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G.R. No. 164938.

August 22, 2005

VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, Petitioners,

vs.

HON. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch
3; ANTHONY DE LEON and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’ (CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70629
dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner Victor C. Agustin which, in turn, assailed the
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, denying the motion to quash the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 17892-R to 17895-R, for libel.

On June 13, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, filed four separate Informations2 charging the
petitioner, a Philippine Daily Inquirer columnist, with libel. The inculpatory portion of that in Criminal Case No. 17892-R
is quoted infra, as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of March 2000, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent and malicious intent and evil motive of attacking, injuring and
impeaching the character, honesty, integrity, virtue and reputation of one Anthony De Leon the acting general manager
of the Baguio Country Club, and as a private citizen of good standing and reputation in the community and with
malicious intent of exposing the (sic) Anthony De Leon to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor,
without any justifiable motive, did then and there willfully, maliciously and criminally prepare or cause to prepare, write
in his column "Cocktails" and publish in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of
Baguio and in the entire Philippines, wherein in said column the said accused did then and there defame the
complainant Anthony De Leon by branding and imputing upon him the following defamatory and libelous statements, to
wit:

"The trysting place between the President Marcos and Hollywood actress Dovie Beams is not the subject of a high level
tax evasion investigation ordered by no less than the new BIR Commissioner, Dakila Fonacier.

That bungalow on Northwestern Street had hastily changed hands in the last two years, and had supposedly been sold
to, first Anthony De Leon, the acting general manager of the exclusive Baguio Country Club, who in turn disposed of it to
an unwitting Chinoy couple.
According to preliminary BIR findings, the transfer to Mr. De Leon is already spurious since the cook De Leon had been
missing and had gone ‘TNT’ in New York more than eight years ago. The spurious sale to the male De Leon who is not
related to the cook, was necessary to make it appear that it had been an intra-family transfer.

Second, the Baguio Country Club manager made it appear that he and his family had been using the house himself, but
the BIR had now gotten a certification from the Greenhills homeowners’ association that the said bungalow has all these
years been rented to third parties, the last of which was an ADB executive.

The most damaging of the findings was the supposed transfer price of the bungalow between the De Leons and how
much the bungalow was later palmed off to the Chinese-Filipino couple.

We will leave those details for the BIR Commissioner to announce himself, that, if he could overcome the tremendous
and well-oiled lobbying efforts by De Leon’s principals.

Tip: One of the principals is a lawyer and self-proclaimed best friend of Lenny ‘Dragon Lady’ de Jesus."

which aforesaid defamatory, malicious and libelous words and statements have been read by the personnel of the
Baguio Country Club, by the residents of the City of Baguio, and by the public in the other parts of the country, and that
those libelous and defamatory words and statements aforementioned are untrue, false and malicious tending to
impeach the character, integrity, virtue and reputation of the said Anthony De Leon as Acting General Manager of the
Baguio Country Club, thus, placing and causing said Anthony De Leon to public hatred, contempt, dishonor, discredit and
ridicule which acts are serious and insulting in nature, to the damage and prejudice of the said Anthony De Leon.3

Except for the alleged libelous articles, as well as the dates of the commission of the crimes charged therein, the three
other Informations are similarly worded.

Agustin was arraigned on September 10, 2001, and pleaded not guilty to all the charges.4

Agustin then filed a Motion to Quash the Informations, on the sole ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
offenses charged. He pointed out that the said Informations did not contain any allegation that the offended party,
Anthony de Leon, was actually residing in Baguio City, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first
published in a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City.

Private complainant De Leon, through counsel, opposed the motion, alleging that he was a bona fide resident of the
Baguio Country Club located at the Country Club Road, Baguio City; he was also the acting general manager of the club
at the time the alleged libelous article was published. He emphasized that the Informations alleged that he was of good
standing and reputation in the community, and that the word "community" meant Baguio City, where he was residing.
Moreover, Agustin was estopped from assailing the court’s lack of jurisdiction since he was arraigned before he filed his
motion to quash the Information. Even if it may be assumed that there was some ambiguity in the Informations as to
whether he was an actual resident of Baguio City, amending them would suffice; based on the entirety of the context
and applying the doctrine of necessary implication, there can be no other conclusion than that he was a resident of
Baguio City.

By way of Reply, Agustin averred that the allegations in the Informations (that the private complainant was the acting
general manager of the Baguio Country Club and was a private citizen of good standing and reputation in the
community) do not constitute an allegation that the private complainant was an actual resident of Baguio City. He
insisted that to construe the word "community" in the Informations to mean the community in Baguio City would be to
unduly strain the limits of a fair interpretation; there must be clear and positive allegations in the Informations that the
private complainant actually resided in Baguio City. He argued that he was not estopped from assailing the court’s
jurisdiction over the crimes charged even after his arraignment because lack of jurisdiction is a matter which can be
dealt with at any time.

On January 16, 2002, the trial court issued an Order5 denying the motion to quash, holding that in the light of the
petitioner’s admission that the private complainant was the General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, "it was
reasonable to infer therefrom that the private complainant was actually a resident of Baguio City at the time the alleged
libelous articles were published."

Agustin filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order, insisting that the mere fact that the private complainant was the
General Manager of the Baguio Country Club did not necessarily mean that the latter was actually residing in Baguio
City, as it was also possible that he was actually residing in a place nearby. The trial court, however, denied the motion
on April 1, 2002.

Agustin forthwith filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a plea for an injunctive relief before the Court of
Appeals (CA), claiming that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying his Motion to Quash.

On February 24, 2004, the CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition. It disagreed with Agustin, and held that the
trial court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in so ruling. According
to the CA, while the Informations filed by the prosecution did not contain allegations that the complainant was actually a
resident of Baguio City at the time the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published, and that the alleged
libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio City, such defects were merely of form and not of substance.
Thus, there is no need to quash the Informations, as they may merely be amended pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "an amendment, either of form or substance, may be
made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge, and thereafter, as to all matters of form with leave of
court."6 The CA further ruled that any amendment that would be made to conform to the private complainant’s
residency requirements would not place the accused at a disadvantage.

Agustin filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the appellate court denied for lack of merit.7
Agustin, now the petitioner, insists that the CA erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari and prohibition, it appearing
that the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Informations, as well as
his motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order denying the same.

The petitioner maintains that in the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the private respondent was
actually residing in Baguio City, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio City as
mandated by Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He
asserts that the amendments of the Informations would likewise be improper, considering that the defects of the
Informations were not merely of form but of substance. The petitioner posits that venue in criminal cases is
jurisdictional and mandatory; hence, conformably with the decisions of the Court in Lopez v. City Judge,8 and Agbayani
v. Sayo,9 the Informations must be quashed.

In its Comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the failure of the Informations to
allege that the private respondent is a resident of Baguio City (where the Informations were filed) is not a jurisdictional
defect. It asserts that the averment in the Informations that the crimes charged were committed within the jurisdiction
of the trial court in Baguio City, taken in conjunction with the other allegations therein, are sufficient to vest jurisdiction
over the subject cases in the RTC of Baguio City.

For his part, the private complainant reiterated his arguments in the RTC and in the CA in his Comment on the Petition.

The threshold issues in the present petition are (1) whether or not the RTC of Baguio City has jurisdiction over the
offenses charged in the four Informations on the premise that the Informations are defective; and (2) whether the
Informations may be amended to cure the said defects.

The petition is meritorious.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.10 The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or Information, and the offense must have been committed or any one
of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.11

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides –

ART. 360. Persons responsible.— Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed
and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense;
Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the
time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of
the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold
office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance or the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case
one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed
and first published: Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is
filed and vice versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first
filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: And provided, finally, That this amendment shall not
apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions to which have been filed in court at the time of
the effectivity of this law.

Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by
the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where
such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article.

No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall
be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party.

Thus, the rules on venue in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.12

Experience has shown that under the old rule, the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the
venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant places.13 To obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal
action from written defamation, the complaint or Information should contain allegations as to whether the offended
party was a public officer or a private individual at the time the offense was committed, and where he was actually
residing at that time; whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first published should
likewise be alleged.14

In this case, the Informations did not allege that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City at the time of the
commission of the offenses, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published in Baguio City. It cannot
even be inferred from the allegation "the offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club
and of good standing and reputation in the community" that the private respondent (complainant) was actually residing
in Baguio City.

The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the
residence must be more than temporary.15 The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay
in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house therein.16 To create a residence in a
particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a
freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time.17 While it is possible that as the
Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the
Informations did not state that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely
possible that the private complainant may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts business in a
place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident therein.18 Where one may have or
own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is
not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.19

We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely formal. Indeed, the absence of
any allegations in the Informations that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City, where the crimes
charged were allegedly committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed, the amendments of the Informations to vest
jurisdiction upon the court cannot be allowed.20

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
70629 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Informations
and DISMISS the cases against petitioner Victor C. Agustin in Criminal Case Nos. 17892-R to 17895-R.

SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 156747 February 23, 2005

ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., and ALFIE LORENZO, petitioners,

vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSELITO TRINIDAD, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision1 dated 22
March 2002 and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22067 entitled, "People of
the Philippines v. Alfie Lorenzo, et al."

The factual antecedents are as follows:

In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes, columnist,
publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper "Abante" were charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, with the crime of libel. The information, which was raffled off to Branch 93 of said court,
reads:

The undersigned accuses ALFIE LORENZO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., ROGER B. PARAJES and JORDAN
CASTILLO, of the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of July, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused ALFIE LORENZO, columnist,
ALLEN MACASAET, publisher, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., managing editor, ROGER B. PARAJES, editor, respectively of
"Abante" a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and JORDAN CASTILLO, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with evident intent of exposing JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD, a.k.a.
JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD to public hatred, dishonor, discredit and contempt and ridicule, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and maliciously write, publish, exhibit and circulate and/or cause to be written,
published, exhibited and circulated in the aforesaid newspaper, in its issue of July 13, 1996 an article which reads as
follows:

"Humarap sa ilang reporters si Jordan Castillo hindi para magkaroon ng writeups kundi para ituwid lang ang ilang bagay
na baluktot at binaluktot pang lalo ng isang Toto Trinidad.1a\^/phi1.net

Hindi namin naging barkada si Joey Trinidad. Bah, Toto na pala siya ngayon. Anong palagay niya sa sarili niya, si Direk
Toto Natividad siya? Nakikibuhat lang talaga yang taong ‘yan sa amin sa Liberty Ave. noon. Ni hindi nga pinapansin ni
Tito Alfie ‘yan dahil nga sa amoy-pawis siya pagkatapos mag-barbell. Kami naka-shower na, si Joey punas lang nang
punas sa katawan niya ng T-shirt niyang siya ring isusuot niya pagkatapos na gawing pamunas!

Madalas ngang makikain sa amin yan noon. Galit na galit nga ang mayordoma naming si Manang Hilda noon dahil
nagkukulang ang rasyon namin dahil dagdag pakainin nga yang si Joey. Tamang-tama nga lang sa amin ang kanin at
ulam, pero sinusugod pa niya ang kaldero para magkayod ng natitirang tutong sa kaldero. Naaawa nga ako madalas
diyan kaya sineshare ko na lang ang pagkain ko sa kanya.

Ewan ko kung anong naisipan ng taong ‘yan at pagsasalitaan pa niya ng masama si Tito Alfie. Hindi man lang siya
tumanaw ng utang na loob na kahit konti at kahit na sandali ay naitawid ng gutom niya. Hindi ko alam kung may
kunsenya pa ang gangyang klaseng tao, pero sana naman ay makunsensya ka, Pare!

Madalas nga itinatago ka na nga namin ni Tito Alfie para hindi mahighblood sa iyo, ganyan pa ang gagawin mo.
Napupuyat nga si Manang Hilda sa pagbabantay sa iyo at hindi makatulog ang matanda hangga’t hindi ka pa umuuwi,
magsasalita ka pa ng mga inimbento mo. Pati nga si Eruel ay madalas mabanas sa iyo, natatandaan mo pa ba, dahil sa
kakulitan mo! Pilit mo kaming binubuyo na sabihin kay Tito Alfie na tulungan ka rin tulad ng tulong na ibinibigay ni Tito
Alfie na pag-aalaga sa amin. Pero hate na hate ka nga ni Tito Alfie dahil sa masamang ugali, natatandaan mo pa ba yun?
Kaya tiyak ko na imbento mo lang ang lahat ng pinagsasabi mo para makaganti ka kay Tito Alfie," ani Jordan sa mga nag-
interbyu sa kanyang legitimate writers.

