G.R. Nos.

L-21528 and L-21529 March 28, 1969

ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Jose F. Mañacop for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Antonio M.
Martinez for respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This case is before us on appeal by certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that a the municipal
court of Cavite City, convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats and grave oral defamation, and sentencing
him, in the first case (Criminal Case No. 2594), to four (4) months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of
P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and in the second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an
indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prison
correccional and to pay Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs in both cases.

The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City,
whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons
in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried
placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;"
"Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida rin
bo chiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine
Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval
station and the civilian population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of
the base to meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis
Buenaventura upon learning that the demonstration was not directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare
and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col.
Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would like the
people in the station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they did not intend
to use violence, as "they just wanted to blow off steam."

At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he learned about the demonstration he
became apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare,
his brother, and another person in going out of the station, using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col.
Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate the request of Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good look at the
demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si
Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook passed the car while the other to led
behind. After Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon
sped away.

The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro
Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the
gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita."
Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of
Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.lâwphi1.ñet

On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave
oral defamation, respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595, Municipal Court of Cavite City), as follows;

The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as defined
by Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Article, committed as follows:

That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, orally
threaten to kill, one Agustin Hallare.

Contrary to law.

1
 Cavite City, July 24, 1961.

DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS
City Fiscal

BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ

Special Counsel

The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law, accuses Rosauro Reyes
of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and penalized by Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:

That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, without any justifiable motive but with the intention to cause
dishonor, discredit and contempt to the undersigned complainant, in the presence of and within hearing of several
persons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously utter to the undersigned complainant the
following insulting and serious defamatory remarks, to wit: "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO". which if translated into
English are as follows: "Agustin, Your mother is a whore."

Contrary to law.

Cavite City, July 25, 1961.

(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE

Complainant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of July, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.

(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ

Special Counsel

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the cases were set for joint trial. On the day of
the hearing the prosecution moved to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting
therefrom the word "orally". The defense counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the accused had already
been arraigned on the original information and that the amendment "would affect materially the interest of the accused."
Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint trial proceeded.

From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the Court of Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the accused brought this appeal by certiorari.

Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the proceedings in the lower court allowing the
substantial amendment of the information for grave threats after petitioner had been arraigned on the original
information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the case of grave threats without first requiring petitioner to enter his plea
on the amended information; (3) in convicting petitioner of both offenses when he could legally be convicted of only one
offense, thereby putting him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense; (4) in convicting petitioner of
grave threats when the evidence adduced and considered by the court tend to establish the offense of light threats only;
and (5) in convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation when the evidence tend to establish that of simple slander only.

On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused has pleaded the information may be amended as to all
matters of form by leave and at the discretion of the court when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of
the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of Court). Amendments that touch upon matters of substance cannot be
permitted after the plea is entered.

After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as
defined in Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1) that
the offender threatened another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to
a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence, petitioner could have been convicted thereunder.
It is to be noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the threat is made not a
qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and essence of
the crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused threatened to
kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to undergo any material change or modification in his defense. Contrary

2
to his claim, made with the concurrence of the Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the amendment to the
danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides for a different penalty, since there was no allegation
in the amended information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion of the word "orally"
was effected in order to make the information conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial. It was merely
a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.

Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment was properly allowed, the trial court committed a
reversible error in proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to enter his plea to the amended
information. Considering, however, that the amendment was not substantial, no second plea was necessary at all.

The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court erred in affirming him of grave threats and of grave oral defamation when he could
legally be convicted of only one offense, and in convicting him of grave threats at all when the evidence adduced and
considered by the court indicates the commission of light threats only.

The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards
with threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to
his residence; and the demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a
loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the
mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect." 2Indeed, Hallare became so
apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed
while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a
temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We,
therefore, hold that the appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.

The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common
enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure.
It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant
case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same
more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:

The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten
is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered,
are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express the
beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter
culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under the
circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly
and principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute
an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which
should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats.

The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio, insofar as
Criminal Case No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with respect to Criminal Case
No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Santos, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes

1
ART. 282. Grave threats. — Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or
property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:

1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to commit, if
the offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though
not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained his
purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.

3
 If the threat made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period.

2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat shall not have been made
subject to a condition.

2
U.S. vs. Sevilla, 1 Phil. 143; U.S. vs. Paguirigan, 14 Phil. 450.

RONNIE CALUAG, G.R. No. 171511

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,*
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. March 4, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated December 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
28707 and its Resolution[2] dated February 15, 2006, denying reconsideration. The appellate court had affirmed the
Decision[3] dated August 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 198, in Criminal Case No. 04-
0183-84, which affirmed the Joint Decision[4] dated January 28, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Pias
City, Branch 79, in Criminal Cases Nos. 47358 and 47381 finding petitioner Ronnie Caluag and Jesus Sentillas guilty of slight
physical injuries and Ronnie Caluag guilty of grave threats.

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:

On May 18 and 23, 2000, two separate Informations[5] docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 47381 and 47358,
respectively, were filed against Caluag and Sentillas. The Information in Criminal Case No. 47381 charged Caluag and
Sentillas with slight physical injuries committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of March, 2000, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together,
and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person of NESTOR PURCEL DENIDO,
by then and there mauling him, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which required medical
attendance for less than nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the
same period of time.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

The Information in Criminal Case No. 47358 charged Caluag with grave threats committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of March 2000, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by personal resentment which he
entertained against one JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
threaten said JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO with the infliction on her person of a harm amounting to a crime, by
then and there poking his gun at her forehead and uttering the following words in tagalog, to wit:

Saan ka pupunta gusto mo ito?

4
 thereby causing said complainant to be threatened.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Upon arraignment, Caluag and Sentillas pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, joint trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the two private complainants, the spouses Nestor and Julia Denido, as witnesses. Their
version of the facts are as follows:

In the afternoon of March 19, 2000, around 4 oclock[8] in the afternoon, Nestor learned that two of his guests
from an earlier drinking spree were mauled. At that time, Caluag and Sentillas were drinking at the store owned by the
son of Sentillas. When Nestor inquired from several people including his own son Raymond what happened, Caluag butted
in and replied, Bakit kasama ka ba roon?, and immediately boxed him without warning. Nestor retaliated but he was
overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia saw Caluag and Sentillas box her husband. Although she tried to pacify them,
they did not listen to her. To avoid his assailants, Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. At around 6:00 p.m., Nestor
told his wife to report the boxing incident to the barangay authorities.[9]

Later, at around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia and her son Rotsen were on their way to their barangay hall, she
encountered Caluag, who blocked her way at the alley near her house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun, poked it at her
forehead, and said Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?[10] Despite this fearful encounter, she was still able to proceed to the
barangay hall where she reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay authorities.[11]

For its part, the defense presented the accused Caluag and Sentillas; and the barbecue vendor Pablo Barrameda,
Jr. as witnesses. According to them, in the afternoon of March 19, 2000 at around 6 oclock in the evening, Caluag was on
his way home with his three-year old son when Nestor, drunk and unruly, blocked his way and asked him, Pare, galit ka
ba sa akin? He answered in the negative but Nestor persisted in his questioning and would not allow him to pass
through. Annoyed, he told Nestor, Hindi nga! Ang kulit kulit mo! Nestor then boxed him on his face which caused him to
fall down. Caluag first assured himself of the safety of his son and then punched Nestor back. As people around pacified
them, he was led to the store owned by the son of Sentillas. Nestor pursued him and punched him again. As he retaliated,
some bystanders separated them. Nestor then shouted, Putang ina mo, Pare! Gago ka! Gago ka! Marami ka ng taong
niloko! Thereafter, an unidentified man from the crowd armed with a knife went towards Nestor but Sentillas timely
interceded and pacified the man. Sentillas never boxed Nestor. Caluag also denied poking a gun at Julia.[12]

In a Joint Decision dated January 28, 2004, the MeTC found Caluag and Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries,
and Caluag guilty of grave threats.

The MeTC relied on Nestors testimony. It noted that Nestor did not deny that he was drunk at the time of the
incident while Caluag admitted that he got annoyed by Nestors attitude. The MeTC concluded that Caluag and Sentillas
lost control of their tempers due to Nestors unruly behavior. On the other hand, the MeTC noted that Julia did not waste
time reporting the gun-poking incident to the barangay. While she had intended to report the mauling of her husband, as
he instructed her, what she reported instead was what happened to her. With such straightforward and seemingly natural
course of events, the MeTC was convinced that the negative assertions of Caluag and Sentillas cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia.

The decretal portion of the joint decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds and declares accused RONNIE
CALUAG AND JESUS S[E]NTILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Slight Physical Injuries
under Criminal Case No. 47381, and sentences them to pay [a] fine of P200.00 each. The two (2) accused
are also censured to be more complaisant and well-bred in dealing with people.

The Court also finds accused RONNIE CALUAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Grave Threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, under Criminal Case No. 47358, and
sentences him to suffer two (2) months imprisonment [and to] pay [a] fine of P200.00.

5
 Criminal Case No. 47382, as earlier explained, is ordered dismissed being merely a duplication of
Criminal Case No. 47358.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Caluag and Sentillas appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the joint decision of the MeTC.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC on December 9, 2005. The appellate court noted
that the MeTC gave credence to the testimonies of Nestor and Julia because they were in accord with the natural course
of things. Likewise, petitioners negative assertions cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia. The
appellate court disregarded the purported inconsistencies in the testimonies of Nestor and Julia since these refer to
collateral matters and not to the essential details of the incident.

Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to this Court on the ground that the Court of Appeals:
I.
MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF
PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION;

II.
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE [MeTC] WHICH MADE INFERENCES OR CONCLUSIONS IN ITS
JOINT DECISION THAT ARE MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE AND WHICH ARE GROUNDED
ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES OR CONJECTURES OR ARE BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS;

III.
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER HEREIN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.[14]

Simply, the issue is: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain petitioners conviction of slight physical injuries and
of grave threats?

Petitioner contends that he was able to present Barrameda, an independent and impartial witness, who supported
his version of events and debunked those of Nestor and Julia. Contrary to the findings of the lower courts that petitioner
offered mere denials, Barramedas testimony is actually a positive statement that should have been given full
credit. Petitioner also argues that although the lower courts acknowledged that Nestor was drunk and troublesome at the
time of the incident, they chose to believe his testimony rather than petitioners. Petitioner adds that there is no basis for
the lower courts to conclude that he lost his temper because of Nestors unruly behavior. Petitioner maintains that just
because Julia immediately reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay, this did not necessarily mean that it actually
happened. Petitioner also argues that assuming that he did poke a gun at Julia, the crime committed was other light
threats as defined under Article 285, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.[15]

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the MeTC did not err in giving credence
to the testimonies of Nestor and Julia. The MeTC found that the positive assertions of Nestor and Julia, their
straightforward manner of testifying, and the seemingly natural course of events, constituted the more plausible and
credible version. The MeTC also noted that Julia did not waste time reporting the gun-poking incident to the barangay
authorities immediately after it happened. The OSG also agrees with the MeTC that petitioner lost his temper, given the
unruly behavior of Nestor.

We find the petition with insufficient merit and accordingly sustain petitioners conviction.

At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner raises questions of fact. Certainly, such matters mainly require a
calibration of the evidence or a determination of the credibility of the witnesses presented by the parties and the existence
and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities
of the situation.[16]
6
 The well-entrenched rule is that only errors of law and not of fact are reviewable by this Court in petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 under which this petition is filed. It is not the Courts function under Rule 45 to review,
examine and evaluate or weigh once again the probative value of the evidence presented.[17]

Moreover, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court. It
is not the function of this Court to weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the Court of Appeals for these are
deemed final and conclusive and may no longer be reviewed on appeal.[18]

A departure from the general rule, however, may be warranted where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the evidence on
record. Nevertheless, we find that there is no ground to apply the exception in the instant case because the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals are in full accord with those of the MeTC and the RTC. This Court will not assess and
evaluate all over again the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to the appeal particularly
where, as in this case, the findings of the MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals completely coincide.[19]

Even if the Court relaxes the abovecited general rule and resolves the petition on the merits, we still find no
reversible error in the appellate courts ruling.

As the lower courts and the Court of Appeals correctly stated, the testimonies of Nestor and Julia were more in
accord with the natural course of things. There could be no doubt that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their temper as
Caluag himself admitted that he got annoyed by Nestors unruly behavior. Likewise, the gun-poking incident also happened
since Julia did not waste time in reporting it to the barangay authorities. Instead of reporting the mauling of her husband,
she reported what happened to her in her hurry, excitement and confusion. Indeed, the positive declarations of Nestor
and Julia that petitioner committed the acts complained of undermined his negative assertions. The fact that Barrameda
testified in petitioners behalf cannot be given more weight than the straightforward and credible statements of Nestor
and Julia. Indeed, we find they had no reason to concoct stories to pin down petitioner on any criminal act, hence their
testimonies deserve full faith and credit.

The MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals uniformly found petitioner guilty of grave threats under Article 282,
par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer two months of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P200. We
find no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of the MeTC and RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Under the Revised Penal Code, there are three kinds of threats: grave threats (Article 282), light threats (Article
283) and other light threats (Article 285). These provisions state:

Art. 282. Grave threats. Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor
or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:

1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to commit, if
the offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though
not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained his
purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.

If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period.

2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat shall not have been made
subject to a condition.

Art. 283. Light threats. Any threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime, made in the manner
expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall be punished by arresto mayor.

Art. 285. Other light threats. The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:

7
 1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall threaten
another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense.

2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some harm not constituting a
crime, and who by subsequent acts show that he did not persist in the idea involved in his threat, provided
that the circumstances of the offense shall not bring it within the provisions of Article 282 of this Code.

3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not constituting a felony.

In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by a condition.
In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a condition. In other
light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no condition.

The records show that at around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left her house to go to the barangay hall to
report the mauling of her husband which she witnessed earlier at around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon. On her way there,
petitioner confronted her and pointed a gun to her forehead, while at the same time saying Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo
ito?[20] Considering what transpired earlier between petitioner and Julias husband, petitioners act of pointing a gun at
Julias forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her person. Actions speak louder
than words. Taken in the context of the surrounding circumstances, the uttered words do not go against the threat to kill
or to inflict serious injury evinced by petitioners accompanying act.

Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since:
(1) killing or shooting someone amounts to a crime, and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a condition.

Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it specifically states, shall threaten another with a
weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel, since it presupposes that the threat to commit a wrong will not constitute a
crime. That the threat to commit a wrong will constitute or not constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor between
grave threats on one hand, and light and other light threats on the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The Decision dated December 9, 2005 and the
Resolution dated February 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

SANTIAGO PAERA, G.R. No. 181626

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,

- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

8
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. May 30, 2011

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This resolves the petition for review1 of the ruling2 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City3 (RTC) finding petitioner
Santiago Paera guilty of three counts of Grave Threats, in violation of Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner Santiago Paera (petitioner) allocated his
constituents use of communal water coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents
of Mampas, Bacong. The tank sits on a land located in the neighboring barangay of Mampas, Valencia and owned by
complainant Vicente Darong (Vicente), father of complainant Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite petitioners
scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. On 7 April 1999, petitioner reminded Indalecio of the water
distribution scheme and cut Indalecios access.

The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of water supply interruption.
Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly disconnected. To stem the flow of water from the
ensuing leak, petitioner, using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived.
What happened next is contested by the parties.

According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and charged towards Indalecio,
shouting Patyon tikaw! (I will kill you!). Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way his wife, Diosetea Darong (Diosetea)
who had followed him to the water tank. Upon seeing petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead of
replying, petitioner shouted Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw! (I dont spare anyone, even if you are a
woman, I will kill you!). Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in the nearby house of a relative. Unable to
pursue Diosetea, petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and,
recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting Bisag gulang ka, buk-on nako imo ulo! (Even if you
are old, I will crack open your skull!).

9
According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily inquiring why petitioner had
severed his water connection. This left petitioner with no choice but to take a defensive stance using the borrowed bolo,
prompting Indalecio to scamper.

Except for Vicente, who was seriously ill, the Darongs testified during trial. Petitioner was the defenses lone witness.

The Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court

The 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valencia-Bacong, Negros Oriental (MCTC) found petitioner guilty as charged,
ordering petitioner to serve time and pay fine for each of the three counts.4 The MCTC found the prosecution evidence
sufficient to prove the elements of Grave Threats under Article 282, noting that the Darongs persistent water tapping
contrary to petitioners directive must have angered petitioner, triggering his criminal behavior.5 The MCTC rejected
petitioners defense of denial as self-serving and uncorroborated.6

Petitioner appealed to the RTC, reiterating his defense of denial.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the latters finding on petitioners motive. The RTC similarly found
unconvincing petitioners denial in light of the clear, direct, and consistent testimonies of the Darongs and other
prosecution witnesses.7

Hence, this appeal.

Abandoning his theory below, petitioner now concedes his liability but only for a single count of the continued
complex crime of Grave Threats. Further, petitioner prays for the dismissal of the case filed by Vicente as the latters failure
to testify allegedly deprived him of his constitutional right to confront witnesses. Alternatively, petitioner claims he is

10
innocent of the charges for having acted in defense of the property of strangers and in lawful performance of duty,
justifying circumstances under paragraphs 3 and 5, Article 11 of the RPC.8

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) finds merit in petitioners concession of liability for the single
count of the continued complex crime of Grave Threats. The OSG, however, rejects petitioners prayer for the dismissal of
Vicentes complaint, arguing that petitioners guilt was amply proven by the prosecution evidence, not to mention that
petitioner failed to raise this issue during trial. Further, the OSG finds the claim of defense of stranger unavailing for lack
of unlawful aggression on the part of the Darongs. Lastly, the OSG notes the absence of regularity in petitioners
performance of duty to justify his conduct.9

The Issue

The question is whether petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.

