I. SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR.

y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017

TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal protection clause

PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,
praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE:
should have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of the Constitutional right to equal
protection of the law.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Their
exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branchesof our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within
the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue
orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the
exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the
Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. – The Cooperative Code
provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market
Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption
of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon.
Mangotara, et al. – Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from
the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770,
which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it
contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is
exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.

SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED

The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to
the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court
on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, the
Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and
unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower
courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates
procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is
not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter;
but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. By the same
token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases
in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by
agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly desirable,” and
“legitimate” component of the administration of justice.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the
defense make concessionsto avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouragedbecause the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the accused,
the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right
nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than
accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party
and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of
criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what
the evidence on hand can sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution
already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion should not amount
to a grave abuse thereof.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution
rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act
in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on
record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent
any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is
improper and irregular.

III. Bergonia v CA
IV. JAIME TAN, JR. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE A. MAGDANGAL and ESTRELLA
MAGDANGAL
FACTS:
On January 22, 1981, Jaime Tan, for a consideration of P59,200.00, executed a deed of absolute sale over the
property, parcel of land, with an area of 34,829 square meters, situated in Bunawan, Davao City in his name, in
favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the
same contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan given one (1) year within which to
redeem or repurchase the property.
Albeit given several opportunities and/or extensions to exercise the option, Tan failed to redeem the property
until his death on January 4, 1988. On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the Regional Trial Court at Davao
City a suit against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument. The complaint alleged that, while Tan and the
Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an
equitable mortgage.
Barely hours after the complaint was stamped 'received,' the Magdangals were able to have Tan's title over the
lot in question canceled and to secure in their names TCT No. T-134470. This development prompted the heirs
of Tan, who were to be later substituted by Jaime V. Tan, Jr. (Tan, Jr.) as plaintiff, to file a supplemental complaint.
On June 4, 1991, Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City rendered judgment finding for Tan, Jr.
wherein the judgment was rendered that the plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the
finality of this decision.
The Magdangals appealed to this Court and in a decision promulgated on September 28, 1995, this Court, thru
its then Special Third Division, affirmed in toto the appealed decision of the lower court. On March 13, 1996, the
Clerk of this Court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment the Decision has, on October 21, 1995, become
final and executory.
On March 21, 1996, the Magdangals filed in the lower court a MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF
POSSESSION, therein alleging that they did not appeal from the aforesaid decision of this Court, adding '[T]hat
the appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals has become final and executory 15 days from October 5, 1995
or up to October 20, 1995, which the 120 days redemption period commences.
In opposition to this motion, Tan, Jr. alleged, among other things, that until an entry of judgment has been issued
by the Court of Appeals and copy thereof furnished the parties, the appealed decision of the court a quo in this
case cannot be considered final and executory. Pressing the point, Tan, Jr., citing Cueto vs. Collantes, infra.,
would then assert that the period of redemption on his part commenced to run from receipt of entry of judgment.
Meanwhile, Tan, Jr. via a motion for execution dated March 27, 1996, which he filed directly with this court,
prayed this court to direct the court a quo to issue the corresponding writ of execution of the civil case. In a
related move, Tan, Jr. filed on April 16, 1996, a MANIFESTATION AND MOTION therein advising the court
a quo of his intention to redeem the property in question and of the fact that, on such date, he has deposited
with its clerk of court the repurchase price, plus interest, as required by its original decision. By way of relief, Tan,
Jr. prayed that the Magdangals be ordered to claim the amount thus deposited and the Register of Deeds of
Davao City, to reinstate the title of Jaime Tan and Praxedes Tan.
Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTON FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESION of the
Magdangals, MANIFESTATION AND MOTION of Tan, Jr., the court a quo presided by the respondent judge
denied the motions for lack of merit.
The respondent judge wrote in the same order:
'Following the ruling of the Supreme Court in Cueto vs. Collantes, et al., 97 Phil. 325, the 120 days period
for plaintiff to pay the amount of P59,200.00 plus interest x x x should be reckoned from the date of Entry
of Judgment x x x which was March 13, 1996. The plaintiff made a deposit on April 17, 1996 well within
the 120-day period mandated by the decision of this Court.'
In due time, the Magdangals moved for a reconsideration. However, the respondent judge denied the motion for
being proforma and fatally defective.
ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the petitioner.
RULING:
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of judgment is Rule 51 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
"SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. - If no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final
resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the
dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that
such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory. (2a, R36)
SEC. 11. Execution of judgment. - Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion
thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper
court after its entry.
In original actions in the Court of Appeals, its writ of execution shall be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the entry of judgment or final resolution and addressed to any appropriate officer for its
enforcement.
In appealed cases, where the motion for execution pending appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals at a
time that it is in possession of the original record or the record on appeal, the resolution granting such
motion shall be transmitted to the lower court from which the case originated, together with a certified
true copy of the judgment or final order to be executed, with a directive for such court of origin to issue
the proper writ for its enforcement."
This rule has been interpreted by this Court in Cueto vs. Collantes as follows:
"The only error assigned by appellants refer to the finding of the lower court that plaintiff can still exercise
his right of redemption notwithstanding the expiration of the 90-day period fixed in the original decision
and, therefore, defendants should execute the deed of reconveyance required in said decision. Appellants
contend that, the final judgment of the Court of Appeals having been entered on July 8, 1953, the 90-day
period for the exercise of the right of redemption has long expired, it appearing that plaintiff deposited the
redemption money with the clerk of court only on October 17, 1953, or, after the expiration of 101 days.
Appellee brands this computation as erroneous, or one not in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by the rules of court.
Appellee's contention should be sustained. The original decision provides that appellee may exercise his
right of redemption within the period of 90 days from the date the judgment has become final. It should
be noted that appellee had appealed from this decision. This decision was affirmed by the court of appeals
and final judgment was entered on July 8, 1953. Does this mean that the judgment became final on that
date?
Let us make a little digression for purposes of clarification. Once a decision is rendered by the Court of
Appeals a party may appeal therefrom by certiorari by filing with the Supreme Court a petition within 10
days from the date of entry of such decision (Section 1, Rule 46). The entry of judgment is made after it
has become final, i.e., upon the expiration of 15 days after notice thereof to the parties (Section 8, Rule
53, as modified by a resolution of the Supreme Court dated October 1, 1945). But, as Chief Justice Moran
has said, 'such finality *** is subject to the aggrieved party's right of filing a petition for certiorari under
this section,' which means that 'the Court of Appeals shall remand the case to the lower court for the
execution of its judgment, only after the expiration of ten (10) days from the date of such judgment, if no
petition for certiorari is filed within that period.' (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p.
950) It would therefore appear that the date of entry of judgment of the Court of Appeals is suspended
when a petition for review is filed to await the final entry of the resolution or decision of the Supreme
Court.
Since in the present case appellee has filed a petition for review within the reglementary period, which
was dismissed by resolution of July 6, 1953, and for lack of a motion for reconsideration the entry of
final judgment was made on August 7, 1953, it follows that the 90-day period within which appellee may
exercise his right of redemption should be counted from said date, August 7, 1953. And appellee having
exercised such right on October 17, 1953 by depositing the redemption money with the clerk of court, it
is likewise clear that the motion be filed for the exercise of such right is well taken and is within the purview
of the decision of the lower court."
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by
providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:
"Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on
motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in
the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice
to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the
court of origin to issue the writ of execution."
The rationale of the new rule is explained by retired Justice F.D. Regalado as follows:
"1. The term 'final order' is used in two senses depending on whether it is used on the issue of
appealability or on the issue of binding effect. For purposes of appeal, an order is "final" if it disposes
of the action, as distinguished from an interlocutory order which leaves something to be done in
the trial court with respect to the merits of the case For purposes of binding effect or whether it can
be subject of execution, an order is 'final' or executory after the lapse of the reglementary period to
appeal and no appeal has been perfected (
 Under the present procedure, the prevailing party can secure certified true copies of the judgment or final
order of the appellate court and the entry thereof, and submit the same to the court of origin with and to
justify his motion for a writ of execution, without waiting for its receipt of the records from the appellate
court. That motion must be with notice to the adverse party, with a hearing when the circumstances so
require, to enable him to file any objection thereto or bring to the attention of said court matters which
may have transpired during the pendency of the appeal and which may have a bearing on the execution
sought to enforce the judgment.
The third paragraph of this section, likewise a new provision, is due to the experience of the appellate
courts wherein the trial court, for reasons of its own or other unjustifiable circumstances, unduly delays
or unreasonably refuses to act on the motion for execution or issue the writ therefor. On motion in the
same case while the records are still with the appellate court, or even after the same have been remanded
to the lower court, the appellate court can direct the issuance of the writ of execution since such act is
merely in the enforcement of its judgment and which it has the power to require."
It is evident that if we apply the old rule on finality of judgment, petitioner redeemed the subject property
within the 120-day period of redemption reckoned from the appellate court's entry of judgment. The appellate
court, however, did not apply the old rule but the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine, it applied the
new rule retroactively and we hold that given the facts of the case at bar this is an error.
There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. This general rule, however, has well-
delineated exceptions. We quote author Agpalo:
Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining
redress for their invasion; they refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law, they provide
or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It
