who
had executed them.
In particular, it may not insist that the photocopies of the documents fall
under Sec. 7 of Rule 130, which states:
Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. ─ When
the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office, its contents may be proved be a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof.
Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of
Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is imperative therefore that the estate be duly represented.
The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every
party to a litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased
litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be properly represented in the suit
through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.[40] On that note, we
take judicial notice of the probate proceedings regarding the will of Ferdinand E.
Marcos. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos II,[41] we upheld the grant by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of letters testamentary in solidum to Ferdinand R.
Marcos, Jr. and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and
testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Unless the executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to waive in
favor of the state their right to defend or protect the estate or those properties found
to be ill-gotten in their possession, control or ownership, then they may not be
dropped as defendants in the civil case pending before the Sandiganbayan.
We also hold that the action must likewise be maintained against Imee
Marcos-Manotoc and Irene Marcos-Araneta on the basis of the non-exhaustive list
attached as Annex A to the Third Amended Complaint, which states that the listed
properties therein were owned by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and their
immediate family.[43] It is only during the trial of Civil Case No. 0002 before the
Sandiganbayan that there could be a determination of whether these properties are
indeed ill-gotten or were legitimately acquired by respondents and their
predecessors. Thus, while it was not proven that respondents conspired in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth, they may be in possession, ownership or control of
such ill-gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of the Marcos couple.
Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act does not remove the character of
the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging to the State.
Secondly, under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became
co-owners of the Marcos properties upon the death of the President. The property
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted to another through the decedents death.[44] In this concept, nothing
prevents the heirs from exercising their right to transfer or dispose of the properties
that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition
or the distribution of the estate. In Jakosalem v. Rafols,[45] we said:
Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of hereditary
property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from
the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be
accepted. And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person, each
of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect
to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it
remains undivided. (3 Manresa, 357; Alcala vs. Alcala, 35 Phil. 679.) And
according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or
mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment
or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the
partition upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, in the case of Ramirez
vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of
the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking
thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid,
but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted to
the vendors upon the partition of the estate. (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, the Marcos siblings are maintained as respondents, because (1) the
action pending before the Sandiganbayan is one that survives death, and, therefore,
the rights to the estate must be duly protected; (2) they allegedly control, possess or
own ill-gotten wealth, though their direct involvement in accumulating or
acquiring such wealth may not have been proven.
Nevertheless, the allegations against Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and
Yeung Chun Fan in the case at bar were also proved to be baseless. Again,
petitioner failed to illustrate how respondents herein acted as dummies of the
Marcoses in acquiring ill-gotten wealth. This Court notes that the Complaint
against the Yeungs alleges that the Marcoses used Glorious Sun the garment
company in which the Yeungs are controlling stockholders for illegal dollar salting
through the companys importation of denim fabrics from only one supplier at
prices much higher than those being paid by other users of similar materials.
Notably, no mention of De Soleil Apparel was made.
The foregoing quotation from the Petition is bereft of any factual matter that
warrants a consideration by the Court. Straight from the horses mouth, these
documents are only meant to show the ownership and interest of Imee Marcos
Manotoc in De Soleil and not how respondent supposedly participated in dollar
salting or in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth.
PEA-PTGWO
The PEA-PTGWO Demurrer to Evidence was granted primarily as a
consequence of the prosecutions failure to establish that the assets of Pantranco
were ill-gotten, as discussed earlier. Thus, we find no error in the assailed Order of
the Sandiganbayan.
A Final Note
As earlier adverted to, the best evidence rule has been recognized as an
evidentiary standard since the 18th century. For three centuries, it has been
practiced as one of the most basic rules in law. It is difficult to conceive that one
could have finished law school and passed the bar examinations without knowing
such elementary rule. Thus, it is deeply disturbing that the PCGG and the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) the very agencies sworn to protect the interest of the
state and its people could conduct their prosecution in the manner that they did. To
emphasize, the PCGG is a highly specialized office focused on the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth, while the OSG is the principal legal defender of the government.
The lawyers of these government agencies are expected to be the best in the legal
profession.
The public prosecutors should employ and use all government resources and
powers efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid
wastage of public funds and revenues. They should perform and discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and
skill.[48]
The basic ideal of the legal profession is to render service and secure justice
for those seeking its aid.[49] In order to do this, lawyers are required to observe and
adhere to the highest ethical and professional standards. The legal profession is so
imbued with public interest that its practitioners are accountable not only to their
clients, but to the public as well.
We note that there are instances when this Court may overturn the dismissal
of the lower courts in instances when it is shown that the prosecution has deprived
the parties their due process of law. In Merciales v. Court of Appeals,[53] we
reversed the Decision of the RTC in dismissing the criminal case for rape with
homicide. In that case, it was very apparent that the public prosecutor violated the
due process rights of the private complainant owing to its blatant disregard of
procedural rules and the failure to present available crucial evidence, which would
tend to prove the guilt or innocence of the accused therein. Moreover, we likewise
found that the trial court was gravely remiss in its duty to ferret out the truth and,
instead, just passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled the case.
However, it must be emphasized that Merciales was filed exactly to
determine whether the prosecution and the trial court gravely abused their
discretion in the proceedings of the case, thus resulting in the denial of the
offended partys due process. Meanwhile, the present case merely alleges that there
was an error in the Sandiganbayans consideration of the probative value of
evidence. We also note that in Merciales, both the prosecution and the trial court
were found to be equally guilty of serious nonfeasance, which prompted us to
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings and reception of
evidence. Merciales is thus inapplicable to the case at bar.
Nevertheless, given the particular context of this case, the failure of the
prosecution to adhere to something as basic as the best evidence rule raises serious
doubts on the level and quality of effort given to the governments cause. Thus, we
highly encourage the Office of the President, the OSG, and the PCGG to conduct
the appropriate investigation and consequent action on this matter.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PERALTA,* and
PEREZ, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
FORFOM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Promulgated:
Respondents.
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DECISION
The facts of the case, as determined by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
(4) Although the property covered by TCT No. 10896 has already
been subdivided into different lots and covered by separate titles in the
name of Ma. Teresa Limcauco, said lots were not yet transferred or
conveyed to third parties. But as to the property covered by TCT No.
64884, said certificate of title was cancelled and a new certificate of
title, TCT No. 75436/T-378 was issued in the name of Ellenora Vda. De
Limcauco. On September 23, 1987, a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed by Ellenora Vda. De Limcauco in favor of defendant Raul P.
Claveria whereby the property covered by TCT No. 64884 was
supposedly sold to said defendant for the sum of P5,139,126.00. On
September 24, 1987, TCT No. 75436/T-378 was cancelled and a new
certificate of title, TCT No. 75533 was issued in the name of defendant
Raul P. Claveria. On October 21, 1987, defendant spouses Raul and Elea
Claveria mortgaged the property with the defendant Philippine Trust
Company to guarantee a loan in the amount of P8,000,000.00, which
mortgage was duly registered and annotated as Entry No. 2858 in TCT
No. 75533.
In an Order dated October 30, 1991, the trial court declared the
defendants Ma. Teresa Limcauco, Ellenora Limcauco, Raul P. Claveria
and Elea R. Claveria in default for their failure to file the necessary
responsive pleadings despite the lapse of sixty (60) days from the last
day of publication of summons, and accordingly allowed the plaintiff to
present its evidence ex parte against the said defendants. During the
pre-trial conference held on November 25, 1991, plaintiffs counsel
manifested that it was joining the defendant Register of Deeds only as a
nominal party as the latter also waived his counterclaim against the
plaintiff.
On December 29, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of private
respondent Forfom Development Corporation (Forfom):
On June 15, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision
affirming the Decision of the RTC:
On August 21, 2001, the Court of Appeals denied Philtrusts Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, where Philtrust raises the
following arguments:
Philtrust claims that the loans secured by the mortgage on the subject
property were granted to the spouses Claveria after Philtrust was satisfied
regarding the spouses credit worthiness and capacity to pay.[11] In fact, according
to Philtrust, the spouses Claveria were able to maintain a satisfactory record of
payment during the early period of their transactions with the bank.[12] Philtrust
insists that prior to the constitution of the mortgage, it followed the standard
operating procedures in accepting property as security, including having
investigators visit the subject property and appraise its value.[13]
When the Court of Appeals ruled that these claims by Philtrust were not
supported by evidence, the latter countered before us that its allegations were
supported by the following documents: (a) the Promissory Note;[14] (b) the Deed
of Mortgage;[15] and (c) TCT No. 75533.[16] Philtrust adds that it stated in the
Answer to Interrogatories that it followed the standard operating procedures in
accepting the property as security. Since said Answer to Interrogatories is a
notarized document, Philtrust claims that it is a public document which is
conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents.[17]
It is settled that banks, their business being impressed with public interest,
are expected to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their
dealings, even those involving registered lands.[18] The rule that persons dealing
with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to
banks.[19] Consequently, Philtrust should prove that it exercised extraordinary
diligence required of it in approving the mortgage contract in favor of the spouses
Claveria.
It baffles us how Philtrust can argue that the promissory note and Deed of
Mortgage executed by the spouses Claveria, and the TCT of the subject property,
can prove its allegations that (a) the mortgage was granted after it was satisfied of
the spouses credit worthiness; (b) the latter was able to maintain a satisfactory
record of payment early on; or (c) it followed the standard operating procedures
in accepting property as security, including having investigators visit the subject
property and appraise its value. The mere fact that Philtrust accepted the subject
property as security most certainly does not prove that it followed the standard
operating procedure in doing so. As regards Philtrusts claim that the Answer to
Interrogatories, being a notarized document, is conclusive as to the truthfulness of
its contents, we deem it necessary to clarify the doctrines cited by Philtrust on this
matter.