The Ruling of the Court

We rule in the affirmative, deny the petition and affirm the RTC.

Due Process Mischief in Raising

New Issues on Appeal

Although uncommented, petitioners adoption of new theories for the first time before this Court has not escaped our
attention. Elementary principles of due process forbid this pernicious procedural strategy - it not only catches off-guard
the opposing party, it also denies judges the analytical benefit uniform theorizing affords. Thus, courts generally refuse to
pass upon freshly raised theories.10 We would have applied this rule here were it not for the fact that petitioners liberty is
at stake and the OSG partially views his cause with favor.

Petitioner Liable for Three Counts of Grave Threats

To limit his liability to one count of Grave Threats, petitioner tries to fit the facts of the case to the concept of continued
crime (delito continuado) which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal
intent or resolution.11 To fix the penalty for his supposed single continued crime, petitioner invokes the rule for complex
crime under Article 48 of the RPC imposing the penalty for the most serious crime, applied in its maximum period.

11
 The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the concepts of continued and complex
crimes preclude the adoption of petitioners theory.

Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the
person x x x of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime[.] This felony is consummated as soon as the
threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened.12

Applying these parameters, it is clear that petitioners threat to kill Indalecio and Diosetea and crack open Vicentes skull
are wrongs on the person amounting to (at the very least) homicide and serious physical injuries as penalized under the
RPC. These threats were consummated as soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard petitioner utter his threatening
remarks. Having spoken the threats at different points in time to these three individuals, albeit in rapid succession,
petitioner incurred three separate criminal liabilities.

Petitioners theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threats because he only had a single mental resolution, a single
impulse, and single intent13 to threaten the Darongs assumes a vital fact: that he had foreknowledge
of Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicentes presence near the water tank in the morning of 8 April 1999. The records, however,
belie this assumption. Thus, in the case of Indalecio, petitioner was as much surprised to see Indalecio as the latter was in
seeing petitioner when they chanced upon each other near the water tank. Similarly, petitioner came across Diosetea as
he was chasing Indalecio who had scampered for safety. Lastly, petitioner crossed paths with Vicente while running
after Indalecio. Indeed, petitioner went to the water tank not to execute his single intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea,
and Vicente but to investigate a suspected water tap. Not having known in advance of the Darongs presence near the
water tank at the time in question, petitioner could not have formed any intent to threaten any of them until shortly
before he inadvertently came across each of them.

The importance of foreknowledge of a vital fact to sustain a claim of continued crime undergirded our ruling
in Gamboa v. Court of Appeals.14 There, the accused, as here, conceded liability to a lesser crime one count of estafa, and
not 124 as charged theorizing that his conduct was animated by a single fraudulent intent to divert deposits over a period
of several months. We rejected the claim

[f]or the simple reason that [the accused] was not possessed of any fore-knowledge of any deposit by any
customer on any day or occasion and which would pass on to his possession and control. At most, his
intent to misappropriate may arise only when he comes in possession of the deposits on each business
day but not in futuro, since petitioner company operates only on a day-to-day transaction. As a result,
there could be as many acts of misappropriation as there are times the private respondent abstracted
and/or diverted the deposits to his own personal use and benefit.15 x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, petitioners intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente with bodily harm arose only when he chanced
upon each of his victims.

Indeed, petitioners theory holds water only if the facts are altered that is, he threatened Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente
at the same place and at the same time. Had this been true, then petitioners liability for one count of Grave Threats would
have rested on the same basis grounding our rulings that the taking of six roosters16 or 13 cows17 found at the same place
and taken at the same time results in the commission of only one count of theft because
[t]here is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of different purposes, but only of one which
was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters
[and heads of cattle] in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having

12
 an independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two
intentions that characterize two separate crimes.18 (Emphasis in the original)

Having disposed of petitioners theory on the nature of his offense, we see no reason to extensively pass upon his use of
the notion of complex crime to avail of its liberal penalty scheme. It suffices to state that under Article 48 of the RPC,
complex crimes encompass either (1) an act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave offenses; or (2) an offense
which is a necessary means for committing another19 and petitioner neither performed a single act resulting in less or less
grave crimes nor committed an offense as a means of consummating another.

The Prosecution Proved the Commission

of Grave Threats Against Vicente

We find no reversible error in the RTCs affirmance of the MCTCs ruling, holding petitioner liable for Grave Threats against
Vicente. The prosecutions evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Indalecio, Diosetea and two other corroborating
witnesses,20 indisputably show petitioner threatening Vicente with death.21 Vicentes inability to take the stand, for
documented medical reason,22 does not detract from the veracity and strength of the prosecution evidence. Petitioners
claim of denial of his constitutional right to confront witnesses is untenable as he had every opportunity to cross-examine
the four prosecution witnesses. No law requires the presentation of the private complainant as condition for finding guilt
for Grave Threats, especially if, as here, there were other victims and witnesses who attested to its commission against
the non-testifying complainant. Significantly, petitioner did not raise Vicentes non-appearance as an issue during the trial,
indicating that he saw nothing significant in the latters absence.

No Justifying Circumstances Attended Petitioners

Commission of Grave Threats

There is likewise no merit in petitioners claim of having acted to defend[] and protect[] the water rights of his constituents
in the lawful exercise of his office as punong barangay.23 The defense of stranger rule under paragraph 3, Article 11 of the
RPC, which negates criminal liability of

[a]nyone who acts in the defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second
requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be
not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.

requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) absence of evil motives such as revenge and resentment.24 None of these requisites obtain
here. Not one of the Darongs committed acts of aggression against third parties rights when petitioner successively
threatened them with bodily harm. Indeed, all of them were performing ordinary, peaceful acts Indalecio was standing
near the water tank, Diosetea was walking towards Indalecio and Vicente was standing in the vegetable garden a few
meters away. With the element of unlawful aggression absent, inquiry on the reasonableness of the means petitioner used
to prevent or repel it is rendered irrelevant. As for the third requisite, the records more than support the conclusion that
petitioner acted with resentment, borne out of the Darongs repeated refusal to follow his water distribution scheme,
causing him to lose perspective and angrily threaten the Darongs with bodily harm.

13
Lastly, the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the 5th paragraph of Article 11 of the
RPC lies upon proof that the offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or
the lawful exercise of office.25 Arguably, petitioner acted in the performance of his duty to ensure delivery of basic
services26when he barred the Darongs access to the communal water tank. Nevertheless, petitioner exceeded the bounds
of his office when he successively chased the Darongs with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for
violating his order. A number of options constituting lawful and due discharge of his office lay before petitioner 27 and his
resort to any of them would have spared him from criminal liability. His failure to do so places his actions outside of the
ambit of criminally immune official conduct. Petitioner ought to know that no amount of concern for the delivery of
services justifies use by local elective officials of violence or threats of violence.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 November 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
of Dumaguete City, Branch 39.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26395 November 21, 1969

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. MONICO O. CERVERA, Defendant-Appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo and Solicitor Pedro A.
Ramirez for plaintiff-appellant.
Benjamin M. Valente for defendant-appellee.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:chanrobles virtual law library

Appeal from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Antique, upon the ground of double
jeopardy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On September 29, 1962, Ambrosio Elequin filed, with the Municipal Court of Sibalom, Antique, two criminal complaints
against Monico O. Cervera. In the first complaint, Criminal Case No. 682, Cervera was charged with grave oral defamation,
later changed to slight defamation. It alleged:

That on or about September 28, 1962, between 4:00 and 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while inside the restaurant in the
poblacion of Sibalom, Antique, Philippines, .. the said accused MONICO O. CERVERA did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, utter to the undersigned the following words in the Visayan dialect, to wit:chanrobles virtual law library

"Baboy ikaw; wala huya; Hijodepota ikaw; Bastos, patay huya mabato ikaw? Sabat; Caron badilon ta; Palotawon co caron
ikaw sa suba," and other words of similar import, which when translated into English, means: "You are pig; Shameless;
Son of a Bastard (whore); Shameless (rough); you will fight? Answer. I will shoot you and throw your body into the river,"
and words of similar import.

Charging Cervera with grave threats, it was alleged in the second complaint, Criminal Case No. 683:

That on or about September 28, 19,62, between 4:00 and 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while the undersigned was inside
the restaurant of Juana de los Santos, situated in the vicinity of the public market, within the Poblacion of Sibalom,
Antique, ... the said accused MONICO O. CERVERA, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, threaten to
kill the undersigned and throw his body into the river, when he uttered the following words, as follows, to wit:chanrobles
virtual law library

14
"Caron badilon ta; Patyon ta; Caron palotawon co caron ikaw sa suba; Pa lukpon co ang olo mo; Sabat cay badilon to ikaw,"
and words of similar import, and which when translated into English reads as follows: "I will shoot you; I will kill you; I will
throw your body into the river; I will blast your head; Answer and I will shoot you," and other words of similar import.

On April 15, 1963, the defendant filed a motion to quash the complaint in Criminal Case No. 683, for grave threats, upon
the ground: (1) that the charge therein should have been for light threats, the acts imputed to him having been allegedly
committed in the heat of anger; and (2) that he would be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same act. The
motion was denied on May 9, 1963.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The two cases were jointly tried. After the introduction of the evidence for the prosecution, on January 27, 1964, the
defendant moved to dismiss both cases, upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The complainant objected to the motion, which was denied on February 28, 1964. Thereafter, the
municipal court proceeded with the trial, up to its conclusion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On April 15, 1964, said court rendered judgment in the two cases, acquitting the defendant in Criminal Case No. 682, for
slight oral defamation, but finding him guilty of light threats in Criminal Case No. 683 and sentencing him to pay a fine of
P100.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The defendant appealed from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 683 to the Court of First Instance of Antique, in which
the Provincial Fiscal charged the defendant with light threats, under an information (Criminal Case No. 428) alleging:

That on or about the 28th day of September, 1962, in the municipality of Sibalom, province of Antique, Republic of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in the presence of several
persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten Ambrosio Elequin with a blunt instrument
(caborata) and at the same time uttering the following words, to wit: "Caron badilon ta; Patyon ta; Caron palotawon co
caron ikaw sa suba; Pa lukpon co ang olo mo; Sabat cay badilon to ikaw." which translated into English is as follows: (I will
shoot you; I will kill you; I will throw your body into the river; I will blast your head; Answer so that I will shoot you), and
other words of similar import.

The defendant moved to quash the information, upon the ground that his acquittal in Criminal Case No. 682 of the
municipal court for slight oral defamation was a bar to his prosecution for light threats, both the oral defamation and the
light threats having been allegedly committed on one and the same occasion. The prosecution objected thereto alleging
that, although made on a single occasion, the utterances conveyed distinct implications and meanings falling under two
separate provisions of the Revised Penal Code, one for oral defamation, and the other for threats. On December 3, 1965,
the court of first instance denied the motion to quash, holding that the offense of oral defamation, of which the defendant
had been acquitted, was not necessarily included in the offense of light threats.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration. Relying principally upon People vs. Yebra,1 on February 28, 1966, the
court of first instance reconsidered its order of December 3, 1965 and dismissed the information, upon the theory that
having been committed on the same occasion, the offense of oral defamation was necessarily included in that of light
threats, and that, in view of defendant's acquittal in the case for oral defamation, his prosecution for the offense of light
threats would place him in double jeopardy. The prosecution sought a reconsideration, which said court of first instance
denied on April 22, 1966. Hence, this appeal by the prosecution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Appellant maintains that People vs. Yebra2 is not in point, because in that case only one information was filed, whereas,
in the present case, there have been two separate criminal complaints, one for oral defamation and another for light
threats. In the Yebra case, the trial court dismissed the information, upon the ground that it charged two offenses, namely
libel and threats, committed and made in a letter written and sent by the defendant. In reversing the order of dismissal,
this Court held that the libelous remarks contained in said letter were merely preparatory acts culminating in the final
threat, which was the offense committed by the defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the case at bar, the court of first instance seemed to believe that defendant's acquittal in criminal case No. 682 of the
municipal court, for slight defamation, necessarily implied his acquittal for the threatening remarks alleged in the
complaint in that case, for, apart from setting forth the insults heaped upon the complainant, it was averred therein that
the accused had added: "You will fight? (Will you fight?) Answer. I will shoot you and throw your body into the river," and
"words of similar import." The conclusion thus reached by the court of first instance is
untenable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

To begin with, a remark that is literally insulting may be made without the slightest intention of casting any aspersion
upon the person to whom it is addressed or even as an expression of affection for him or of joy upon seeing him. So, too,

15
a person may say that he will kill another and throw his body into the river, for the purpose, not of intimidating, but of
insulting him, as a manifestation of the former's contempt for him and to express the feeling that the former considers
the latter so worthless and insignificant, as well as so lacking in manly qualities, that the former could do whatever he
wanted to with the latter, as if he were a chicken or a rat. Thus, in the Yebra case, it was held that the offensive remarks
made by the accused did not constitute defamation, the remarks being merely an incident preliminary to the threat made
by him, in the heat of anger.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We note that - unlike the complaint in case No. 683 of the municipal court, in which it is alleged that the defendant
had threatened to kill the complainant - in case No. 682 of the same court, the complaint did not allege that the remarks
above-quoted were uttered with the intention of intimidating the complainant. Moreover, in choosing to designate the
offense therein charged as grave oral defamation, and, later, as slight oral defamation, the complainant impliedly indicated
therein that said remarks had not been made for the purpose of intimidating him. Indeed, the words "You will fight? (Will
you fight?) Answer," allegedly uttered by the defendant, before saying "I will shoot you and throw your body into the
river," suggested that he had doubts about the courage of the complainant, not only to fight, but, even to answer him
back. The defendant intimated thereby that complainant was afraid of him. Thus, the complaint in case No. 682, when
considered in its entirety, strongly suggests the intention of asserting that the acts therein set forth were performed for
no other purpose than to insult the complainant. We are not prepared, therefore, to hold that the crime of light threat
was included in the charge contained in said complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Secondly, we should bear in mind that the two (2) cases were heard and decided, by the municipal court, at the same
time. Let us suppose that the complaint in said case No. 682 was exactly identical to that filed in case No. 683 of the
municipal court, and that, in deciding both, the same declared that, since the two (2) cases involved one and the same
offense, it was not proper to twice punish the accused therefor, and that, accordingly, he should be and was convicted in
one case only, and acquitted in the other. In such event, it would be clear that said judgment of conviction would not
violate the constitutional injunction against double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

No such infringement has similarly taken place in the case at bar. Besides, a breach of the fundamental law should not be
assumed. On the contrary, the municipal judge is presumed to have done his duty and complied with the law, unless and
until the contrary is clearly established, and the defendant has not done so. Indeed, the decision of the municipal court,
in said case No. 682, does not appear in the record of the present case. Neither does the latter show that the judgment of
acquittal in case No. 682 was based either upon failure to prove the facts alleged in the complaint or upon proof that the
allegations thereof are not true. What is more, the denial of the motion to quash filed by the defendant, in the municipal
court, upon the conclusion of the evidence for the prosecution, premised upon the alleged insufficiency of the evidence
to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and his conviction in case No. 683 of said court indicate the exact opposite
and that his acquittal in case No. 682 was due merely to the belief that said facts constituted the crime of light threat, not
slight defamation. Under these circumstances, the court of first instance erred in reconsidering its order of December 3,
1965 and in dismissing the information in the present case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be, as it is hereby set aside, and the case at bar remanded to the Court of
First Instance of Antique for further proceedings, in conformity with this decision, without special pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

DAVID TIU, G.R. No. 162370

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
-versus- CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS and Promulgated:
EDGARDO POSTANES,
Respondents. April 21, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

16
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 29 October 2003 Decision[2] and 24 February 2004 Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64783.The Court of Appeals annulled the 6 November 2000 Decision[4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 115, Pasay City on the ground of violation of the right of the accused against double
jeopardy. The RTC declared void the acquittal by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44, Pasay City, of respondent
Edgardo Postanes for the crime of grave threats.

The Facts

The instant controversy stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by respondent Edgardo Postanes
(Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand, petitioner David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal charge for grave
threats against Postanes.

Consequently, an Information for Slight Physical Injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-412, and an Information for
Grave Threats, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-413, were filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay
City. The Informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 96-412 (Slight Physical Injuries)

That on or about the 2nd day of November 1995, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Remegio Pasion, there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Edgardo Postanes y
Talara thereby inflicting physical injuries to the latter, which injuries required and will require medical
attendance for a period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated and will incapacitate him from
performing his habitual work and/or activities during the same period of time.

Contrary to law.[5]

Criminal Case No. 96-413 (Grave Threats)

That on or about the 2nd day of November 1995, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Edgardo Postanes y Talara, without
justifiable cause, by creating in the minds of the complainants Genes Carmen y Motita and David S. Tiu
that the threats will be carried out, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threatened to
inflict bodily harm on the latters person by poking a gun and uttering the following threatening words, to
wit:

PUTANG INA NINYO MGA HINDOT KAYO PAGBABABARILIN KO KAYO.

Contrary to law.[6]

Upon motion of Pasion, Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413 were consolidated and jointly heard before the MeTC of
Pasay City, Branch 44.

