G.R. No. 181057 June 17, 2015 and a new one, TCT No. 269811,11 was issued.

12

JOSEFINA C. BILLOTE, represented by her Attorneys-in-Fact, WILLIAM C. BILLOTE and
SEGUNDO BILLOTE, Petitioner,
vs.
IMELDA SOLIS, SPOUSES MANUEL and ADELAIDA DALOPE, SPOUSES VICTOR and
REMEDIOS BADAR, REGISTER OF DEEDS (LINGAYEN, PANGASINAN), and HON. MELITON
EMUSLAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Urdaneta City, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a partial petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to partly reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated May
24, 2007 and December 5, 2007, respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 85583 which declared the Decision3 dated February 24, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in PET. Case No. U-1959 null and void.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The property subject of the instant petition is a parcel of land consisting of an area of
6,894 square meters, situated in the Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 15296 issued under the names of the
spouses Hilario Solis and Dorotea Corla,4 who had begotten three (3) children, namely,
Ludovico Solis, and respondents Imelda Solis and Adelaida Solis-Dalope.5 After Hilario’s
death on November 15, 1955, Dorotea contracted a subsequent marriage with Segundo
Billote, with whom she had two (2) children, namely, petitioner Josefina C. Billote and
William C. Billote.
On November 25, 2003, respondents Imelda and Adelaida executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale,13 conveying the entire subject property, including the 1/2 conjugal share of
Dorotea, in favor of respondent spouses Victor and Remedios Badar (Spouses Badar).
Pursuant thereto, another title, TCT No. 274696,14 was issued in the name of the
spouses.
On July 30, 2004, petitioner, through her Attorneys-in-Fact, William Billote and Segundo
Billote, filed before the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment15 seeking to annul the
Decision of the RTC granting respondent Imelda’s Petition for the Issuance of New
Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. 15296. Petitioner alleged that on July 28, 2001,
Dorotea executed a Deed of Absolute Sale16 conveying her 1/2 conjugal share in the
subject property in favor of petitioner. She stated that before she left for the United
States in the same year, she and her mother Dorotea entrusted to William the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 15296.17 Petitioner also alleged that in July 2002, respondents
Imelda and Adelaida asked a certain Atty. Ramon Veloria to assist them in transferring the
entire subject property in their names. Dorotea told them, however, that she had already
sold her conjugal share to petitioner. Despite this, respondents Imelda and Adelaida
nevertheless requested the owner’s duplicate copy from William, who refused on account
of lack of any instruction from their mother and the need for the registration of the Deed
of Sale executed in favor of petitioner. In April 2004, upon hearing that his sister,
respondent Imelda, was able to buy a piece of property notwithstanding her poor financial
capacity, William went to Atty. Veloria’s office wherein he discovered that the property in
question was the subject of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. William then
went to the Register of Deeds and learned that TCT No. 15296 had already been cancelled
despite the fact that the owner’s duplicate copy was in his possession. Thus, petitioner
sought the nullification of the RTC’s decision ordering the issuance of the new owner’s
copy of title for lack of jurisdiction in view of the fact that the owner’s duplicate of title
was not lost, but had all the while been in the possession of her brother, William.

On May 24, 2007, the CA partially granted the petition for annulment of judgment in the
On the claim that the owner’s duplicate copy of the subject property’s title was missing,
following wise:
respondent Imelda filed before the RTC of Urdaneta City on December 16, 2002 a Petition
for the Issuance of New Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. 15296.6 Among several
When spouses Badar bought subject property, it was already covered by TCT No. 269811
other documentary evidence, respondent Imelda submitted a copy of a Deed of
in the names of Imelda and Adelaida.1âwphi1 Although the second owner’s duplicate of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person with Quitclaim dated July 13, 2002
TCT No. 15296 was void the same having been issued by a court which did not have
whereby Dorotea allegedly conveyed her share in the subject property to respondents
jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new owner’s copy in lieu of an owner’s duplicate
Imelda and Adelaida,7 as well as an Affidavit of Loss duly notifying the Register of Deeds
which was not lost but was in the possession of another person, (Straight Times, Inc. vs.
of the title’s loss.8
CA, 294 SCRA 714; Easterworld Motor Industries Corp. vs. Skunac Corp., 478 SCRA 420)
and although TCT No. 269811 in the names of Imelda Solis and Adelaida Dalope was
On February 24, 2003, the trial court granted the petition, finding that the jurisdictional
fraudulently secured, such facts cannot prejudice the right of spouses Victor and Remedios
requirements of Section 1099 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 have been duly
Badar absent any showing that they had any knowledge or participation in such
complied with.10 Upon receipt of the new owner’s duplicate copy, respondents Imelda and
irregularity. Aforenamed spouses cannot be obliged to look beyond the vendor’s certificate
Adelaida registered the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, pursuant to which TCT No.
of title which appeared to be valid on its face and devoid of any annotation of any adverse
15296was cancelled
claim. Spouses Badar appear to be purchasers in good faith and for value as they bought
the disputed property, without notice that some other person has right or interest over the
same and paid a full price for the same at the time of the purchase or before they had
notice of any claim or interest of some other person therein (Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals,
253 SCRA 391). No valid transfer certificate of title can issue from a void certificate of
title, unless an innocent purchaser for value has intervened (Pineda vs. CA and Teresita
Gonzales, 409 SCRA 438). Established is the rule that the rights of an innocent purchaser
for value must be respected and protected notwithstanding the fraud employed by the
sellers in securing their title (Eduarte vs. CA, supra).
While this Court, therefore, can declare the judgment dated February 24, 2003, rendered
by Branch 47, RTC, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan in PET. Case No. U-1959, as well as the
second owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 15296 issued pursuant thereto null and void for
having been issued without jurisdiction, the same cannot be done relative to TCT No.
274696 issued to the spouses Victor and Remedios Badar, absent any showing that they
purchased the property covered thereby with knowledge or privity as to any irregularity or
fraud employed by the vendors in securing their title.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED in part. The decision dated
February 24, 2003 issued by Branch 47, RTC, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan in PET. Case No.
U-1959 as well as the second owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 15296 issued pursuant thereto
are declared NULL and VOID.
This Court cannot declare nullity of TCT No. 274696 in the names of spouses Victor and
Remedios Badar.1âwphi1
SO ORDERED.18
When the appellate court denied petitioner’s Partial Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner
filed the instant Partial Petition for Review on Certiorari on January 31, 2008, invoking the
following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING TCT
NO. 269811 IN THE NAMES OF RESPONDENTS SOLIS AND DALOPE AND TCT NO. 274696
IN THE NAMES OF RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES BADAR AS NULL AND VOID.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONDUCTING
PROCEEDINGS OR IN NOT REFERRING THE ISSUE ON RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES BADAR
BEING PURCHASERS IN GOOD FAITH FOR VALUE TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
PURSUANT TO SEC. 6 OF RULE 47 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
Petitioner asserts that the re-appearance and existence of the owner’s duplicate copy
renders the court issuing the decision ordering the issuance of a second owner’s copy
devoid of any jurisdiction. In support of her contention, petitioner cites Sections 1819 and
1920 of Republic Act (RA) No. 2621 as well as several rulings22 wherein it has been held
that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another
person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not
acquired jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new duplicate title. Thus, while the
appellate court correctly declared the decision of the trial court as well as the second
owner’s copy issued therefrom null and void, petitioner maintains that TCT No. 269811 in
the names of respondents Imelda and Adelaida, as well as TCT No. 274696 in the names
of respondent spouses Badar, should have likewise been declared a nullity for having been
derived from a void title.