Hindi na siguro namin kailangan pang dagdagan ang mga sinabi ng sinasabi ni Toto Trinidad na mga barkada niya at
kapwa niya kuno Liberty Boys!"

thereby publicly imputing a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary or an act, omission, condition, status or circumstance
and causing in view of their publication, discredit and contempt upon the person of said JOSELITO MAGALLANES
TRINIDAD a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD, to his damage and prejudice.2

In an Order dated 16 July 1997, Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., presiding judge of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon City, set the
arraignment of the petitioners on 27 August 1997.3

On 22 August 1997, petitioners filed before the court a quo an Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer
Proceedings dated 21 August 1997 claiming that they intended to elevate the adverse Resolution of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for review. Despite this motion, the scheduled
arraignment of petitioners pushed through on 27 August 1997. During said proceeding, petitioners Lorenzo and Quijano,
Jr., together with their co-accused Parajes and Castillo, refused to enter any plea and so the trial court ordered that a
plea of not guilty be entered into the records on their behalf.4 As for petitioner Macasaet, his arraignment was
rescheduled to 20 October 1997 due to his failure to attend the previously calendared arraignment.

On 12 September 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not
have jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the residence of
private respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed
and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense…5
(Emphasis supplied.)

Subsequently, on 23 September 1997, the trial court received by way of registered mail, petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea dated 3 September 1997.6 Petitioners argued therein that the trial court
committed grave error when it denied the petitioners’ Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer
Proceedings and continued with the scheduled arraignment on 27 August 1997. According to petitioners and their co-
accused, by the trial judge’s denial of their Urgent Motion to Defer Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings, he had
effectively denied them their right to obtain relief from the Department of Justice. Moreover, banking on the case of
Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals,7 the petitioners and their fellow accused contended that since they had already
manifested their intention to file a petition for review of the Resolution of the city prosecutor of Quezon City before the
DOJ, it was premature for the trial court to deny their urgent motion of 21 August 1997. Finally, petitioners and their co-
accused claimed that regardless of the outcome of their petition for review before the DOJ, the withdrawal of their "not
guilty" pleas is in order as they planned to move for the quashal of the information against them.

In an Order dated 26 September 1997,8 Judge Bruselas, Jr., ruled that "with the filing of the ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ the
court considers the accused to have abandoned their ‘Motion for Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea’ and sees no
further need to act on the same."

In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 23 September 1997,9 the public prosecutor argued that the RTC,
Quezon City, had jurisdiction over the case. He maintained that during the time material to this case, private respondent
(private complainant below) was a resident of both 28-D Matino St. corner Malumanay St., Sikatuna Village, Quezon City
and Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Niño, Marikina, Metro Manila, as shown in his Reply-Affidavit of 11 October 1996 filed
during the preliminary investigation of the case.

For their part, the petitioners and their co-accused countered that it was incorrect for the public prosecutor to refer to
the affidavit purportedly executed by private respondent as it is "axiomatic that the resolution of a motion to quash is
limited to a consideration of the information as filed with the court, and no other." Further, as both the complaint-
affidavit executed by private respondent and the information filed before the court state that private respondent’s
residence is in Marikina City, the dismissal of the case is warranted for the rule is that jurisdiction is determined solely by
the allegations contained in the complaint or information.10

On 16 October 1997, petitioners and their fellow accused filed a Supplemental Reply11 attaching thereto certifications
issued by Jimmy Ong and Pablito C. Antonio, barangay captains of Barangay Malaya, Quezon City and Barangay Sto.
Niño, Marikina City, respectively. The pertinent portion of the barangay certification12 issued by Barangay Captain Ong
states:
This is to certify that this office has no record on file nor with the list of registered voters of this barangay regarding a
certain person by the name of one MR. JOSELITO TRINIDAD.

This further certifies that our BSDO’s (have) been looking for said person seeking information regarding his whereabouts
but to no avail.

On the other hand, the certification13 issued by Barangay Captain Antonio, reads in part:

This is to certify that JOSELITO TRINIDAD of legal age, single/married/separate/widow/widower, a resident of Karen
Street, Sto. Niño, Marikina City is a bonafide member of this barangay.

...

This is being issued upon request of the above-named person for "IDENTIFICATION."

During the hearing on 20 October 1997, the trial court received and marked in evidence the two barangay certifications.
Also marked for evidence were page 4 of the information stating the address of private respondent to be in Marikina
City and the editorial box appearing in page 18 of Abante indicating that the tabloid maintains its editorial and business
offices at Rm. 301/305, 3/F BF Condominium Bldg., Solana cor. A. Soriano Sts., Intramuros, Manila. The prosecution was
then given five (5) days within which to submit its comment to the evidence submitted by the petitioners and their
fellow accused.

In his Rejoinder to Supplemental Reply,14 private respondent contended that the certification issued by the barangay
captain of Barangay Malaya was issued after he had already moved out of the apartment unit he was renting in Sikatuna
Village, Quezon City; that owners of residential houses do not usually declare they rent out rooms to boarders in order
to avoid payment of local taxes; and that there is no showing that a census was conducted among the residents of
Barangay Malaya during the time he resided therein.

As regards the certification issued by the barangay chairman of Sto. Niño, Marikina City, private respondent argued that
it is of judicial notice that barangay and city records are not regularly updated to reflect the transfer of residence of their
constituents and that a perusal of said certification reveals that the barangay captain did not personally know him
(private respondent). Finally, private respondent claimed that his receipt of the copy of petitioners’ Appeal to the DOJ,
which was sent to his alleged address in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, proved that he did, in fact, reside at said place.

On 24 November 1997, the trial court rendered an Order dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction.15 The court a
quo noted that although the information alleged the venue of this case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, the
evidence submitted for its consideration indicated otherwise. First, the editorial box of Abante clearly indicated that the
purported libelous article was printed and first published in the City of Manila. In addition, the trial court relied on the
following matters to support its conclusion that, indeed, jurisdiction was improperly laid in this case: a) on page 4 of the
information, the address of private respondent appeared to be the one in Marikina City although right below it was a
handwritten notation stating "131 Sct. Lozano St., Barangay Sacred Heart, QC"; b) the two barangay certifications
submitted by the petitioners; and c) the Memorandum for Preliminary Investigation and Affidavit-Complaint attached to
the information wherein the given address of private respondent was Marikina City.

On 03 December 1997, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration16 insisting that at the time the alleged
libelous article was published, he was actually residing in Quezon City. According to him, he mistakenly stated that he
was a resident of Marikina City at the time of publication of the claimed defamatory article because he understood the
term "address" to mean the place where he originally came from. Nevertheless, the error was rectified by his
supplemental affidavit which indicated Quezon City as his actual residence at the time of publication of the 13 July 1996
issue of Abante.

On 22 January 1998, private respondent filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration to which he attached an
affidavit executed by a certain Cristina B. Del Rosario, allegedly the owner of the house and lot in Sikatuna Village,
Quezon City, where private respondent supposedly lived from July 1996 until May 1997. She also stated in her affidavit
that she was not aware of any inquiry conducted by the barangay officials of Barangay Malaya regarding the residency of
private respondent in their locality.

Through an Order dated 12 February 1998, the trial court denied private respondent’s motion for reconsideration, ruling
thus:

[Del Rosario’s] affidavit appears to have been executed only on 19 January 1998 to which fact the court can only chuckle
and observe that evidently said affidavit is in the nature of a curative evidence, the weight and sufficiency of which is
highly suspect.17

Undaunted, the public and the private prosecutors filed a notice of appeal before the court a quo.18 In the Decision now
assailed before us, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s conclusion and ordered the remand of
the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated November 24, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93,
Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903, dismissing the case filed against herein accused-appellees on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered remanding the case to the court a quo
for further proceedings.19

The Court of Appeals held that jurisprudentially, it is settled that the "residence of a person must be his personal, actual
or physical habitation or his actual residence or abode" and for the purpose of determining venue, actual residence is a
person’s place of abode and not necessarily his legal residence or domicile.20 In this case, the defect appearing on the
original complaint wherein the residence of private respondent was indicated to be Marikina City was subsequently
cured by his supplemental-affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation of the case. Moreover, as the
amendment was made during the preliminary investigation phase of this case, the same could be done as a matter of
right pursuant to the Revised Rules of Court.21
As for the barangay certifications issued by the barangay chairmen of Barangay Malaya and Barangay Sto. Niño, the
Court of Appeals ruled that they had no probative value ratiocinating in the following manner:

. . . With respect to the requirement of residence in the place where one is to vote, residence can mean either domicile
or temporary residence (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution A Primer, 3rd Ed., p. 209). Therefore, one who is a resident of
Quezon City can be a voter of Marikina if the latter is his domicile. Conversely, a person domiciled in Marikina can vote
in Quezon City if he resides in the latter. It is just a matter of choice on the part of the voter. Thus, logic does not support
the supposition that one who is not a registered voter of a place is also not a resident theref. Furthermore, the right to
vote has the corollary right of not exercising it. Therefore, one need not even be a registered voter at all. The same
principle applies to the certification issued by the barangay in Marikina.22

The appellate court likewise gave weight to the affidavit executed by Del Rosario and observed that petitioners failed to
controvert the same.

The petitioners thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
promulgated on 6 January 2003.23

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY HAS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF CRISTINA B. DEL ROSARIO.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT TRINIDAD’S PERSONALITY TO APPEAL A CRIMINAL CASE.24

Petitioners insist that the evidence presented before the trial court irrefutably established the fact that private
respondent was not a resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous publication saw print. According to them,
the information dated 10 July 1997 filed before the RTC of Quezon City indicated private respondent’s address to be in
Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Niño, Marikina City. Further supporting this claim were the affidavit-complaint25 and the
memorandum for preliminary investigation26 where references were explicitly made to said address. Thus, petitioners
are of the view that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the supplemental affidavit executed by private respondent
claiming that its execution amounted to nothing more than a mere afterthought.1awphi1.nét

In addition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred when it took into account the affidavit executed by Del
Rosario. They insist that its belated submission before the trial court and the prosecution’s failure to present the affiant
to testify as regards the veracity of her statements undermined the evidentiary value of her affidavit. More, as the
affidavit was not formally offered as evidence, it was only proper that the trial court disregarded the same in dismissing
the case.

Finally, petitioners contend that private respondent did not have the requisite personality to appeal from the decision of
the trial court as it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which is authorized by law to institute appeal of
criminal cases. Thus, the Court of Appeals made a mistake in holding that -

… While it is true that only the OSG can file an appeal representing the government in a criminal proceeding, the private
complainant nevertheless may appeal the civil aspect of the criminal case. The case at bar was dismissed due to the
alleged improper laying of venue resulting in the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and not based on the merits
of the case. It cannot therefore be argued that private complainant’s appeal pertains to the merits of the criminal case
as what happened in accused-appellees’ cited case in the motion to strike, VicentePalu-ay vs. Court of Appeals(GR No.
112995, July 30, 1998). Needless to say, the private complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the dismissed
criminal case which he had the right to protect. In the interest of justice and fair play, therefore, the Brief filed by private
complainant in the present case should be treated as pertaining only to the civil aspect of the case.27

In his Comment/Opposition dated 25 April 2003,28 private respondent reiterated his position that the RTC of Quezon
City had jurisdiction over this libel case. According to him, the affidavit executed by Del Rosario, the alleged owner of the
house he leased in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, established, beyond doubt, that he resided in said place during the
time the claimed defamatory article appeared on the pages of Abante. In addition, he draws attention to the fact that
petitioners and their co-accused furnished him a copy of the petition for review, filed before the DOJ, at the
aforementioned address in Quezon City.

Anent the affidavit of Del Rosario, private respondent maintains that the prosecution exerted efforts to present the
affiant before the trial court. Unfortunately, Del Rosario was out of town when she was supposed to be presented and
so the public and the private prosecutors decided to submit for resolution their motion for reconsideration sans the
affiant’s testimony. Citing the case of Joseph Helmuth, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, et al.,29 private respondent avers
that this Court had previously admitted the affidavits of witnesses who were not presented during the trial phase of a
case.

As regards the petitioners’ contention that he (private respondent) did not have the personality to bring this case to the
appellate level, private respondent contends that the proper party to file the Notice of Appeal before the trial court is
the public prosecutor as what happened in this case.
On its part, the OSG filed its Comment dated 07 July 200330 wherein it prayed for the dismissal of this petition based on
the following: First, as the petition is concerned with the determination of the residence of private respondent at the
time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, Rule 45 should be unavailing to the petitioners because this
remedy only deals with questions of law.

Second, venue was properly laid in this case as private respondent’s residency in Quezon City during the time material to
this case was sufficiently established. The OSG claims that the errors appearing in the memorandum for preliminary
investigation and in the affidavit complaint with regard to private respondent’s residence were corrected through the
supplemental affidavit private respondent executed during the preliminary investigation before the Quezon City
prosecutor’s office.