17
During the trial, Postanes testified as a witness, together with his eyewitnesses Jose Aynaga (Aynaga) and Aristotle Samson
(Samson). Postanes testimony was also offered to prove his innocence as the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-413, thus:

ATTY. VALDEZ: The purposes in presenting the testimony of this witness your Honor, is [sic] to affirm and
confirm his Affidavit or Sworn Statement earlier submitted to this Honorable Court as his direct testimony
pursuant to the Rules of Summary Procedure; second, to affirm and confirm his Affidavit or his Sworn
Statement as part of his controverting evidence on the counter charge on Criminal Case No. 96-413 also
pursuant to the Rules on Summary Procedure; third, to identify the accused; and [fourth] to prove that
the accused is guilty of the crime charged; and [fifth] to prove that the witness Edgardo Postanes is
innocent in the charges in Criminal Case No. 96-413.[7] (Emphasis supplied)

On 3 April 1997, Postanes formally offered his evidence, as the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-412. Postanes
offered, among others, his affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses, Aynaga and Samson, which were correspondingly
marked as Exhibits A, C, and D.

On 17 April 1997, the MeTC admitted all of Postanes documentary evidences.

In Criminal Case No. 96-413, where he stood as the accused, Postanes adopted his testimony and his witnesses testimonies
which were formally offered and admitted in Criminal Case No. 96-412. Accordingly, the MeTC issued an Order dated 13
October 1998, which pertinently states:

Atty. Paul Edwin D.S. Bautista, counsel for the accused manifested that the witness to be presented today
in the person of Norlie B Ubay cannot be located by Mr. Postanes. Atty. Bautista further manifested that
he is adopting the testimonies of their witnesses, Aristotle Samson and Jose Aynaga in Criminal Case
No. 96-412 for Slight Physical Injuries wherein Edgardo Postanes is the private complainant against
Remigio Pasion, Jr., their testimonies and other evidences introduced as evidence for the
accused.[8] (Emphasis supplied)

Postanes requested more time to submit a formal offer of evidence in Criminal Case No. 96-413. However, Postanes
counsel filed a formal offer of evidence belatedly. In its Order dated 22 December 1998, the MeTC denied Postanes motion
to admit formal offer of evidence and ordered it expunged from the records.[9]

In its Decision dated 26 January 1999,[10] the MeTC dismissed both Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413. The dispositive
portion of the MeTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the charge for Slight
Physical Injuries against Remegio Pasion, Jr. and the counter-charge of Grave Threats against Edgardo
Postanes DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Tiu filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the MeTC in its Order dated 11 March 1999.

On 29 March 1999, Tiu, through his counsel, filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Pasay City.
On 6 November 2000, the RTC, Branch 115, Pasay City rendered a Decision declaring void the judgment of the MeTC. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, granting certiorari, the Decision of Acquittal dated January 26, 1999 of the respondent judge
in Criminal Case No. 96-413, with respect to accused Edgardo Postanes, is declared NULL AND VOID.

18
 This case is remanded to the Court of origin for reconsideration of its Decision.[12]

Postanes moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in its Order dated 3 April 2001.[13]

On 22 May 2001, Postanes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari (with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order), challenging the decision of the RTC which annulled the
judgment of the MeTC dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413.

In a Resolution promulgated on 5 January 2001, the Court of Appeals directed respondents (Tiu and Judge Francisco G.
Mendiola of RTC Pasay, Branch 115) to file their Comment on the petition. The Court of Appeals found no reason to justify
the issuance of a temporary restraining order.[14]

Meanwhile, Tiu, through his counsel, filed with the MeTC a Motion for Compliance asking the MeTC to enforce the RTC
decision. He also filed a motion to inhibit MeTC Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas. Postanes, on the other hand, filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings and an Opposition to the motion for compliance.

On 3 September 2001, the MeTC issued an Order[15] granting Postanes motion to suspend the proceedings. Presiding Judge
Estrellita M. Paas also inhibited herself from further hearing the case.

On 3 January 2002, Tiu filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Dismiss Petition[16] on the ground of forum shopping.

In a Resolution promulgated on 16 September 2003, the Court of Appeals stated that action on the Motion to Dismiss
Petition filed by the private respondents, together with the petitioners Opposition thereto, and private respondents Reply
to Opposition shall be included in the preparation of the decision in the present petition.[17]

On 29 October 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, reversing the RTC Decision and affirming the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-413. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated November 6, 2000 and the Order dated
April 3, 2001 of the public respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[18]

On 24 February 2004, the Court of Appeals denied Tius motion for reconsideration.[19]

Hence, this petition.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In annulling the RTC decision, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC has granted upon the State, through the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision of acquittal which right the government does not have.

The Court of Appeals stated that the prosecution had not been denied by the MeTC of its right to due process. Hence, it
was wrong for the RTC to declare the findings of the MeTC as having been arrived at with grave abuse of discretion,
thereby denying Postanes of his Constitutional right against double jeopardy.

19
The Court of Appeals opined that the MeTC evaluated and passed upon the evidence presented both by the prosecution
and the defense. The MeTC, however, believed that the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence of Postanes, thus acquitted him based on reasonable doubt.

The Issues

The main issues in this case are:

1. Whether there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning the acquittal
of Postanes by the MeTC; and

2. Whether there was forum shopping when Postanes filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the MeTC
when the Court of Appeals already denied Postanes prayer for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
enforcement of the decision of the RTC.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition lacks merit.

At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General. Instead, it was
filed by Tiu, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-413, through his counsel. Settled is the rule that only the
Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State
in criminal proceedings before this Court and the Court of Appeals.[20] Tiu, the offended party in Criminal Case No. 96-413
is without legal personality to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals before this Court. Nothing shows that the Office
of the Solicitor General represents the People in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition must fail.

However, the Court opts to resolve the question of double jeopardy to finally put an end to this controversy.

The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.[21]
These elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes was sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 96-413; (3) Postanes was
arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea;[22] and (4) the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.[23] Clearly, for this Court to grant
the petition and order the MeTC to reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the
Constitutional proscription not to put any person twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.[24] Further,
as found by the Court of Appeals, there is no showing that the prosecution or the State was denied of due process resulting
in loss or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MeTC, which would have allowed an appeal by the prosecution from the
order of dismissal of the criminal case.[25]

Tiu also contends that since the defense in Criminal Case No. 96-413 failed to submit a formal of evidence, the defense in
effect had no evidence to dispute the charge against Postanes. Tiu insists that though Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-
413 were consolidated, the MeTC should not have considered the evidence offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 to dismiss

20
Criminal Case No. 96-413. In doing so, the MeTC allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion rendering its dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 96-413 (grave threats case) void.

Tius arguments fail to convince us. There is nothing in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure prohibiting the MeTC
from appreciating the evidence presented and formally offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in resolving Criminal Case No.
96-413, inasmuch as these two criminal cases were properly consolidated and jointly tried. In fact, the MeTCs act of
assessing the evidence in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in deciding Criminal Case No. 96-413 is consistent with the avowed
objective of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the
cases covered by these Rules. Besides, the testimonies of Postanes, Aynaga,[26] and Samson[27] were properly offered at
the time when these witnesses were called to testify.[28] Hence, while the affidavits as documentary evidence were not
formally offered, there were testimonial evidences supporting Postanes defense in Criminal Case No. 96-413.

Contrary to the RTCs finding, there is nothing capricious or whimsical in the act of the MeTC of considering the evidence
formally offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in resolving the consolidated Criminal Case No. 96-413. Therefore, the MeTC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-413 for insufficient evidence.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no need to discuss the forum shopping issue.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 29 October 2003 Decision and 24 February 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64783. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 138281. July 12, 1999]

ANTONIO MILITAR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

FIRST DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 12, 1999.

G.R. No. 138281 (Antonio Militar vs. People of the Philippines.)

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
23 October 1998, in the case of People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Militar (CA-G.R. No. 21386) and its Resolution, dated
19 April 1999, which denied the motion for reconsideration of the cited decision.

Petitioner Senior Inspector Antonio Militar was charged with the crime of Grave Threats under Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code with the Metropolitan Trial Court of manila, Branch 7. After the trial, petitioner was convicted of the crime
charged for uttering the words: "Putang-ina mo Peejay, mag-iingat ka sa akin, papatayin kita." Petitioner appealed the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court with the Regional Trial Court. On appeal, the decision of the lower court was
affirmed. The Regional Trial Court sentenced petitioner to a penalty of imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day
to four (4) months of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of three hundred (P300.00) pesos.1 [CA Decision, Rollo, p. 45.]
Unrattled by this defeat, petitioner filed a petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court with the Court of
Appeals. Finding no reason to reverse the decision of the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction
with modification as to the penalty. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads thus:

21
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision dated October 16, 1997 is
AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the penalty of "fine of THREE HUNDRED (P300.00) PESOS x
x x," should be "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency." x x x

SO OREDERED.2 [Id., at 61.]

Hence, the recourse to this Court.

Petitioner presents for resolution of the Court the following issues:

1. The rule giving weight to the trial court's findings on credibility of witnesses is not applicable to
the present case;

2. The irreconcilable inconsistencies on substantial matters greatly affect the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses;

3. It is not probable for the herein petitioner to have declared the threat "Putang ina mo Peejay,
mag-iingay ka sa akin, papatayin kita," and;

4. The declaration "Putang ina mo Peejay, mag-iingat ka sa akin, papatayin kita," does not
constitute the crime of Grave Threat.

We find the petition devoid of merit. The Court of Appeals correctly upheld the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Except for the last issue presented by petitioner, all the rest of the issues are factual in nature and is beyond the scope of
review of this Court. Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction is the principle that factual findings of the trial court, adopted
and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.3 [GSIS vs. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 128471, March 6, 1998.] This Court finds no justifiable reason or exception sufficient to deviate from his rule as
to cause a reversal of the judgments rendered by both the trial and appellate courts. Corollary thereto, the findings of trial
courts on the credibility of witnesses are accorded with respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, in the absence of any
showing that some fact or circumstances of weight or substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.4 [People vs. Bersabe, G.R. No. 122768, April 27, 1998.]
Indeed, the trial court is in a better position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, as it has the
opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude while on the witness
stand.5 [Ibid.] In the case at bar, both the Court of Appeals and the trial court accorded full faith and credence to the
testimony of the sixteen year-old complainant rationalizing that the same was delivered clearly and convincingly.

Pitted against the unwavering testimony of the complainant is petitioner's denial and alibi. As correctly ruled by the Court
of Appeals, the defenses set up by petitioner cannot outweigh the convincing declaration by complainant who pointed to,
and positively identified petitioner as the person who threatened him. It is settled that alibi cannot prevail over the
prosecution witness' positive identification of the accused.6 [People vs. Cabebe, G.R. No. 125910, May 21, 1998.]

With regard to the argument of petitioner that the uttered words do not constitute the crime of Grave
Threats,7 [Art. 282. Grave Threat.- Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or
property of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:
1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to commit, if the offender
shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and said
offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two
degrees shall be imposed.
If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500 pesos, if the threat shall have been made subject to a
condition.] the same cannot be sustained. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, all the elements of the crime
were established by the prosecution. Petitioner threatened complainant with the infliction of a crime upon his person.
The threat was made without petitioner attaining his purpose. Lastly, the threat was not subject to a condition.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) VIRGINIA ANCHETA-SORIANO

22
Clerk of Court

G.R. No. 193034, July 20, 2015

RODGING REYES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SALUD M. GEGATO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated August 17,
2010, of petitioner Rodging Reyes assailing the Resolution1 dated November 23, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 00421-MIN.

The facts are the following:

Petitioner, in a complaint filed by private respondent Salud M. Gegato, was charged with Grave Threats before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bayugan and Sibagat, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, which reads as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about the 16th day of October 2001, at about 5:10 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, in the premises and
vicinity, particularly at Avon Store, situated at Atis Street, Poblacion, in the municipality of Bayugan, province of Agusan
del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Accused, with deliberate intent,
moved by personal resentment and hatred, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threatened the life of
Mrs. Salud Gegato, speak and utter by telephone the following threatening words, to wit; “SALUD, UNDANGA ANG IMONG
PAGSIGI UG TSISMIS SA AKONG ASAWA, KAY MAULAWAN ANG AKONG ASAWA. WARNINGAN TAKA AYAW PANG HILABOT
SA AMONG KINABUHI KAY BASIN PATYON TAKA,” meaning (Salud, stop your rumor against my wife because she will be
embarrassed. I’m warning you, don't mind our lives for I might kill you), which acts cast fear and danger upon the life of
the victim Salud Gegato, to the damage and prejudice consisting of actual, moral and compensatory damages.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, October 23, 2001.2

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Before arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash based on the ground of jurisdiction and that the crime is not Grave
Threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, but Other Light Threats under Article 285, paragraph 2 of the same
Code.

The MCTC, in its Order dated June 3, 2002, denied the motion. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied by
the same court in an Order dated July 25, 2002.

On September 13, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit the presiding judge on the ground that private respondent is
the Court Interpreter of the same court, but it was denied in the court's Order dated September 16, 2002 based on the
Order of this Court dated July 3, 2002 regarding the same motion for inhibition of the same presiding judge filed earlier
by the petitioner with this Court. Based on that Order of this Court, the basis of the inhibition does not fall within the
absolute disqualification rule under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, and neither does it appear to be a just or
valid reason under paragraph 2 thereof. This Court also ordered the presiding judge to set aside the Order of Inhibition
and directed the same presiding judge to hear and decide the case with dispatch applying the Rules on Summary
Procedure.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The MCTC, in a Decision4 dated August 10, 2005, found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
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In view of the foregoing, this Court finds the Accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of GRAVE THREATS
under Paragraph 1 (2) imposing condition, without the offender attaining his purpose, and is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment, considering one (1) mitigating circumstance, the medium period of arresto mayor or a period of two (2)
months and one (1) day to four (4) months.

In addition, he is ordered to pay Private Complainant [the] following civil liabilities.

a. The amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral damages.

23
b. the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) Pesos for litigation expenses and for Attorney’s Fees as it is clear from
the trials that complainant was assisted by a Private Prosecutor for a fee.

SO ORDERED.
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On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, in its Decision5 dated April 2, 2007, denied petitioner's appeal but found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Other Light Threats under Article 285, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
instead of Grave Threats as originally adjudged by the MCTC. The RTC ruled that:
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WHEREFORE, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 10 days of arresto menor and the moral damages of
P100,000.00 be reduced to P50,000.00, attorney's fee of P20,000.00 stands.

The original decision is hereby modified.

If accused does not file an appeal within the reglementary period, let the entire records be returned back to the Court of
origin for proper disposition thereat.6
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Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and in its Amended Decision7 dated May 16, 2007, the RTC denied the
motion and modified its original decision reducing the amount of moral damages to P10,000.00 and the attorney’s fees
to P10,000.00.

Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review. However,
instead of filing a petition for review within the 15-day period allowed by the CA, petitioner filed a second Motion for
Extension of Time asking for another 15 days within which to file his petition for review. Afterwhich, petitioner filed his
petition.

Thereafter, the CA, in its Resolution8 dated August 2, 2007, dismissed the petition. The Resolution partly reads, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioner's first Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review asking for fifteen (15) days from June 6, 2007 or
until June 21, 2007 is DENIED for failure to pay the full amount of the docket fees pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court. His second motion for extension is likewise DENIED as no further extension may be granted except for most
compelling reason.

The petition subsequently filed is, however, NOTED but DISMISSED on the following grounds:
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1. Filed beyond the reglementary period;

2. Failure of petitioner to pay complete docket fees as prescribed by law. It is deficient by P3,530.00;

3. Failure of petitioner to indicate a complete statement of material dates as required under the Rules. Petitioner did not
mention in the body of the petition when he received the RTC's Order dated May 16, 2007 denying his Motion for
Reconsideration;

4. Failure of petitioner to attach pertinent documents material in the petition. No copy of the May 16, 2007 Order denying
his Motion for Reconsideration was attached to the petition.
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On August 14, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
October 17, 2008 for failure of the petitioner to furnish copies to the Solicitor General and the private respondent.

Thus, petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration. The CA, in its Resolution dated November 23, 2009, denied
the said motion, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
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ACCORDINGLY, the Court RESOLVES to:

1. DISPENSE with the Offices of the Solicitor General's comment on the petitioner's second Motion for Reconsideration
dated 13 November 2008;

2. GRANT the petitioner's second Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 November 2008, and RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE
the Court's 17 October 2008 Resolution dismissing the petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 August 2007;
and
24
3. DENY the petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 August 2007; and

4. DISMISS with finality the instant petition for review.

SO ORDERED.9
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On December 28, 2009, petitioner filed a third Motion for Reconsideration, but was resolved by the CA on June 24, 2010,
as follows:
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The Court RESOLVES to merely NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the petitioner's third Motion for Reconsideration, in view of Our
23 November 2009 Resolution dismissing this petition with finality.10
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Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner insists that the CA erred in favoring procedural technicalities over his constitutional right to due process.

It must be remembered that petitioner filed three (3) successive Motions for Reconsideration before the CA on August 14,
2007, November 13, 2008, and December 28, 2009.

In its Resolution dated November 23, 2009, the CA granted the petitioner's second Motion for Reconsideration setting
aside its previous Resolution dated October 17, 2008 and dismissing the first Motion for Reconsideration dated August
13, 2007. The CA, in the same Resolution, discussed the other grounds for the dismissal of the petition as contained in its
first Resolution dated August 2, 2007. Thus, the CA not only denied the first Motion for Reconsideration dated August 13,
2007 but also dismissed the Petition for Review filed earlier.