Moreover, granting that the CA did not have the authority to declare the Spouses Badar’s
title null and void, petitioner contends that the appellate court should have remanded the
issue on whether said spouses were innocent purchasers for value to the RTC, wherein the
issue of ownership over the subject property is being ventilated in Civil Case No. U-8088.
According to petitioner, the Spouses Badar are not innocent purchasers for value
considering that they were able to acquire the subject property from respondents Imelda
and Adelaida only after they could not reach the price originally offered to them by
petitioner. Clearly, therefore, the Spouses Badar had knowledge of petitioner’s right to the
property. In view of this alleged bad faith on the part of the spouses, petitioner contends
that the appellate court should have ordered further proceedings to determine the
veracity of the parties’ claims to the subject property.
In their Comment, respondents Imelda and Adelaida allege that contrary to petitioner’s
contention, it is actually Section 10923 of PD No. 1529 and not Sections 18 and 19 of RA
No. 26 that is applicable in this case. According to respondents, the cited sections of RA
No. 26 apply specifically to reconstitution of titles, where the original copies thereof are
lost or destroyed. Here, what was lost was not the original copy of TCT No. 15296, as can
be derived from the fact that the same is still in the possession of the Register of Deeds,
but the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. Thus, what applies herein are not the more
stringent requirements provided in RA No. 26 for reconstitution of lost or destroyed
original title but those of PD No. 1529, which merely require the applicant to submit a
sworn statement as to the fact of loss of the owner’s duplicate copy to the Register of
Deeds and the trial court, which will, in turn, direct the issuance of the new duplicate title
after notice and hearing. Considering that petitioner did not appear to have any interest in
the subject property, the Deed of Absolute Sale evidencing her purchase of the same not
being registered or annotated on the title, she did not have any right to notice of the
proceedings. Accordingly, respondents assert that since proper procedure required by
applicable law was observed by the trial court, it had all the authority to hear and decide
their petition, as well as jurisdiction to order the issuance of the second owner’s duplicate
copy of title. Moreover, respondents Imelda and Adelaida refute petitioner’s factual
allegations, particularly on the fact that the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 15296 had been
in William’s possession all the while. Also, respondents maintain that the filing of the
instant petition is violative of the rule on forum shopping for petitioner had previously filed
a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Titles, Documents, Recovery of Ownership and
Possession, Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Injunction
docketed as Civil Case No. U-8088 involving the same parties, issues, and causes of
action.
For their part, respondent Spouses Badar essentially claim that they are innocent
purchasers for value who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title presented to
them by respondents Imelda and Adelaida. Thus, the appellate court did not err when it
refused to declare the nullity of the title issued to them for there is no showing that they
purchased the property covered thereby with knowledge or privity as to any fraud
employed by respondents Imelda and Adelaida in securing their title.
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, it must be noted that the applicable law in this case is not Sections 18 and
19 of RA No. 26 but Section 109 of PD No. 1529. A reading of the provisions clearly
reveals that Sections 18 and 19 of RA No. 26 applies only in cases of reconstitution of lost
or destroyed original certificates of title on file with the Register of Deeds, while Section
109 of PD No. 1529 governs petitions for the issuance of new owner's duplicate
certificates of title which are lost or destroyed.24
This does not mean, however, that this Court can take cognizance of respondents’
assertion that since the trial court applied the correct procedure imposed by law herein,
the trial court necessarily had jurisdiction to order the issuance of the second owner’s
duplicate copy of title.
In Manila v. Gallardo-Manzo,25 this Court explained:
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.
In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show
not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of
jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by
law.26
Time and again, it has been consistently ruled that when the owner’s duplicate certificate
of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision had no
jurisdiction.27 Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the original
certificate.28 Thus, the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is jurisdictional.29
In this case, the appellate court categorically found that the owner’s duplicate of TCT No.
15296 was not, in fact, lost but was in the possession of William Billote all along.30 While
respondents Imelda and Adelaida, in their Comment, claimed they did not know the
whereabouts of the duplicate, and asserted that William even admitted that he did not
know where the same is, they never refuted such finding of the CA. This Court, therefore,
does not find any reason to deviate from the same. Accordingly, since the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but was in the possession of William, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate certificate of title. Hence, the CA was correct in declaring the decision of the RTC
as well as the second owner’s duplicate of title issued pursuant thereto a nullity. It is,
therefore, the fact of the loss or existence of the owner’s duplicate certificate, and not
whether the process prescribed by applicable law was successfully complied with, that
determines the presence or lack of jurisdiction of the trial court.
Anent the findings of the CA, however, that since the subject property had already passed
into the hands of spouses Badar, innocent purchasers for value, having bought the
disputed property without notice that some other person has right or interest over the
same, the title issued to them remains valid and cannot be nullified, the same cannot be
conclusively affirmed. The appellate court ruled as follows:
The property covered by said title, however, passed into the hands of innocent purchasers
for value in the persons of spouses Victor and Remedios Badar, to whom TCT No. 274696
had already been issued.
When spouses Badar bought subject property, it was already covered by TCT No. 269811
in the names of Imelda and Adelaida.1âwphi1 Although the second owner’s duplicate of
TCT No. 15296 was void the same having been issued by a court which did not have
jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new owner’s copy in lieu of an owner’s duplicate
which was not lost but was in the possession of another person, (Straight Times, Inc. vs.
CA, 294 SCRA 714; Easterworld Motor Industries Corp. vs. Skunac Corp., 478 SCRA 420)
and although TCT No. 269811 in the names of Imelda Solis and Adelaida Dalope was
fraudulently secured, such facts cannot prejudice the rights of spouses Victor and
Remedios Badar absent any showing that they had any knowledge or participation in such
irregularity. Aforenamed spouses cannot be obliged to look beyond the vendor’s certificate
of title which appeared to be valid on its face and devoid of any annotation of any adverse
claim. Spouses Badar appear to be purchasers in good faith and for value as they bought
the disputed property, without notice that some other person has right or interest over the
same and paid a full price for the same at the time of the purchase or before they had
notice of any claim or interest of some other person therein (Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals,
253 SCRA 391). No valid transfer certificate of title can issue from a void certificate of
title, unless an innocent purchaser for value has intervened (Pineda vs. CA and Teresita
Gonzales, 409 SCRA 438). Established is the rule that the rights of an innocent purchaser
for value must be respected and protected notwithstanding the fraud employed by the
sellers in securing their title (Eduarte vs. CA, supra).31
After a cursory examination of the aforequoted findings, this Court observes that the
conclusion that the spouses Badar were, indeed, innocent purchasers for value, lacks
sufficient basis. As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the CA merely declared that the
spouses appear to be purchasers in good faith without specifying material evidence
supporting such declarations. The fact that the subject property was already covered by
the title issued under the names of respondents Imelda and Adelaida, by itself, does not
automatically lead to the conclusion that the spouses Badar had no knowledge of some
other party’s interest over the property. While the CA cited appropriate doctrines of law, it
failed to substantiate them with factual proofs confirming the same. This Court is,
therefore, not prepared to categorically rule that spouses Badar were, indeed, innocent
purchasers for value and are consequently entitled to the disputed property.
