The Strategy & Tactics of World War II

Number 6

Greater East Asia War

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 The Strategy & Tactics of World War II

Number 6
Jun/Jul 2009

Features 6
6 The Greater East Asia War:
A Strategic Analysis
The Japanese take on China, America and the British Empire
in one of the most epic military campaigns in history.
by Joseph Miranda
21 Joachim von Ribbentrop: Imbecile or Foreign
Policy Colossus?
The Third Reich’s foreign minister is still a controversial figure:
did he single-handedly start World War II or was he merely a
pawn of Adolf Hitler?
by Blaine Taylor 21
33 Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean
Features

Theater of Operations 1939-45

Axis and Allied forces clash in a struggle for control of the
Mediterranean air and sea lanes.
by David Higgins

48 Med War Post-Mortem

Lost opportunities in the European Theater of Operation’s
33
greatest air-naval campaign.
by Joseph Miranda
52 Skorzeny Strikes: Coup in Budapest, 1944
As the Red Army approached Hungary, Hitler’s top
commando made a daring strike into Budapest and took
over the government.
by Kelly Bell
52

4 #6

WaW 6 Issue.indd 4 4/15/09 4:23:47 PM

 columns
20 Design Corner:
Greater East Asia War
Joseph Miranda
Publisher: Christopher Cummins
24 Game preview:
Editor: Ty Bomba
Arriba España! Assistant Editor: Joseph Miranda
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Design • Graphics • Layout: Callie
Behind the Lines: Cummins & Chris Cummins
Map Graphics: Meridian Mapping
A Calculated Risk
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 The Greater East Asia War:
A Strategic Analysis
By Joseph Miranda

Japanese formations are in italics, Allied in plain text.

World
War II in the Pacific comprised one of the largest campaigns in his-
tory, both in terms of geographic extent and the manpower engaged.
To the Western Allies, this vast arena was composed of the Pacific
Theater of Operations (PTO) and the China-Burma-India Theater of
Operations (CBI). The Japanese called the conflict that raged across those sea, land and airways Dai Toa Senso,
the Greater East Asia War.
During the years following World War I’s conclusion, there was debate within the Japanese ruling class over
their national strategy. The two main factions involved were centered on the high commands of the Imperial
Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). Both the IJA and IJN had considerable political power
and were in positions to dictate policy. The ascendancy of the military in Japan was in contrast to the situation in
the other major powers of the time. In the United States, Great Britain and France the military was subordinate to
civilian authority. In the USSR, Stalin had crushed all independence of thought in the Red Army with his purges.
Even Hitler had succeeded in bringing the Wehrmacht under his control. What all that indicates is Japanese strat-
egy for the coming war was—relatively speaking—uniquely dictated by military men for military objectives,
undiluted by conflicting political considerations.
The overall objectives of the Japanese strategists were in many ways a reflection of the geopolitic theories of
the time. Broadly, those theories called for the control of central landmasses and sea lanes that would, in turn,
make for much easier domination over even larger regions of the world. One such principle was termed “autarky,”
the control by an empire of sufficient resources to support its home industrial system.
6 #6

WaW 6 Issue.indd 6 4/15/09 4:23:50 PM

 In the 1920s the Japanese Empire consisted of not only
the Home Islands, but also Formosa and Korea along with
various smaller islands in the Pacific. Formosa had been
acquired as a result of Japan’s (1889-94) war with China,
Korea via coup and occupation in 1910, and the Pacific
islands seized from Germany during World War I. The
Japanese applied a ruthless policy of industrialization to
Korea and Formosa, and also took steps to suppress lo-
cal culture there. Among other things, Japanese colonists
were sent to those countries. In 1931, Japan moved into
Manchuria, which was until then part of China. They
established the satellite state of Manchukuo, though the
reins of power firmly in the hands of the Japanese Kwan-
tung Army, their garrison force. The Kwantung Army
command also represented yet another political force in
its own right, frequently setting policy on the Asian main-
land and interfering in decisions made in Tokyo.
WaW 6 Issue.indd 7
Despite those acquisitions, the Japanese Empire still
wasn’t economically self-sufficient. The critical shortages
were in petroleum and iron ore, both of which were vital
for sustaining an industrial economy and war machine. The
empire would have to further expand to gain self-sufficien-
cy. If nothing else, the growing land power of the Soviet
Union, as well as the potentially global reach of the United
States, meant Japan had to expand or face eventually being
relegated to minor-power status. The question that divided
the IJA from the IJN, then, was in which direction was that
expansion to take place.
The IJN looked south. It seemed to the admirals that
Japanese security would best be enhanced by seizing the
resource areas of the East Indies, which were rich in petro-
leum, and by seizing Pacific islands as bases against the ri-
val US. The IJA looked to East Asia. There the Soviet Union
was seen as the major threat with its ideology of commu-
World at War 7
4/15/09 4:23:53 PM
 nism that promoted international revolution, as well
as being a rival for control of Manchuria. The Sovi-
ets were also interfering in China, which the Japanese
saw as their own sphere of influence. Consequently,
there was an IJA faction that advocated war with the
USSR to remove the Soviet Union from the Far East.
They believed they could repeat the successful perfor-
mance against Russia from the 1904-05 war; however,
the border clash between the IJA and Red Army at
Khalkhyn Gol (Nomonhan) in mid-1939 demonstrat-
ed that wasn’t feasible. Soviet mechanized forces, un-
der the command of Georgi Zhukov, wrecked several
IJA infantry divisions. While Japanese soldiers fought
hard, they found samurai spirit was no substitute for
heavy tanks and artillery. As a result, Japan and the
USSR would maintain a mutual non-belligerence until
August 1945.
Ironically, during the 1930s the Soviets provided
military support to Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists in
China, even though the Nationalists were fiercely anti-
communist. That Soviet support was in part due to the
legacy of the radical history of Chiang’s Kuomintang
(KMT) Party, which under Sun Yat-sen had established
the first Chinese republic. More practically, Moscow
saw supporting Chiang as a means to counter Japa-
nese expansion on the Asian mainland. At that time,
the Kremlin was cool toward Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), seeing it as unorthodox in its
peasant-based ideology, and as a rival for control of
the banner of revolution. Stalin would later withdraw
Soviet support for Chiang as a result of the Nazi-So-
viet Pact of 1939, but that merely indicated the tenu-
ous state of diplomacy during the 1930s.
China Incident
On the night of 7-8 July 1937, someone opened
fire on Japanese troops conducting maneuvers near
the Marco Polo Bridge in Peking. Technically Japan
and China were at peace, though IJA troops occupied
Against the Co-Prosperity Sphere: Chinese troops attack.
8 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 8
parts of northern China to “protect” Japanese interests,
and such incidents weren’t uncommon. The Japanese
used the gunfire as an excuse to demand concessions
from the Chinese government, mainly recognition of
its control of Manchuria and expansion of the Japa-
nese sphere of influence into Inner Magnolia. Tokyo
expected the Chinese to fold under pressure, as had
happened before; however, this time around, Chiang
refused to back down. His recalcitrance caused con-
sternation in Tokyo.
The IJA faction wanted war, given that its strate-
gic direction was into the Asian mainland. There was
also the consideration of the larger military and po-
litical situations. Backing down in any confrontation
with China would endanger Japan’s broader position
in Asia, and might embolden Chiang to threaten other
Japanese holdings on the mainland. Further exacerbat-
ing the situation was the fact the IJA command inside
China was, like the Kwantung Army, quasi-indepen-
dent of Tokyo. If the central Japanese government at-
tempted to bring its China command under too tight a
control, it could threaten a coup or simply ignore such
orders.
The IJN faction opposed a land war in China. Such
a move didn’t suit the Navy’s needs, since it diverted
attention away from the Pacific and the southern re-
source area. The IJN faction leaders understood Ja-
pan lacked the industrial capacity for a protracted war
unless those resource areas were first secured. At the
same time, any major land war on the Asian mainland
would inevitably be an Army show, which would in
turn work to give the IJA faction more leverage in the
ongoing political struggle in Tokyo.
In the event, the IJA won out and the conflict with
China became open warfare-the Japanese termed it
the “China Incident.” That choice of terminology was
in part a propaganda move, to try to minimize the in-
ternational implications of their act of aggression. It
also reflected their larger strategy in that, if the whole
episode was restricted to being no more than an “in-
cident,” it could conceivably be brought to an end in
Japan’s favor by quick and correct moves. According-
ly, Japanese strategy against China was to use a com-
bination of military, political and diplomatic pressures
to force the Chinese government to recognize Tokyo’s
conquests.
On the military front the Japanese conducted a se-
ries of offensives intended to destroy China’s overall
ability to resist. They included seizing the traditional
capital city of Peking (Beijing) and grabbing port cit-
ies along the coast. What made the ports critical was,
by taking them, the Japanese could cut off the Chinese
military from its sources of outside supply. China it-
self produced little in the way of arms and military
equipment, and so an interdiction strategy could be ef-
fective. The Japanese followed up by taking Nanking,
the new Nationalist capital. The capture of those cities
4/15/09 4:23:54 PM
 also deprived the Chinese of much of their industrial
capacity.
At the same time, the Japanese set up satellite
governments with Chinese collaborators working for
them. While those collaborationist governments had
little real power, and even less legitimacy in the eyes
of the populace, they did reduce the need for the IJA to
garrison occupied areas. They also served to divide the
Chinese, given the kaleidoscope of factions, warlords,
secret societies and out-and-out bandits—not to men-
tion the Communist Party—which were warring for
the loyalties of the populace.
Finally, the Japanese attempted to negotiate direct-
ly with Chiang to bring the war to an end, though he
wasn’t interested in talking. China had been pushed
too far. More practically, had Chiang made any con-
cessions to Japanese demands, he would’ve lost his
position as chief claimant to power among the Na-
tionalists. By instead designating himself the embodi-
ment of Chinese resistance, he could rally support for
his own position, as well as undermine the power of
his various competitors—the chief of those being, of
course, Mao Tse-tung. That also put Chiang in posi-
tion to appeal to foreign powers for military assistance
and to control the arms sent by the friendly powers in
the West.
All that implied the Nationalists could successfully
resist the invaders, and Chiang initially ordered his
military to resist the Japanese attack. The Nationalist
army was large, but too many units lacked effective-
ness as well as equipment. Logistics were poor to non-
WaW 6 Issue.indd 9
existent. Still, Chiang had several divisions that were
well trained. (In another irony, the training for those
units had been conducted by German advisors be-
fore the Berlin-Tokyo alliance was solidified.) Those
units performed well, but the Japanese still managed
to destroy them at Shanghai and Nanking. With that,
Chiang began to apply the ancient strategy of trading
space for time. He fell back into central China, estab-
lishing a new provisional capital at Chungking.
The Communists also conducted military actions.
In late 1940, Mao launched the “100 Regiments Of-
fensive” to mobilize communist military and political
resources to attack the Japanese. The offensive initial-
ly gained some success, but the Japanese response was
swift and ruthless. The communists were beaten back
to their base areas. Even so, Mao had made his point
on the political front: the communists were a force to
be reckoned with and were also a claimant on the loy-
alty of the Chinese people.
Meanwhile the Chinese opened up new overland
supply routes. One of them ran through the French
colonies of Indochina, a railroad connecting to Viet-
nam. Another route was from Rangoon, the soon to
be famous Burma Road. Those routes would incite
the Japanese to further expansion into Southeast Asia
as they looked for the means to close them. The IJA
would close the Indochinese route when it occupied
that area in 1940, and the Burma Road was cut when
they overran that country in 1942.
Despite Japanese military victories, the Chinese
continued to resist. Chiang really had no choice. With
World at War 9
4/15/09 4:23:54 PM
 each Japanese offensive, more public outrage was
raised against the invaders. Moreover, the Japanese
had reached a point of diminishing returns. While they
could defeat Chinese forces in the field, policing cap-
tured territory had become another matter altogether.
The Japanese realized they couldn’t hold the entire
country, and so they concentrated instead on locking
down the cities and communication lines. The coun-
tryside would be left to assorted guerrillas and bandits.
When they became too troublesome, the IJA would be
sent on massive and destructive counter-guerilla op-
erations. Terrorization of the populace then came to
be used routinely as a tactic intended to break Chinese
will to resist. As usual, such terror had extreme results.
In some cases the shock demoralized the populace; in
others, it pushed more people into supporting the re-
sistance.
The Japanese had a problem; the “incident” had
clearly grown too large to be contained or ended
quickly. Chungking and much of the rest of China
remained beyond the reach of their ground force; so
they resorted to the new weapon of airpower. Their
British Empire Order of the Day
Issued on 8 December 1941, by Air Chief Marshal R. Brooke-
Popham (Commander-in-Chief, Far East) and Vice Adm. G.
Layton (Commander-in-Chief, China)
Japan’s action today gives the signal for the [British] Empire Naval,
Army and Air Forces, and those of our Allies, to go into action with a
common aim and common ideal.
We are ready. We have had plenty of warning and our preparations
are made and tested. We do not forget the years of patience and forbear-
ance in which we have borne, with dignity and discipline, the petty
insults and insolences inflicted on us by the Japanese in the Far East.…
Now, when Japan herself has decided to put the matter to a sterner test,
she will find out that she has made a grievous mistake…
We are confident. Our defences are strong and our weapons effi-
cient. Whatever our race, and whether we are now in our native land
or have come thousands of miles, we have one aim and one aim only.
It is to defend these shores, to destroy such of our enemies as may set
foot on our soil, and then, finally, to cripple the power of the enemy to
endanger our ideals, our possessions and our peace.
Imperial armor: Japanese tanks make a show of force.
10 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 10
bombers attacked Chinese cities in a vast campaign of
aerial warfare. Chiang’s air force rose to the defense,
while other actors also became increasingly involved.
During 1937-39, the Soviets provided large numbers
of aircraft to the Nationalists. There were also foreign
mercenaries, notably Claire Chennault, an American
fighter pilot who established an air warning and de-
fense system for Chiang. Chennault went on to be-
come a major player in China’s war, but that was later,
after the US had openly entered the fight.
Allies
Britain was the major colonial power in Asia, with
its vast holdings stretching from the emirates of the
Persian Gulf (vital for controlling the petroleum fields
there), through India and Burma and on to Malaya,
Singapore and northern Borneo. In the South Pacific,
the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand were
also regional powers, populated largely by the descen-
dants of British colonists. The Netherlands held the
East Indies, a vast archipelago the IJN faction looked
on as a must-have resource area. France controlled
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which were among its
most profitable of colonies. The US held the Philip-
pines as a result of its victory in the Spanish-American
War of 1898.
Taken altogether, those colonies seemingly made
up a formidable counterbalance against the Japanese,
until actual events turned around the geo-strategic
situation. On 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Po-
land, which touched off World War II in Europe. In the
following year the Germans overran western Europe.
The capitulation of both France and the Netherlands
had major implications for the overall Allied position
in the Far East. Both French Indochina and the Dutch
East Indies were placed in precarious political and
military straits. With their home countries German oc-
cupied, neither colony could expect much in the way
of assistance, nor were they left in a political position
from which they could actively work with the British
Empire. That situation was made all the worse when
Japan occupied Indochina in September 1940.
One of the key British positions in Southeast Asia
was the fortress-city of Singapore, which they’d pro-
moted as the great symbol of their power in the Far
East. In fact, as long as the French and Dutch colo-
nies were actively defended, Singapore could serve as
a linchpin for a larger Allied strategy. Any Japanese
offensive would have to first engage the defenses of
Indochina and the East Indies. While that was going
on, Singapore could be reinforced and used as the base
for a counter-offensive.
With the collapse of the continental European pow-
ers, however, Singapore became a lone colonial out-
post, effectively thrust out in front of what remained
of the Allied position in Southeast Asia. With the Japa-
nese establishing bases in Indochina, their air and na-
4/15/09 4:23:59 PM
 World at War 11

WaW 6 Issue.indd 11 4/15/09 4:24:02 PM

 val power were within striking range of Singapore. In-
deed, it would be Indochinese-based Japanese planes
that would sink the Royal Navy’s Prince of Wales and
Repulse in Malayan waters. Exacerbating the situation
still further, Thailand (Siam) became an ally of Japan.
The Japanese could thus march from Indochina down
the Malay peninsula, as well as into Burma and toward
India. Singapore was now outflanked by air, sea and
land.
The British problem was that, once having made
propaganda out of the importance of Singapore, they
couldn’t abandon it. So, as 1940 turned into 1941 and
the empires moved toward war, the British continued
to reinforce the fortress-city, effectively putting more
manpower and equipment into what had become little
more than a strategic trap.
War in Asia
The events of 7 December 1941 are well known
(in Asia the date of the Japanese attack was 8 Decem-
ber owing to the International Date Line). In the en-
suing weeks the Japanese seized Malaya, Singapore,
the Dutch East Indies and Burma, as well as numerous
islands in the Pacific. By mid-1942, then, the Japanese
had seemingly succeeded in gaining their strategic ob-
jectives. They’d conquerored Southeast Asia and the
Dutch East Indies, and had established a chain of is-
land bases across the Pacific. The question in Tokyo
then became what to do next, which was where Japa-
nese strategy started to go even further awry than had
already occurred in China. Tokyo had expected the
Western Allies to respond to Japanese victories by ne-
gotiating a peace that would recognize their conquests.
Instead, the US mobilized to fight a total war and win
a total victory. The Japanese were then faced with a
protracted naval-air war across the Pacific, and all on
top of their land war in Asia.
Nonetheless, the Japanese thought they were ready
for a Pacific war. They would use their island bases
to stage airpower that would reduce Allied naval in-
cursions, and then launch the IJN against surviving
intruders for the decisive naval battle—a battle they
expected would win the war for them. Meanwhile the
Southern Resource Area would provide the raw ma-
terials to fuel the Japanese war machine. If the war
couldn’t be ended in Japan’s favor in 1942, the Allies
could still be stopped later if the costs of winning were
made too high for them. Of course, that strategy failed.
One reason was the attack on Pearl Harbor mobilized
the American public behind the war effort to a degree
never seen before or since.
On the Asian mainland the British Empire was
faced with inescapable issues. Having been driven out
of Burma, Malaya, and especially, Singapore by the
Japanese, the British weren’t willing to simply pack
up and go home. London looked to restore its pre-war
position in the postwar world after a presumed victory
12 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 12
in Asia, and could do so only by militarily re-conquer-
ing the areas lost in 1941-42. Anything else would be
an admission the British Empire was no longer a force
to be reckoned with across the region. Britain also had
to consider its relations with Australia and New Zea-
land. With the Japanese moving into New Guinea and
the Solomon islands in 1942, Australia recalled its best
units from North Africa and began reorienting its de-
fenses toward the Pacific threat. Like it or not, Britain
was faced with a global war and had to fight for Asia.
Consequently, the Allies formed a new theater of op-
erations for the land war in Asia called China-Burma-
India (CBI). It would become one of the largest Allied
commands of World War II.
Japan found itself fighting a major war in Pacific
waters, but its long-run objectives remained on the
Asian mainland and in the Dutch East Indies. The Jap-
anese therefore reluctantly had to commit large forces
to the Pacific, even though it proved futile. The Pacific
War was a war of machines and industrial capacity—
airplanes, ships, fuel. Related to fuel was training, es-
pecially of pilots, whose aircraft consumed inordinate
amounts of petroleum products. American industrial
capabilities far exceeded the Japanese, and the US was
self-sufficient in oil production. The Japanese could
deploy large amounts of land power—in World War
II the IJA would organize more divisions than the US
Army—but because of superior American sea and air
power, those divisions couldn’t be deployed in suffi-
cient concentration to counter the US advance across
the Pacific.
What happened, then, was the Japanese ended up
being forced to transfer many of their forces—espe-
cially veteran air units—from Manchuria, China and
Southeast Asia as reinforcements for the air battles
fought over the Solomons and elsewhere. The ensu-
ing battles of attrition over the Pacific destroyed the
Japanese trained aircrew. They also depleted Japanese
airpower in the CBI, even though it was there that
Japanese airpower held at least parity with the Allied
air forces until late 1943. Given the IJA also still had
an edge over the Allied ground forces in that theater
into 1944, the diversion of airpower was what initially
turned the military balance in Southeast Asia to the Al-
lied side. As will be seen, the 1944 Japanese offensive
into India failed in no small part due to their lack of air
cover.
Burma or China?
On the Allied side there was debate over strategy
for the CBI. The British, given their imperial interests,
wanted to launch a counter-offensive to retake Burma
and Malaya as soon as possible. The US, given its re-
lationship with Chiang Kai-shek and American public
opinion, was more interested in China.
For both the British and Americans, however, the
CBI had to be kept low on the list of global military
4/15/09 4:24:03 PM
 The Japanese
The reasons for the Japanese successes in 1941-42 can
be summarized as follows.
Planning & Organization. The IJA deployed an army to
seize each major objective. Each army was actually the
size of a reinforced American or British corps, with two
to four divisions. They were further reinforced with en-
gineer and transport units that efficiently moved forward
the whole effort, circumventing the usual barriers of
jungles and waterways.
Training. In the opening phase of the war, Japanese land,
air and naval forces were at a superb peak of training.
Small-unit leadership was good and morale was high. In
contrast, many of the Allied formations they were facing
were made up of poorly trained soldiers. Japanese pilots
were at peak efficiency, owing to a rigorous pre-war se-
lection and training process.
Speed. The Japanese exploited sea power to move forma-
tions quickly to target areas. On land, Japanese forces
also moved quickly, often outflanking and taking enemy
positions prior to the Allies being able to react. Japanese
tactics relied on infiltration to penetrate enemy defenses.
That was especially useful in Southeast Asia, where the
jungle terrain and wide frontages made it difficult for
more conventional Allied forces to hold a line.
Airpower. Both the IJA and IJN maintained air services, and
they proved to be of inestimable value in concentrating
combat power against what would otherwise have been
superior enemy defenses. Airpower was also useful in in-
terdicting enemy naval movement and countering Allied
sea power in the opening stage of the campaign. Also
useful were Japanese airborne troops, who were landed
to quickly seize critical objectives.
WaW 6 Issue.indd 13
Good Leadership. Commanders such as Tomoyuki Yamashi-
ta (the “Tiger of Malaya,” whose Twenty-Fifth Army took
Singapore in February 1942) understood the strengths
of their own forces and exploited the vulnerabilities of
their enemies. Even late in the war, Japanese command-
ers were flexible enough to call off operations that were
proving counter-productive.
Psychological Factors. Prior to the outbreak of the war,
many Western observers dismissed the military potential
of the Japanese; so the quick succession of Japanese vic-
tories proved a shock. Suddenly the Japanese appeared
as invincible warriors. Adding to that new image was
Japanese propaganda calling for a pan-Asian uprising
against the colonial powers. The Japanese promised a
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere that would ben-
efit all Asian peoples economically, though in practice,
it would turn into a brutal system for Japanese exploita-
tion of resources. Still, when the Japanese first invaded
Malaya and Burma there were desertions among Brit-
ish Empire formations composed of local troops. The
Japanese carrier raid into the Indian Ocean in March and
April 1942 also did much to force the British onto the de-
fensive in the Far East, via the communication of a major
threat of India itself, even though the Japanese actually
lacked the capacity to conduct a serious invasion of the
subcontinent.
World at War 13
4/15/09 4:24:04 PM
 New Asia? Japanese allies march.
War & Politics
The political situation in British India was complex during World War
II. To mobilize sufficient public support in India to maintain the war effort,
the British had to promise independence would be granted after the war.
Critics might ask that, if India was to become independent, what was the
point of fighting the war in Asia in the first place? One answer was there
was sufficient reason in simply having a friendly Indian government in the
planned-for postwar Commonwealth. Indian soldiers were also fighting
in the European theater of operations, so independence would give them
something tangible to fight for. In any event, the issue couldn’t be side-
stepped. In India itself the British had to contend with a growing indepen-
dence movement that had crystallized around leaders such as Mohandas
Gandhi.
The Japanese also tried to exploit that sentiment by organizing an In-
dian National Army (INA, Azad Hind Fauj in Hindi), intending it to lead
an uprising against the British. The INA was one of several such armies the
Japanese organized to be spearheads in a pan-Asian uprising against the
Europeans, but the Japanese never actually had much enthusiasm for those
forces. While Japan wanted to throw out the Europeans, Tokyo planned
to establish its own empire in their place. Large satellite armed forces
couldn’t be relied on and, as was to be demonstrated in the final months
of the war, many of the collaborating soldiers defected to the Allies once
the tide had clearly turned. Nonetheless, movements such as the INA were
effective as propaganda weapons, and the Japanese tried to further ex-
ploit such sentiments via the concept of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere. That was supposed to be a pan-Asian union, intended to raise the
overall economic level of the region. The Sphere garnered some interest
among colonial peoples, though the concept fell flat in China and other
areas that were actually under the Japanese boot.
One colony that proved a hotbed of anti-Japanese resistance was the
Philippines. That was in large part due to pre-war American plans to grant
those islands independence. Macarthur’s paternalistic but even-handed
tenure that, among other things, built up a Philippine military, also did
much to create the cadre for anti-Japanese guerillas once the islands were
overrun. In Japanese occupied Vietnam, part of French Indochina, a na-
tionalist movement rose under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh.
14 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 14
priorities. Logistics and major reinforcements were
first needed to fight the all-critical war in Europe. It
took the British into late 1943 to build up a sufficient
logistical infrastructure in northeast India to properly
support any major offensive.
Meanwhile the US developed its own strategy for
China. They appointed Joseph “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell
as commander of the CBI as well as chief of staff to
Chiang. Stilwell had his own ideas on how the war
was to be fought. He believed China could become
a decisive theater in which the IJA could be engaged
and defeated. How that was to be done, exactly, wasn’t
clear. Large numbers of US ground forces weren’t
available to fight in China, nor could they have been
kept well supplied even if committed.
Stilwell’s plan, then, was to train up Nationalist di-
visions and equip them with modern weaponry. More
specifically, his idea was to form a 30-division Chinese
force that could fight the Japanese on even terms. The
problem was the Chinese weren’t cooperating. Chi-
ang, as did most Chinese leaders, had another agenda:
emerging with sufficient military strength to gain su-
premacy in the expected postwar struggle for power.
Consequently the Nationalists considered it better to
stockpile arms rather than expend them in combat.
Of course, Chiang had tried openly challenging the
Japanese at the start of the war, but that had only led
to defeat. Politically, he couldn’t afford another such
military catastrophe. Even so, some Chinese divisions
were trained by the Americans, and were put to good
use along the Chinese-Burmese frontier, but there
were never enough to make a strategic difference.
Adding to Stilwell’s problem was the logistical sit-
4/15/09 4:24:05 PM
 uation, this time in China itself. Railroads were poor,
paved roads were largely non-existent, and most facto-
ries were under enemy control. With the Japanese tak-
ing the Burma Road in early 1942, the only supply line
to China was via cargo aircraft that flew from bases
in India to southwestern China. That was the famous
“Hump,” the air route over the eastern Himalayas and
one of the greatest aerial supply efforts in history.
As it became clear Allied land power wasn’t going
to win against the Japanese in China any time soon,
it was then thought airpower could do the job (an Al-
lied strategy shift similar to the one the Japanese made
at the end of the 1930s). Just before the Pearl Harbor
attack, Chennault had brought to Burma a group of
mercenary pilots called the American Volunteer Group
(AVG), more famously known as the Flying Tigers.
The AVG had actually been covertly funded by the US
government as a means to counter Japanese ambitions
in China but, with the Pearl Harbor attack, Chennault
could operate his group openly. During the Japanese
advance into Burma, then, the Tigers flew repeated The ‘Old Man’: Gen. Chennault.
missions alongside the Royal Air Force (RAF), inflict-
ing grievous damage on the intruders before falling Chennault’s raiders and decided to take decisive action
back to India. From there, Chennault’s command was against them. In April 1944 they launched Operation
reorganized and sent back to China as the US Four- ICHI-GO, a new offensive in China that soon overran
teenth Air Force. the Fourteenth Air Force’s bases. ICHI-GO continued
well into 1945.
Chennault’s plan to win the war in Asia was sim-
ple. Fourteenth Air Force should get priority on sup- ICHI-GO indicated that, whatever the strategy the
plies flown in via the Hump. He would then start an Allies employed in China, the Japanese still held the
aerial offensive against the Japanese, first gaining air initiative in that country. Superficially, the situation on
superiority, then launching bombers against Japanese the Chinese front seemed to have some analogy with
communications and depots, thereby neutralizing their that of Germany’s position on the Russian front. In
ground force in China. Later in the war, heavy bomb- both cases, a major Axis power had tied down the ma-
ers could be brought in that could attack Japan directly jority of its land forces against an enemy too numer-
from bases in China. ous to be defeated and whose country was too large to
be overrun. The analogy doesn’t really extend much
In retrospect, Chennault made some wildly ex- further than that surface comparison. The Chinese
travagant claims for airpower. That was all the more were divided and lacked a military effective enough
odd given his earlier successful experience organiz- to challenge the Japanese. While the Russian front
ing fighter defenses that demonstrated how intruding
bombers could be stopped. At the time, though, be-
cause of the lack of options within the overall Allied
situation, he gained support for his offensive air war.
Chiang saw such a campaign as an alternative that
spared his divisions from having to fight the Japanese
and preserved them for the expected postwar political
struggle. It might also take the pressure off the Chinese
cities that were under attack from Japanese airpower.
At the same time, the media glamour of the Flying Ti-
gers created enthusiasm for Chennault in the United
States.
Stilwell, among others, objected that without ef-
fective land forces, no ground could actually be re-
taken and the Japanese would continue to hold all
they’d seized. As events demonstrated, he would be
proven largely correct. Fourteenth Air Force lacked
the aircraft to win a decisive aerial victory over the Objective Burma:
Japanese. At the same time, the Japanese got tired of Gen. Slim
World at War 15