However, as keenly pointed out by the OSG in its Comment11 dated January 11, 2011, instead of elevating the present
case before this Court within the period provided under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner opted to file a third
motion for reconsideration, which was filed without leave of court and notwithstanding the express declaration of the CA
that petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 was denied and the case already dismissed with
finality.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

At the outset, the Court emphasizes that second and subsequent motions for reconsideration are, as a general rule,
prohibited. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides that "no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or
final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." The rule rests on the basic tenet of immutability of judgments.
"At some point, a decision becomes final and executory and, consequently, all litigations must come to an
end."13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The general rule, however, against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration admits of settled exceptions.
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court declared:
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In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or
unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where
technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods
set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always
existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried
to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be
given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.15
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The circumstances surrounding this case do not warrant the relaxation of the rules. Petitioner failed to present compelling
justification or reason to relax the rules of procedure. The CA ruled that, “[t]he petitioner's attribution to inadvertence (as
the cause) of his failure to indicate a complete statement of material dates and to attach pertinent documents material
to the petition is not compelling or reasonable enough for the Court to disregard the mandate in Rule 42, Sec. 3 of the
Rules, x x x.”16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It must be noted that the CA has acted favorably upon petitioner's second motion for reconsideration. However, that does
not mean that petitioner is already right in arguing that the reglementary period for the filing of the present petition
before this Court should be reckoned from his receipt of the denial of his third Motion for Reconsideration. As correctly
observed by the OSG, “[t]o condone such a procedurally irregular practice would lead into an absurd situation where
petitioner would, in effect, be rewarded for unilaterally suspending the running of the reglementary period to appeal by
filing prohibited pleadings.”17This is in consonance with this Court's ruling in Securities and Exchange Commission v. PICOP
25
Resources, Inc.,18 thus:
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The same issue was the focal point in Obando v. Court of Appeals.19 In Obando, this Court maintained the prohibitory
nature of a second motion for reconsideration and its gnawing implications in the appeal process. Said the court:
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x x x [T]he Rules of Court are explicit that a second motion for reconsideration shall not be allowed. In this case, petitioners
filed not only a second motion for reconsideration, but a third motion for reconsideration as well. Since the period to
appeal began to run from the denial of the first motion for reconsideration, the notice of appeal which petitioners filed
six months after the denial of their first motion for reconsideration was correctly denied for having been filed late.
(Emphasis supplied)
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Since the second motion for reconsideration was not allowed, this Court ruled that it did not toll the running of the period
to appeal. More so, would a third motion for reconsideration.

In Dinglasan v. Court of Appeals,20 this Court explained the reason why it is unwise to reckon the period of finality of
judgment from the denial of the second motion for reconsideration.
To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or order denying the second motion
for reconsideration would result to an absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders or resolutions
denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place, in order that the period for finality of judgments shall run, thereby,
prolonging the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to forestall the running of the period for
finality of judgments by virtue of filing a prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only illogical but also unjust to the
winning party.

x x x x
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The overt consequence of the introduction of a prohibited pleading was pointed out succinctly by this Court in Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Ascot Holdings and Equities, Inc.:21cralawlawlibrary
It is obvious that a prohibited pleading cannot toll the running of the period to appeal since such pleading cannot be given
any legal effect precisely because of its being prohibited.
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Clearly, a second motion for reconsideration does not suspend the running of the period to appeal and neither does it
have any legal effect.22
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Hence, the CA did not commit any error when it properly noted without action the petitioner's third motion for
reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading, as well as merely a reiteration of his arguments in his first motion for
reconsideration. Therefore, the said motion for reconsideration is a mere scrap of paper that does not deserve any
consideration and the filing of the same did not toll the running of the prescriptive period for filing a petition based on
Rule 45.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is significant to emphasize that the CA dismissed the petition due to the following procedural infirmities: (1) it was filed
beyond the reglemetary period; (2) petitioner failed to pay the complete docket fee; (3) the petition failed to indicate a
complete statement of material dates since petitioner did not mention in the body of the petition when he received the
RTC's Order dated May 16, 2007 denying his Motion for Reconsideration; and (4) petitioner failed to attach pertinent
documents material in the petition as no copy of the May 16, 2007 Amended Decision was attached to the petition.

Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court states the need to pay docket fees, thus:
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Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying
at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of
P500.00 for costs, x x x.
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The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory.24 In Manchester v. Court of
Appeals,25 it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion,26 wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required.27 Thus, in the more recent case of United
Overseas Bank v. Ros,28 the Court explained that where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in
26
payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required
by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in Manchester,
will apply.

Admittedly, this rule is not without recognized qualifications. The Court has declared that in appealed cases, failure to pay
the appellate court docket fee within the prescribed period warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal
of the appeal and that the court shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play,
and with great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In that connection, the CA, in its discretion, may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file
the petition for review upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and
the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglemetary period and that no further extension shall be granted except
for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.30 Therefore, the grant of any extensions for the
filing of the petition is discretionary and subject to the condition that the full amount of the docket and lawful fees are
paid before the expiration of the reglementary period to file the petition. In its Resolution dated November 23, 2009, the
CA clearly explained its denial of petitioner's motion for extension of time to file a petition for review, thus:
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Clearly, there are pre-requisites before a motion for extension to file a Rule 42 petition for review could even be granted.
The petitioner must pay the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration
of the reglementary period. This requirement was not met by the petitioner as the docket fees he had paid are actually
deficient by Three Thousand Five Hundred Thirty Pesos (P3,530.00). Granting the petitioner's two (2) motions for
extension of time to file petition for review would have been beyond the pale of the limits allowed by the Rules for the
Court in that instance, considering that the petitioner failed to fulfill a requirement.31
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Petitioner now begs this Court for leniency in the interest of justice. While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets,
on the one hand, there is, on the other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably,32 for it is far
better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in
injustice.33 However, [i]t is only when persuasive reasons exist that the Rules may be relaxed to spare a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure.34 In the present case, petitioner
failed to convince this Court of the need to relax the rules and the eventual injustice that he will suffer if his prayer is not
granted.

Nevertheless, granting that this Court would decide the merits of this case, the petition would still be denied. In its petition,
the arguments presented by petitioners are factual in nature. The well-entrenched rule is that only errors of law and not
of fact are reviewable by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 under which this petition is filed. It
is not the Court’s function under Rule 45 to review, examine and evaluate or weigh once again the probative value of the
evidence presented.35ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated August 17, 2010, of
petitioner Rodging Reyes is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Thus, the Resolution dated November 23, 2009 of the Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

G.R. No. 160316 September 2, 2013

ROSALINDA PUNZALAN, RANDALL PUNZALAN AND RAINIER PUNZALAN, PETITIONERS,

vs.
MICHAEL GAMALIEL J. PLATA AND RUBEN PLATA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 29, 2003
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62633, which annulled and set aside the June 6, 20002 and October
11, 20003 Resolutions of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and reinstated its (DOJ’s) March 23, 2000 Resolution4 ordering
the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City to file separate informations charging the petitioners, Rosalinda Punzalan
(Rosalinda), Rainier Punzalan (Rainier), Randall Punzalan (Randall) and several other individual with various offenses -
three (3) counts of Slight Oral Defamation against petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan (Rosalinda); two (2) counts of Light Threat
against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin; Attempted Homicide against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, petitioners Rainier and Randall, Jose
27
Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito Dela Cruz, Emmanuel Nobida, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, Alejandro Diez, Vicente
Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar, and Raymond Poliquit; and Malicious Mischief
and Theft against petitioners Rainier and Randall, Mark Catap, Alejandro Diez, Jose Fregorio Lanuzo, Alexander "Toto"
Ofrin, Herson Mendoza, Emmanuel Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino "Bobby" Serrano, and John Does.

The basic facts as found by the Court in G.R. No. 158543,5 are as follows:

The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong City. At around 11:00 p.m. of August 13,
1997, Dencio dela Peña, a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store near their house when the group of Rainier
Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others arrived. Ricky Eugenio
shouted at Dela Peña, "Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili and sumbrero mo?" Dela Peña replied, "Kalbo nga ako, ay
pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako." Irked by the response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dela Peña while Rainier punched him in the
mouth. The group then ganged up on him. In the course of the melee, somebody shouted, "Yariin na ‘yan!" Thereafter,
Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed because he was able to run. The group
chased him.

While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas’ family driver, who was carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun
from Cagara and pointed it to the group chasing him in order to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened
and tried to wrestle the gun away from Dela Peña. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan on the thigh.
Shocked, Dela Peña, Cagara and Plata ran towards the latter’s house and locked themselves in. The group ran after them
and when they got to the Platas’ house, shouted, "Lumabas kayo d’yan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo!" Dela
Peña, Cagara, and Plata left the house through the back door and proceeded to the police station to seek assistance.

Thereafter, Rainier filed a criminal complaint for Attempted Homicide against Michael Gamaliel Plata (Michael) and one
for Illegal Possession of Firearms against Robert Cagara (Cagara). On the other hand, Michael, Ruben Plata (Ruben) and
several others filed several complaints against petitioners Rosalinda, Randall, Rainier, and several individuals before the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Mandaluyong City, to wit:

Investigation
Slip No. Charge Parties
(I.S. No.)

97-11485 Slight Roberto Cagara v. Randal Punzalan, Avelino

Physical Serrano, Raymond Poliguit, Alex "Toto" Ofrin,
Injuries Alejandro Diez, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Mark Catap,
Vicente "Joven" Manda, Mark Labrador and Herson
Mendoza

97-11487 Grave Oral Michael Gamaliel J. Plata v. Rosalinda Punzalan

Defamation

97-11492 Grave Michael Gamaliel J. Plata v. Rosalinda Punzalan

Threats

97-11520 Grave Dencio Del Peña v. Alex "Toto" Ofrin

Threats

97-11521 Grave Dencio Dela Peña v. Alex "Toto" Ofrin

Threats

97-11522 Grave Oral Dencio Dela Peña v. Rosalinda Punzalan

Defamation

97-11523 Grave Oral Robert Cagara v. Rosalinda Punzalan

Defamation

97-11528 Attempted Dencio Dela Peña v. Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, Rainier

Murder Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano,
Lito Dela Cruz, Emmanuel Nibida, Randal Punzalan,
mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, alejandro Diez,
Vincente "Koven" Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark
Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar and Raymond
Poliquit

28
 97-11764 Grave Oral Roland Curampes and Robert Cagara v. Avelino
Defamation Serrano, Randal Punzalan, Emmanuel Nobida,
Herson Mendoza, Alejandro Diez, Raymond
Poliquit, Alex Pascua, Rainier Punzalan, Alexander
"Toto" Ofrin and Edwin Vivar

97-11765 Malicious Michael Gamaliel J. Plata v. Avelino Serrano, Randal

Mischief Punzalan, Emmanuel Nobida, Herson Mendoza,
Alejandro Diez, Rainier Punzalan, Alexander "Toto"
Ofrin, Edwin Vivar, Mark Catap, Joven Manda and
Jose Gregorio Lanuzo

97-11766 Robbery Michael Gamaliel J. Plata v. Avelino Serrano, Randal

Punzalan, Emmanuel Nobida, Herson Mendoza,
Alejandro Diez, Rainier Punzalan, Alexander "Toto"
Ofrin, Edwin Vivar, Mark Catap, Vicente "Joven"
Manda and Jose Gregorio Lanuzo

97-11786 Grave Oral Michael Gamaliel J. Plata v. Rosalinda Punzalan

Defamation

On July 28, 1998, the Office of the City Prosecutor, in its Joint Resolution,6 dismissed the complaints filed against the
petitioners for lack of sufficient basis both in fact and in law, giving the following reasons:

The investigation and affidavits of all parties reveal that the above cases have no sufficient basis. First, as regards the
Grave Oral Defamation charges against Rosalinda Punzalan allegedly committed on the 13th of August 1997 and 16th of
October 1997 (I.S. Nos. 97-11487, 97-11786; 97-11522 and 97-11523), the alleged defamatory statements are not
supported by any evidence to prove that they would ‘cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person (Article
359, Revised Peñal Code), which are essential requisites of Grave Oral Defamation. Complainants presented no evidence
aside from their claims to prove their cases; hence, insufficient. Further, the records show that the alleged defamatory
statements were made by respondent during the scheduled hearing of one of the above case, which even if true, must
have been said while in a state of distress caused by the filing of the above numerous cases filed against her family, hence,
not actionable. The same also holds true with the other Oral Defamation and Grave Threat charges allegedly committed
on October 21, 1997 by Avelino Serrano and 15 other persons including the sons of Rosalinda Punzalan named Randal and
Rainier against Roberto Cagara and Ronald Curampes (I.S. No. 11764), the alleged defamatory statements are not
supported by any evidence that would cause dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person neither would such
utterances constitute an act which may fall under the definition of ‘Grave Threat’ which complainant’s claimed against
them because such utterances do not amount to a crime.

‘Merely insulting or abusive words are not actionable, unless they constitute defamation punishable by law (Isidro vs
Acuna, 57 O.G. 3321) as to make the party subject to disgrace, ridicule or contempt or affect one injuriously in his office,
profession, trade or occupation (People vs. Perez, 11 CA Rep. 207).’

Moreover, the elements of ‘PUBLICATION’ is not alleged nor proved by complainants, hence, not applicable.

‘The only element of grave oral defamation not found in intriguing against honor is publication’ (People vs. Alcosaba, 30
April 1964)

As regards the case of Attempted Murder (I.S. No. 97-11528) allegedly committed on 13 August 1997 by Ranier Punzalan,
et al., the same is already the subject of other two (2) criminal cases docketed as Crim. Case No. 66879 and 66878 entitled
‘People vs. Michael Plata’ for Attempted Homicide and ‘People vs. Roberto Cagara’ for Illegal Possession of Firearm,
respectively, both pending before Branch 60, MTC of Mandaluyong; hence, cannot be the subject of another case,
conformably with the foregoing pronouncement of the high court:

xxxx

In the case at bar, what is undisputed is that RAINIER sustained a gunshot wound in his thigh for which reason he filed a
case of frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms. The version of Michael Plata and Dencio Dela Peña (the
defendants in said two cases) is that the latter was seen by Plata and Cagara while Dencio was being mauled by RAINIER,
et al., thereby compelling Plata and Cagara to go out of Plata’s house and defend Dencio. Dencio run towards Plata and
Cagara and took the gun out of Cagara’s hand and aimed the gun at RAINIER, et al. which, in turn, forced Plata to grapple

29
with Cagara to prevent Cagara from hurting anyone but unfortunately, the gun accidentally fired and hit RAINIER in the
thigh.

Thus, whether the shooting of RAINIER arose from Plata’s and Cagara’s attempt to defend Dencio from the mauling by
Rainier, et al. or from an accident, the elements of these justifying (defense of strangers) and exempting circumstances
(accident) should properly be established WITH CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE NOT in the attempted murder case
filed against RAINIER, et., al. by Dencio but in the attempted homicide case filed against Michael Plata by RAINIER, there
being a clear admission as to the fact of shooting which wounded RAINIER who filed a frustrated murder case but was
eventually downgraded to attempted homicide.

With regard to the alleged robbery (I.S. no. 97-11766) which was allegedly committed on the same date as the malicious
mischief (I.S. No. 97-11765), these two (2) cases cannot be the product of the same criminal act for some element of one
may be absent in the other, particularly "animus lucrandi." Further, it is noted that the complainant in the robbery case,
who is the same complainant in the malicious mischief (Michael Plata), use the very "same affidavit" for the two (2)
different charges with no other obvious intention aside from harassing the respondents.

As regards the claim of Slight Physical Injuries (I.S. No. 97-11485), it appears on the affidavit of the complainants, Robert
Cagara ("CAGARA") and Dencio Dela Peña ("DENCIO"), that they have conflicting statements which were not properly
explained during the investigation. According to Cagara, he and Dencio were standing near the gate of the Platas ‘bandang
looban’ and it was the house which was stoned and Cagara was accidentally hit by one of these stones which were aimed
at the house and not at him; however, in Dencio’s affidavit, he claimed that Randal Punzalan hit Cagara on the shoulder
with a bottle while the latter himself did not even mention this in his own affidavit. These inconsistencies belied their
claim. Moreover, it is noted that the complaint for Slight Physical Injuries was filed belatedly (10 October 1997), more than
a month after the commission of the alleged act on 30 August 1997 and that the Medical Certificate of Cagara was issued
much later (15 October 1997) from the commission of the alleged injuries and Cagara did not even bother to explain this
in his affidavit.

As regards the charge of Grave Threat (I.S. No. 97-11492, 97-11520 and 97-11521), there is no act which may fall under
the definition of "grave threat" because the utterances claimed do not amount to a crime. Further, in I.S. No. 97-11492,
the alleged threat was made through telephone conversations and even to the complainant himself, hence, they did not
pose any danger to the life and limbs nor to the property of the complainant.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above cases are hereby dismissed for lack of sufficient basis in fact and in
law.7 [Emphases supplied]

The complainants in I.S. Nos. 97-11487, 97-11523, 97-11786, 97-11520, 97-11521, 97-11528, 97-765, and 11-766 filed
their separate petitions8 before the DOJ. On March 23, 2000, the DOJ modified the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the
Office of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of separate informations for Slight Oral Defamation, Light Threats,
Attempted Homicide, Malicious Mischief, and Theft against Rosalinda, Rainier, Randall and the other respondents in the
above cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration,9 dated April 28, 2000. Upon review , the DOJ reconsidered its
findings and ruled that there was no probable cause. In its Resolution, dated June 6, 2000, the DOJ set aside its March 23,
2000 Resolution and directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to withdraw the informations.