has been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of
transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance
of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." The general rule against
giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights
does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they
neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively
applicable to all actions - those which have accrued or are pending.
Exceptions to the rule.
The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings admits certain exceptions. The
rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending
actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested
rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the retroactive application of procedural laws in the
event that to do so would not be feasible or would work injustice. Nor may procedural laws be applied
retroactively to pending actions if to do so would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the
independence of the courts."
We hold that Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should NOT be given retroactive
effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right
to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing
as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he
redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult
to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be
penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of
redemption when he made the redemption. The subject lot may only be 34,829 square meters but as petitioner
claims, "it is the only property left behind by their father, a private law practitioner who was felled by an assassin's
bullet."
Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the date of
reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and
the change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is already
vested.
V. BPI v CA
Facts:
First Union (FU) borrowed from BPI PHP 5,000,000.00 and $ 123,218.32, evidenced by PNs. Linda and her
spouse Eddy Tien executed a Real Estate Mortgage against 2 condo units to secure the loan. Linda also
agreed to be solidarily liable with FU for obligations with BPI. However, FU was eventually unable to pay its
loan upon maturity. BPI initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings with the Sheriff of RTC Pasig against the
2 condo units to satisfy the solidary obligation. The properties were eventually sold at a public auction, with BPI
as highest bidder. After applying the proceeds, FU still owed BPI PHP 4,742,949.32. Also, the dollar loan
remained unpaid and has already amounted to 175,324.35. BPI filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money in RTC Makati, with the complaint’s verification and certificate of non-forum shopping signed by Ma.
Cristina Asis and Kristine Ong (CK). However, no Secretary’s Certificate or Board Resolution was attached to
evidence Asis’ and Ong’s authority to file the complaint.
FU and Linda filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the Rules, stating that BPI
failed to attach to the complaint the necessary board resolution authorizing CK to institute collection action
against FU and Linda. BPI opposed, stating that verification and certificate of non-forum shopping established
CK’s authority to file complaint and proof of their authority could be presented during trial. BPI further alleges
that a complaint can only be dismissed under Sec. 5, Rule 7 if there was no certification against forum
shopping. BPI also states that the provision does not even require that the person certifying should show proof
of authority to do so.
Instead of a board resolution, BPI attached a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Zosimo A.
Kabigting (Zosimo), Vice-President of BPI. This authorized CK or any lawyer from the Benedicto Versoza
Gealogo and Burkley Law Offices to initiate any legal action against FU and Linda.
FU countered, citing Public Estates Authority v. Elpidio Uy, stating that “an initiatory pleading which does not
contain a board resolution authorizing the person to show proof of his authority is equally guilty (sic) of not
satisfying the requirements in the Certification against Non-Forum Shopping. It is as if though (sic) no
certification has been filed.”
RTC granted FU and Linda’s Motion to Dismiss. Upon appeal, CA decided that BPI failed to comply with the
procedural requirements on non-forum shopping, stating that the requirement that a petition should sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to corporations since the Rules of Court do not distinguish
between natural and civil persons. The CA did not question the authority of CK as bank representatives,
however BPI failed to show through an appropriate board resolution the proof of authority as representatives.
BPI now goes to the SC, arguing against CA’s interpretation of Shipside vs. CA, stating that the SC actually
excused Shipside’s belated submission of its Secretary’s Certificate and held that it substantially complied with
the rule requiring the submission of a verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as it did, in fact, make a
submission. BPI was in fact, “in a better position” as it also submitted the SPA signed by Zosimo. BPI also
cited GMC vs. NLRC, where the SC held that GMC’s belated submission was considered in substantial
compliance with the Rules.
Issue:
Whether BPI was in substantial compliance with the Rules through its submission of the Board Resolution with
SPA. NO.
Ratio:
In ruling for FU and Linda, the SC emphasized the need to abide by the Rules, pointing out that the verification
of a complaint and attachment of a certificate of non-forum shopping are requirements that are basic,
necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness. The SC did not find any reason for it to generally apply
the “liberal jurisprudential exception” held in the Shipside case to excuse the failure to submit a Board
Resolution. The rule for the submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping, proper in form and substance,
remains to be a strict and mandatory rule. A liberal application has to be justified by ample and sufficient
reasons that maintain the integrity of, and do not detract from, the mandatory character of the rule. Citing Tible
& Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association and Mediserv v. Court of Appeals, the SC stated
that it will only allow the liberal interpretation of the rules if special circumstances or compelling reasons which
will make the strict application of the Rules inequitable exist, and even then the SC will look for a reasonable
attempt at (substantial) compliance with the rules.
These were not seen in the case of BPI, who did not submit any proof of authority in the first instance because
it did not believe that a board resolution evidencing such authority was necessary, and even argued that Sec.
5, Rule 7 does not require proof of authority as a necessity for the certification against forum shopping. In fact,
BPI only attached the SPA issued by Zosimo, granting authority to CK. Therefore, no direct authority was
initially ever given by BPI. Only in the Reply to the Comment did BPI ask the Court to allow submission of the
Corporate Secretary’s Certificate authorizing Zosimo to appoint substitutes. BPI did not even elaborate or
explain on its claimed inadvertence in failing to submit the Corporate Secretary’s Certificate. The SC held,
therefore, that the failure was a “mistake of counsel that BPI never cared to admit but which nevertheless
bound it as a client”.