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court enumerates three kinds of public
documents, to wit:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties
attending the execution of the different kinds of public instruments. Official duties
are disputably presumed to have been regularly performed.[26] As regards
affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which are required to be sworn to
by the person making them,[27] the only portion thereof executed by the person
authorized to take oaths is the jurat. The presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed therefore applies only to the latter portion, wherein the
notary public merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before
him or her, on the date mentioned thereon. Thus, even though affidavits are
notarized documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving, must be
received with caution.[28]
Philtrust, therefore, presented no evidence rebutting the following badges
of bad faith shown in the records of the case. Even though circumstantial, the
following adequately prove by preponderance of evidence that Philtrust was
aware of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated upon Forfom:
1. Within a period of less than one year, Philtrust extended unsecured loans
amounting to P7,300,000.00 to the spouses Claveria as shown in its Answer
wherein it declared:
Spouses Raul and Elea Claveria has been clients of the bank since 1986
and on October 2, 1987, all their outstanding obligations in the amount
of P7,300,000.00 were consolidated into one account on a clean
basis.[29]
All Philtrust can give is a very general explanation for these unsecured loans:
[ANSWER:]
7. Did the bank not request from the Claveria spouses collateral
within the Metro Manila area and if so what was the reply of the
Claveria spouses?[32]
[ANSWER:]
[ANSWER:]
15. Did an officer or employee of the bank actually visit the given
residences of the Claveria spouses in Angeles City and Bacolod City, the
result of such visit, and the name or names of the persons representing
the bank who visited such places? [37]
[ANSWER:]
15. As stated above, the last known address of spouses was 406
Caliraya Street, New Alabang, Muntinlupa, M.M.[38]
17. Who was the particular bank officer who dealt directly with
the Claveria spouses and handled their accounts?[39]
[ANSWER:]
SO ORDERED.
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
Petitioners,
Present:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
LLEMOS, Promulgated:
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
During her lifetime, the late Saturnina Salvatin Llemos acquired a parcel
of land described as Lot No. 2059, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 38564, which all the parties presently occupy.
xxxx
x x x x[2]
On February 29, 1996, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, then
the defendants. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
SO ORDERED. [ 3 ]
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. [ 5 ]
The CA held that the entries in the Registry Book of St. John
Metropolitan Cathedral in Dagupan City may be considered as entries
made in the course of business under then Section 37 of Rule
130, [ 6 ] which is an exception to the hearsay rule; that Saturnina
passed away on March 12, 1938 as stated by the Book of t he Dead of
the Catholic Church; that, for this reason, the Deed of Absolute Sale
purportedly executed on November 5, 1964 is invalid, as there could
not possibly be a meeting of the minds between a dead person and a
living one; that all the parties in the instant suit are presently
occupying the property in question; and finally, that the petitioners
cannot invoke the indefeasibility of title since it may still be attacked
even beyond the one year period reckoned from the date of its
issuance on the ground of fraud.
In the present case, evidence shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale
(Exhibit C) dated November 5, 1964, conveying the subject property
to Felipe, petitioners predecessor -in-interest, was thumbmarked by
Saturnina, by virtue of which, the Register of Deeds of Dagupan,
Pangasinan cancelled Original Certificate of Title No. 38564 (Exhibit
B) and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 15632 (Exhibit D)
on November 5, 1964 in the name of Felipe.
Petitioners insist that respondents are guilty of laches considering
that the latter filed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the TCT
only on August 10, 1992 or almost 28 years after the TCT was issued
to the former on November 5, 1964. On the other hand, respondents
claim that when the Deed of Absolute Sale, on which basis the TCT
was issued, was purportedly thumbmarked by Saturnina on N ovember
5, 1964, the latter had been dead since 1938; that therefore fraud
attended the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the TCTs in
the names of petitioners are null and void; and that they discovered
the fact of fraud only in 1991.
written; or
xxxx
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PURISIMA, J:
At bar are Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
seeking a review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated November 13, 1991, and its
Resolution[2] of July 9, 1992, denying the motion for reconsideration in CA- G.R. SP Nos. 28109
and 28110.
The two cases were tried jointly and decided by Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court in
Tabaco, Albay.
Petitioners are legal heirs of Pedro Cabais, who died on April 16, 1982, leaving a parcel of
land situated[3] in Basud, Tabaco, Albay, with an area of 1,638 square meters, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55640 in the name of Pedro Cabais. The said property was
inherited by Pedro Cabais from his grandmother Eustaquia Caeta by right of representation. His
mother, Felipa Caeta Buesa, who was the only daughter of Eustaquia Caeta,[4] predeceased the
latter, leaving him as the only legal heir of Eustaquia. Thus, Pedro Cabais executed a Deed of
Self-Adjudication,[5] adjudicating in his favor subject property. By virtue thereof, Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-3433 (23899) was cancelled and in lieu thereof, the aforementioned
transfer certificate of title issued in his name.
On October 15, 1979, shortly after Pedro Cabais had adjudicated to himself the property in
question, a complaint for partition and accounting was brought by Simon Bonaobra, Heirs of
Victoria Caeta and Heirs of Anastacio Caeta against Pedro Cabais, docketed as Civil Case No. T-
567 before the Regional Trial Court but the plaintiffs were declared non-suited, resulting to the
dismissal of the case.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. T-567, Pedro Cabais died. Whereupon, the
respondents herein entered the property in dispute and constructed houses thereon, depriving
petitioners of possession thereof.
On April 15, 1987, petitioners filed with the lower court,[6] Civil Case No. T-1283, for
quieting of title, recovery of possession and ownership with a prayer for preliminary injunction,
against the herein respondents, alleging that the acts of the latter with regard to the disputed
property cast a cloud on their title thereto. In their Answer, respondents theorized that the
petitioners have no cause of action and were in estoppel, and that the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 55640 was in derogation of respondents successional rights.
On April 21, 1987, the respondents, Heirs of Victoria Caeta, Paulino Loria, Jose Loria,
Constancia Loria Vda. de Paglinawan, Emeterio Loria, and spouses Rufino Nicolas and Aurea
Goyal, instituted before the same lower court Civil Case No. T-1284, for annulment of title and
damages, claiming to be co-owners of subject property. The respondent spouses, Rufino Nicolas
and Aurea Goyal, asserted that they bought 806.5 square meters of Lot No. 2119 from Simplicia
Casaul. The latter was said to have acquired the said portion of the lot from Benigno Bonaobra,
who, in turn, acquired the same from Victoria Caeta and Ciriaca Vda. de Gawan.
The respondent heirs of Victoria Caeta averred that they purchased the remaining portion of
Lot No. 2119 from their deceased grandmother, Ciriaca Vda. de Gawan, the first wife of Antonio
Buesa.According to them, the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. RO-3433 (23899)
and issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 55640 were tainted by fraud.
Petitioners denied the allegations of respondents Answer in Civil Case No. T-1284. It was
their submission that the truth of the matter were those alleged in their Complaint in Civil Case
No. T-1283, and that Civil Case No. T-1284 is barred by Civil Case No. 567, which had been
previously dismissed.
In due time, the two cases were jointly tried and on September 28, 1989, the lower court
came out with a Joint Decision upholding the view of petitioners, quieting their title over the
contested lot; ordering the respondents to vacate the same, to pay the rents thereon to petitioners
until they leave the place, apart from litigation expenses. The trial court ruled that res
judicata barred the institution of Civil Case No. T-1284 by reason of the prior dismissal of Civil
Case No. T-567.
Respondents seasonably presented a motion for reconsideration of the said disposition,
which the trial court granted[7] on November 26, 1989, upon the reasoning that res judicata as
alluded to in the decision did not apply and that the baptismal certificate of Felipa C. Buesa does
not show her to be the daughter of Eustaquia Caeta. From such adverse action against them,
petitioners went to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision on November 13,
1991, affirming the decision of the lower court. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied in the Resolution dated July 9, 1992.
Undaunted, petitioners have come to this Court for relief.
The main issue for resolution here is whether or not the Order of the lower court
reconsidering its Joint Decision was proper. Firstly, petitioners maintain that the lower court
erred in relying on the Baptismal Certificate[8] of Felipa C. Buesa to establish the parentage and
filiation of Pedro Cabais. They contend that the grant of the motion for reconsideration and
reversal of its own decision were without legal basis. It is also petitioners submission that the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 567 constituted a bar to Civil Case No. T-1284 on the ground of res
judicata.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Order under attack disregarded the limited evidentiary value of a baptismal certificate in
this jurisdiction vis--vis a birth certificate.
A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of filiation[9]and a
high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained in such public
document.[10]This is pursuant to the rule that entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.[11] The
evidentiary nature of such document must, therefore, be sustained in the absence of strong,
complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.[12]
On the contrary, a baptismal certificate, a private document, which, being hearsay, is not a
conclusive proof of filiation.[13] It does not have the same probative value as a record of birth, an
official or public document.[14] In US vs. Evangelista, this Court held that church registers of
births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No.
68[15] and the passage of Act No. 190,[16] are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly
authorized public officials.[17] Thus, in this jurisdiction, a certificate of baptism such as the one
herein under controversy is no longer regarded with the same evidentiary value as official
records of birth. Moreover, on this score, jurisprudence is consistent and uniform in ruling that
the canonical certificate of baptism is not sufficient to prove recognition.[18]
The unjustified failure to present the birth certificate instead of the baptismal certificate now
under consideration or to otherwise prove filiation by any of the means recognized by law weigh
heavily against respondents. In Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[19] this Court declared
that a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the
dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to his
kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the
Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of the
person baptized.[20] It is indispensable that such declarations and statements are shown by proof
recognized by law.[21]
There is thus no reason to further sustain respondents stance in the face of the aforecited
rulings explaining the significance of baptismal certificates. The lower court erred in giving too
much credence on the baptismal certificate of Felipa Caeta Buesa to prove that Felipa was the
daughter of one Gregoria Caeta and not of Eustaquia Caeta, the original registered owner of the
property under controversy.
The grant by the lower court of the motion for reconsideration from its own decision,
quieting the title of Pedro Cabais (and consequently of herein petitioners-successors in interest)
to the said property, on the basis mainly of such proof was unwarranted. To repeat, a baptismal
certificate, like all documents in general, attests the fact leading to its execution and the date
thereof, the administration of the sacrament on the day therein specified, but not to the veracity
of the statements therein contained regarding the kinsfolk of the person baptized.[22]
Furthermore, the above findings of the courts below relying on the baptismal certificate in
question to establish the filiation of Pedro Cabais mother must of necessity yield to the inherent
inconsistency and unbelievable nature of the baptismal certificate in question. It appears that said
baptismal certificate of Felipa C. Buesa states that she was born on September 13, 1899, while
the baptismal certificate of Gregoria Caeta, the supposed mother of Felipa, indicated that
Gregoria was born on May 9, 1898, or only a little more than one year ahead of her alleged
daughter.