WaW 6 Issue.indd 15 4/15/09 4:24:07 PM

 would prove a catastrophic drain on the Wehrmacht, the
situation was the opposite for the IJA in China. From
1941 to 1944, the front in China saw little in the way of
major military operations. The Japanese were even able
to arrange truces with the communists and warlords at
various times. They were also able to bring some Chi-
nese forces under control of their satellite government.
When the Japanese launched major offensives in China,
they were either against guerrillas or were short and
sharp enough to gain victories, after which the Japanese
would stop to consolidate and refit.
16 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 16
It wasn’t until August 1945 the Japanese would
face a serious military threat in China, and that was
in Manchukuo, when the Soviets launched their offen-
sive into the theater. By that time Japan had been effec-
tively defeated owing to events in the Pacific, though
Moscow would later claim it had been its offensive
that caused Tokyo to capitulate. While that claim was
largely propaganda, there was also some measure of
truth in it insofar as the loss of Manchuria meant the
loss of one of Japan’s major industrial regions.
4/15/09 4:24:11 PM
 Chindits, Imphal & Singapore
Late in 1942 London put pressure on its Southeast
Asia Command (SEAC) to get something done in
Burma, which resulted in the abortive Arakan cam-
paign. In that operation, a division-sized British force
fought its way into Burma and retook some territory,
but the Japanese counterattacked, cutting up the Brit-
ish and restoring the front. The defeat demonstrated
that, at that time, the British lacked sufficient land and
air forces, as well as the logistics, to sustain a major
offensive in Southeast Asia.
If conventional divisions couldn’t win, though, it
was then hoped unconventional forces could. Orde
Wingate, a maverick British officer, put together the
“Chindits,” a brigade-sized (later division-sized) task
force trained to conduct commando operations deep
behind enemy territory. There were two major Chindit Gen.Tsuitsui confers with his officers.
expeditions in 1943, both of which caused havoc be-
hind Japanese lines. Both also received much acclaim Army, commanded by Gen. William Slim, held firm.
on the Allied home fronts. Clearly, Wingate had ac- Using aerial transport, Slim kept the isolated positions
complished something where the regular generals had supplied, and the Japanese attacks against them were
failed. repulsed. Conventional relief forces then marched in
and routed the overextended Japanese.
The British command in India viewed the Chin-
dits less positively, though, because the manpower U-GO failed because it was poorly planned and
required to build those units used up the equivalent of abysmally supported. Logistics were primitive. The
two good divisions at a time when well-trained units troops were first told to use elephants for transport and
were in short supply. Further, the Chindits required an then, when the rations ran out, to eat the poor beasts.
enormous logistical effort to sustain them behind ene- Several of the operation’s senior commanders openly
my lines. They were flown in via gliders and then sup- stated the plan was idiotic from the start. (Indeed, the
ported through advanced aerial resupply points. The Japanese command had rejected a plan for the inva-
drain on air cargo capabilities was especially critical, sion of India in 1942 as being logistically impractical.)
given aerial supply was a necessity all across the CBI What ultimately killed U-GO, though, was the lack of
owing to the lack of ground based lines of communi- Japanese airpower. The air units that had led the way
cation. While the short-term accomplishments of the in 1941-42, and that challenged the RAF in the skies
Chindits were impressive, in the longer term they were over northeastern India in 1942-43, had long since
really just diverting resources away from the planned- been transferred to other theaters. U-GO therefore
for final counteroffensive. lacked aerial reconnaissance and air cover, and Japa-
nese ground units were regularly strafed and bombed
One thing the British did to prepare for their South-
by Allied air forces. Allied aircraft could also fly into
east Asia counter-offensive was training their divisions
besieged garrisons such as Imphal to resupply them.
to fight efficiently in jungles and mountains. Several
July saw the Japanese throw in the towel on U-GO,
light divisions were organized, which had more mo-
with the remnants of their divisions staggering back to
bile equipment, fewer motor vehicles, some mule
Burma.
transport, and organic long-range reconnaissance de-
tachments. This time around the British-Indian Army Meanwhile the US was finishing up one of the
wouldn’t be caught fighting unprepared on terrain greatest engineering feats of the entire war, the build-
that favored the enemy. Those preparations took time, ing of the Ledo Road, which ran from northeastern In-
however, and time was running out in the CBI. dia into China. It ran over some of the roughest terrain
in the world, and in some stretches it even skirted the
The increasing British activity on the Burma front
Japanese rear area. It was finally finished in January
then worked to attract the attention of the Japanese
1945, when truck convoys began hazarding the trip to
high command. They put together Operation U-GO,
bring supplies into China.
to run concurrently with ICHI-GO. U-GO’s objec-
tive was to seize the British bases on the Indian fron- The destruction of Japanese forces in U-GO finally
tier, thereby forestalling any offensive into Burma. It opened the way for the British to launch their long
kicked off on 15 March 1944, with Japanese columns expected offensive. The Japanese by then lacked both
quickly infiltrating the frontier and laying siege to the ground and airpower to resist. They abandoned
British positions at Imphal and Kohima. The situation their forward positions in Burma and fell back toward
seemed perilous, but the British-Indian Fourteenth Siam while the Allies pursued. Meanwhile a combined
World at War 17

WaW 6 Issue.indd 17 4/15/09 4:24:12 PM

 Australian-US amphibious force landed in the Dutch
East Indies. With Japanese naval power long since de-
stroyed, there was no effective opposition.
The British planned an amphibious-airborne attack
to liberate Malaya and Singapore, Operation Zipper,
which was executed after a fashion at the time of Ja-
pan’s surrender on 15 August 1945. With Japanese in
Southeast Asia collapsing, the colonial powers rushed
back to try to reestablish control. That led to some
anomalous situations, such as the British rearming
Japanese prisoners of war to maintain order in Indo-
china, but the mystique of European power had been
shattered.
Winners & Losers
Which side, then, can claim victory on the Asian
mainland in World War II? The Allies indisputably
won the overall war against Japan, but the Japanese
still held much of China and Southeast Asia on V-J
Day. Indeed, had Japan itself not surrendered, those
holdings could have conceivably been used as a base
from which the war could have been indefinitely con-
tinued. In China the Japanese were still able to launch
ground offensives into early 1945. The Allied victory
came elsewhere, from the largely US drive across the
Pacific, and with the American strategic bombing and
submarine campaigns, all of which isolated the Japa-
nese home islands, pretty much according to earlier
“War Plan Orange” projections.
The Japanese held the Southern Resource Area un-
til the final months of the war, but those resources had
only a marginal impact on Japanese industry. That was
due in part to their inability to efficiently exploit those
resources. For example, the Japanese were never able
to restore East Indies petroleum production to prewar
levels. Even when they could extract the resources, US
naval supremacy and the submarine campaign made it
difficult to ship large amounts of raw materials back to
Japan.
18 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 18
In China the US objective had been to support
an independent ally, working through Chiang Kai-
shek. The war ended with China as divided as ever
and, with the withdrawal of the Japanese, hostilities
between the Nationalists and communists broke into
the open. The ensuing Chinese Civil War would see
a communist victory in 1949 and a vast alteration in
the Asian power system. Mao Tse-tung’s strategy of
peasant-based insurgency then became the model for
many of the guerilla wars that would rage in the ensu-
ing decades. The British, French and Dutch empires
in Asia disappeared within a decade of the end of the
war. The United States became the dominant power in
the Pacific and along the Asian periphery. All that was
a result of the Greater East Asia War.
at
References
Dunnigan, James & Albert Nofi. The Pacific War Encyclopedia. New
York: Checkmark, 1998.
Dear, I.C.B. The Oxford Companion to World War II. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995.
Hayashi, Saburo, Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War. Quan-
tico: Marine Corps Association, 1959.
Kirby, Maj. Gen. S. Woodburn. The War against Japan, vols. I - V. Lon-
don: H. M. Stationery’s Office, 1969.
Romanus, Charles & Riley Sunderland. US Army in World War II:
Times Runs Out in CBI. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
Military history, 1959.
U.S. War Department. Handbook on Japanese Military Forces. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1991 (reprint of 1944 edition).
4/15/09 4:24:13 PM
 Cross the sweeping Asian continent.

The wargame featured in this issue is Joseph

Miranda’s Greater East Asia War, which uses the
much-liked system he pioneered in his earlier Twi-
light of the Ottomans: World War I in the Middle
East design in Strategy & Tactics magazine.
Greater East Asia War (GEAW) is a two-player,
intermediate-complexity, strategic-level simulation
of the World War II campaigns waged across China
and Southeast Asia.
Each hex on the 34x22” map represents 74.5
miles (120 kilometers) from side to opposite side.
The map extends from Korea and Manchuria in
the north to Indonesia in the south, to the Ganges
River delta and Mongolia on the west. Each turn
represents three months. Units of maneuver are
corps, armies, divisions and brigades, and they’re
presented in the form of 176 large-size, NATO-
style counters, with the following types: infantry,
light infantry, garrison, armor, mechanized, ma-
rines, airborne, special operations, cavalry, fortress,
headquarters, tactical airbases, strategic airbases,
supply, naval bombardment task forces, carrier task
forces, and amphibious task forces.
The concept of “victory points” (VP) is central
to play of the game. Players begin each scenario
with a designated number of them. They expend
them to gain reinforcements and carry out actions.
They gain new VP as a result of achieving objec-
tives; they lose VP when they lose units in combat.
To win the game you must have more VP than your
opponent, so play becomes a balancing act between
expending VP and attaining objectives.

To purchase the game that covers the battles featured in

this issue send your name and address along with:
$26 US Customers
$32 Canadian Customers All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping.
$34 Overseas Customers CA residents add $1.65 sales tax. Send to:
Decision Games
ATTN: S&T Game Offer
PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
World at War 19

WaW 6 Issue.indd 19 4/15/09 4:24:17 PM

 Greater East Asia War
By Joseph Miranda
World War II in the Far East is usually thought of
as a naval-air-amphibious war, owing to the nature of
the fighting in the Pacific from Pearl Harbor to Oki-
nawa. But the largest number of troops on both sides
were actually engaged on the Asian mainland, from
Manchuria to India. Japan was fighting the Pacific War
in large part to secure the resources of Southeast Asia,
especially petroleum, which were a prerequisite for
running a war economy. They were also trying to win
their war in China. The British, Dutch and French also
had empires in Southwest and Southeast Asia.
The land war in Asia involved numerous types of
combat, from armored clashes to special operations
raids, with the infantry often slogging through some of
the worst terrain in the world, and it was fought out on
a geographic scale equal to that of the Eastern Front in
Europe. That epic clash became the genesis of Greater
East Asia War (GEAW). One thing that made the game
so interesting to design is both sides had opportunities
to attack and defend. You had the stunning Japanese
offensive of late 1941 and 1942 that overran Southeast
Asia and reached the Indian frontier, as well as seizing
the Dutch East Indies. By late 1942 the Allies were
launching counteroffensives, while as late as 1945 the
Design Corner
Japanese were still able to take territory in China.
The game system is based on that of Twilight of the
Ottomans, which I also designed for S&T, but I modi-
fied it to account for advances in doctrine between the
two World Wars. GEAW uses a double-impulse sys-
tem, in which players have two opportunities to move
and fight in each turn. That represents the increases
in mobility and command control that were in place
by 1941. Even so, you have to expend supply to use
second phases. Logistics remain as critical as ever.
The victory point (VP) system for mobilizing units
allowed me to overcome a common problem of strate-
gic games, that of reinforcements. Given the time and
space scales, a fixed reinforcement schedule would
make little sense. Both sides sent in reinforcements
based on many factors: pressure from the high com-
mand to initiate offensives, response to enemy moves,
mobilization of local forces, etc. By paying VP to get
new units, players have a hand in those decisions. It
also allows for play strategies in which you choose
how much you want to risk.
20 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 20
In many ways the CBI (China-Burma-India The-
ater, as it is called in the US), was an air-land cam-
paign. Some commanders, such as US Gen. Chennault
of Flying Tigers fame, thought airpower alone could
win the war. They were exaggerating the effectiveness
of World War II air forces, but they weren’t far from
the mark. Air forces are modeled in the game at theater
level, representing major concentrations of airpower.
Airpower can do two basic things: provide ground sup-
port and conduct airlift. I avoided the usual intricacies
of an air war game to give players the overall impact
of airpower. The optional rules provide more air mis-
sions, but they’re still within the scope of a campaign
game.
The order of battle was easy to research. Among
others, I used John Ellis’s World War II Statistical
Survey, the British official history, The War Against
Japan, and Saburo Hayashi’s Kogun. One thing re-
quiring further research was the disposition of the Jap-
anese navy’s land-based aviation, special naval land-
ing forces, and base defense forces, since they weren’t
included in the Army orders of battle.
You win the game with VP. The critical thing is
you accumulate VP on a turn by turn basis. That repre-
sents the accumulation of resources (for the Japanese)
that could be used to support the overall war effort, or
(for the Allies) maintaining morale, especially to keep
China in the war. Since you get VP at the end of each
turn, players have a reason to fight over objectives that
might otherwise make little military sense, as well as
holding on to them as long as possible.
So that’s GEAW. We have some variants in the
works for future issues, including an expansion to
cover the various actions between the Japanese and
Soviets in Manchuria.
4/15/09 4:24:19 PM
 Joachim von Ribbentrop:
Imbecile or Foreign Policy Colossus?
By Blaine Taylor

German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop with aides

during the Second World War. (Photo by Walter Frentz.)

Maligned as “Brickendrop” in British propaganda,
Joachim von Ribbentrop was also ridiculed as a vain,
pompous and glory-seeking imbecile in a spate of bi-
ographies, diaries, letters, trial transcripts and mem-
oirs by leaders, field marshals, generals and diplomats
from both the Allied camp and his own Axis Pact part-
ners during and after the war. He was also, however,
one of the major foreign affairs practitioners of the
Nazi epoch.
In a life full of ironies, he was one of the first of
the top Nazi leaders to have a full-scale biography
written about him, in 1943: This Man Ribbentrop:
His Life and Times, by Paul Schwarz, a disgruntled
former Foreign Office official who’d served with him
in Berlin. His autobiography, The Ribbentrop Mem-
oirs—written between 25 August and 23 September
1946, in his Nuremberg jail cell as he awaited hang-
ing as a convicted war criminal—appeared with added
material from his widow in 1954. From that date until
1992—as every other top Nazi leader was profiled in
a seemingly unending series of biographies—Ribben-
trop, who Adolf Hitler called his “second Bismarck,”
remained virgin territory to authors. That changed,
however, with the appearance that year of two excel-
lent biographies: Hitler’s Diplomat: The Life & Times
of Joachim von Ribbentrop, by the late John Weitz,
and Ribbentrop by Michael Bloch.
Many have wondered why Hitler picked him as the
Third Reich’s second foreign minister on 4 February
1938, in a move that surprised both Ribbentrop and
his contemporaries. Part of the answer lay in fact Rib-
bentrop was well-traveled—far more so than almost
anyone else in the top leadership cadre, especially
Hitler himself—having journeyed to London, Rome,
Paris and New York before his appointment, and to
Moscow and all the Axis Pact capitals except Tokyo
afterward. (As regards the latter, during the war he ac-
tually planned to get there either by long-range Luft-
waffe aircraft or by U-boat, but the mission was then
forbidden by Hitler as too dangerous.)
Moreover, his rivals both within and without Ger-
many had reason to be jealous of Ribbentrop because
of the number of positions he held in succession and
the success he achieved while in them. They included
World at War 21