VI. CMTC INTERNATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, vs. BHAGIS INTERNATIONAL TRADING

CORPORATION

Facts

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Resolutions dated August 19, 20051 and November 15, 2005 of the Former Special Twelfth Division of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84742.

Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Unfair Competition and/or Copyright Infringement and Claim for Damages
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against respondent before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati (trial court).

On February 14, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision4 dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner.

After receiving a copy of the trial court’s Decision, petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court
of Appeals (appellate court) on March 4, 2005.

Thereafter, the appellate court issued a Notice to File the Appellant’s Brief on May 20, 2005, which was received
by the law office representing petitioner on May 30, 2005, stating as follows:

Pursuant to Rule 44, Sec. 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure you are hereby required to file with this Court
within forty-five (45) days from receipt of this notice, SEVEN (7) legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed
copies of the Appellant’s Brief with legible copies of the assailed decision of the Trial Court and proof of service
of two copies upon the appellee/s.

However, despite said notice, petitioner failed to file its appellant’s brief timely. Hence, on August 19, 2005, the
appellate court issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner.

Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit
Appellant’s Brief,9 which was filed forty-two (42) days late from the date of its expiration on July 15, 2005.

On November 15, 2005, the appellate court denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit
Appellant’s Brief. It ruled that one of the grounds by which the Court of Appeals may, on its own motion or that
of the appellee, dismiss the appeal is the failure on the part of the appellant to serve and file the required number
of copies of his brief within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court questioning the August 19, 2005
and November 15, 2005 Resolutions of the appellate court.

Issue:

Propriety of the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal for its failure to file the appellant’s brief within the reglementary
period.

Held:

The Court finds merit in the instant petition.

Time and again, this Court has emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due
regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay
in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time to time, however, we have
recognized exceptions to the Rules, but only for the most compelling reasons where stubborn obedience to the
Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.

In Obut v. Court of Appeals, this Court reiterated that it "cannot look with favor on a course of action which would
place the administration of justice in a straightjacket, for then the result would be a poor kind of justice if there
would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be
dealt with as the circumstances attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the principle
that a party-litigant if to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint of defense rather
than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities."

The same principle was highlighted in Philippine National Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Philippine Milling Company, Incorporated, et al. where the Court ruled that even if an appellant failed to file a
motion for extension of time to file his brief on or before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals does not necessarily lose jurisdiction to hear and decide the appealed case, and that the Court of
Appeals has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss appellant’s appeal, which discretion must be a sound one to
be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play having in mind the circumstances obtaining in
each case.

Ergo, where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the strict application of the
rules of procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. Thus, a rigid application of the rules
of procedure will not be entertained if it will obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the light
of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.

In the instant case, it is apparent that there is a strong desire to file an appellant’s brief on petitioner’s part.

When petitioner filed its motion attaching therewith its appellant’s brief, there was a clear intention on the part of
petitioner not to abandon his appeal. As a matter of fact, were it not for its counsel’s act of inadvertently
misplacing the Notice to File Brief in another file, petitioner could have seasonably filed its appellant’s brief as its
counsel had already prepared the same even way before the receipt of the Notice to File Brief.

It bears stressing at this point then that the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel binds the client, may
not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property,
or where the interest of justice so requires. In rendering justice, procedural infirmities take a backseat against
substantive rights of litigants. Corollarily, if the strict application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice, this Court is not without power to exercise its judicial discretion in relaxing the rules of
procedure.16

Also, it must be stressed that petitioner had no participatory negligence in the dismissal of its appeal. Hence, the
ensuing dismissal of its appeal was completely attributable to the gross negligence of its counsel. For said
reason, the Court is not averse to suspending its own rules in the pursuit of justice. Where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the interests of justice so require, relief
is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence.