This Court need not overstress the point that it is simply improbable under the above
circumstances for Gregoria to have been the mother of Felipa, and thus, to have been the real
grandmother of Pedro.The lower court should have readily taken judicial notice of this fact,
being one of those matters which come to the ordinary experiences of life and which is generally
accepted as true and is capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.[23]
However, as regards the contention that Civil Case No. 567 barred the filing of Civil Case
No. T-1284, the Court holds that the Court of Appeals erred not. Thus, in ruling on the
inapplicability of res judicata, it ratiocinated:
Nor would the defense of res judicata prosper. For the doctrine of res Judicata to
apply, (1) the judgment or order must be final; (2) the court rendering it must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the
merits; and (4) there must be identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
While We agree with appellants that the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-567 for non-
suit is an adjudication on the merits, the fourth element, particularly the identity of
causes of action, is absent in the case at bar. Civil Case No. T-567 was an action for
partition and accounting, while the instant case is an action for the annulment of
T.C.T. No. 55640. The evidence needed to sustain both the former and the present
causes of action are not the same.[24]
Be that as it may, the said pronouncement by the Court of Appeals is rendered moot and
academic by the finding here that there was no basis for the grant by the trial court of the motion
for reconsideration of its Joint Decision of September 20, 1989.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 28109 and
28110 is SET ASIDE, and the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of origin in Civil Case
Nos. T-1283 and T-1284, dated September 20, 1989, REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Acting Chief Justice), and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur in the result.
Supreme Court
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
Petitioners,
CORONA, J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus -
NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
Respondents. Promulgated:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
xxxx
II
That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the descendants of the late
Simeon C. Santos, married to Trinidad Duldulao, who died intestate
leaving a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Natividad Nstra.
Sra., Municipality of Laoag, designated as Lot No. 10675 of the
Cadastral Survey of Laoag;
III
That Simeon C. Santos during his lifetime, married to Trinidad
Duldulao, begot four (4) legitimate children, namely: Basilisa D. Santos,
Alberto D. Santos, Leoncio D. Santos and Alejandra D. Santos. Basilisa
D. Santos, [who] was married to Petronilo Agustin, is now deceased;
Alberto Santos, married to Rizalina Guerrero, is now deceased, while
Leoncio D. Santos, married to Dictinia Tabeta, and Alejandra D. Santos
married to Isauro M. Lazaro, are still living;
IV
That in the desire of the children of Simeon C. Santos from whom the
parcel of land originated as owner, his children, namely[:] Alberto,
Leoncio and Alejandra, all surnamed Santos, consented that the parcel of
land mentioned in paragraph II of this complaint be titled in the name of
Basilisa, the latter being the eldest and so Original Certificate of Title
No. 20742 in the name of Basilisa Santos was obtained although it was
agreed among them that it did not and does not necessarily mean that
Basilisa Santos is the sole and exclusive owner of this parcel of land, and
as embodied in the Title obtained in the name of Basilisa Santos, the
parcel of land is particularly described as follows:
V
That there is a residential house constructed on the lot described in
paragraph IV of this complaint and in the construction of which plaintiff
Alejandra Santos, then still single, spent the amount of P68,308.60,
while Basilisa Santos and her children spent the amount of P3,495.00.
Afterwards, Alejandra Santos got married to Isauro M. Lazaro who was
employed in a private company and when he retired from the service,
some additional constructions were made on the residential house and lot
such as a bedroom, azotea, two (2) toilets, two (2) kitchens, a car garage,
the money spent for these additional constructions came from the
earnings of the spouses Alejandra Santos-Lazaro and Isauro M. Lazaro.
The said residential house is now covered by Tax Declaration No. 010-
00225 in the names of Basilio Agustin (should be Basilisa Agustin) and
Alejandra Santos for the year 1994 with a market value of P93,920.00
and an assessed value of zero;
VI
That without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, the title of the
lot described in paragraph IV of the complaint was transferred into
another title which is now Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20695 in
the names of Modesta Agustin, Filemon Agustin, Venancia Agustin,
Marcelina Agustin, Monica Agustin, Gregorio Agustin and Bienvenido
Agustin who are the children of the late Basilisa Santos-Agustin who are
herein named as defendants with Monica Agustin now deceased
represented by her children Paul A. Dalalo and Noel A. Dalalo as
defendants;
VII
That during the lifetime of Basilisa Santos-Agustin, plaintiff Alejandra
Santos-Lazaro informed the former, who are sisters, that the transfer of
the title covering the lot described in paragraph IV of this complaint in
the name of Basilisa Santos into the names of her children would
erroneously imply that the lot is solely and exclusively owned by
Basilisa Santos-Agustin's children, but Basilisa Santos-Agustin replied
[to] plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro not to worry because an affidavit
was already executed by her recognizing and specifying that her brothers
Alberto Santos and Leoncio Santos, and her sister Alejandra Santos-
Lazaro would each get one fourth () share of the lot;
VIII
IX
That plaintiffs now invoke the intervention of the court to partition the
lot in accordance with the law on intestate succession and to partition the
residential house as specified below. x x x
x x x x[5]
Petitioners also prayed for the grant of attorney's fees, moral and exemplary
damages, and costs of suit.
Herein respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim,[6] raising the following
as their Special/Affirmative Defenses:
x x x x[7]
After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits
ensued.
On January 6, 2000, the MTCC rendered its Decision[8] dismissing the complaint
and denying petitioners' prayer for partition.
The MTCC ruled, among others, that no evidentiary value could be given to the
affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein she purportedly acknowledged
her co-ownership of the subject property with her siblings Alberto, Leoncio and
Alejandra, because the affiant was not presented on the witness stand, such that all
the statements made in her affidavit were hearsay. Moreover, the MTCC held that
two credible witnesses testified in plain, simple and straightforward manner that at
the time the affidavit was supposed to have been signed and sworn to before the
notary public, Basilisa was already bedridden and an invalid who could not even
raise her hand to feed herself. In addition, the MTCC also gave credence to the
testimony of the notary public, before whom the document was supposedly signed
and sworn to, that the said affidavit was already complete and thumbmarked when
the same was presented to him by a person who claimed to be Basilisa.
On February 6, 2001 the RTC issued a Decision[9] affirming, with modification, the
judgment of the MTCC. The RTC found that the house erected on the disputed lot
was built and renovated by petitioners in good faith. As a consequence, the RTC
held that petitioners were entitled to indemnity representing the costs of the
construction and renovation of the said house. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision, thus, reads:
SO ORDERED.[10]
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, petitioners filed a petition for review with the
CA.
On February 21, 2002, the CA issued its presently assailed Decision disposing as
follows:
SO ORDERED.[11]
In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that Basilisa's sworn statement
which recognizes her siblings' share in the disputed property is a declaration
against interest which is one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Petitioners argue that since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be
admitted in court without further proof of its due execution and authenticity; that
the testimonies of Basilisa's nurse and physician cannot qualify as clear and
convincing evidence which could overthrow such notarized document; that the
notary public cannot impugn the same document which he notarized for to do so
would render notarized documents worthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice
to the public.
As to the second assigned error, petitioners aver that their co-ownership of the
questioned property with Basilisa did not cease to exist when the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) consolidated its ownership over the said parcel of land.
Petitioners assert that they did not lose their share in the property co-owned when
their share was mortgaged by Basilisa without their knowledge and consent; that
the mortgage was limited only to the portion that may be allotted to Basilisa upon
termination of their co-ownership; that PNB acquired ownership only of the share
pertaining to Basilisa; that when Basilisa bought back the property from PNB, she
simply re-acquired the portion pertaining to her and simply resumed co-ownership
of the property with her siblings. Petitioners also contend that Basilisa's children
did not acquire ownership of the subject lot by prescription, and that neither
Basilisa nor respondents repudiated their co-ownership.
Anent the third assignment of error, petitioners argue that Alejandra Lazaro, being
a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land and not simply a builder in good faith, is
entitled to a partition of the subject residential house.
At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong for petitioners to argue that
Basilisa's alleged sworn statement is a declaration against interest. It is not a
declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission against interest.
A cursory reading of the subject sworn statement also reveals that it refers to a
parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 10678 while the property being disputed is
Lot No. 10676.[17] On this basis, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the
property being referred to in the sworn statement is the same property claimed by
petitioners.
Having made the foregoing observations and discussions, the question that arises is
whether the subject sworn statement, granting that it refers to the property being
disputed in the present case, can be given full faith and credence in view of the
issues raised regarding its genuineness and due execution.
The Court rules in the negative.
Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of
regularity.[18] However, this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.[19]
Moreover, not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on
authentication.[20] Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public
document just because it contains a notarial jurat.[21] The presumptions that attach
to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the
notarization was regular.[22]
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to reverse the rulings of the
MTCC, the RTC and the CA. Although the questioned sworn statement is a public
document having in its favor the presumption of regularity, such presumption was
adequately refuted by competent witnesses.
The Court further agrees with the ruling of the RTC that:
The testimony of [the notary public] Atty. Angel Respicio did not suffice
to rebut the evidence of the appellees considering his admission that the
affidavit was already thumbmarked when presented to him by one who
claimed to be Basilisa Santos and whom, the witness said he did not
know personally. Further, what makes the documents suspect is the fact
that it was subscribed on the same date as the financial statement of
Alejandra Santos.
It may not be amiss to point out, at this juncture, that the principal function of a
notary public is to authenticate documents.[31] When a notary public certifies to the
due execution and delivery of a document under his hand and seal, he gives the
document the force of evidence.[32] Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring
documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity
which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize
such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and
delivery.[33] A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed before a notary public and appended to a
private instrument.[34] Hence, a notary public must discharge his powers and duties,
which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. [35] A notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are
the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest
to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.[36]
In the instant case, the notary public should have exercised utmost diligence in
ascertaining the true identity of the person executing the said sworn statement.
However, the notary public did not comply with this requirement. He simply relied
on the affirmative answers of the person appearing before him attesting that she
was Basilisa Santos; that the contents of the sworn statement are true; and that the
thumbmark appearing on the said document was hers. However, this would not
suffice. He could have further asked the person who appeared before him to
produce any identification to prove that she was indeed Basilisa Santos,
considering that the said person was not personally known to him, and that the
thumbmark appearing on the document sought to be notarized was not affixed in
his presence. But he did not. Thus, the lower courts did not commit any error in not
giving evidentiary weight to the subject sworn statement.