WaW 6 Issue.indd 21 4/15/09 4:24:20 PM

 being head of the Nazi Party’s “Ribbentrop [foreign
affairs] Bureau,” outside the regular Foreign Ministry
during 1934-38, Special Commissioner for Disarma-
ment Questions during 1934-35—in which post he
managed to have signed the landmark Anglo-Ger-
man Naval Treaty on 18 June 1935, something no one
thought he could accomplish—and Ambassador to
Great Britain in 1936-38.
In his final posting as foreign minister, Ribbentrop
negotiated and signed the most crucial treaty of the
entire prewar period, the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggres-
sion Pact of August 1939. That document gave the
green light to the joint German-Soviet invasion of
Poland that launched the Second World War. In 1946
he insisted that treaty was his “very own idea,” not
Hitler’s. He also negotiated the Anti-Comintern Pact
of 1936, which brought imperial Japan into the Ger-
man orbit for the first time, the pact with Fascist Italy
on 22 May 1939, and his grand finale, the Tripartite
Pact of 27 September 1940, which tied into one al-
liance Germany, Italy and Japan. Taken together or
viewed singly, then, those were no mean feats, for any
diplomat of any regime, no matter how loathsome, in
any era. Even so, for his part in all those treaties, Rib-
bentrop was convicted and hanged by the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg on 16 October
1946, at age 54.
Ribbentrop was born at Wesel on the Rhine River
on 30 April 1893. The offspring of several generations
of soldiers, he first became interested in foreign affairs
when he chanced to see Kaiser Wilhelm II and King
Edward VII of England during the latter’s state visit to
imperial Germany in 1909.
Stalin and Ribbentrop at the signing of the
Non-Aggression Pact, 23 August 1939.
22 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 22
Before spending the years 1910-14 in Canada,
young Ribbentrop—he only later purchased the title of
“von” from a relative—made a trip to London. He al-
ways felt an affinity for the might, majesty and power
of the British Empire, he asserted, even in prison at the
end. He considered it the extreme irony of his life that
he was viewed as having hated England so much he
advised Hitler wrongly she wouldn’t fight in 1939 on
behalf of Poland.
In the New World, he worked for 18 months as
a bank clerk in Montreal, was a bridge construction
worker in Quebec and, despite having to spend time
in a hospital to have a kidney removed, spent sever-
al months in New York City, where he worked as a
reporter (he was fluent in both English and French).
“I seriously considered being a violinist,” he later re-
called wistfully, and also rode, hunted, played tennis,
skied and bobsledded during the 18 months he lived in
Switzerland. When WWI broke out in August 1914,
Ribbentrop thought it his duty to return home from
Canada for military service, but later lamented in his
jail cell memoirs: “What if I had stayed?”
When his ship was stopped at sea, he first hid in a
coal bunker and then talked his way out of wartime in-
ternment as an enemy alien when he was found. Back
home, he avoided a medical examination that might
have found him unable to serve due to his missing kid-
ney, and thus joined the “Blue Hussars” at Torgau.
Ribbentrop saw combat action on fronts both east
and west, and was awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class
for valor under fire. (He proudly noted in his memoirs
that four generations of his family had received that
coveted medal, including his son Rudolf, a Waffen SS
panzer officer in World War II.)
The end of the war and the unexpected defeat of the
Second Reich came as a complete shock to Ribben-
trop: “We officers considered it especially humiliating
that our [imperial era] epaulettes should be replaced
by [Weimar era] blue stripes,” he later noted.
Working at the War Ministry in the armistice peri-
od, 1st Lt. Ribbentrop helped prepare for the Versailles
Peace Conference that he and Hitler later did so much
to dismantle. In 1919 he resigned his commission and
joined the Berlin branch of an old firm of cotton im-
porters, a job in which he could put his foreign con-
tacts to good use. “The owners soon granted me pow-
er of attorney,” he remembered, and his success was
crowned on 5 July 1920 by the fortuitous marriage to
the wealthy heiress of the still well known and pros-
perous wine and champagne firm, Annelies Henkell.
He met Hitler for the first time at Berchtesgaden on
13 August 1932 and, as a result, immediately joined
the Nazi Party. He also soon took a place among the
inner ranks of those working to have Hitler named
chancellor.
Far from being the “yes man” his enemies termed
him, Hitler himself described Ribbentrop as “his most
4/15/09 4:24:20 PM
 difficult subordinate.” That was because he argued to
moderate the Nazis’ policy toward the Jews—both for
“humanity’s sake,” he wrote, and because it made Ger-
many look bad in the eyes of the world—and also for
trying to end the war with the USSR after the twin
disasters of Stalingrad and Kursk in 1943, when it be-
came clear the Third Reich would lose.
During what he called the “critical years of 1935-
36,” Ribbentrop sought in vain, he asserted, to arrange
personal meetings between Hitler and the leaders of
France and England. That finally occurred in Septem-
ber 1938 at Munich, but by then the chance for alli-
ances with both had gone for good.
Hitler sent von Ribbentrop to London in 1936 as the
new German Ambassador to the Court of St. James, on
the death of the previous representative. “Ribbentrop,
bring me the English alliance!” Hitler commanded as The war: SS troops prepare to cross a bridge.
he saw him off, but the mission failed because, Rib-
bentrop later testified, the British remained unwilling
to allow Germany to become too powerful on the con-
tinent and thus upset the “balance of power.” That, of
course, had been the general British approach since
the days of French King Louis XIV.
As for the various wartime assassination plots
against Hitler, he stated in 1946 that “I never entered
into any conspiracy, and remained loyal to the end,”
and even beyond. As his defense before the IMT at
Nuremberg proved, when he refused to part company
with the dead Fuehrer even when fighting for his own
life in testimony given on the witness stand. His basic
defense stance was that neither he nor Hitler wanted
war in 1939, only the settlement of the Polish ques-
tion. “I was never informed about military questions,”
he avowed, and hadn’t known of the plan to attack the
USSR until April 1941, two months before it occurred.
He argued against it up until the day of the invasion.
“Not even half of my evidence was admitted…only
the prosecution, not the defense, had access to Ger-
man and foreign archives,” he lamented at the end,
maintaining to the last neither he nor Hitler had sought
“world domination.” He insisted instead that Hitler
wanted only to block Stalin’s westward expansion into
Europe. His defense was largely conducted, and his
memoirs entirely written, from his own memory. Of
course, from the perspective of the victorious nations
making up the Grand Alliance, the discordant note
came from the fact that one among them—the Soviet
Union—had been at least as complicit in arranging the
war’s start as Ribbentrop.

at

World at War 23

WaW 6 Issue.indd 23 4/15/09 4:24:23 PM

 World at War No. 8:
Arriba España!

World at War number eight will have Brian Train’s
Arriba Espana: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39. It’s
intended for two-player play, one representing the left-
wing coalition government of the Spanish Republic,
and the other the alliance of right-wing forces that rose
in revolt against it. Solitaire play is doable.
  The 34x22” area-map shows all of Iberia and is
Game Preview
Most of the 280 iconic counters are military units;
however, their scale is abstract, with each generally
representing groupings of two or more historic regi-
ments, brigades or divisions. (There are also 16 new
variant-add-on counters included for issue number
one’s Barbarossa game.)
  There are four armed autonomous regions: As-

divided into regions, each with its own name. A re-
gion may be in one of three states: government con-
trol, rebel control, or contested, meaning neither side
controls it. Getting and maintaining control of regions
is central for keeping your units supplied and for gain-
ing a high political support level. Each region is sub-
divided into one or more areas corresponding to that
region’s component provinces. Each winter game turn
represents three months, while those at the other times
of year each represent two months.
turias, Basque, Catalonia and Santander. The Gov-
ernment player controls those units along with the
Popular Army, the anarchists, the Marxist POUM, and
the international brigades. The Rebel player controls
Nationalist, Carlist, colonial, Portuguese, German and
Italian units. There are 8,632 words in the rules. Two
experienced players can finish a game in about four
hours.

Issue # Month Game Topic & Lead Article

7 Aug 09 Greek Tragedy
8 Oct 09 Arriba Espana!
9 Dec 09 Destruction of Army Group Center
10 Feb 10 Coral Sea Solitaire
11 Apr 10 AfrikaKorps
12 Jun 10 1940: What If?