Not in conformity, the complainants moved for a reconsideration of the June 6, 2000 Resolution but the DOJ denied the
motion in its Resolution, dated October 11, 2000.

On January 11, 2001, the complainants elevated the matter to the CA by way of certiorari ascribing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary which ordered the withdrawal of the separate informations for Slight Oral
Defamation, Other Light Threats, Attempted Homicide, Malicious Mischief and Theft.

On September 29, 2003, the CA annulled and set aside the June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000 Resolutions of the DOJ and
reinstated its March 23, 2000 Resolution. In the said decision, the CA explained that:

In the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the main purpose of the same is to determine "whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof," (Tandoc vs. Resultan, 175
SCRA 37). Based on the records We hold that probable cause exists in the subject complaints.

Re: the complaints filed for malicious mischief and theft, We hold that said complaints had sufficient basis. Contrary to
the second ruling of the Secretary of Justice that there was lack of eye witnesses to support the alleged act constituting

30
the complaint, there were persons who claimed to have seen the respondents as they were running away from the place
of incident. The joint affidavit of witnesses Rolando Curampes and Robert Cagara attest and corroborate the allegations
in the complaint. Further the circumstances surrounding the incident as well as the presence of the defendants in the
scene of the crime yield to strong presumption that the latter may have had some participation in the unlawful act. Since
there was positive identification of the alleged malefactors, the complaints should not be dismissed, and trial should
proceed to allow for the presentation of evidence in order for the court to determine the culpability or non-culpability of
the alleged transgressors.

As regards the complaints for oral defamation, the Secretary of Justice belatedly maintains that said complaints had no
basis and that the evidence presented was not sufficient considering that the alleged defamatory words were uttered in
a state of shock and anger. We, however, rule otherwise.

The complaints for oral defamation were filed based on three separate occasions whereupon the respondent Rosalinda
Punzalan by harsh and insulting words casted aspersions upon the person of Michael Plata in the presence of other people.
To say that the words thus uttered were not malicious and were only voiced because of shock and anger is beyond disbelief
since respondent Punzalan could not have been in a state of shock in all three separate occasions when such remarks were
made. And even if such remarks were made in the heat of anger, at the very least the act still constitutes light oral
defamation.

Likewise, the complaint against Ofrin was not without basis since the supporting affidavits submitted and the allegation
of the complainant positively identifying defendant Ofrin as the culprit, were sufficient to establish probable cause. That
there were other persons who allegedly did not see any fighting that day and time when the incident took place, was not
sufficient reason to dismiss the said complaint for lack of basis. The positive identification made by the witnesses for the
complainant must be given credence over the bare denials made by respondents. "Alibi and denial are inherently weak
and could not prevail over the positive testimony of the complainant" (People v. Panlilio, 255 SCRA 503).

From the above discussions, We find that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued
the assailed June 6, 2000 Resolution where he reversed himself after finding earlier, in his March 23, 2000 Resolution that:

xxxx

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000
are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated March 23, 2000 (Resolution No.
594, Series of 2000) is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.10

Hence, this petition filed by Rosalinda, Randal and Rainier, anchored on the following:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE
THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DATED JUNE 6, 2000 AND OCTOBER 11, 2000.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT, AT THE VERY LEAST, THE REMARKS
MADE BY PETITIONER ROSALINDA PUNZALAN CONSTITUTE SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF RESPONDENTS’
WITNESSES, ROLANDO CURAMPES AND ROBERT CAGARA, ARE SUFFICIENT BASES FOR PROSECUTING
PETITIONERS RANDALL AND RAINIER PUNZALAN FOR MALICIOUS MISCHIEF AND THEFT.11

In essence, the petitioners argue that the determination of the existence of probable cause is lodged with the prosecutor,
who assumes full discretion and control over the complaint. They insist that the DOJ committed no grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000 Resolutions ordering the withdrawal of the informations.
In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, they contend that the courts should not interfere with the discretion of the
prosecutor.

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

31
The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor.12 Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as
amended,13 provides:

Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal action. - All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public
prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief
of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court. Once
so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to end of
the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

The prosecution of crimes lies with the executive department of the government whose principal power and responsibility
is to see that the laws of the land are faithfully executed. "A necessary component of this power to execute the laws is the
right to prosecute their violators." Succinctly, the public prosecutor is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime and should be held for trial.14 In
the case of Crespo v. Mogul,15 the Court ruled:

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by a complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the
fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party,
according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant. Prosecuting officers
under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who,
according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the
jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become
convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.16

Consequently, the Court considers it a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary
investigations and to leave the DOJ a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of the supposed offenders.17 The rule is based not only upon the
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the executive department but upon
practicality as well.18 As pronounced by this Court in the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in the
case of Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,19

In this special action, this Court is being asked to assume the function of a public prosecutor. It is being asked to determine
whether probable cause exists as regards petitioners. More concretely, the Court is being asked to examine and assess
such evidence as has thus far been submitted by the parties and, on the basis thereof, make a conclusion as to whether
or not it suffices to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

It is a function that this Court should not be called upon to perform. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor, one that, as far as crimes cognizable by a Regional Trial Court are concerned, and notwithstanding that it
involves adjudication process of a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to said executive officer, the public prosecutor. It is
moreover a function that in the established scheme of things, is supposed to be performed at the very genesis of, indeed,
prefatorily to, the formal commencement of a criminal action. The proceedings before a public prosecutor, it may well be
stressed, are essentially preliminary, prefatory, and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative adjudgment of the
guilt or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or crime.

Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor-i.e., whether or not he had made a
correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case- is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may
not be compelled to pass upon. There is no provision of law authorizing an aggrieved party to petition for a such a
determination. It is not for instance permitted for an accused, upon the filing of an information against him by the public
prosecutor, to preempt trial by filing a motion with the Trial Court praying for the quashal or dismissal of the indictment
on the ground that the evidence upon which the same is based is inadequate. Nor is it permitted, on the antipodal theory
that the evidence is in truth adequate, for the complaining party to present a petition before the Court praying that the
public prosecutor be compelled to file the corresponding information against the accused.

Besides, the function this Court is asked to perform is that of a trier of facts which it does not generally do, and if at all,
only exceptionally, as in an appeal in a criminal action where the penalty of life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua, or
death has been imposed by a lower court (after due trial, of course), or upon a convincing showing of palpable error as
regards a particular factual conclusion in the judgment of such lower court.
32
Thus, the rule is that this Court will not interfere in the findings of the DOJ Secretary on the insufficiency of the evidence
presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.20 Grave abuse of discretion, thus "means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction."21 The party seeking the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ Secretary exercised his
executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.22

In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse of discretion committed by the DOJ when it set aside its
March 23, 2000 Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998 Resolution of the public prosecutor. The DOJ was correct
when it characterized the complaint for attempted murder as already covered by two (2) other criminal cases. As to the
other complaints, the Court agrees with the DOJ that they were weak and not adequately supported by credible evidence.
Thus, the CA erred in supplanting the prosecutor’s discretion by its own. In dismissing the complaint of Michael and Ruben,
the DOJ reasoned that:

Record reveals that Plata and Caraga instituted the instant complaints against herein respondents only after they were
charged with attempted homicide and illegal possession of firearms by respondent Rainier Punzalan. Hence, it appears
that the complaints are in the nature of countercharges against respondents.

Indeed, as found by the investigating prosecutor, the evidence on record is not sufficient to sustain a finding of probable
cause against all of respondents for the crimes charged. When Rosalinda Punzalan uttered the alleged defamatory
statements, she was in a state of anger and shock considering that her son Rainier was injured in an altercation between
his group and that of Plata’s. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the case show that she did not act with malice. Besides,
aside from complaints allegations, there is nothing on record to prove that the utterances were made within the hearing
distance of third parties.

Relative to the charge against Alexander "Toto" Ofrin, there is likewise no corroborative evidence to show that he drew a
knife in a quarrel with Dela Peña. In contradiction, respondents’ witnesses Ravina Mila Villegas and Ruben Aguilar, Jr., who
were not assailed as biased witnesses, stated that they did not see anyone fighting at the time and in the place of the
incident.

With respect to the charge of attempted homicide, the allegations supporting the same should first be threshed out in the
full blown trial of the charge for attempted homicide against Plata, wherein, the testimony of complainant Dela Peña will
be presented as part of the defense evidence. Moreover, it bears stressing that aside from Dela Peña’s allegations and the
medical certificate obtained forty-five (45) days after the mauling, there is no showing that respondents intended to kill
him.

Further, the charge for malicious mischief and theft are also not supported by evidence. In the absence of eyewitnesses
who positively identified respondents as the perpetrators of the crime the photographs submitted are incompetent to
indicate that respondents committed the acts complained of. The respondents here were merely charged on the basis of
conjectures and surmises that they may have committed the same due to their previous altercations.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed resolution is REVERSED. The resolution dated March 23, 2000 is set
aside and the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to withdraw the separate informations for slight oral
defamation, other light threats, attempted homicide, malicious mischief, and theft against all respondents and to report
the action taken withim ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.23 [Emphases supplied]

Evidently, the conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither whimsical nor capricious as to be corrected by certiorari.
Even on the assumption that the DOJ Secretary made erroneous conclusions, such error alone would not subject his act
to correction or annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.24 After all, not "every erroneous conclusion of law
or fact is an abuse of discretion."25

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62633
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The June 6, 2000 and the October 11, 2000 Resolutions of the Department of Justice are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

33
[G.R. No. 9444. October 29, 1914. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SOFRONIO DE LA CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant.

Ricardo Gonzalez Lloret, for Appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; APPEAL FROM ORDER SUSTAINING MOTION TO DISMISS. — The principle laid down in the decision of
this Supreme Court in the case of the United States v. Abaroa (3 Phil. Rep., 116) has been totally abrogated. Since the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Kepner v. United States (195 U. S., 100) the situation
assumed and disposed of in the decision in the Abaroa case cannot be considered, for the government cannot now appeal
from an order sustaining the motion to dismiss presented by the defense after the evidence for the prosecution has been
closed, because of insufficiency thereof.

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J. :

Sofronio de la Cruz was charged with having threatened Dolores Coronel in a letter with death or the burning of her house
unless she gave him P500, which she must deposit in the place indicated to her in the letter. This letter was found by
Rafaela Goronel, who was living with Dolores, in the fence around her house, and as she was then on her way to church
she turned it over to her neighbor Agustin, Coronel, who read its contents to Dolores Coronel, an old woman of 70 years,
who became nervous and uneasy upon seeing herself thus threatened. Tito Coronel reported the matter to the municipal
president of Guagua, Pampanga, who went to Dolores’ house and adopted some precautionary measures. Upon returning
to the town hall he found a man held under arrest by the Constabulary. He had him searched to see whether he was
carrying any prohibited thing and there was found upon him an envelope inside a pocketbook, and upon the envelope
was written the name of Dolores Coronel. The man under arrest was Sofronio de la Cruz.

The letter with its envelope, found in the fence around the house, forms Exhibit A. The envelope found in the pocket-
book, Exhibit B.

On this envelope (Exhibit B) the name written is "Dolores Cronel" and the letter and envelope (Exhibit A) also set forth the
same name, "Dolores Cronel." It is sufficient to compare the nature of the handwriting of the name "Dolores Cronel" on
the envelope (Exhibit B) with that of the same writing used in the letter (Exhibit A) in order to appreciate at a glance their
complete similarity.

Sofronio de la Cruz had been arrested by the Constabulary and taken to the town hall for a similar letter, addressed,
apparently, to one Andres Valenzuela of the same neighborhood of Guagua, which has been brought into this case as
Exhibit C. A glance at it corroborates the idea that both letters were written by the same hand.

Sofronio de la Cruz says that Tito Coronel wrote the name "Dolores Cronel" that appears on the envelope found on him;
but Tito Coronel was made to write a name in court for comparing his handwriting, and it is evident that this is not at all
like that of any of the letters that figure as exhibits in the case.

In connection with this phase of the defense the defendant presented the witness Florentino Nacu to demonstrate that
the old woman Dolores Coronel had been in his house, accompanied by Tito Coronel, for the purpose of talking about
plowpoints with the defendant, and that the latter made a note of her name in order to know her address, and Tito Coronel
wrote the name "Dolores Cronel" on the envelope (Exhibit B); that the defendant remained in Florentino Nacu’s house
until Good Friday (on which day the letter addressed to Dolores Coronel was found); that he was in said house to collect
from Nacu what the latter owed him; that on the Wednesday previous he had urged Nacu to get some money because he
needed it badly. Florentino Nacu testified in agreement, but to all this said that while the old woman Dolores and the
defendant were talking about plowpoints he was in the kitchen cooking the food for his family and gave his attention to
that, although he was moving in and out where Dolores and Tito Coronel were talking with the defendant, but still he did
not affirm that he had seen Tito Coronel write on the envelope that he handed the defendant. Tito Coronel totally denies
all the assertions of the defendant and his witness Nacu.

34
The Court of First Instance of Pampanga sentenced the defendant, as guilty of threats, under article 494 of the Penal Code,
to four years two months and one day of prision correccional, the accessories of the law, with credit for half the time of
detention suffered, and to payment of the costs.

The first ground of error assigned to us is the denial of the motion for dismissal presented by the defense after the
evidence for the prosecution had been closed and before that for the defense had been begun, the motion being based
upon lack of evidence.

The Attorney-General in this instance alleges that the question has already been determined by this Supreme Court in a
negative sense in the case of the United States v. Abaroa (3 Phil. Rep., 116), wherein the following principle was laid down:
"After the prosecution rests, the court should not dismiss the case on motion for insufficiency of proof but should require
the defendant to present evidence on his own behalf."cralaw virtua1aw library

This is true. But this decision was rendered on December 29, 1903, when, in conformity with General Order No. 58, it was
possible to appeal from dismissals and final judgments. It was then held that the practice of dismissing the case
immediately after the evidence for the prosecution had been closed ought not to be followed, for when the order of
dismissal was appealed from and this higher court sustained the conviction of the accused on that evidence of the
prosecution he would have been convicted without having been heard in his own defense, which would work an in justice;
and when to avoid this difficulty the order of dismissal was overruled and the case returned for rehearing, another
difficulty would be encountered, which is that of subjecting the accused a second time to another trial without action on
his part and without need, since all the evidence could and should have been taken at the trial already held, and with the
additional risk of all the inconveniences of delay. In this state of affairs the Supreme Court of the United States rendered
the decision in the case of Kepner v. U. S. (195 U. S., 100; 11 Phil. Rep., 669), and since then the situation assumed and
disposed of in United States v. Abaroa cannot be considered, for the Government cannot now appeal from an order
sustaining the motion to dismiss presented by the defense after the evidence for the prosecution has been closed, on the
ground of insufficiency thereof.

Even now, after the Kepner case, it is no ground for error that the Court of First Instance denied the motion for dismissal
presented immediately after the evidence for the prosecution had been closed because the defense believed it to be
insufficient; for the reason that, as in this case, the court did not hold it to be insufficient — it was under no obligation so
to hold it — and it could continue the trial and take the evidence for the defense in order to reach the conclusion induced
in its opinion by the allegations and the evidence, or as it did conclude in this case by sentencing the defendant on the
evidence for the prosecution, which it held to be sufficient.

And it is quite sufficient, as the trial court has held, even taking into consideration only the exhibits.

One of the methods of proving the authenticity of a writing is collation, the comparison the court can make with other
writings proven to its satisfaction to be authentic. The trial court held to be proven to its satisfaction as authentic the
writing by the defendant (Exhibit B) that was found inside the pocketbook. The defendant tried to ascribe the writing to
another — to Tito Coronel — and his counsel tested Tito Coronel by having him write in the court room what he dictated
to him. He directed him to write the name of a person and of a place as the address of a letter, and it plainly appears that
neither the free handwriting of the letter nor the firmness of the strokes of the writing is at all like the somewhat rough
and uncertain form, as of a beginner, of the writing and strokes in Exhibit B and the anonymous Exhibits A and C. These
are signed in the same way with a "Pulano Tal" so similar that it seems to be one signature traced over the other.
Moreover, Tito Coronel, said to be an intimate of the old woman Dolores Coronel, if he had really written her name in
order thus to give the defendant a definite post-office address when he knew so well how to write, as he demonstrated,
would not have written Dolores Cronel, as it appears in Exhibits A and B. Furthermore, the initial "D" of the name Dolores
and the same unusual way of writing the "D" in the Exhibits A and C is not the "D" written by Tito Coronel in the word
"Dumaguete," which he was made to write. The attempt to ascribe to Tito Coronel the writing of the name that appears
in Exhibit B was frustrated. "I wish to prove," said the witness Pedro Bacani, municipal president, "that the witness Tito
Coronel is an influential man, and not, as the defense is trying, to prove indirectly that it was Tito Coronel who wrote the
letter." The defense: "From the moment we presented him as a witness, we ceased to suspect him. We admit that Tito
Coronel is an influential man." (p. 50.)

The trial court having held that the anonymous threat (Exhibit A) was written by the defendant, and there being no ground
for the contrary, the legitimate conclusion from the facts is to sustain such finding, which is certainly corroborated by the
other data furnished by the witness Florentino Nacu regarding the presence in Guagua of the defendant, who was a
resident of Angat, Bulacan.