The second and third assigned errors proceed on the presumption that petitioners
are co-owners of the disputed property. Since the Court has already ruled that the
lower courts did not err in finding that petitioners failed to prove their claim that
they were co-owners of the said property, there is no longer any need to discuss the
other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 21, 2002 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63321 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
Promulgated:
ROSARIO G.
VENTUROZO, October 19, 2011
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision reversed and set aside the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 40 in Civil Case No. D-
9040, as the appellate court declared respondent Rosario G. Venturozo the owner
of the land in dispute, and ordered petitioner Adelaida Meneses to vacate and
surrender her possession thereof to respondent.
The issue before the trial court was whether the sale made by defendant
Adelaida Meneses in favor of plaintiffs father, Basilio de Guzman, was valid.[6]
On July 18, 1991, the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 40 (trial court)
rendered a Decision in favor of defendant Adelaida Meneses. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
1) Declaring the Deed of Absolute and Definite Sale dated June 20, 1966
(Exhibit B) and the Deed of Absolute and Definite Sale dated January 31,
1973 (Exhibit A) null and void ab initio;
SO ORDERED.[7]
The trial court found that defendant Adelaida Meneses inherited the land in
dispute from her father, Domingo Meneses; that she did not sell her property to
Basilio de Guzman in 1966; and that the signature of Adelaida Meneses on the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 is a forgery. The trial court stated that
the signature of Adelaida Meneses, as appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 20, 1966, is very much different from her specimen signatures and
those appearing in the records of Civil Case No. 1096 in the Municipal Trial Court
of Mangaldan. It held that since there was no valid transfer of the property by
Adelaida Meneses to Basilio de Guzman, the conveyance of the same property in
1973 by Basilio de Guzman to his daughter, plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo, was
also invalid. The trial court stated that the claim of plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo,
that her parents, Spouses Basilio and Crescencia de Guzman, purchased from
defendant Adelaida Meneses the subject property in 1966, is negated by
defendants continued possession of the land and she gathered the products
therefrom.
Plaintiff appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals stated that appellee Adelaida Meneses failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that her signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 20, 1966 was a forgery. Instead, she admitted on direct examination that
her signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was genuine, thus:
Q. There is a signature over the name of the vendor Adelaida Meneses which was
previously marked as Exhibit 6-a and Exhibit A-1 for the plaintiff, will you
examine this signature, if do you (sic) know this signature?
A. This is my signature, sir.[9]
The Court of Appeals also stated that mere variance of signatures cannot be
considered as conclusive proof that the same were forged, as forgery cannot be
presumed.[11]Appellee Adelaida Meneses should have produced specimen
signatures appearing on documents executed in or about the year 1966 for a better
comparison and analysis.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that a notarized document, like the questioned
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, has in its favor the presumption of
regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the document should be
upheld.[13] Moreover, Atty. Abelardo G. Biala − the notary public before whom the
questioned Deed of Sale was acknowledged − testified and confirmed its
genuineness and due execution, particularly the signature in question. The
appellate court stated that as against appellee Adelaida Meneses version, Atty.
Bialas testimony, that appellee appeared before him and acknowledged that the
questioned deed was her free and voluntary act, is more credible. The testimony of
a notary public enjoys greater credence than that of an ordinary witness.[14]
The Court of Appeals held that appellee Adelaida Meneses failed to present
clear and convincing evidence to overcome the evidentiary force of the questioned
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 1966, which appears on its face to have been
executed with all the formalities required by law.
Adelaida Meneses motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit
by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[15] dated April 5, 2006.
Hence, Adelaida Meneses, substituted by her heir, filed this petition raising
this lone issue:
I
WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, WHICH
REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, IS IN
KEEPING WITH BOTH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.[16]
Petitioner contends that her statement, made during the course of her
testimony in the trial court, was taken out of context by respondent to be used
merely as an argumentative point. The examining lawyer used the words, Do you
know this signature? viz.:
Q. There is a signature over the name of the vendor Adelaida Meneses which was
previously marked as Exhibit 6-a and Exhibit A-1 for the plaintiff, will you
examine this signature, if do you (sic) know this signature?
A. This is my signature, sir.[17]
She avers that the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon
the party invoking it and does not require proof admits of two exceptions: (1) when
it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake; and (2) when it
is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one
to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission. For
instance, if a party invokes an admission by an adverse party, but cites the
admission out of context, then the one making the admission may show that he
made no such admission, or that his admission was taken out of context. [18] This
may be interpreted as to mean not in the sense in which the admission is made to
appear.[19]
Petitioner also contends that a comparison of the signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 and her specimen signatures, as well as her
genuine signature on pleadings, were made by the trial court, and it ruled that her
signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 was a forgery. She
submits that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is entitled to great respect,[20] and the appellate court should have given
weight to the trial courts findings that her signature on the said Deed of Absolute
Sale was a forgery.
The rule is that the jurisdiction of the Court over appealed cases from the
Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly
committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed
conclusive.[21] Thus, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over
again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.[22] However, this
rule admits exceptions,[23] such as when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court[24] like in this case.
In this case, it should be pointed out that contrary to the finding of the Court
of Appeals, the Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1966 did not comply with the
formalities required by law, specifically Act No. 496,[32] otherwise known as The
Land Registration Act, which took effect on January 1, 1903, as Section 127 of the
Act provides:
FORMS
Section 127. Deeds, conveyances, mortgages, leases, releases,
and discharges affecting lands, whether registered under this Act or
unregistered, shall be sufficient in law when made substantially in
accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to
convey, encumber, lease, release, discharge, or bind the lands as
though made in accordance with the more prolix form heretofore in
use: Provided, That every such instrument shall be signed by the
person or persons executing the same, in the presence of two
witnesses, who shall sign the instrument as witnesses to the execution
thereof, and shall be acknowledged to be his or their free act and deed
by the person or persons executing the same, before the judge of a
court of record or clerk of a court of record, or a notary public, or a
justice of the peace, who shall certify to such acknowledgment x x
x.[33]
In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, the Notary Public signed
his name as one of the two witnesses to the execution of the said deed; hence, there
was actually only one witness thereto. Moreover, the residence certificate of
petitioner was issued to petitioner and then it was given to the Notary Public the
day after the execution of the deed of sale and notarization; hence, the number of
petitioners residence certificate and the date of issuance (June 21, 1966) thereof
was written on the Deed of Absolute Sale by the Notary Public on June 21, 1966,
after the execution and notarization of the said deed on June 20,
1966.[34] Considering the defect in the notarization, the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 20, 1966 cannot be considered a public document, but only a private
document,[35] and the evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based on
preponderance of evidence.
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either: (a) by anyone who saw the document executed
or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.
The Court agrees with petitioner that her admission was taken out of context,
considering that in her Answer[39] to the Complaint, she stated that the alleged
Deed of Sale purportedly executed by her in favor of Basilio de Guzman is a
forgery; that she never signed the said Deed of Sale; that she did not appear
personally before the Notary Public; and that she did not secure the residence
certificate mentioned in the said Deed of Sale. She also testified that she never sold
her land to Basilio de Guzman;[40] that she never met the Notary Public, Attorney
Abelardo Biala,[41] and that she did not meet Basilio de Guzman on June 20,
1966.[42] The trial court found petitioner and her testimony to be credible, and
declared the Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1966 null and void ab initio. These
circumstances negate the said admission.
The Court finds the Notary Publics testimony self-serving and unreliable,
because although he testified that petitioner was the one who submitted her
residence certificate to him on June 21, 1966,[43] the next day after the Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed on June 20, 1966, Crescencia de Guzman, respondents
mother, testified that she and her husband got the residence certificate from
petitioner and gave it to the Notary Public on June 21, 1966.[44] Thus, it is doubtful
whether the Notary Public really knew the identity of the vendor who signed the
Deed of Absolute Sale[45] dated June 20, 1966.
The Court notes that the trial court found petitioner and her testimony to be
credible. It is a well-settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility
of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect.[46] Having observed the deportment
of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a better position to determine the
issue of credibility.[47]
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is to assist and facilitate a trial court's
function to be able to receive all the evidence of the parties, and evaluate their admissibility and probative value
in the context of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings in order to arrive at a conclusion as to the facts
that transpired. Having been able to establish the facts, the trial court will then be able to apply the law and
determine whether a complainant is deserving of the reliefs prayed for in the pleading.
Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules without a clear demonstration of the
injury to a substantive right of the defendant weighed against 19 years of litigation actively participated in by
both parties should not be encouraged.
There is likewise serious reversible error, even grave abuse of discretion, when the Sandiganbayan dismisses
a case on demurrer to evidence without a full statement of its evaluation of the evidence presented and offered
and the interpretation of the relevant law. After all, dismissal on the basis of demurrer to evidence is similar to a
judgment. It is a final order ruling on the merits of a case.
This is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated May 25, 2006 2 and
September 13, 2006.3 The Sandiganbayan deemed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) to have
waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence4 and granted the Motion to Dismiss of respondents Spouses
Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez (Gimenez Spouses) based on demurrer to evidence.5
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a Complaint 6 for
Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before the
Sandiganbayan.7 "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten wealth . . . acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses]
as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]" 8
During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held, business interests,
income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses.9 The Republic presented the testimonies of Atty.
Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of
the Research and Development Department of PCGG.10 Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and
businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.11
On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo R.V. Daniel’s testimony. 12 The
Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further evidence."13 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 "to file its formal offer of evidence."14
On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28, 2006, within
which to file [its] formal offer of evidence."15 This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of
the same date.16
On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within which to file its
Formal Offer of Evidence.17 This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8,
2006.18 Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the Republic.
In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed to file
its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the date it
terminated its presentation of evidence.19 Thus, it declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer
of Evidence.20
It appearing that the plaintiff has long terminated the presentation of its evidence on February 27, 2006, and it
appearing further that it failed or otherwise neglected to file its written formal offer of evidence for an
unreasonable period of time consisting of 75 days (i.e., 30 days original period plus two extension periods
totaling 45 days), the filing of said written formal offer of evidence is hereby deemed WAIVED.