It must be recalled at this point that in a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate copy of a certificate of title in lieu of one allegedly lost, the RTC, acting only as a
land registration court, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership
of the land covered by the lost owner’s duplicate copy of the certificate of title.32
Possession of a lost owner’s duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not necessarily
equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does
not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular property.33
of ownership over the property in question, taking into consideration the conflicting claims
alleged by the parties supported by their corresponding pieces of evidence. In the instant
case for annulment of judgment, however, petitioner only needed to show the fact that
the owner's duplicate copy was not, in truth, missing in order to determine the lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court resulting in the annulment of judgment thereof Hence, the
allegation of forum-shopping cannot be sustained for the cause of action in the former
case differs from that of the latter.

The CA herein was, therefore, limited only to the determination of whether the trial court WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The issue on
had jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of a the determination of ownership over the disputed property is REMANDED to the Regional
certificate of title in lieu of the one allegedly lost. The only fact that had to be established Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Branch 45, wherein Civil Case No. U-8088 is pending. The
was whether or not the original owner’s duplicate copy of a certificate of title is still in Decision and Resolution, dated May 24, 2007 and December 5, 2007, respectively, of the
existence.34 Thus, the dispute regarding the issue of ownership over the subject property Court Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85583, are PARTLY AFFIRMED, insofar as they declared
as well as whether the Spouses Badar are, in fact, purchasers in good faith and for value the Decision dated February 24, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court in PET Case No. U-1959,
will have to be threshed out in a more appropriate proceeding, specifically in Civil Case as well as the second owner's duplicate certificate of TCT No. 15296 issued therefrom, null
No. U-8088, where the trial court will conduct a full-blown hearing with the parties and void. SO ORDERED.
presenting their respective evidence to prove ownership over the subject realty,35 and
not in an action for the issuance of the lost owner's duplicate certificate of title, nor in a G.R. No. 177042
proceeding to annul the certificate issued in consequence thereof.36 Accordingly,
respondents’ imputation of forum-shopping on the part of petitioner for having previously THIRD DIVISION
filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Titles, Documents, Recovery of Ownership
and Possession docketed as Civil Case No. U-8088 cannot be given ample consideration. [ G.R. No. 177042, December 10, 2012 ]
In Demetriou v. Court of Appeals,37 cited by petitioner, We held:
SPOUSES CRISANTO ALCAZAR AND SUSANA VILLAMAYOR, PETITIONERS, VS. EVELYN
Nor was the filing of such a petition forum shopping in violation of Circular No. 28-91. ARANTE, RESPONDENT.
Private respondents allege that in an action for recovery of possession of the lands which
DECISION
they had brought against the JB Line in the Regional Trial Court of Albay (Civil Case No. T-
1590), petitioners intervened and alleged substantially the same facts as those alleged by
PERALTA, J.:
them in their petition for annulment of judgment. We have gone over petitioners' answer
in intervention in that case. We find that the allegation of forum shopping is without basis.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
While they indeed alleged that private respondent had obtained a second owner's
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
duplicate of TCT T-65878 knowing that 2/3 of the land covered by the certificate had been
November 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88475. The assailed Decision nullified the
sold to them and that the "2nd owner's copy should be cancelled and recalled considering
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 268 in LRC Case No. R-
the fact that the original is in fact still existing and not lost, "the allegation was made
6309. The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the appellate court's March 14,
more for the purpose of demanding a partition, recognizing that private respondent is the
2007 Resolution[3] denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
owner of 1/3 of the land. Petitioner's intervention is thus different from their action in the
Court of Appeals which is solely for the purpose of seeking the annulment of the judgment
in CAD Case No. T-1024 granting private respondent's petition for the issuance of a new
owner's duplicate certificate of title.38 On November 14, 2003, herein petitioner Crisanto Alcazar (hereinafter referred to as
Alcazar) filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer
Similarly, the instant case is merely for the purpose of seeking the annulment of the trial Certificate of Title with the RTC of Pasig City alleging and praying as follows:
court's February 24, 2003 Decision granting the Petition for the Issuance of New Owner's
Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. 15296 while the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of xxxx
Titles, Documents, Recovery of Ownership and Possession in Civil Case No. U-8088 is
more for the recovery of ownership and possession of the subject property. Thus, there is
no identity of causes of action which would result in a violation of the rule against forum-
shopping. In Civil Case No. U-8088, it is incumbent on the trial court to resolve the issue
2. That petitioner is the sole heir of his deceased parents, Emilio Alcazar and Caridad
Alcazar, who both died on 12 December 1967 and 04 March 2002, respectively. x x x
3. That said petitioner's parents left a real estate property covered by TCT No. 169526,
then registered at the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal but was transferred to the
Register of Deeds of Pasig City. x x x
4. That the owner's duplicate of said owner's certificate of title was lost on or about April
2003 and have since, the petitioner exerted diligent efforts to recover the same but failed.
5. That the facts of its los[s] are as follows:
Since the demise of the petitioner's mother[,] he has been in his desire to transfer in his
name the title of the said property, he being the sole and compulsory heir.
Being unknowledgeable about the procedures, petitioner, who was living in the province,
went to the Land Registration Office in Quezon City to inquire about the requirements.
Unfortunately, petitioner was approached by a group [of] individuals who identified
themselves as connected with the LRA and they [offered to] help. An[d] to cut the story
short, said individuals lured herein petitioner to have the said owner's duplicate of title
entrusted to them for alleged transfer. Since then said group of individuals have never
seen or contacted with the petitioner's copy of TCT.
6. That said certificate of title has never been pledged or otherwise delivered to any
person or entity to guarantee any obligation or for any other purpose.
7. That the fact of its los[s] was reported to the Register of Deeds of Pasig on 28 April
2003 by wa[y] of Affidavit of Los[s].
WHEREFORE, the petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to declare null and
void the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 169526 which has been lost,
and to order and direct the Registrar of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasig City, after payment
to him of the fees prescribe by law, to issue in lieu thereof a new owner's duplicate
certificate which shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original
duplicate, in accordance with Section 109 of Act No. 496, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1529.
x x x x[4]
Acting on the petition, the RTC issued an order which set the case for hearing and directed
Alcazar to comply with the statutory requirements of posting. The RTC also ordered that
copies of the above order and the petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig and the Register of Deeds of Pasig.
When the case was called for initial hearing on December 9, 2003, there was no
appearance from the OSG, Pasig City Registry of Deeds and the Pasig City Prosecutor's
Office. Upon Alcazar's motion and there being no opposition, he was allowed to present
evidence ex parte.