Third, the OSG takes the view that the public prosecutor was the proper party to file the notice of appeal before the trial
court since its (OSG’s) office is only "authorized to bring or defend actions on appeal on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Honorable Court of the Court of Appeals.

We find merit in the petition and therefore grant the same.

Jurisdiction has been defined as "the power conferred by law upon a judge or court to try a case the cognizance of which
belongs to them exclusively"31 and it constitutes the basic foundation of judicial proceedings.32 The term derives its
origin from two Latin words – "jus" meaning law and the other, "dicere" meaning to declare.33 The term has also been
variably explained to be "the power of a court to hear and determine a cause of action presented to it, the power of a
court to adjudicate the kind of case before it, the power of a court to adjudicate a case when the proper parties are
before it, and the power of a court to make the particular decision it is asked to render."34

In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional.l^vvphi1.net Thus, the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.35 In the case of Uy v.
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,36 this Court had the occasion to expound on this principle, thus:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.37

The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The possible venues for the institution of the criminal and the civil
aspects of said case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4363. It provides:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. - . . .

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of
Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer
does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous matter is printed and first published.

In Agbayani v. Sayo,38 we summarized the foregoing rule in the following manner:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.39

In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article,
hence, he could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila where Abante was first published or in the province or city
where he actually resided at the time the purported libelous article was printed.

A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals that the allegations contained therein are
utterly insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other than perfunctorily stating "Quezon City" at the
beginning of the information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the information did not bother to indicate
whether the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was invoked either because Abante was printed in that place or private
respondent was a resident of said city at the time the claimed libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the
fundamental issue of the court’s jurisdiction, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either
one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself and the absence of both from the very face of the
information renders the latter fatally defective.l^vvphi1.net Sadly for private respondent, the information filed before
the trial court falls way short of this requirement. The assistant city prosecutor’s failure to properly lay the basis for
invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the power to take cognizance of this
case.1a\^/phi1.net

For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier
pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:

In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or
information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a
public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place
where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine
qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the
action.40

Anent private respondent and OSG’s contention that the supplemental affidavit submitted during the preliminary
investigation of this libel suit cured the defect of the information, we find the same to be without merit. It is
jurisprudentially settled that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint
or information.41 In resolving a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the general rule is that the facts
contained in the complaint or information should be taken as they are.42 The exception to this rule is where the Rules of
Court allow the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash43 such as when the ground invoked is the extinction
of criminal liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of the accused.44 In these instances, it is incumbent upon
the trial court to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the merit of the motion to dismiss. As the present case
obviously does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions, the trial court correctly dismissed this action.

In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals likewise put premium on the affidavit executed by Del Rosario which was
attached to private respondent’s supplemental motion for reconsideration. According to the appellate court, said
document "supports private (respondent’s) claim that indeed, he was a resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged
libelous article was published."45 The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, under Rule 10, Section 6 thereof, states:

Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as
are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten
(10) days from notice of the order admitting the supplemental pleading.

By the very nature of a supplemental pleading, it only seeks to reinforce and augment the allegations contained in the
principal pleading. It does not serve to supplant that which it merely supplements; rather, it ought to co-exist with the
latter. Further, the admission of a supplemental pleading is not something that parties may impose upon the court for
we have consistently held that its admittance is something which is addressed to the discretion of the court.46

Explicit in the aforequoted provision of the Rules of Court is the requirement that the contents of a supplemental
pleading should deal with transactions, occurrences or events which took place after the date of the pleading it seeks to
supplement. A reading of the supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent discloses no
additional or new matters which transpired after he filed his original motion for reconsideration. The fact that he
attached thereto the affidavit of his alleged lessor fails to persuade us into giving to said supplemental motion the same
evidentiary value as did the Court of Appeals. For one, private respondent did not even bother to explain the reason
behind the belated submission of Del Rosario’s affidavit nor did he claim that he exerted earnest efforts to file it much
earlier in the proceedings.l^vvphi1.net He must, therefore, bear the consequences of his own lethargy.

Finally, we come to the issue of whether the private prosecutor and the public prosecutor had the personality to file the
notice of appeal before the trial court. Petitioners insist that the OSG should have been the one to file said notice in its
capacity as the "sole representative of the [g]overnment in the Court of Appeals in criminal cases."47

Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to "represent the
government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings." This provision has been carried
over to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is
the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. In such capacity, it only takes over a criminal
case after the same has reached the appellate courts.48

The next question should then be: when does the jurisdiction of the trial court end and that of the Court of Appeals
commence? Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is clear on this point. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules states that "(i)n
appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties."49 When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial
court’s jurisdiction over the case does not cease as a matter of course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed
perfected as to him.50 As explained by our former colleague, Justice Florenz Regalado –

. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case. However, where all the parties have either
thus perfected their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due time and the period to file such notice of appeal has
lapsed for those who did not do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of
appeal or the expiration of the period to do so for all the parties.51

Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that the notice of appeal was filed by the private and the public
prosecutors before the trial court. The Rules cannot be any clearer: until the filing of the last notice of appeal and the
expiration of the period to perfect an appeal by all the parties, the lower court still has jurisdiction over the case. It is
only after the occurrence of these two incidents when the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals begins and at which time
the OSG is supposed to take charge of the case on behalf of the government.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 22 March 2002 and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the 24 November 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 93, Quezon City, dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172142 October 17, 2007

DAVID B. CAMPANANO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.

JOSE ANTONIO A. DATUIN, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Assailed via the instant Petition for Review is the Court of Appeals Decision2 of December 9, 2005 which set aside the
August 20, 2004 Resolution3 of the Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissing the petition for review filed by respondent
Jose Antonio Datuin.

On complaint for Estafa by Seishin International Corporation, represented by its president-herein petitioner David B.
Campanano, Jr.,4 an Information for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed against respondent.

After trial, respondent was convicted of Estafa by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71 of Pasig City by Decision of May 3,
1999.5 Respondent’s appeal before the Court of Appeals, and eventually with this Court, was dismissed and the decision
became final and executory6 on October 24, 2003.

Later claiming that the complaint of Seishin International Corporation against him was "false, unfounded and malicious"
in light of newly discovered (by respondent) evidence, respondent filed a complaint for Incriminating Against Innocent
Persons, punishable under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
against petitioner and a certain Yasunobu Hirota.7 The pertinent portions of respondent’s complaint-affidavit read:

I, JOSE ANTONIO A. DATUIN, of legal age, Filipino, married, with residence and postal address at No. 1 Commonwealth
Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, under oath, depose and state:

xxxx

2. I was charged by Seishin International Corporation, represented by its President, Mr. David Campanano, Jr. with the
crime of Estafa before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, by virtue of a criminal information filed against me
by said prosecution office with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. x x x

xxxx
5. In a decision dated May 3, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71, rendered a Decision convicting me
(accused-complainant) of estafa x x x;

xxxx

13. Meanwhile, sometime in July 15, 2003, I had my office rented, vacated the same, and had all of my things, including
my attaché case, all my records, and other personal belongings, transferred and brought to my house; that while I was
sorting and classifying all my things, including the records, as well as those in the attaché case, I found the CASH
VOUCHER evidencing my cash payment of the two (2) roadrollers, Sakai brand, which I purchased from Mr. Yasonobu
Hirota, representing Seishin International Corporation, in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.
The cash voucher was dated June 28, 1993, and it was signed by me and Mr. Hirota. A copy of the said cash voucher is
hereto attached as ANNEX "H" hereof;

14. In light of this newly discovered evidence, the complaint of Seishin International Corporation[,] represented by Mr.
David Campanano, Jr.[,] and the testimony of the latter in support of the complaint are false, unfounded and malicious
because they imputed to me a crime of Estafa which in the first place I did not commit, as evidenced by the fact that the
subject two (2) units of roadrollers, Sakai brand, subject of the criminal complaint before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City by the corporation through Mr. Campanano, and the information filed in court, had been
purchased by me in cash from the said corporation and had already been paid on June 28, 1993.

While I testified also in court, my testimony arose from my having forgotten that I have already fully paid for the said
two units of roadrollers, especially that I could not find the necessary document consisting of the cash voucher in
support of my defense. I could not say that I have fully paid for the said units of roadrollers because at that time I was
not in possession of any evidence or document to support my claim.

15. In filing the complaint for Estafa – fully knowing that it was baseless and without factual or legal basis, Messrs.
Campanano, Jr. and Mr. Hirota should be criminally liable for the crime of Incriminating Innocent Persons punishable
under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By Resolution of January 20, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City9 dismissed respondent’s complaint
for incriminating innocent person in this wise:

It appearing that the case of estafa was filed in Pasig City, and the testimony given by respondent David Campañano, Jr.
was also made in Pasig City, this office has no jurisdiction on the above-entitled complainant.

Granting en arguendo that this office has jurisdiction over this case, the undersigned investigating prosecutor finds no
basis to indict the respondents of the crime imputed to them for it is an established fact that the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City finds merit in the estafa case filed by Seishin International Corporation, represented by its president, herein
respondent David Campañano, Jr. In fact, the petition for review, including the supplemental motion for reconsideration
filed by the herein complainant to [sic] the Honorable Supreme Court was denied for lack of merit and with an order of
Entry of Final Judgment.

As to the discovery of the alleged new evidence, the cash voucher, dated June 28, 1993[,] it is not this office that should
determine the materiality or immateriality of it.10 (Underscoring supplied)

By petition for review, respondent elevated the case to the DOJ which dismissed the petition outright by Resolution11 of
August 20, 2004, holding that "[it] found no such error committed by the prosecutor that would justify the reversal of
the assailed resolution which is in accord with the law and evidence on the matter." Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by DOJ Resolution12 of April 11, 2005.

The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the resolutions of the DOJ by Decision of December 9, 2005, the fallo of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course, and the assailed Resolutions of the Department of Justice are hereby SET
ASIDE. The case is directed to be remanded to the City Prosecutor’s Office of Quezon City for further investigation.13
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Hence, the present petition, petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in the main:

. . . IN RULING THAT THE COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER DAVID B. CAMPANANO EXECUTED IN QUEZON CITY ON
NOVEMBER 30, 2003 AND NOT THE AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT JOSE ANTONIO DATUIN THAT [sic]
IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION ON THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT DATUIN AGAINST PETITIONER INCRIMINATING AGAINST
INNOCENT PERSONS.

xxxx

. . . IN RULING THAT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENT DATUIN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION SINCE THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT APPEARS TO BE MERITORIOUS.14
(Underscoring supplied)

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an essential element of jurisdiction;15 and that the jurisdiction of a court
over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.16
For purposes of determining the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred." This is a fundamental principle, the purpose of which is not to compel the defendant to
move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed as it would cause
him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.17

The complaint-affidavit for incriminating innocent person filed by respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City on August 28, 2003 does not allege that the crime charged or any of its essential ingredients was committed
in Quezon City. The only reference to Quezon City in the complaint-affidavit is that it is where respondent resides.18
Respondent’s complaint-affidavit was thus properly dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for lack of
jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals’ conclusion-basis of its reversal of the DOJ Resolutions that since petitioner’s November 20, 2003
Counter-Affidavit19 to respondent’s complaint for incriminating innocent person was executed in Quezon City, the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City had acquired jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of the case is
thus erroneous.

In any event, the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not make out a clear probable cause of incriminating innocent
person under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes "[a]ny person who, by any act not constituting perjury, shall directly
incriminate or impute to an innocent person the commission of a crime." The crime known as incriminating innocent
person has the following elements: (1) the offender performs an act; (2) by such act he directly incriminates or imputes
to an innocent person the commission of a crime; and (3) such act does not constitute perjury.20

The pertinent portion of respondent’s complaint-affidavit reads:

14. In light of this newly discovered evidence, the complaint of Seishin International Corporation[,] represented by Mr.
David Campanano, Jr.[,] and the testimony of the latter in support of the complaint are false, unfounded and malicious
because they imputed to me a crime of Estafa which in the first place I did not commit, as evidenced by the fact that the
subject two (2) units of roadrollers, Sakai brand, subject of the criminal complaint before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City by the corporation through Mr. Campanano, and the information filed in court, had been
purchased by me in cash from the said corporation and had already been paid on June 28, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 363 does not, however, contemplate the idea of malicious prosecution – someone prosecuting or instigating a
criminal charge in court.21 It refers "to the acts of PLANTING evidence and the like, which do not in themselves
constitute false prosecution but tend directly to cause false prosecutions."22 Apropos is the following ruling of this
Court in Ventura v. Bernabe:23
Appellants do not pretend, neither have they alleged in their complaint that appellee has planted evidence against
them.1âwphi1 At the most, what appellee is alleged to have done is that he had filed the criminal complaint above-
quoted against appellant Joaquina Ventura without justifiable cause or motive and had caused the same to be
prosecuted, with him (appellee) testifying falsely as witness for the prosecution. These acts do not constitute
incriminatory machination, particularly, because Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code punishing said crime expressly
excludes perjury as a means of committing the same.