WHEREFORE, the reception of the defendants’ evidence shall proceed on June 22 and 23, 2006, both at 8:30
o’clock [sic] in the morning as previously scheduled.21
Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated May 30, 2006.22 He argued that the
Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action.23 Fe Roa Gimenez
filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of failure to prosecute. 24 Through her own Motion
to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence.25
Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June 15, 2006, the Republic filed a
Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of
Evidence.26 The pertinent portions of the Republic’s offer of documentary exhibits attached to the Motion are
summarized as follows:
Exhibits A to G and series consist of the Income Tax Returns, Certificate of Income Tax Withheld On
Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld At Source, Schedule of Interest Income, Royalties and Withholding
Tax, Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net Worth of Ignacio B. Gimenez from 1980-1986 proving his legitimate
income during said period. Exhibits H -J and series refer to the Deeds of Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title
proving that spouses Gimenezes acquired several real properties.
Exhibits K and series (K-1-K-4) pertain to Checking Statements Summary issued by the Bankers Trust
Company (BTC) proving that Fe Roa Gimenez maintained a current account under Account Number 34-714-
415 with BTC. Exhibits L and series (L1-L-114) are several BTC checks, proving that from June 1982 to April
1984, Fe Roa Gimenez issued several checks against her BTC Current Account No. 34-714-415 payable to
some individuals and entities such as Erlinda Oledan, Vilma Bautista, The Waldorf Towers, Cartier, Gliceria
Tantoco, Bulgari, Hammer Galleries and Renato Balestra, involving substantial amount of money in US
Dollars. Exhibits M and series (M1-M-25) are several The Chase Manhattan Bank (TCMB) checks drawn
against the account of Fe Roa Gimenez under Account Number 021000021, proving that she issued several
checks drawn against her TCMB account, payable to individuals and entities such as Gliceria Tantoco, Vilma
Bautista and The Waldorf Towers, involving substantial sums in US Dollars. Exhibit N is the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), New York Branch Office Charge Ticket No. FT 56880 dated December 9, 1982 in the amount of
US$30,000.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she received said enormous amount from the PNB, New York
Branch Office, with clearance from the Central Bank, which amount was charged against PNB Manila. Exhibit
N-1 is the PNB New York Branch Advice to Payee No. FT 56535 dated November 12, 1982 in the amount of
US$10,990.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving her receipt of such amount as remitted from California Overseas
Bank, Los Angeles. Exhibits O and series (O1-O-8) refer to several Advices made by Bankers Trust AG
Zurich-Geneve Bank in Switzerland to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she maintained a current
account with said bank under Account Number 107094.50 and that from July 30, 1984 to August 30, 1984, she
placed a substantial amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Hypobank, Luzemburg, Luxemburg,
Societe Generale, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.
Exhibit P is the Certification dated March 19, 2002 issued by Director Florino O. Ibanez of the Office of the
President proving that Fe Roa Gimenez, from January 1, 1966 to April 1, 1986, worked with the Office of the
President under different positions, the last of which as Presidential Staff Director with a salary of P87,072.00
per annum.
Exhibit Q and series (Q-1-Q-18) is the Affirmation of Ralph Shapiro filed with the United States Court of
Appeals in the case entitled, "The Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al." which discussed
certain acts of Fe Roa Gimenez and Vilma Bautista, among others, in relation to the funds of the Marcoses.
Exhibits R and S and series (R-1, R-9; S-1-S-10) refer to the Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of
Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., the Amended Articles of Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed
Education, Inc., the Treasurer’s Affidavit executed by Ignacio Gimenez and the Director’s Certificate executed
by Roberto B. Olanday, Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto Coyuto, Jr. proving Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto
Olanday’s interests in GEl Guaranteed Education, Inc.
Exhibits T and series (T-1-T-8) are the Advices made by the Bankers Trust AG Zurich-Geneve Bank in
Switzerland to Ignacio Gimenez proving that he maintained a current account with said bank under Account
Number 101045.50 and that from March to June, 1984, he placed a substantial amount on time deposit in
several banks, namely, Credit Lyonnais, Brussels, Societe Generale, Paris, Credit Commercial De France,
Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.
Exhibits U and V and series (U-1-U-5; V1-V-18) consist of the Affidavit dated April 25, 1986 and the
Declaration dated June 23, 1987 including the attachments, of Oscar Carino, Vice-President and Manager of
the PNB New York Branch, narrating in detail how the funds of the PNB New York Branch were disbursed
outside regular banking business upon the instructions of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
Marcos using Fe Roa Gimenez and others as conduit.
Exhibits W and series (W-1-W-4) are the Debit memos from the PNB to Fe Roa Gimenez while Exhibits X
and X-1 are the Acknowledgments of said respondent, proving that she received substantial amounts of money
which were coursed through the PNB to be used by the Marcos spouses for state visits and foreign trips.
Exhibit Y and series (Y-1-Y-2) is the Letter dated August 25, 1986 of Juan C. Gatmaitan, Assistant Chief
Legal Counsel of PNB to Charles G. LaBella, Assistant United States Attorney regarding the ongoing
investigation of irregular transactions at the PNB, New York Branch proving that PNB cooperated with the
United States government in connection with the investigation on the irregular transactions of Oscar Carino at
PNB New York Branch.
Exhibit Z is the service record of Fe Roa Gimenez issued by Florino O. Ibanez of the Office of the President
which proves that she worked with the Office of the President from 1966-1986 holding different positions, the
last of which was Presidential Staff Director.
1âwphi 1
Exhibits AA and series (AA-1 –AA-2) are the several Traders Royal Bank checks drawn against Account No.
74-702836-9 under the account name of Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that she issued said checks payable to
individuals and entities involving substantial amount of money.
Exhibits BB and CC and series (BB-1–BB-17; CC-1-CC-3) are the several Transfer of Funds Advice from
Traders Royal Bank Statements of Account of Fe Roa Gimenez, proving that she maintained a current account
under Account No. 74-7028369 at Traders Royal Bank.
Exhibits HH and series (HH-1-HH-3) are the Certification dated October 3, 2002 of Lamberto R. Barbin,
Officer-in-Charge, Malacanang Records Office, that the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of spouses
Marcoses for the years 1965 up to 1986 are not among the records on file in said Office except 1965, 1967 and
1969; the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of December 31, 1969 and December 31, 1967 of former
President Ferdinand Marcos; and the Sworn Statement of Financial Condition, Assets, Income and Liabilities
as of December 31, 1965 of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These documentary exhibits prove the assets
and liabilities of former President Marcos for the years 1965,1967 and 1969.
Exhibit II and series is [sic] the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of December 31,1969 submitted by Fe
Roa Gimenez which prove that her assets on that period amounted only to P39,500.00.
Exhibit KK is the Table of Contents of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan entitled "Republic of
the Philippines vs. Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, et. al.", including its Annexes which prove the
assets and liabilities of spouses Gimenezes.
Exhibits KK-1 up to KK-12 are several transfer certificates of title and tax declarations in the names of
spouses Gimenezes, proving their acquisition of several real properties.
Exhibits KK-15, KK-18, KK-20 up to KK-27, KK-30, KK-32 up to KK-38 and KK-40 are the General
Information Sheet, Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation, and Amended Articles of
Incorporation of various corporations. These prove the corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez has
substantial interests.
Exhibits KK-41 up to KK-44 are the Writs and Letters of Sequestration issued by the PCGG which prove that
the shares of stocks of Ignacio Gimenez in Ignacio B. Gimenez, Securities, Inc. and the real properties covered
by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 137638, 132807, 126693 and 126694 located in San Fabian, Pangasinan,
were sequestered by the PCGG.
Exhibit KK-45 is the Memorandum dated August 1, 1988 of Atty. Ralph S. Lee and Alexander M. Berces,
Team Supervisor and Investiogator, [sic] respectively, of IRD, PCGG, proving that the PCGG conducted an
investigation on New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction Corporation, and OTO Construction and
Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday.
Exhibits KK-48, KK-49 and KK-50 are certain Lis Pendens from the PCGG addressed to the concerned
Register of Deeds informing that the real properties mentioned therein had been sequestered and are the
subject of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan.
Exhibits KK-51, KK-51-A, KK-52 and KK-52-A are the Letter and Writ of Sequestration issued by the PCGG
on Allied Banking Corporation and Guaranteed Education Inc. pursuant to its mandate to go after ill-gotten
wealth.
Exhibits NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 refer to the Memorandum To All Commercial Banks dated March 14,
1986 issued by then Central Bank Governor Jose B. Fernandez and the Letter dated March 13, 1986 of Mary
Concepcion Bautista, PCGG Commissioner addressed to then Central Bank Governor Fernandez requesting
that names be added to the earlier request of PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga to instruct all commercial banks
not to allow any withdrawal or transfer of funds from the market placements under the names of said persons,
to include spouses Gimenezes, without authority from PCGG.
Exhibits KK and series, NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 which prove the various real properties, business
interests and bank accounts owned by spouses Gimenezes were part of the testimony of Atty. Tereso Javier.
Exhibit RR and series (RR-1-RR-23) are the Affidavit dated July 24, 1987 of Dominador Pangilinan, Acting
President and President of Trader’s Royal Bank, and the attached Recapitulation, Status of Banker’s
Acceptances, Status of Funds and Savings Account Ledger wherein he mentioned that Malacanang
maintained trust accounts at Trader’s Royal Bank, the balance of which is approximately 150-175 million
Pesos, and that he was informed by Mr. Rivera that the funds were given to him (Rivera) by Fe Roa Gimenez
for deposit to said accounts.
Exhibits SS and series (SS-1-SS-29) are the Affidavit dated July 23, 1987 of Apolinario K. Medina, Executive
Vice President of Traders Royal Bank and attachments, which include Recapitulation, Status of Funds, and
Messages from Traders Royal Bank Manila to various foreign banks. In his Affidavit, Medina divulged certain
numbered confidential trust accounts maintained by Malacanang with the Trader’s Royal Bank. He further
stated that the deposits were so substantial that he suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or
his family.
Exhibit TT and series (TT-1-TT-3) is [sic] the Memorandum dated July 19, 2005 of Danilo R.V. Daniel, then
Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG regarding the investigation conducted on the
ill-gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, the subject matter of Civil Case No. [0]007. He revealed that during
the investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, it was found out that from 1977 to 1982,
several withdrawals, in the total amount of P75,090,306.42 were made from Trust Account No. 128 (A/C 76-
128) in favor of I.B. Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez.