VII. FELIPE MADRIAN vs FRANCISCA MADRIAN

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent were married with three sons and a daughter. After a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the
conjugal abode bringing with him their three sons (2 are minors) to Albay and to Laguna, subsequently. Thus
respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in the Court of Appeals,
alleging that petitioners act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the
education of their children and deprived them of their mothers care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to
appear and produce their sons before the court and to explain why they should not be returned to her custody.

Petitioner then filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of the children because
she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of
her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a mother, and that the Family Courts have jurisdiction over
the case.
CA rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling that under the family courts,
respondent was entitled to customs asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling, that under the Family
Code, respondent was entitled to custody of minors.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA has jurisdiction on habeas corpus on the custody of the minor children

HELD:

YES. RA 8369 provides that:

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in
RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the
custody of minors.

xxxxxxxxx

We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
of their jurisdiction overhabeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors

And was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC which likewise provides that

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of
A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ
of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court.
The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court
belongs.
xxxxxxxxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to
a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner
resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested with original
exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued
exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedythat may be availed
of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the
issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before the family court. The writ must be
issued by the same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court
and judicial instability.

The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer. [11] Once
a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts,
including related incidents and ancillary matters.

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.

VIII. Calleja v. Panday

FACTS: Respondents filed a petition with the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages
and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
against herein petitioners. Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court,
they had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime
in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly
and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to respondents.
RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the RTC in Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58,
since the verified petition showed petitioners therein (herein respondents) to be residents of Naga City, then
pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be
brought in the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the
respondents resides. However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the
subject case for quo warranto, stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case
to another administrative jurisdiction.
The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners (respondents
below). Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer, raising therein the affirmative defenses of (1) improper venue, (2)
lack of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of quo warranto. Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their
Answer, also raising the same affirmative defenses. All the parties were then required to submit their respective
memoranda.
RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order: "xxx xxx Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to
Dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings. On the otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order
8-01 has directed the transfer from the regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts specially
designated to try and decide intra-corporate dispute. xxx The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to the
Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that motion
to dismiss is a prohibited pleading (Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-01 of the Supreme
Court dated March 1, 2001, this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court Branch 23, Naga
City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special court to try and decide intra-corporate
controversies under R.A. 8799. xxx The scheduled hearing on the prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction set on July 18, 2005 is hereby cancelled.For reasons of comity the issue of whether Quo
Warranto is the proper remedy is better left to the court of competent jurisdiction to rule upon."
Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead, immediately elevated the
case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

HELD: It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the
offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for
an intra-corporate controversy. Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice Jose Y.
Feria’s view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals that Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
is “limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public
officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated,”
while “[a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation,
fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No.
902-A as amended).”
However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:
5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A
is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That
the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall
exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx
Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly
cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts
of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does
not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. Presently, Section
1(a) of Rule 66 reads thus:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public office, position
or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
against
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
xxxx
As explained in the Unilongocase, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase
“or an office in a corporation created by authority of law” which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present
Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or
franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without
being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 which applies to the petition for quo
warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein
petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.

The next question then is, which branch of the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present action for
quo warrato? Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced and tried in the
Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is undisputed that the
principal office of the corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Commercial Courts in
Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto filed by herein respondents.

Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for quo
warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate
dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative
issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never
vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC.

The petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Camarines Sur dated July 13, 2005 is SET ASIDE for being NULL and VOID. The petition for quo warranto in
Civil Case No. T-1007 (now re-docketed as SEC Case No. RTC 2005-0001), entitled “Jose Pierre A. Panday, et
al. v. Sps. Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr., et al.” is ordered DISMISSED.

IX. Home Guaranty Builders vs. R-II Builders & NHA (2011)
Home Guaranty (guarantor) v. R-II Builders (developer) & NHA (landowner/implementing agency)

Amendment is not allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of
the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Hence, with jurisdiction over the case yet to properly
attach, CA erred in upholding respondent RTC’s admission of respondent’s R-II Builders’ Second Amended
Complaint despite non-payment of the docket fees for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental
Complaint as well as the clear intent to evade payment thereof.

