Atty.

Patrick Sarmiento, Section 2E – 2nd Semester AY 2016-2017

Book: Notes and Updates in Administrative Law, Law on Local Government, and Election law – Gonzales Jr.

SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG – School of Law

Administrative Law & Law on Public Officers
COURSE SYLLABUS

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

INTRODUCTION/GENERAL CONSIDERATION
Malaga vs. Penachos, 213 SCRA 516 (p. 43-book)
De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 296 (p. 49-book)

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208 (p.72-book)
U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
Marcos vs. Manglapuz 177 SCRA 668
Carino vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 1991
LLDA vs. CA, 231 SCRA 292
Rizal Empire Insurance Corp., vs. NLRC, 150 SCRA 565 (p.72-book)

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil 234
Araneta vs. Gaitmaitan, 101 Phil 328
People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 250 (p.73-book)
Bautista vs. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329
Maceda vs. ERB, 192 SCRA 363
Philippine Consumers Foundation vs. DECS, 153 SCRA 622
CIR vs. CA, 261 SCRA 236 (p. 76-book)
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs. BOT, 117 SCRA 597
US vs. Panlilio, 28 Phil 608
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association vs. Defensor, GR No. 163980, 3 August 2006 (full text)
Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141
PSDSA vs. De Jesus, GR No. 157299, 19 June 2006

QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
Syquia vs. Board of Power, 72 SCRA 212
Globe Wireless vs. Public Service Commission, 147 SCRA 269
Philippine Association of Lawyers vs. Agrava, 105 Phil 173
Guevarra vs. COMELEC, 104 Phil 268
Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil 635
Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, GR No. 139465, 18 January 2000

JUDICIAL REVIEW
Abejo vs. Dela Cruz, 149 SCRA 654
Bernardo vs. Abalos, GR No. 137266, 5 December 2001
Industrial Enterprises vs. CA, 184 SCRA 426
GSIS vs. CSC, 204 SCRA 826
Paat vs. CA, 266 SCRA 167
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256
Mangubat vs. Osmena, 105 Phil 1308 (x)
Pros. Tabao vs. Judge Lilagan, AM No. RTJ-01-1651, 4 September 2001
Arrow Transportation vs. BOT, 63 SCRA 193
KBMPBM vs. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92
National Development Corp. vs. Hervilla, 151 SCRA 200 (x)
Atlas Consolidated Mining vs. Factoran, 154 SCRA 49 – (full text)
Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290
Heirs of Eugenio vs. Roxas, 173 SCRA 581 9 (x)
Industrial Power Sales vs. Sinsuat, 160 SCRA 19 (x)
National Development Co. vs. Collector of Customs, 9 SCRA 429

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE

Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549
Luego vs. CSC, 143 SCRA 327
Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil 740
Costin vs. Quimbo, 120 SCRA 159
Monsanto vs. Factoran, 110 SCRA 190
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317
Labo vs. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1
Yee vs. Director of Public Schools, 7 SCRA 832
Laurel vs. Desierto, GR No. 145368, 12 April 2002

DE FACTO OFFICERS
Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil 866
Rodriguez vs. Tan, 91 Phil 724
Regala vs. CFI of Bataan, 77 Phil 684
Solis vs. CA, 38 SCRA 53
Monroy vs. CA, 20 SCRA 620
Menzon vs. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251

THE CIVIL SERVICE

Juco vs. NLRC, GR No. 98107, 18 August 1997
Maturan vs. Maglana, 113 SCRA 268
Corpus vs. Cuaderno, 13 SCRA 591
Pineda vs. Claudio, 28 SCRA 34
National Service Corporation vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122
Monsanto vs. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190
SSS Employees Association vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686
TUCP vs. NHA, 173 SCRA 33
Garcia vs. COA, GR No. L-75025, 14 September 1993

AUTHORITY OF THE PUBLIC OFFICER

Festejo vs. Fernando, 94 Phil 504
American Tobacco Co. vs. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 286

INHIBITIONS/SALARY AND PERQUISITES

Santos vs. CA, GR No. 139792, 22 November 2000
Laurel vs. CSC, 203 SCRA 195
CSC vs. Dacoycoy, GR No. 135805, 29 April 1999

LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332
Correa vs. CFI, 92 SCRA 312
Ocampo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 114683, 18 January 2000
OCA vs. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1
Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282

TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS

Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 130872, 25 March 1999
Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 146738, 2 March 2001
Collantes vs. CA, GR No. 169604, 6 March 2007
General Manager, PPA vs. Monserate, GR No. 139616, 17 April 2002
Municipality of San Andres vs. CA, GR No. 118883, 16 January 1998
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317
CASES
INTRODUCTION/GENERAL
CONSIDERATION
Malaga vs. Penachos Jr.
Facts: Iloilo State College of Fisheries through its Pre-
qualifiecation, Bids and Awards Committee caused the
publication in the Nov. 25, 26 and 28 1988 issues of the
Western Disayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction
of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced
that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification
requirements was December 2, 1988 at 3’o clock in the
afternoon.
Petitioners Maria Malaga and JosieeleenNajarro,
respectively doing business under the name of B.E.
Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their
documents at two o’clock in the afternoon of December 2,
1988. Petitioner Jose Occena submitted on December 5, 1988.
All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding
as they were considered late as having been submitted after
the cut-off time of 10 o clock in the morning of December 2,
1988
On December 12, 1988 petitioner filed a complaint
claiming that they have submitted their documents on time,
the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them. On the
same date Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order
prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding
the project. The plaintiffs argued the inapplicability of PD 1818
which state that no court shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order xxx, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state
college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was
not part of the national government.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the
restraining order stating that ISCOF was within the coverage of
PD 1818
ISSUE: WON ISCOF is covered by PD 1818
HELD: Yes, first, it was created in pursuance of the integrated
fisheries development of the State; second, the Treasurer of the
RP shall also be the ex-officio treasurer of the State College,
third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government
are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the
president of the State College such apparatus, equipments etc.
and lastly, an additional amount of P1.5 Million has been
appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that
ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree. There
are two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified
injunction of the bidding and awarding of the project. First,
PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and then
changed these deadlines without prior notice; second, PBAC
was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans,
specifications and proposal book forms for the project to bid
30 days before the date of the bidding if the estimated project
cost was between P1M and 5M in order to secure competitive
bidding and to prevent favouritism, collusion and fraud.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered upholding
the restraining order as not covered by the Prohibition of PD
1818
De la Llana vs. Alba
Facts: De la Llana, et al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
and/or for Prohibition (considered by this Court as an action
for prohibition), seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget,
the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Ministerof
Justice from taking any action implementing Batas
PambansaBlg. 129. BP 129 mandates that Justices and judges
of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit
courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act, would be considered separated from
the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for
petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that
thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has
been ignored and disregarded.
Issue: Whether the abolition of the existing inferior courts
collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by
incumbentJustices and judges Under Article X, Section 7 of the
Constitution.
Held: The BatasangPambansa is expressly vested with the
authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process
toabolish existing ones. The termination of office of their
occupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is
hardlydistinguishable from the practical standpoint from
removal, a power that is now vested in the Supreme Court.
Removal is,of course, to be distinguished from termination by
virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a
non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant whowould thereby lose his position. It is in that sense
that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless,
for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is
one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between
removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid
of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In
the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore,
itwould be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices
and judgesare concerned, the Supreme Court be consulted and
that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear
need beentertained that there is a failure to accord respect to
the basic principle that the Supreme Court does not render
advisoryopinions. No question of law is involved. If such were
the case, certainly the Supreme Court could not have its say
prior tothe action taken by either of the two departments. Even
then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where
thematter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion
into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created
bythe reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no
departuretherefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this
liberalinterpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the
charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of
reorganizing theinferior courts, the power of removal of the
present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. Thechallenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except
to thosepredisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a
construction would be in accordance with the basic principle
that inthe choice of alternatives between one which would
save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former
is to bepreferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The
principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of
every act toavoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied.
Batas PambansaBlg. 129 could stand the most rigorous test of
constitutionality. Further, it is of the essence of
constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded
from actingwithin the boundaries of its conceded competence.
That is why it has long been well-settled under the
constitutionalsystem we have adopted that the Supreme Court
cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation.
It is acardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it
is the people who are endowed with rights, to secure which
agovernment is instituted. Acting as it does through public
officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly
certainpowers. Those they exercise not for their own benefit
but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in
thelanguage of ambiguity: "A public office is a public trust."
That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative.
Thelaw may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to
enable them to perform his functions and
fulfillhisresponsibilities more efficiently. It is from that
standpoint that the security of tenure provision to assure
judicial independence is to be viewed. There is no reason to
assume that the failure of this suit to annul BP 129 would be
attended with deleterious consequences to the administration
of justice. It does not follow that the abolition in good faith of
the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals and the creation of new ones will result in
a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with independence
its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor
should there be any fear that less than good faith will attend
the exercise of the appointing power vested in the Executive. It
cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is
something to the credit of any administration. Well and truly
has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation of
powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments
are as one in their determination to pursue the ideals and
aspirations and to fulfill the hopes of the sovereign people as
expressed in the Constitution.
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES
TIO VS.VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151
SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of
videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential
DecreeNo. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogramindustry.A month after the promulgation of the said
Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal
Revenue Code providedthat:"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There
shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready
for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video
tapes shall be subject tosalestax.""Section 10.Tax on Sale, Lease
or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision
of law to the contrary, theprovince shall collect a tax of thirty
percent (30%) of the purchase price orrental rate, as the case
may be, for every sale,lease or disposition of a videogram
containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual
program.
“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall
accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%)
shallaccrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;
PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be
sharedequally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan
Manila Commission. The rationale behind the tax provision is
to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videogramsincluding,among others, videotapes, discs,
cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof,
have greatly prejudiced theoperations of movie houses and
theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp
decline in theatrical attendanceby at least forty percent (40%)
and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's
specific, amusement and othertaxes, thereby resulting in
substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in
government revenues.Videogram(s) establishments
collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals,
sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have
not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of
approximately P180Million in taxes each year.The unregulated
activities of videogram establishments have also affected the
viability of the movie industry.
Issues: (1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a
valid exercise of police power.(2) Whether or nor the DECREE
is constitutional.
Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's
police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose.
Itwas imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the
video industry, particularly because of the rampant film
piracy,the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and
the proliferation of pornographicvideo tapes. And while it was
alsoan objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry,
the tax remains a valid imposition.We find no clear violation of
the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing
Presidential Decree No. 1987 asunconstitutional and void.
While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the
moribund movie industry, there isno question that public
welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair
competition posed by rampant filmpiracy; the erosion of the
moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the
availability of unclassified andunreviewedvideo tapes
containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent
sequences; and losses in governmentrevenues due to the drop
in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the
activities of video establishments arevirtually untaxed since
mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees
are required to engage inbusiness."WHEREFORE, the instant
Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
US.vs. ANG TANG HO
Delegation of Power – Admin Bodies
Facts: On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during
special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An
Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and
Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances
authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules
and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products.
Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53
which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the
price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang
Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a
ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos.
The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the
EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08 August
1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found
guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence
countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the
Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the
Governor General.
HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed
because he committed the act prior to the publication of the
EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime.
Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an
order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the
order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said
Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain,
so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to
take the place of all others without the determination of the
insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated,
and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The
law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it
leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing
must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee
or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it
is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of
any prescribed fact or event.
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts: The case was about the constitutionality of EO 626-A
which prohibits interprovincial movement of carabaos.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The
petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits
of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos
and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity.
Held: The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so
it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of
the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable
and immutable command for all seasons and all persons.
Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very
elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt
easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its
protection as the changing times and circumstances may
require.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with
because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial
system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of
law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have
consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome
power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which
Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every
person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out
of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due
process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions
when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary
action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as
procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In
the exceptional cases accepted, however there is a justification
for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the
urgency of the need to correct it.
Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
EO 626-A was declared unconstitutional.
Marcos v. Manglapus - G.R. No. 88211
September 15, 1989
FACTS: It is a case of a dictator President Ferdinand Marcos of
the Philippines forced out of office and into exile after causing
twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the
country and who within the short space of three years seeks to
return to the Philippines to die.
But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the
nation of his return at a time when the stability of government
is threatened from various directions and the economy is just
beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the
decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
Issue: 1 .Whether or not the ban of Mr. Marcos and family from
returning to the Philippines has international precedents?
2. Whether or not the President acted in grave abuse of
discretion in determining the return of the Marcoses?
HELD: NO, The right to return to one's country is not among
the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it
is our well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of international
law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land
[Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily
deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)]
separately from the "right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).]
On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art.
12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including
his own."
[Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are
necessary to protect national security, public order, public
health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one
cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).]
It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations
to the right to return to one's country in the same context as
those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
2.NO.The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion in determining that the return of former
President Marcos and his family at the present time and under
present circumstances poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines.
The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the
duty of the President, as steward of the people.
Petition is Dismissed
CARINO vs. CHR
Adjudicatory Power of the CHR
Facts: On 17 Sept 1990, some 800 public school teachers in
Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in
order for their grievances to be heard. As a result thereof, eight
teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was
then investigated, and on 17 Dec 1990, Secretary Carino
ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the
suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the
Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor
General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and
prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless,
CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide
and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human
rights violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD: The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no
judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights
violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and
should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved
therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with
the trial.
Carino vs. CHR
• Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the
power to investigate
FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass
concerted actions” to protest the alleged failure of public
authorities to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions”
consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the
LiwasangBonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The
Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to
work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the
return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay
High School were administratively charged, preventively
suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and
temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the
Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout
signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings.
Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of
Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and
del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising
the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to due
process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in
the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn
statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that
while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly
without notice and consequently for reasons completely
unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its
resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the
Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite
this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the “striking
teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not
have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil
and political rights which the Commission is empowered to
investigate.”
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the
issues involved
HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to
have no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency
in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions
of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way
of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
Power to Investigate
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise
that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person.
It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure
as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for
contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course
of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it
may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It
may also request the assistance of any department, bureau,
office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the
conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as
may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To
investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the
popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
“Investigate” vs. “Adjudicate”
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine,
explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The
dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study
closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: .
. . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official
inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover,
to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or
intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application
of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o
follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To
trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with
care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to
inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn
describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which
ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec.
257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and
collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on,
settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the
rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of
issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge
or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant
judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise
of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with
adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass
on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the
entry of a judgment."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having
merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try
and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in
the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS,
their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power
to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not
the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers
constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law;
(b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in
those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue
those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to
this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions
of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative
disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts
done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any,
may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
Who has Power to Adjudicate?
These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of
Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers
granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the
appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.
Manner of Appeal
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions
reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are
correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence;
whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or
defective in not having accorded the respondents due process;
and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth
committed "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and
determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to
the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse
verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and
eventually the Supreme Court.
LLDA vs. CA
Facts: On March 8, 1981, the Task Force CamarinDumsite of
our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Caloocan City filed a complaint
with the Laaguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop
the operation of the 8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in tala
Estate due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-
site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate
(liquid that has percolated through soil or other medium). The
LLDA found that the city government of Caloocan was
maintaining an open dumpsite without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental
Management Bureau of the DENR, as required under PD 1586
and clearance from LLDA.
On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a CEASE and
DESIST ORDER. However, sometime in Aug. 1992, the dumping
operation was resumed after a meeting among the city
government of Caloocan and LLDA failed to settle the problem.
ISSUE: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a
“cease and desist” order under RA No. 4850
HELD: Yes, the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA
requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its
garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to
have been done in violation of RA no. 4850 and other relevant
environmental laws cannot be stamped as an unauthorized
exercise by the LLDA of its injunctive powers. As an
administrative agency, it has powers that are necessarily
implied in the exercise of its express powers.
The issuance of the Cease and Desist Order by the
LLDA is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its
charter and its amending law. The charter of LLDA as stated in
RA 4850 Section 4(d) is the power to institute “ necessary legal
proceedings against any person who shall commence to
implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or
program with the Laguna de Bay region without previous
clearance from the LLDA
RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/ OR
SERGIO CORPUS, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
Facts: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R.
Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance
Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On
January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been
appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00.
Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of
petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior
and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without
change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the
Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a
month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting
Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month
plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the
Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an
inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00
plus allowances and other benefits.
On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was
dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness
and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with
the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a
Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor
Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with
back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated
November15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed
on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence,
the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
petitioner sappeal on a technicality.
Held: Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor
Relations Commission on appeal, provides:
SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter
shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission
by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of notice thereof.
SECTION 6. No extension of period. No motion or request for
extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall
be entertained.
The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein)
received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April
1,1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the
Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no
extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission,
aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its
resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was
dismissed for having been filed out of time. The Revised Rules
of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and
explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an
elementary rule in administrative law that administrative
regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the
force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v.
Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314
[1985]).Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised
NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has
become final and executory and can no longer be subject to
appeal. Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter
appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and
salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a
highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite
occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection
cannot after all be demanded. WHEREFORE, this petition is
DISMISSED
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931
MAURICIO CRUZ vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG
Topic: Contingent regulation (page 50)
FACTS: This is a petition brought originally before the Court of
First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory
injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as
Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to
issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by
the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner
attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present
prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into
the Philippine Islands.
The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The
demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No.
3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner
would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No.
3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit
the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that
Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.
The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was
dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file
another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner
appealed to this court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent as cause of action
HELD: Yes. It is now generally recognized that the promotion
of industries affecting the public welfare and the development
of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of
the police power.
The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows
that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was
reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the
Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being
so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon
constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine
whether the measures are wise or the best that might have
been adopted.
Araneta vs. Gatmaitan
Facts: The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near
the San Miguel Bay, between the provinces of Camarines Sur
and CamarinesNorte, manifested in a resolution that they
condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving
to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing
in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the same League of
Mayors prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls
in the San Miguel Bay area. In response to the pleas, the
President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San
Miguel Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in
answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines
Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the
typhoon season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving
EO 22.
Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint
for injunction praying that the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from
enforcing said executive order and to declare the same null and
void. The Court held that until the trawler is outlawed by
legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay
by executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are
invalid.
ISSUES: 1. W/N the President has authority to issue EOs 22, 66
and 80
2. W/N the said EOs were valid as it was not in the
exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the
President
HELD:
1. YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the Fisheries law,
the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine
waters come within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions
subject to the general supervision and control of the President
of the Philippines, the President can exercise the same power
and authority through executive orders, regulations, decrees
and proclamations upon recommendation of the Secretary
concerned. Hence, EOs 22,66 and 80 restricting and banning of
trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by
authority of law.
YES. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature
fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of the
Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing
devise like trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our
supply of seafood, and to that end authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations
and such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to
preserve the aquatic resources of the land. When the President,
in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of
Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by
means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel
Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare
of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues
of general concern which were in consonance and strict
conformity with the law
PEOPLE VS. MACEREN
Administrative regulations adopted under egislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with
the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations,
the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress.
FACTS: The respondents were charged withzh violating
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes
electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the
law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court
quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly
prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial
departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI
affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro
fishing is valid?
HELD: NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in
issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does
not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to
punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The
lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the
power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can
authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the
penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has
delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards
authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express
legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and
boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict
with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid
precise of the rule-making power
People vs. Maceren
Facts: On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes,
Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlitodel Rosario were
charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court