On January 6, 2004, the RTC issued a Decision[5] in favor of Alcazar, the dispositive
portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 169526 is hereby declared null and
void and of no force and effect. The Registry of Deeds for the City of Pasig is hereby
directed to issue a new Owner's Duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 169526 based
on the original thereof on file in his office, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact
that it was issued in lieu of the lost duplicate and which shall, in all respect[s], be entitled
to like faith and credit as the original, for all legal intents and purposes.
x x x x[6]
On February 16, 2004, the RTC issued an Entry of Judgment[7] stating that the
abovementioned Decision of the RTC became final and executory on February 5, 2004.
On February 8, 2005, herein respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Final
Decision contending that the RTC, sitting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction
to entertain Alcazar's petition because the subject owner's duplicate certificate of title
which was allegedly lost was not, in fact, lost but actually exists, contrary to Alcazar's
claim.[8]
Respondent alleged in her petition that on April 4, 2003, petitioners obtained a loan of
P350,000.00 from her as evidenced by a promissory note; as security for the loan,
petitioners executed in respondent's favor a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land
located in Pasig City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 169526;
simultaneous with the execution of the mortgage contract, Alcazar personally delivered
and turned over to respondent the original owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 169526;
respondent did not then see the need to immediately annotate the mortgage with the
concerned Register of Deeds; when petitioners subsequently failed to pay their loan,
respondent decided to register the mortgage with the Pasig City Register of Deeds; to her
surprise, respondent learned that Alcazar had caused to be annotated to the copy of TCT
No. 169526 on file with the Pasig Register of Deeds, an affidavit stating the owner's
duplicate copy thereof was lost; respondent also learned that Alcazar filed with the RTC of
Pasig City a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of the subject TCT in
lieu of the allegedly lost one; that the RTC decision granting Alcazar's petition became
final on February 5, 2004; that, as a consequence, TCT No. 169526 was canceled and in
lieu thereof TCT No. PT-125372 was issued.[9]
Petitioners filed their Answer claiming that they did not enter into a contract of real estate
mortgage with respondent; that the deed evidencing such alleged contract is forged; that
during the date that the alleged real estate mortgage contract was executed, they were
not yet the absolute owners of the subject property and, thus, cannot mortgage the
same.[10]
After the parties filed their Reply[11] and Rejoinder,[12] the CA set the petition for pre-
trial conference.[13] Thereafter, the parties were directed to submit their respective
memoranda.
On November 29, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
In the light of the foregoing, the petition having merit in fact and in law is GIVEN DUE
COURSE. Resultantly, and as prayed for, the decision of public respondent Regional Trial
Court, Branch 268, Pasig City, LRC Case No. R-6309 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the new owners['] duplicate copy of TCT No. 169526, in the name of Emilio
Alcazar, married to Caridad Alcazar issued by virtue of the said decision of the Regional
Trial Court as well as the replacement thereof namely, TCT No. PT-125372 in the name of
Crisanto Alcazar married to Susana Villamayor, is hereby declared void and the original
duplicate certificate of TCT No. 169526 in the custody and possession of the petitioner,
hereby reinstated for all legal intents and purposes.
As regards the claim for damages, We find an award for moral damages justifiable in view
of private respondents['] malicious concoctions and fraudulent machinations undoubtedly
causing petitioner besmirched reputation, social humiliation and mental anguish.
Exemplary damages should likewise be imposed by way of example for the public good
and to deter others from following private respondents' wanton and irresponsible
actuations against petitioner. And by reason of private respondents[']
perjurious and malicious claim[,] petitioner was constrained to retain counsel not only to
recover what is rightfully his but more so to protect his good name and reputation, thus
payment of attorney's fees is also justified.
Private respondents therefore are further hereby directed to pay jointly and severally,
petitioner, the following: (1) P30,000.00 as moral damages (2) exemplary damages in the
amount of P20,000.00 and [(3)] P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Herein petitioners-spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] but the CA denied it in
its Resolution dated March 14, 2007.
Hence, the instant petition with the following Assignment of Errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
VERSION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HEREIN.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT TCT NO.
169526 WAS NEVER LOST OR MISPLACED BY HEREIN PETITIONERS.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION 109
OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE (P.D.) NO. 1529 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO HEREIN
PETITIONERS.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
HONORABLE RTC OF PASIG CITY, BRANCH 268 HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE
ISSUANCE OF TCT NO. PT-125372 IN LIEU OF THE ALLEGED LOST CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE HEREIN PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.[16]
The petition lacks merit.
In their first and second assigned errors, petitioners assail the factual findings of the CA.
It is a time-honored principle that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only
questions of law may be raised.[17] It is not this Court's function to analyze or weigh all
over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below, as this Court's
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the
lower court.[18] The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose
findings on these matters are received with respect.[19] A question of law which this
Court may pass upon must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants.[20]
Thus, as a rule, findings of facts of the CA are conclusive, subject to certain exceptions, to
wit: (1) the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) the
inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (4) there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) the Court
of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; and (8) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or
where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by respondent, or where the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but are
contradicted by the evidence on record.[21] However, this Court finds that none of these
exceptions are present in the instant case.
Moreover, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assailed findings of the CA
on the following grounds:
First, petitioners simply alleged, without any proof, that they did not mortgage the subject
property and that respondent and her cohorts defrauded them in obtaining possession of
the disputed TCT. However, the rule is well settled that he who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.[22]
Second, the real estate mortgage contract between the parties was notarized. A notarized
document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution, and it has in its favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted
by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the falsity
of the certificate.[23] Absent such, the presumption must be upheld.[24] The burden of
proof to overcome the presumption of due execution of a notarial document lies on the
one contesting the same.[25] Furthermore, an allegation of forgery must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the
same.[26] As stated above, petitioners failed to prove their allegations. They merely
denied that they did not execute the REM and that the same was a forgery. Certainly, the
pieces of evidence presented by respondent weigh more than petitioners' bare claims and
denials.
With respect to the third assignment of error, the Court does not agree with petitioners'
contention that when respondent and her alleged cohorts supposedly took from them the
subject owner's duplicate copy of the TCT through fraud and deceit, the said TCT was
considered to have been "lost," in accordance with the provisions of Section 109[27] of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.
In construing words and phrases used in a statute, the general rule is that, in the absence
of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary and
common usage meaning.[28] The words should be read and considered in their natural,
ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious signification, according to good and
approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction.[29] Words are
presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and
acceptation.[30] Thus, petitioners should not give a special or technical interpretation to a
word which is otherwise construed in its ordinary sense by the law. In the instant case,
respondent was able to prove that the subject owner's duplicate copy of the TCT is not
lost and is in fact existing and in her possession. Moreover, petitioners admit that they
entrusted the subject TCT to respondent. There is, thus, no dispute that the TCT in the
possession of respondent is the genuine owner's duplicate copy of the TCT covering the
subject property. The fact remains, then, that the owner's duplicate copy of the certificate
of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of respondent, with the knowledge
of petitioners.
As to the fourth assigned error, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the action for reconstitution filed by petitioners.
In Manila v. Gallardo-Manzo,[31] this Court held:
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.