Petition for review under R45

 19 March 1993, a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was entered into between respondents NHA and R-II
Builders for the implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project
(SMDRP) which was amended and restated after 11 months.
 11 August 1994, JVA was aimed at implementing a 2-phase conversion of the Smokey Mountain
Dumpsite “into a habitable housing project inclusive of the reclamation of the area across Radial Road
10 (R-10)”.
o R-II Builders, as developer, was entitled to own 79 hectares of reclaimed land and the 2.3
hectare commercial area at the Smokey Mountain.
o NHA, as landowner/implementing agency, was entitled to own the 2,992 temporary housing
units agreed to be built in the premises, the cleared and fenced incinerator site consisting of 5
hectares, 3,520 units of permanent housing to be awarded to qualified on site residents, the
industrial area consisting of 3.2 hectares and the open spaces, roads and facilities within the
Smokey Mountain Area.
 26 September 1994, NHA and R-II Builders, alongside petitioner Housing Guaranty Corporation (HGC)
as guarantor and the PNB as trustee, entered into an Asset Pool Formation Trust Agreement which
provided the mechanics for the implementation of the project. To back the project, an Asset Pool was
created.
 The parties also executed a Contract of Guaranty whereby HGC, upon the call made by PNB and
conditions therein specified, undertook to redeem the regular Smokey Mountain Project Participation
Certificates (SMPPC) upon maturity and to pay the simple interest thereon to the extent of 8.5% per
annum. The foregoing agreements led to the securitization of the project through the issuance of 5,216
SMPPCs upon the Asset Pool, with a par value of 1M each, classified and to be redeemed by the
trustee or, in case of call on its guaranty, by HGC.
 29 January 2001, subsequent to R-II Builders' infusion of P300M into the project, the issuance of the
SMPPCs and the termination of PNB’s services, NHA, R-II Builders and HGC agreed on the institution
of Planters Development Bank (PDB) as trustee.
 24 October 2002, all the Regular SMPPCs issued had reached maturity and, unredeemed, already
amounted to an aggregate face value of P2.513 Billion. The lack of liquid assets with which to effect
redemption of the regular SMPPCs prompted PDB to make a call on HGC’s guaranty and to execute in
the latter’s favor a Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) of the entire Asset Pool.

Procedure:
RTC Manila Branch 24, acting as Special Commercial Court (SCC)
1. R-II Builders filed the complaint against HGC and NHA contending that HGC’s failure to redeem the
outstanding regular SMPPCs despite obtaining possession of the Asset Pool ballooned the stipulated
interests and materially prejudiced its stake on the residual values of the Asset Pool. Deed of
Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) should be rescinded since PDB exceeded its authority in
executing the same prior to HGC’s redemption and payment of the guaranteed SMPPC… Assessed
docket fees corresponding to an action incapable of pecuniary estimation, the complaint sought the
grant of the following reliefs:
(a) TRO/preliminary and permanent injunction, enjoining disposition/s of the properties in
the Asset Pool;
(b) the resolution or, in the alternative, the nullification of the DAC;
(c) R-II Builders' appointment as trustee pursuant to Rule 98 of the Rules of Court;
(d) HGC’s rendition of an accounting of the assets and the conveyance thereof in favor of R-II
Builders; (e) P500k in attorney’s fees.
2. RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by R-II Builders.
3. In the meantime, HGC, having filed its answer to the complaint, went on before the SC to move for the
conduct of a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses which included such grounds as lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue and the then pendency entitled Francisco Chavez vs. National Housing
Authority, et al., a case which challenged, among other matters, the validity of the JVA and its
subsequent amendments.
 4. R-II Builders filed a motion to admit its Amended and Supplemental Complaint which deleted the prayer
for resolution of the DAC initially prayed for in its original complaint.
5. Manila RTC Branch 24 issued a clarificatory order holding that R-II Builders’ complaint was an ordinary
civil action and not an intra-corporate controversy and that it did not have the authority to hear the case.
6. Case was re-raffled to respondent Manila RTC Branch 22.