The conclusion in law therefore is for the guilt of the defendant, who is guilty of the crime penalized in paragraph one of
article 494 of the Penal Code; and there must be imposed upon him the penalty lower by two degrees than that fixed by
the law for the crime he threatened to commit. For having made the threat and demanding a sum of money, even though
35
he did not obtain it, the penalty should be in the maximum degree, however, as he made the threat in writing. The penalty
fixed by the law for the crime he threatened to commit, which is homicide, is reclusion temporal (art. 404), so the lower
by two degrees, according to scale No. 2, is prision correccional, which in its maximum degree is four years two months
and one day to six years. The penalty of four years two months and one day of prision correccional in the judgment
appealed from being in this degree and the imposition of the accessories of the law and the allowance of half of the time
of detention suffered and the payment of the costs all being proper, said judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance.

Torres, Johnson, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. L-5348 November 16, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALEJO PAGUIRAN, defendant-appellant.

William Tutherly for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J.:

The defendant Paguirigan, charged with having threatened to kill Sotero Pascua, Vicente Marquez, and Maximo Lopez,
was convicted and sentenced under the second part of article 494 of the Penal Code to one month and one day of arresto
mayor, and to pay a fine of 325 pesetas, and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of 12 ½
pesetas a day, said subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed ten days, and to pay the costs of this prosecution. The court
found no extenuating or aggravating circumstances, and gave the defendant the benefit of article 11 of the Penal Code,
for the purpose of reducing the penalty from the medium to the minimum degree.

The offense was not a serious one, and there is nothing in the evidence to show that the defendant ever really
contemplated carrying his threat into effect. The men were engaged in transplanting rice upon land which was claimed by
the defendant. While they were at work the defendant appeared, and flourishing a cane in an excited manner, ordered
them to stop their work and leave, at the time threatening to kill them unless they obeyed. They obeyed the order, and
the incident was closed. Upon these facts the defendant should have been convicted under the third subdivision of article
589, instead of article 494 of the Penal Code. The threats referred to in article 494 consist in formally threatening a private
person with some injury to himself or his family which would amount to a crime. A threat made in jest or in the heat of
anger is a misdemeanor only under article 589. Subdivision 3 of article 589 provides that "Those who shall threaten
another, by words and in the heat of anger, with an injury that would constitute a crime, and who by their subsequent
actions show that they persisted in the intention which they gave utterance to in their threat; provided that, in view of the
circumstances of the deed, it should not be included in Book II of this code," shall be punished with the penalty of from
one to five days of arrest, or a fine of from 15 to 125 pesetas. The fact that the threat was made in the heat of anger, and
that the subsequent actions of the party show that he did not seriously intend to carry the threat into execution, reduce
the offense from a crime to a misdemeanor. It is true that the code uses the words "and who by their subsequent actions
showed that they persisted in the intention which they gave utterance to in their threat," but a literal adherence to this
language would produce the absurd result of making persistence in an illegal purpose operate in mitigation of the offense.
The power of the court to supply or omit words from a statute in order to prevent an absurd result which the legislature
will not be supposed to have intended, is well established. (State vs. Bates, 96 Minn., 110.) It is evident that words of
negotiation should be inserted between the words "they and "persisted," thus making the provision read "and who by
their subsequent actions showed that they had not persisted in the intention which they gave utterance to in their threat."
In connecting upon this section, Viada, volume 3 page 310, says:

The article says . . . "that did persist." This is undoubtedly a mistake, because it is precisely the persistence in a
threat that gives it the aggravating character so as to amount the crime. However, this mistake is not found among
the many that were corrected by the decree of January 1, 1870. But the strict moral and juridical sense should
supply this omission.

36
That this is understood to be the true meaning of the provision of the code appears from the language used in United
States vs. Estrada (10 Phil. Rep., 583). The defendant had taken offense at some words used by one Delgado, and
threatened to kill him. While Estrada was searching for a revolver, Delgado concealed himself. On the following day
Estrada called at Delgado's house and stated that the threat had been uttered without premeditation, and that it was not
seriously made. The court commented upon the fact that it appeared that the defendant had not persisted in carrying out
the threat, and held that the offense had only the characteristics of a misdemeanor, and was punishable under article 589,
instead of article 494, of the Penal Code. These articles have been construed by this court several other cases. In United
States vs. Sevilla (1 Phil. Rep., 143) it appeared that the defendant while beating certain parties said that he would kill
them if they did not return his jewels. It was held that the threats dealt with under article 494 are those made with the
deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat will be carried into effect,
and that under the circumstances of the case the defendant was punishable under article 589, instead of article 494. So
in United States vs. Simeon (3 Phil. Rep., 388), a person who raised a bolo as if to strike or stab a night watchman, who
thereupon ran away, was held guilty under article 589 of threatening another with weapons.

In United States vs. Castañares (8 Phil Rep., 730), the defendant having taken offense at some remark, drew a revolver
and threatened to kill one Yap Gea, who thereupon fled. The trial court held the defendant guilty of amenaza under article
494, but this court was the opinion that the defendant was guilty only of the offense declared by section 2 of article 589
of the Penal Code. In United States vs. Algurra (9 Phil. Rep., 644), it was held that threats made against another, and in
the heat of anger, constituted a misdeamenor only under section 3 of article 589 of the Penal Code. The court there
remarked that "it has not been shown . . . that he threatened them in earnest with the apparent intent to carry the threat
into effect." lawphil.net

Under the authority of these decisions the defendant should have been convicted and punished for a misdemeanor. The
sentence is therefore reversed, and the defendant is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of 125 pesetas, and in case of
insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in the provincial jail of La Union, at the rate of 15 pesetas or P3 a day, said
subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed ten days, and to pay the costs of this prosecution. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Moreland.

G.R. No. 102070

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Which court has jurisdiction over cases involving a violation of Article 312 of the
Revised Penal Code where the intimidation employed by the accused consists of a
threat to kill?
This is the issue in this case.
Upon a complaint for Grave Threats and Usurpation of Real Property filed against
Ruperto Dimalata and Norberto Fuentes, and after the appropriate preliminary
investigation wherein Dimalata presented evidence showing that he is a successor-in-
interest of the alleged original owner of the land, and that the threat was established to
have been directed against the complainants' tenant-encargado,Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Juliana C. Azarraga of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Capiz
handed down a Resolution, duly approved by the Provincial Prosecutor, finding prima
facie evidence of guilt for the crime charged.[1] The complainants are co-owners of the
parcel of land allegedly usurped.
On 5 July 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Azarraga filed the corresponding
Information[2] for "Usurpation of Real Rights In Property defined and penalized under
Article 312 in relation to Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code" with the Regional Trial
Court of Capiz. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3386 and was raffled to Branch 15
thereof. The Information reads as follows:
"The undersigned, with the prior authority and approval of the Provincial Prosecutor,
accuses RUPERTO DIMALATA and NORBERTO FUENTES of the crime of Usurpation
37
of Real Rights in Property defined and penalized under Article 312 in relation to Article
282 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of November, 1990, at Brgy. Cabugao, Municipality of
Panitan, Province of Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, possess and occupy a portion of Lot No.
3000, Panitan Cadastre, belonging to and owned in common by Teresita Silva and the
latter's brothers and sisters, after threatening to kill the tenant-encargado if the latter
would resist their taking of the portion of the land, and thereafter, plowed, cultivated
and planted palay on said portion of land to the exclusion of the above-named owners
thereof who, therefore, were prevented from appropriating the property's produce or
earning profits therefrom from the time of the said usurpation by accused up to the
present to the damage and prejudice of the said Teresita Silva and her co-owners.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
On 17 July 1991, respondent Judge, as Presiding Judge of Branch 15 of the court below,
dismissed the case motu proprio on the ground of lack of jurisdiction considering that
"the crime committed by the accused falls under Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code
and the violence or intimidation by the accused is (sic) a means to commit it or a mere
incident in its commission, hence, the threat is absorbed by the crime charged," and
considering that "the impossable (sic) fine as penalty is from P200.00 to P500.00"
because the value of the gain cannot be ascertained. The order of dismissal[3] reads
as follows:
"Upon personal examination and evaluation of the affidavit of the complainant,
annexes and the resolution in support of the information, the crime committed by the
accused falls under Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code and the violence or
intimidation by the accused is (sic) a means to commit it or a mere incident in its
commission, hence, the threat is absorbed by the crime charged.
Under above (sic) facts, an (sic) act of the accused was not a means to commit the other
or by their single act, it resulted to (sic) two or more offenses thereby making
paragraph 1 of Article 282 the basis in imposing the penalty. In fine, the act of the
accused as alleged could not be a complex crime under Article 312 in relation to Article
282. One is a distinct crime from the other with separate elements to prove in case of
prosecution.
On the basis of the allegations of the information the value of the gain incurred for the
act of violence or intimidation executed by the accused cannot be ascertained, hence
the impossable (sic) fine as penalty is from P200 to P500 which is below the
jurisdiction of this court.
For lack of jurisdiction over the case the herein information is dismissed."
Assistant Prosecutor Azarraga filed a motion to reconsider the above order[4] alleging
therein that it is true that the crime charged is not a complex crime and if mention is
made of Article 282, it is because "the penalty of the crime defined under Article 312 is
dependent on Article 282. Article 312 'borrows' the pertinent provision on penalty from
Article 282, because Article 312 does not provide a penalty" as "Article 312 expressly
provides that the penalty for the violence shall likewise be imposed in addition to the
fine." In the instant case, the intimidation consists of the threat to kill
the encargado, penalized under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code; considering
that the accused attained their purpose, the penalty imposable thereunder is that which
38
is one degree lower than that prescribed by law for the crime they had threatened to
commit -- homicide. In his Order of 24 July 1991,[5] respondent Judge denied the
motion for reconsideration. The order reads:
"This refers to the motion for reconsideration on (sic) the order of this court dated July
17, 1991, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the case as charged in the
information.
The legal basis of the dismissal is founded on the fact that paragraph 1 of Article 282,
and Article 312, of the Revised Penal Code, are separate and distinct offenses. They
could not be made a complex crime. Both are simple crimes where only one juridical
right or interest is violated. Neither is Article 312 a special complex crime. The mere
circumstance that the two crimes may be so related does not make them a special
complex crime or be treated (sic) like one for the purpose of imposing the penalty.
Seemingly, the information charges two (2) separate and distinct crimes, one under
paragraph 1, Article 282 and the other under Article 312, of the Revised Penal Code.
Close examination reveals that the violence or intimidation by the accused as alleged
therein is a means to commit the crime under Article 312 or a mere incident in its
commission. Under the premises, the test of jurisdiction of the court over the case is
the impossable (sic) penalty under Article 312.
Above premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED."
Hence, this petition was filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Azarraga for and in
behalf of the People of the Philippines against respondent Judge to whom is imputed
the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for
dismissing the criminal case. In support thereof, it is argued that: (a) respondent Judge
erred in not considering the penalty prescribed under Article 282 of the Revised Penal
Code as the basis for the imposable penalty in the crime defined in Article 312 thereof,
and (b) the crime charged in the information is not complexed with Article 282 by the
mere allegation in the caption of the information that it is a prosecution under said
Article 312 in relation to Article 282.
Before acting on the petition, this Court required the Office of the Solicitor General to
comment on the petition filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.[6]
In its Comment[7] filed on 13 November 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General, while
observing that the Assistant Provincial Fiscal lacks the authority to file the instant
petition as only the Solicitor General is authorized by law to represent the People of the
Philippines in cases of this nature, declares, nevertheless, that the petition is impressed
with merit and, consequently, it ratifies the same and prays that it be admitted, given
due course and the questioned orders of the respondent Judge be reversed. It, however,
urges that the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor be advised to be more circumspect in
filing cases of this nature with this Court without the intervention of, or prior
authorization from, the Solicitor General.
In sustaining the position of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the Office of the
Solicitor General argues that "in prosecution for Usurpation of Real Property as
provided for in Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code, the over-all penalty imposable on
the accused is determined not only by the penalty provided therein but also by the
penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him. x x x The accused in Crim.
Case No. 3386 committed acts of violence on the complainant's tenant. The violent acts
with which the accused were charged in attaining their wishes constituted threats to kill
Inocencio Borreros, if the latter prevented or prohibited both accused in (sic) taking
39
possession of the lot in question. Hence, accused's threats on the life of Borreros may
be considered as the 'violence or intimidation of persons' mentioned in Art.
312, supra, as the means by which accused took possession of the lot in question. And,
under Art. 282, the imposable penalty for the threatening act of both accused -- to kill
Borreros -- is one (1) degree lower than that prescribed by law for the crime accused
threatened to commit -- homicide; hence, the additional penalty imposable on both
accused is prision mayor minimum toprision mayor maximum, which is well within
the jurisdiction of (sic) Regional Trial Court."
Acting on the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General, this Court admitted the
petition and required respondent Judge to file his Comment thereon, which he
complied with on 9 December 1991.[8] Defending his challenged orders, respondent
Judge argues that: (a) only the crime of usurpation of real property is charged in the
information; the violence against or intimidation of persons alleged therein is an
element of the crime charged; it cannot constitute a distinct crime of grave threats or
give rise to the complex crime of usurpation of real property with gave threats as basis
for determining the jurisdiction of the court; (b) the clause "in addition to the penalty
incurred for the acts of violence executed by him" does not refer to Article 282 of the
Revised Penal Code; both Articles 312 and 282 are distinct offenses where only one
juridical interest is violated; if ever there are resultant offenses arising from the acts of
violence of the accused in their occupation of the real property or usurpation of real
rights over the same, they shall be subject to other criminal prosecutions not
necessarily under Article 282. He further claims that although not dwelt upon in his
order of dismissal, there is another ground for the dismissal of the case; this ground is
the failure to allege intent to gain in the information, an essential element of Article
312.
On 29 January 1992, this Court required the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to file a
Reply to the respondent's Comment. Considering the appearance of the Office of the
Solicitor General, she moved to be excused from complying with the same. The Office
of the Solicitor General subsequently filed the Reply.
This Court thereafter resolved to give due course to the petition.
Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"ART. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. -
- Any person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take
possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to
another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him,
shall be punished by a fine of from 50 to 100 per centum of the gain which he shall
have obtained, but not less than 75 pesos.
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine of from 200 to 500 pesos shall be
imposed."
The Article is not as simple as it appears to be. What is meant by the phrase "by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons" and the clause "in addition to the
penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him"? What penalty should be
made the basis for determining which court shall acquire jurisdiction over a case
involving a violation of the said Article?
An inquiry into the nature of the crime may yield the desired answers.
The offense defined in this Article is one of the crimes against property found under
Title Ten, Book Two of the Revised Penal Code, and is committed in the same manner
as the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons defined and
40
penalized in Article 294 of the same Code. The main difference between these two (2)
crimes is that the former involves real property or real rights in property, while the
latter involves personal property.[9] In short, Article 312 would have been denominated
as robbery if the object taken is personal property.
Accordingly, the phrase "by means of violence against or intimidation of persons" in
Article 312 must be construed to refer to the same phrase used in Article 294. There are
five (5) classes of robbery under the latter, namely: (a) robbery with homicide (par. 1);
(b) robbery with rape, intentional mutilation, or the physical injuries penalized in
subdivision 1 of Article 263 (par. 2); (c) robbery with the physical injuries penalized in
subdivision 2 of Article 263 (par. 3); (d) robbery committed with unnecessary violence
or with physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of Article 263 (par. 4); and (e)
robbery in other cases, or simple robbery (par. 5), where the violence against or
intimidation of persons cannot be subsumed by, or where it is not sufficiently specified
so as to fall under, the first four paragraphs.[10]
Paragraphs one to four of Article 294 indisputably involve the use of violence against
persons. The actual physical force inflicted results in death, rape, mutilation or the
physical injuries therein enumerated. The simple robbery under paragraph five may
cover physical injuries not included in paragraphs two to four. Thus, when less serious
physical injuries or slight physical injuries are inflicted upon the offended party on the
occasion of a robbery, the accused may be prosecuted for and convicted of robbery
under paragraph five.[11]
It seems obvious that intimidation is not encompassed under paragraphs one to four
since no actual physical violence is inflicted; evidently then, it can only fall under
paragraph five.
But what is meant by the word intimidation? It is defined in Black's Law
Dictionary[12] as "unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear". To take, or
attempt to take, by intimidation means "willfully to take, or attempt to take, by putting
in fear of bodily harm". As shown in United States vs. Osorio,[13] material violence is
not indispensable for there to be intimidation; intense fear produced in the mind of the
victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient. In an appropriate
case, the offender may be liable for either (a) robbery under paragraph 5 of Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code if the subject matter is personal property and there is intent
to gain or animus furandi, or (b) grave coercion under Article 286 of said Code if such
intent does not exist.[14]
In the crime of grave coercion, violence through force or such display of force that
would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party is an essential
ingredient.[15]
In the crime of Grave Threats punished under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code,
intimidation is also present. However, this intimidation, as contra-distinguished from
the intimidation in paragraph 5, Article 294 or Article 286 -- which is actual,
immediate and personal -- is conditional and not necessarily personal because it may
be caused by an intermediary.[16]
Paragraphs one to five of Article 294 are single, special and indivisible felonies, not
complex crimes as defined under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.[17] The penalties
imposed do not take into account the value of the personal property taken, but the
gravity of the effect or consequence of the violence or intimidation.
Article 312 may also be considered as defining and penalizing the single, special and
indivisible crime of occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property
41
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. It is likewise not a complex
crime as defined under Article 48. However, while Article 294 provides a single penalty
for each class of crime therein defined, Article 312 provides a single, albeit two-tiered,
penalty consisting of a principal penalty, which is that incurred for the acts of violence,
and an additional penalty of fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the
accused. This is clear from the clause
"in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts ofviolence executed by him." For want
of a better term, the additional penalty may be designated as an incremental penalty.
What Article 312 means then is that when the occupation of real property is committed
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, the accused may be prosecuted
under an information for the violation thereof, and not for a separate crime involving
violence or intimidation. But, whenever appropriate, he may be sentenced to suffer the
penalty for the acts of violence and to pay a fine based on the value of the gain
obtained. Thus, if by reason or on the occasion of such occupation or usurpation, the
crime of homicide, or any of the physical injuries penalized in either subdivisions 1 or 2
of Article 263 is committed; or when the same shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation; or when, in the course of its execution, the offender shall have
inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical
injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of Article 263; or when it is committed
through intimidation or through the infliction of physical injuries not covered by
subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., physical injuries
penalized under Articles 265 and 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused may be
convicted for the violation of Article 312. However, he shall be sentenced: (a) to suffer
the penalty for homicide, rape, intentional mutilation and physical injuries provided
under subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263, other physical injuries[18] or for
the intimidation, which may fall under Article 282 (Grave Threats) or Article 286
(Grave Coercion) of the Revised Penal Code, as the case may be, and (b) to pay a fine
based on the value of the gain obtained by him, which shall be an amount equivalent to
50 to 100 per centum of such gain, but in no case less than seventy-five
(P75.000) pesos, provided, however, that if such value cannot be ascertained, the fine
shall be from 200 to 500 (P200.00 to P500.00) pesos.
Respondent Judge then was wrong in his two (2) inconsistent propositions.
This Court cannot agree with the first which postulates that the threat was the means
employed to occupy the land and is therefore absorbed in the crime defined and
penalized in Article 312. If that were the case, the clause
"in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him" would be
meaningless. As earlier explained, intimidation is a form of violence which may come
in the guise of threats or coercion. Besides, the peculiar theory of absorption would
result in an absurdity whereby a grave or less grave felony defined in paragraph 1 of
Article 282 and punished by an afflictive correctional penalty[19] consisting of the
deprivation of liberty, would be absorbed by a crime (Article 312) penalized only by a
fine. Neither can this Court accept his second proposition that Article 282 and Article
312 refer to two (2) separate crimes, both of which "are simple crimes where only one
juridical right or interest is violated." As already stated, the crime of occupation of real
right in property is a single, special and indivisible crime upon which is imposed a two-
tiered penalty. Also, such a proposition obfuscates the first proposition and ignores the
distinction between the two Articles. Article 286 is a crime against personal security
while Article 312 is a crime against real property or real rights thereon.
It does not, however, necessarily follow that just because the respondent Judge is
wrong, the petitioner is correct. This Court finds the proposition of petitioner similarly
42
erroneous and untenable. As earlier stated, the complainants in the case are the co-
owners of the lot and not the tenant-encargado who was the person threatened.
Thelatter was in actual physical possession of the property for, as found by the
investigating prosecutor:
"x x x This lot was tenanted by Inocencio Borreros after the latter was installed thereat
by Teresita Silva herself. Lot No. 3000 is an agricultural land devoted to palay."[20]
Accepting this to be a fact and without necessarily inquiring into the effects of P.D. No.
27 and R.A. No. 6657 on such tenancy, the tenant has, at the very least, a real right over
the property -- that of possession -- which both accused were alleged to have usurped
through the threat to kill. Borreros is, therefore, the offended party who was directly
threatened by the accused; while the information expressly states this fact, Borreros is
not, most unfortunately, made the offended party. The information does not even
suggest that the accused threatened complainants or their families with the infliction
upon their persons, honor or property of any wrong amounting to a crime so as to bring
the former within the purview of Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code. At most, the
liability of the accused to the complainants would only be civil in nature. Hence, to the
extent that it limits the offended parties to just the co-owners of the property who were
not even in possession thereof, the information in question does not charge an
offense.[21] It may, therefore, be dismissed in accordance with Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court. Considering, however, that both accused have not yet been
arraigned, the information may be accordingly amended to include the tenant as the
offended party. This of course is on the assumption that the accused usurped the
tenant's real right with intent to gain or with animus furandi; for without such intent,
he could only be charged with coercion.[22] In so holding, this Court does not preclude
the owner of a piece of property from being the offended party in the crime of
occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property by means of
intimidation consisting of a threat, under Article 282, provided, however, that all the
elements thereof are present. In such a case, the penalty imposable upon the accused
would be the penalty prescribed therein plus a fine based on the value of the gain
obtained by the accused. As stated earlier, intimidation as found in Article 312 could
result in either the crime of grave threats under Article 282 or grave coercion under
Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, if complainants were in fact the parties
threatened and paragraph 1 of Article 282 is applicable,[23] the Regional Trial Court
would have exclusive original jurisdiction over the offense charged because the
corresponding penalty for the crime would be prision mayor, which is the penalty next
lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense threatened to be committed --
homicide -- which is reclusion temporal,[24]and a fine based on the value of the gain
obtained by the accused.[25]
WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of 17 July 1991 and 24 July 1991 in
Criminal Case No. 3386 are hereby SET ASIDE. The petitioner may amend the
information as suggested above; otherwise, it should be dismissed not for the reason
relied upon by the respondent Judge, but because it does not charge an offense.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-14348 September 30, 1960