24 #6

WaW 6 Issue.indd 24 4/15/09 4:24:24 PM

 Behind the Lines
A Calculated Risk
In November 1943 the 10,000-
ton Liberty Ship SS John Harvey
was loaded with 2,000 M47A1 100
lb. bombs full of mustard gas at
Baltimore, Maryland. Just over four
feet long and eight inches in diameter,
each chemical bomb held 65 lbs. of
mustard gas. Also on board were six
members of the US Chemical Warfare
Service.
The Harvey and her cargo were
part of what was standard operat-
ing procedure by both the Allies and
Axis militaries. Convinced chemical
warfare (CW) could start at anytime,
both the Allied and German high
commands in World War II faced
the dilemma of how to be prepared
without looking as if they were about
to initiate it. Throughout the war,
both sides kept supplies of chemi-
cal weapons near the various battle
areas for such an eventuality. The two
sides shrouded those “dumps” in the
greatest possible secrecy, fearful if the
enemy discovered their existence he
might use them as a pretext to initiate
chemical warfare. The Harvey, then,
was only one of a number of such
merchant ships pressed into service to
assure the US had a sufficient stock of
chemical armaments on hand in case
the Germans or Italians attempted to
slow the Allied invasion of Italy via
CW.
As the ship made its way toward
the major Allied supply port of Bari,
on southern Italy’s Adriatic coast,
the men aboard had plenty to occupy
them. Fashioned by the cheap and
speedy “Levinstein H” process, US
mustard gas was notoriously unstable.
Because of that process, the mustard
gas inside the bombs contained up
to 30 percent impurities. Those other
gases could build up inside the casing
and cause an explosion. Consequent-
ly, the bombs had to be regularly
vented and the casings constantly
inspected for evidence of corrosion.
On 28 November the Harvey
arrived at Bari, where the harbor was
WaW 6 Issue.indd 25
choked with Allied shipping. Forbid-
den to reveal its cargo to the port
authorities, the supposedly “standard”
supply ship was ordered to tie itself
to a pier and wait its normal turn for
off-loading.
Four days later, on 2 December,
Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham
held a press conference announcing
the Allies had achieved “total air su-
premacy” over southern Italy. At 7:30
p.m., 100 German Ju-88 bombers,
despite Coningham’s claim, roared in
and inflicted the Allies’ worst post-
Pearl Harbor port disaster.
In 20 minutes the bombers had
sent 17 ships, carrying some 90,000
tons of supplies, to the bottom of
the harbor. Eight other ships were
set ablaze and seriously damaged.
Shortly after 8:00 p.m., a fuel ship
exploded next to the Harvey with
enough force to shatter windows in
homes seven miles away. A few mo-
ments later, an explosion tore through
the Harvey causing her to list and
begin sinking.
Some of the mustard gas went
straight to the bottom, while other
cylinders began to burn. The rest of it
began to leak out of the ruptured hold
and spread across the debris-choked
SS John W. Brown on the Great Lakes in 2000. John W. Brown is one of only two
surviving World War II Liberty ships, the other is SS Jeremiah O’Brien.
harbor. There it mixed with hundreds
of tons of oil floating on the surface.
A strong odor of garlic soon hung in
the air. Slowly a dense cloud of black
smoke mixed with the gas and rolled
over the town. The worst casualties
were suffered by the men floating in
the harbor, standing in puddles of oil
in life rafts, or hanging onto pieces of
debris. Their entire bodies were im-
mersed in a solution of mustard and
oil.
The rescue teams in the harbor
and at the hospitals in Bari had no
idea mustard gas was aboard the
Harvey; everyone aboard her had
died in the explosion. The hospital
was overwhelmed with 800 wounded
(1,000 had already died). Assuming
most of the men were suffering from
simple exposure, there was no effort
made to decontaminate them. Still
wet and covered in oil, the wounded
were wrapped in blankets and given
warm tea. Most sat quietly in that
state for the remainder of the night.
The wounded were thus dipped in a
solution of mustard-and-oil, wrapped
in blankets and allowed a prolonged
period for absorption. Inadvertently,
those were exactly the wrong things
to do. The combination of circum-
World at War 25
4/15/09 4:24:25 PM
 stances made it look as if the worst
possible mustard gas burns were
being deliberately produced.
By morning, the first of an esti-
mated 630 mustard gas victims began
to complain they were blind, as their
eyelids swelled to several times their
normal size. As the day progressed,
appalling burns developed. Epidermal
(surface) layers came loose in large
strips as large blisters, themselves
filled with mustard agent, burst. Some
men lost 90 percent of their skin in
the days that followed. Seventy of
them died.
At sea, the US destroyer Bistera,
which had picked up 30 survivors
before dashing farther out, was also in
serious difficulties. The vapors from
the mustard agent clinging to the men,
as well as what clung to the decks,
On the Seas
Axis Blockade Runners
Throughout much of World War
II, the Germans relied on blockade
runners to deliver vitally needed
strategic materials. Their Axis partner,
Japan, agreed to supply tungsten, tin,
rubber, vegetable oils and quinine.
Rubber, in particular, was critical
to the Nazi war effort. In return for
raw materials, Tokyo requested steel,
aluminum, optical glass, mercury and
German military technology.
The conquest of France granted
Germany better access to the high
seas than had been possible in
World War I. Blockade running was
therefore inaugurated before the end
of 1940, though few ships sailed in
the first months of the program. The
need for the trade became more acute,
however, after the onset of the Rus-
sian campaign. From June 1941, war
with the USSR deprived the Reich
of contact with the Far East via the
Trans-Siberian Railway. Blockade
26 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 26
was having an effect. Her officers
and crew became almost totally blind
and severely burned. It was 18 hours
before the crippled crew was able
to bring the ship back into Taranto
harbor.
In Bari itself there were similar
scenes of misery. More than 1,000
civilians were killed in the attack
and its aftermath. At least 25 percent
of them died as a direct result of the
mustard cloud that billowed over the
town. Others were coated with the
agent after being splashed with the
oil-and-mustard waves that covered
the seafront. Thousands more fled
town, spreading stories of war gases
throughout the countryside.
After first attempting to clamp
a lid of secrecy on the incident, the
Allied high command finally admitted
a chemical weapons accident had
runners therefore became almost the
only means of obtaining essential
commodities.
All the ships employed in the
venture were either German vessels
or Italian ones under German control.
Those en route to Europe passed
through the Sunda Strait, the Indian
Ocean, the Cape of Good Hope,
and the South Atlantic. For most the
destination was Bordeaux in German-
occupied France. Outbound vessels
delivered goods to Yokahama and
picked up raw materials in Singapore
or Batavia. By mid 1942, Japanese
control of the Sunda Strait further
facilitated German access to Japan’s
rich southern conquests.
Even in the halcyon days,
blockade running was a hazardous
enterprise. Ships had to traverse
thousands of miles of ocean, nearly
all of it dominated by Allied navies.
If a blockade runner was confronted
by an enemy warship, there was often
occurred. Eisenhower, in his press
release of 2 January 1944, reiterated
that: “Allied policy is not—repeat
not—to use gas unless or until the
enemy does so first, but we are fully
prepared to retaliate and do not deny
the accident, which was a calculated
risk.”
In May, all Allied commanders
were directed to inform their medical
officers when and what stores of gas
weapons were in their localities. In
the meantime, in Italy, sufficient agent
had been placed within easy reach
of Fifth Army to conduct full-scale
chemical warfare for 45 days, and
more was being shipped to England
to support Operation Overlord. The
calculated risk continued to the end of
the war.
~David Tschanz
nothing it could do but scuttle to pre-
vent capture by the enemy. Though
the vessels had some armament, they
couldn’t fight off warships. Even Axis
submarines were a menace, as they
occasionally mistook blockade run-
ners for Allied vessels.
To increase the chances of surviv-
ing, the Germans took a number of
precautions. Vessels often employed a
“cover ship” ruse. If challenged, they
claimed to be an Allied ship. As for
the threat of friendly fire, the German
U-boat command established safe
lanes for blockade-runners. Some 200
miles in width, Lane A extended from
France to 30 degrees west longitude,
then down to about five degrees south
latitude. Whenever a blockade run-
ner was scheduled to pass through,
U-boats were forbidden to attack any
lone ships in the lane. The Germans
also arranged for U-boats to escort
both outbound and inbound vessels.
As an added precaution, most sailings
occurred during the autumn or winter.
4/15/09 4:24:25 PM
 Long nights enabled ships to slip
through the Bay of Biscay, the most
hazardous part of the voyage, under
cover of darkness.
From 1940 to 1942, blockade
running produced good results. Of the
five ships that departed for Europe
between November 1940 and July
1941, only one was lost. Twelve more
ships headed for Bordeaux between
August 1941 and February 1942.
Nine of those vessels got through. Of
the three lost, one, the Spreewald, was
torpedoed by an Italian submarine.
Another, traveling outside the safe
lane, succumbed to a mistaken attack
by a U-Boat.
At first the Allies could do little
to stop this Axis maritime traffic.
As late as November 1942, three
vessels—the Dresden, the Tannen-
fels and the Kulmerland—arrived at
Bordeaux. By that time the program
has succeeded in delivering about
40,000 tons of precious rubber. Many
of those involved were decorated with
a special blockade runner’s badge,
depicting an eagle holding a swastika
over a merchant ship.
But just as November 1942
marked the turning point for the
campaigns in North Africa and Rus-
sia, it was also a watershed for this
maritime struggle. After penetrating
the German ENIGMA cypher, the Al-
lies used that intelligence bonanza to
strangle Axis shipping. Successful up
to that time, blockade running quickly
turned into a disaster for the Axis.
From November 1942 to April 1943,
seven of 15 inbound vessels were
sunk while four others were forced to
turn back.
While traversing the Indian
Ocean, the Ramses blundered into the
Australian cruiser Adelaide. Forced to
scuttle, the German vessel went down
with its cargo of 4,000 tons of rubber
and 1,500 cases of quinine.
Tipped off by decrypted radio
messages, the British cruiser Scylla
sank the inbound ship Rhakotis near
Cape Finisterre. Occurring at night,
on 1 January 1943, that action cost
the Reich a substantial amount of
tin, rubber, zinc ore, quinine bark
and other commodities. The German
WaW 6 Issue.indd 27
naval command had ordered U-Boats
to escort the Rhakotis, but they failed
in their mission.
Acting again on the basis of
signals intelligence, the British
readied another cruiser, the Sussex,
to intercept the next inbound ship,
the Hohenfriedburg. On 26 February
1943, Sussex approached its quarry,
forcing her to scuttle. Again, U-Boats
failed to protect a blockade runner.
The commander of U-264, Hartwig
Looks, fired four torpedoes at the
Sussex, but they all missed. His only
accomplishment was to later rescue
the crew of the Hohenfriedburg.
In addition to being nearly use-
less as escorts, U-Boats continued to
pose their own friendly fire threat to
blockade runners. On the evening of
3 March 1943, a U-Boat fired three
torpedoes at what its commander
thought was a British ship. In fact
it was the inbound blockade runner
Doggerbank. Fatally holed, the ship
went to the bottom with its 7,000 tons
of rubber. Doggerbank had endan-
gered itself by steaming ahead of the
safe area established for it that month.
About a week later, on 10 March,
the US cruiser Savannah and the de-
stroyer Eberle cornered the blockade
runner Karin in the South Atlantic.
Stymied, the Karin’s captain blew up
his ship. American seamen boarded
the vessel to try to prevent that, but
their attempt to capture the Karin
and its cargo failed. Later that same
month, the blockade runner Regens-
burg attempted to reach port via the
Denmark Strait with a U-boat escort.
As usual, the submarine was ineffec-
tive. A British cruiser, the Glasgow,
intercepted Regensburg with ease.
The last inbound vessel of that
season, the Irene, shared the fate of
most of the others. On 10 April, HMS
Adventure compelled Irene to scuttle.
Only one ship in bound that
spring, the Pietro Orseolo, succeeded
in reaching Bordeaux, and just barely.
A British submarine lurking near the
harbor torpedoed the Pietro Orseolo.
Despite flooding, though, the vessel
arrived in port on 2 April.
Outbound vessels fared little
better. From November 1942 to April
1943, four ships, the Cortelazzo, the
Annaliese Essberger, the Germania
and the Portland, were lost. Only the
Alsterufer and Osorno reached the
Japanese.
In the spring of 1943, then, the
Axis powers decided to begin relying
more on special adapted submarines
for transport operations. In theory,
submarines, despite their minimal
cargo capacity, were more survivable
than surface ships, but their record
proved equally poor. Only one Japa-
nese submarine, the I-8, successfully
completed the round trip. (Because
of their greater size and endurance
compared to German U-Boats, it was
mostly Japanese submarines that were
pressed into service as blockade run-
ners.)
In November 1943 the British
submarine Taurus sank the I-34 after
the latter left Penang with its cargo.
Similarly, a US submarine ambushed
the I-29 before it could arrive at Kure.
In June 1944, I-52 fell victim to an
air-dropped acoustic-homing torpedo.
Despite their increased reliance
on submarines by mid 1943, the Axis
hadn’t yet fully given up on surface
ships. At the time, eight such vessels
remained in French waters; however,
prospects for success continued to
wane. In September an air strike dis-
abled the Kulmerland. The Dresden
hit a mine on 6 November, and an-
other vessel was wrecked by an aerial
torpedo. The Pietro Orseolo was next
to be written off, due to bombing.
Finally, in January 1944, the Germans
World at War 27
4/15/09 4:24:26 PM
 abandoned all hope of reaching Japan
with the few ships left. The risk had
become too great.
That decision reflected the fate
of the last inbound ships. Of the five
vessels that sailed for Hitler’s Europe
that fall, only one, the Osorno, ar-
rived, and it was a close run affair.
Severely damaged by aircraft, the
ship had to be beached in the estuary
of the harbor.
While traversing the Atlantic,
Osorno had fooled the Allies by
posing as the British ship Prome.
Too late, the Allies discovered Prome
was actually in Bombay at that time.
Later, the Osorno got some protection
from Operation Bernau, which was a
German attempt to defend blockade
runners in the Bay of Biscay with
destroyers and other light warships.
But Bernau was mostly a failure; the
Alsterufer was sunk as were several
German warships.
Alerted by signals intelligence,
an American cruiser and destroyer
lay in wait in the South Atlantic for
the last three blockade runners—the
Rio Grande, the Weserland and the
Burganland. In January 1944, those
US vessels picked off all three of the
German ships one after the other.
One US sailor recalled that, after the
sinkings, the ocean was full of tires.
The loss of rubber was a colossal
disaster for the Reich, and the lack of
such vital imports hastened its doom.
Following the failure of the January
1944 effort, Hitler and Doenitz agreed
there would be no more surface ship
blockade running expeditions to or
from the Far East.
~Tim Donovan
28 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 28
Movers & Shakers
Draper Laurence Kauffman: Father of the UDTs
The present-day US Navy SEALs
(Sea Air and Land commandoes)
have a reputation for being effective,
ingenious and unconventional. It is a
reputation they cherish, one inherited
from their precursors, the World War
II Underwater Demolition Teams
(UDTs). Those traditions were actu-
ally also inherited by the UDTs, from
the man who founded them, Draper
Laurence Kauffman. His career in the
Navy seems an improbable combina-
tion of Clark Kent and Superman.
Even his name seems perfect for a
character in an adventure novel.
Kauffman’s father, James
Laurence Kauffman, was one of the
Navy’s acknowledged experts on
destroyers and cruisers. In his early
teens, Draper Kauffman decided to
follow his father and become a naval
officer himself. He secured the prom-
ise of an appointment to the Naval
Academy from an Ohio Representa-
tive, but the Congressman died before
completing the paperwork. With the
same energy and unconventional-
ity that would characterize Draper
Kauffman’s later career, he fixed the
problem. He skipped school, took a
train to Washington and wandered
through Congress seeking a spon-
sor. He met with 22 Representatives,
convincing three to sponsor him.
Getting the appointment proved
only the first barrier, however, be-
cause Kauffman’s eyesight was poor.
He barely got through the physical
due to it. He also picked the wrong
time to enter the Naval Academy.
When he graduated, in 1933, the
world was in the midst of the Great
Depression. As a cost-cutting mea-
sure, Congress commissioned only
half of his class’s graduates. As part
of that reduction process, the Navy
raised its eyesight standard. Kauffman
failed the new eye examination and
wasn’t commissioned.
Discharged from the Navy, he
sought employment in the private
sector, finding a job with the United
States Lines, a shipping company. He
rose quickly. By 1939 he’d become
assistant operations manager and was
sent to Europe for seasoning: standard
practice for those being groomed for
upper management.
Two months in the firm’s German
office convinced Kauffman the Nazi
regime was dangerous. When war
broke out in September, he found an
unconventional way to participate
while maintaining neutrality. He
joined the American Volunteer
Ambulance Corps, a group providing
battlefield medical services inside
France. That required him to come
up with $3,500—$3,000 to pay for
an ambulance and $500 to cover his
living expenses. He spent $1,000 of
his own money and found a sponsor
to cover the rest. By May 1940 he
was on the Maginot Line in Alsace
Lorraine.
Kauffman arrived just in time
for the end of the Phony War, and
was immediately embroiled in heavy
combat. Between 10 May and 22
June, when the Maginot garrison
surrendered, Kauffman operated
his ambulance under heavy fire. He
earned the first of several medals for
bravery during that period, a French
Croix de Guerre.
After the French surrender, Kauff-
man and other American members
of the AVAC were interned by the
Germans. He was released in August
1940, on the promise he’d return to
America and take no further part in
the war. Instead, after arriving in
Spain, and with the connivance of the
British consul in Lisbon, he signed
on as a seaman on a ship bound to
Scotland.
Packed off to London on arrival,
Kauffman talked his way into the
Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve. His
naval training had come to count
more than his bad eyes. The British,
with a shortage of trained officers,
gave him a commission.
While he was undergoing training,
the school put out a call for six bomb
disposal trainees. Only three volun-
4/15/09 4:24:27 PM
 teers were immediately forthcoming;
so Kauffman put in his name. As it
turned out, an additional 14 trainees
then volunteered. To get the number
back down to six, the director of
the Unexploded Bomb Department
interviewed all of the candidates. The
director picked Kauffmann because
he confessed he wasn’t eager for the
job. The director believed anyone
keen on bomb disposal was thereby
too unsteady for the job.
Kauffman spent months in that
dangerous trade, accumulating
tremendous experience in defusing
different types of bombs, including
duds and time-delayed bombs with
anti-tamper fuses. It was all experi-
ence gained at considerable personal
risk. Recommended for the George
Cross, Britain’s highest non-combat
award for bravery, Kauffman couldn’t
receive it due to US neutrality.
Kauffman also cheated death on
that job. Tipped by the buzzing of
an unwinding fuse mechanism he
inadvertently ignited, he managed to
run out of the blast zone before the
bomb exploded. Despite sustaining
injuries—Royal Navy policy was
bomb experts who survived such
explosions were to be transferred to
other duties—within three months he
was back defusing bombs.
Finally, in September 1941,
Kauffman was granted home leave.
While in the US he heard the Navy
was setting up a bomb-disposal outfit.
Through his father, by that time
an admiral, he offered to share his
expertise before returning to England.
He then had several meetings with
Bureau of Ordinance personnel.
In November 1941, Adm. W.H.P.
Blandy, chief of that bureau, sum-
moned Kauffman and invited him to
transfer to the US Navy. Kauffman
demurred on the grounds Britain was
in a war. Blandy assured him the US
would soon be joining England as an
active ally in that fight. He then pre-
sented Kauffman with copies of the
papers that had already been sent to
the Royal Navy requesting his trans-
fer to the USN. The Royal Navy had,
in fact, already agreed to the transfer.
Kauffman thereby achieved his
WaW 6 Issue.indd 29
childhood dream of becoming a US
Navy officer in the most roundabout
manner possible, by being impressed
from the Royal Navy. He entered as a
reserve lieutenant.
A month later the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor. Kauffman,
then the Navy’s leading expert on
bomb disposal, was in Washington
organizing bomb disposal units. On
15 December he went to Hawaii to
defuse an unexploded Japanese bomb
left over from the air raid. He defused
the bomb and sent it to Washington
for study, for which success he was
awarded the Navy Cross.
He was back in Washington by
4 January 1942, and spent the next
18 months running the Navy Bomb
Disposal School. That school became
a focal point for research on bomb
disposal technique and fuse design.
It eventually assembled the best
collection of foreign ordnance in the
US and Britain. While heading that
school, he also helped organize the
Joint Army-Navy Experimental Test-
ing Board, which was set up to share
information about bomb disposal
between the two services. a few were used at D-Day. Lacking
In May 1943, Kauffman was
given a new job. War planners were
worried about the Atlantic Wall ob-
stacles the Germans were installing,
fearing those barriers would strand
landing craft far from shore. Kauff-
man was tasked with training teams to
destroy the obstacles. It was the birth
of underwater demolition.
Kauffman assembled a team to
run the new school, which was based
in Fort Pierce, Florida, drawing liber-
ally from the Bomb Disposal School
for ordinance knowledge. He also
borrowed from the Seabees, and the
Scouts and Raiders school that was
also at Fort Piece. Because time was
short, and most of it had to be spent
on demolition training, Kauffman
compressed the eight-week Scouts
and Raiders course to one week. He
led by example, going through that
grueling week of physical condition-
ing with the trainees. “Hell Week,” as
it was called, washed out 40 percent
of the first class.
It wasn’t a useless hardship. UDT
work required both physical and
psychological strength and endur-
ance, and Hell Week built tremendous
esprit de corps among its survivors.
It is a tradition that continues in
the SEALs today. Kauffman also
instituted another practice then
unconventional to the Navy, binding
officers and enlisted into six-man
units without the traditional distance
between sailor and officer.
Word soon went out, if you could
cut it in the UDTs you were some-
thing special. The remarkable level of
trust team members shared was key
to the their battlefield success, as the
technical and physical demands of
removing underwater obstacles under
fire required unremitting teamwork.
The teams also tended to be casual
about traditional Navy courtesies.
Performance counted more when
mistakes cost lives.
Once trained, the first gradu-
ates weren’t sent to Europe, but
instead went to the Pacific. Despite
the original intention to use UDTs
to clear Normandy obstacles, only
hard first-hand experience with beach
obstacles, D-Day planners viewed
frogmen as reconnaissance forces and
feared pre-invasion demolition—even
if conducted just a few hours prior to
the invasion—would warn the Ger-
mans of the impending assault. On
the other hand, in the Pacific, Navy,
Army and Marine forces had paid in
blood after encountering inadequately
cleared beaches, and therefore eagerly
welcomed the UDTs.
By then they’d been organized
into 100-man teams, each with 13 of-
ficers and 87 enlisted. Kauffman went
with them, feeling a need to play a
more active role than running a train-
ing school. He became head of UDT
5, which, along with UDT 6, was
tasked with supporting the invasion of
the Marianas.
The UDTs provided invalu-
able service during the invasions
of Saipan, Tinian and Guam. They
cleared obstacles from the beach,
marked safe lanes for landing craft,
and blew channels through reefs to
World at War 29
4/15/09 4:24:27 PM
 widen beachheads. Kauffman partici-
pated in all those missions, earning
a second Navy Cross for leading a
daylight reconnaissance of a fortified
beach on Saipan.
The UDTs participated in every
major Pacific invasion for the rest
of the war, and Kauffman saw more
action at both Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
He conducted beach clearing and
reconnaissance missions for both in-
vasions. He was also forced to change
ships on two occasions when his ship
was struck by Japanese bombs or
Kamikazes. By war’s end he’d risen
to commander and was involved in
the planning of the invasion of Japan.
Draper Kauffman had his officer’s
commission converted from reserve
to regular Navy after the end of the
war. He passed the required eye
exam with the help of a sympathetic
surgeon who’d been at Saipan and re-
membered Kauffman. His postwar ca-
reer was as distinguished as his war-
time service. He obtained admiral’s
stars and served as the Superintendent
of the US Naval Academy from 1965
through 1968, retiring as rear admiral
in 1973.
~Mark Lardas
Attention readers: We’re always looking
for authors for FYI for Strategy & Tactics
and Observation Post for World at War.
If you’d like to try your hand at writing
short (under 2,000 words), pithy articles
for this column, on virtually any aspect of
WWII military history, contact Ty Bom-
ba, FYI editor, at: WhiteRook@att.net.
30 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 30
In the Air
The Westland Whirlwind
In the early days of World War
II, Britain produced an outstanding
single-seat twin-engine fighter. That
plane, the Westland Whirlwind, could
match the Spitfire I in level flight
speed, climbed and dove faster than
that famous fighter, and mounted the
best armament of any interceptor
aircraft of its day, four 20 mm cannon
in the nose. Pilots loved the Whirl-
wind, which, in a handful of air-to-air
fights, gave as good as it got against
Germany’s main single-seat fighter of
the time, the Messerschmitt 109E.
The Whirlwind’s story began in
the 1930s, when the RAF issued a
specification for an aircraft mount-
ing the unprecedented armament of
four 20 mm cannon. The Westland
Company won the competition with
its innovative proposal. The lead
designer was Teddy Petter, a gifted
young engineer who later designed
the RAF’s Canberra jet bomber and
the BAC Lightning, Britain’s first
supersonic jet fighter.
Petter emphasized compact-
ness and a clean airframe in the
Whirlwind’s design. For power he
chose the small 885-hp Rolls-Royce
Peregrine engine, which he placed
in sleekly aerodynamic nacelles. He
paired the oil and coolant radiators
into the wing center section’s leading
edge instead of the nacelles, thereby
reducing drag and contributing to the
Whirlwind’s smooth and futuristic
appearance. The Whirlwind also had
one of the world’s first glass “bubble”
canopies, with excellent all-around vi-
sion, and it was the RAF’s first fighter
with a retractable tail wheel, another
measure to reduce drag.
The Whirlwind was an advanced
design that pressed the era’s technical
limits. When the prototype Whirlwind
first flew, its engines overheated,
directional stability needed improve-
ment, and the plane buffeted in some
conditions. Such problems were
normal for high-performing prototype
aircraft, but the small, inexperienced
Westland Company had trouble cor-
recting them within the Air Ministry’s
schedule. Opinionated and irritating
in manner, Petter worsened the delay
by resisting recommended changes to
his cherished plane, to the point the
Air Ministry grew tired of dealing
with him.
The most serious problem was
the Peregrine engines, which lacked
sufficient boost pressure at high
altitude. New engine designs were
frequently troublesome, but the Per-
egrine project never got time to work
them out. In the run-up to war, Rolls
Royce faced impossible demand for
aircraft engines. The firm’s legend-
ary Merlin engine was already slated
as the motive power for hundreds of
Hurricane and Spitfire fighters com-
ing off production lines. In August
1939, lacking surplus machinery and
skilled workers, Rolls-Royce halted
further technical development on the
Peregrine and all other engines except
the vital Merlin. That decision, neces-
sary as it may have been, ultimately
doomed the Whirlwind. Production
of the Peregrines ceased altogether in
December 1940, after only 290 had
been built.
The RAF kept the Whirlwind
secret, which explains in part why its
characteristics never became widely
known. It also remains a little known
fact of history that, when the Spitfire
encountered problems with delayed
development in the late 1930s, the Air
Ministry seriously considered cancel-
ing that program, and the Whirlwind
was one alternative proposed to fulfill
RAF fighter needs.
That would have been a mistake,
but clearly Westland’s innovative new
fighter held a great deal of prom-
ise. The Whirlwind could climb to
15,000 feet in 5.7 minutes, faster than
either the Me-109E or Spitfire I. In
level flight, Westland’s fighter was
outstandingly fast up to about 15,800
feet, where speed maxed out at 354
mph. At or below that level, the
Whirlwind was faster in level flight
than either the Spitfire I or Me-109E;
4/15/09 4:24:28 PM
 however, the Peregrine engine was
less competitive at higher altitudes,
giving those other planes an edge
higher up.
The Whirlwind had a high stall
speed, which in theory confined the
fighter to longer paved runways in
an era when most airbases were short
grass fields. In practice, though,
Whirlwinds proved able to oper-
ate from shorter fields. Small for a
twin-engine aircraft, the Whirlwind
was barely bigger than the single-
engine Hurricane. The Whirlwind’s
wingspan was 45 feet compared with
40 feet for the Hurricane, while fu-
selage length was virtually the same.
Pilots also praised the Whirlwind’s
maneuverability. The Whirlwind had
a maximum range of about 800 miles,
mach better than the 395 to 460 miles
for early versions of the Spitfire and
Hurricane, respectively.
In sum, then, it was really just
haste generated by crisis conditions
that kept this potentially superb
fighter from attaining large-scale
mass production and continued
development to improve its promising
characteristics. The first production
Whirlwind had not yet flown when
Peregrine engine production was
ordered phased out in late 1939. Of
course, Peregrine production could
have been contracted out to another
factory, or the Whirlwind could’ve
been redesigned to take the success-
ful Merlin, as the Westland Company
proposed to the Air Ministry in Janu-
ary 1941.
Instead, the Whirlwind project
coasted to its doom, dogged by delays
and aggravated by tensions between
Westland and the Air Ministry. As
WaW 6 Issue.indd 31
the Battle of Britain approached,
Winston Churchill appointed Lord
Beaverbrook, a newspaper tycoon, to
ramp up British aircraft production.
His ruthless management style was
less effective than is today conveyed
by his image in popular history.
Whirlwinds cost more than Spitfires
or Hurricanes, and took longer to
make. The poor performance of twin-
engine Me-110’s over Britain that
summer also worked to encourage a
bias against all twin-engine fighters.
And Westland was behind schedule.
Not all delay was the company’s
responsibility—during the battle, the
Luftwaffe twice bombed the Whirl-
wind factory in Yeovil. With just 12
Whirlwinds in service, Beaverbrook
cancelled the fighters in late October
1940. Production continued with the
Peregrine engines in stock, ending
in early 1942 after about 114 of the
high-performing but outcast fighters
had been made.
Whirlwinds first saw service with
263 Squadron, already famous for
its gallant operations with Gladia-
tor biplanes in Norway. During the
Battle of Britain, the untried and top
secret Whirlwinds were shunted off to
Scotland for training and working-up.
During the summer of 1941,
263 Squadron was moved into the
combat zone in southern England.
Fighter Command used the unit to
escort Blenheim bombers conducting
low-level raids against ground targets
and coastal shipping. Whirlwinds
did well in their first engagement in
August 1941, when four of them were
jumped by 25 Me-109s. Even though
badly outnumbered, the Whirlwinds
shot down three German fighters in a
swirling low-level dogfight—without
a loss of their own.
The Whirlwinds were also em-
ployed in the RAF’s offensive over
occupied France during 1941, an
otherwise poorly-conceived cam-
paign that entailed high cost and little
gain. Often assigned to risky ground
attack, the Whirlwinds could usually
shake pursuing fighters, but took
many losses due to flak. Even so, 263
Squadron developed an elite reputa-
tion with its strikes against airfields
and shipping—enough so that, though
the supply of Whirlwinds was finite,
the RAF formed another Whirlwind
unit, 137 Squadron.
During the summer of 1942, both
Whirlwind squadrons were given
bomb racks, and served as “fighter-
bombers” from that time on. Head-
to-head combat with German fighters
became rare, thanks to occasional
Spitfire escort and the Whirlwind’s
good evasion speed, but losses to
flak were steady. The two Whirl-
wind squadrons served primarily as
a “Channel stop,” operating against
coastal shipping that was well protect-
ed with anti-aircraft guns. The RAF’s
coastal shipping campaign, little-
noticed by historians, added further
damage to the already strained Axis
transport system in western Europe.
On the other hand, the RAF’s loss in
aircraft and crews was high—worse,
in fact, than the appalling loss rate
sustained in the night bombing cam-
paign against Germany.
In February 1943, the Whirlwinds
had a small and little known brush
with history. Germany’s Adm. Raeder
ordered one last attempt to sustain
surface attacks on Allied shipping
World at War 31
4/15/09 4:24:28 PM
 by dispatching the armed merchant
raider Togo through the English
Channel. Disguised as a normal
merchant vessel, but heavily escorted,
the Togo slipped through the Straits
of Dover on the night of 10 February.
Alerted by Admiralty intelligence,
the RAF dispatched three Whirlwinds
of 137 Squadron to attack the ship.
Only one pilot, Flying Officer Eddie
Musgrave, found the Togo. Driven
off three times by searchlight directed
flak, Musgrave made a final attempt
at wave-top height, dropping two
bombs as he passed over the ship.
Flak damaged Musgrave’s Whirlwind
as he broke for England, but he made
it back.
One bomb hit and badly damaged
Togo near the bow, forcing her into
Boulogne for repair. The German
naval command then concluded a
breakout was impossible and pulled
Togo back to Germany. That ended
the Kreigsmarine’s efforts to wage
surface war outside Arctic waters.
Musgrave, an Australian and one of
137 Squadron’s best pilots, probably
never knew of his accomplishment
because he was shot down and killed
by flak while on another coastal mis-
sion three months later.
Combat losses, accidents, and
spare parts needs had reduced the
supply of available Whirlwinds to
just 31 by June 1943. At that time the
RAF switched 137 Squadron to Ty-
phoons. By December 1943, with just
16 operational Whirlwinds on hand,
the RAF also switched 263 Squadron
to Typhoons, and the Whirlwind’s
service life was over. Mechanics in
263 Squadron were soon complain-
ing how difficult it was to keep the
Typhoons’ Sabre engines serviceable
compared with the Peregrines in their
beloved Whirlwinds—a direct contra-
diction of the notion Whirlwinds were
unreliable.
Whirlwind production had already
been cancelled when the fighter first
saw action, yet the plane went on to
develop a solid reputation in combat.
As a fighter-bomber, the Whirlwind
was certainly capable, with sub-
stantially higher performance than
Hudsons, Hampdens, Blenheims and
Beaufighters, the other mainstays of
the coastal bombing campaign. The
RAF literally used up its Whirlwinds,
only withdrawing the type when there
were too few left to sustain opera-
tions.
Pilots who actually flew Whirl-
winds loved their unique plane, and
felt it had gotten short shrift from
the desk-bound managers of aircraft
production. That said, the Whirlwind
was limited by lack of high-altitude
performance, and its successes in air
combat occurred at low level.
We will never know if Whirlwind
performance might have improved
with further development of its
Peregrine engine, or if it could’ve
been successfully adapted to take the
Merlin. The RAF, however, certainly
could’ve made good use of a capable
twin-engine escort fighter with heavy
armament and nearly double the range
of Spitfires and Hurricanes. It should
also be remembered that, despite
shifting to mainly nighttime bombing,
the RAF still had to make precision
attacks in daylight beyond the range
of single-engine fighter escort against
such as like the battleships Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau in Brest.
In final measure, then, the Whirl-
wind got caught on the wrong side
of RAF production priorities during
the crisis of 1939-40. Hard decisions
had to be made under the pressure
of war, and whatever opportunities
were missed, the RAF had the Merlin
engines and the Hurricanes and Spit-
fires it needed to persevere during that
difficult time. The pace of wartime
innovation can be ruthlessly fast, and
a few obstacles—engine production
bottlenecks, development and design
delays, personality issues, and lack of
persistent and imaginative oversight—
can make the difference between a
successful weapon system and a story
of what might have been.
~Jonathan Lupton

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32 #6

WaW 6 Issue.indd 32 4/15/09 4:24:30 PM

 Naval Strategy
in the
Mediterranean Theater
of
Operations 1939-45
By David R. Higgins

The
Mediterranean Sea’s importance as a strategic waterway in the modern world grew with in-
dustrialization in Europe, as it became a conduit for shipments of petroleum and other critical
resources. The 1930s witnessed increasing geopolitical tensions throughout its nearly 970,000
square miles as French, British, and Italian colonies placed increasing demands on home coun-
try merchant fleets. Middle Eastern and North African territories offered abundant resources to the metropolitan powers,
as well as providing bases to outflank potential continental foes. Possession of Gibraltar, Suez, and the Sicilian Strait-
Malta chokepoints were a prerequisite to controlling the Mediterranean’s sea lanes. All that wasn’t lost on pre-World War
II naval planners. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria and Lebanon were French; Libya was Italian, and Egypt and Palestine
were British. The most critical British facility, of course, was the Suez Canal, which was the gateway to the petroleum-rich
lands of the Middle East as well as the British colonies in India and the Far East.
World at War 33

WaW 6 Issue.indd 33 4/15/09 4:24:31 PM

 World War II in Europe began on 1 September 1939 with
the German invasion of Poland. The Mediterranean was
relegated to the status of a secondary theater of operations,
at least initially. One reason was there were no belligerents
on its littoral. Italy, despite being part of the Berlin-Tokyo-
Rome Axis, started the war neutral. In addition, conditions
in the Mediterranean pointed toward unorthodox strategy
and tactics. The British, French, and Italian navies officially
adhered to traditional doctrine that called for fleets engaging
and destroying their opponents in surface actions. The re-
sponsibility to escort merchant ships, however, then required
a growing use of aircraft carriers, light craft, submarines and
mines.
In that environment, anti-convoy operations, or guerre
de course, and control of corresponding sea lanes of com-
munication, provided a means to reduce the enemy’s fight-
ing ability on land. The oceanography of the Mediterranean
itself also reinforced that approach. It was a narrow battle
space, bounded by irregular coastlines and dotted with many
islands useful as air and sea bases. The sea’s exit and entry
areas are chokepoints: Gibraltar, the Bosporus, and the Suez
Canal. Land based aircraft could dominate its waters and,
consequently, naval, air and land operations had to be inte-
grated.
Britain
The Royal Navy possessed the world’s largest fleet in
1939, and it was led by officers who understood the impor-
tance of power projection. Britain exploited that naval su-
periority to gain strategic maneuverability, deploying forces
to critical theaters of operation so as to be able to attain at
least local, temporary superiority there. Naval supremacy
also allowed logistical support of forces ashore as well as
cutting enemy lines of communication. Still, the British had
to contend not only with the Axis naval threat in the Atlantic,
but also the potential for a war with the Japanese in the east.
The principal threat in the Mediterranean, of course, was the
Italian Navy (Regia Marina Italiana).
Between September 1939 and June 1940, when Italy en-
tered the war, the Mediterranean remained relatively quiet.
London reasonably believed the Atlantic was the primary
naval theater of operations, with the threat there of German
surface raiders and U-boats taking strategic precedence. By
mid-1940, though, the British, isolated after the collapse of
their Allies on the continent, adopted a three-fold strategy
of defending the British Isles, retaining a strong Mediter-
War at sea: Italian cruiser Pola in battle.
34 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 34
ranean presence, and protecting more distant colonial inter-
ests. Three arms were to be employed in that strategy: the
Royal Navy (RN), the Fleet Air Arm (FAA), and the Royal
Air Force (RAF).
Aircraft carriers were essential within that strategic
framework to project airpower in regions where land bases
were few, as well as on the high seas. With the intensification
of the land campaign in North Africa, an additional responsi-
bility was assumed of convoying men and materiel.
Winston Churchill viewed the Mediterranean as Europe’s
“soft underbelly,” where a second front could be opened
against Germany’s more vulnerable allies. Consequently the
British reinforced their air and naval bases at Gibraltar, Mal-
ta and Suez. Given Axis domination of the Mediterranean’s
air lanes during the 1940-42, the British for the most part
abandoned large-scale convoy operations between Gibraltar
and Suez, with the exception of emergency supply to Malta
and Egypt. British convoys instead sailed the 10,000 miles
around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope rather than the more
direct, but also more dangerous, 2,400 miles through the
Mediterranean itself.
Naval Aviation
Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy all had initi-
ated aircraft carrier programs in the 1930s, but only the Brit-
ish eventually deployed an operational carrier force. Italian
dictator Benito Mussolini claimed “all of Italy is an aircraft
carrier and that no such ships are needed [by the Italian
Navy].”
While, in theory, Italian aircraft based on the mainland
or Sicily had much of the Mediterranean within their range,
land based airpower proved no substitute for a committed
naval air arm that could closely escort fleets and convoys at
sea.
The German carriers Graf Zeppelin and Peter Strasser
had haphazard development at best and never became opera-
tional.
As for the French, their converted battleship, Béarn, was
quickly deemed obsolete as a carrier and had to be redesig-
nated as only an aircraft tender.
The Royal Navy had six carriers in service by 1939,
including the Glorious in the Mediterranean. There were
also six more under construction. Technological innovation
provided those ships with further advantages. Illustrious’s
possession of Type 79 air warning radar, with 60 nautical
mile range, facilitated broad search and interdiction mis-
sions. With Valiant, Ajax, Coventry and Calcutta following
in August 1940, coordination between shore and ship based
planes was greatly enhanced. Anti-submarine actions using
ASDIC (Anti-Submarine Detector Indicator Committee, the
predecessor to sonar) also proved successful.
The Royal Navy’s Illustrious and Implacable carrier
classes even incorporated armored flight decks. There was,
however, a tradeoff with that, as the additional armor created
high centers of gravity on those ships that reduced stability.
Deck length was also limited, necessitating internal hangers
and lifts that further hampered efficient aircraft launch and
recovery.
Following its entry into the war in December 1941,
the US provided lend-lease escort carriers (CVE) for close
convoy protection, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and air
cover. There were some doctrinal differences between the
two Allies. US escort carrier doctrine stressed independent
4/15/09 4:24:32 PM
 Naval Strength (September 1939)
Aircraft Battleships/ Cruisers Destroyers Escorts Submarines
Carriers Battlecruisers
France 1/1 7/5 19/19 70/48 - 77/53
Germany - 5/- 8/- 22/- - 59/-
Italy - 2/2 19/19 50/50 - 108/108
Britain 6/1 15/3 61/7 181/26 54/4 59/10
The number before the slash is total naval strength for each belligerent. The number after the slash is
the number of that type deployed in the Mediterranean.