RTC Manila Br. 22

1. Issued the 19 May 2008 order which, having determined that the case is a real action, admitted the
aforesaid Amended and Supplemental Complaint, subject to R-II Builders’ payment of the “correct and
appropriate” docket fees.
2. But instead of paying docket fees, R-II Builders filed a motion to admit its Second Amended
Complaint, on the ground that its previous Amended and Supplemental Complaint had not yet been
admitted in view of the non-payment of the correct docket fees therefor. Said Second Amended
Complaint notably resurrected R-II Builders’ cause of action for resolution of the DAC, deleted its
causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool,
reduced the claim for attorney’s fees to P500k, sought its appointment as Receiver pursuant to Rule 59
of the Rules of Court and, after an inventory in said capacity, prayed for approval of the liquidation and
distribution of the Asset Pool in accordance with the parties’ agreements.
3. HGC filed its opposition to the admission of R-II Builders’ Second Amended Complaint on the ground
that respondent RTC had no jurisdiction to act on the case until payment of the correct docket fees and
that said pleading was intended for delay and introduced a new theory inconsistent with the original
complaint and the Amended and Supplemental Complaint. Claiming that R-II Builders had defied
respondent court’s 19 May 2008 order by refusing to pay the correct docket fees, HGC moved for the
dismissal of the case.
4. R-II Builders also filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Annotation of Lis Pendens on the titles of the
properties in the Asset Pool, on the ground that HGC had sold and/or was intending to dispose of
portions thereof, in violation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in the premises.
5. Respondent RTC issued its first assailed order dated 3 March 2009 which: (a) denied HGC’s MTD; (b)
granted R-II Builders’ motion to admit its Second Amended Complaint; and, (c) noted R-II
Builders’ Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Annotation of Lis Pendens, to which the attention of the Manila
Register of Deeds was additionally called.
6. Undaunted, HGC filed its MFR of the foregoing order, arguing that: (a) the case is real action and the
docket fees paid by R-II Builders were grossly insufficient because the estimated value of properties in
the Asset Pool exceeds P5B; (b) a complaint cannot be amended to confer jurisdiction when the court
had none; (c) the RTC should have simply denied the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Annotation of Lis
Pendens instead of rendering an advisory opinion thereon.
7. R-II Builders opposed the foregoing motion and on the theory that the Asset Pool was still in danger of
dissipation, filed an urgent motion to resolve its application for the appointment of a receiver and
submitted its nominees for said position.
8. Respondent RTC issued its second assailed order which (a) denied HGC’s motion for reconsideration;
(b) granted R-II Builders’ application for appointment of receiver and, for said purpose: [i] appointed
Atty. Danilo Concepcion as Receiver and, [ii] directed R-II Builders to post a bond in the sum of P10M.

CA Former Special Fifteenth Division

1. HGC filed Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition imputing grave abuse of discretion against the
RTC for not dismissing the case and for granting R-II Builders’ application for receivership.
2. Petition denied and HGC’s MFR was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

Issues
1. WON RTC a quo had jurisdiction to proceed with the case. (NO jurisdiction)
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees. R-II
Builders’ original complaint was initially docketed before RTC Manila Br. 24, a designated Special Commercial
Court. With HGC’s filing of a motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses asserted in its answer
and R-II Builders’ filing of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, said court issued an order ordering the
re-raffle of the case upon the finding that the same is not an intra-corporate dispute. With its acknowledged
lack of jurisdiction over the case, RTC Manila Br. 24 should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint, since
a court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court.

At the time of its surrender of jurisdiction, Br. 24 had already acted on the case and had in fact issued the writ
of preliminary injunction sought by herein respondent R-II Builders. At that point, there was absolutely no
reason which could justify a re-raffle of the case considering that the order that was supposed to have caused
the re-raffle was not an inhibition of the judge but a declaration of absence of jurisdiction. A re-raffle which
causes a transfer of the case involves courts with the same subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot involve courts
which have different jurisdictions exclusive of the other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a case cannot cure
a jurisdictional defect.

The jurisdictionally flawed transfer of the case from Branch 24, the SCC to Branch 22, the regular court, is
topped by another jurisdictional defect which is the non-payment of the correct docket fees. Granted that R-II
Builders is not claiming ownership of the Asset Pool because its continuing stake is, in the first place, limited
only to the residual value thereof, the conveyance and/or transfer of possession of the same properties sought
in the original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint both presuppose a real action for which
appropriate docket fees computed on the basis of the assessed or estimated value of said properties should
have been assessed and paid.

For failure of R-II Builders to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint or, for that matter,
its Amended and Supplemental Complaint as directed in respondent RTC's 19 May 2008 order, it stands to
reason that jurisdiction over the case had yet to properly attach.

2. (TOPICAL) WON the admitting of R-II Builder’s Second Amended Complaint is proper. (NO)
Although the policy in this jurisdiction is to the effect that amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally
allowed in the interest of justice, amendment is not allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the original
complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Hence, with jurisdiction
over the case yet to properly attach, CA erred in upholding respondent RTC’s admission of R-II
Builders’ Second Amended Complaint despite non-payment of the docket fees for its original complaint
and Amended and Supplemental Complaint as well as the clear intent to evade payment thereof.

In view of respondent RTC’s non-acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, it clearly had no authority to grant the
receivership sought by R-II Builders. It needs pointing out though that the prayer for receivership clearly
indicates that the R-II Builders sought the transfer of possession of property consisting of the assets of the JVA
from HGC to the former’s named Receiver. As already noted, said transfer of possession was sought by
respondent R-II Builders since the very start, overtly at the first two attempts, covertly in the last, the
successive amendments betraying the deft maneuverings to evade payment of the correct docket fees.

CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC Branch 22’s & 24’s Orders are NULLIFIED. The
complaint of R-II Builders first before Br. 24 and thereafter before Br. 22 both of the RTC Manila is
DISMISSED.

X. A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, v EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN
MONDEJAR, Respondent.

FACTS
On 23 March 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of money under Rule of Procedure
for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of P23, 111.71 which
represented her unpaid water bills for the period of 1 June 2002 to 30 September 2005.
Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment therefor from the
homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is the respondent.
Respondent assailed that she religiously paid the monthly charges of P75.00. She claimed that the
increased rate of P113.00 for every 10 cubic meter of water plus an additional P11.60 for every cubic meter
thereafter was not valid because the petitioner unilaterally made the increase without informing the residents
therein which was stipulated in their agreement.
MTCC
The MTCC ruled in favour of the respondent. The petitioner can only charge the respondent the agreed
flat rate for the period 1 June 2002 to 7 August 2003 since the Certificate of Public Convenience was only issued
on the latter date. Respondent should be considered to have fully paid.
The MTCC disregarded the petitioner’s reliance on HLURB’s decision because it failed to prove that it
complied with the directive to inform the HLURB of the result of its consultation with the concerned homeowners
as regards the rates to be charged and the HLURB’s approval to such charges.
Petitioner also failed to submit evidence showing the exact date when it actually began imposing the
NWRB approved rates and the formal agreement of the parties containing the terms and conditions thereof,
without which it cannot establish with certainty respondent’s obligation.
RTC
On a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for grave abuse of discretion filed with the
RTC, the petitioner assailed that the MTCC disregarded petitioner’s reliance on the source of its authority to
impose new water consumption rates.
The RTC issued a decision dismissing the petition, finding that the petition was only filed to circumvent
the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided in Section23 of the Rules of Procedure on Small
Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that it cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision
directing respondent to pay petitioners a bigger sum than that which has been awarded.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the RRC assailing the
propriety of the MTCC’s decision in the subject small claims case.
RULING
Yes. The RTC erred in its decision.
The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the RRC before the RTC was proper.
It is an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules in the absence
of an appeal or any “plain, speedy and adequate remedy” in the ordinary course of law.
In the case at bar, the first level courts are vested exclusive jurisdiction over small claims cases, certiorari
petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed to their corresponding RTCs.
The SC held that the RTC was wrong in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper
remedy and, as such, the RTC case must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
Petition is granted. The RTC’s decision and resolution are reversed and set aside. RTC case is reinstated
and the court a quo is ordered to resolve the same with dispatch.

XI. TOMAWIS V. BALINDONG (G.R. NO. 182434)

Facts:
Respondents herein, daughters of the late Acraman Radia, filed with the Shari’a District Court an action for
quieting of title of a parcel of land against petitioner Tomawis, alleging that they are the absolute owners of the
lot, that petitioner assumed ownership of the land and removed the small houses they built therein, and thereby
unlawfully deprived them of their possession of the land. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint assailing
SDC’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as it is the regular civil courts that had such
jurisdiction pursuant to BP 129. Respondent judge denied the motion asserting in his decision SDC’s original
jurisdiction over the case, concurrently with the RTC. Petitioner sought relief before the CA, but the latter
dismissed the petition. Petitioner now asserts that BP 129 as amended, vesting original exclusive jurisdiction to
the RTCs/MTCs over real actions, effectively removed the concurrent jurisdiction once pertaining to the SDC.

Issue:
Whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the action for quieting of title, notwithstanding the
jurisdiction of RTCs or MTCs over such cases.

Ruling: YES.
The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private respondents, the elimination of the “cloud of doubts on
the title of ownership” on the subject land, are within the SDC’s jurisdiction to grant.

A reading of the pertinent provisions of BP 129 and PD 1083 shows that the former, a law of general application
to civil courts, has no application to, and does not repeal, the provisions found in PD 1083, a special law, which
only refers to Shari’a courts. BP 129 was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general
application to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to Shari’a courts.

We have held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should
be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. A general law does not nullify
a special law. The general law will yield to the special law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the
latter. We must read and construe BP 129 and PD 1083 together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to
the general law to reconcile the two laws.

In order to give effect to both laws at hand, we must continue to recognize the concurrent jurisdiction
enjoyed by SDCs with that of RTCs under PD 1083.
We hold that the respondent court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Its reliance on the provisions
of PD 1083 in asserting its jurisdiction was sound and unassailable.

XII. Villagracia v Fifth Sharia District Court