43
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CIRIACO YEBRA, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor E.M. Salva for appellant.
Ricardo S. Heraldo for appellee.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Hon. Melquiades G. Ilao, presiding,
dismissing an information upon a motion to quash filed by defense counsel on the ground that two distinct offenses,
namely, libel and threats, are alleged in the information. The information filed by the fiscal is as follows:

The undersigned Fiscal accuses CIRIACO YEBRA of the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about February 7, 1958, in the Municipality of Daet, Province of Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused, CIRIACO
YEBRA, moved by personal resentment and, with an evident intention of imputing an act or
circumstance tending to dishonor or discredit one Luciano Sta. Catalina, and injure his good name
and reputation did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, publicly, and maliciously impute,
threaten and make against the said Luciano Sta. Catalina, in a letter written and sent by said
accused to one Narciso Dames, the following derogatory statements threatening to inflict upon the
said Luciano Sta. Catalina a wrong amounting to a crime, that is, to kill the said Luciano Sta.
Catalina, to wit:

... Huwag nilang ipagmatigas and paglilinglang ni Luciano Sta. Catalina sa mga tao . . .

at kung hindi babayaran ni Sta. Catalina ang mga nagugol ko o ang nagugol ninyo sa
donasyong ito ay maka-aasa kayo na ang gagawin ko ay buhay sa buhay laban sa mga
taong ito na manlilinglang sa ating baryo at sa Kapangyarihan ng ating govierno sa wakas ng
lahat kong sinabi dito ay umaasa ako na hindi mo pagkakaitan ang kahilingan ko. 1awphîl.nèt

which statement are fabricated, false, and without foundation in truth and in fact, and made solely to
dishonor, discredit and to besmirch the good name and reputation of the said Luciano Sta. Catalina, as a
result of which the said Luciano Sta. Catalina suffered damages, both moral and actual in the amount of
P10,000.00.

Contrary to Articles 355 of the Revised Penal Code.

Daet, Camarines Norte, July 3, 1958.

That portion of the letter sent by Ciriaco Yebra to Narciso 38 3 Dames, barrio lieutenant, which is quoted in the
information, may be translated, thus:

. . . They must not be stubborn about Mr. Luciano Sta. Catalina's fooling the people . . . .

. . . And if there is nobody which will care among the authorities in the government in this request of my
being belittled and the belittling of others and if Sta. Catalina will not pay what I paid and other paid for the
donation, you can be sure that I will do, life for a life; against those people who have been fooling our barrio
and to the authorities in the government, I hope they will not withstand all what I said (asked) in this respect.
(pp. 5-6, Brief for the Appellant.)

The Solicitor General, in his brief before Us, argues that even if two distinct offenses are alleged in the information,
namely, libel and threats, the second offense of threat is not clearly imputed therein; the expressions "life for life
against those people who have been fooling our barrio" or "tooth for a tooth," may reveal the anger the accused may
have been engulfed, at the time he expressed them, but does not show an intent to kill. He argues, therefore, that
such statements may be treated as mere surplusage in the information. 1awphîl .nèt

We have carefully read the letter containing the alleged libelous remarks, and we find that the letter is more
threatening than libelous, and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object of the letter. The libelous remarks
contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In
other words, the libelous remarks express the heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat.
This is the more important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under these circumstances this Court
believes, after a study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats
and that the statements therein derogatory to a person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for

44
which the writer may be prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be considered as part of the more
important offense of threats.

for the foregoing considerations, the order of the court dismissing the information on the ground of duplicity should
be, as it is hereby, set aside, and the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this decision. Without costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and
Dizon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-27825 June 30, 1970

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
GERARDO RIVERA and the HONORABLE JUDGE LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as presiding judge of
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, First Branch, respondents.

Batangas Provincial Fiscal Benedicto M. Sanchez and Special Counsel Julio G. Enriquez, Jr. for petitioner.

Jose W. Diokno for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Original action for a writ of certiorari and mandamus, against respondent Court's order denying the prosecution's
petition to amend the original information for grave threats against respondent-accused so as to allege the true and
actual date of commission of the offense on March 2, 1964, rather than March 2, 1965 as inadvertently alleged in
the original information.

On June 20, 1966 the original information was filed with respondent court against respondent Rivera as accused,
charging him for grave threats, alleged by the prosecution to have been committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1965, in the Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas,
Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
motivated by personal resentment which he entertained against one Ricardo Rivera, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and, in a letter, seriously threatened to kidnap the wife and the
daughter of said Ricardo Rivera if the latter would not give him P25,000.00, the accused thus
threatening to inflict upon the persons of the wife and daughter of Ricardo Rivera of a wrong
amounting to a crime, that is, to kidnap them, although the said accused failed to attain his purpose.1

Upon arraignment held on August 24, 1966, respondent entered a "not guilty" plea. Trial was set by respondent
court, with the prosecution initially presenting the complainant as a witness on February 22, 1967, who testified that
the incident complained of occurred in March, 1964, (not March, 1965 as alleged in the original information).

On March 9, 1967, the prosecution filed a formal petition for admission of its amended information, the sole
amendment consisting of changing the year of commission of the offense from March 2, 1965 to March 2, 1964 on
the grounds of clerical error and of having the information conform to the evidence in its possession with respect to
the year of commission of the crime charged.

Respondent court, on respondent's opposition, denied on April 12, 1967 admission of the amended information
ruling that it was unfair to respondent and concerned material facts constituting the offense and would consequently
be prejudicial to the substantial rights of respondent-accused. It denied the prosecution's motion for reconsideration
and reset the continuation of the trial on August 2, 1967 and other dates thereafter, unless the matter was elevated
to this Court.

Upon the prosecution's resort to this Court, we issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining respondent court,
until further orders, from continuing with the trial of the case.

The clear issue, then, is whether or not under Rule 110, section 13 of the Rules of Court,2 the amendment sought
after respondent-accused's plea and during the trial, is merely formal and may be permitted without prejudice to the
rights of respondent-accused.

45
We hold that the amendment sought by the prosecution merely to state the true and actual year of commission of
the offense charged on March 2, 1964 rather than March 2, 1965 as inadvertently alleged through oversight in the
information is a matter of form which does not prejudice or impair the rights of respondent-accused.

1. The rule consistently applied by the Court is that after the accused's plea is entered, amendments that touch
upon matters of substance are not permitted and the information or complaint may be amended only as to formal
matters by leave and at the trial court's discretion, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused. Thus, an amendment which neither adversely affects any substantial right of the accused (e.g. does not
deprive him of the right to invoke prescription3 nor affects and/or alters the nature of the offense originally charged
nor involves a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to require the accused to undergo any material
change or modification in his defense) is an amendment as to a matter of form.4

2. Here, all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized by paragraph 1 thereof were duly alleged in the original information, viz., (1) that respondent-accused
threatened complainant with the infliction of a wrong on the latter's wife and daughter (2) that such wrong amounted
to a crime, the threat being to kidnap them and (3) the threat was made in a letter (which calls for imposition of the
maximum penalty). The amendment which sought the correction of an obviously typographical or clerical error in the
last digit of the year alleged (from 1965 to 1964, the month and day being left exactly the same) did not affect the
nature and essence of the crime as originally charged. Neither did it involve any change in the basic theory of the
prosecution so as to cause surprise to respondent and require him to effect any material change or modification in
his defense.

Any evidence respondent might have would be equally applicable to the information in the original form as in the
amended form. It is obvious from the stated facts, and respondent makes no contrary assertion, that no defense of
prescription of the offense is available to respondent whether the original information alleging the commission of the
offense on March 2, 1965 stands or the same is amended to allege one year earlier, 1964, as the date of
commission of the crime charged. As in U.S. vs. Ramos,5 therefore, where the Court held that "no error was
committed by permitting the fiscal to amend the date of the year of the complaint, by striking out the last word (1911)
and substituting in lieu thereof '1910' (the crime having been committed on June 16, 1910 and not in June, 1911),"
the amendment here would cause no impairment of prejudice to the rights of respondent-accused.

3. Respondent Court erroneously relied on time cases of People vs. Opemia 6 and Wong vs. Yatco 7 to rule that the amendment
would impair the substantial rights of respondent-accused as "he must have been caught by surprise upon being confronted by evidence tending to prove a similar
offense committed in 1964." Both cases involved amendments of substance and not merely of form, which respondent court failed to appreciate properly.
In Opemia, in an appeal from the trial court's order of dismissal, where the proposed amendment would have changed the date of the commission of the offense
from 1947 to 1952, the Court upheld the trial court's exercise of its discretion in disallowing the amendment on the ground that "(T)he difference in date could not
be attributed to a clerical error, because the possibility of such an error is ruled out by the fact that the difference is not only in the year but also in the month and in
the last two digits of the year." In any event, the Court pointed out, the trial court's dismissal order rendered at the conclusion of the trial on the ground of variance
between allegation and proof, really amounted to an acquittal, which could no longer be appealed by the prosecution without placing the accused in double
jeopardy. In Wong, the State was allowed by the trial court "to amend the information (for violation of Com. Act No. 104) by stating that the offense was committed
between January 2, 1955 and March 17, 1955 (and not from May 3, 1954 to October 11, 1954, as originally charged) on an original information dated December
28, 1954." The Court, on certiorari, set aside the amendment as one of substance, "especially as the offense charged was not yet punishable (for lack of
publication) on December 28, 1954, when the original information was filed "and that while it was true that after the information was filed, the law had become
effective, "the law can have no retroactive effect ...and the proper course was not to amend the previous information but to file another one."

4. A further decisive factor in the case at bar is that the pleadings before us fail to show that respondent-accused
had opportunely and timely made any objection to the testimony of the complainant at the opening day of trial that
the threat was made against him in March, 1964 by reason of the same being at variance with the allegations of the
information that the crime charged was committed in March, 1965. The testimony of the complainant is already in
the record without objection from respondent-accused, and the prosecution is therefore entitled to effect the
amendment to make the information conformable to the testimony presented and the documentary evidence in its
possession. 8

5. When the prosecution moved for admission of the amendment, respondent-accused, aside from asserting
general grounds of impairment of his substantial rights, (above shown to be untenable) opposed the amendment on
the ground that "(I)t is not true that the difference in date was due to clerical error, because a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the Provincial Fiscal and all the documentary evidence showing the date the offense
was allegedly committed, were submitted to him." 9 On respondent's own premises, therefore, since the documentary evidence showing the
date the offense of grave threats was allegedly committed by him was submitted at preliminary investigation and the original information duly alleged that the threat
made by him was documented, i.e. "in a letter," he could in no way claim unfairness or prejudice through the amendment, for he was duly apprised from the
beginning — and through the testimony of the complainant admitted at the trial without objection on his part — that he was being charged and tried for the crime of
grave threats allegedly committed by him on March 2, 1964 and not in March, 1965, i.e., that he was being charged for only one crime of grave threats committed
on March 2, 1964, (inadvertently originally alleged to have been committed in March, 1965) rather than the prosecution confronting him "with evidence tending to
prove a similar offense committed in 1964," aside from another committed in 1965, as baselessly speculated by respondent court.

The Court, in U.S. vs. Bungaoil, 10 where the information alleged that the therein accused stole a cow in February,
1915, whereas the evidence at the trial established that it was stolen seven years, earlier in 1908, pointed out
through the late Justice Moreland that "a variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence of
the prosecution with respect to the time when the crime was committed would not result in an acquittal of the
accused; but if the accused interposed timely objection to such variance and showed that it was prejudicial to his
interests in that it deceived him and prevented him from having a fair opportunity to defend himself, the trial court
might grant an adjournment for such time as would enable the defendant to meet the change in date which was the
cause of his surprise," and that the accused must take advantage of the variance "some time during the trial by
46
appropriate objection and satisfy the trial court that he had been prejudiced by reason thereof" so that the trial court
may "take such measures (as an adjournment) as would give the defendant an opportunity to produce such
witnesses or evidence as the variance ... made necessary." 11

Respondent court therefore committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the amendment of the information,
and the writ prayed for should be granted. A note of advertence is due, however, to the prosecution service that it is
preferable that they exercise greater care in the preparation of the information and checking the allegations
thereof before filing, to avoid similar clerical errors and oversights which lead only to unnecessary delays of the trial,
as well as errors of substance which would be beyond amendment and result in a miscarriage of justice.