operations, with the carriers grouped into “hunter-killer” non-existent. An absence of sonar until October 1942, when
units. Royal Navy carriers remained in close support of the the SAFAR MC 3000 and GC 3000 models came into use,
convoys they escorted. effectively blinded the Italian fleet in anything other than
visual acquisition of submarines.
Italy (Regia Marina)
Perhaps most critically, the Regia Marina’s fuel re-
Mussolini’s plan was to make Italy a contending imperial
serves—1,666,674 tons in July 1940—proved hopelessly
power, with the Mediterranean as its Mare Nostrum (Latin
inadequate. The Germans provided some shipments of Ro-
for “our sea”). By 1939 Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rhodes, Libya and
manian oil, but by September 1940 a mere 58,750 tons of
the Adriatic Sea were under Italian control. In addition, Sar-
fuel remained. That made the Italians rely increasingly on
dinia and Sicily could be used as forward air and naval bases.
aircraft, mines, submarines and naval special forces. While
Still, Britain’s Suez and Gibraltar bases confined the Regia
those forces could and did exact a toll on Allied shipping,
Marina within the Mediterranean. As Italy approached ac-
they were incapable of maintaining control of vital sea
tive belligerency, it modernized its aging battleships Giulio
lanes.
Cesare and Conte di Cavour in anticipation of some great
surface action. Like their contemporaries in other European countries,
the Italian Naval High Command (Supermarina) believed
By June 1940 the Regia Marina enjoyed an impressive
Jutland-style fleet actions would be decisive. Consequently,
and generally modern fleet of cruisers, destroyers and nearly
the Regia Marina adopted hit-and-run raids aimed at pre-
operational “super-battleships.” It also had the world’s larg-
serving their ‘fleet in being.’ The idea was those raids would
est submarine force. The confining waters of the Adriatic
attrition the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean and thus set
and Aegean seemingly made speed and performance more
the stage for a decisive action—or at least avoid the destruc-
critical for Italian warships than protection, range and dam-
tion of the Italian fleet. That defensive husbanding, however,
age control. Sailing out of such waters, striking hard, then
also surrendered the initiative and diminished the ability of
retiring in safety took priority over ship-to-ship combat ca-
the Regia Marina to make an impact on the campaign in
pability.
North Africa. In the end that was decisive in that the Allied
The Italian dilemma came from the fact their military victory on land opened up Italy itself to amphibious inva-
functioned within a hopelessly unprepared larger frame- sion.
work. The Italians hadn’t maintained the pace of industri-
There was also the matter of command structure. Where
alization necessary to build a completely modern navy. The
Royal Navy commanders exercised operational control and
fascist economic system, for all its superficial efficiency,
could used their own initiative, their Italian counterparts
couldn’t mobilize the nation for war to the same degree as
were required to fulfill specific mission objectives. Any de-
Nazi Germany or the democracies. Exacerbating the situa-
viations required Supermarina’s approval. That adherence to
tion were assorted technological limitations. Ship designs
Mussolini’s directives promoted debilitating inter-command
weren’t compatible with larger gun calibers, while electric
rivalries.
torpedoes, reliable shells and radar were in short supply or continues on page 38

Name Displacement Main Speed Armor Commissioned

(Class) (Std. tons) Armament (in.) (knts.) (Belt/ Deck) (in.)
Battleships
Warspite (03) 31,315 8x15 /42 cal 25.0 6.0-13.0/2.5-5.0 3/1915
Queen Elizabeth Mk I
Heavy Cruisers
York (90) 8,415 6x8 /50 cal BL 30.75 1-4.38/1.5-3 5/1930
York Mk VIII
Orion (85) 7,215 8x6 /50 cal BL 32.5 2.0-4.0/2.0 1/1934
Leander Mk XXIII
Destroyers
Hasty (H 24) 1,340 4x4.7 Mk CP 35.5 - 11/1936
“H” XVIII
Jervis (F 00) “J” 1,760 6x4.7 36.0 - 8/1939
World at War 35

WaW 6 Issue.indd 35 4/15/09 4:24:32 PM

 Timeline
28 June 1940: “Espero” Convoy Attack. An Italian fast troop
convoy attempts to reinforce Tobruk when the British 7th
Cruiser Squadron sinks its escort, Espero.
3 July 1940: Mers-el-Kebir. British assault the Algerian-
based French fleet to prevent the Germans from seizing
those ships following the armistice.
4 July 1940: British Neutralize Alexandria-Based French
Fleet. Following Mers-el-Kebir, French naval units in Al-
exandria, Egypt, surrender to British forces.
6-10 July 1940: Battle of Punta Stilo. A brief engagement be-
tween Italian and British convoy escorts near Malta sets the
stage for future Mediterranean surface actions.
19 July 1940: Battle of Cerigotto/Cape Sapada. Italian
cruisers attempt to interdict British transports en route to
Greece, but are repulsed with the first Italian cruiser loss
of the war.
2 August 1940: Royal Navy Force H Attacks Cagliari, Sar-
dinia. The carrier Ark Royal launches Swordfish aircraft
against the Italian air base.
29 August – 5 September 1940: Operation Hats. An opera-
tion combining a Malta-bound convoy and a fast convoy
around Africa that adds two cruisers to the Royal Navy’s
Mediterranean Fleet.
24-25 September 1940: Vichy Planes Attack Gibraltar. In
retaliation for the British and Free French attack on Dakar,
36 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 36
roughly 100 Vichy bombers attack the anchorage but in-
flict little damage.
11-12 October 1940: Battle off Cape Passero. The Med-
iterranean’s first night action between the British 7th
Cruiser Division and intercepting Italian ships.
11-12 November 1940: Taranto & Otranto Raids. British
carrier-launched strike cripples half the existing Italian
battleship fleet at anchor, combined with a supporting
anti-convoy surface raid off Albania.
27 November 1940: Battle of Cap Spartivento/Teulada.
While escorting convoy “Collar” southwest of Sardinia,
British ships attack a numerically superior Italian force,
forcing its withdrawal.
January 1941: Flieger X arrives in the Mediterranean.
9 February 1941: Force H Attacks Genoa. Daring Royal
Navy bombardment is designed to lower Italian morale
and dissuade Spain from siding with the Axis.
28-29 March 1941: Battle off Cape Matapan/Cape Gav-
do. Italian ships on anti-convoy patrol conduct a long-
range battle with the Mediterranean Fleet that involves
torpedo-bombers and radar.
15-16 April 1941: Battle of the Kerkennah Islands/Tarigo
Convoy. Off the Tunisian coast a mixed Italo-German
convoy is attacked by the British 14th Destroyer Flotilla
with the loss of all freighters and the escorting Tarigo.
4/15/09 4:24:34 PM
 6-12 May 1941: Operation Tiger. Elements of Force H, in-
cluding Ark Royal, escort five fast freighters to Malta be-
fore continuing to Alexandria.
21-27 July 1941: Operation Substance. Reinforced by the
Home Fleet, Force H escorts five freighters to Malta.
24 September 1941: First U-Boat Enters the Mediterra-
nean. Throughout the rest of the year, U-boat strength in-
creases, scoring notable successes against Barham and Ark
Royal.
24-30 September 1941: Operation Halberd. Force H, includ-
ing Ark Royal and Home Fleet reinforcements, escorts nine
freighters to Malta that deliver 50,000 tons of supplies.
8-9 November 1941: Beta Convoy. Royal Navy Force K suc-
cessfully attacks the Libya-bound Italian convoy Beta.
23-25 November 1941: Maritza Convoy. Using ULTRA in-
telligence, Force K attempts to destroy this Axis convoy to
Benghazi.
5 December 1941: Fliegerkorps II Arrives in the Mediterra-
nean. This major Luftwaffe air formation moves from the
Eastern Front to neutralize British airpower on Malta and
support Axis troops in North Africa.
13-19 December 1941: Battle of Cape Bon. The fuel-laden
Italian 4th Cruiser Division is surprised by the Malta-bound
British 4th Destroyer Flotilla.
WaW 6 Issue.indd 37
17 December 1941: First Battle of Sirte Gulf. A major Italian
surface effort to break the British blockade of Libya.
19 December 1941: Force K Crippled. British Force K runs
into a minefield off Tripoli that damages several ships and
sinks the Neptune.
20-23 March 1942: Second Battle of Sirte Gulf. Lacking
battleships, elements of the British Mediterranean Fleet at-
tempt to supply Malta, but are attacked by the numerically
superior Italian 3rd Cruiser Division.
8 April 1942: Malta’s Worst Air Attack of the War. In an
all-out attempt to subdue the island, Axis air units launch
sustained and destructive attacks against the airport and
harbor.
11-16 June 1942: Convoys Vigorous & Harpoon. British
launch partially successful Alexandria and Gibraltar-based
convoys to supply Malta.
10-15 August 1942: Operation Pedestal. With Malta on the
verge of collapse, the British initiate a major supply effort.
9 September 1943: Italy Surrenders. As the Italian Fleet’s
main body sails to Malta to surrender, they are interdict-
ed by Luftwaffe aircraft that sink several ships including
Roma.
World at War 37
4/15/09 4:24:39 PM
 British Aircraft Carriers
Name Displacement Aircraft
(Class) (Std. Tons)
Fleet Aircraft Carriers
Formidable (67) 23,000 35
Illustrious
Aircraft Carriers
Ark Royal (91) 22,000 60
Ark Royal
Escort Aircraft Carriers
Archer (D 78) 11,300 16-21
Archer
Following the Luftwaffe’s defeat in the Battle of Britain
in the autumn of 1940, the Mediterranean became an impor-
tant Axis theater of operation, as one place where the Allies
could be confronted. The Regia Marina found itself assigned
ever increasing responsibilities but lacked the resources to
execute them.
The Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 brought
about another shift in strategic direction. The Italian Navy
and Air Force (Regia Aeronautica), which could have been
better used in the campaign against British Empire forces in
Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean, were diverted at a criti-
cal moment. In September, Italy’s Marshal Rodolfo Graziani
had invaded Egypt in a lackluster offensive. Gen. Richard
O’Conner’s counteroffensive, opening in December, quickly
overran Graziani’s forces. A concentrated Italian naval and
air offensive against British bases from Malta to Suez could
have made a difference but, in the event, operations were
indecisive.
With the Regia Marina’s refusal (or, given the fuel situ-
ation, inability) to undertake major fleet actions, its mission
also changed. The Italian Navy’s “principal, indeed only
task,” according to its fleet commander, Adm. Angelo Iachi-
no, became convoy and logistical security duty. To make
matters worse, at the start of the war a third of Italian mer-
chant ships (218 ships and 1,215,000 tons) were stranded,
captured or interned in foreign harbors.
Inadequate numbers of escort and auxiliary ships con-
tinued to plague the Regia Marina for the remainder of the
Italian heavy cruiser: Zara.
38 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 38
Speed Armor Commissioned
(knts.) (Belt/Deck) (in.)
30.5 4.5/4.38 5/1940
31.0 4.5/2.5 11/1938
17.8 -/6.0 (Wood) 4/1940
war. And again, politics made an impact. Mussolini expected
to maintain an intact combat fleet to leverage his post-war
position, so protection of merchant shipping got short shrift.
Meanwhile Germany refused to allow the Italians access to
French colonial ports in North Africa until November 1942,
largely to maintain the uneasy neutrality of Vichy France.
Unable to replace sunken merchant ships or confiscate
French vessels, the Italians resorted to more unorthodox
supply techniques. Merchant vessels sent to the overcrowd-
ed port of Tripoli were often pessimistically under-loaded
to speed transit and better enable the anticipated salvage
of damaged ships. Battleships were used as convoy escorts
starting in January 1942, and warships were on occasion em-
ployed as tankers.
Even when the Axis captured Tobruk in June 1942, its
port was underused as the approaches to it were vulnerable
to Allied interdiction. That led to the over-extension of land
supply routes as Axis forces under Rommel plunged into
Egypt. While the Regia Marina successfully maintained a
supply line to North Africa into early 1943, ad hoc measures
proved insufficient. That poor logistical situation did much
to determine the course of operations on the North African
mainland. If nothing else, the lack of a secure port between
Tripoli and the Egyptian frontier meant that what reinforce-
ments and supplies did reach North Africa couldn’t be swift-
ly concentrated.
In August 1942, with Axis forces stalled at El Alamein,
the Italian fleet attempted a recovery. Central to the dilemma
4/15/09 4:24:44 PM
 Italian Warships
Name Displacement Main Speed Armor Commissioned
(Class) (Std. Tons) Armament (in.) (knts.) (Belt/Deck) (in.)
Battleships
Vittorio Veneto 35,000 9 x Ansaldo 30.0 2.4-13.8/1.4-6.4 4/1940
Italia OTO 15 50cal
Model 1934
Conte di Cavour 23,619 10x12.6 43.8cal 28.0 3.1-9.8/.5-4.0 4/1915
Conte di Cavour Model 1934
Heavy Cruisers
Bolzano 10,500 8x8 53cal 36.0 2.75/2.0 8/1933
Model 1927
Destroyers
Nicoloso da Recco 1,628 6x4.7 50cal 38.0 - 1/1930
Granatiere Model 1933

was, as usual, the increasing fuel shortage. So the Italians Navy Special Assault Units
restricted their activities to essential merchant fleet support, While the Regia Marina’s major surface units proved in-
protective corvettes, and X MAS (Motoscafo Armato Silu- capable of achieving a decision at sea, the Italians deployed
rante) raiders, while the major surface units stayed in port. an assortment of supplementary craft that were effective.
The idea was to accumulate sufficient fuel reserves to allow The most successful of them was the secret, cover-named
for future major operations. 10th Light Flotilla (Decima Flottiglia MAS or X MAS).
The battleship Roma was also commissioned in 1942, Unexpectedly striking against Allied naval bases from Gi-
bringing battleship strength back to six. Five new destroy- braltar to Alexandria, that remarkable contingent of torpedo
ers and three new cruisers were also added to the fleet, but motor-boats (Surface Department) and SLC (Siluro a Lenta
those ships couldn’t compensate the for 45 and 11, respec- Corsa) Maiale (“pig boats”), two-man “human torpedoes,”
tively, lost of those types in the war up to that time. By Janu- miniature submarines, and assault swimmers (Underwater
ary 1943 only a third of the Italian Navy’s escorts remained Demolitions) inflicted severe damage on Allied shipping.
afloat, while 1,278 merchant ships had been sent to the bot- The Regia Marina’s progressive application of those assault
tom. With the final Axis capitulation in North Africa in May units in coastal defense and interdiction roles accounted for
1943, the Regia Marina ceased operations. the sinking or disabling of 28 allied ships totaling 202,762
Regia Marina Fuel Usage tons (72,190 in warships and 130,572 in merchantmen).
Destroyers: 42% (758,968 tons) The 10th Light Flotilla used small exploding motorboats
(MTM-modified touring boat, Motoscafo Turismo Modifi-
Torpedo Boats: 34% (624,513 tons) cato or E-Boat) to sink the British cruiser York and cripple
Corvettes: 3% (49,644) the merchant ship Pericles in Suda Bay in March 1941. SLC
Italian Warship Losses: 339 ships “pigs” provided effective harbor-penetration, raiding, and
Regia Marina Tonnage Dispatched to North Africa anti-shipping capabilities as well. On 19 December 1941,
the Marceglia and de la Penne, with 300 kilogram detach-
1940 98.0% able hull-detonating warheads, sank the Alexandria-based
1941 83.9%
1942 84.2%
To Tunisia Rotta della morte 68.3%
(The road to death)
Last Quarter 59.1%

Italian Shipments
Libya:
1,930,000 tons (14% losses)
189,200 men (8.4% losses)
Tunisia:
306,530 (28.0% losses)
72,250 men (7.0% losses)
Italian Shipments to North Africa Sent Safely:
91.7% of 206,202 men
84.6% of 2,844,698 supplies
Naval special ops: Italian mini-sub.
World at War 39

WaW 6 Issue.indd 39 4/15/09 4:24:45 PM

 French Warships
Name Displacement Main Armament Speed Armor Commissioned
(Class) (Std. tons) (in.) (knts.) (Belt/Deck) (in.)
Battleships
Dunkerque 26,500 8x13 52cal 29.5 5.75-11.0/7.0 4/1937
Dunkerque Model 1931
Heavy Cruisers
Algérie 10,000 8x8 50cal 31 4.33/1.0-3.14 9/1934
Croiseurs de 1ère Model 1931
Destroyers
Le Fantasque 2,569 5x5.5 50cal 37 - 3/1934
Le Fantasque

Queen Elizabeth and Valiant in harbor. That removed the
last British battleships in the Mediterranean (Barham having
been sunk by U-331 on 25 November), and left Axis con-
voys much safer for the next five months. Italian naval spe-
cial forces thereby gained more for the Axis than did their
entire surface fleet.
X MAS units also targeted the Allied bases in Algiers and
Gibraltar. The latter’s position as British Fleet Headquarters
(Western Mediterranean) made it especially critical as the
home port for many Allied warships and merchant vessels.
“Pigs” and assault swimmers operated covertly against
those vessels from a partially scuttled ship, the Olterra, off
neutral Spain’s coast. Known as the “Floating Trojan Horse
of Gibraltar,” X MAS attacked targets of opportunity at Gi-
braltar, sinking or damaging 14 ships (82,967 tons) between
September 1941 and August 1943. Ambitious plans were
drawn up for an attack against New York, but the Italian ar-
mistice in September 1943 ended that proceeding.
France (Marine Nationale)
Like its Italian counterpart, the Marine Nationale focused
on retaining a strong Mediterranean position from which to
protect colonial possessions in Syria and North Africa as
well as metropolitan locales. French naval forces were active
during the 1939-40 winter drôle de guerre (“Phony War”),
while the western front was quiet. On 10 June 1940, Mus-
solini declared war on France. On 14 June, with France on
the verge of capitulation, elements of the French fleet bom-
barded Genoa and Vado, severely damaging the former’s oil
production installation. With the armistice, the Marine Na-
War in the air: Italian Savoia bombers.
40 #6
tionale withdrew to bases at Toulon, Bizerta, Algiers, Oran,
Mers-el-Kébir and Alexandria. France capitulated on 21
June, and technically its armed forces reverted to neutrality.
With Britain now focusing on the Mediterranean, the
French naval situation became even bleaker. The Marine
Nationale was faced with conflicting loyalties between the
Vichy administration under Marshal Pétain and De Gaulle’s
Free French “government-in-exile.”
Fearing the Axis would seize French warships, the Royal
Navy attacked the French fleet anchored at Mers-el-Kébir
on 3 July 1940, sinking three battleships, while the French
Force X in Alexandria, Egypt, was subsequently disarmed.
The irony was those moves were unnecessary, as the Ger-
mans lacked the trained crews to use any seized French
ships. The British attack on its former ally also had political
repercussions, further entrenching French anti-Allied senti-
ment.
During the Marine Nationale’s neutral interim it achieved
some success protecting French merchant shipping. Some
4,440,000 tons of Axis supplies were delivered to North
Africa via French ports between July 1940 and November
1942 when, with Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of
Algeria, French forces in North Africa broke with Vichy and
Germany. Ultimately, then, the combination of French war-
ships and merchant marine convoys can be said to have kept
their overseas empire viable during the Nazi occupation.
Naval Air Power & Air Warfare
Britain (Fleet Air Arm)
The Royal Navy’s limited resources restricted Mediter-
ranean deployments to a maximum of two aircraft carriers
prior to mid-1943. Throughout the war, land-based aircraft
provided the majority of air support.
The Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm initially deployed 232
aircraft to the theater; however, their actual combat value
was questionable. The aircraft included a large number of
outdated biplanes. A dearth of pre-war naval air doctrine
then further hindered operations as FAA coordination with
land-based RAF commands was often lacking. Early car-
rier aircraft complements were small, composed only of
three fighters and 17 torpedo-bombers on each. Even so,
skilled FAA pilots employed obsolete Blackburn Skuas to
great effect in escort and interdiction duties, while outdated
Swordfish Torpedo-Spotter-Reconnaissance (TSR) planes
sustained anti-shipping operations.
Tactics dictated aircraft attacking bigger ships with their
larger silhouettes. Swordfish biplanes achieved successes
against Italian shipping at Taranto and Cape Matapan.