of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint
that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted
to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta.
Cruz using a device or equipment to catch fish thru electric
current which thereby destroy any aquatic animals within its
current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace.
The municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI
affirmed such dismissal. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro
fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the
Fisheries Commission is valid.
Held: No. The court held that the that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries
Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders
are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic
Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under
that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it.
In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in
penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a
penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied
in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.
By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be
extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute.
BAUTISTA vs. JUINIO
Police Power
Facts: The validity of an energy conservation measure, Letter
of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979 — the response
to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 — is put in
issue in this prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners,
spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista, for
being allegedly violative of the due process and equal
protection guarantees of the Constitution. The use of private
motor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends and
holidays was banned from ”[12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to
5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00
a.m. of the day after the holiday.” 2 Motor vehicles of the
following classifications are exempted: (a) S (Service); (b) T
(Truck); (c) DPL (Diplomatic); (d) CC (Consular Corps); (e) TC
(Tourist Cars
This Court gave due course to the petition requiring
respondent to answer. There was admission of the facts as
substantially alleged except, as previously noted, that the ban
starts at 12:00 a.m. rather than 1:00 a.m. of a Saturday or of a
holiday and as to the mention of a Willy’s Kaiser jeep being
registered in the name of a certain TeresitaUrbina, about which
respondents had no knowledge. There was a denial of the
allegations that the classification of vehicles into heavy (H) and
extra heavy (EH) on the other hand and light and bantam on
the other hand was violative of equal protection and the
regulation as to the use of the former cars on the dates
specified a transgression of due process. The answer likewise
denied that there was an undue delegation of legislative power,
reference being made to the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. There was also a procedural objection raised, namely,
that what is sought amounts at most to an advisory opinion
rather than an adjudication of a case or controversy.
It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police
power measure may, because of its arbitrary, oppressive or
unjust character, be held offensive to the due process clause
and, therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of
them. A recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of
Instruction makes it clear. Thus: “[Whereas], developments in
the international petroleum supply situation continue to follow
a trend of limited production and spiralling prices thereby
precluding the possibility of immediate relief in supplies
within the foreseeable future; [Whereas], the uncertainty of
fuel supply availability underscores a compelling need for the
adoption of positive measures designed to insure the viability
of the country’s economy and sustain its developmental
growth; [Whereas], to cushion the effect of increasing oil prices
and avoid fuel supply disruptions, it is imperative to adopt a
program directed towards the judicious use of our energy
resources complemented with intensified conservation efforts
and efficient utilization thereof; . . ..” What is undeniable is that
the action taken is an appropriate response to a problem that
presses urgently for solution. It may not be the only
alternative, but its reasonableness is immediately apparent.
Thus, to repeat, substantive due process, which is the epitome
of reasonableness and fair play, is not ignored, much less
infringed.
In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police
power, especially so where the assailed governmental action
deals with the use of one’s property, the latter is accorded
much leeway. That is settled law. What is more, it is good law.
Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed
in the cited Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: “To hold otherwise
would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police
power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending
as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’ It would be, to
paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to
be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put,
police power is ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society.’”
Mary Concepcion Bautista et al vs Alfredo
Juinio et al
“Equal Protection” – Distinction Between Heavy and Extra
Heavy Cars and Others
Facts: Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869
issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra
Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends
and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday.
Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as
bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be
discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars
are heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact there are
smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption. Further,
the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others
who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that
there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on
vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for
precisely those owned by them fall within such category.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection.
HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit
out of her contention. The classification on cars on its face
cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. The ideal
situation is for the law’s benefits to be available to all, that
none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus
could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men
governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of
the very essence of the idea of law. The actual, given things as
they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the
ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not
take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure
that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a
regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and
property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they
can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted
by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that
finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws
operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that
equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If
law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that
fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest.
Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board
Facts: The petitioners pray for injunctive relief to stop the ERB
from implementing its Order mandating a provisional increase
in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products. The Order,
which was in pursuance to EO 172, was a response to the
separate applications of Caltex, Pilipinas Shell and Petron
Corporation for the Board to increase the wholesale posted
prices of petroleum products. Petitioners submit that the Order
was issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction and without proper notice and hearing.
ISSUE: W/N the ERB committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD: NO. While under EO 172, a hearing is indispensable, it
does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a
provisional increase, as it did, subject to its final disposition of
whether or not: 1) to make it permanent;2) to reduce or
increase it further; or 3) to deny the application. The Board has
jurisdiction to decree a price adjustment, subject to the
requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it
may order, under Section 8 of EO 172, an authority to increase
provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final
outcome of the proceeding.
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC.
vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS
Gancayco, J.
Petitioner: Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-
stock, non-profit corporate entity duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines
Respondent: Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a
ranking cabinet member who heads the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of
the Philippines.
FACTS: On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private
Higher Education created by DECS submitted a report entitled
"Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and
Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the
DECS the following courses of action with respect to the
Government's policy on increases in school fees for the SY
1987 to 1988. DECS took note of the report and issued an
Order authorizing the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as
recommended by the Task Force. Petitioner sought for
reconsideration on the ground that increases were too high.
Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a
lower ceiling of 10% to 15%. Petitioner still opposed the
increases.
Petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to
this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking
that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned
Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition
is that the said Department Order was issued without any legal
basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned
Department Order was issued in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not
given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order
was issued.
In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that
while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school fees in
educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always
include the power to increase school fees.
Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that
students and parents are interested parties that should be
afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are
increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned
Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due
process of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not DECS has the power to prescribe school
fees
HELD: Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this
power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other
government agency has been vested with the authority to fix
school fees and as such, the power should be considered
lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively
discharge its functions and duties under the law.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency
may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it
were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and
hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due
process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice
and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the
rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are
meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the
rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular
party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-
judicial in character.
Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise
of its legislative function? We believe so. The assailed
Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that
may be charged by all private schools in the country for
schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and
hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.
CIR vs. CA
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA G.R.
No. 124043, October 14, 1998
Facts: Private respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit
institution, which conducts various programs and activities
that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people,
pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives.
YMCA earned an income from leasing out a portion of its
premises to small shop owners and from parking fees collected
from non-members. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency income tax,
deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and
professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages.
YMCA protested the assessment.
Issue: Whether or not the income of private respondent YMCA
from rentals of small shops and parking fees is exempt from
taxation
Held: YMCA argues that Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the Constitution
exempts charitable institutions from the payment not only of
property taxes but also of income tax from any source. The
Court is not persuaded. The debates, interpellations and
expressions of opinion of the framers of the Constitution reveal
their intent. Justice Hilario Davide Jr., a former constitutional
commissioner, stressed during the Concom debate that what is
exempted is not the institution itself; those exempted from real
estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually,
directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, an eminent authority
on the Constitution and also a member of the Concom, adhered
to the same view that the exemption created by said provision
pertained only to property taxes. In his treatise on taxation,
Justice Jose Vitug concurs, stating that the tax exemption
covers property taxes only. Indeed, the income tax exemption
claimed by YMCA finds no basis in Art. VI, Sec. 28(3) of the
Constitution.
YMCA also invokes Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution
claiming that YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit educational
institution whose revenues and assets are used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is
exempt from taxes on its properties and income. The Court
reiterates that YMCA is exempt from the payment of property
tax, but not income tax on the rentals from its property. The
bare allegation alone that it is a non-stock, non-profit
educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption
from the payment of income tax. Laws allowing tax exemption
are construed strictissimi juris. Hence, for the YMCA to be
granted the exemption it claims under the aforecited provision,
it must prove with substantial evidence that: 1. it falls under
the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution;
and 2. the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes.
However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was
submitted by YMCA to prove that it met the said requisites.
YMCA is not an educational institution within the purview of
Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution. The term “educational
institution,” when used in laws granting tax exemptions, refers
to a school, seminary, college or educational establishment.
Therefore, YMCA cannot be deemed one of the educational
institutions covered by the said constitutional provision.
Moreover, the Court notes that YMCA did not submit proof of
the proportionate amount of the subject income that was
actually, directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes.
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs.
Board of Transportation
Facts: Petitioner is a domestic corporation composed of
taxicab operators. They filed the petition seeking to declare the
nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of the Bureau of
Land Transportation. The assailed memorandum order
provides for the phasing out and discontinuance in the
operation of dilapidated taxis or taxis of Model 1971 and
earlier. Pursuant to the said memorandum, the Bureau of Land
Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52
instructing Regional Directors, the MV Registrars and other
personnel of the BLT, all within the National Capital Region, to
implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-
out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as
public conveyances.
ISSUES: W/N the assailed memorandum orders were invalid
exercise of police power
HELD: NO. Section 2 of Presidential Decree 101 grants the
Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable
standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements,
or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by
operators of public utility motor vehicles. As enunciated in the
BOT circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and
comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power,
can prescribe regulations to promote the health…,safety and
general welfare of the people.
US VS. PANLILIO
The orders (rules and regulations) of an administrative officers
or body issued pursuant to a statute have the force of law but
are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not a
offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly
penalizes such violation.
FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760
relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from
dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial.
It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being
authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said
carabaos exposed to rinderpest was still in effect, permitted
and ordered said carabaous to be taken from the corral in
which they were quarantined and drove them from one place
to another. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the
information and proved on the trial do not constitute a
violation of Act No. 1760
ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the
order of the Bureau of Agriculture?
HELD: NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of
the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is
there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders.
Section 8 of Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating
any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit
acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5.
This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by
paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The
orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be
said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not
penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal
offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation
thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a
violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a
penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way
therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, ¶2 of the
Penal Code which punishes any person who violates
regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease
among animals.
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs.
SECRETARY MOCHAEL DEFENSOR;
GR. NO. 163980; AUGUST 3, 2006
FACTS: Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of
presidential issuances authorized the creation and
development of what is now known as the National
Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former President
Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a
parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a
little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be
known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President
Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of
the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition
of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents
therein.
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the
portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage
of Proclamation No. 1826, former
President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on
September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the
excluded portion to maximize the
number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of
the government’s socialized housing program. On May 14,
2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A.
No. 9207.
Sec. 2.Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of
the State to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward
this end, lands located in
the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing,
socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes.
Sec. 3.Disposition of Certain Portions of the National
Government Center Site to Bona Fide Residents. –
Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby
amended by excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares
on the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of
Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the same open for
disposition to bona fide residents therein: Provided, That the
determination of the bona fide residents on the west side shall
be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and the
determination of the bona fide residents on the east side shall
be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and
occupancy verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided,
further, That all existing legal agreements, programs and plans
signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken, consistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.
Sec.4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National
Government Center Site for Local Government or Community
Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable,
Educational and Religious Purposes. – Certain portions of land
within the aforesaid area for local government or community
facilities, socioeconomic,
charitable, educational and religious institutions are hereby
reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only
those institutions already
operating and with existing facilities or structures, or those
occupying the land may avail of the disposition program
established under the provisions this
Act; Provided, further, That in ascertaining the specific areas
that may be disposed of in favor of these institutions, the
existing site allocation shall
be used as basis therefore: Provided, finally. That in
determining the reasonable lot allocation of such institutions
without specific lot allocations,
the land area that may be allocated to them shall be based on
the area actually used by said institutions at the time of
effectivity of this Act.
ISSUE:Whether an IRR issued by an administrative office may
be reviewed by Courts
HELD:Yes. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or
rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power
is the power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting
statute and
the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not
exhaust administrative remedies
before going to court. This principle, however, applies only
where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-
making or quasi-legislative power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative
power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207.
The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR
issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not
germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks
to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its
quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction
to pass upon the same.
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the
exercise of its quasi-legislative
power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom
of choice of court forum.
True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation
of the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition.
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to
assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative
function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
ordering
said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when
said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or
person’s jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[20][21]
Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not
against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the
purpose of a writ of
prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its
jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice
in orderly channels. Prohibition
is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling
matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where
there is no adequate remedy available in
the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an
IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly
falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any
case, petitioners’ allegation
that “respondents are performing or threatening to perform
functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction” may
appropriately be enjoined by the trial
court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining
order. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is
DISMISSED.
Blas Oplevs Ruben Torres et al
Executive Power – Administrative Orders &The Administrative
Code
On 12 Dec 1996, Ramos issued AO 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System". The
late Senator Ople averred that the said AO is unconstitutional
because it infringes upon the people’s privacy and that the said
AO is an encroachment of the Legislature’s power to legislate
laws. Blas opined that the said AO is not merely an AO because
it partakes of the nature of a law hence it is beyond the
president’s power to issue such. He filed a petition to enjoin
Ruben Torres et al from carrying out such AO. Torres et al
countered that the AO is not a law for it creates no office;
confers no right; affords no protection and imposes no duty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the president is an
encroachment of the functions of the Legislature.
HELD: As head of the Executive Department, the President is
the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole
and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. He has control over the
executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he
has the authority to assume directly the functions of the
executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the
discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the
President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of
laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order.
Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative
orders, rules and regulations.
Upon these precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An
administrative order is:
Sec. 3.Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate
to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance
of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
An AO is not a law. In here, AO 308 partakes the nature of a law
hence it is beyond executive power. Only the legislative can
enact such a law of general effect.-
PSDSA vs. De Jesus
FACTS: Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the
“Governance of Basic Education Act 2001,” became a law on
August 11, 2001, in accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of
the Constitution. Under Section 14 of the law, the DepEd
Secretary is mandated to “promulgate the implementing rules
and regulations within ninety (90) days after the approval of
the Act, provided that the principle of shared governance shall
be fully implemented within two (2) years” after such
approval.
On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of
about 1,800 public school district supervisors of the DepEd, in
behalf of its officers and members, filed the instant petition for
prohibition and mandamus, alleging that:
I. THE ACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IN
REMOVING PETITIONERS’ ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION
OVER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS (SCHOOL
HEADS) WITHIN HIS/HER DISTRICT AND CONVERTING
HIS/HER ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION TO THAT OF
PERFORMING STAFF FUNCTION FOR THE DIVISION OFFICE
PER SECTION 5.1 RULE V OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 (DEPED ORDER NO. 1,
SERIES OF 2003) IS A GROSS VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT
9155 – THE GOVERNANCE OF BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF
2001.
II. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF
REPUBLIC ACT 9155 AS PROMULGATED UNDER DEPED
ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003 EXPANDED THE LAW AND
INCLUDED PROVISIONS WHICH ARE DIAMETRICALLY
OPPOSED TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE SUBJECT LAW.
III. THE DOWNGRADING OF SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OR THE NEGLECT
OR REFUSAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT TO UPGRADE
THE SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT TO
A RESPECTABLE LEVEL OF SALARY GRADE HIGHER THAN
THAT OF THE PRINCIPALS – DESPITE CLEAR INTENTION OF
R.A. 9155 TO RETAIN THE POSITION OF PSDS IN THE
HIERARCHY OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGERS AND OFFICERS
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION – IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL.
Issues: 1) Whether or not District Supervisor shall not exercise
administrative supervision over the Elementary School
Principals (ESPs) and Secondary School Principals (SSPs).
2) Whether or not Rule IV, Section 4.3; Rule V, Sections 5.1 and
the second paragraph of Section 5.2; and Rule VI, Section 6.2,
paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series
of 2003 are constitutional.
Rulings:
1) A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district
supervisors have no administrative supervision over the
school heads; their responsibility is limited to those
enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, to wit:
(1) Providing professional and instructional advice and
support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools
and learning centers in the district or cluster thereof;
(2) Curricula supervision; and
(3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by
proper authorities.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention
been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned.
2) The court reviewed the IRR and found that Section 4.3 of
Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are valid. The
provisions merely reiterate and implement the related
provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the law, a division
superintendent has the authority and responsibility to hire,
place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district
supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both
teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads. A
school head is a person responsible for the administrative and
instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools.
The division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the
operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and
integrated schools and learning centers
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
Syquia vs. Board of Power and Waterworks
FACTS: Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints
with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia as
administrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offense
of selling electricity without permit or franchise and alleging
that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in
excess of the Meralco rates.
In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board,
saying that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but
merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their
legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease
contracts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction
HELD: Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly
exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and
adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against
petitioner.
Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's
contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her
tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor
in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.
Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional
cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in
addition to those registered in their respective apartment
meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character
that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the
Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the
respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by
the regular courts of general jurisdiction.
Respondent board in resolving the complaints against
petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising
costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and
elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year
arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its
jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.
Globe Wireless Ltd. vs. Public Service
Commission
Private respondent Antonio Arnaiz sent a message to Maria
Diaz in Spain through the telegraph office of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Dumagete and was transmitted to
Manila. The message, however, was not delivered to the
addressee. After being informed of said fact, Arnaiz sent a
complaint to the Public Service Commissioner a letter-
complaint. In its answer, petitioner denied liability but
questioned PSC¶s jurisdiction over the subject matter. After
hearing, the PSC found petitioner responsible for the
unsatisfactory service complained of and ordered it to pay a
fine.
ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction to discipline and impose fine
upon petitioner
HELD: NO. The Public Service Act vested in the PSC
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services
and their franchises, equipment and other properties.
However, Section 5 of RA 4630, the legislative franchise under
which petitioner was operating, limited respondent
Commission¶s jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate
which petitioner may charge the public. The negligence
imputed to public respondent had nothing whatsoever to do
with the subject matter of very limited jurisdiction of the
Commission over petitioner
Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava
Respondent Director of the Philippine Patent Office issued a
circular announcing an examination schedule for the purpose
of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippine Patent Office, the said
examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the
rules of practice before said office. According to said circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified.
Petitioners contend that one who has passed the bar exams
and licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines is duly qualified to practice before the said office.
On the other hand, respondent Director maintains that the
prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely the
practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training.
ISSUE: W/N the appearance before the Philippine Patent Office
is included
in the practice of law
HELD: YES. The practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or the
enforcement of their rights in patent cases. The practice before
the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of
other laws and legal principles.
Furthermore, the Director of Patents, exercising as he does
judicial or quasi- judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that
a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training, should be allowed to practice before the said office,
without further examination or other qualification.
GUEVARA vs. COMELEC
Petitioner was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt for having published in
the Sunday Times an article which tended to interfere with and
influence the COMELEC and its members in the adjudication of
a controversy then pending. The article pertained to the
contracts entered into by COMELEC regarding the
requisitioning and preparation of ballot boxes to be used in the
elections. Petitioner appeared and filed a motion to quash
upon the ground, among others, that the Commission has no
jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the
alleged contemptuous article. The COMELEC denied the motion
to quash but granted petitioner a period of 15 days within
which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC has the power to jurisdiction to
conduct
contempt proceedings
HELD: NO.Although the negotiation conducted by the
Commission has resulted in controversy between several
dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which
the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in
relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our
Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a
ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such
being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for
contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently
judicial in nature.
Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations
Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR
TeodoroToribio owns and operates AngTibay a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of
National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not
valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor
unions in AngTibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood.
That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over
NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come
up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to
obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able
to present it before in the CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of
NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore
or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of
due process. They are;
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.”
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION [322 SCRA
160 (2000)]
Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC
Facts: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received
from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other
supporting documents for said extradition were attached along
with the request. Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel
proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the
extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to
be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the
documents included in the extradition request and for him to
be given ample time to assess it.
The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the
completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in
the process of evaluating whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069—Philippine
Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have
been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation
by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation
like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed
rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized
disclosure of the information in the documents.
3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law
of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties.
The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and
prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent.
Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested
papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.
Issues:
1. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic
due process rights of notice and hearing
Held: Yes. §2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as “the removal
of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing
him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with
any criminal investigation directed against him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or government.” Although
the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an
administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply
lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the
extradition process which may ultimately result in the
deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional
arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of
the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite
during the pendency of the extradition petition in court.
Clearly, there’s an impending threat to a prospective
extraditee’s liberty as early as during the evaluation stage.
Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin
to an administrative agency conducting an investigative
proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal
since such technical assessment sets off or commences the
procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a
prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation
process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.
There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily
available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled
in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative
proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property,
the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal,
& such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case
at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the
filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly
lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the
extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice &
hearing according to A3 §14(1) & (2), as well as A3 §7—the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern
& the corollary right to access to official records & documents
The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the
nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which
will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite.
A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person
to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the
penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is
like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may
have the same result – the arrest and imprisonment of the
respondent.
The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal,
civil & administrative proceedings. Non-observance of these
rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled
to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, &
upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present
their side.
Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases:
a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action
(preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking
filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport).
b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action,&
the respondent isn’t prevented from enjoying the right to
notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint& levy of
the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an
appointee)
c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise
them had not been claimed.
2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal
commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government
under the RP-US Treaty?
No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about
the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process
protection to their respective citizens. The administrative
investigation doesn’t fall under the three exceptions to the due
process of notice and hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the
Rules of Court.
3. WON there’s any conflict between private respondent’s
basic due process rights & provisions of RP-US Extradition
treaty
No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international
law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to
national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute
can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during
trial. Request should impose veil at any stage.
Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Abejo v dela Cruz.
F: Case involves a dispute between the principal stockholders
of the corporation Pocket Bell Philippines, Inc. (Pocket Bell), a
"tone and voice paging corporation," namely, the spouses Jose
Abejo and Aurora Abejo vs. De la Cruz Abejo (hereinafter
referred to as the Abejos) and the purchaser, Telectronic
Systems, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Telectronics) of their
133,000 minority shareholdings (for P6 million) and of 63,000
shares registered in the name of Virginia Braga and covered by
five stock certificates endorsed in blank by her (for
P1,674,450.00), and the spouses Agapito Braga and Virginia
Braga (hereinafter referred to as the Bragas), erstwhile
majority stockholders. With the said purchases, Telectronics
would become the majority stockholder, holding 56% of the
outstanding stock and voting power of the corporation Pocket
Bell. Telectronics requested the corporate secretary of the
corporation, Norberto Braga, to register and transfer to its
name, and those of its nominees the total 196,000 Pocket Bell
shares in the corporation's transfer book, cancel the
surrendered certificates of stock and issue the corresponding
new certificates of stock in its name and those of its nominees.
Norberto Braga, the corporate secretary and son of the Bragas,
refused to register the aforesaid transfer of shares in the
corporate books, asserting that the Bragas claim preemptive
rights over the 133,000 Abejo shares and that Virginia Byaga
never transferred her 63,000 shares to Telectronics but had
lost the five stock certificates representing those shares. This
triggered off the series of intertwined actions between the
protagonists, all centered on the question of jurisdiction over
the dispute. The Bragas assert that the regular civil court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction as against the Securities and
Exchange Commission, while the Abejos and Telectronics, as
new majority shareholders, claim the contrary. Respondent
Judge de la Cruz issued an order rescinding the order which
dismissed the complaint of the Bragas in the RTC, thus holding
that the RTC and not the SEC had jurisdiction. Respondent
judge also revived the temporary restraining order previously
issued restraining Telectronics' agents or representatives from
enforcing their resolution constituting themselves as the new
set of officers of Pocket Bell and from assuming control of the
corporation and discharging their functions.
The Abejos filed a MR, which motion was duly opposed by the
Bragas, which was denied by respondent Judge.
I: W/N the RTC, as claimed by the Bragas, has jurisdiction over
the case or the SEC, as claimed by the Abejos
H: The Court ruled that the SEC has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the dispute between the principal
stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell, namely, the Abejos
and Telectronics, the purchasers of the 56% majority stock on
the one hand, and the Bragas, erstwhile majority stockholders,
on the other, and that the SEC, through its en banc Resolution
of May 15, 1984 correctly ruled in dismissing the Bragas'
petition questioning its jurisdiction, that "the issue is not the
ownership of shares but rather the nonperformance by the
Corporate Secretary of the ministerial duty of recording
transfers of shares of stock of the Corporation of which he is
secretary." The SEC ruling upholding its primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over the dispute is correctly premised on, and fully
supported by, the applicable provisions of P.D. No. 902-A
which reorganized the SEC with additional powers "in line with
the government's policy of encouraging investments, both
domestic and foreign, and more active public participation in
the affairs of private corporations and enterprises through
which desirable activities may be pursued for the promotion of
economic development and, to promote a wider and more
meaningful equitable distribution of wealth.” The dispute at
bar, as held by the SEC, is an intracorporate dispute that has
arisen between and among the principal stockholders of the
corporation Pocket Bell due to the refusal of the corporate
secretary, backed up by his parents as erstwhile majority
shareholders, to perform his "ministerial duty" to record the
transfers of the corporation's controlling (56%) shares of
stock, covered by duly endorsed certificates of stock, in favor of
Telectronics as the purchaser thereof. Mandamus in the SEC to
compel the corporate secretary to register the transfers and
issue new certificates in favor of Telectronics and its nominees
was properly resorted to therefore.
The very complaint of the Bragas for annulment of the sales
and transfers as filed by them in the regular court questions
the validity of the transfer and endorsement of the certificates
of stock, claiming alleged preemptive rights in the case of the
Abejos' shares and alleged loss of the certificates and lack of
consent and consideration in the case of Virginia Braga's
shares. Such dispute clearly involves controversies "between
and among stockholders," as to the Abejos' right to sell and
dispose of their shares to Telectronics, the validity of the
latter's acquisition of Virginia Braga's shares, who between the
Bragas and the Abejos' transferee should be recognized as the
controlling shareholders of the corporation, with the right to
elect the corporate officers and the management and control of
its operations. Such a dispute and case clearly fall within the
jurisdiction of the SEC to decide, under Section 5 of P.D. 902-A.
Insofar as the Bragas and their corporate secretary's refusal on
behalf of the corporation Pocket Bell to record the transfer of
the 56% majority shares to Telectronics may be deemed a
device or scheme amounting to fraud and misrepresentation
employed by them to keep themselves in control of the
corporation to the detriment of Telectronics (as buyer and
substantial investor in the corporate stock) and the Abejos (as
substantial stockholders-sellers), the case falls under
paragraph (a). The dispute is likewise an intra-corporate
controversy between and among the majority and minority
stockholders as to the transfer and disposition of the
controlling shares of the corporation, falling under paragraph
(b) of Sec 5 PD 902-A. As pointed out by the Abejos, Pocketbell
is not a close corporation, and no restriction over the free
transferability of the shares appears in the Articles of
Incorporation, as well as in the bylaws 10 and the certificates
of stock themselves, as required by law for the enforcement of
such restriction. As the SEC maintains, "There is no
requirement that a stockholder of a corporation must be a
registered one in order that the Securities and Exchange
Commission may take cognizance of a suit seeking to enforce
his rights as such stockholder." This is because the SEC by
express mandate has "absolute jurisdiction, supervision and
control over all corporations" and is called upon to enforce the
provisions of the Corporation Code, among which is the stock
purchaser's right to secure the corresponding certificate in his
name under the provisions of Section 63 of the Code.
An intra-corporate controversy is one which arises between a
stockholder and the corporation. There is no distinction,
qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is
broad and covers all kinds of controversies between
stockholders and corporations.
Bernardo v. Abalos
FACTS: Antonio Bernardo, et al filed a criminal complaint
against Benjamin Abalos, Sr. and Jr., and others for vote buying
in violation of the Omnibus Election Code. They alleged that the
Abaloses sponsored an outing for the public school teachers
who were also registered voters and members of the Board of
Election Inspectors in Mandaluyong City, several weeks before
the elections were to take place. Abalos Sr. also allegedly
delivered a speech promising the said teachers hazard pay and
an increase in their allowances of a total of P3,000.00.
The COMELEC issued a resolution dismissing the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence to establish a prima facie case. The
petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC for
the nullification of the COMELEC’s Resolution, citing that it was
issued with apparent grave abuse of discretion. The petition
was filed without first submitting a motion for reconsideration
with the COMELEC.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners’ failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration with the COMELEC is fatal to their cause.
HELD: YES. Petitioners’ failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration utterly disregarded the COMELEC Rules
intended to achieve an orderly, just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission. A petition for
certiorari can only be resorted to if there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Having failed to file the required motion for
reconsideration of the challenged Resolution, petitioners’
instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they have
not raised any plausible reason for their direct recourse to this
Court.
RATIO: A petition for certiorari can only be resorted to if there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC VS. CA
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed
within the special competence of an administrative body, in
such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view.
FACTS: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted
a coal operating contract by the Government through the
Bureau of Energy Development (BED). It was also granted a
coal operating contract in the so-called “Giporlos Area.” IEI was
later advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the
country’s coal supply-demand balance, the logical coal
operator in the area would be Marinduque Mining and
Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI assigned and transferred to
MMIC its rights in the area but later filed an action for
rescission with damages against MMIC for failure of the latter
to comply with its obligations. IEI prayed that the Energy
Minister approve the return of the contract from MMIC to IEI.
Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both
IEI and MMIC. Trial Court ordered the rescission and declared
the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of IEI and
ordered the BED to issue its written affirmation of the contract
and to give due course to IEI’s application. CA reversed the
decision and ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over
the action considering that under PD 1206, it is the BED that
has the power to decide controversies relative to the
exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks.
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should
apply in this case?
HELD: YES. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving
matters that demand the special competence of administrative
agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter
involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is
such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized
skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are
involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts
even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a
court. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds
application in this case since the question of what coal areas
should be exploited and developed and which entity should be
granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a
technical determination by the BED as the administrative
agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the
matter. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It
need only be suspended until after the matters within the
competence of the BED are threshed out and determined.
GSIS vs. CSC
According to Asuncion Salazar’s service record filed with the
CSCS, she was employed by the GSIS as a casual laborer. She
became permanent with a designation of stenographer.
Thereafter, she was promoted to Confidential Technical
Assistant Aide.
Salazar's GSIS Service Record however, revealed that she was
appointed to the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in
the office of then GSIS President and General Manager Roman
A. Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status. She was then promoted to
Technical Assistant III, the position she held when her services
were terminated by the newly appointed President and
General Manager of the GSIS for the reason that her position
was co-terminous with the term of the appointing authority.
Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board
of Trustees, but reconsideration was denied. Thereafter, she
filed a petition for reconsideration of the denial with the
Review Committee, which referred the same to the Merit
Systems Promotion Board and the CSC.
In a resolution, the CSC directed the immediate reinstatement
of Salazar with back salaries. The Board however affirmed her