In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show
not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of
jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by
law.[32]
As early as the case of Strait Times, Inc. v. CA,[33] this Court has held that when the
owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of
another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered
the decision had no jurisdiction.[34]
Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the original certificate.[35] This
rule was later reiterated in the cases of Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[36]
Eastworld Motor Industries Corporation v. Skunac Corporation,[37] Rodriguez v. Lim,[38]
Villanueva v. Viloria[39] and Camitan v. Fidelity Investment Corporation.[40] Thus, with
proof and with the admission of petitioners that the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT was
actually in the possession of respondent, the RTC Decision was properly annulled for lack
of jurisdiction.
Whether or not respondent came into possession of the said TCT through fraudulent
means is not an issue in determining the propriety of canceling the owner's duplicate copy
of the subject TCT. Stated differently, granting that respondent obtained possession of the
subject TCT through fraud or deceit, the same is not sufficient justification for the court to
issue an order declaring the same to be null and void and directing the issuance of a new
copy. If petitioners were indeed defrauded, then they could have filed a criminal complaint
for estafa against respondent for the alleged fraud and deceit employed upon them.
Moreover, petitioners' remedy to recover the title in the possession of respondent should
not have been a petition for reconstitution of a lost title but some other form of action
such as a suit for specific performance to compel respondent to turn over the owner's
duplicate copy of the subject TCT.
Another issue is whether or not the subject lot was already owned by petitioners at the
time that it was mortgaged to respondent on April 25, 2003. Petitioners admit in the
instant petition that petitioner Alcazar's father died on December 12, 1967, while his
mother died on March 4, 2002 and that he is their sole heir. On these bases, the Court
agrees with respondent's contention that upon the death of Alcazar's mother in 2002, the
latter became the absolute owner of the subject lot by operation of law, pursuant to the
provisions of Articles 774[41] and 777[42] of the Civil Code.
As to the propriety of the award of damages by the CA, this Court again quotes with
approval the disquisition of the CA on this matter, to wit:
xxxx
As regards the claim for damages, We find an award for moral damages justifiable in view
of private respondents['] [herein petitioners] malicious concoctions and fraudulent
machinations undoubtedly causing petitioner [herein respondent] besmirched reputation,
social humiliation and mental anguish. Exemplary damages should likewise be imposed by
way of example for the public good and to deter others from following private
respondents' wanton and irresponsible actuations against petitioner. And by reason of
private respondents['] perjurious and malicious claim petitioner was constrained to retain
counsel not only to recover what is rightfully his but more so to protect his good name
and reputation, thus payment of attorney's fees is also justified.
x x x x[43]
The rule is that in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and
proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like.[44] In the instant case,
respondent alleged that he suffered from wounded feelings, sleepless nights and mental
anxiety and the CA found that respondent was able to substantiate these claims and
allegations. Suffice it to reiterate that the findings of fact of the CA are final and
conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal[45] subject to exceptions,[46]
which do not obtain in this case.
The Court also affirms the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Exemplary or
corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[47] While the amount
of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages ·before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.[48] As correctly
pointed out by the CA, respondent is entitled to moral damages. Moreover, since
exemplary damages are awarded, attorney's fees may also be awarded in consonance
with Article 2208 (1)[49] of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the November 29,
2006. Decision and the March 14, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 88475.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 115181. March 31, 2000]
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO,
SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO
and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO, respondents. Sdaa miso
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its Resolution dated April 28,
1994 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441
converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for
judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio
Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all
surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is
the second wife of Avelino, Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma.
Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died
intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator of the
estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion
to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner
duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order which reads:
"Acting on the Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition, considering
that the petitioner is the only heir not amenable to a simple partition, and all the other
compulsory heirs manifested their desire for an expeditious settlement of the estate of the
deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
"WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate of deceased
Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties are directed to submit a complete inventory of all the real
and personal properties left by the deceased. Set the hearing of the judicial partition on
APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Notify all the parties and their counsel of
this assignment.
"SO ORDERED."[1]
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an
Order dated June 16, 1993.
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, in granting private respondents' motion to
convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for
judicial partition. Her petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31574. Sdaad
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the assailed decision,
stating that the "petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and accordingly dismissed."[2]
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was denied on April
28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
PARTITION IS PROPER UNDER THE PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF
THE CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE.[3]
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole issue here is
whether respondent appellate court committed an error of law and gravely abused its
discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as
no determination has yet been made of the character and extent of the decedent's estate.
She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles v. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held
that when the existence of other properties of the decedent is a matter still to be reckoned
with, administration proceedings are the proper mode of resolving the same.[4] In
addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of being depleted for want of an
administrator to manage and attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a
motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. The
conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and should be struck down
for lack of legal basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond
required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered
and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78.[5] The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
74[6] which provide:
"SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left
no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.. Scs daad
"SEC. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value.- Whenever the gross value of the
estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten
thousand pesos, and that fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which
shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date
of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such
other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed
summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay,
to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons
legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it among them after
the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such
persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians
or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to
receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the
proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall
be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real
estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office."
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the
moment of the latter's death.[7] Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to
divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated.
When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to
submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the court.[8]
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and
the heirs and legatees are all of age."[9] With this finding, it is our view that Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that there is
nothing to partition yet, as the nature and character of the estate have yet to be
determined. We find, however, that a complete inventory of the estate may be done
during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Hence, the
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the lower court did not
err in converting petitioner's action for letters of administration into an action for judicial
partition. Sup rema
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting an
action for letters of administration to one for judicial partition has no basis in the Rules of
Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74
of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition
of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for On September 11, 2006, petitioner Wilson A. Go instituted an action[5] for partition with
partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more accounting against private respondent Harry A. Go in the RTC of Valenzuela City. The case
expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of was raffled to Branch 172 and docketed as Civil Case No. 179-V-06.
them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings.[10] The trial court
appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for Petitioner alleged that he and private respondent are among the five children of Spouses
judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible error may be Sio Tong Go and Simeona Lim Ang; that he and private respondent are the registered co-
attributed to the Court of Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 7,151 square meters located at Valenzuela
order. City, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-44555 issued on
June 24, 1996 by the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that, upon mutual
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision and agreement between petitioner and private respondent, petitioner has possession of the
resolution of the Court of Appeals is CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 are AFFIRMED. Costs against Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. V-44555; that on said land there are seven
petitioner. warehouses being rented out by private respondent to various businesses without proper
authority from petitioner; that from March 2006 to September 2006, private respondent
SO ORDERED. collected rentals thereon amounting to P1,697,850.00 without giving petitioner his one-
half (1/2) share; that petitioner has repeatedly demanded payment of his rightful share in
WILSON A. GO, G.R. No. 183546 the rentals from private respondent to no avail; and that due to loss of trust and
confidence in private respondent, petitioner has no recourse but to demand the partition
Petitioner, of the subject land. Petitioner prayed that the RTC render judgment (a) ordering the
partition of the subject land together with the building and improvements thereon in equal
Present:
share between petitioner and private respondent; (b) directing private respondent to
render an accounting of the rentals collected from the seven warehouses; (c) ordering the
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
joint collection by petitioner and private respondent of the monthly rentals pending the
resolution of the case; and (d) ordering private respondent to pay attorney's fees and the
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
costs of suit.