WaW 6 Issue.indd 40 4/15/09 4:24:46 PM

 British Aircraft
Name Speed Armament Ceiling Range Payload (lbs)
(mph) (feet) (mi)
Fighters
Fulmar MkII 259 8 x 7.7mm MG 16,000 783 250
Blackburn Skua MkII 225 5 x 7.7mm MG 20,500 760 500
Supermarine Seafire MkII 351 2 x 20mm MG 33,888 725 500
Torpedo-Bomber-Reconnaissance
Fairey Swordfish MkI 139 2 x 7.7mm MG 10,700 546 1,500 or 1x1,610 torpedo
Bristol Beaufort MkI 265 4 x 7.7mm MG 16,500 1,600 2,000 or 1,610 torpedo
TBF-1 Grumman Avenger 278 2x.30 cal MG, 23,368 1,215 2,000 or 1x1,921 torpedo
1x.50 cal MG
Fairey Albacore MkI 161 3 x 7.7mm MG 20,700 932 2,000 or 1,610 torpedo
Reconnaissance
Supermarine Walrus MkI 135 2 x 7.7mm MG 18,500 600 760

Italy (Regia Aeronautica Italiana) the Regia Marina, resulting in limited naval-aerial recon-
The Royal Italian Air Force (Regia Aeronautica Italiana) naissance and negligible CAP (combat air patrol) for ship-
enjoyed excellent leadership and a Douhet-inspired doctrine ping. Making matters worse were flaws in existing naval
emphasizing the offensive, with strategic bombing of enemy seaplanes. The catapult-launched Ro-43 recon aircraft were
infrastructure being the theoretical imperative. The Regia unrecoverable at sea and had to land ashore. There was also
Aeronautica’s growth indirectly reflected Mussolini’s advo- the underlying deficiency in Italy’s failure to build aircraft
cacy of airpower as a symbol of the future. The reality, how- carriers. While later in the war the Italians attempted to con-
ever, was Italy had virtually no modern aircraft available at vert merchant ships into carriers, those efforts were too little
the war’s start and, indeed, many of its existing designs were and too late.
rapidly becoming obsolete. Reserves were deficient and tac- The primary Regia Aeronautica aircraft were the CR-42
tical doctrine was undeveloped—and the Axis was facing a biplane, the Savoia-79 bomber and the Cant-501 flying boat.
campaign in the Mediterranean in which strategic bombing The striking power of those aircraft was inadequate, but
would be of minimal importance. then their British counterparts weren’t much better. Argu-
Italian efforts had been concentrated on the building of ably the best Regia Aeronautica aircraft was the improvised
an independent air force not subject to army or navy control. three-engine torpedo/bomber, the SIAI Marchetti SM. 79-1.
While that was certainly a step in the right direction, it ran Italian planes operated from airfields positioned to threaten
afoul of the already fragile inter-service coordination struc- Allied bases from Malta to the Suez Canal, but those facili-
ture. Since the Regia Aeronautica had to conduct a campaign ties lacked the mobility of carriers. Further reducing overall
over the Mediterranean, it needed to closely coordinate with combat effectiveness was Italy’s lack of torpedo production.
the naval command. A mere nine torpedo squadrons were equipped by 1942, a
glaring deficiency for an air force that was supposed to be
In the event, priorities for the Regia Aeronautica and its
attacking enemy shipping.
Luftwaffe partner were continually placed above those of
continues on page 44
Italian Aircraft
Name Speed Armament Ceiling Range Payload
(mph) (feet) (mi) (lbs)
Fighters
Fiat CR 42 272 2 x 12.7mm MG 34,450 480 490
Torpedo Bomber
SIAI Marchetti 267 3 x 12.7mm MG 23,000 1,180 2,756
SM. 79-1 Sparviero 2 x 7.7mm MG
(Sparrow Hawk)
CRDA Cant Z.506B 226 1 x 12.7mm MG, 26,240 1,700 2,650
Airone (Heron) 3 x 7.7mm MG
Reconnaissance
CRDA Cant Z.501 171 3 x 7.7mm MG 22,965 1,490 1,408
Gabbiano (Seagull)
IMAM Ro. 43 186 2 x 7.7mm MG 21,600 678 -
(Catapult)
World at War 41

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 Taranto: Prelude to Pearl Harbor Order of Battle, Taranto
In November 1940 the Royal Navy’s FAA launched an British
operation, the objective of which was nothing less than the Commander: Rear Adm. A. L. St. G. Lyster
nullification of the Regia Marina’s central Mediterranean
Carrier: R.87 Illustrious
presence and the removal of the threat to Malta and the Gi-
braltar-Suez convoy traffic. The FAA’s target was Italy’s 21 Swordfish (813, 815, 819, & 824 Squadrons.)
main naval base at Taranto. It was home port to a full com- 1st wave (12)- Led by Lt.-Cdr. N. W. Williamson, 815
plement of Regia Marina battleships and heavy cruisers. Sqn.
The British carried out thorough preparations for the air 2nd wave (9)- Led by Lt.-Cdr. J. W. Hale, 819 Sqn.
raid. RAF photoreconnaissance provided important details Carrier Illustrious air defense (806 Sqn.)
on anchorages, anti-aircraft and searchlight positions, as well 14 Fulmars
as previously unknown barrage balloons. Six Royal Navy
4 Sea Gladiators
groups coordinated diversionary attacks to overload Italian
naval intelligence while the Taranto strike force moved to- Heavy Cruisers: Berwick, York
ward its ‘fly off’ point. Light Cruisers: Glasgow, Gloucester
That fly off point was 170 miles southeast of Taranto. Destroyers: Hasty, Havock, Hyperion, Ilex
HMS Illustrious launched 21 torpedo and bomb-loaded Italians
Swordfish in two groups on 11 November. By 11:00 p.m. the Harbor Commander: Vice-Adm. Arturo Riccardi
first wave of 12 aircraft was over the target, coming in from
Main Battlefleet: Vice-Adm. Inigo Campioni
as low as 30 feet, with the Italian ships silhouetted by flares.
The Swordfish braved heavy flak to hit Conte di Cavour and 9th Naval Division: Rear Adm. Carlo Bergamini
Littorio. A second wave of nine more aircraft further dam- 1st Cruiser Division: Vice-Adm. Angelo Iachino
aged Caio Duilio and Littorio. The Littorio was crippled for Fixed Harbor Defenses
a year, Caio Duilio beached, and Conte di Cavour was put 21 x 102mm guns
out of action for the duration of the war. Several minor ships
84 x 37mm and 20mm cannons
were also damaged. The results weren’t bad for the loss of a
mere two Swordfish. 109 x light machineguns
Taranto was the first major air-launched attack on a 600+ ship guns
protected anchorage. It not only ended the Regia Marina’s 4,600 yards of torpedo nets
hopes for control of the Mediterranean, it ushered in the 27 barrage balloons
carrier’s ascendancy over the battleship. That was a lesson Forces Employed
that didn’t go unnoticed by the Japanese Navy, whose of-
Mar Grande (Outer Harbor)
ficers later visited Italy to better understand the FAA tactics
that had been involved. A year later, highly trained Japanese Battleships: Andrea Doria, Caio Duilio (beached), Conte
naval aircrews preformed a similar carrier-launched attack di Cavour (sunk), Guilio Cesare, Littorio (sunk), Vittorio
on the US fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor. Veneto
Heavy Cruisers: Fiume, Gorizia, Zara
Destroyers: Baleno, Carducci, Folgore, Fulmine,
Gioberti, Lampo, Oriani
Mar Piccolo (Inner Harbor)
Heavy Cruisers: Bolzano, Pola, Trento, Trieste
Light Cruisers: Giuseppe Garibaldi, Luigi Di Savoia
Duca Degli Abruzzi
Destroyers: Alpino, Ascari, Bersagliere, Camicia Nera,
Carabiniere, Corazziere, Dardo, Da Recco, Freccia,
Fuciliere, Geniere, Granatiere, Grecale, Lanciere, Li-
beccio, Maestrale, Pessagno, Saetta, Scirocco, Strale,
Usodimare
Fleet Torpedo Boats
16 Submarines
4 Minesweepers
1 Minelayer
9 Tankers
2 Hospital/Rescue ships

Assault on Malta: Luftwaffe Ju-88 bomber flies over the island.

42 #6

WaW 6 Issue.indd 42 4/15/09 4:24:48 PM

 MALTA
The island of Malta was positioned directly astride the Axis North African sea routes. The British turned the island into an
ideal base for interdicting Axis traffic. Of course, that made Malta a prime target for German and Italian air attack. Combined
Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica strikes nearly crippled Malta in 1941 and forced the Royal Navy to rely on blockade-runners
to supply its garrison.
The situation turned around, though, in September 1941 when British torpedo-bomber raids began disrupting Axis con-
voys. Luftwaffe attacks recommenced in full strength during January 1942, and the Axis gained air superiority over the area by
April. The island’s supplies were reduced to dangerously low levels, and there was the threat of an Italo-German airborne and
amphibious invasion.
Timely reinforcement by Spitfire fighters enabled the British to challenge Axis air superiority. The planned-for Axis inva-
sion was then finally canceled when the aircraft and assault units needed for it were diverted to Rommel’s drive into Egypt.
The balance at sea and in the air shifted toward the Allies throughout the remainder of the year, and by November 1942 Malta
was back in business.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, Adm. Sir An-

ULTRA
ULTRA was the British code-breaking operation that got its
start in January 1940 at Bletchley Park’s Government Code and Ci-
pher School (GC&CS). Secretly captured and unencrypted German
“Enigma” ciphers provided invaluable insight into Axis operations,
as well as convoy routes and cargoes. ULTRA’s information worked
best when integrated within other surveillance and intelligence gath-
ering operations. In practice, ULTRA’s utility was often hampered
in that its existence was so secret the British used cover stories to
indicate to the Axis the information they’d gained had been due to
other intelligence operations. Intelligence was, therefore, often so
slowly processed it became outdated and had to be disregarded by
commanders in the theater. Still, ULTRA is credited with shortening
the war by at least a year.
drew Browne Cunningham, KCB, DSO (1883-1963). Cun-
ningham’s offensive strategy served Britain well throughout
the Mediterranean campaign. He was known for his roguish wit
and being a stickler for military custom. Never shy to give an
opinion, his strategy of confronting the Regia Marina whenever
possible, and as far forward as possible, effectively protected
the Suez Canal and kept open British sea lanes. His extensive
experience with destroyers was suitable for the Mediterranean’s
“narrow water” environment, requiring as it did quick decision
making in the face of superior enemy forces.
Cunningham emphasized sustaining a high level of activity at
sea in order to maintain an operative fleet-in-being to overcome
numerical deficiencies. His approach was to focus British naval
and air resources at the times and locations where they would
produce maximum effect.
While an extraordinary naval strategist, he lacked a full un-
derstanding of airpower, due in part to the inflexibility of his
battleship-heavy force. Still, he won through in the end.
World at War 43

WaW 6 Issue.indd 43 4/15/09 4:24:49 PM

 German Aircraft
Name Speed Armament Ceiling Range Payload Notes
(mph) (feet) (mi) (lbs)
Fighters
Bf 110D-3 349 6 x 7.9mm MG, 32,800 528 2,205 Aufklärungsgruppe: reconaissance group
2 x 20mm MG Stab: staff command element
Bomber Gruppe: group
Staffel: squadron
He 111H-3 258 6 x 7.9mm MG, 25,590 745 4,410 Kampfgeschwader: bomber wing
1 x 20mm MG Sturzkampfgewschwader: dive
Ju 88A-4 292 3 x 7.9mm MG, 26,900 1,056 6,614 bomber wing
2 x 13mm MG Lehrgeschwader: demonstration wing
Ju 87R-2 236 3 x 7.9mm MG 26,315 954 551 Zerstörergeschwader: destroyer (heavy
fighter) wing
Reconnaissance
Ju 88D-1 301 3 x 7.9mm MG 26,250 2,983 -

Germany (Luftwaffe) Luftwaffe doctrine stressed independent operations and

In early 1941 the Third Reich was preparing for its inva- favored fighters, twin-engine bombers, and transport aircraft.
sion of the Soviet Union. Consequently the Germans were Fliegerkorps X was also strong in short-range dive-bombers
unable to send significant forces to the Mediterranean other (the famous Ju-87 Stuka), but those aircraft proved generally
than some submarines and aircraft. The Luftwaffe’s Flieg- ineffective against moving ships, though their attacks could
erkorps X (nicknamed CAT by the Italians—Corpo Aereo be shattering against vessels in port. The Germans were also
Tedesco) transferred from Norway to Sicily in January to deficient in torpedo planes. Nonetheless, Fliegerkorps X
counter growing Allied pressure. demonstrated, albeit briefly, land-based airpower could seize
control of the seas and neutralize a modern navy.
The pilots and crews of Fliegerkorps X prided them-
selves as anti-shipping specialists. One such mission was Fliegerkorps X (12 January 1941)
the neutralization of the British base on Malta. Malta was
positioned such that its aircraft could attack Axis convoys en Commanding officer: Gen. Geisler
route to North Africa. The appearance of Fliegerkorps X so- 255 aircraft total, 179 serviceable
lidified Axis air superiority in the central Mediterranean and Unit Airfield Type
protected the newly arriving Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK)
route to North Africa. Zerstörergeschwader 26
The Royal Navy was at first unprepared to deal with III. Gruppe Palermo Bf 110D-3
the new Luftwaffe onslaught. Consequently the British took Lehrgeschwader 1
considerable damage from Axis aerial attacks in 1941. Adm.
Stab Catania Ju 88A-4
Cunningham was forced to cancel all daylight shipping runs
and shifted to nighttime operations. Fliegerkorps X, how- II. Gruppe Catania Ju 88A-4
ever, had yet another surprise in store with its night com- III. Gruppe Catania Ju 88A-4
bat capabilities. Following Luftwaffe offensive operations
in March 1941, Britain’s central Mediterranean presence Kampfgeschwader 4
became almost untenable and German aerial attacks on the IV. Gruppe Comiso He 111H-3/5
Suez Canal even occasionally closed that waterway. Kampfgeschwader 26
II. Gruppe Comiso He 111H-3/5
Sturzkampfgewschwader 1
I. Gruppe Trapani Ju 87R-2
Sturzkampfgewschwader 2
II. Gruppe Trapani Ju 87R-2
Sturzkampfgewschwader 3
Stab Trapani Ju 87R-2
Aufklärungsgruppe 121
1. Staffel Catania Ju 88D-1

In North Africa: Luftwaffe airfield. continued on page 47

44 #6

WaW 6 Issue.indd 44 4/15/09 4:24:51 PM

 Shipping Sunk in Mediterranean
1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Merchant Allied 64,183 501,363 365,127 635,658 159,545 14,374
(tonnage)
(number) 13 158 73 137 30 2
Axis 253,452 691,658 576,704 1,466,611 930,885 80,930
104 313 288 1,223 642 104
Carriers Allied 0 1 1 0 0 0
Ger/It 0 0 0 0 0 0
Battleships Allied 0 1 0 0 0 0
Ger/It 0/1 0/0 0/0 0/- 0/- 0/-
Cruisers Allied 1 8 5 1 2 0
Ger/It 0/1 0/7 0/3 0/3 0/- 0/-
Destroyers Allied 3 15 25 9 4 0
Ger/It 0/9 0/15 0/8 1/11 3/2 4/2
Submarines Allied 4 8 15 7 1 0
Ger/It 0/19 3/12 14/22 20/16 29/- 1/-

Merchant Fleets (1939)

Country Vessels Tonnage
France 1,231 2,933,933
Germany 2,459 4,482,662
Italy 1,227 3,424,804
UK 6,722 17,891,134

The prize: Suez Canal from the air.

World at War 45

WaW 6 Issue.indd 45 4/15/09 4:24:53 PM

 Allied & Axis Front-Line Aircraft (Mediterranean 6/1940 - 3/1945)
Date Allied German Italian
1940 June 300 (Middle East) - 1,770 RA + 300 (Libya)
1941 Jan. 208 (Middle East) 410 330
June 419 (Middle East) 320 376 (N Africa and Sicily)
Oct. 780 (Middle East) 642 544 (N Africa and Sicily)
1942 Jan. 445 (Desert Air Force) 560 277 (N Africa and Sicily)
June 803 (Med) + 463 (N Africa) 357 (Med) + 183 (N Africa) 748 (Med) + 248 (N Africa)
Nov. 1,500 (Middle East) + 920 940 (Med) + 375 (N Africa) 515 (Med) + 283 (N Africa)
(W Africa)
1943 Apr. 3,241 (Med) 800 (Med) + 200 (N Africa) 376 (outside N & C Italy)
July 3,680 (Med) 960 (Med) 300
Aug. 841 (Italy) 450
Oct. 571 (Italy) -
Dec. 4,000 (Med) 470 (Med) + 341 (Italy) -
1944 Jan. 575 (Med) + 370 (Italy) -
Mar. 3,960 (Med) 760 (Med) + 566 (Italy) -
July 5,000 (Med) 300 (Med) + 125 (Italy) -
Nov. 104 (Italy) -
1945 Mar 4,000 (Med) 217 (Italy) -

Annual Allied and Axis Crude Oil Production (1939-1945)

m. metric tons
US UK Total Germany* Italy Total
1939 - unknown unknown 5.3 - 5.3
1940 - 11.9 11.9 8.0 .01 8.01
1941 - 13.9 13.9 9.6 .12 9.72
1942 183.9 11.2 195.1 11.2 .01 11.21
1943 199.6 15.8 215.4 13.2 .01 13.21
1944 222.5 21.4 243.9 9.5 - 9.5
1945 227.2 16.6 243.8 unknown unknown unknown
Total 833.2 90.8 924.0 56.8 .17 56.95
* Includes synthetic oil

End of campaign: Allied troops

land in Algiers.