Exhibits RR, SS, TT and their series prove that spouses Gimenez maintained bank accounts of substantial
amounts and gained control of various corporations. These are also being offered as part of the testimony of
1âwphi 1
In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s
Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss.28 According to the
Sandiganbayan:
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the higher ends of substantial justice
militate against dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds, the circumstances of this case show that the
ends of justice will not be served if this Court allows the wanton disregard of the Rules of Court and of the
Court’s orders. Rules of procedure are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases. . . .
The reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to timely file the formal offer of evidence fail to persuade
this Court. The missing exhibits mentioned by the plaintiff’s counsel appear to be the same missing documents
since 2004, or almost two (2) years ago. The plaintiff had more than ample time to locate them for its purpose. .
. . Since they remain missing after lapse of the period indicated by the Court, there is no reason why the search
for these documents should delay the filing of the formal offer of evidence.
[Petitioner’s] counsel . . . admits that faced with other pressing matters, he lost track of the time. We cannot just
turn a blind eye on the negligence of the parties and in their failure to observe the orders of this Court. The
carelessness of [petitioner’s] counsel in keeping track of the deadlines is an unacceptable reason for the Court
to set aside its Order and relax the observance of the period set for filing the formal offer of evidence. 29 (Citation
omitted)
The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its case for an unreasonable length of time
and to comply with the court’s rules.30 The court also noted that the documentary evidence presented by the
Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies.31 However, the persons who certified the documents as
copies of the original were not presented.32 Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.33 The dispositive
portion of the assailed Resolution reads:
ACCORDINGLY, there being no valid and cogent justification shown by the plaintiff for the Court to Grant its
Motion for Reconsideration and admit its Formal Offer of Evidence, the plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence
filed by the defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez and adopted by defendant Fe Roa Gimenez is GRANTED. The case
is then DISMISSED.
The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 3, 2006 before this court. 35
The Gimenez Spouses were required to comment on the Petition.36 This court noted the separate
Comments37 filed by the Gimenez Spouses.38 The Republic responded to the Comments through a
Consolidated Reply39 dated June 22, 2007.
In the Resolution40 dated August 29, 2007, this court required the parties to submit their memoranda. 41
On February 18, 2008, this court resolved to require the parties to "move in the premises[.]"42
On March 2, 2012, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Re-open Proceedings, to File and Admit Attached
Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari.43 In this Supplement, the Republic argued that the second assailed
Resolution dated September 13, 2006 was void for failing to state the facts and the law on which it was
based.44This Motion was granted, and the Gimenez Spouses were required to file their Comment on the
Supplement to the Petition.45 Thereafter, the Republic filed its Reply.46
Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Rejoinder47 dated December 19, 2012 which was expunged by this court in a
Resolution48dated January 23, 2013. Ignacio Gimenez’s Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached
Rejoinder49 was denied.50
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in dismissing the case in the light of the allegations in the
Complaint which were substantiated by overwhelming evidence presented vis-a-vis the material admissions of
spouses Gimenezes as their answer failed to specifically deny that they were dummies of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and that they acquired illegal wealth grossly disproportionate to their lawful income in a
manner prohibited under the Constitution and Anti-Graft Statutes.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner’s Motion to Admit Formal Offer of
Evidence on the basis of mere technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right to due process.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in making a sweeping pronouncement that petitioner’s
evidence do not bear any probative value.51
First, whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions; and
Second, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner Republic of the Philippines waived the
filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez’s
Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez pictures petitioner as being confused as to the proper mode of review of the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions. According to him, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion.52 Hence, petitioner should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and not a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.53 Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any error,
and petitioner has to show that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
in excess of jurisdiction.54
Observance of the proper procedure before courts, especially before the Sandiganbayan, cannot be stressed
enough. Due process is enshrined in the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights.55 "Due process [in criminal
cases] guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved[.]" 56 "Mere suspicion of
guilt should not sway judgment."57
To determine whether a petition for review is the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions, we
review the nature of actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages.
Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth are also called
civil forfeiture proceedings.
Republic Act No. 137958 provides for the procedure by which forfeiture proceedings may be instituted against
public officers or employees who "[have] acquired during his [or her] incumbency an amount of property which
is manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as such public officer or employee and to his [or her] other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed prima
facie to have been unlawfully acquired."59
This court has already settled the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over civil forfeiture cases:
. . . violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even though the
proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty. 60
In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,61 this court re-affirmed the doctrine that forfeiture proceedings under
Republic Act No. 1379 are civil in nature.62 Civil forfeiture proceedings were also differentiated from plunder
cases:
. . . a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case.
. . . In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine,
by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate
income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor
General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a
determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the
illegal wealth.63(Citation omitted)
To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 is the
same with other civil cases — preponderance of evidence.64
When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the dismissal is equivalent to an acquittal. 65
As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the
accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.66
Hence, the Republic may only assail an acquittal through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court:
Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence
may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow ground of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.67 (Citation omitted)
In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner correctly filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides the mode of appeal from
judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
II
Petitioner argues that substantial justice requires doing away with the procedural technicalities. 68 Loss of vital
documentary proof warranted extensions to file the Formal Offer of Evidence.69 Honest efforts to locate several
missing documents resulted in petitioner’s inability to file the pleading within the period granted by the
Sandiganbayan.70
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for its incompetence
during trial.71 Even if the evidence were formally offered within the prescribed period, PCGG’s evidence still had
no probative value.72 It is solely petitioner’s fault "that the persons who certified to the photocopies of the
originals were not presented to testify[.]"73 It is also misleading to argue that the pieces of documentary
evidence presented are public documents.74 "The documents are not public in the sense that these are official
issuances of the Philippine government." 75 "The bulk consists mainly of notarized, private documents that have
simply been certified true and faithful."76
According to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez, petitioner tries to excuse its non-filing of the Formal Offer of
Evidence within the prescribed period by raising its efforts to locate the 66 missing documents. 77 However, the
issue of the missing documents was laid to rest during the hearing on November 16, 2004.78 The
Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until March 2005 to produce the documents; otherwise, these would be
excluded.79 The testimonies of the witnesses related to the missing documents would also be expunged from
the case records.80
Moreover, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that "[t]he Sandiganbayan did not err when it ruled that the
great bulk of the documentary evidence offered by the PCGG have no probative value."81 Aside from the 66
missing documents it failed to present, almost all of petitioner’s pieces of documentary evidence were mere
photocopies.82The few that were certified true copies were not testified on by the persons who certified these
documents.83
Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of evidence. Testimonial evidence is offered "at
the time [a] witness is called to testify."84 Documentary and object evidence, on the other hand, are offered
"after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence."85 Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally
done orally unless permission is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence. 86
More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be formally offered to be considered by
the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the determination of the case.87 "Failure to make a formal offer
within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it."88
Rule 132, Section 34 provides:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due process. Parties
must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them and take the necessary actions to
secure their case.89 Hence, any document or object that was marked for identification is not evidence unless it
was "formally offered and the opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the
witness called upon to prove or identify it."90
The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." A
formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know
the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows
opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the
appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial
court.91 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
To consider a party’s evidence which was not formally offered during trial would deprive the other party of due
process. Evidence not formally offered has no probative value and must be excluded by the court. 92
Petitioner’s failure to file its written Formal Offer of Evidence of the numerous documentary evidence presented
within the prescribed period is a non-issue. In its first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan declared that petitioner waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence when it failed to file the
pleading on May 13, 2006, the deadline based on the extended period granted by the court. Petitioner was
granted several extensions of time by the Sandiganbayan totalling 75 days from the date petitioner terminated
its presentation of evidence. Notably, this 75-day period included the original 30-day period. Subsequently,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, and the Formal
Offer of Evidence.
In resolving petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, the
Sandiganbayan found the carelessness of petitioner’s counsel unacceptable. According to the Sandiganbayan,
it could not countenance the non-observance of the court’s orders.
This court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover the assets and properties illegally
acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their
close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees.93 Hence, this court has
adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten
wealth:
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities
and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases
resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties
concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two
decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The
definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition,
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these
funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities
and annoying procedural sidetracks.94 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit, belatedly. Petitioner hurdled 19 years
of trial before the Sandiganbayan to present its evidence as shown in its extensive Formal Offer of Evidence.
As petitioner argues:
Undeniable from the records of the case is that petitioner was vigorous in prosecuting the case. The most
tedious and crucial stage of the litigation and presentation of evidence has been accomplished. Petitioner
completed its presentation of evidence proving the ill-gotten nature and character of the funds and assets
sought to be recovered in the present case. It presented vital testimonial and documentary evidence consisting
of voluminous record proving the gross disparity of the subject funds to spouses Gimenezes’ combined
declared income which must be reconveyed to the Republic for being acquired in blatant violation of the
Constitution and the Anti-Graft statutes.95
This court is not unmindful of the difficulty in gathering voluminous documentary evidence in cases of forfeiture
of ill-gotten wealth acquired throughout the years. It is never easy to prosecute corruption and take back what
rightfully belongs to the government and the people of the Republic.
This is not the first time that this court relaxed the rule on formal offer of evidence.
Tan v. Lim96 arose from two civil Complaints: one for injunction and another for legal redemption, which were
heard jointly before the trial court.97 The defendant did not file a Formal Offer of Evidence in the injunction
case98 and merely adopted the evidence offered in the legal redemption case.99 The trial court held that the
defendant’s failure to file his Formal Offer of Evidence in the injunction case rendered the plaintiff’s evidence
therein as uncontroverted.100 The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision and was affirmed by this court.101 This
court ruled that while the trial court’s reasoning in its Decision was technically sound, a liberal interpretation
was more appropriate and in line with substantial justice:
It may be true that Section 34, Rule 132 of the rules directs the court to consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered and that under Section 35, documentary evidence is offered after presentation of
testimonial evidence. However, a liberal interpretation of these Rules would have convinced the trial court that
a separate formal offer of evidence in Civil Case No. 6518 was superfluous because not only was an offer of
evidence made in Civil Case No. 6521 that was being jointly heard by the trial court, counsel for Jose Renato
Lim had already declared he was adopting these evidences for Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court itself stated
that it would freely utilize in one case evidence adduced in the other only to later abandon this posture. Jose
Renato Lim testified in Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court should have at least considered his testimony since
at the time it was made, the rules provided that testimonial evidence is deemed offered at the time the witness
is called to testify. Rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid, technical case as they are devised
chiefly to secure and not defeat substantial justice.