Evidently, petitioner may not, under respondent’s complaint-affidavit, be charged with the crime of incriminating
innocent person under Article 363. Parenthetically, respondent’s conviction bars even the filing of a criminal case for
false testimony against petitioner.24

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of December 9, 2005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint of respondent for Incriminating Innocent Person filed against petitioner DAVID B. CAMPANANO, JR. is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998

ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue, Better
Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant
Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to
P8,542.00.

Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint 1 against petitioner
with the Fiscal's Office.

On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed as Criminal
Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical
Injury." The information read:

The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver
and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
drive, manage and operate the same in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to traffic
laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to property and
injuries to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with a
Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage amounting to
P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.

That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which required
medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for
the same period of time.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.

On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision 3 convicting petitioner of the "quasi offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries," and sentencing her:

[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the
sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, without subsidiary impairment in
case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. 4

The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:

As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In
view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental
of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished
with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorio's
book, p. 718). 5

As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00).

Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660. After
her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation
Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing Appellant's Brief. However, respondent Court of
Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file her brief. 6

After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision
7 on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.

Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 8 raising new issues, thus:

NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND
SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND
EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9

xxx xxx xxx

REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10


In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit,
as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following grounds:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24,
1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE
BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.

A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A
PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT
OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO
MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE
THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE
EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.

C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.

Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but likewise the ruling of the
case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the
title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for such quasi
offense was arresto menor — not arresto mayor.

As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced that there were
two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless
imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she insists, "do
not . . . rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months," citing Lontok v. Gorgonio, 12 thus:

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to
P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical
injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May
31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the instant case because in that
case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to property which were both less
grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted a complex crime.

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence
should have been charged in a separate information.

She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their maximum period and
computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as imposed by the lower
courts."

On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months. Here, since the
information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three months from the date the vehicular collision occurred,
the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence
should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontok's
criminal liability therefor was already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and
[f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's motion to
quash that part of the information charging him with that light offense.

Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial Courts do not deal
with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and slight physical injuries are light felonies and thus
covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could
have tolled the statute of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13

In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with petitioner
that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 14 which frowns
upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to "complex" reckless imprudence with slight
physical injuries and damage to property because what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless
imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two separate informations.

To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction to impose
arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of this case because it had
the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of
P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia. 15
The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the prescriptive period here was
tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma
16 and Chico v. Isidro. 17

In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in joining cause
with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSG's reliance on Buerano v. Court of Appeals 18 as
misplaced, for nothing there validates the "complexing" of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and
damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate informations were filed — one for slight and serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for damage to property through reckless imprudence. She then
insists that in this case, following Arcaya v. Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two informations should have been
filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia 21 would only apply here on the assumption that it was proper to
"complex" damage to property through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Chico v. Isidro 22 is likewise "inapposite," for it deals with attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.

Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not be given retroactive effect; otherwise, it would either
unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling in Zaldivia 24 favorable to her.

The pleadings thus raise the following issues:

I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.

II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00
and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies.

III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in
question.

IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.

V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.

VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.

I. The Proper Penalty


We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by the trial court
and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their submission that the
penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper penalty.

Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which,
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of
arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs
of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed
in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of
slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under
Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266
may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case,
the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. 25
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of Article
365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in
damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless imprudence
which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of
P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6
months which is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329 were
equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e.,
the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period
or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which
could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court,
since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein provided "the courts shall
exercise their sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in article 64."

II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.

Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the
wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 26

As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public censure only. Article 9,
paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menor
or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty,
and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto
menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.

On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized with
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the
Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony — not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.

Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised Code on complex
crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal
negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime, thus:

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting offenses may be
treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to
property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime.
They cannot be charged in one information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50
Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to
P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical
injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menor graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May
31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].

Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in physical injuries.

IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.

Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the
information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her
failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules
of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to
it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the
penalty for each of them. 29

V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the

Quasi Offenses in Question.

The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action,
unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending
before its enactment. 30
At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Section 32(2) 31 thereof provided that except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts
(MTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over
"all offenses punishable with imprisonment of got exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including
the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof."

The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the amount
of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over
offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.

In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court had jurisdiction over
offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-
extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise:

Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and
municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No.
217, it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express
provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place
offenses penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under
that of courts of first instance.

Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the
jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty
lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to
30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries was cognizable by said courts.

As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under the
jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods — the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.

Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati.

VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light
felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the
amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
prescribes in five years.

To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether the
filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident in question tolled the running of the
prescriptive period.

Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint of information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis
supplied)

Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information," does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or
investigation only or for an action on the merits. 33 Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 34 and People v. Cuaresma, 35
this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's office suspends the running of the statute of
limitations.

We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as
offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the prosecution commences by
the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary
examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced
only by information." However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by
the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII
of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. 37 Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and
the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.

Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was a violation of a
municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as
amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run." Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is
suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this Court held that the
prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as
such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing of
the information in the proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings in
Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the
filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the
termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses charged in
the information in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 33919.

Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38544 July 30, 1982

LUZ E. BALITAAN, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, BRANCH II, and RITA DE LOS REYES, respondents.

Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for petitioner.

Jose N. Contreras for respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Civil Case No. 81
entitled "Rita de los Reyes vs. Luz E. Balitaan, et al." which annulled the orders of the Judge of the Municipal Court of
Bauan, Batangas and ordered the questioned testimonies to be striken out from the record on the ground that they are
at variance with the allegations of the Information.

The chronological sequence of the events leading to the filing of the instant petition is as follows:

On April 11, 1973, Special Counsel Arcadio M. Aguila filed with the Municipal Court of Bauan, Batangas, an Information
charging respondent Rita de los Reyes of the crime of estafa. The Information reads as follows:

That in, about and during the period comprised between April 27, 1982 to June, 1972, inclusive, in the Municipality of
Bauan, Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then
an employee of one Luz E. Balitaan, owner of a baby dresses mending shop in Barrio Aplaya of the said municipality and
having collected and received from Uniware, Inc., a business establishment in Makati, Rizal, to which finished baby
dresses are turned over after they have been mended and made, the sum of P127.58 in payment of work done on baby
dresses by said Luz E. Balitaan, and under the express obligation on the part of the accused to immediately account for
and deliver the said amount of P127.58 to said Luz E. Balitaan, with unfaithfulness and grave abuse of confidence and in
spite of repeated demands made to the said accused to turn over the said amount of P127.58, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the sum of P127.58 to her (accused) own use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Luz E. Balitaan in the aforementioned amount of P127.58.

Contrary to law. 1
At the initial hearing on September 18, 1973, complaining witness Luz E. Balitaan, herein petitioner, was called as the
prosecution's first witness. She testified that she was the proprietress of a baby dress mending shop, that her business
was engaged in the sewing of baby dresses with the accused, Rita de los Reyes, herein respondent, as the one in charge
of the management of her business, including the procurement of unsewed baby dresses from, and the delivery of
finished dresses to Unaware, Inc. She further testified as follows:

Q. Sometime in April 27,1972, do you know if the accused in this case, Rita de los Reyes had made deliveries of
baby dresses to Uniware, Incorporated?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you have a receipt or cash voucher to show that those baby dresses were delivered?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. I am going to show you a cash voucher dated April 27, 1972, which appears to be the original carbon copy and
which for purposes of Identification we ask that the same be marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution.

COURT:

Mark it.

Atty. Enriquez:

Q. Is this the cash voucher of baby dresses delivered by Rita de los Reyes?

xxx xxx xxx

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know this or what is this about?

A. This is receipt of payment made to us for the dresses we have made.


xxx xxx xxx

Q. It appears in this voucher, Exhibit "A", that the total payment made and suppose to be received was in the
amount of P1,632.27 in words and figures, how was the payment made?

A. By checks sir.

Q. How many checks?

A. Three (3) checks, sir.

Q. Would you know from this Exhibit "A" the number of checks and the corresponding amount appearing in the
checks in payment of this P1,632.97?

(Witness again shown Exhibit "A").

A. Yes sir.

Q. Where, will you point to this Exhibit "A"?

A. Witnesses pointing to #17000703 and opposite it the amount of P500.00; she was also pointing to #17000702
and opposite it P500.00; and also #17000704, opposite it is the amount of P632.97.

Q. Now, who received the checks in payment of the dresses made in this cash voucher?

A. Rita de los Reyes, sir. (herein respondent)

Q. From where?

A. In Makati.

Q. This cash voucher dated April 27, 1972, Exhibit "A", who received this from Unaware, Incorporated, if it was
received? 2
At this juncture, counsel for the accused Rita de los Reyes objected to the testimony of complaining witness, Luz E.
Balitaan and presented two motions. The transcript of stenographic notes shows what these motions are:

ATTY. CONTRERAS:

If your Honor please, the defense is respectfully presenting to this Honorable Court two (2) motions: first, to strike out
all the testimonies of the witness as far as Exhibit "A" is concerned on the ground that said testimonies are at variance
with the allegations in the information, there is no allegation in the information whatsoever regarding these checks and
this cash voucher, your Honor, and we are filing a motion in the nature of an objection to any other question or
questions regarding these checks that were allegedly received by the herein accused from the Unaware Incorporated
because there is no allegation in the information. If the information will only be read carefully, the sum of P127.58 in
payment of work done in baby dresses was received by the accused, so that all these evidence, having received checks in
so much amount ... It is respectfully submitted by the defense that no evidence could be admissible under the rules.

ATTY. ENRIQUEZ:

There was already testimony of this witness that there is certain amount received and that portion thereof was not
delivered to the offended party. What we are proving here are preliminary evidence going directly to the present issue
of P127.58 was received, as the Court would readily see in this cash voucher that the amount subject matter of the
information or complaint is indicated in this cash voucher. This exhibit and evidence is germane and I want to show that
there is misappropriation of the amount from the total amount of P1,632.97.

ATTY. CONTRERAS:

The information alleges that the accused received the sum of P127.58, the information does not cite that this amount
was only a part of the cash received. All these evidence will be immaterial, there is no allegation in the information by
which this information would be tending to sustain. I submit, your Honor.

ATTY. ENRIQUEZ:

We submit, your Honor.

COURT:

Objection overruled. 3
As clearly seen above, the objection was overruled. Luz E. Balitaan thereby continued with her testimony and declared
that accused Rita de los Reyes delivered the said checks and voucher to her; that upon delivery, the said accused
represented to her that the baby dresses with style Nos. 648, 151, 161 and 203 were those of Cesar Dalangin whose
payment in the amount of P127.58 was included in the checks; that in view of this statement, said Luz E. Balitaan
instructed said accused to cash the checks in order to pay Cesar Dalangin; that Rita de los Reyes returned the following
day with the cash minus the amount of P127.58. She further declared that two or three weeks afterwards, she noticed
that there were too many baby dresses that were lost prompting her to verify the receipts of payment, one of which is
the cash voucher, Exhibit "A". In the course of her investigation, she went to see Cesar Dalangin who declared that Style
Nos. 648, 151, 161 and 203 were not his and denied having received any amount from Rita de los Reyes or of even
knowing the latter; that when she confronted the accused and asked why she deceived her, said accused could not talk,
turned pale but later admitted having kept the amount.

At the close of the direct examination of Luz E. Balitaan, counsel for the accused moved to strike out the foregoing
testimonies but respondent court also denied the motion.

Consequently, accused Rita de los Reyes instituted in the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Eighth Judicial District,
Branch II, Civil Case No. 81, against petitioner-appellant, Luz E. Balitaan, and the Honorable Guillermo B. Magnaye, in his
capacity as Judge of the Municipal Court of Bauan, Batangas, a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction, to
annul the aforementioned orders of the said Municipal Court of Bauan, Batangas, overruling the objections of accused
Rita de los Reyes to the testimony of complaining witness on the grounds of immateriality and variance with the
Information as well as denying the motion to strike out the same.

In a decision dated March 13, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Batangas sustained respondent's stand and hence,
granted the petition for writ of certiorari, the dispositive portion of the same states as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of respondent Judge overruling petitioner's objection, as well as
denying her motion to strike out the testimonies of Luz E. Balitaan abovequoted and appearing on pages 23-32 of the
transcript of stenographic notes marked Exhibit "X", are hereby annulled. Let said testimonies be stricken out from the
record of the hearing of September 18, 1973, of Criminal Case No. 2172 of the Municipal Court of Bauan, Batangas
entitled People vs. Rita de los Reyes. Costs against private respondent Luz E. Balitaan.