46 #6

WaW 6 Issue.indd 46 4/15/09 4:24:54 PM

 Amphibious & Combined Operations
By late 1942 the Royal Navy was regaining dominance
in the Mediterranean. US military leaders wanted a direct
invasion of German occupied Europe through France, but
the Allies instead settled on Operation Torch, the invasion
of French North Africa. To the Americans it seemed a diver-
sion from the establishment of a “second front” in Europe.
The British, though, emphasized exploiting weak points,
invading Italy or the Balkans to dissipate Axis strength onto
several fronts. British operational doctrine for amphibious
operations, based on experience from Gallipoli (1915), Nor-
way (1940), Greece (1941), and Dieppe (1942) showed the
need for deployment of overwhelming numbers of landing
craft, warships and aircraft, as well as experienced person-
nel—and all those were still in short supply during 1942.
In any event, the Allies conducted several amphibious
landings in the Mediterranean, into North Africa, Sicily
and mainland Italy. They proved successful, and Italy was
knocked out of the war. By January 1944, however, the
Mediterranean amphibious strategy had run out of steam,
as the Allies were held up at Anzio by a tenacious German
defense. The restricted waters of the Adriatic and Aegean
made warships and transports more vulnerable than on the
open ocean, and the withdrawal of landing craft and other
forces to support operations in the Pacific and the Overlord
invasion brought an end to the Allied naval offensive in the
Mediterranean.
Conclusion
What is amazing is the Axis powers contested Allied
naval power in the Mediterranean for as long as they did.
Further, they did so despite the general inferiority of the
Italo-German navy, compounded by a lack of sufficient oil
reserves. Among other things, the Axis supported an army
in North Africa that threatened British bases in the Middle
East as well as the Suez Canal. Fliegerkorps X’s flexible use
of offensive airpower also did much to challenge the Royal
Navy, vindicating to some degree the Italian doctrine of us-
ing airbases as substitutes for aircraft carriers.
Of course, to the Germans the Mediterranean was a
secondary theatre. Starting in June 1941, the Luftwaffe was
heavily engaged on the Eastern Front, as well as having re-
sponsibility for interdicting British waters and defending the
Reich’s airspace. The lack of offensive orientation in the Re-
gia Marina (including the absence of aircraft carriers) meant
the Axis couldn’t consolidate any victory at sea. Air raids
and naval special operations attacks, while inflicting losses
on the Allies, didn’t give the Axis the power of a true fleet-
in-being.
In the end the Axis underestimated Allied resolve in the
Mediterranean. It was the one theater in which the British
could challenge the Axis, and they exploited it accordingly.
Allied emphasis on amphibious operations also gave them
a strategic instrument with which they could strike at the
sources of Axis airpower and ultimately knock Germany’s
partner Italy out of the war.
at
WaW 6 Issue.indd 47
Sources
Bagnasco, Erminio and Grossman, Mark. Regia Marina: Italian
Battleships of World War Two. Missoula, Montana: Pictorial
Histories Publishing Co., 1986.
Beesly, Patrick. Very Special Intelligence. Hamish Hamilton: Great
Britain, 1977.
Bennett, Ralph. Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy. William Mor-
row & Company, Inc., 1989.
Borghese, Iunio Valerio. Sea Devils: Italian Navy Commandos in
World War II. A. Melrose, London, 1952.
Brown, Eric. Wings of the Navy: Flying Allied Carrier Aircraft of
World War II. Pilot Press, Ltd.: Annapolis, MD, 1980.
Campbell, John. Naval Weapons of World War Two. London: Con-
way Maritime Press Ltd., 1985.
Coates, Tim. East of Malta West of Suez: The Admiralty Account of
Naval War in the Eastern Mediterranean, September 1939 to
March 1941. Stationery Office Books, 2001.
_______. Fleet Air Arm. Stationery Office Books, 2001.
Cunningham, Viscount Andrew. A Sailor’s Odyssey. London:
Hutchinson, 1951.
Ellis, John. World War II: A Statistical Survey. New York: Facts on
File, 1993.
Greene, Jack. The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940-1943.
London: Chatham Publishing, 1998.
Griess, Thomas E., ed. The Second World War: Europe and the Med-
iterranean. Avery Publishing Group, Inc.:Wayne, NJ, 1984.
Grove, Eric. Sea Battles in Close-up: World War II, vol. 2. Annapo-
lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993.
Howard, Michael. The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World
War. Greenhill Books: London, 1993.
Koburger, Charles W., Jr.: The Cyrano Fleet: France and Its Navy,
1940-1942, Praeger Publishers. New York, 1989.
_______. Naval Warfare in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1940-1945.
Westport, CT, 1993.
Lowry, Thomas P. & Wellham, John W. G. The Attack on Taranto:
Blueprint for Pearl Harbor. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole
Books, 1995.
Pack, S.W.C. Night Action off Cape Matapan. Annapolis, MD: Na-
val Institute Press, 1973.
Schofield, B. B. The Attack on Taranto. Great Britain: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 1973.
Shores, Christopher. Regia Aeronautica. Warren, MI: Squadron/Sig-
nal Publications, Inc., 1976.
Shirer, William L.: The Collapse of the Third Republic, Pocket
Books. New York, 1971.
Stephen, Martin. Sea Battles in Close-up World War II. Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988.
Sadkovich, James J. The Italian Navy in World War II. Greenwood
Press, 1994.
Winton, John. Cunningham. The Greatest Admiral Since Nelson.
John Murray Publishers. Ltd. London, 1998.
World at War 47
4/15/09 4:24:54 PM
 MEDWAR Post Mortem
By Joseph Miranda
The
war in the Mediterranean pro-
vides many lessons, most of them
negative. For one, it demonstrat-
ed that, despite overwhelming
British naval superiority, there never was an attempt by the
Allies to clear the Mediterranean of Axis naval forces. That
failure was further highlighted with the entry of the US into
the war on 7 December 1941, and the ensuing buildup of
American naval power in the following years. The combined
Anglo-American fleets still couldn’t engage and destroy the
much smaller Italian and German fleets in the Mediterra-
nean.
The campaign lasted from Italy’s declaration of war
against France in June 1940 to the Allied landings in south-
ern Italy in September 1943, a period of over three years.
Those years saw numerous minor fleet actions involving
cruisers and destroyers, air attacks against naval forces and
bases, and naval special operations. Despite the interwar de-
cade’s emphasis on capital ship building by Britain, the US
and Italy, however, there never was any general action be-
tween opposing battle fleets. The situation can be compared
to a much shorter period during the Pacific War surround-
ing the Guadalcanal campaign of August 1942 to February
1943, which saw several actions between opposing cruiser
fleets and at least one battleship versus battleship fight.
One reason for the indecision was doctrinal. In the
Mediterranean both sides operated to some degree under
the “fleet in being” concept, which emphasized maintaining
one’s battleships as a threat and deterrent rather than risk-
ing them in combat. To give an example of the indecision in
the Mediterranean, as late as August 1943 the Allied navies
proved unwilling to interdicting the strait between Sicily and
48 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 48
the Italian mainland. After a hard fought delaying action, the
Germans evacuated their divisions and many of the Italians
from Sicily with hardly any Allied interference. The Royal
Navy high command explained that lack of aggressiveness
was due to concerns that attacking Axis coastal defenses
might have led to another repeat of the disasters of the first
phase of Gallipoli, 1915, in which British capital ships took
considerable losses due to Turkish shore-based defenses and
minefields. Allied naval superiority in the European Theater
of Operations in World War II was far greater than it had
been in World War I, though, which indicates what was re-
ally in play in 1943 was a lack of mission focus for naval
power in a combined naval-air-land theater of operations.
The Royal Navy was in fact limited by several factors.
One was the need to keep the fleet divided between the At-
lantic, the Mediterranean and, after Japan entered the war,
the Pacific. Another factor was the Royal Navy lacked the
support ships possessed by the US Navy, making it logisti-
cally difficult to keep a fleet at sea. Given the lack of Al-
lied naval bases in the central Mediterranean, maintaining a
permanent naval presence was difficult. The threat of Axis
airpower against vessels that sortied too far toward Italy was
also considerable.
On the Italian side, the reluctance to fight is more under-
standable, given their battle line was outnumbered by that
of the Allies. That numeric disparity was made all the worse
after the losses the Italians sustained as a result of the British
air attack on their battleship anchorage at Taranto in Novem-
ber 1940. The general Axis fuel shortage also did much to
limit Italian sorties. The Italian fleet was therefore less effec-
tive than it could have been had it been more aggressively
utilized. As for the Kriegsmarine, it was an ocean away fac-
4/15/09 4:24:55 PM
 ing the North Sea. Even had Hitler decided to commit it to
the Mediterranean, it’s doubtful it could have transited Gi-
braltar or been sustained from bases in southern France and
Italy.
The naval units that made the difference ended up being
the unconventional forces. Italian naval special operations
units crippled several major Royal Navy units. British car-
rier aviation crippled much of the Italian fleet at Taranto. The
Luftwaffe counterbalanced the Royal Navy via its control of
the air over the central Mediterranean, thereby at least par-
tially vindicating inter-war airpower advocates who claimed
the airplane would render naval power obsolete.
The real advantage of air superiority was not so much
that it could sink enemy capital ships, but rather that it could
attack enemy cargo and transport traffic, thereby making it
difficult for a force relying on naval lines of communication
to sustain itself. An extreme example of that was Operation
Mercury, the German airborne assault on Crete in May 1941.
There the Royal Navy was able to turn back German naval
reinforcements for the attack; however, it was the Luftwaffe
transport fleet of Ju-52s and gliders that brought the assault
troops and then sustained them via airlift. And it was the
Luftwaffe that was able to make the waters surrounding
Crete unsafe for the Royal Navy.
Carrier aviation ought to have held the most promise for
the Mediterranean, as demonstrated by operations concur-
rent in the Pacific Theater. The British, with just one carrier,
crippled the Italian battle fleet at Taranto. Yet Taranto was a
unique operation, never repeated in the Mediterranean, de-
spite the fact the Royal Navy had several aircraft carriers, all
of which could be supplemented in 1942-43 by even more
American carriers. The Allies had an absolute advantage in
carrier aviation, since the Italians and Germans had no op-
erational aircraft carriers. If just one Allied carrier launching
20 or so biplanes could accomplish so much at Taranto, what
then might have happened had the Allies employed several
carriers, launching more modern attack aircraft?
With the Italian battle fleet effectively taken out of the
war at Taranto, the opportunity was there for a general Allied
naval offensive that could’ve cut off Axis forces in North
Africa and made superfluous the protracted land battles in
the Western Desert and Tunisia. Axis forces in North Africa
relied on naval shipping for reinforcements and supplies.
Had Allied naval forces gained control of the sea lanes, or
blockaded Axis ports, it would have been impossible for the
Axis to sustain the operations of Panzerarmee Afrika.
The main Axis counterforce to Allied naval power was
airpower. Supposedly, the many Italian islands, as well as
the Italian peninsula itself, could provide all the aircraft
bases needed. While land-based aviation lacked the flexibil-
ity of the carriers to move about the seas and provide close
air cover for offensive fleet operations, that theory did have
some truth to it. The Luftwaffe, flying from its bases in Sic-
ily and elsewhere, were able to negate much of Allied naval
power in the Mediterranean.
The Luftwaffe restored some of the naval imbalance by
attacking Allied shipping at sea and raiding the British base
at Malta. As a result, the British ceased routing convoys
through the central Mediterranean. In response, though, the
Allies then established alternative lines of communication
around southern Africa and via an air route through central
Africa. Even so, that added thousands of miles to the lines of
communication. Control of the Mediterranean would have
WaW 6 Issue.indd 49
allowed convoys to go by the much quicker Gibraltar-Alex-
andria route.
In response to Operation Torch, the American invasion of
North Africa in November 1942, Hitler ordered Tunisia held
at all costs, and poured in reinforcements. German transport
aircraft provided a tenuous line of supply and replacement
airlift. Given the short distances between Italy and Tunisia,
distances that could be covered by Axis airpower based in
Sicily, the Axis ought to have been able to maintain their line
of communication much better than they did. Again, it was
airpower, this time Allied, which proved the deciding factor,
cutting that line of communication. US fighters made it too
expensive for the Germans to continue flying transports into
North Africa.
Combined Operations or Not?
All that goes to underscore a critical point. Each side
conducted three separate campaigns in the Mediterranean:
one at sea, one in the air and one on the ground. The tank
battles that swept back and forth from Libya to the gates of
Alexandria, the legends of Rommel and the Afrika Korps,
Montgomery turning the tide at El Alamein, the last Axis
victory at Kasserine Pass: in the end they all depended on
the fight to control the Mediterranean. For the Axis, obvi-
ously, the Mediterranean was the only line of communica-
tion across (or over) the sea. Had the Allies gained control of
the Mediterranean, they would have rendered meaningless
all the stirring desert land battles.
On the other hand, had the Axis gained control of the
Mediterranean, they would have had secure lines of commu-
nication to support their land force in North Africa. A major
limitation on Axis forces was the logistical situation. Large
numbers of supplies and replacements were lost at sea owing
to Allied air and naval attacks against convoys (though most
did get through). Control of the sea would have reduced
those losses. More critically, it would have allowed the Axis
to exploit forward ports, such as Tobruk, to push supplies up
to the front more efficiently. Rommel’s logistical problems
weren’t so much a lack of supply, but in the lack of a trans-
port system to get them to forward units. Everything had to
be trucked or flown to the front, burning up more precious
fuel as well as being subjected to Allied aerial interdiction.
What was lacking was combined naval-air-land opera-
tions or, as they’re called today, “joint operations.” On the
Axis side, Albert Kesselring did yeoman work with the Luft-
waffe, especially in wrecking Malta, but he never developed
common operations and objectives with Rommel. One of the
more critical decisions of the war, the Axis delay and then
cancellation of the invasion of Malta, was the result of that
impasse. Rommel convinced the German High Command to
turn over the Luftwaffe’s Fliegerkorps X to support his drive
to the Suez Canal in mid-1942. Once committed to North
Africa, the Luftwaffe was never able to redeploy for a Mal-
ta invasion. Rommel’s gamble failed and, with the British
counteroffensive at El Alamein, the Axis land war in North
Africa was doomed.
One of the big historical “what-ifs” is what would have
occurred had Rommel’s request for the Luftwaffe been turned
down and the Malta invasion been put into motion. An Axis
seizure of Malta would have ended the threat to their line
of communication and eased the logistical situation on the
ground. Of course, the Malta invasion, had it been executed,
might have turned into an Axis disaster, and then historians
might have claimed, had the Luftwaffe instead been commit-
World at War 49
4/15/09 4:24:56 PM
 ted to North Africa, Rommel could have broken through to
Alexandria, Suez and points beyond.
The issue, though, isn’t really which operation was bet-
ter. The issue is a decision on which turned the Axis North
African campaign, and with it the entire war in the Mediter-
ranean, wasn’t made due to any kind of central plan. Rather,
it was the result of debates between quasi-independent com-
manders without regard to the overall strategic situation.
Given all that, Hitler was probably right in relegating the
Mediterranean as an Italian theater of operations, and lim-
iting the number of reinforcements he sent there. His real
error was the decision to commit German reinforcements to
Tunisia after Operation Torch. That succeeded only in put-
ting another Axis army into Allied prisoner of war camps, as
well as in the loss of considerable air assets supporting the
airlift into Tunisia. Occurring at the same time as Germany’s
Stalingrad debacle, the Tunisian campaign succeeded in
crippling the German air transport arm as well as losing the
equivalent of an army group.
All that brings into question Axis goals in North Africa.
It can be argued that, had the Germans made North Africa
their primary theater in 1941-42, sending massive reinforce-
ments and supplies to Rommel, they could have defeated the
British, seized the Suez Canal and taken the Middle Eastern
oilfields; however, that approach had several disadvantages.
For one, it played against the British strength at sea. Send-
ing more land forces to North Africa would’ve been futile
if the naval line of communication remained threatened by
the Royal Navy. Axis lines of communication were already
over-extended by the drive into Egypt. Continuing the ad-
vance across the Sinai and into the Middle East would’ve put
incredible, perhaps unsustainable, strain on the system.
On the ground, unless Germany was able to get Turkey
into the war on its side, there would’ve been no land line
of communication to sustain an Axis presence the Middle
East or to ship oil back to Germany. So the Axis dilemma in
North Africa and the Middle East still came back to the na-
val situation. It’s fascinating to speculate how World War II
would’ve turned out, at least in the Middle East, had Turkey
become an active ally of Germany as it had been in World
War I.
Then there was the fuel situation. Axis shortages in pe-
troleum, as is well known, set a limit on operations. That was
especially true for the Italians, who had to get considerable
amounts of their fuel from the Germans who, in turn, were
loathe to give up their own reserves. Italy thereby entered
And on the ground: German panzers in the Western Desert.
50 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 50
the war without the economic basis to sustain modern armed
forces. Conceivably, a victory in North Africa might’ve
meant the Axis gaining control of the Iraqi and Persian Gulf
oilfields. Even assuming Axis forces could’ve made it as far
as the Persian Gulf, there’s still the technical question of
moving the oil to Europe.
The failed pro-Axis coup in Iraq in 1941 provided the
possibility, had it succeeded, of putting a pro-German gov-
ernment into power in Baghdad, though that would no doubt
have fallen to a determined British counteroffensive. For
the Axis to have supported a friendly regime in Iraq (or the
Vichy colonies in Syria and Lebanon) would have required
them to have had some kind of naval control over the eastern
Mediterranean through which they could stage reinforce-
ments. Again, all that goes back to the issue of their lack of
strategic decision making. The Germans had no ready way to
exploit a political move such as the Iraqi coup, which might
have turned the balance in their favor. The opportunity was
there only briefly, then dissipated as the British retook Iraq.
All that calls into question the rationale for Italian entry
into the war. Fascist Italy was supposed to guard the south-
ern flank of Fortress Europa, but the southern flank became
vulnerable precisely because Italy entered the war. It gave
the British a front on which they could exploit their supe-
rior naval power. Had Italy remained neutral, there would’ve
been no North African campaign, no loss of Sicily, no Italian
surrender.
It then further comes back to the issue of combined op-
erations. The Allies never did truly exploit their superior sea
power, which by early 1943 could be reinforced by their su-
perior airpower, to win a decisive victory in the Mediterra-
nean. That can be compared to US operations in the Pacific,
especially revolving around the Solomons fighting, in which
naval-air-land forces were combined into a winning force,
and that in the face of considerable Japanese naval and air-
power.
The Sicily operation is a case in point. Land, air and na-
val commanders all fought different wars. Allied air com-
manders, in accordance with the “victory through airpower”
doctrine of the time, concentrated their forces on long range
interdiction missions against the Italian mainland, instead of
providing close support to hard pressed ground forces. Na-
val commanders proved unwilling to interdict the Strait of
Messina, even though the possibility was there for cutting
off an elite panzer corps. In the end, the Germans more or
less succeeded in their goal, which was to fight an economy
of force delaying action in which four divisions held up two
entire Allied armies.
In the long term, it could be argued, despite the string of
Axis defeats, the Mediterranean war was actually a marginal
victory for that side. The Allies failed to gain a decision, de-
spite their superiority. The campaigns in North Africa, Tuni-
sia, Sicily, and even in Italy itself were really a series of Axis
delaying actions. While Italy was knocked out of the war, the
Allies were never able to advance into the Reich itself via
the “soft underbelly of Europe.”
at
4/15/09 4:24:57 PM
 Windows Edition
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World at War 51

WaW 6 Issue.indd 51 4/15/09 4:25:00 PM

 Skorzeny Strikes:
Coup in Budapest, 1944
by Kelly Bell
By
late 1944 Nazi Germany was surrounded
and being closed in by enemies, German
troops controlled only a remnant of the
massive realm they’d occupied two years earlier. Fur-
ther, Berlin’s allies were having second thoughts about
continuing their allegiance to what plainly was the
losing side. Relations among those countries weren’t
rosy, either. The traditional hostility among the Bal-
kan nations wasn’t being extinguished by the loom-
ing menace posed to all of them by the advancing Red
Army.
One of the linchpins of the Reich’s eastern marches
was Hungary, ruled by Regent Miklos Horthy. As the
Red Army approached the Hungarian frontier, he con-
sidered switching sides and allying his country with
the Allies. That would cause the center of what was
left of the German line on the Eastern Front to collapse
and cut off all the troops still fighting in the Balkans.
The situation was desperate, and Hitler believed only
one man could turn it around—Otto Skorzeny.
The wartime politics of the Balkans were complex.
Even though in theory Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria,
Slovakia and Croatia were all Axis-allies, they actually
presented anything but a unified front. And Hitler nev-
er entirely trusted the Hungarian government. In 1941-
52 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 52
43, the Hungarians only reluctantly contributed an ex-
peditionary force to fight against the Soviet Union. In
1944, with the war going badly for the Reich, Berlin
was concerned the Hungarians might make some kind
of deal with the Allies. That would be a threat to the
Germans’ oil supplies, since Hungary contained one
of the last sources for petroleum available to them. A
Hungarian defection would also threaten German lines
of communication with Romania and its Ploesti oil-
field.
Hitler therefore tried to assemble a united Roma-
nian-Croat-Slovak front against the Hungarians. The
problem was those peoples had no more use for each
other than they did for Hungary. Romania and Hunga-
ry, in fact, were already devising strategies for a post-
World War II struggle between themselves. Romania’s
Antonescu regime had, in 1942, begun persecuting the
Hungarian minority living in southern Transylvania.
At the same time Hungary was maltreating the Roma-
nians living in northern Transylvania.
Mindful of potential damage to his vital eastern
European oilfields, Hitler hoped to at least postpone an
open conflict between Romania and Hungary. He later
described to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini how he
had told Hungarian and Romanian delegations that:
4/15/09 4:25:00 PM
 World at War 53

WaW 6 Issue.indd 53 4/15/09 4:25:03 PM

 If, at all costs, they wanted to wage war be-
tween themselves he would not hinder them,
but they would both lose by it. It would be a
problem if both countries now withheld petro-
leum for the war they wanted to fight between
themselves later.
It would be the duty of Axis foreign ministers to
deal with both countries persuasively and calmly so
as to prevent an open break. A joint German-Italian
delegation sent to Transylvania in the summer of 1942
achieved little in its assignment to soothe tensions.
That failure was unsurprising. Romania had mobilized
fully behind Germany for the invasion of the USSR in
1941, and had generally contributed much more to the
Nazi war effort in the east than had Hungary. Antones-
cu was also a favorite of the Fuehrer’s. The Romanian
leader seemed to have modeled himself after Hitler,
whose interpreter later described how Antonescu was:
one of Hitler’s closest intimates, and was even
kept more closely in the picture than [was] Mus-
solini. He was the only foreigner from whom
Hitler ever asked for military advice when he
was in difficulties. He made long speeches just
like Hitler, usually starting off with the creation
of Romania, and somehow relating everything
he said to the hated Hungarians and the recov-
ery of Transylvania. This hatred of Hungary,
too, made him pleasing to Hitler, for the Fuhrer
despised the Magyars [Hungarians]. Hitler
took a secret pleasure in Antonescu’s outbursts
against the Hungarians, and even went so far
as to hint he might perhaps give him a free
hand in his plans of conquest.
Throughout much of 1942 Hungary tried to ar-
range a separate alli-
ance with Italy, but with
Rome increasingly rel-
egated to the status of
Hitler’s vassal there was
little support available
there. Even had Mus-
solini been theoretically
willing to turn against
Hitler, the practical time
for that had passed. Fol-
lowing the Anglo-Amer-
ican invasions of Sicily
and the Italian mainland
in the summer of 1943,
Mussolini’s government
toppled and the country
surrendered to the Allies
on 3 September.
The collapse of Fascist
Italy at a time when Al-
lied armies were still too
far away to reach the
54 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 54
Balkans left Hungary isolated and vulnerable. Had
Budapest attempted a break with Berlin at that junc-
ture Hungary no doubt would’ve been immediately
and directly taken over by Hitler’s forces. A purge was
sure to follow such an occupation, in which all anti-
Nazi elements would be liquidated while a new puppet
government would officially hand over the country’s
resources to the German war effort. Many in Hungary
hoped the Western Allied armies would reach their
nation’s frontier by late 1943 or early 1944, and their
foreign minister even attempted to make preparations
to switch sides when that happened.
In February 1943 the Hungarian foreign minister
informed British and American diplomats in Istanbul
their military forces wouldn’t resist if they entered
Hungary. At that time in the war there still seemed
some possibility the Western Allies would conduct
an invasion of the Balkans and then advance through
southern Europe to Germany. Conceivably, the Allies
could have reached Hungary in time to stave off a Ger-
man counter-invasion. The Hungarian foreign ministry
also requested Romanian troops not participate in the
liberation, and that the forces of the Yugoslav partisans
also be kept out of the country.
On 17 August 1943, the Hungarian consul general
in Istanbul, Dezso Ujvary, informed British Minister
Plenipotentiary Sterndale Bennett that Hungary was
ready to surrender to the West. US President Frank-
lin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill were conferring at the Quebec Conference
when they received word of the proposed deal. Re-
sponding through the British embassy in Istanbul, the
Allied powers informed the Hungarians as to how they
should go about joining the anti-Hitler coalition.
1. The Hungarian government was to officially con-
firm its 17 August statement about its readiness to
capitulate on Allied terms.
2. The Allies would in turn keep the surrender secret
in the hope of precluding German retaliation, pub-
licizing it simultaneously with the Hungarian gov-
ernment at a more militarily suitable date, which
would not be before Allied armies reached the
Hungarian border.
3. Hungary would meanwhile cut back its military
cooperation with Germany, step-by-step, starting
by withdrawing its military forces from the Soviet
Union, and by permitting Allied air forces to pass
freely through Hungarian airspace en route to at-
tacks on German targets.
4. Hungary would start cutting back economic col-
laboration with the Third Reich by no longer con-
tributing to its war production.
5. Hungary would promise to militarily resist any Ger-
man attempt to occupy the country. The Hungar-
ian general staff would be reorganized to facilitate
4/15/09 4:25:04 PM
 Friedenthalers: The Waffen SS Special Operations Force

When Otto Skorzeny was summoned to Berlin in April The coup in Hungary in October 1944 was therefore
1943 to meet Walter Schellenberg, head of the Reich Central Skorzeny’s second major operation. Aside from his own
Security Office Foreign Intelligence Service (German ac- Friedenthalers, one of the units that accompanied him into
ronym: RSHA), he was surprised to find himself appointed Budapest was the 600th SS Parachute Battalion, which in-
the chief of the Waffen SS’s new commando force. Skorzeny corporated remnants of the 500th SS Parachute Battalion, an-
was a long time Austrian Nazi who’d volunteered for the SS other of Germany’s special operations forces. Back in May
after the 1938 German-Austrian Anschluss. Serving in the 1944, the 500th had stormed Marshal Tito’s headquarters in
SS Reich Division on the eastern front, he was wounded in an abortive attempt to kill or capture him.
action. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, chief of the RSHA, had known Interestingly, the German high command always consid-
Skorzeny prior to the war and considered him to have the ered regular Luftwaffe paratroopers and glider troops to be
necessary intelligence, ruthlessness and finesse to create an qualified for special operations and, given their performance
unconventional force, and thus recommended him to Schel- in 1940, seizing airfields behind Allied lines and taking the
lenberg. Belgian fortress of Eben Emael, there was good reason to
Setting up shop at Friedenthal, near Berlin, Skorzeny use them for unconventional missions. As noted in the main
threw himself into studying commando warfare. Since the portion of the article, a battalion of Luftwaffe paratroopers
Wehrmacht (collectively, all the German armed forces, in- was also assigned to Skorzeny for Operation Panzerfaust.
cluding the army, navy, air force and Waffen SS) was a large- Later in 1944, Skorzeny organized the 150th Panzer Bri-
ly conventional force, Skorzeny had to start from scratch. gade for the Ardennes offensive, Hitler’s last great attack
Some experience could be gleaned from British commando in the west. The Friedenthalers and the 600th SS Parachute
operations, which had proved a constant thorn in the side of were both part of the 150th. The objective was to infiltrate
the Reich; otherwise, Skorzeny improvised. The new unit Allied lines by disguising the men as American soldiers. The
he formed would become known after its place of training operation largely failed, but the capture of a few of Skorze-
as the Friedenthaler Jagdverbande, or Friedenthal Hunting ny’s men was enough to cause a brief panic in the Allied rear
Group. At various other times in the war it was also called area. The Friedenthalers ended the war in 1945 by making
the SS Sonderverbünde z.b.V. Friedenthal, SS Jaeger Bat- their way to Hitler’s “Alpine Redoubt.” Alas for the Nazis,
talion 502, and SS Jägerverbande-Mitte. no such redoubt actually existed; so Skorzeny and a few
Recruits for the unit were trained in a variety of skills, other survivors surrendered to the Americans.
such as intelligence gathering, sabotage, foreign languages
and parachuting. Details on the unit’s organization remain
sketchy, owing mostly to the many reorganizations the Jag-
dverbande underwent. Roughly, it was the size of a battalion
with four companies. There were also some additional com-
panies of foreign volunteers who were useful for behind the
lines work. Personnel were often dispersed over the Reich’s
far-flung frontiers and beyond. One group parachuted into
Iran to support anti-British guerrillas who were supposed to
attack Allied lend-lease supply lines running to the Soviet
Union. Other missions included assorted plots to kill or kid-
nap various Allied leaders, mundane anti-partisan warfare
operations and, in the final days of the war, acting as a last-
ditch rearguard.
Skorzeny rocketed to fame in September 1943 with his
rescue of Benito Mussolini, imprisoned by anti-fascist Ital-
ians in the mountain fortress of the Gran Sasso. Skorzeny’s
initially assigned role in the mission was on the intelligence
end, locating the incarcerated Duce. Luftwaffe paratroopers
were assigned to conduct the actual rescue, flying onto the
Gran Sasso in gliders. When the aircraft carrying the Luft-
waffe mission commander overshot the mountain, however,
Skorzeny, in the second plane with some of his own men,
took command. He not only rescued Mussolini, he brought
him back to a grateful Fuehrer.

Operation Panzerfaust: German special operations troops.