Velasco, Jr.,
In his answer,[6] private respondent claimed that during the lifetime of their father, Sio
Nachura, and Tong Go, the latter observed Chinese customs and traditions; that, for this reason, when
Sio Tong Go acquired the subject land together with one Wendell Simsim on November
Peralta, JJ. 23, 1995, the title to the same was placed in the names of petitioner, private respondent
and Simsim instead of his (Sio Tong Go's) name and that of his wife; that the interest of
HARRY A. GO, Simsim in the subject land was subsequently transferred in the names of petitioner and
private respondent through the deed of extra-judicial settlement dated June 24, 1996;
Respondent. Promulgated: that the investment of their father flourished after businessmen started renting the
warehouses built thereon; that during his lifetime, Sio Tong Go had control and
September 18, 2009 stewardship of the business while petitioner and private respondent helped manage the
business; that it was Sio Tong Go who entrusted the title to the subject land to petitioner
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x for safekeeping and custody while the operations and management of the business were
given to private respondent in accordance with the prevailing customs observed and
DECISION
practiced by their parents of Chinese origin; that the buildings and other improvements
were sourced from the business and money of their parents and not from petitioner or
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
private respondent; that partition is not proper because indivision was imposed as a
condition by their father prior to his death; that the subject land cannot be partitioned
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the April 21,
without making the whole property unserviceable for the purpose intended by their
2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100100 which annulled the
parents; that partition will prejudice the rights of the other surviving siblings of Sio Tong
May 4[2] and July 4, 2007[3] Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City,
Go and his surviving wife who depend on the rental income for their subsistence and to
Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 179-V-06. In its July 4, 2008 Resolution,[4] the Court of
answer for the expenses in maintaining and preserving the subject land; that the amount
Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
of rental collection is only P228,000.00 per month or a total P1,596,000.00 for a period of
six months and not P1,697,850.00 as alleged by petitioner; that the income must be
offset with the payment for the debts of petitioner which were paid out from the rental
income as well as the expenses for utilities and other costs of administration and
preservation of the subject land; and that the issue of ownership must first be resolved
before partition may be granted. Private respondent prayed that the complaint be
dismissed; he counterclaimed for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
On April 23, 2007, petitioner filed a motion[7] to require private respondent to deposit
with the trial court petitioner's one-half (1/2) share in the rental collections from the date
of the filing of the complaint on September 11, 2006 up to April 30, 2007, and every
month thereafter as well as the rental collections from February 2006 to August 2006. On
May 4, 2007, the trial court issued an order granting the motion not only with respect to
the one-half (1/2) share prayed for but the entire monthly rental collections:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant motion to be well-taken, the defendant is hereby
directed to deposit in Court within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof all the amounts
collected by him from the lessees of the warehouses covered by the certificate of title in
the names of the [petitioner] and [private respondent], and no withdrawal therefrom shall
be allowed without the previous written authority of this Court.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Private respondent moved for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court in its
July 4, 2007 Order. Aggrieved, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court Appeals
attributing grave abuse of discretion on the trial court. On April 21, 2008, the Court of
Appeals issued the assailed Decision which nullified and set aside the May 4 and July 4,
2007 Orders of the trial court:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE
and the writ prayed for accordingly GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated May 4 and July
4, 2007 issued by respondent court are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The Court of Appeals noted, citing the ruling in Maglucot-aw v. Maglucot,[10] that an
action for partition involves two phases. During the first phase, the trial court determines
whether a co-ownership in fact exists while in the second phase the propriety of partition
is resolved. Thus, until and unless the issue of co-ownership is definitely resolved, it would
be premature to effect a partition of the subject property. Applying this principle by
analogy, the appellate court concluded that the deposit of the monthly rentals with the
trial court was premature considering that the issue of co-ownership has yet to be
resolved:
The Court holds that with the issue of co-ownership, or to be precise, the nature and
extent of private respondent's title on the subject real estate, i.e., whether as owner of
one-half (1/2) share, or a co-owner along with the other heirs of the late Sio Tong Go, not
having been resolved first, it was premature for the respondent court to act favorable on
private respondent's motion to deposit in court all rentals collected from the date of death
of the said decedent, which according to petitioner is the true owner of the property under
co-ownership. Such relief may be granted during the second stage of the action for
partition, after due trial and the court has been satisfied that indeed private respondent-
movant is the owner of the full one-half (1/2) share, and not just of an equal share with
the other siblings and their mother, the surviving wife of Sio Tong Go. For, if it turns out
that the subject property is owned not just by petitioner and private respondent but all
the heirs of the late Sio Tong Go, then the latter had to be included as parties in interest
in the partition case, pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 69. As co-owners entitled to a share in the
property subject of partition, assuming the evidence at the trial proves the contention of
petitioner, the other sibling and mother of petitioner and private respondent are
indispensable parties to the suit. Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a
condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. Without the presence of all the
other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief
in favor of the private respondent.
Moreover, assuming the veracity of the allegations raised in the answer by petitioner, it
would appear that the real property sought to be partitioned is merely held in trust by
petitioner and private respondent for the benefit of their deceased father, and the latters
surviving heirs who succeeded him in his estate after his death. Thus, all the co-heirs and
persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for
partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. The circumstance that the
names of the other alleged co-owners and co-heirs do not appear in the certificate of title
over the subject property is of no moment. It was held that the mere issuance of a
certificate of title does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under
co-ownership with persons not named therein.
xxxx
Petitioners answer and the annexes attached thereto raise serious question on the right
or interest of private respondent to seek segregation of the subject property to the extent
of one-half (1/2) share thereof, and consequently, to receive rents or income of the
property corresponding to such claimed one-half (1/2) share. That the rentals sought to
be deposited in court is limited only to those collected following the death of their father
only tends to support the position of petitioner that the subject real property is owned in
common by the heirs of Sio Tong Go, and not just by petitioner and private respondent. It
may also be noted that the complaint contains no categorical statement that private
respondent, before the filing of the complaint, has in fact received such one-half (1/2)
share out of the rentals collected from the lessees of the warehouses. Hence, respondent
courts order for petitioner to deposit all rental income from the real estate subject of
partition, which amounts to an accounting of rents and income pertaining to the co-owner
share of private respondent prior to the determination of the question of co-ownership,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.[11]
 Thereafter, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in
Resolution dated July 4, 2008. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate
court in nullifying the aforementioned orders of the trial court.
The Court notes that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy when he filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 from the adverse ruling of the Court of Appeals. The province of a
petition for certiorari is strict and narrow for it is limited to questions of lack of or excess
in jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion. The proper remedy should have been a
petition for review under Rule 45. However, the Court, pursuant to the liberal spirit which
pervades the Rules and given the substantial issue raised, shall treat the present petition
as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 since it was filed within the 15-day
reglementary period prescribed under said rule.[12]
The sole issue is whether the Court Appeals erred when it nullified the order requiring
private respondent to deposit the monthly rentals over the subject land with the trial court
during the pendency of the action for partition and accounting.