SO ORDERED. 4

From said decision, Luz E. Balitaan filed this instant petition for review with the following assigned errors:

I. The lower court erred in granting the writ of certiorari to annul the orders of the Municipal Court of Bauan,
Batangas in Criminal Case No. 2172.

II. The lower court erred in holding that there is a variance between the allegation in the information for estafa in
Criminal Case No. 2172 and the proof established by the petitioner's testimony thereat.
III. The lower court, in resolving the present case, erred when it decided the merits of Criminal Case No. 2172
instead of limiting itself to a determination of whether the writ of certiorari should issue or not. 5

In resolving the issue of variance between allegation and proof, the Court of First Instance ruled:

Private respondent contends that Luz E. Balitaan's testimonies about the delivery of the checks to petitioner and their
having been cashed by her is merely to show the source of the P127.58 misappropriated. True but when she testified
that petitioner deducted the said amount from the proceeds falsely representing that the same belonged to Cesar
Dalangin, and should be delivered to him, when in fact she did not deliver but misappropriated the same to her own use
and benefit, the testimony became objectionable. It became objectionable because it tended to prove estafa committed
not in the manner as alleged in the information but in a manner not alleged therein. In overruling petitioner's objection,
respondent Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction because the Rules expressly provides (sic) that evidence should
correspond with the allegations of the complaint or information. 6

Petitioner vehemently objected to the resolution of the issue in that manner, contending that what counsel for Rita de
los Reyes presented before the Municipal Court of Bauan were only these two motions; viz: (1) to strike out complaining
witness' testimony concerning the cash voucher on the ground of immateriality and variance with the Information which
did not allege the existence of said voucher and three checks; and (2) a motion objecting to any and all other questions
concerning the checks in the total amount of P1,632.97 on the ground of variance inasmuch as the Information recited
that the accused received and misappropriated the amount of P127.58 only.

In other words, it is petitioner's stand that since these were the only motions that were denied by the Municipal Court, it
is their denial that is accordingly questioned by way of certiorari before the Court of First Instance and that when the
latter court went beyond the merits of the motions in question, it acted improperly for in so doing, it did not give the
adverse party a chance to argue the point and receive evidence on the question.

We disagree. The facts of the case, culled from petitioner-appellant's brief itself, show that aside from the two motions
above-mentioned, private respondent moved to strike out complaining witness' testimony "relating to the receipt
(voucher) of the three checks" and cashing thereof by the accused Rita de los Reyes, which, according to counsel, is at
variance with the allegation in the Information, it appearing that there is no allegation or averment therein that "the
accused received the checks," that those checks "were cashed by the accused", and that the accused got a portion of the
amount or cash "for the purpose of having it delivered to Cesar Dalangin." 7

The issue of variance between the mode or from of estafa alleged in the Information and that sought to be proved by
the testimony may be inferred from the foregoing motion to strike out. Contrary also to petitioner's contention in her
brief before this Court that this issue was not raised in Civil Case No. 81 in the Court of First Instance of Batangas, private
respondent aptly quoted her arguments in her memorandum dated February 3, 1974 before said court showing that the
issue was in fact raised, to wit:
... the information charges the accused with Estafa under Article 315, 4th par., No. 1, letter (b) of the Revised Penal
Code, the allegation being that the accused, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, misappropriated and
converted the amount of P127.58 which she received in trust for a certain specific purpose. But, the evidence consisting
of the testimony of the complainant, as already adverted to in the foregoing discussion, tends to prove another kind of
estafa which may fan under Article 315, 4th par., No. 2, letter (a) of the Revised Penal Code wherein the punishable act
consists of using false pretenses or fraudulent act. This is so because, according to the complainant's testimony, the
accused made false pretense or misrepresentation that the amount of P127.58 was due in favor of Cesar Dalangin. The
essence therefore of the criminal act shown by the testimonial evidence is the element of deceit, and this is an entirely
different kind of estafa (from that) charged against the accused in the information under which she was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. 8

After threshing out this preliminary matter of whether the issue at hand was raised or not, We now proceed with the
resolution of the said issue.

It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information.
What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be determined by reference to the definitions and the
essentials of the specific crimes. 9

Thus, in the case at bar, inasmuch as the crime of estafa through misappropriation or with grave abuse of confidence is
charged, the information must contain these elements: (a) that personal property is received in trust, on commission,
for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person
who has so received it; (c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and (d) that there be
demand for the return of the property. 10

The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused
to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. 11

However, it is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts necessary to be stated in
order to render the information sufficiently certain to Identify the offense. As a general rule, matters of evidence, as
distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be averred. 12 For instance, it is not
necessary to show on the face of an information for forgery in what manner a person is to be defrauded, as that is a
matter of evidence at the trial. 13

Moreover, reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime suffices. All that is required is that the charge be set forth
with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed and
will enable him intelligently to prepare his defense, and if found guilty to plead her conviction, in a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. 14

Applying these principles, We rule that the existence of the three checks need not be alleged in the Information. This is
an evidentiary matter which is not required to be alleged therein. Further, that these checks, as testified by petitioner
amounted to P1,632.97 did not vary the allegation in the Information that respondent Rita de los Reyes misappropriated
the amount of P127.58. Proof of the checks and their total amount was material evidence of the fact that respondent
misappropriated the amount of P127.58 which was but a part of the total sum of the checks.

Inasmuch as the Information herein sufficiently charges the crime of estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315, Revised
Penal Code, We shall now determine whether the testimonies of complaining witness prove the same or tend to prove
instead estafa under paragraph 2(a) of the same article.

It is true that estafa under paragraph 1(b) is essentially a different offense from estafa under paragraph 2(a) of the same
article because the elements of these two offenses are not the same. In estafa under paragraph 1(b), which is
committed with grave abuse of confidence, it must be shown that the offender received money or other personalty in
trust or on commission or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same but misappropriated it to the prejudice of another. It is also necessary that previous demand be made
on the offender. To sustain a conviction for estafa under paragraph 2(a), on the other hand, deceit or false
representation to defraud and the damage caused thereby must be proved. And no demand is necessary. 15

This does not mean, however, that presentation of proof of deceit in a prosecution for estafa under paragraph 1(b) is
not allowed. Abuse of confidence and deceit may co-exist. Even if deceit may be present, the abuse of confidence win
characterize the estafa as the deceit will be merely incidental or as the Supreme Court of Spain held, is absorbed by
abuse of confidence. 16

It has also been held that as long as there is a relation of trust and confidence between the complainant and the accused
and even though such relationship has been induced by the accused thru false representations and pretense and which
is continued by active deceit without truthfully disclosing the facts to the complainant, the estafa committed is by abuse
of confidence although deceit co-exists in its commission. 17

Thus, the questioned testimony eliciting the fact that accused respondent falsely represented to the complainant-
petitioner that the amount of P127.58 out of the total of P1,632.97 belonged to Cesar Dalangin may not be said to be at
variance with the allegations of the Information. The presence of deceit would not change the whole theory of the
prosecution that estafa with abuse of confidence was committed. Besides, in estafa by means of deceit, it is essential
that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the
complainant to part with the thing. 18 The municipal court properly denied, therefore, the motion to strike out the
testimonies anent use of false representations.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II in Civil Case No. 81, ordering the
questioned testimonies to be stricken from the record is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and de Castro, JJ., concur.


Escolin, J., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The Court of First Instance grievously erred (and thus delayed the disposition of a simple estafa
case) in entertaining the certiorari petition of the accused, Rita de los Reyes, wherein she complained of the alleged
errors of the trial court in the reception of the evidence of complainant Luz E. Balitaan. Appeal, not certiorari, is the
remedy for correcting those errors. certiorari is a remedy for correcting errors of jurisdiction (Nocon vs. Geronimo, 101
Phil. 735).

Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy. Its use is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is
wholly void. (Herrera vs. Barreto and Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245, 271). That situation does not obtain in this case.

Barredo (Chairman), J., I concur for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion of Justice Aquino.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The Court of First Instance grievously erred (and thus delayed the disposition of a simple estafa
case) in entertaining the certiorari petition of the accused, Rita de los Reyes, wherein she complained of the alleged
errors of the trial court in the reception of the evidence of complainant Luz E. Balitaan. Appeal, not certiorari, is the
remedy for correcting those errors. certiorari is a remedy for correcting errors of jurisdiction (Nocon vs. Geronimo, 101
Phil. 735).

Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy. Its use is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is
wholly void. (Herrera vs. Barreto and Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245, 271). That situation does not obtain in this case.

Barredo, (Chairman), J., I concur for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion of Justice Aquino.
G.R. No. L-67842 September 24, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

PABLO MOLERO, defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Appellant Pablo Molero was charged with the crime of rape by his own daughter Pacita Molero in a complaint filed in
the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental. The criminal complaint dated March 30, 1978 alleged:

That on or about the 5th day of February, 1976, on the banks of the river Siaton at Sitio Balogo, Barangay Tamlang,
Municipality of Santa Catalina, Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with grave abuse of confidence being the father of the herein complainant, with force
and intimidation by brandishing a bolo in threatening the undersigned that if the latter would not submit to his carnal
desires he would kill the undersigned and all the members of the family, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against the will of the latter.

The facts established by the prosecution and accepted by the trial court as basis for the judgment of conviction are
summarized by the court as follows:

It appears from the evidence particularly in the testimony of complainant Pacita Molero that on February 5, 1976 at
about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, her father, Pablo Moler, told her to go with him to the Siaton River at Tamlang, Sta.
Catalina, Negros Oriental, about a kilometer away from their house ostensibly to catch shrimps and perhaps fish
presumably for viand for the family that day. Pacita was the third among the seven children of Pablo. On February 5,
1976, she was barely 17 years young having been born on November 11, 1958. Obeying the command of her father, she
went with him to the Siaton River which evidently was a secluded area in the mountain barrio of Tamlang. As they
reached the river and while walking along its bank, with Pacita ahead and followed by her father, all so suddenly Pacita
was hugged from behind by her father, and she staggered and fell to the ground face up. He fell too as he was holding
her left hand placing it on her back while he knelt on her right arm. She tried to struggle but he unsheathed his harp bolo
(locally known as PINUTI) and placed it along her side. He then proceeded to pull up her dress and remove her short
pants and panty. She cried saying 'why are you doing this to me' and he only answered 'you shut up.' (Tsn-Gertrudes
Tangon, Dec. 7, 1978, page 12 of her transcript and page 247 of record). Then he unbuttoned his pants, let out his penis
and lay on top of her and did the push and pull movement in sexual intercourse. She tried to kick him but he again held
the unsheathed bolo which was placed on her side. Afraid that he might do her harm with the bolo if she continued to
put up resistance, and obviously because of his moral ascendancy over her, the accused succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with his daughter and the latter again cried.

After he satisfied his carnal lust, he stood up and the complainant likewise stood up and put on her panties and pants
and proceeded home. Before she walked home, the accused warned her not to tell her mother of what happened
otherwise he would kill all of them . As she walked home, she noticed that her father followed her and did not proceed
anymore in catching fish or shrimps. She surmissed that he followed her, so she would not have the opportunity to tell
her mother of what happened until three days later or on February 8, 1976. Among others, Pacita Molero said:

I just decided to report the matter to my mother whether he will kill all of us because I could no longer endure what he
had been doing to me.' (Tsn-Gertrudes Tangon, page 14 of transcript and page 249 of record)

Upon being informed of the incident her mother told her to just keep quiet for the moment as they would report the
matter to the police authorities soon. They were secretive about their plan to report to the police because the mother
and the daughter and the whole family knew that the accused was quite a fierce man, a cruel husband and a merciless
father.

On February 11, 1976, Pacita Molero and her mother went to the office of the Station Commander of Pamplona, Negros
Oriental, to report the incident. The accused was also called to the office and the accused and his daughter had a
confrontation before the Station Commander. The accused asked 'what is this all about, Pacita' and she answered saying
'this could not have happened if you did not abuse me.' (Tsn-Nena S. Saad, Dec. 5, 1978, page 15 of her transcript, page
219 of record). It would seem that the case was too serious for the station Commander of Pamplona to handle, so the
complainants were advised to report to the PC Headquarters at barrio Palanas.