termination. Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Board's order and manifested that the Commission already
resolved her petition on July 22, 1987. On June 30, 1988.the
Board set aside its previous Order affirming Salazar's dismissal
in view of the Commission's prior resolution of the case. The
GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the
board and stated that the CSC is a higher administrative
appellate body on matters concerning the removal of officers
and employees from the service. Hence, the Board cannot in
any manner modify or alter the determinations and actions of
the Civil Service Commission. The GSIS appealed but the CSC
denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: No. Presidential Decree No. 1409, creating the Merit
Systems Board provides that the Merit Systems Board has the
function to “Hear and decide cases brought before it by
officers and employees who feel aggrieved by the
determination of appointing authorities involving
appointment, promotion, transfer, detail, reassignment and
other personnel actions, as well as complaints against any
officers in the government arising from abuses arising from
personnel actions of the these officers or from violations of the
merit system.”
When the law bestows upon a government body the
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters,
it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it
be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same
jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter. Presidential Decree No. 1409
clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall take
cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of
appointing officers involving personnel action. The
Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the
cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409, except in the case
specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which
directly gives it such power, to wit:
SECTION 9.Powers and Functions of the Commission. The
Commission shall administer the Civil Service Commission and
shall have the following powers and functions:
j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted
directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it
on appeal;
In the case at bar, the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the
Review Committee to both the Merit Systems Board and the
Civil Service Commission. In the absence of a decision from the
Merit Systems Board, the Commission cannot legally assume
jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, its decision in favor of
Salazar and all subsequent resolutions of the Commission in
this case are void. Likewise, the Order of the Board setting
aside its previous order upholding the termination of Salazar
in deference to the Commission's final appellate jurisdiction
over the matter, is null and void. Jurisdiction is vested by law
and is not lost nor be legally transferred by voluntary
surrender in favor of a body not vested by law with such
jurisdiction.
Paat vs. CA
FACTS: The truck of private respondent De Guzman was
seized by DENR personnel because the driver could not
produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed on the truck. Petitioner Layugan( Community
Environment and Natural Resouces Officer) issued an anoder
of confiscation of the truck and gave de Guzman 15 days within
which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be
forfeited. De Guman failed to submit the required explanation.
Regional Executive Director of DENR sustained Petitioner
Layugan’s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of
the truck. De Guzman filed a suit of Replevin with RTC.
Petitioner filed an MD. RTC dismissed the MD and MR, which
the CA affirmed. Petitioner assailed the Doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies while the Respondent states that
the doctrine does not apply because 1. Due process was
violated and seizure and forfeiture was unlawful because (a)
DENR Sec. and his representatives had no authority to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances utitlized in transporting
illegal forest products. And 9b) trucks were not used in the
commission of the crime
ISSUE: 1. WON without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, an action for replevin may prosper?
2. WON the DENR Sec. and his representatives
empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favour of the govt.
HELD: 1. No, the general rule is that before a party is allowed
to seek intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him. If a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction tat such remedy should be
exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The
exception to the general rule is that 1. When there is a violation
of due process; 2. When the issue involved is purely a legal
question; 3.When the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, 4. When there is
estoppels on the part of the admin agency concerned; 5. When
there is irreparable injury. 6. When the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the the
president bears the implied and assumed approval of the
latter; 7. When to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable; 8. When it would amount to
a nullification of a claim; 9.When the subject matter is a private
land case proceeding; 10 when the rule does not produce a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy and 11.When there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial proceedings.
A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the
petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by the for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section
68-A if the PD 705, as amended
2 Yes, Section 68 and 68-A of PD 70, as amended by EO 277.
The secretary and his duly authorized representatives are
given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances
utilized in violating the code or other forest laws, ruled and
regulations.
Petition is granted.
Valmonte vs. Belmonte
Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4
June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of
the opposition members of (the) BatasangPambansa who were
able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic)
of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan.
Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte,
et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President & General
Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the
Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro
replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship
exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it,
whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers
to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper
for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by
the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet
received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance
System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote
Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a
reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired
objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986,
Ricardo Valmonte, OswaldoCarbonell, Doy Del Castillo,
Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo
Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and
Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with
preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and
pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al.
the list of the names of the BatasangPambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to
secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election
thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady
Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified
true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for
the subject information.
Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and
taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given
by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to BatasangPambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political
parties.
Held: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the
government and its employees and the administrator of
various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter.
Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More
particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of PD 1146, as amended (the
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide
for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums,
interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government,
as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of
the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the
nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its
resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with
the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the
reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA
186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times
the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the
Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD 1146.] Consequently, as
Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed
to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of
the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly
with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to
the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed
borrowers were Members of the defunct BatasangPambansa
who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were
therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS
performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that
all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature
of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by
the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a
matter of public interest and concern. Still, Belmonte maintains
that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its
borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts
the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte
has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the present
petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy
issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not
what the law should be. Under our system of government,
policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of
the government, and of the people themselves as the
repository of all State power.
MANGUBAT vs. OSMENA
PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO, vs. JUDGE FRISCO
T. LILAGAN
Facts:
Respondent issued a writ of replevin regarding the seized
tanbark by the DENR thru the order of the Prosecutor's Office,
due to irregular and incomplete documents. The captain and
crew of M/L Hadija was also charged for violation of Section 68
(now Section 78) of PD 705 or The Forestry Reform Code of the
Philippines.
Issue(s):
1) Whether or not replevin is a proper remedy wherein the
items sought to be recovered are proceeds from illegal logging.
2) Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law.
Ruling:
1) No, the regular courts has no jurisdiction over proceeds
from illegal logging. Under the doctrine of primary
jursidiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending
before administrative agencies of special competence. That
since the seized items is in the custody of the DENR, the latter
has jurisdiction over the items and an adminitrative
proceedings may have already been commenced concerning
the shipment. And that Hernandez in the replevin suit, failed to
exhaust administrative remedies available to him.
2) Yes, the act of respondent taking cognizance of the replevin
suit, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Arrow Transportation Corp. vs. Board of
Transportation
FACTS: Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-
Car are domestic corporations. The former has in his favor a
certificate of public convenience to operate a public utility
auto-truck service from Cebu city to MactanInterantional
Airport and vice versa. Private respondent filed a petition with
the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of private
respondent filed a petition with the respondent Board for the
issuance of a certificate of public convenience to operate a
similar service on the same line. Without the required
publication, the Board issued on order granting it provisional
permit to operte on the line applied for. A motion for
reconsideration was filed and for the cancellation of such
provisional permit but without awaiting final action, this
petition was filed on the ground that the issuance of
provisional permit was patently illegal or was performed
without jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the controversy is ripe for judicial
determination
HELD: YES. It is undeniable that at the time the petition was
filed, there was pending with respondent Board a motion for
reconsideration. Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited.
The Court was impelled to go into the merits of the
controversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of
the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest
in having the matter settled.
KBMBPM vs. Dominguez
FACTS: The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, thru its
Mayor Santiago Carlos, entered into a contract with petitioner
for the latter’s management and operation of its New
Muntinlupa public Market. The contract provides for a 25 year
term renewable for a like period unless sooner terminated
and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties.
Subsequently, Mayor Ignacio Bunye, Mayor Carlos’ successor,
claiming to be particularly scandalized by the 50-year term of
the agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143,
paragraph 3 of Batas PambansaBlg. 337, and the patently
inequitable rental,
directsdcccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccced the review of
the contract. Consequently, the Municipal Council approved a
Resolution abrogating the contract.
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for breach
of contract, specific performance with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers.
The writ applied for was denied, the KBMBPM officers resisted
the attempts of Bunye and company to complete the take-over.
The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court but it was
remanded to the Court of Appeals.
Thereafter, Amado Perez, Gerneral Manager of KBMBPM, filed
with the Ombudsman a complaint charging Bunye and his co-
petitioners of harassment, oppression, abuse of authority and
violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for taking
over the management of the public market.
On October 1998, respondent Madriaga and Coronado,
accompanied by the Bunye and the latters’ heavily armed men
forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners
purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of respondent
Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the same by taking
over and disbanding the incumbent Board of Directors of
KBMBPM. Petitioners claim that the Order served on them was
not written on the stationary of the Department, does not bear
its seal and is a mere Xerox copy. Thereafter, petitioners filed a
petition praying that respondents refrain, cease and desist
from enforcing the questioned Order and that the order be
declared null and void.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issued Order was valid
2. Whether or not the petitioners needed to exhaust
administrative remedies available
HELD:
1. NO. There is an established procedure for the
removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise
manifest that the right to due process is respected by the
express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even
without said provision , petitioners cannot be deprived of that
right. The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent
Secretary of Agriculture arrogated himself the power of the
members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to
remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take
refuge under PD 175 which grants him the authority to
supervise and regulate all cooperatives. An administrative
officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him
and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These
powers should not be extended by implication beyond what
may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
2. NO. The rule is well-settled that this requirement
does not apply where the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the
implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by
him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy
access to the courts when most needed. There was no need to
appeal the decision to the Office of the President; recourse to
the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other
exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal,
as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently
illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners
which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS.
HERVILLA
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs Hon.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to set aside
the decision rendered by public respondent Deputy Executive
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., by authority of the
President, reinstating and confirming the decision dated April
17, 1978 of the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences, and setting
aside the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources.
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
On February 9, 1972, Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation registered the location of its "Master
VII Fr." mining claim with the Mining Recorder of Toledo City.
On September 10, 1973, private respondent AsterioBuqueron
registered the declarations of location of his "St. Mary Fr." and
"St. Joseph Fr." mining claims with the same Mining Recorder.
On October 15, 1973, Atlas registered the declarations of
location of its "Carmen I Fr." to "Carmen V. Fr. " with the same
Mining Recorder.
Buqueron's "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed
and the survey plans thereof were duly approved by the
Director of Mines and Geo Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease
application was published in the February 22 and 28, 1977
issues of the Evening Post.
During the said period of publication, petitioner filed an
adverse claim against private respondent's mining claims on
the ground that they allegedly overlapped its own mining
claims.
After hearing, the Director of Mines rendered a decision, dated
April 17, 1978, the dispositive portion of which reads:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, respondent
(Buqueron) is hereby given the preferential right to possess,
lease, explore, exploit and operate the areas covered by his "St.
Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims, except the area
covered thereby which is in conflict with adverse claimant's
(Atlas) "Master VII Fr." Adverse claimant (Atlas) on the other
hand, is given the preferential right to possess, lease, explore,
exploit and operate the area covered by its "Master VII Fr."
case.
Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources who
rendered a decision dated November 10, 1978, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the derision of the Director of Mines
dated April 17, 1978, should be, as hereby it is, set aside. In lieu
thereof, it is hereby decision that the "St. Mary Fr." and "St.
Joseph Fr." mining claims of AsterioBuqueron are null and
void, that the "Carmen I Fr. " to "Carmen V. Fr. " mining claims
of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation are
valid, and that it be given the preferential right to possesses,
explore, exploit, lease and operate the areas covered thereby.
(Decision, Office of the President; Rollo, pp. 52-57; Decision of
the Minister of Natural Resources, Rollo, pp. 47-51; Comment
of Public Respondent, Rollo, pp. 88-90; Decision, Director of
Mines, Rollo, pp. 157-160).
As aforestated, on further appeal, the Deputy Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, reversed the decision of the
Minister of Natural Resources and reinstated the decision of
the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences.
Hence, this petition.
Briefly stated, petitioner's assignment of errors may be
combined into the following issues:
(1) Whether or not private respondent's appeal to the Office of
the President was time-barred;
(2) Whether or not there was a valid location and discovery of
the disputed mining claims.
The Second Division of this Court without giving due course to
the petition, required respondents to comment in the
resolution of October 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 76). Both private
respondent and public respondent filed their respective
comments on November 17, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 81-86; pp. 88-95).
On December 8, 1986 (Rollo, p. 104) this Court required the
respondents to file a rejoinder to the consolidated reply filed
by counsel for petitioner dated November 4, 1986 (Rollo, pp.
97-102). Said rejoinder was filed on February 6, 1987 (Rollo,
pp. 108-111), by the Solicitor General for public respondent,
after which petitioner filed a sur-rejoinder thereto on March
13, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 113-116). Thereafter the Court in the
resolution of March 30, 1987 gave due course to the petition
and required both parties to file their respective memoranda.
Counsel for public respondent filed a Manifestation/Motion
praying to be allowed to adopt its comment dated November 2,
1986 and Rejoinder dated February 4, 1987 as the
memorandum for public respondent. Petitioner filed its
memorandum on May 25,1987 (Rollo, p. 136).
The petition is devoid of merit.
I.
It is not disputed that private respondent received a copy of
the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources dated
November 10, 1978 on November 27, 1978 and that under
Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 463, the decision of the
Minister is appealable to the Office of the President within five
(5) days from receipt thereof. In the case at bar, the 5-day
period expired on December 2, 1978, a Saturday, private
respondent filed his appeal on December 4, 1978, a Monday.
Petitioner contends that the appeal was filed out of time and
therefore, the Office of the President did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case and should have dismissed the same
outright (Rollo, pp. 20-21).
This contention is untenable.
Petitioner and private respondent are in accord on the fact that
at the time of the filing of the questioned appeal, Saturday was
observed as a legal holiday in the Office of the President
pursuant to Section 29 of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended.
The same law provides:
Section 31.Pretermission of holiday. — Where the day, or the
last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on
a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business
day.
Apart from the fact that the law is clear and needs no
interpretation, this Court in accordance therewith has
invariably held that in case the last day for doing an act is a
legal holiday, it does not have the effect of making the
preceding day, the last day for doing the same; the act may be
done on the next succeeding business day (Gonzaga vs. Ce
David, 110 Phil. 463-464 [1960]; Calano vs. Cruz, 91 Phil. 247
[1952]; Austria, et al. vs. The Solicitor General, et al., 71 Phil.
288 [1941]).
Coming back to the case at bar, as the next working day after
December 2,1978 was December 4, 1978 — a Monday, it is
evident that private respondent's appeal was filed on time.
II.
It is apparent that the second issue as to whether or not there
was a valid location and discovery of the disputed mining
claims is a question of fact best left to the determination of the
administrative bodies charged with the implementation of the
law they are entrusted to enforce. As uniformly held by the
Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are
supported by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that
findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence.
Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an
administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence is "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." (AngTibay vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642; Police Commission vs.
Lood, 127 SCRA 762 [1984]).
In the case at bar, the record amply shows that the Director of
Mines' decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Petitioner claimed that it is a registered surface land owner
and locator of six (6) lode claims duly registered with the
Office of the Mining Recorder as above stated and that in
derogation of its permission, caused the "table" location and
survey and applied for the lease of his alleged mining claims
known as "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr. " lode claims.
In his answer, private respondent denied the material
allegations of the adverse claim and by way of affirmative
defense alleged that all of petitioner's claims including a
portion of Master VII Fr. are null and void for having been
located in areas which were closed to mining location in open
and gross violation of paragraph 1 (d) of Section 28 and of
Section 60 of the Mining Act as amended.
The main thrust of petitioner's claim is that all of the mining
claims of both petitioner and private respondent are located
inside the premises or properties of the former, so that it is
hardly possible for private respondent to have conducted the
requisite location and survey without having been seen or
noticed by petitioner and its personnel.
The Director of Mines established that there is in fact an
overlapping of mining claims of petitioner and private
respondent and that as a matter of record petitioner's mining
claims were registered subsequent to those of private
respondent with the exception of Master VII Fr. which was
registered on February 9, 1972 or prior to the registration of
the mining claims of private respondent.
In ruling as to who, between the parties shall be given
preferential right to lease the area in question, the Director of
Mines' findings are as follows:
Adverse claimant in its attempt to impugn the validity of the
mining claims of respondent alleged that said mining claims
were the result of table locations and survey and in support
thereof submitted the sworn statements of its Chief Geologist
and Chief Security.
On the other hand, respondent asserted that he, through his
authorized representative actually and validly performed all
the acts of discovery and location required by law and the field
survey of his mining claims was actually conducted by Geodetic
Engineer Salvador Aligaen from December 16 to 18, 1974. In
support of this assertion, respondent submitted in evidence
affidavit of the authorized agent (Annex "D" of the answer) and
another affidavit of Geodetic Engineer Salvador Aligaen (Annex
"F" of the answer). Respondent also submitted in evidence
Bureau of Forestry map and Bureau of Coast and Geodetic
Survey map of the total area (Exhs. "9" to "10") which
embraces the area in question. These maps tend to prove that
the Atlas main gate is not the only point of ingress and egress
such that one can enter the area in question for the purpose of
mining location and survey without being noticed by any of the
personnel of Atlas.
After a careful appraisal of the evidence submitted, and
cognizance as we are of the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 99-A, we are of the view that adverse claimant failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to nullify the prior claims of
respondent. Stated differently, the evidence submitted are not
sufficient to destroy the prima facie character of the sworn
declarations of location of respondent's mining claims which
were duly registered on the date herein before stated. Thus "A
location notice certificate or statement when re-examine
accorded is prima facie evidence of all the facts the statute
requires it to contain and which were sufficiently set forth" (40
C.J. pp. 811-812) and constitute notice to all persons and to the
whole world of the contents of the same (Sec. 56 of the Mining
Act, as amended).
It is, therefore, pertinent to quote hereunder Sections 28(d)
and 60 of the Mining Act, as amended, as well as Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 99-A:
SEC. 28 — No Prospecting shall be allowed:
(d)-In lands which have been located for mining leases by
other prospectors under the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 60. — No valid mining claim or any part thereof, may be
located by others until the original locator or his successors in
interest abandons the claim or forfeits his rights on the same
under the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 1 — Whenever there is any conflict between claim owners
over any mining claims whether mineral or non-mineral, the
locator of the claim who first registered his claim with the
proper mining registrar, notwithstanding any defect in form or
technicality, shall have the exclusive right to possess, exploit,
explore, develop and operate such mining claims. ...
In the light of the aforequoted provisions of law applicable on
the matter, and in view of our findings, earlier discussed, the
subsequent mining claims of adverse claimant insofar as they
conflict the prior claims of respondent are hereby declared nun
and void.
On the other hand, it is also our view that respondent failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to prove that the prior claim of
adverse claimant (Master VII Fr.) is null and void. Considering
that this mining claim is prior in point of location and
registration, it follows that this claim will have to prevail over
that of respondent. For the same reason, therefore, that the
subsequent claims of adverse claimant were declared null and
void insofar as they conflict with the prior claims of
respondent, the mining claims of respondent insofar as they
conflict with "Master VII Fr." claim of adverse claimant are
likewise declared null and void. (Decision, Director of Mines;
rollo pp. 157-160).
As earlier stated the above findings, although reversed by the
Minister of Natural Resources, were affirmed by the Office of
the President.
However, petitioner would have this Court look into the said
findings because of the open divergence of views and findings
by the adjudicating authorities in this mining conflict involving
highly contentious issues which warrant appellate review
(Rollo, p. 18).
This Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the
decision of an administrative official is of course subject to
certain guide posts laid down in many decided cases. Thus, for
instance, findings of fact in such decision should not be
disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is
justified when there has been a denial of due process, or
mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the
administrative proceeding (L-21588-Atlas Development and
Acceptance Corp. vs. Gozon, etc. et al., 64 O.G. 11511 [1967]),
where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular;
when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest (Ateneo
de Manila University vs. CA, 145 SCRA 100-101 [1986];
International Hardwood and Veneer Co., of the Philippines vs.
Leogardo, 117 SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club Corporation vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 118 SCRA 557;
Sichangco vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA 61; and
Eusebio vs. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569).
A careful study of the records shows that none of the above
circumstances is present in the case at bar, which would justify
the overturning of the findings of fact of the Director of Mines
which were affirmed by the Office of the President. On the
contrary, in accordance with the prevailing principle that "in
reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing Court
cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as if
originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence,
that was not submitted to the administrative agency
concerned," the findings of fact in this case must be respected.
As ruled by the Court, they will not be disturbed so long as they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if not
overwhelming or preponderant (Police Commission vs. Lood,
supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DENIED and
the assailed decision of the Office of the President, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio vs. Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290
(1992)
• power of administrative control
• power of executive control
FACTS:Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and
member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition, questioning
the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO. RA
6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES,” allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of
the 1986 Constitution: “The State shall establish and maintain
one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character, to be administered and controlled by a national
police commission. The authority of local executives over the
police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
ISSUEs: Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the
Constitution
• Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an
“encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by
the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief
powers”
HELD: Power of Administrative Control
NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.
SC held that the President has control of all executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of
control over the executive branch of government extends over
all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest
clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power
of control means “the power of the President to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very
“heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”
As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the
“Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.” As the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the
same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them
to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a
single executive, “all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
Thus, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by
him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his
authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”
The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized
DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would
bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the
citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement
agencies and public safety agencies.
Power of Executive Control
Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief
powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process
during which the national police would gradually assume the
civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the
State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates
nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in
reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He
remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief
provision “represent only a part of the organic duties imposed
upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.” His
position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with,
and a testament to, the constitutional principle that “civilian
authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.”
Heirs of Eugenio vs. Roxas
INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES vs. SINSUAT
National Development Co. Vs. Collector of
Customs
Facts: The collector of customs sent a notice to C.F. Sharp and
Company informing it that a vessel it operates was
apprehended and found to have committed a violation of the
customs laws and regulations and that it carried on
unmanifested cargo of one RCA Victor TV set 21” in violation of
Sec 2521 of the Tarriff and Customs Code
C. F. Sharp and Company, not being the agent or
operator of the vessel, referred the notice to A.V. Rocha, the
agent and operator thereof, who answered the notice stating
that the TV set referred to therein was not a cargo of the vessel
and therefore, was not required by law to be manifested. Rocha
stated further, “if this explanation is not sufficient, we request
that this case be set for investigation and hearing. The collector
of customs replied to Rocha stating that the TV set in question
was a cargo on board the vessel and that he does not find his
explaanation satisfactorily enough to exempt the vessel from
liability for violating Section 2521of the Tarriff and Customs
Code. In said letter, the collector imposed a fine of P5000 on
the vessel and ordeered payment thereof within 48 hours with
a threat that he will deny clearance to said vessel and will issue
a warrant of seizure and detention against it if the fine is not
paid. Petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari with
preliminary injunction before the CFI, which was granted.
ISSUE: WON the requirements of administrative due process
have already bee complied with
HELD: No, Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove that
the TV set complained is not a cargo that needs ti be
manifested as required by Section 2521 of the Tarriff and
Customs Code. Not only was he denied this chance, but
respondent collector immediately imposed the vessel the huge
fine of P5000. This is a denial of the elementary rule of due
process.
True is that the proceedings before the Collector of
Customs insofar as the determination of any act or irregularity
that may involve a violation of any customs law or regulation is
concerned, or of any act arising under the Tarriff and Customs
Code, are not judicial in nature, but merely administrative,
where the rules of procedure are generally disregared but
should be observed. The right to due process is not merely
statutory. It is a constitutional right. That this principle applies
with equal force to administrative proceedings was well
elaborated by this court in the AngTibay case.

The decision appealed from is affirmed.