Petitioner contends that the subject order is merely provisional and preservatory in
character. It is intended to prevent the undue dissipation of the rental income until such
time that the trial court shall determine who is lawfully entitled thereto. Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court on partition does not preclude the trial court from issuing orders to protect
and preserve the rights and interests of the parties while the main action for partition is
being litigated. In this case, there is no dispute that the subject property is registered in
the names of petitioner and private respondent, this being admitted by private respondent
himself. Petitioner thus asserts that the trial court correctly ordered the deposit of the
monthly rentals to safeguard the interests of the parties to this case.
Private respondent counters that assuming that the subject order is merely provisional in
nature, such order needs a concrete ground to justify it. The fact that the title to the
subject land is in the names of petitioner and private respondent does not automatically
mean that there exists a co-ownership. The surrounding circumstances of this case
support the contention that the subject land was bought by Sio Tong Go and the title
thereto was placed in the names of his two sons, petitioner and private respondent, in
observance of the Chinese customs and tradition. Private respondent emphasizes that
petitioner began to claim his (petitioners) alleged one-half (1/2) share in the rentals only
after the death of their father on February 27, 2006 despite the fact that the subject land
was bought way back on June 24, 1996. Petitioners acquiescence for 10 years thus shows
that he knew that the subject land was really owned by their father and was merely
placed in their names. Further, the grant of the motion to deposit will unduly prejudice the
whole family because they depend on the rental income for their living expenses as well
as the costs of administration and preservation of the subject land. Also, petitioner failed
to prove that there was an undue dissipation of the rental income by private respondent
which would warrant the issuance of the subject order. Finally, the order to deposit the
whole monthly rental income is erroneous because petitioner only prayed for the deposit
of his alleged one-half (1/2) share therein and not the entirety thereof.
The petition is partly meritorious.
The appellate court held that the order granting petitioners motion to deposit monthly
rentals is premature because the question of co-ownership should first be resolved before
said motion may be granted. However, as correctly argued by petitioner, the assailed
order is merely preservatory or provisional in nature. It does not amount to an
adjudication on the merits of the action for partition and accounting for the rentals are
merely kept by the trial court until it is finally determined who is lawfully entitled thereto.
Although the Rules of Court do not expressly provide for this kind of provisional relief, the
Court has, in the past, sanctioned such practice pursuant to the courts general power to
issue such orders conformable to law and justice[13] and to adopt means necessary to
carry its jurisdiction into effect.[14]
In The Province of Bataan v. Hon. Villafuerte, Jr.,[15] the Court sustained the escrow
order issued by the trial court over the lease rentals of the subject properties therein
pending the resolution of the main action for annulment of sale and reconveyance. In
upholding the authority of the trial court to issue such order, the Court ratiocinated thus:
In a manner of speaking, courts have not only the power to maintain their life, but they
have also the power to make that existence effective for the purpose for which the
judiciary was created. They can, by appropriate means, do all things necessary to
preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution
of Government. Courts have therefore inherent power to preserve their integrity, maintain
their dignity and to insure effectiveness in the administration of justice.
To lend flesh and blood to this legal aphorism, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court explicitly
provides:
Section 5. Inherent powers of courts Every court shall have power:
. . . (g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to
law and justice.
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect When by law jurisdiction is conferred on
a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry
it into effect may be employed by such court or officer, and if the procedure to be followed
in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules,
any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable
to the spirit of said law or rules. (Emphasis ours)
It is beyond dispute that the lower court exercised jurisdiction over the main action
docketed as Civil Case No. 210-ML, which involved the annulment of sale and
reconveyance of the subject properties. Under this circumstance, we are of the firm view
that the trial court, in issuing the assailed escrow orders, acted well within its province
and sphere of power inasmuch as the subject orders were adopted in accordance with the
Rules and jurisprudence and were merely incidental to the court's exercise of jurisdiction
over the main case, thus:
xxxx
In the ordinary case the courts can proceed to the enforcement of the plaintiff's rights
only after a trial had in the manner prescribed by the laws of the land, which involves due
notice, the right of the trial by jury, etc. Preliminary to such an adjudication, the power of
the court is generally to preserve the subject matter of the litigation to maintain the
status, or issue some extraordinary writs provided by law, such as attachments, etc. None
of these powers, however, are exercised on the theory that the court should, in advance
of the final adjudication determine the rights of the parties in any summary way and put
either of them in the enjoyment thereof; but such actions taken merely, as means for
securing an effective adjudication and enforcement of rights of the parties after such
adjudication. Colby v. Osgood Tex. Civ. App., 230 S.W. 459; (emphasis ours)
On this score, the incisive disquisition of the Court of Appeals is worthy of mention, to
wit:
. . . Given the jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the raised question of ownership
and possession of the disputed property, there then can hardly be any doubt as to the
competence of the same court, as an adjunct of its main jurisdiction, to require the
deposit in escrow of the rentals thereof pending final resolution of such question. To
paraphrase the teaching in Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos (G.R. No. L-4268,
January 18, 1951, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 2nd ed., p. 133),
jurisdiction over an action carries with it jurisdiction over an interlocutory matter
incidental to the cause and deemed essential to preserve the subject matter of the suit or
to protect the parties' interest. x x x
x x x the impugned orders appear to us as a fair response to the exigencies and equities
of the situation. Parenthetically, it is not disputed that even before the institution of the
main case below, the Province of Bataan has been utilizing the rental payments on the
Baseco Property to meet its financial requirements. To us, this circumstance adds a more
compelling dimension for the issuance of the assailed orders. . . .
Applying the foregoing principles and considering the peculiarities of the instant case, the
lower court, in the course of adjudicating and resolving the issues presented in the main
suit, is clearly empowered to control the proceedings therein through the adoption,
formulation and issuance of orders and other ancillary writs, including the authority to
place the properties in custodia legis, for the purpose of effectuating its judgment or
decree and protecting further the interests of the rightful claimants of the subject
property.
To trace its source, the court's authority proceeds from its jurisdiction and power to
decide, adjudicate and resolve the issues raised in the principal suit. Stated differently,
the deposit of the rentals in escrow with the bank, in the name of the lower court, is only
an incident in the main proceeding. To be sure, placing property in litigation under judicial
possession, whether in the hands of a receiver, and administrator, or as in this case, in a
government bank, is an ancient and accepted procedure. Consequently, we find no
cogency to disturb the questioned orders of the lower court and in effect uphold the
propriety of the subject escrow orders. (emphasis ours)[16]
In another case, Bustamante v. Court of Appeals,[17] private respondents filed a
complaint against petitioners for recovery of possession with preliminary injunction over
the subject lot with buildings thereon. Favorably acting on the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, the trial court required the petitioners to pay reasonable rent to
private respondents and granted to the latter the right to collect rentals from the existing
lessees of the subject lot and buildings. On review, the Court ruled, inter alia, that the
vesting in private respondents of the right to collect rent from the existing lessees of the
buildings is premature pending a final determination of who among the parties is the
lawful possessor of the subject lot and buildings. The Court went on to state that [t]he
most prudent way to preserve the rights of the contending parties is to deposit with the
trial court all the rentals from the existing lessees of the Buildings.[18] Consequently,
petitioners were ordered to deposit with the trial court all collections of rentals from the
lessees of the buildings pending the resolution of the case.