At the PC Headquarters the complaint was investigated by Patrolman Arturo Adriatico Sr. who took down the statement
of Pacita Molero and her mother. The accused was likewise investigated by Adriatico on February 25, 1976, but the
accused did not want the investigation to be continued beacuse according to him this was just their 'own problem.'
Asked to elaborate what he meant by 'own problem' the accused said 'kaugalingon ra nakong sala sa akong pagpuyo'
which in English , means 'it is my own fault in my family life.' Asked to elaborate further on his last statement, the
accused said:

Nga akong nahapanglapasan ang salingsing sa sacramento sa among pagpuyo nga ang akong anak babaye akong
gibuongan sa iyang dumgog

which in English means:

I have commited a wrong against my own daughter wherein I destroyed her virtue as a woman.

These statement above quoted are found in the sworn statement of the accused (Exhibit "B" ) which was testified to by
Pat. Arturo Adriatico, Sr.

In connection with the investigation of the complaint of Pacita Molero, Dr. Enofreda Abordo-Sebul testified that she
conducted an internal and external examination of Pacita Molero and she found that her vaginal opening admitted two
fingers freely and easily and there were old lacerations of the hymen at two o'clock , three o'clock, five o'clock , six
o'clock , seven o'clock, nine o'clock, ten o'clock and twelve o'clock, thus showing that Pacita Molero had several previous
sexual intercourses, although the cervical smear showed no signs of spermatozoa.

The appellant denied the charge. According to him, he could not have committed the crime because on February 5,
1976, he was already confined in the provincial jail and that he had been in jail since December 7, 1975.

The appellant also denied any knowledge of the sworn statement he made "because I am an illiterate" (TSN, March 8,
1982, p. 11). He, however, admitted that he was investigated by PC soldiers before he was placed in the stockade.

During the investigation, he denied the rape charge filed against him by his own daughter "because as a man, I have
been earning my living for I have masters to serve like my stomach and my children. So, I have to work in my own
humble way." (TSN, March 8, 1982, p. 12) Moreover, he stated that before the investigation started he was not
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel; that he was not assisted by counsel during the
investigation and that the first time he had a lawyer was at the trial of the instant case.

The appellant's defense of alibi was readily refuted by Benjamin Alcorcon, Supervising Prison Guard of the Negros
Oriental Provincial Jail who informed the court that according to the records of the Provincial Jail, the appellant was
committed to the Jail only on December 2, 1976 and that definitely on February 5, 1976, he was not yet confined there.

The trial court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify
Pacita Molero the sum of P10,000.00 and to pay the costs of this action.

The appellant submits that the issues involved in the instant case are as follows:

a) Whether or not, under the facts obtaining in the case at bar, accused- appellant, Pablo Molero was placed under
double jeopardy; and

b) Whether or not the accused-appellant committed the crime of rape.

The double jeopardy issue stems from the following antecedent facts:

The original complaint of Pacita Molero, dated March 22, 1977, charged her father with the crime of rape allegedly
committed "on or about the 13th day •f February, 1976." Except for the date which is "on or about the 5th day of
February, 1976" in the March 30, 1978 complaint, the facts alleged in the two complaints were exactly the same.

The appellant was originally arraigned under the March 22, 1977 criminal complaint. He pleaded "Not Guilty."
During the trial, Pacita Molero, the complaining witness testified that she was raped by her father on February 5, 1976.

In view of Pacita's testimony, the assistant provincial fiscal filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint.

The motion was granted. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the appellant, the trial court issued an
Order the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused dated February 22, 1978 in relation to the Reply to
Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration dated March 6, 1978 is hereby granted and the Order of this Court dated
February 17, 1978 admitting the amended criminal complaint dated February 2, 1978 is hereby set aside, and the said
amended criminal complaint is hereby denied admission. Accordingly, this case is hereby dismissed with costs de oficio,
but the accused shall not be discharged as there appears a good cause to detain him in custody to answer for the proper
offense pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. the Provincial Fiscal and/or the prosecuting fiscal is hereby
ordered to cause the filing of a new complaint and/or information charging the accused of the proper offense of rape
committed on or before February 5, 1976 within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order. (People v. de la Cruz, 59 Phil.
529, cited by Padilla, Criminal Procedure, 1971 ed., p. 763.)

Accordingly, the corrected criminal complaint dated March 30, 1978 was filed.

The appellant filed a motion to quash the criminal complaint on the ground that the appellant had been previously in
jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged citing Section 1(h) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
motion was denied. Arraignment followed. The appellant pleaded "Not Guilty." Thereafter, hearings were conducted
resulting in the conviction of the appellant.

The appellant now contends that he was placed in double jeopardy when the instant case was filed and he was brought
to trial to answer for the crime of rape allegedly committed on February 5, 1976. He argues that the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 2148 on ground of variance between allegation and proof amounted to his acquittal, citing People v.
Opemia (98 Phil. 698). He points to the fact that the criminal complaint alleged that he committed the crime of rape on
February 13, 1976 and yet the prosecution's evidence shows that the alleged crime was committed on February 5, 1976.

Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states that no person shag be put twice in j jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense." Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, now substantially reproduced as Section 7, Rule
117 in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, lays down the necessary requisites in order that defense of double
jeopardy may prosper, to wit:

Former conviction or acquittal double jeopardy. -When defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.

Dismissal of the first case contemplated by this rule presupposes a definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates
the case. (Jaca v. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452; People v. Manlapas, 5 SCRA 883; Republic v. Agoncillo, 40 SCRA 579; People v.
Hon. Surtida, 43 SCRA 29; People v. Mogol, 131 SCRA 296). And "for dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause of
the Constitution, it must have the effect of acquittal." (People v. Agoncillo, supra)

It is quite clear that the order of the trial court dismissing the Criminal Case No. 2148 was without prejudice to the filing
of a new complaint and/or information charging the appellant with the proper offense. The case was not terminated
because the dispositive portion of the order expressly directed the Provincial Fiscal and/or the prosecuting fiscal to file a
new complaint and/or information charging the accused with the proper offense of rape committed on or before
February 5, 1976. The case was dismissed for no other reason except to correct the date of the crime from "on or about
the 13th day of February" to "on or about the 5th day of February." Hence, the provisional dismissal of Criminal Case No.
2148 could not have barred the prosecution of the case against the appellant.

Contrary to the claim of the appellant, the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2148 did not amount to his acquittal.

There was no need for the trial court to have used such a cumbersome procedure. What the trial court should have
done was simply to deny the motion for reconsideration of the order granting the prosecution's motion for leave to
amend the complaint as to the date of the commission of the crime from February 13, 1976 to February 5, 1976. There
was no need to dismiss the case without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint. Section 12, Rule 119, Revised Rules
of Court applies when there is a mistake in charging the proper offense but not when an honest error of a few days is
sought to be corrected and the change does not affect the rights of the accused. The prosecution in Criminal Case No.
2148 had already moved for the amendment of the date of the commission of the crime. The dismissal of the case
pursuant to Section 12, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court was made only for that precise purpose.

After arraignment and where the appellant has pleaded "not guilty," it is still proper to amend the date of the
commission of the crime? The applicable rules are Sections 10 and 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court. These
rules provide:

Time of the commission of the offense.-It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at
which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged
to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committee as the information
or complaint will permit.

xxx xxx xxx


Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion
of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

Applying the rules, the amendment sought by the prosecution should have been granted.

The precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of the offense of rape. The amendment of
the complaint changing the date of the commission of the crime of rape from February 13, 1976 to February 5, 1976, a
difference of eight (8) days was only a matter of form under the facts of this case and did not prejudice the rights of the
appellant. This Court has ruled:

In the case of People v. Rivera (1970, 33 SCRA 746), We ruled that the amendment of the information as to the date of
the commission of the offense from March 2, 1964 to March 2, 1965, a difference of one (1) year or twelve (I 2) months,
was merely a matter of form and does not prejudice the rights of the accused, reiterating the ruling in the case of U.S. v.
Ramos, (1912, 23 Phil. 300) where the Fiscal was permitted to amend the date of the commission of the offense from
June 16, 1910 to June, 1911.

The phrase 'on or about' employed in the information does not require the prosecution 'to prove any precise date but
may prove any date which is not so remote as to surprise and prejudice the defendant. In case of surprise, the Court
may allow an amendment of the information as to time and an adjournment to the accused, if necessary, to meet the
amendment' (U.S. v. Dichao, 27 Phil. 420, 423 [1914]).

In the case of People v. Reyes, (supra) on which the respondent judge relies, the change sought was from 1964 to 1969,
a difference of five (5) years, which gap of five years 'is so great as to defy approximation in the commission of one and
the same offense.'

This is not so in the case at bar where the difference is only, as aforestated, two months and five days, which disparity
allows approximation as to the date of the commission of the offense of grave coercion." (People v. Borromeo, 123 SCRA
253).

The appellant's reliance on the case of People v. Opemia supra, is not well- taken. The amendment proposed in that case
was the changing of the date of the commission of the crime from June 18, 1952 to July, 1947, or a difference of five
years. We disallowed the amendment and adopted the lower court's ruling that "the amendment that would change the
date of the commission of the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form.... It is apparent that the
proposed amendment concerns with material facts constituting the offense, and consequently, it would be prejudicial to
the constitutional rights of the defendants."

The dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2148 did not amount to the appellant's acquittal. In effect, the order of dismissal does
not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy: (See People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166)
The constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense is to protect
the accused from going through a trial a second time. But, since the first proceedings has not yet been terminated, there
is no second proceeding to speak of, and, therefore, no double jeopardy (Flores, Jr. v. Enrile, 115 SCRA 236).

Under the second issue, the appellant insists that the evidence failed to establish the presence of force and intimidation
in the commission of the sexual act. He mentions Pacita's testimony that she had a series of sexual intercourses with the
appellant since she was thirteen years old and yet did not report the incident to her mother. He argues that if a crime
was committed by him at all, it was one of qualified seduction.

The appellant's arguments deserve no merit. Pacita's narration of the incident clearly shows that the appellant
employed force and intimidation against her, to wit:

FISCAL:

Q Now,on what part of the river did this incident happen??

A At Balogo while we were walking on the edge of the river.

Q You mean, you were following the river?

A Yes, I was ahead.

Q Now, while you were ahead, there was that incident that happened. What was that incident?

A Because he made me go ahead and suddenly he wrestled me.

COURT:

Q Is that the correct translation?

FISCAL:

No, Your Honor. She was hugged from behind.


COURT:

'I was ahead and suddenly he hugged me from behind.'

That is the correct translation.

FISCAL:

Now, when you were hugged by your father suddenly from behind, what happened?

A I fell down.

Q On the very place where you were then hugged by your father?

A Yes.

Q When you fell to the ground, what was your position?

A My left hand was placed in my back because he held my left hand.

Q When did your father hold your left hand placing it at your back?

COURT:

After you fell or before you fell?

A I had already my hand at my back when I fell down because he immediately embraced me but then I tried to
free myself. After which, I fell down.

FISCAL:
When your father was hugging you and you told this Court that you struggled to free yourself and you also told the
Court that you fell to the ground, when you fell to the ground, did you fall to the ground together with your father or
you were the only one who fell to the ground?

A He also fell down following me because he was holding my hand.

Q And your father at that time was holding which of your hand or arm?

A Left.

Q And when you were already on the ground, win you please tell the Court what was your position?

A I was lying on my back.

Q And how about your left arm, which you said was being held by your father while you were already lying flat on
the ground?

A He pulled up my dress and put off my panties." (TSN, November 20, 1978, pp. 8-10)

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL:

According to you, you fell to the ground followed by your father and your father was still holding your left arm which
was placed at your back. While you were already flat on the ground, was your father still holding your left arm at the
back?

A He was still holding my left arm and then when we fell down he knelt on my other arm.

Q And you are referring to your right hand?

A Yes.

Q When your father, the accused therein, was doing that, where was he in relation to you?
COURT:

What was the position of your father when he was kneeling on your right arm and holding your left arm on the back?

A He was on a kneeling but bending position.

FISCAL:

Was he directly on top of you or he was on either side of your body?

A On my side.

Q Which side of your body was your father when he was kneeling or bending?

A My right.

Q Then, while your father was doing that, what did he do to you?

A He was removing his buttons and he took off my panties.

Q All right, now, how about your dress, what kind of dress were you wearing at that time?

A I was wearing a thick clothing because I was sure that I will be wet and I was also wearing a short pants.

COURT:

What is this thick clothes you were wearing? You mean, dress, pants or blouse?

A What I mean is that, the dress I was wearing was not like this one I am wearing now but it was for a daily use.

Q It is a one-piece dress?
A Yes.

Q And you were wearing also short pants, according to you?

A Yes.

Q And you were wearing panties under the short pants?

A Yes.

ATTY. REYES:

Your Honor please, may we add for the records that she refers to a dress made of cotton or silk but relatively of light
material.