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of certiorari and mandamus prayed for is hereby granted. Respondent court's order of
April 12, 1967 is set aside and it is directed to permit the amended information dated March 7, 1967 as presented by
the prosecution. With costs against respondent-accused. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Villamor, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 59241-44 July 5, 1989

PEDRO TANDOC, ROGELIO ERCELLA, RUDY DIAZ, JUAN ROSARIO, AND FRED MENOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RICARDO P. RESULTAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the City Court of San
Carlos City (Pangasinan), ARNULFO PAYOPAY, MANUEL CANCINO, and CONRADO PAYOPAY,
SR., respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Petition for certiorari assailing the Orders 1 of the City Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, dated 13 August 1981,
finding reasonable ground to believe that petitioners Pedro Tandoc, Rogelio Ercella, Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and
Fred Menor had probably committed the crimes of "Trespass to Dwelling", "Serious Physical Injuries", "Less Serious
Physical Injuries" and "Grave Threats", docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2105, 2106, 2107 and 2108; and the
Order 2 dated 21 October 1981, denying petitioners' motion for a re-investigation of the complaint by the Office of the
City Fiscal of San Carlos City. The incident which gave rise to the petition at bar is as follows:

On 19 October 1980, a criminal complaint docketed as I.S. No. 80- 198 was lodged with the Office of the City Fiscal
of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, with the charges of "Serious Physical Injuries", filed by Bonifacio Menor against
respondent Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay; "Slight Physical Injuries", filed by Fred de la Vega against respondent Beda
Acosta, and "Trespass to Dwelling", filed by Pacita Tandoc against respondents Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay, Beda
Acosta, Manuel Cancino, Nadong Fernandez and Arturo Syloria.

Pending the resolution of said complaint, Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay and his father Conrado Payopay, Sr., together
with Manuel Cancino, also filed a complaint on 2 December 1980 3 with the Office of the City Fiscal, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, against Pedro Tandoc, Pacita Tandoc, Rudy Diaz, Fred Menor, Rogelio Ercella, Juan Rosario and
Fred de la Vega, with the charges of "Trespass to Dwelling", "Serious Oral Defamation", "Grave Threats" and
"Physical Injuries", docketed as I.S. No. 80-233.

On 10 December 1980, the investigating fiscal found reasonable ground to believe that respondents Arnulfo (Arnold)
Payopay, Beda Acosta, Manuel Cancino, Nadong Fernandez and Arturo Syloria committed the crimes charged in
I.S. 80-198, 4 thus

The evidence in the above-cited complaints tend to show that at about 6:35 o'clock in the afternoon
of October 19,1980, at the house of Pacita B. Tandoc, situated at Rizal Avenue, SCC, the
respondents entered the store and dinning [sic] room of the complainant without her permission.
There was a sort of altercation between the complainant and respondent, Arnold Payopay, regarding
the stoning of the store and house of complainant, Tandoc. In the course of their altercation,
respondent Arnold Payopay picked up stones and struck the complainant Tandoc but instead her
helper Bonifacio Menor was hit and suffered physical injuries which according to the medico-legal
certificate will heal for [sic] more than thirty days. She further declared that respondent, Beda
Acosta, who was behind Arnold Payopay picked up stone [sic] struck her but unfortunately her
helper, Fred de la Vega, was hit and suffered injuries which injury will heal in less than nine days
according to the medical certificate. The matter was reported to the Barangay Chairman of the place
and to the Office of the Station Commander. In support of the complaint are the sworn statements of
Bonifacio Menor, Fred de la Vega and Barangay Chairman Hermogenes Salangad.

47
 xxx xxx xxx

After evaluating the evidence on hand and the entries in the police blotter the undersigned finds that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime of Trespass To Dwelling, has been committed
by all respondents; Serious Physical Injuries, has been committed by respondent Arnold Payopay;
and Slight Physical Injuries, has been committed by respondent Beda Acosta. The latter case has
not been referred to the Barangay Chairman as the case will soon prescribe and that the affidavit of
complainant was just endorsed on November 28, 1980. I most respectfully recommend that the
corresponding Informations be filed in Court.

From the aforequoted resolution, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied in a
resolution dated 5 January 1981. 5 Consequently, the corresponding informations for "Slight Physical Injuries",
"Trespass to Dwelling" and "Serious Physical Injuries" were filed with the City Court of San Carlos City, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 1992, 2000 and 2001, respectively. 6

With respect to the criminal complaint docketed as I.S. No. 80-233 filed by Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay and Manuel
Cancino against petitioners for "Serious Oral Defamation", "Grave Threats" and "Physical Injuries", the Office of the
City Fiscal recommended the dropping of said charges on the ground that they "were found to be in a [sic] nature of
a countercharge, the same having been filed after more than one (1) month from the date of the alleged incident of
19 October 1980." However, as to the charge of "Trespass to Dwelling" filed by Conrado Payopay, Sr. against Pedro
Tandoc, a prima facie case was found by the investigating fiscal. 7 Thus, on 28 January 1981, an informations 8 for
"Trespass to Dwelling" was filed with the City Court of San Carlos City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2017.

On 28 July 1981, respondents Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay, Conrado Payopay, Sr. and Manuel Cancino, directly
lodged with the City Court of San Carlos City the following criminal complaints against herein petitioners, 9 to wit:

— Criminal Case No. 2105, entitled "People v. Pedro Tandoc, Rogelio Ercella, Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred
Menor", for Serious Physical Injuries, filed by Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay as private complainant.

— Criminal Case No. 2106, entitled "People vs. Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred Menor", for Trespass to
Dwelling, filed by Conrado Payopay, Sr. as private complainant.

— Criminal Case No. 2107, entitled "People vs. Pedro Tandoc, Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred dela Vega", for
Less Serious Physical Injuries, filed by Manuel Cancino as private complainant.

— Criminal Case No. 2108, entitled "People vs. Pedro Tandoc, Rudy Diaz, Rogelio Ercella, Juan Rosario & Fred
Menor", for Grave Threats to Kill, with Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay as private complainant.

On 13 August 1981, the City Court of San Carlos City issued several Orders 10 which are the subject of the petition
at bar, whereby the court a quo, after conducting a preliminary examination of the four (4) aforementioned cases,
found reasonable ground to believe that the offenses charged may have been committed by the accused (now
petitioners) and that the latter were probably guilty thereof. The issuance of warrants of arrest was ordered against
herein petitioners, although said warrants were later suspended upon motion of the petitioners. A motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution was filed by petitioners, but it was denied. 11 They moved for a re-
investigation of the cases by the Office of the City Fiscal. On 21 October 1981, the court a quo denied said
motion. 12 Petitioners sought a reconsideration of said order, but it was likewise denied, 13 hence, this petition.

The sole issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the city court has the power and authority to
conduct anew a preliminary examination of charges, which were previously the subject of a preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the City Fiscal and thereafter dismissed by the latter.

A preliminary investigation is intended to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of
defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a
fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct
useless and expensive trials. 14

There are two (2) stages in a preliminary investigation; first, the preliminary examination of the complainant and his
witnesses prior to the arrest of the accused to determine whether or not there is ground to issue a warrant of arrest;
second, preliminary investigation proper, wherein the accused, after his arrest, is informed of the complaint filed
against him and is given access to the testimonies and evidence presented, and he is also permitted to introduce
evidence in his favor. The purpose of this stage of investigation is to determine whether or not the accused should
be released or held before trial. 15

Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. 16 It is not a trial of
the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and

48
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person
against whom it is taken in jeopardy. 17

Under Section 10, Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in cases falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of an inferior court, as well as in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city courts or municipal
courts with Courts of First Instance, the accused was not entitled to be heard in a preliminary investigation
proper. 18The reason behind this rule is as follows.

Indeed, balancing the considerations, the withholding of the right of the preliminary investigation
from the accused in cases triable by the inferior courts involving offenses with lower penalties than
those exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance, could not be termed an unjust or unfair
distinction. The loss of time entailed in the conduct of preliminary investigations, with the consequent
extension of deprivation of the accused's liberty, in case he fails to post bail, which at times outlasts
the period of the penalty provided by law for the offense, besides the mental anguish suffered in
protracted litigations, are eliminated with the assurance of a speedy and expeditious trial for the
accused, upon his arraignment (without having to undergo the second stage of the preliminary
investigation), and of a prompt verdict on his guilt or innocence. On the other hand, the so-called first
stage of preliminary investigation or the preliminary examination, conducted by the duly authorized
officer, as borne out by the examination and sworn written statement of the complainants and their
witnesses, generally suffices to establish the existence of reasonable ground to charge the accused
with having committed the offense complained of. 19

The preliminary examination prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the sworn statements of the
complainant and his witnesses are sufficient to establish whether "there is a reasonable ground to believe that an
offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof', to prevent needless waste or duplication of
time and effort. 20

In the case at bar, the offenses charged against petitioners for "Trespass to Dwelling", "Grave Threats" and
"Physical Injuries" were all within the jurisdiction of the City Court of San Carlos City. Under the circumstances, the
complaints could be filed directly with the City Court which is empowered to conduct a preliminary examination for
purposes of issuance of warrants of arrest, and thereafter to proceed with the trial of the cases on the merits. The
preliminary investigation proper conducted by the Office of the City Fiscal could have been dispensed with. Neither
did the earlier order of dismissal of the complaints by the investigating fiscal bar the filing of said complaints with the
city court on the ground of double jeopardy.

... . The result of a preliminary investigation can neither constitute nor give rise to the defense of
double jeopardy in any case, because such preliminary investigation is not and does not in itself
constitute a trial or even any part thereof. The only purpose of a preliminary investigation is to
determine, before the presentation of evidence by the prosecution and by the defense, if the latter
party should wish to present any, whether or not there are reasonable grounds for proceeding
formally and resolutely against the accused (People vs. Peji Bautista, G.R. No. 45739, April 25,
1939; U.S. vs. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil. 209). In order that the defense of jeopardy may lie, there must be a
former judgment, either of acquittal or of conviction, rendered by a court competent to render the
same, not only by reason of the offense committed, which must be the same or at least comprised
within it, but also by reason of the place where it was committed. Under the established facts it
cannot be stated that the same circumstances exist in the case under consideration. Consequently,
the defense of double jeopardy is untenable. 21

As long as the offense charged has not prescribed, the city court has the power and authority to conduct a
preliminary examination and proceed with the trial of the case properly within its jurisdiction. The prescriptive period
of a crime depends upon the penalty imposed by law. The penalty of arresto mayor is imposed by law for the crimes
of "Trespass to Dwelling", 22 "Grave Threats", which is not subject to a condition 23 and "Less Serious Physical
Injuries" which has incapacitated the offended party for ten (10) days or shall require medical attendance for the
same period; 24 for "Serious Physical Injuries" which has caused illness or incapacity for labor for more than thirty
(30) days, the penalty is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. 25 The
prescriptive period of offenses punishable by arresto mayor is five (5) years, while crimes punishable by correctional
penalties prescribe in ten (10) years. 26 The incident at bar occurred on 19 October 1980, while the complaints were
filed with the City Court nine (9) months from said occurrence or on 28 July 1981, thus, the crimes charged had not
yet prescribed under the given facts.

From the order of the City Court finding reasonable ground to believe that a crime was committed and the accused
probably guilty thereof, petitioners cannot seek a re-investigation by the Office of the City Fiscal. The re-
investigation sought by petitioners applies only to instances where a case is cognizable by the Court of First
Instance but filed with the City Court for purposes of preliminary investigation only and thereafter dismissed by the
latter on the ground that no prima facie case exists. However, for cases cognizable by inferior courts and filed with
the same not only for purposes of preliminary investigation but for trial on the merits, the Office of the City Fiscal has
no authority to re- investigate.

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WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-48974 March 20, 1944

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
BANAAG LINATOC and GERARDO LINATOC, defendants-appellees.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Bautista for appellant.
Pedro P. Muñoz for appellee.

OZAETA, J.:

Defendants-appellees were accused by the chief of police of Calamba, Laguna, of "slight physical injuries with
threats to kill" in a complaint filed on November 11, 1942, in the justice of the peace court of said municipality, which
reads as follows:

The undersigned Chief of Police, after having duly sworn on oath, accuses Banaag Linatoc and Gerado
Linatoc of the crime of "Slight Physical Injuries with Threats to Kill" committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of Nov. 1942, in the public market of Calamba, Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the above-named accused confederating together and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and threaten to kill the person
of Suzana Galvez and using personal violence upon the said Suzana Galvez by holding her arm, pushing
and hitting her with a fist blow thus causing injuries in the different parts of her body, which injuries have
required and will require medical attendance necessary for a period of 7 days, and will incapacitate the said
Suzana Galvez from performing her customary labor for the same period of time.

That in the commission of the said crime there is present the aggravating circumstance of superior strength
due to sex. Contrary to law.

Upon said complaint the accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. They were, however, found guilty by the
justice of the peace court of slight physical injuries with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
and sentenced to twenty-one days of arresto menor and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P13. From
that sentence they appealed to the Court of First Instance.

The Court of First Instance, upon motion of counsel for the accused, dismissed the case without prejudice, on the
ground that the complaint charged the complex crimes of slight physical injuries with grave threats, and as the
penalty for the more serious crime was beyond the competence of the justice of the peace court, the Court of First
Instance did not acquire appellate jurisdiction. From the order of dismissal the fiscal appealed to this Court.

The appeal in our opinion is meritorious. The complaint above transcribed charges two different crimes — slight
physical injuries and threats to kill. The justice of the peace court undeniably had jurisdiction to try and decide the
light offense of slight physical injuries. Assuming, without deciding, that the complaint sufficiently charges also the
less grave offense of "grave threats" as penalized in article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, the justice of the peace
had to ignore it because it was beyond his jurisdiction, and any pronouncement he might have made with regard
thereto would have been coram non judice.

The complaint did not charge complex crimes within the purview of article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Act No. 4000, which reads as follows:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

In the first place, there are not two "grave or less grave felonies" involved in the complaint, slight physical injuries
being a light offense. In the second place, the act that caused slight physical injuries did not constitute also the
crime of grave threats, nor was the one a necessary means for committing the other.

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The Court of First Instance, therefore, should try and decide the appeal involving slight physical injuries and ignore
the charge of "threats to kill" until a proper separate information therefor is presented, if desired.

The order is reversed and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, with costs against the
appellees.

Yulo, C.J., Moran and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

Paras, J. I concur in the result. See U.S. vs. Sevilla, 1 Phil., 143 and U.S. vs. Paguirigan, 14 Phil., 450.

Separate Opinions

BOCOBO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. I deem it advisable to state that the more serious offense, threats to kill, should have been
given preference by the Justice of the Peace by immediately making a preliminary investigation thereof, with a view
to forwarding the case to the Court of First Instance if good and justifiable grounds for such action were found by the
Justice of the Peace. It was in the public interest and the offense of threats to kill should have been prosecuted and
tried before the offense of slight physical injuries, because the former involved a more serious menace to public
order.

G.R. No. L-32737 May 8, 1985

GREGORIO A. CONCON, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE JOAQUIN T. MAAMBONG, as Judge of the City Court of Cebu City,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Solicitor General, respondents.

Realino P. Cinco for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

This original petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition seeks the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin
respondent Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court, from taking cognizance of an appeal interposed
by petitioner Gregorio A. Concon from the decision of the City Court of Cebu, now Municipal Trial Court of Cebu,
convicting him of the offense of grave threats.

Charged with grave threats for having ... "unlawfully and feloniously threaten(ed) to kill one Cecilio Abella with said
shotgun," petitioner was found guilty as charged and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one [1] month and one [1]
day of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P200.00. Immediately after promulgation of the sentence on July 2, 1968,
he filed a notice of appeal, stating that he was appealing the decision to the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
City Court, however, instead of transmitting the records to the Court of First Instance, forwarded the same to the
Court of Appeals where the case was docketed as CA-G. R. No. 09188.

On November 2, 1970, or two years after the perfection of the appeal, petitioner filed a motion asking that the
records be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Cebu on the ground that the latter court, and not the Court of
Appeals, had appellate jurisdiction over the case. The appellate court denied the motion and required petitioner to
file his brief. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.

In support of the thesis that the appeal should be determined by the Court of First Instance, petitioner relies on
Section 42 of the Rep. Act 3857, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of Cebu City, which provides that "an
appeal shall lie to the Court of First Instance in all cases where fine or imprisonment or both is imposed by the City
Court ... ." The provision cited, however, applies only to appeals from the criminal cases decided by the Cebu City
Court in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction.

Under the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the law in force at the time of perfection of petitioner's appeal, the
offense of grave threats, punishable under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, fell within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the City Court and the Court of First Instance. 1 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 44(f), 2 and of
paragraph (b), (c) and the penultimate paragraph of Section 84 of the 1948 Judiciary Act, said courts exercised
concurrent, original jurisdiction in the offenses enumerated or referred to therein.
51
Considering that the City Court of Cebu had tried and decided the case against petitioner in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction concurrently with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the appeal interposed by petitioner was
rightly certified to the Court of Appeals, the proper forum for such appeal. The last paragraph of Section 87(c) of the
Judiciary Act is clear and categorical:

All cases filed under the next preceding paragraph with municipal judges of capitals and city court
judges shall be tried and decided on the merits by the respective municipal judges or city judges.
Proceedings had shall be recorded and decisions therein shall be appealable direct to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied.)

It should be pointed out, however, that the above ruling applies only to appeals perfected before the implementation
on January 17, 1983 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. This new law, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act, has repealed those provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which relate to the jurisdictions of the Court of
Appeals, Courts of First Instance, City and Municipal Courts. By defining the precise periphery of the original as well
as appellate jurisdiction of lower courts, this law completely eliminated the conflict of jurisdiction of the courts
obtaining under the 1948 Judiciary Act. And under Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 "regional trial courts
shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdictions... ."

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Abad Santos and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.

52