As can be seen, the order to deposit the lease rentals with the trial court is in the nature
of a provisional relief designed to protect and preserve the rights of the parties while the
main action is being litigated. Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, such an
order may be issued even prior to the determination of the issue of co-ownership because
it is precisely meant to preserve the rights of the parties until such time that the court
finally determines who is lawfully entitled thereto. It does not follow, however, that the
subject order in this case should be sustained. Like all other interlocutory orders issued by
a trial court, the subject order must not suffer from the vice of grave abuse of discretion.
As will be discussed hereunder, special and compelling circumstances constrain the Court
to hold that the subject order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
At the outset, the Court agrees with private respondent that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it ordered the deposit of the entire monthly rentals whereas petitioner
merely asked for the deposit of his alleged one-half (1/2) share therein. Indeed, the
courts power to grant any relief allowed under the law is, as general rule, delimited by the
cardinal principle that it cannot grant anything more than what is prayed for because the
relief dispensed cannot rise above its source.[19] Here, petitioner categorically prayed for
in his motion for deposit with the trial court of only one-half (1/2) of the monthly rentals
during the pendency of the case.[20] It was, therefore, highly irregular for the RTC to
order the deposit of the entire monthly rentals. The RTC offered no reason for its
departure from such a basic principle of law; its actuations, thus, constituted grave abuse
of discretion.
This finding does not, however, fully dispose of this case. The question may be asked, if
petitioner is not entitled to the deposit of the entire monthly rentals, is he then entitled to
the deposit of his alleged one-half (1/2) share therein?
The Court answers in the negative.
The origin of petitioners alleged one-half (1/2) share as co-owner of the subject land is
conspicuously absent in the allegations in his complaint for partition and accounting before
the trial court. Petitioner tersely stated that, as per the title of the subject land, he and
private respondent are named as co-owners in equal shares. It was private respondents
answer to the complaint which brought to light the alleged origin of their title to the
subject land. Private respondent claimed that the subject land was actually bought by
their father but the title was placed in petitioner and private respondents names in
accordance with the customs and traditions of their parents who were of Chinese descent.
Furthermore, it was their father who exercised control and ownership over the subject
land as well as the warehousing business built thereon. Before the Court of Appeals,
petitioner never refuted this claim by private respondent. Rather, petitioner insisted that
the names in the title is controlling and, on its face, the existence of a co-ownership has
been duly established, thus, entitling him to the deposit of his one-half (1/2) share in the
monthly rentals in order to protect his interest during the pendency of the case. Curiously,
after the Court of Appeals ruled in its April 21, 2008 Decision that the act of Sio Tong Go
in placing in the names of his two children the title to the subject land merely created an
implied trust for the benefit of Sio Tong Go and, upon his death, all his legal heirs
pursuant to Article 1448[21] of the Civil Code, petitioner, in his motion for
reconsideration, harped on a new theory through a process of deduction. For the first time
on appeal, he claimed that the subject land was donated by their father to him and private
respondent using the very same provision that the Court of Appeals relied on in
concluding that an implied trust was created.[22] Then, before this Court, petitioner
sought to further amplify his new found theory of the case. In trying to explain why he did
not demand the rental collections as early as the date of purchase of the subject land in
1996 and why he waited until the death of his father in 2006, he stated, again for the first
time on appeal, that while it may be true that petitioner did not seek the partition of the
property and asked for his share in the rental collection when their father Sio Tong Go was
still alive, it was but an act of courtesy and respect to their father, since the latter was still
the one overseeing and supervising the business operation, and there was yet no danger
and risk of abuse and dissipation of the rental collections since Sio Tong Go was still alive
to control the rental collections and disbursements of the funds.[23] In effect, petitioner
admitted that his father had control and ownership of the subject land and the lease
rentals collected therefrom thereby lending credence to private respondents consistent
claim that the subject land was actually bought by their father.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court cannot lightly brush aside petitioners lack of
forthrightness and candor reflected, as it were, in the shifting sands of his theory of the
case. While initially in his complaint he anchored his alleged one-half (1/2) share based
solely on the names appearing in the title of the subject land, petitioners subsequent
admissions (when confronted with private respondents answer to the complaint)
contradicted his previous allegations, thus, creating serious doubts as to the real extent of
his lawful interest in the subject land. What emerges at this stage of the proceedings,
albeit preliminary and subject to the outcome of the presentation of evidence during the
trial on merits, is that the subject land was bought by Sio Tong Go and, upon his death,
his interest therein passed on to his surviving spouse, Simeona Lim Ang, and their five
children. Under the presumption that the subject land is conjugal property because it was
bought during the marriage of Sio Tong Go and Simeona Lim Ang, and pursuant to the law
on succession, petitioners share, as one of the children, appears to be limited to 1/12[24]
of the monthly rentals. Thus, it is only to this extent that his alleged interest as co-owner
should be protected through the order to deposit rental income. Consequently, under the
prevailing equities of this case, the subject order requiring private respondent to deposit
with the trial court the entire monthly rental income should be reduced to 1/12 of said
income reckoned from the finality of this Decision and every month thereafter until the
trial court finally determines who is lawfully entitled thereto.
The Court emphasizes that these are preliminary findings for the sole purpose of
resolving the propriety of the subject order requiring the deposit of the monthly rentals
with the trial court. The precise extent of the interest of the parties in the subject land will
have to await the final determination by the trial court of the main action for partition
after a trial on the merits. While ordinarily this Court does not interfere with the sound
discretion of the trial court to determine the propriety and extent of the provisional relief
necessitated by a given case, the afore-discussed special and compelling circumstances
warrant a correction of the trial courts exercise of discretion based on the grave abuse of
discretion standard. It is well to remember that the question often asked of this Court,
that is, whether it is a court of law or a court of justice, has always been answered in that
it is both a court of law and a court of justice.[25] When the circumstances warrant, this
Court shall not hesitate to modify the order issued by a trial court to ensure that it
conforms to justice. The result reached here is but an affirmation of this long held and
cherished principle.
As a final note, private respondent raised a collateral matter regarding the lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC over this case for failure to implead indispensable parties, i.e., all
the legal heirs of Sio Tong Go. The records indicate that on August 16, 2007, Simeona Lim
Ang filed a motion[26] to intervene although it is not clear whether the trial court has
acted on this motion and whether the other legal heirs have similarly intervened in this
case. At any rate, the Court cannot rule on this issue because the present case is limited
to the propriety of the subject order granting the motion to deposit monthly rentals. The
proper forum to thresh out this issue, if the parties so desire, is the trial court where the
main action is pending.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The April 21, 2008 Decision and July
4, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100100 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The May 4 and July 4, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
City, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 179-V-06 are SET ASIDE and a new Order is entered
directing private respondent to deposit 1/12 of the monthly rentals collected by him from
the buildings on TCT No. V-44555 with the trial court from the finality of this Decision and
every month thereafter until it is finally adjudged who is lawfully entitled thereto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.