COURT:

Make that of record.

COURT:

Go ahead, Fiscal.

FISCAL:

All right, now, according to you, your father, the accused therein, removed your panty. Now, which was removed first,
your panty or the short pant you were wearing because according to you, you were wearing short pant?

COURT:

How can you remove the panty first when you are wearing the short pant? Well, witness may answer the question.
A Both were removed at the same time.

FISCAL:

And which took first, the simultaneous removal of your shorts and panty or the unbottoning of the pants of your father?

A He took off my panty and shorts first.

COURT:

How was he able to remove your panty and shorts, were you not struggling to free yourself?

A I was not able to struggle because he unsheathe a bolo.

Q What did he do with the bolo

A That if I continue to struggle, he would kill me.

Q When he was holding that bolo, with what hand was he holding that?

A Right.

Q How about his left hand, what was it doing at that time?

A His left hand was also holding my other hand and so when he unsheathe his bolo, I did not continue to struggle
because I know he would kill me.

FISCAL:

And which took place first, the simultaneous removal of your shorts and panty or the unsheathing of the bolo by your
father?
A The simultaneous taking of the panty and short pant took place first because I kept on struggling so he
unsheathe his bolo.

COURT:

Actually, the Court gets it from you that he was able to remove your panty and short pant before he unsheathe his bolo?

A Yes, after he took off my panty and short pant that was the time he threatened me.

Q He was able to remove your panty and short pant completely out before he threatened you with the use of a
bolo?

A Yes.

COURT:

Go ahead.

FISCAL:

Now, after your panty and short pant were already removed and according to you, your father unsheathe his bolo and
threatened you. When did your father remove or unbutton his pants, while he was still holding that bolo?

A He put down the bolo on his side and after which, he unbuttoned his pants.

Q At that time, what was the kind of pants your father was wearing?

A He was only wearing an improvised short pant and with buttons in front.

Q Was your father actually able to unbutton his improvised short pants?

A Yes.
Q After he was able to unbutton his improvised short pants what did he do?

A He lay down on top of me.

Q And how about your legs at that time, was it already spread out?

A I tried to hold my both thighs together but then he opened them.

Q And your father, according to you, placed himself on top of you while your legs were already spread out?

A When he was able to lie on top of me, I tried to close both legs but then he held them open and he lay on top of
me.

Q So that when your father was lying on top of you, your both legs were already spread

A Yes.

Q How about your dress at that time your father was on top of you, what was the position of your dress?

A He rasised it up to my stomach.

Q Now, what happened while he was already on top of you?

A He was doing the push and pull movement of his buttocks.

Q And at that time, did you not struggle to free yourself?

A When he was doing that act, I kicked him but then he again got hold of the bolo placed on his side.

Q Then, what did you do after he got hold of the bolo?

A I cried because he made sexual intercourse with me.


Moreover, there is no doubt that the appellant had a moral ascendancy and influence over Pacita such that he could
easily intimidate and force her to submit to his lustful desires considering that the appellant was her father and she was
only seventeen(17) years old at that time. The complainant is obviously illiterate and unschooled. Her complaint is
signed with a thumbmark. These, plus the fact that the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime threatened
her with a bolo had practically rendered complainant helpless against the lustful demands of the appellant. (See People
v. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280). The records also show that the appellant was a fierce man, a cruel husband, and a merciless
father such that mother and daughter had to cower in secretive fear before reporting the rape to the authorities.

The fact that Pacita did not report the previous incidents involving her and the appellant to her mother has no bearing
on the prosecution of the instant case. This case refers to the commission of the crime of rape on February 5, 1976 by
the appellant against Pacita which is a distinct and separate crime from whatever crimes the appellant might have
committed when he had sexual intercourse with his own daughter Pacita ever since she was thirteen years old. An
intimidated person cowed into submitting to a series of repulsive acts may acquire some courage as she grows older and
finally state that enough is enough, the depraved malefactor must be punished. The tragedy in this case is that the
criminal happens to be her own father.

Indeed, we find no reason to depart from the trial court's finding that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape against his own daughter. We agree with the findings of the trial court that:

As against the vivid and clear testimony of Pacita Molero, the accused had nothing to offer except his short testimony
denying having committed in any way the crime of Rape against his very own daughter, He denied having brought his
daughter to the Siaton River on February 5, 1976 because he insisted that he was already confined in the PC Stockade on
February 13, 1975, and that he was already incarcerated in the Provincial Jail since December 5, 1975. However, defense
witness Benjamin Alcorcon, Supervising Prison Guard of the Negros Oriental Provincial Jail clearly told the Court that the
record of the Provincial Jail shows that the accused was committed to the Provincial Jail only on December 2, 1976 and
definitely on February 5, 1976 he was not yet confined in the Provincial Jail. . . . Pressed by the Court if he could have
any satisfactory explanation why his daughter would file such a serious charge against him if in truth he had not
committed the act, the accused just matter-of-factly said that 'my daughter Pacita and her mother agreed to file this
case.' (Tsn-Liberata Balasbas March 10, 1982, page 11 of transcript, page 434 of record).

The defense placed Pacita Molero as its own witness and her testimony as witness for the defense, that her father had
sexual intercourse with her on February 5, 1976 when he brought her to the Siaton River, has only served to reinforce
her testimony on 'this aspect of the case, when she testified as a witness for the prosecution. Undoubtedly, the accused
is bound by the testimony of his own witness.

All told, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused was established beyond reasonable doubt by the clear and
convincing testimony of the complainant, Pacita Molero. Although at times during her testimony she got confused as to
dates, this is understandable considering that she is illiterate and this did not in any way affect the vivid portrayal of the
heinous act committed on her by her father.
WHEREFORE, except for the MODIFICATION that the indemnity of P10,000.00 is increased to TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00), the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38634 June 20, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner,

vs.

HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I, Camarines Sur, ARISTON ANADILLA, RAFAEL ANADILLA and
JOSE ANADILLA, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order * of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, 10th Judicial
District, Branch I, dated 20 March 1974, dismissing motu proprio Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled "People of the
Philippines, Complainant versus Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, Accused," as well as of the order
dated 22 April 1974 of the same court denying the motion for reconsideration of said earlier order.

The facts are not disputed.

On 10 August 1964, an information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against
accused-private respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set on 11 and 12
March 1974. The hearing set on 11 March 1974 was, however, postponed in view of the absence of one of the accused,
respondent Rafael Anadilla who had not yet been arrested by the police authorities. On the same date, the court a quo
issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set the trial of the case for 29 and 30 July 1974.

On 20 March 1974, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads:

Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and there
being no objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, this case is hereby
DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is
hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect.

The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled.

In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is hereby ordered to release said accused from
their detention immediately upon receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED. 1

The affidavit of desistance, relied upon by the aforequoted order, was executed by the offended party on 20 March
1974 and subscribed and sworn to before the branch Clerk of Court Atty. R.B. Torrecampo. It alleged, among others,
that:

That he was the complainant in Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled, People vs. Ariston Anadilla, et al., for Attempted
Homicide, which case is pending before the first branch of this Court; that he is no longer interested in the further
prosecution of this case and that he has already forgiven the accused for their acts; that his material witnesses could no
longer be contacted and that without their testimonies, the guilt of the accused cannot be proven beyond reasonable
doubt, and that in view of these circumstances, he requests the Prosecuting Fiscal for the dismissal of the said case. 2

The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was denied by the court a quo in an order dated 22
April 1974. 3 This petition was thereupon filed before this Court.

The issue in this petition is whether the courta a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of
desistance executed by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal.

The issue presented is not novel. In Crespo v. Mogul, 4 promulgated on 30 June 1987, the Court had occasion to state
the rule in regard to the respective powers of the prosecuting fiscal and the court, after the complaint or information
has been filed in court. In said case, the issue raised was whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal
case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review,
may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial of the case on the merits.

In the Crespo case, an information for Estafa had already been filed by the Assistant Fiscal before the Circuit Criminal
Court of Lucena City. Arraignment of the accused and trial of the case were, however, deferred because of a pending
appeal by the accused/respondent to the Secretary of Justice. Reversing the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal, the Undersecretary of Justice directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against
the accused. Upon such instructions, the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. The
Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment. On a certiorari recourse to the Court of Appeals, the petition was
dismissed. Review of the Court of Appeals decision was then sought by the accused with this Court, raising the issue
previously stated herein, Resolving, the Court held:

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over
the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to
the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn,
as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the
fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured.
After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal
case should be filed in court or not [sic], once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal
may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only
qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the
People to due process of law.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case
as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions
of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation." (Emphasis supplied). 5

In the case at bar, the Court has taken note that before the case was set for trial, almost ten (10) years had elapsed from
the date of filing of the information. It was not, therefore, unusual that the complainant-offended party, in his affidavit
of desistance manifested that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted, but, without their testimony, the
guilt of the accused could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecuting fiscal in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case, obviously believed that despite
such manifestation of the complainant, he (fiscal) could prove the prosecution's case.

To avoid similar situations, the Court takes the view that, while the Crespo doctrine has settled that the trial court is the
sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed (after the complaint or information has been filed in court),
still, any move on the part of the complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case, even if without objection of
the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal for his own view on the matter. He is, after all, in control of
the prosecution of the case and he may have his own reasons why the case should not be dismissed. It is only after
hearing the prosecuting fiscal's view that the Court should exercise its exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78492 May 29, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
DICK OCAPAN accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Accused-appellant Dick Ocapan and Joselyn Ocapan, the woman who lived with him in an ostensible marital
relationship, were charged on March 11, 1985 before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte at Iligan City with the
complex crime of rape with serious illegal detention.

The case against Joselyn Ocapan was dismissed while Dick Ocapan was convicted and sentenced accordingly for the
crime of serious illegal detention. The decision of the trial court was appealed to the Court of Appeals which elevated its
decision to this Court for final determination in accordance with Section 13 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which
provides:

Whenever a Criminal Cases Division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be
imposed in a case, the said Division after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall render judgment
imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering
judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for review.

and with the ruling in People v. Daniel (86 SCRA 511).

The decision of the Court of Appeals penned by Associate Justice Vicente Mendoza and concurred in by Associate
Justices Josue N. Bellosillo and Hector C. Fule reads as follows:

The accused-appellant, Dick Ocapan and his common-law wife, Joselyn Ocapan were accused of rape with serious illegal
detention in the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte. The information, dated March 11, 1985, alleged:

That on or about January 17, 1985, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Dick Ocapan conspiring and confederating with his common-law wife, Joselyn O. Ocapan did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge with one Arlene
Yupo, a minor and who was working as house helper, of the said accused; that thereafter, in order to prevent the said
Arlene Yupo from reporting to the proper authorities, detained and deprived her of her liberty for more than five (5)
days.

Later, on motion of the City Fiscal, the trial court dismissed the case against Joselyn Ocapan on May 23, 1985 on the
ground that there was no prima facie case against her. The case proceeded with respect to Dick Ocapan who pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Trial was thereafter held. The prosecution versions is as follows:

The offended party, Arlene Yupo, was house helper of the accused-appellant, Dick Ocapan and the latter's common-law
wife, Joselyn Ocapan In the evening of January 17, 1985, Joselyn Ocapan made Arlene drink half a glass of Tanduay
Rhum, as a result of which she felt drowsy. She therefore went to bed, but as she was about to fall asleep, somebody
knocked on the door. When she opened it, she saw the accused-appellant Dick Ocapan. Dick Ocapan had a knife and
threatened to kill her if she shouted. He pushed her to the floor, placed himself on top of her, tore her blouse and
fondled her breasts. He then pulled up her skirt, kissed her, and pulled down her underwear and inserted his finger into
her vagina. Arlene said she lost consciousness and when she came to, she felt some pain and found her blanket stained
with blood. The accused, who was still in the room, gave her money and warned her not to tell anybody about the
incident, or he would kill her.

The next day, Arlene told Joselyn about the incident. Joselyn told her not to tell anybody and asked her to stay, but as
she insisted on going home, Joselyn slapped her. Joselyn locked her inside a room whose only window was closed.
According to Arlene, the ground below was muddy and there were many broken glasses, making it dangerous for her to
jump to the ground. Besides, the accused and Joselyn guarded her. Arlene said she was not allowed to go out, except to
go to the toilet. However, as she refused to eat, she became weak and so, on January 23, 1985, after five days of
detention, the accused-appellant finally released her. According to Arlene, she stayed at the Cristan Commercial until
January 29, 1985, when she saw her aunt, Saturnina Dagting, passing by and called her to tell her what had happened to
her. At 7:00 in the evening of that day, she was taken by her mother and her aunt to the police station where she
reported the incident. Later she was examined by Dr. Carmina Barte who found that the hymen had healed lacerations
at 1.4 and 6 o'clock positions, and that such lacerations could have been caused from one week to one year before.