....
The logic of the Court of Appeals is highly persuasive. Indeed, apparently, the trial court was being overly
technical about the nonsubmission of Jose Renato Lim’s formal offer of evidence. This posture not only goes
against Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure decreeing a liberal construction of the rules to
promote a just, speedy and inexpensive litigation but ignores the consistent rulings of the Court against utilizing
the rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice. Despite the intervening years, the language of the Court in
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, still remains relevant:
"x x x. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to
the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the
character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and
unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism."102 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Furthermore, "subsequent and substantial compliance . . . may call for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure."103
Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays petitioner incurred in
submitting its Formal Offer of Evidence and the state’s policy on recovering ill-gotten wealth, this court is of the
belief that it is but only just that the Rules be relaxed and petitioner be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer
of Evidence. The Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions should be reversed.
III
According to petitioner, the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the demurrer to evidence filed by
respondents and dismissed the case despite a "prima facie foundation [based on the pleadings and documents
on record] that spouses Gimenezes amassed enormous wealth grossly disproportionate to their lawful income
or declared lawful assets."104
Similarly, the Complaint alleged specific acts committed by respondent Ignacio Gimenez:
[T]aking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and connection, by himself and/or in unlawful concert
and active collaboration with former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos for the purpose of
mutually enriching themselves and preventing the disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained: (a) acted
as the dummy, nominee or agent of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in several
corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi
National Resources, Philippine Oversees, Inc. and Pioneer Natural Resources; (b) unlawfully obtained, through
corporations organized by them such as the New City Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multi-million peso contracts with
the government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as projects of
the National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika Livelihood, to the gross and
manifest disadvantage of the Government and the Filipino people; and (c) in furtherance of the above stated
illegal purposes, organized several establishments engaged in food, mining and other businesses such as the
Transnational Construction Corporation, Total Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology
Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T Development Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development
Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining Corporation, Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation,
GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc.105
Despite the specific allegations in the Complaint, petitioner contends that respondents merely gave general
denials to the allegations in the Complaint.106 "[N]o specific denial [was] made on the material allegations [in] the
[C]omplaint."107
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the Sandiganbayan was correct in granting the Motion to Dismiss
on demurrer to evidence.
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez claims that petitioner cannot be excused from filing its Formal Offer of Evidence
considering the numerous extensions given by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner had all the resources and time to
gather, collate, and secure the necessary evidence to build its case. 108 Petitioner’s presentation of evidence
took 19 years to complete, and yet it failed to submit the necessary documents and pleading.109
Similarly, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez argues that petitioner was negligent in failing to comply with the
Sandiganbayan’s orders considering the inordinate amount of time given to petitioner to present evidence,
which resulted in only five witnesses in 19 years.110
To determine the propriety of granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on Demurrer to Evidence, we
review the nature of demurrer.
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.— After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
In Oropesa v. Oropesa111 where this court affirmed the dismissal of the case on demurrer to evidence due to
petitioner’s non-submission of the Formal Offer of Evidence,112 demurrer to evidence was defined as:
. . . "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue." We have
also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant
having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is
not entitled to the relief sought."113 (Citations omitted)
This court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to evidence:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be
drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be
sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the
plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has
failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an
allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient
for a recovery.114
Furthermore, this court already clarified what the trial court determines when acting on a motion to dismiss
based on demurrer to evidence:
What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is
entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that
which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as capacity to sue. . . . 115 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)
Petitioner, in its Supplement to the Petition, argued that the testimonial evidence it had presented and offered
during trial warranted consideration and analysis.116 The Sandiganbayan erroneously excluded these
testimonies in determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not, hence:
. . . even assuming that the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s formal offer of evidence, petitioner still had
testimonial evidence in its favor which should [have] been considered. It behoved then upon the
Sandiganbayan to discuss or include in its discussion, at the very least, an analysis of petitioner’s testimonial
evidence.117
With our ruling reversing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions on petitioner’s Formal Offer of Evidence, what
should be determined now by the Sandiganbayan is whether petitioner’s evidence is sufficient to entitle it to the
relief it seeks after the Sandiganbayan rested its case. Petitioner is required to establish preponderance of
evidence.
In the second assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on the
lack of Formal Offer of Evidence of petitioner. At the same time, it observed that the pieces of documentary
evidence presented by petitioner were mostly certified true copies of the original. In passing upon the probative
value of petitioner’s evidence, the Sandiganbayan held:
On another note, the evidence presented by the plaintiff consisted mainly of certified true copies of the original.
These certified copies of documentary evidence presented by the plaintiff were not testified on by the person
who certified them to be photocopies of the original. Hence, these evidence do not appear to have significant
substantial probative value.118
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for making "a general and sweeping statement that the evidence
presented by petitioner lacked probative value for the reason that they are mainly certified true copies which
had not been testified on by the person who certified [them]."119 Thus, its right to due process was violated when
the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s documentary evidence in the same Resolution which dismissed the
case.120
Petitioner argues that: a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the identity and authenticity of the documentary
evidence presented by petitioner;121 and b) the documents it presented were public documents, and there was
no need for the identification and authentication of the original documentary exhibits.122 Petitioner relies on the
Sandiganbayan Order123 dated August 6, 2002. The Order reads:
Considering the manifestation of Atty. Reno Gonzales, counsel for plaintiff/PCGG, that the defendant Fe Roa
Gimenez, through counsel, is willing to stipulate that the documents to be presented and identified by the
witness are in her custody as Records Officer of the PCGG, the parties agreed to dispense with the testimony
of Ma. Lourdes Magno.
WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, the continuation of the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence is set on October 9
and 10, 2002, both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning.
Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG’s functions prescribed under
Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b),125 and form part of the official records of the PCGG:126 "Certifications as to
the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her salaries and compensation during her stint
as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns and Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the declared
income of spouses Gimenezes; the Articles of Incorporation of various corporations showing spouses
Gimenezes’ interests on various corporations; and several transactions involving huge amounts of money
which prove that they acted as conduit in the disbursement of government funds."127
On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s documents are not "official issuances
of the Philippine government."128 They are mostly notarized private documents.129 Petitioner’s evidence has no
probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to evidence is only proper.130 Respondent Fe Roa Gimenez
claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in holding that the majority of petitioner’s documentary evidence has
no probative value, considering that most of these documents are only photocopies.131
The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.
For instance, the nature and classification of the documents should have been ruled upon. Save for certain
cases, the original document must be presented during trial when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of
the document.132 This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.— When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office.
In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may be presented133 as provided for
under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document is in the custody or
under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as
in the case of its loss. (5a)
SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.— When the original of a document is
in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
In Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano,134 citing Estrada v. Hon. Desierto,135 this court clarified the applicability of the
Best Evidence Rule:
As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the inquiry is the
contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus —
But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the content of such
document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule
does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78).
Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for accounting for the original.
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as documentary, but as
real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs.
McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil[.] 565). x x x
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only [a] copy of the Angara Diary as published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best
evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:
"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand
the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be
served by requiring production.
"x x x x x x x x x
"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain documents in
which ordinarily no real dispute arised [sic]. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves
universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the
opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it."
This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in evidence the photocopies
and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners to establish the existence of
respondent’s loans. The terms or contents of these documents were never the point of contention in the
Petition at bar. It was respondent’s position that the PNs in the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534)
never existed, while the PNs in the second set (again, excluding PN No. 34534) were merely executed to cover
simulated loan transactions. As for the MCs representing the proceeds of the loans, the respondent either
denied receipt of certain MCs or admitted receipt of the other MCs but for another purpose. Respondent further
admitted the letters she wrote personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank
acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were just meant to keep up the ruse of the
simulated loans. Thus, respondent questioned the documents as to their existence or execution, or when the
former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents were executed, matters which are, undoubtedly,
external to the documents, and which had nothing to do with the contents thereof.
Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the evidence presented by
petitioners regarding the existence of respondent’s loans, it should be borne in mind that the rule admits of the
following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of Court[.]136 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)
Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts, documents are classified as either
public or private. Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.— For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
The same Rule provides for the effect of public documents as evidence and the manner of proof for public
documents:
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.— Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the
date of the latter.
SEC. 24. Proof of official record.— The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.— Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or
a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
....
SEC. 27. Public record of a private document.— An authorized public record of a private document may be
proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
....
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents.— Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as
provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being
prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. (Emphasis supplied)
Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this court pronounced:
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as
evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities
required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and
requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document
is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or
other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the
official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document
requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in
court.137 (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court is material
with regard to the fact the evidence proves. In Philippine Trust Company v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,138 this
court ruled that:
. . . not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated:
....
"Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer" include those specified as public
documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement, affirmation or oath,
or jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under Section 23, notarized documents are
merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their execution (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories . . . is
proof that Philtrust had been served with Written Interrogatories), and of the date of the latter (e.g., the
notarized Answer to Interrogatories is proof that the same was executed on October 12, 1992, the date stated
thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Additionally, under Section 30 of the same
Rule, the acknowledgement in notarized documents is prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument
or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is prima facie proof that petitioner executed
the same).
The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending the execution of the different kinds
of public instruments. Official duties are disputably presumed to have been regularly performed. As regards
affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which are required to be sworn to by the person making them,
the only portion thereof executed by the person authorized to take oaths is the jurat. The presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed therefore applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public
merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the date mentioned thereon.
Thus, even though affidavits are notarized documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving, must be
received with caution.139 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation,140 this court discussed the difference between mere copies of audited
financial statements submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured from the BIR
or the SEC which are public documents under Rule 132, Section 19(c) of the Revised Rules of Evidence:
The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial statements of SMMC. Financial
statements (which include the balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow) show the fiscal
condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The financial statements prepared by external auditors
who are certified public accountants (like those presented by petitioner) are audited financial
statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as [a] general rule, private documents. However,
once financial statements are filed with a government office pursuant to a provision of law, they become public
documents.
Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence. Public
documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On
the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are properly authenticated. Section
20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
....
Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as evidence were mere copies of the audited
financial statements submitted to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies presented were certified
true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which under Section
19(c), Rule 132 would have been public documents. Thus, the statements presented were private documents.