World at War 55

WaW 6 Issue.indd 55 4/15/09 4:25:05 PM

 detaching itself from German collaboration, and
would also prepare Hungarian forces to actively
engage the Nazi military.
6. Hungary would make her resources, transportation
system, and airfields available to Allied forces to
further the war against Germany.
7. An Allied military commission would fly to Hunga-
ry at a suitable time to make further detailed prepa-
rations for the country’s capitulation.
8. A wireless radio hookup would be established be-
tween the Allies and the Hungarian government in
order to keep the former apprised of the situation
inside the country and of German activities there.
With Hungary hemmed in and essentially at the
mercy of the Germans, those conditions were difficult
to implement. Still, Allied air units bound for German
targets began passing through Hungarian airspace un-
opposed by flak or interceptors. In fact, the Hungar-
ians also passed on information about German air de-
fenses. In September 1943 they also refused a German
demand to station Luftwaffe units in western Hungary.
The bonus for the Hungarians was that, until the Ger-
mans later occupied the country, Allied aircraft ceased
to attack them. What the British and Americans didn’t
tell the Hungarians was they actually had no plan for
an invasion of southern Europe. They were, of course,
building up for the invasion of Normandy in northern
France. Hungary, and all of eastern Europe, were to be
liberated by the Red Army.
Meanwhile, Hitler was becoming impatient with
the increasingly unelpful Hungarians. Their dwindling
contribution to the Axis war effort and their refusal
to actively persecute the nation’s million Jews grated
more and more on the Fuehrer’s nerves. In February
1944 the Hungarian government turned down Hitler’s
request to allow some 100,000 German troops to
pass through the country on their way to the eastern
front. Later the Hungarians agreed to let those units
pass through on the condition they avoided Budapest,
On the prowl: Tiger tanks deploy in Budapest.
56 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 56
which might have been targeted by Allied aircraft had
the Allies learned of the troop convoy’s presence. Af-
ter receiving that cold response, the Germans started
concentrating Wehrmacht forces on Hungary’s west-
ern borders.
On the night of 18-19 March 1944, the Germans
crossed the border into Hungary. By dawn, Hitler’s
forces occupied Budapest’s airfields, railway junc-
tions and all other areas of strategic importance. There
was little resistance. With the Germans suddenly in the
country, the Allies resumed launching air raids against
Hungarian targets. The Germans cracked down hard,
banning all non-fascist political parties, and trade
unions were disbanded. Mass deportations of Hungar-
ian Jews to concentration camps began. Still, Horthy
remained in power and was a possible wild card.
Meanwhile the war on the Eastern Front raged on.
Severely depleted and disillusioned with fighting for
what had clearly become the losing side, Romania sur-
rendered to the Soviets on 23 August 1944, and their
country was taken over by the Red Army during the
following month. German forces in that country were
soon overrun. Early in September, then, the Soviets
occupied the passes leading through the southern Car-
pathian Mountains, leaving the Hungarian lowlands
open for invasion. When the Hungarian government
asked Hitler for assistance to meet that new threat, the
Fuehrer sent several divisions. Those units, however,
didn’t deploy to the front, but instead moved to Buda-
pest. The situation looked bleak, and on 8 September
the Hungarian Crown Council decided to surrender.
After lengthy but futile attempts to negotiate with
the Western Allies, who didn’t want to offend Stalin by
accepting the surrender of a nation within the Soviet
zone of military operations, Horthy sent an armistice
delegation to Moscow, where it arrived on 1 October.
Ten days later that delegation signed a preliminary
surrender agreement. Despite the blanket of secrecy in
which Horthy had sought to wrap the event, the Ger-
man counterintelligence network uncovered the plot.
In fact, Hitler knew about the surrender before the
peace commission had even left Budapest, and he had
no intention of allowing Hungary to slip away.
On 10 September 1944, Hitler summoned his fa-
vorite trouble-shooter, SS Col. Otto Skorzeny. Skorze-
ny arrived the next day and went through a round of
briefings before meeting with Hitler. Ushered into a
conference room packed with such Nazi paladins
as Field-Marshals Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl,
Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, Foreign Minister
Joachim Rippentrop, and other such bigwigs, Skorze-
ny sat and listened as the Fuehrer then addressed all of
them on the situation:
We have secret information Hungarian Regent
Adm. Horthy is attempting to make contact with
the enemy in order to achieve a separate peace
for Hungary. That would mean the loss of our
4/15/09 4:25:06 PM
 armies [in Hungary]. Not only is he trying to
negotiate with the Western Allies, he is also try-
ing to arrange talks with Russian leaders.
That intelligence windfall was the first news the as-
sembled group had received of the perilous situation in
Hungary. They sat in stunned silence as Hitler fastened
his gaze upon Skorzeny and continued: “So, Skorze-
ny, in case the regent does not honor his pledges [of
military co-operation made to Germany], you are to
prepare for the military occupation of the Burgberg
[Castle Hill], Horthy’s hilltop fortified residence.”
At that moment Jodl took over the briefing, outlin-
ing to Skorzeny the forces he would be given: a glider
squadron, two paratrooper battalions (one Luftwaffe,
one Waffen SS), and a formation of SS officer cadets
from the academy at Wiener Neustadt who, though
young, were also battle-hardened fanatics. Hitler then
signed a document granting Skorzeny virtually unlim-
ited authority to commandeer whatever he needed to
complete his assignment, handed the paper to him, and
dismissed him with the words: “Remember, Skorzeny,
I’m counting on you.” team), who’d been walking along the sidewalk, suddenly darted into
The towering colonel threw himself into prepar-
ing for his assignment with the gusto and ruthless
efficiency that led the Western Allies to ruefully dub
him “the most dangerous man in Europe.” Effectively,
Skorzeny had the opportunity to single-handedly alter
the course of the war on the Eastern Front.
Mere days after the briefing, Skorzeny, disguised
as a tourist, “Dr. Wolff,” visited Budapest and me-
ticulously studied the Burgberg, its approaches and
the forces detailed to guard it. He also interviewed
German soldiers stationed in the city, and from them
learned the aged admiral had essentially turned over
the reins of government to his wastrel son who went
by the nickname “Miki.” ful consequences if they didn’t
Skorzeny also interviewed German intelligence
operatives, and soon gained a picture of Miki’s anti-
Nazi inclinations. He also managed to plant a spy on
the younger Horthy’s staff. That mole informed him
Miki was scheduled to meet with emissaries sent by
Tito, the Yugoslav partisan leader, on 15 October. In
the first overt action of what he was calling Operation
Miki Mouse, Skorzeny caught the Yugoslav envoys
and replaced them with German agents who waylaid
the younger Horthy, taking him hostage.
It was too late, though, to try to use Miki to gain
leverage with his father because later that day before
he’d even learned of his son’s capture, the Regent’s
capitulation edict was broadcast by Budapest radio.
German mechanized units then wasted no time in fully
occupying Budapest, doing so with such swiftness the
Hungarian military had no time to react.
Skorzeny continued to move quickly. The Burgberg
would have to be stormed and the elder Horthy taken
into custody. Taking over Budapest radio, the Nazis
WaW 6 Issue.indd 57
Operation Miki Mouse
On Sunday, 15 October 1944, Miki Horthy, son of the Hungar-
ian strongman Adm. Horthy, was scheduled to meet with communist
Yugoslav agents in a second-floor office in a Bucharest building near
the River Danube. The agents were working for Josip Broz Tito, lead-
er of the partisans who controlled much of the southern Hungarian
countryside. Tipped off by moles on the Hungarian government staff,
Skorzeny stationed some of his men on the house’s third floor while
other Germans waited on the ground floor.
On the morning of the 15th, Skorzeny, dressed in civilian clothes,
casually drove a car around the neighborhood, scouting it for signs
of his targets’ presence. He noted two Hungarian trucks parked out-
side the building where Horthy was supposed to meet Tito’s emis-
saries, and farther up the street was another government truck and a
car Skorzeny recognized as Horthy’s own. Parking his car across the
street, Skorzeny got out, raised its hood and pretended to tinker with
its engine. At that moment someone in the back of one of the trucks
pulled back the canvas tarpaulin covering the rear of the vehicle.
Skorzeny could then see three Hungarian soldiers in the truck. They
were glaring suspiciously at him and manning a heavy machinegun.
Evidently young Horthy had come prepared for trouble, but so had
Skorzeny.
Just then two German military policemen (also part of Skorzeny’s
the building containing Horthy. The Hungarians in the trucks imme-
diately realized the game was up, threw back the canvas coverings on
their vehicles, and opened fire on the soldiers Skorzeny had stationed
in the street. Armed only with pistols, the Germans were outgunned,
but their commander still had something else up his sleeve.
Skorzeny blew three sharp blasts on a whistle, and a Capt. von
Foelkersam and a platoon of troops came charging into the fray from
the next block. At the sight of those hostile reinforcements, the Hun-
garians abandoned their machineguns and fled. Skorzeny led his and
von Foelkersam’s platoon into the building only to find his men al-
ready holding Miki at gunpoint
on the top floor. Indignant at that
treatment, the youthful aristocrat
was waving his arms and angrily
threatening his captors with fright-
release him. It was then Skorzeny
strode into the room.
In no mood for folly, Skorzeny
had his men wrap the young man in
a carpet and secure it with a curtain
rope. The Germans then carried
Horthy outside, tossed him into the
back of one the trucks parked there,
and drove him to the airport to be
loaded on a plane for Germany
with his father. Adm. Horthy and
his son would cause the Germans
Adm. Horthy
no more problems for the war’s duration.
broadcast their own proclamation, rescinding the ear-
lier surrender announcement. At the same time they
began arresting pro-Horthy military officers and re-
placing them with German sympathizers. Meanwhile,
Hungarian forces on the eastern front showed them-
selves reluctant to lay down their arms and simply al-
low the mistrusted Soviets to advance into the country.
Skorzeny used the time that afforded him to deploy the
World at War 57
4/15/09 4:25:06 PM

22nd SS Cavalry Division Maria Theresa (named af-
ter an Austrian Empress who’d also ruled in Hungary)
around the Burgberg in preparation for storming and
securing it. The 22nd would act as a screen for the ac-
tual commando assault force and keep outsiders from
interfering.
Despite the citadel’s powerful fortifications, then,
Skorzeny planned to assault the residence early the
next morning in what he was calling Operation Pan-
zerfaust. That effort promised to be costly, as the Hun-
garians were expected to resist, but Skorzeny had his
orders from Hitler, and everyone knew the Fuehrer
wasn’t a patient man.
Complicating matters further was the number of
people involved in the planning. They included vari-
ous high-level German officers, Berlin’s ambassador
to Hungary, as well as SS Gen. Eri von dem Bach-
Zaleski, the Reich’s chief of anti-partisan operations.
The latter recommended using a giant 650mm siege
mortar to simply level the Burgberg. Skorzeny, with
the authority of Hitler behind him, was able to scotch
that idea, as it would have irretrievably destroyed rela-
tionships between the Hungarian rank and file and the
Germans.
Skorzeny gave his final orders for 16 October. He
would lead the main force, approaching through the
Burgberg’s gate on the north side. That force would
58 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 58
include the bulk of his Jagdverbande and 600th SS
Airborne Battalion, a platoon of Panther tanks, and
some Goliath remote-controlled demolition vehicles.
Assaulting the Burgberg citadel west and east faces
would be, respectively, a detachment of the Jagdver-
bande and a company of SS paratroopers. Coming up
from the south would be the officer cadet battalion.
He placed the Luftwaffe paratroopers in reserve. The
assault troops were heavily armed with machine-pis-
tols and panzerfausts (one-shot, man-carried anti-tank
rocket launchers). He told his men to keep their weap-
ons on safe and to shoot only when necessary. The
Hungarians weren’t to be treated as the enemy, but
rather were to brought back into the Nazi fold.
Late on the evening of the 15th a never-yet-identi-
fied man in the uniform of a Hungarian general entered
the Germans’ headquarters at the base of the Burgberg
and promised Skorzeny he would do all he could to
see the installation’s defenders didn’t oppose the as-
sault. At 2:00 a.m. the unidentified Hungarian began
making his way up the hill.
At one minute before 6:00 a.m., Skorzeny climbed
into a Volkswagen and led four tanks and a truck con-
voy of his commandos and paratroopers toward the
Burgberg. During the first half of the advance the at-
tackers encountered no resistance, and went crashing
through the barriers that marked the outer ring of de-
fenses. Scattered gunfire began to rattle as the Ger-
mans neared the governmental seat, but the opposition
was uncoordinated and half-hearted.
4/15/09 4:25:08 PM
 Jumping from his vehicle, Skorzeny grabbed a
surprised and confused Hungarian officer who’d just
walked out of the shadows and bellowed at him: “Lead
us to the commandant of the Burgberg at once!”
The befuddled man meekly turned and indicated
the building from which he’d just emerged, and then
followed the huge SS colonel inside. When the Hun-
garian pointed to a door, Skorzeny kicked it open, but
there was no commandant inside, only a single Hun-
garian soldier firing a machinegun out the window.
Pushing past his chief, a German sergeant rushed into
the room, grabbed the soldier’s weapon and flung it
outside.
When Skorzeny pounded on an adjacent door, a
Hungarian major general opened it. “Are you the com-
mandant of the Burgberg?” he demanded.
Before the man could reply, Skorzeny continued:
“I demand you surrender the Burgberg at once! You
are responsible if any more blood is spilled. I ask you
for an immediate decision. You see, all resistance is
foolish. I’ve already taken the castle.”
As if on cue, an SS captain appeared and told
Skorzeny: “Yard and main entrances taken without a
fight. Request further instructions.”
The dispirited general then said in German: “I sur-
render the Burgberg to you, and will order the immedi-
ate cessation of fire.”
He shook Skorzeny’s hand and went off to carry out
his promise. Minutes later Skorzeny took full advan-
tage of his own Austrian nationality. After rounding up
all the Hungarian officers in the palace, Skorzeny and
his men herded them into the Coronation Hall, where
he adroitly defused the situation. Addressing his pris-
oners he said: “I would like to remind you that for
centuries Hungarians have never fought against Aus-
trians. Always we have been allies. Now there is no
reason for difficulties. Our concern is a new Europe,
but this can only arise if Germany is saved.”
With Skorzeny’s capture of the Burgberg, he also
had control of the vital Ministries of War and the In-
terior, and therefore de facto control of the state appa-
ratus. Senior Hungarian officials and generals decided
to organize a pro-German government and stay in the
war. Horthy himself managed to flee the castle, but the
game was truly up. He took refuge with Gen. Pfeffer-
Wildenbruch, and three days later Skorzeny had the
admiral officially in custody. After placing him on a
special armored train to Berlin, the Germans falsely
announced Horthy had abdicated of his own free will.
They handed over his office to pro-Nazi politician Fe-
renc Szalasi and his fascist Arrow Cross party. Szalasi
immediately announced Horthy’s abdication and re-
scinded the surrender proclamation.
Operation Panzerfaust was over, and at the cost
of just four German lives. Hungary would remain in
the war until the bitter end, its armed forces fighting
WaW 6 Issue.indd 59
Budapest is secure—for a few more months.
alongside the Wehrmacht. After arriving in Germany,
the Horthy family was given the official designation
“guests of the Fuehrer.” Hitler personally granted
Skorzeny a few days leave to enjoy the comforts of
Budapest before sending him to his next assignment
as commando chief for the coming counter-offensive
in the Ardennes.
As for Szalasi, he made little effort to direct poli-
cies of state and war. Realizing he was a prime target
for Soviet assassins and Allied commandos, he hid out
in a castle on the Austro-Hungarian border and waited
for the war to end. And end it would for Hungary on
13 February 1945, when the Red Army fought its way
into Budapest.
at
After Action
Operation Panzerfaust proved successful for several reasons. The
first was that Skorzeny maintained control of the operation from the
start, instead of letting it fragment among competing German intelli-
gence and security services, as well the different service branches of the
Wehrmacht. That was all the more remarkable since Skorzeny was only
a colonel at the time, though with Hitler’s backing he could override the
normal chain of command.
Intelligence also proved critical. Among other things, Skorzeny ob-
tained maps of the Burgberg’s tunnel system, which the SS paratroopers
approaching from the southeast of the complex could exploit to gain
clandestine entry into the fortress. He also used just the right amount of
force, enough men and armor to seize the objective while at the same
time limiting firepower to avoid a bloodbath. The shock effect was criti-
cal in that the Germans were inside the defenses before the garrison
could react. In effect, Skorzeny presented the Hungarians with a fait
accompli.
Skorzeny also understood the political dimension of Panzerfaust.
The Hungarians had to be won over in order to accomplish the larger
objective, which was keeping the country in the war on the German side.
Among other things, after the coup, the Germans held a joint military
funeral in which both their own dead and the Hungarians killed in the
operation were interred together as a sign of solidarity. Afterward, Hun-
garian troops fought on against the Soviets until the bitter end.
Finally, there was the personal element: Skorzeny led from the front.
He maintained control of what could have otherwise been a chaotic
situation. By personally addressing the captured Hungarian officers, he
was able to sway them to the German side. All that is indicative of how
a single special operation can become a major turning point in a war;
though, of course, the Germans still lost in the end.
World at War 59
4/15/09 4:25:09 PM

Leningrad: State of Siege, by Michael Jones
(Basic Books/Perseus, 2008). Reviewed by Chris
Perello.
In Sum: This is the story primarily of the citizens of
Leningrad during the German siege of the city, com-
monly known as “The 900 Days” (actually 872) from
September 1941 to January 1944. It is told primarily
as a series of vignettes from recently published diaries
of civilians, along with some official documents and
soldier recollections. The bulk of the book covers the
worst part of the siege, from November 1941 through
August 1942, when most of the deaths—in excess
of 1,000,000, not the official tab of 630,000—took
place.
Good Stuff: Jones does an excellent job of weaving
Media Reviews
individual narratives into the larger story of the siege.
Those individual stories are compelling, as the individ-
uals gradually succumb to famine, disease, and grief.
The larger story focuses less on the military relief ef-
forts than on the incredibly inefficient and callous city
government, whose failings contributed enormously
to the suffering and death toll.
This is not primarily a military history. For the most
part, the military events are presented in just enough
detail to give context to the individual stories. Howev-
er, there is considerable detail on the deliberate policy
decisions made by the German high command to lay
siege for the purpose of starving the city rather than
trying to conquer it. Only after it was clear starvation
would not work were significant preparations made, in
the fall of 1942, to storm the city.
60 #6
WaW 6 Issue.indd 60
Bad Stuff: Though the book follows the siege chron-
ologically, there is considerable overlap in the dates
covered in various chapters. That’s because Jones is
attempting to cover several topical issues, such as food
distribution, hospitals, and individual survival com-
munes (essentially extended families) that sprang up.
That leads to some confusion about what is happen-
ing to whom, and when and where. Several key points
were made repeatedly in various chapters, and other
issues (particularly the provision of power and water)
could have used more detail.
This same problem spills over to the maps. There
are a number of good ones, but several more would
have been an improvement. In particular, I would have
liked to see locations of more of the city landmarks
mentioned in the text, even the streets where the indi-
vidual characters lived.
Overall: Some familiarity with the war on the East-
ern Front is extremely helpful in keeping the siege in
context. Thus armed, a reader can draw myriad details
and images from the death throes of a large modern
city, and can rejoice in the fact that the two culpable
governments have been exterminated.
The Two Thousand Yard Stare: Tom Lea’s
World War II, by Brendan M. Greeley Jr. (Texas A&M
University Press, 2008). Reviewed by Chris Perello.
In Sum: Tom Lea traveled to nearly every front in WWII
as an artist for Life Magazine. This large-size (11½ x12
inches), glossy, full color book contains all of his wartime
paintings, plus his preliminary sketches, work notes, and
personal experiences during his travels.
Good Stuff: The paintings speak for themselves. The
most haunting, The Two Thousand Yard Stare and The
Price, both done during the invasion of Peleliu in 1944,
are well-known images of the war. Though not primarily
a military history, there are several good maps covering
some of the campaigns he observed.
Bad Stuff: There’s nothing poor anywhere in the execu-
tion of the book, but it must be said the narrative of Lea’s
experiences is largely bland; most was included in the in-
terest of completeness rather than for any intrinsic value.
Overall: Evocative rather than enlightening, but the paint-
ings are superb.
4/15/09 4:25:12 PM
 World at War 61

WaW 6 Issue.indd 61 4/15/09 4:25:17 PM

 New Games for 2009!
D-Day at Omaha
Beach
6 June 1944
D-Day at Omaha Beach recreates America’s most bloody
and heroic day of World War II. In this solitaire game from the
designer of the solo classics RAF and Ambush, you control the
forces of the US 1st and 29th Divisions landing under fire on the
Normandy shore, and struggling desperately to establish a vi-
able beachhead. The game is also great for two players playing
cooperatively, each controlling one US division.
US units include assault infantry, amphibious tanks, artil-
lery, engineers and HQs. The game system controls the hidden
German defenders in Widerstandsnest resistance points on the
bluffs overlooking the beaches. US forces that manage to break
through the deadly coastal defenses and reach the high ground
must then contend with German mobile reinforcements in the
bewildering hedgerows of Normandy’s bocage. An innovative
diceless combat system highlights unknown enemy deployments
and the importance of utilizing the right weapons and tactics.
Event cards keep the action flowing and the rules simple,
while controlling German strategy and introducing extensive
historical detail. The game includes amphibious landings, Ger-
man artillery and rocket barrages, US naval bombardment, tides,
engineer operations, and intangibles such as US leadership under
fire and the initiative of the American GIs.
Scenarios: The First Waves (two to three hour playtime) intro-
duces the basics of the game in a recreation of the initial assault.
Beyond the Beach (four to five hours) picks up on the high ground
at 10:00 a.m. and adds rules for German tactics. D-Day at Omaha
Beach (seven hours) covers the entire day, from 6:15 a.m. to 6:00
p.m. Optional rules explore what-ifs, such as more pre-invasion
bombardment or the arrival of German armor.

Game Contents:
• 352 5/8” Counters
• One 34x22” Full-Color Game Map
• 55 Event Cards
• Rules Booklet
• Historical Study Booklet
• Player Aid Cards.
Game Scale
Time: each turn equals 15 minutes in the basic game,
30 in the extended game.
Units: companies for both sides.
Map: each hex equals 275 yards (250 meters).
Players:
62 #6one or two.

WaW 6 Issue.indd 62 4/15/09 4:25:20 PM

 :
Ed i tion
ayer
RAF
N e w
o- P l
The Battle of Britain, 1940
A l l
& Tw
France has fallen. England stands alone against the might of a triumphant Germany,
r e
tai
defended only by the Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons of the Royal Air Force. Hitler
l i
So orders his mighty Luftwaffe to destroy the RAF in preparation for Operation Sealion—the
invasion of England. German fighters and bombers fill the English skies and the RAF
responds.
Now you command the RAF or the Luftwaffe in history’s greatest air campaign—the
Battle of Britain. Improving on his award winning solitaire classic, designer John Butterfield
ramps up the historical accuracy, tension and play options with three complete games.
RAF: Lion puts you in control of British Fighter Command, responding to German raids.
The game’s unique card system generates targets and forces, which may remain hidden
until after you commit your squadrons. Your foe is no mindless system: the Luftwaffe
has priorities and a strategy. Scenarios range from one raid day, taking an hour to
complete, to the full campaign, playable in 12 hours.
RAF: Eagle puts you in control of the Luftwaffe forces raiding England. You schedule raids
and assign missions to your bombers and fighters, attempting to deliver the knockout
blow. Can you take out the British radar system and cripple their aircraft production?
The game controls the RAF response to your strategies. How does a foe so close to
defeat keep coming back?
RAF: 2-Player pits you against a live opponent, one controlling Fighter Command and the
other the raiding Luftwaffe forces. Historical features include: German high command
priorities, close escort, free hunt, the Channel Patrol, Jabos, day and night bombing,
radar, the Observer Corps, weather, ULTRA intercepts, squadron patrols, “big wings,”
altitude advantage, ace squadrons and flak.
Game Scale
Time: each game turn equals a “raid day” with six two-hour segments.
Units: British squadrons and German Gruppen.
Map: one inch equals 20 miles (32 kilometers). Contents:
• 176 Die cut counters
• 165 Cards
• 3 34” x 22” Map
• Rule booklets
• Player Aid cards & display
• 2 Dice
• Storage bags

QTY Title Price Total

RAF: Lion vs Eagle $80
D-Day at Omaha Beach $55
Available Summer 2009
Shipping
PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
Name 661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com
Address
City/State/Zip Shipping Charges
1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
Country
$10 $2 UPS Ground/USPS Priority Mail
V/MC # Exp.
20 2 Canada
Signature 29 4 Europe, South America
Phone # 29 6 Asia, Australia
World at War 63

WaW 6 Issue.indd 63 4/15/09 4:25:23 PM

 Strategy & Tactics
magazine covers all
of military history
and its future
possibilities.

Each issue is packed

full of:

• In-depth analysis
• Detailed maps
• Orders of Battle

Going beyond the usual

narratives, articles focus
on the “how” and “why”
of conflicts and are il-
lustrated liberally with
maps, charts, tables, and
pictures.
Partial map and diagram
from RAF article in #256.

Use the postcard included in this magazine or visit our website

P.O. Box 21598
for more information and subscription rates. Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598
www.StrategyAndTacticsPress.com ph: (661) 587-9633 • Fax: (661) 587-5031
64 #6

WaW 6 Issue.indd 64 4/15/09 4:25:35 PM