On the other hand, the defense presented evidence to show that Arlene Yupo and the accused-appellant were lovers
and that Arlene complained to the police only because her relationship with the accused-appellant had been discovered
by the latter's common-law wife, Joselyn Ocapan and that it is not true that Arlene Yupo had been detained. According
to the accused-appellant, Arlene and he became lovers in September, 1984 and that they first had sexual intercourse on
September 20, 1984, after which he said he found that Arlene was no longer a virgin. The accused-appellant said he
wanted to go to bed with Arlene on January 17, 1986 but it was Arlene's menstrual period. According to him, in the
evening of January 19, 1985, as they were about to have sex, his common-law wife, Joselyn suddenly came home from
the Molave Disco House, where she was an entertainer and noticed that Dick was perspiring. This prompted her to go to
the room of Arlene, where she found her completely naked under the blanket.

Arlene denied having an affair with the accused-appellant but the latter admitted that he and Arlene were lovers. On
January 20, 1985, Joselyn drove the accused-appellant out of the house, but kept Arlene because she needed her to look
after their children. Joselyn finally dismissed Arlene on January 23, 1985.
The defense also presented Juliet Pasco, who said that twice, on January 19, 1985 and January 20, 1985, she and Arlene
and a certain Caloy went to a place called Abuno to gather young coconuts and, on January 21, they went to the Big
Dipper Restaurant where they had beer, with Arlene paying the bill. Obviously, the purpose of her testimony was to
show that Arlene was under no restraint at a time when she claimed she was detained. This witness said that on January
22, 1985 she accompanied Arlene to Kanaway to see a herb doctor who found her to be pregnant and prescribed a drink
('camias') which made Arlene menstruate. On January 23, 1985 she said, Arlene transferred to the Cristan Commercial.

On October 7, 1985 the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the rape charge on the ground that the offended party
had not filed a complaint, but finding the accused-appellant guilty of serious illegal detention. The dispositive portion of
the trial court's decision states:

In view of the foregoing, considering that the prosecution failed to present a signed complaint of the offended party the
case of rape against the accused is hereby dismissed. However, with regards to the crime of serious illegal detention, the
accused is hereby sentenced after considering the indetermine sentence law and there being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, to suffer a penalty of from 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to reclusion
perpetua as maximum and to indemnify the offended party the sum of P 20,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages.

Hence, this appeal. The accused-appellant Contends:

(1) That the information against him was filed by the City Fiscal without giving him the right to be heard in a
preliminary investigation and that his motion for reinvestigation was summarily denied by the trial court.

(2) That the evidence does not support the finding that he detained the offended party Arlene Yupo from January
17 to January 23, 1985,

(3) That since the information was for the complex crime of rape with serious illegal detention, it was error for the
trial court to split the crime into two separate offenses of rape and serious illegal detention.

We shall deal with these contentions in their order.

First. The record shows that on March 6, 1985 the accused appellant, with the assistance of counsel, filed a written
waiver of the "right to the Second Stage of Preliminary Investigation" with the Municipal Trial Court. Accordingly, the
case was remanded to the Fiscal's Office for the filing of the corresponding information in the Regional Trial Court. Rec.
pp. 11-12) Nonetheless, a reinvestigation was conducted by the City Fiscal which on April 25, 1985 recommended the
dismissal of the case with respect to Joselyn Ocapan. On the basis of this recommendation, the trial court ordered the
case against Joselyn Ocapan ,dismissed There is, therefore, no basis for the accused-appellant's claim that he was denied
the right to a preliminary investigation.
Moreover, it appears that on May 24, 1985, the accused-appellant pleaded to the charge and took no further step to
raise the question of denial of the right to preliminary investigation either to this Court or to the Supreme Court.
Instead, he entered into trial. He thus waived whatever right he might have to preliminary investigation. (People v.
Lambino, 103 Phil. 504 (1958); People v. Magpalo, 70 Phil. 176 (1940); People v. Oliveria, 67 Phil. 427 (1939).

Second. The accused-appellant cites the testimony of the offended party, Arlene Yupo, to the effect that "(she) was
detained by her (Joselyn Ocapan inside the room" (TSN, p. 10, Aug. 15, 1985). The accused- appellant argues that,
therefore, it was not he who detained Arlene. The accused-appellant also cites the testimony of Arlene that "He (the
accused- appellant) usually went out during the evening" (Id. p. 13) to show that he could not have kept watch over her
during her detention.

The testimony of Arlene Yupo is taken out of context. What Arlene said was this:

COURT

When you insisted that you will go home, what was the reply of Joselyn Ocapan?

A She refused.

COURT

What did she do to you, if any ?

A She slapped me.

COURT

After slapping you, what else did she do to you ?

A I was detained by her inside the room.

COURT

How many days were you locked inside the room?


A Five days.

RECORD:

Witness is on the brink of tears.

COURT

From Jan. 18 when you were locked inside the room, did you notice the accused Dick Ocapan?

A He was there.

COURT

What was Dick Ocapan doing, if any?

A They were watching outside.

(TSN, p. 10, Aug. 15, 1985)

On the other hand, when Arlene said that Dick Ocapan the accused- appellant, "usually went out during the evening,"
she was answering the question of the trial court as to the work of the accused-appellant. She was not referring to the
period of her detention. (TSN, p. 13, Aug. 15, 1985)

The accused-appellant also contends: 'Since the accused was no longer at his residence where Arlene Yupo claimed to
have been detained, how could he be held liable for illegal detention?' That the accused-appellant was allegedly driven
out of his house on January 20, 1985 was his own testimony (TSN, p. 6, September 19, 1985) and that of his wife, Joselyn
(TSN, p. 21), Aug. 16, 1985). As far as the prosecution is concerned, Dick Ocapan was not driven out of their house. On
the contrary, the offended party testified that she could not leave the house of the accused- appellant because the latter
and his wife were guarding her.

Nor is there merit in the claim of the accused-appellant that the trial court relied on the weakness and supposed
inconsistencies of the defense evidence rather than the strength of the prosecution evidence. In finding the accused-
appellant guilty, the trial court stated:
The prosecution presented sufficient proof showing that Arlene Yupo was raped by the accused Dick Ocapan on January
17, 1985 and detained up to January 23, 1985 but had to allow her to leave the house because by then Arlene Yupo was
not eating anymore and was becoming weak presumably because of shock suffered by her. The accused denied having
raped Arlene Yupo and claimed that he did not even have sexual intercourse with her on January 17, 1985 because
Arlene Yupo was menstruating and had sexual intercourse only on January 19, 1985 and that was the date when they
were discovered by his common law wife. He also claims that Arlene Yupo had been his sweetheart since September 15,
1984 and they had sexual intercourse for several times. However, the court finds that the testimonies of the witnesses
for the accused to be incredible and contradictory. The accused claims that he did not have sexual intercourse with
Arlene Yupo on January 17, 1985 because the latter was menstruating but the witness for the accused Juliet Pasco
testified that on January 22, 1985 they went to see a quack doctor because of the delayed menstruation of Arlene Yupo
and it was only after Arlene Yupo drank 'camias' on January 22, 1985 that her menstruation came. According to Joselyn
Ocapan the common-law wife of Dick Ocapan she discovered Arlene Yupo and the accused had sexual intercourse on
January 19, 1985 when she went home from her work as a hostess in the Molave Disco House and she confronted
Arlene Yupo at 9:00 o'clock in the morning and that she did not dismiss Arlene Yupo until January 23, 1985 because
there was no one who could take care of her children in the house if she would drive her away. Yet the witness Juliet
Pasco testified that on January 19, 1985 they went on an excursion to Abuno to eat young coconuts, going back there
again on January 20 to get coconuts which were eaten by Dick Ocapan that on January 21, 1985 they went drinking beer
at the Big Dipper at 7:00 o'clock in the evening and stayed for two hours; that on January 22, 1985 they went to
Kanaway to consult a quack doctor about the condition of Arlene Yupo. Certainly this is in conflict with the testimony of
Joselyn Ocapan who claimed that she confronted Arlene Yupo regarding her relationship with Dick Ocapan on January
20, 1985 and would not dismiss Arlene Yupo because she needed her to watch her children. If it is true that Arlene Yupo
was confronted regarding her illicit relationship with Dick Ocapan on January 19, 1985 she would not have gone
gallivanting to Abuno with the witness Juliet Pasco going back there again on January 20, 1985 and then on January 21,
going out to drink. If the claim of Joselyn Ocapan that she did not dismiss immediately Arlene Yupo because she needed
her to watch her children were true, then Arlene Yupo could not have gone to Abuno on January 19 and 20 and go out
again in the evening of January 21 and 22 with Juliet Pasco as she would be watching the children. Not only did the
testimonies of Juliet Pasco and Joselyn Ocapan contradict each other but their testimonies were so full of
inconsistencies that it could not merit credence. Juliet Pasco even admitted that she had made several mistakes during
the questioning by the court, mistakes that could not have been made by a truthful witness. The same thing can be said
of Joselyn Ocapan She stated that she testified because she loves Dick Ocapan (p. 19, TSN August 16, 1985) but later she
also testified that she does not love him anymore (p. 21, TSN, August 16, 1985).

The accused himself also admitted that there was no motive at all for Arlene Yupo to charge him for rape because
according to him he never had any quarrel with Arlene Yupo at the time he last saw her up to the firing of this case
against him is so flimsy that it could not merit credence. According to him Arlene Yupo filed this case against him in
order to save her honor and in order that she would not be put to shame and embarassment because their relationship
was already known. A woman would not file a case for rape in order to just save her honor if she was not really raped
because by doing so she would be further exposed to public ridicule.

Third. The accused-appellant argues that the crime charged in the information is the complex crime of rape with serious
illegal detention and that since the offended party did not file a complaint for this crime, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction. He further claims that, in holding that the information charged two separate offenses, the trial court
violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
On the other hand, the prosecution argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the charge for rape because the
requirement in Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code that the crime of rape must be prosecuted by complaint of the
offended party is not a jurisdictional requirement as held in Valdepanas v. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966).

Neither contention, we believe, is correct. While the information is indeed entitled "For Rape with Serious Illegal
Detention," it clearly charges two separate offenses, namely, rape and serious illegal detention. The accused-appellant
could have objected on the ground of duplicity (Rule 110, sec. 13), but since he did not file a motion to quash on this
ground in accordance with Rule 11 7, sec. 3(e), he must be deemed to have waived the objection. (People v. Policher, 60
Phil. 770 [1934])

On the other hand, we do not think that the Supreme Court intended to reverse a uniform course of decisions holding
that, with respect to crimes against chastity, the filing of a complaint by the offended party is jurisdictional. Valdepenas
v. People, supra, which the prosecution cites in support of its contention that such complaint is not jurisdictional simply
holds that if the offended party files a com plaint for forcible abduction, the accused can be found guilty under such
complaint of abduction with consent. The fact is that, in that case, both the offended party and her mother gave their
assent to the complaint. Indeed, as the prosecution acknowledges, in People v. Zurbano, 37 SCRA 565 (1971), decided
after Valdepenas v. People, the Court reiterated the rule that 'The filing of a complaint for rape or for any other offense
enumerated in Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code by the person or persons mentioned therein is jurisdictional.

We hold that the trial court correctly dismissed the rape charge for lack of complaint by the offended party. (3 Aquino,
The Revised Penal Code 1771 [1976])

Fourth. The trial court sentenced the accused-appellant to an indeterminate sentence of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum. Because of this and contending that the evidence against
him is insufficient, the accused-appellant petitions to be released on bail.

The Solicitor General opposes the bail petition and points out that this case falls under Art. 267, par. 4, of the Revised
Penal Code, which prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. "If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a
minor, female, or a public officer." Accordingly, the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply. In accordance with Art.
63, par. 2, as there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty to be imposed must be reclusion
perpetua as the lesser penalty.

This contention is well taken. Since there is no question that Arlene Yupo was at the time of her illegal detention 18
years old and the guilt of the accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt, the accused-appellant is
not entitled to bail.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by sentencing the accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua. In all
other respects the decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.

The petition for bail of the accused-appellant is DENIED.


In accordance with the ruling in People v. Daniel 86 SCRA 511 (1979), let this case be forthwith elevated to the Supreme
Court for final determination. (Rollo, pp. 70-78).

A careful review of the original records of this case and of the briefs and various pleadings submitted on appeal shows
that the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals are correct. We adopt its decision as our own.

Considering the foregoing, the accused-appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The decision of the trial court is
affirmed in all other respects with costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

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