Consequently, authentication was a precondition to their admissibility in evidence.
During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as evidence is genuine
and has been duly executed or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake
or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely presented a memorandum attesting to the increase in the
corporation’s monthly market revenue, prepared by a member of his management team. While there is no fixed
criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to establish the authenticity of a private document, the best
proof available must be presented. The best proof available, in this instance, would have been the testimony of
a representative of SMMC’s external auditor who prepared the audited financial statements. Inasmuch as there
was none, the audited financial statements were never authenticated.141 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc,142 this court held that mere collection of documents by the PCGG does
not make such documents public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does not make
them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.
Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these public and
private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the
Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However, given the purposes for
which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their
contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those
witnesses." Witnesses can testify only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those
derived from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these
documents, but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the court.
Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before
a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are
not generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the
affiant’s statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon.143(Citations omitted)
Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its main reason
for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no evidence to consider due to
petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off the totality of evidence on which petitioner
built its case.
Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear from the second
assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence presented by petitioner
during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring petitioner’s testimonial evidence without any
basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses.
Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a presumption that
respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s incumbency as public officer and
which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to her and her husband’s salaries and to their
other lawful income or properties.
Petitioner presented five (5) witnesses, two (2) of which were Atty. Tereso Javier and Director Danilo R.V.
Daniel, both from the PCGG:
Petitioner presented as witnesses Atty. Tereso Javier, then Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of
PCGG, and Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG, who
testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned and/ or under the control of spouses Gimenezes.144
Several exhibits excluded by the Sandiganbayan were offered as part of petitioner’s testimonial evidence:
1) Exhibit "KK"145 was offered "for the purpose of proving the assets or properties of the spouses
Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."146
2) Exhibits "KK-1" to "KK-12"147 inclusive of sub-markings, were offered "for the purpose of proving the
real properties acquired by the spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, and as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier."148
3) Exhibits "KK-15," "KK-18," "KK-20," "KK-27," "KK-30," "KK-32" to "KK-38" and "KK-40"149 were
offered "for the purpose of proving the corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez has interest, and as
part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."150
4) Exhibit "KK-45"151 was offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG conducted an investigation
of New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction Corporation, and OTO Construction and
Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday, and as part of
the testimony of Tereso Javier."152
5) Exhibits "KK-48" to "KK-50"153 were offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG formally filed
notices of lis pendens with the Registers of Deeds of Taytay, Rizal, Lucena City, Quezon and San
Fabian, Pangasinan over the properties mentioned in said notices in connection with Civil Case No.
[0]007 pending with the Sandiganbayan, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."154
6) Exhibits "KK-51" to "KK-52"155 and their sub-markings were offered "for the purpose of proving that
the PCGG sequestered the shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation and Guaranteed Education,
Inc. as stated in the said writ/letter of sequestration, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."156
7) Exhibits "NN" to "QQ"157 and their sub-markings were offered "for the purpose of proving that the
PCGG formally requested the Central Bank to freeze the bank accounts of the spouses Igancio [sic] B.
Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez and that the Central Bank, acting on said request, issued a
memorandum to all commercial banks relative thereto. They are also being offered as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier."158
8) Exhibits "RR" to "RR-23"159 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Dominador Pangilinan,
former Acting President and President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an affidavit on July 24, 1987
wherein he mentioned Malacanang trust accounts maintained with the Traders Royal Bank the
balance of which was very high, approximately 150-175 million pesos, as indicated in the monthly
statements attached to his affidavit. They are also being offered as part of the testimony of Danilo R.V.
Daniel."160
9) Exhibits "SS" to "SS-29"161 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Apolinario K. Medina,
Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an Affidavit on July 23, 1987 wherein he
mentioned about certain numbered (confidential) trust accounts maintained with the Traders Royal
Bank, the deposits to which ‘were so substantial in amount that (he) suspected that they had been
made by President Marcos or his family. They are also being offered as part of the testimony of Danilo
R.V. Daniel."162
10) Exhibits "TT" to "TT-3"163 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Director Danilo R.V. Daniel
of the Research and Development Department of the PCGG conducted an investigation on the ill-
gotten wealth of the spouses Ignacio and Fe Roa Gimenez and found that from 1977 to 1982, the total
sum of P75,090,306.42 was withdrawn from the account No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B Gimenez,
I.B. Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez. They are also being offered as part of the testimony of
Director Danilo R.V. Daniel."164
The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence which tests
the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.
The difference between the admissibility of evidence and the determination of its probative weight is
canonical.165
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to [be]
considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it
proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight
depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should be
presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question him on the contents
of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents
suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value.166 (Citations
omitted)
The Sandiganbayan should have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et al.167 where this court held that it
is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value than to outright reject it based
on very rigid and technical grounds.168
Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with
evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them
unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely
discarding them or ignoring them.169(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover ill-gotten wealth. In case of doubt,
courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence. An order
granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits.170 This is because while a demurrer "is an aid or
instrument for the expeditious termination of an action,"171 it specifically "pertains to the merits of the case."172
In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza,173 this court defined a judgment rendered on the merits:
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of
the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections"; or when the
judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point."174 (Citations omitted)
To reiterate, "[d]emurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant
having to submit evidence on his [or her] part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence
shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the relief sought."175 The order of dismissal must be clearly supported by
facts and law since an order granting demurrer is a judgment on the merits:
As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it is
imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is
based.176(Citation omitted)
To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary evidence essentially
deprives one party of due process.
IV
Respondents did not fail to specifically deny material averments in the Complaint.
Under Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the "defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the
truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial."177 There are three modes of specific denial provided for under the Rules:
1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the defendant does not
admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support
his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and material and denying only
the remainder; (3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of a material averment in the complaint, which has the effect of a denial.178
In paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the PCGG, through the Office of the Solicitor General, averred that:
14. Defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, by herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position, influence and connection and with grave abuse
of power and authority, in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained:
(a) actively participated in the unlawful transfer of millions of dollars of government funds into several
accounts in her name in foreign countries;
(b) disbursed such funds from her various personal accounts for Defendants’ own use[,] benefit and
enrichment;
(c) acted as conduit of the Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in purchasing the
New York properties, particularly, the Crown Building, Herald Center, 40 Wall Street, 200 Wall Street,
Lindenmere Estate and expensive works of arts;179
9. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 14(a),
14(b) and 14(c), the truth being that defendant Fe Roa never took advantage of her position or alleged
connection and influence to allegedly prevent disclosure and recovery of alleged illegally obtained assets, in
the manner alleged in said paragraphs.180
16. Defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez, taking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and connection, by
himself and/or in unlawful concert and active collaboration with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves and preventing the disclosure and recovery of assets
illegally obtained, among others:
(a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos,
in several corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining Corporation, Baguio
Gold Mining, Multi National Resources, Philippine Overseas, Inc. and Pioneer Natural Resources;
(b) unlawfully obtained, through corporations organized by them such as the the [sic] New City
Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multimillion peso contracts with the government for the construction of
government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as
projects of the National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika Livelihood,
to the gross and manifest disadvantage to Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
(c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes, organized several establishments engaged in
food, mining and other businesses such as the Transnational Construction Corporation, Total Systems
Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T Development
Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining Corporation,
Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation, GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and
I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc.181
11. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 16,
16(a), 16(b) and 16(c) that defendant Gimenez allegedly took advantage of his alleged relationship, influence
and connection, and that by himself or in alleged unlawful concert with defendants Marcos and Imelda, for the
alleged purpose of enriching themselves and preventing the discovery of alleged illegally obtained assets: (1)
allegedly acted as dummy, nominee or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) allegedly obtained multi-
million peso projects unlawfully; and (3) allegedly organized several establishments, the truth being: (1) that
defendant Gimenez never acted as dummy, nominee or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) that
defendant Gimen[e]z never once obtained any contract unlawfully; and (3) that defendant Gimenez is a
legitimate businessman and organized business establishments legally and as he saw fit, all in accordance with
his own plans and for his own purposes.182
In Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong,183 this court held that using "specifically" in a general denial does not
automatically convert that general denial to a specific one.184 The denial in the answer must be so definite as to
what is admitted and what is denied:
A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denial does not
become specific by the use of the word "specifically." When matters of whether the defendant alleges having
no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s
knowledge, an alleged "ignorance or lack of information" will not be considered as a specific denial. Section 11,
Rule 8 of the Rules also provides that material averments in the complaint other than those as to the amount of
unliquidated damages shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Thus, the answer should be so
definite and certain in its allegations that the pleader’s adversary should not be left in doubt as to what is
admitted, what is denied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a
belief.185 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
However, the allegations in the pleadings "must be contextualized and interpreted in relation to the rest of the
statements in the pleading."186 The denials in respondents’ Answer comply with the modes provided for under
the Rules. We have held that the purpose of requiring specific denials from the defendant is to make the
defendant disclose the "matters alleged in the complaint which he [or she] succinctly intends to disprove at the
trial, together with the matter which he [or she] relied upon to support the denial."187 The denials proffered by
respondents sufficiently disclosed the matters they wished to disprove and those they would rely upon in
making their denials.
To summarize, the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence. It erred in
making a sweeping declaration on the probative value of the documentary evidence offered by petitioner and in
excluding other evidence offered during trial without full evaluation based on reasons grounded in law and/or
jurisprudence.
The third part of Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]f the motion [to dismiss] is granted but
on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed [the movant] shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence." As this court held:
[I]f a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. The movant who presents a demurrer to the plaintiff’s
evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court
agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal
order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve
the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.188 (Citations omitted)
In this case, we principally nullify the assailed Resolutions that denied the admission of the Formal Offer of
Evidence. It only follows that the Order granting demurrer should be denied. This is not the situation
contemplated in Rule 33, Section 1.189 Respondents were not able to even comment on the Formal Offer of
Evidence. Due process now requires that we remand the case to the Sandiganbayan. Respondents may, at
their option and through proper motion, submit their Comment. The Sandiganbayan should then rule on the
admissibility of the documentary and object evidence covered by the Formal Offer submitted by petitioner.
Respondents then may avail themselves of any remedy thereafter allowed by the Rules.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated May 25, 2006 and September 13,
2006 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Civil Case No. 0007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is remanded to the. Sandiganbayan for further proceedings with due and deliberate dispatch in accordance
with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.