Umbao v. Yap, G.R. No.
L-8933, February 28, 1957 The case between herein litigants has not required court intervention from
Facts: Petitioner Umbao and respondent Yap both had agreed in writing to
“submit their case to the Wage Administration Service for investigation” and
“to abide by whatever decision (said) office may render on the case” which
“they recognized . . . to be final and conclusive.” After proper investigation
had been conducted by Severo Puncan of the same Service, who after hearing
the parties and considering their evidence, declared in a written report,
respondent Yap to be liable for unpaid wages; that the award had been
approved by Ruben Santos, Acting Chief of the Service; and that respondent
had refused to abide by and comply with it. Respondent’s answer did not
deny the existence of the covenant and of the award but questioned the
enforceability of both, contending mainly that the Service had no legal
authority to act as arbitrator, that the procedural requirements of Republic
Act No. 602 had not been followed, and that the provisions of Republic Act
No. 876 known as the Arbitration Law had been disregarded. Petitioner then
asked for judgment on the pleadings. The Court, noting non-observance of
the procedure outlined in Republic Act No. 876, gave judgment for defendant.
However upon motion to reconsider, the judge seeing differently, held the
arbitration agreements to be a contract obligatory on the parties under the
provisions of the New Civil Code. Consequently, he rendered judgment
against defendant. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the arbitration by the Service conformed to the Act.
Ruling: The argument evidently assumes that a compromise agreement is the
same as an arbitration agreement. Such assumption is error: one is different
from the other; they are treated in two separate chapters of the Code.
No rules have been promulgated by this Court. However the Legislature
adopted such rules in Republic Act No. 876 known as “The Arbitration Law’
effective December 1953. Said act was obviously adopted to supplement-not
to supplant-the New Civil Code on arbitration. It expressly declares that “the
provisions of chapters one and two, Title XIV, Book of the Civil Code the
parties may select the arbitrator without court intervention. And section 8 of
the Act impliedly permits them to do so. There is nothing in Republic Act 876
requiring court permission of knowledge or intervention before the arbitrator
selected by the parties may perform his assigned work. The section does not
mean there can be no arbitration without a previous court actuation.
the beginning, because they had named the arbitrator: the Administration
Service and necessarily the proper officer, thereof, Severo Puncan. And this
defendant should not be permitted to question the authority of said
officer now, because he voluntarily submitted his evidence to him; and he
only turned around to deny such authority when the resultant verdict
adversely affected his pocket. He even appealed to the Secretary of Labor,
and without questioning Puncan’s authority, pleaded for exoneration on the
merits.
As to the arbitration proceedings, Republic Act No. 876 contains provisions
about the procedure to be adopted by arbitrators, their oath, the hearings,
and the form and content of the award. Even so, herein appellant asserted
no prejudicial departure therefrom. As already stated, Republic Act No. 876
did not require court intervention (in the case at bar) prior to the award of
the arbitrator, no ground for it having arisen, as the parties voluntarily took
steps to carry out the settlement process down to the arbiter’s decision. It
was only after such award, when defendant refused to comply that judicial
action became necessary, thru the means afforded by the statute:
confirmation of award and judgment.
These provisions, we believe, apply whether or not the court intervened from
the very beginning. Now then, examining the complaint and the judgment
entered herein in the light of the above directions, we find substantial
conformity therewith; so much so that defendant raised no issue on the
same.
Wherefore, the judgment should be, and is hereby affirmed
Continental Marble Corp. V. National Labor Relations Commission (Nlrc);,
Et Al., G.R. No. L-43825, May 9, 1988
Facts: private respondent Rodito Nasayao claimed that sometime in May
1974, he was appointed plant manager of the petitioner corporation, with
an alleged compensation of P3,000.00, a month, or 25% of the monthly net
income of the company, whichever is greater, and when the company failed
to pay his salary for the months of May, June, and July 1974, Rodito
Nasayao filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission,
Branch IV, for the recovery of said unpaid varies.
Petitioners denied that Rodito Nasayao was employed in the company as
plant manager with a fixed monthly salary of P3,000.00. They claimed that
the undertaking agreed upon by the parties was a joint venture, a sort of
partnership, wherein Rodito Nasayao was to keep the machinery in good
working condition and, in return, he would get the contracts from end-users
for the installation of marble products, in which the company would not
interfere. In addition, private respondent Nasayao was to receive an
amount equivalent to 25% of the net profits that the petitioner corporation
would realize, should there be any. Petitioners alleged that since there had
been no profits during said period, private respondent was not entitled to
any amount.
The case was submitted for voluntary arbitration and the parties selected
the herein respondent Jose T. Collado as voluntary arbitrator. In the course
of the proceedings, however, the herein petitioners challenged the
arbitrator’s capacity to try and decide the case fairly and judiciously and
asked him to desist from further hearing the case. But, the respondent
arbitrator refused. In due time, or on 29 December 1975, he rendered
judgment in favor of the complainant, ordering the herein petitioners to pay
Rodito Nasayao the amount of P9,000.00, within 10 days from notice.
Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission on
grounds that the labor arbiter gravely abused his discretion in persisting to
hear and decide the case notwithstanding petitioners’ request for him to
desist therefrom: and that the appealed decision is not supported by
evidence.
Rodito Nasayao filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the
decision of the voluntary arbitrator is final, unappealable, and immediately
executory
respondent Commission, in a resolution dated 7 May 1976, dismissed the
appeal on the ground that the decision appealed from is final, unappealable
and immediately executory, and ordered the herein petitioners to comply
with the decision of the voluntary arbitrator within 10 days from receipt of
the resolution.
Court issued a temporary restraining order, restraining herein respondents
from enforcing and/or carrying out the questioned decision and resolution.
ISSUE: Voluntary Arbitration award, generally final. Exceptions.
HELD: A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in quasi-
judicial capacity. There is no reason why her decisions involving
interpretation of law should be beyond this Court’s review. Administrative
officials are presumed to act in accordance with law and yet we do hesitate
to pass upon their work where a question of law is involved or where a
showing of abuse of authority or discretion in their official acts is properly
raised in petitions for certiorari.
While the Court has accorded great respect for, and finality to, findings of
fact of a voluntary arbitrator and administrative agencies which have
acquired expertise in their respective fields, like the Labor Department and
the National Labor Relations Commission, their findings of fact and the
conclusions drawn therefrom have to be supported by substantial evidence.
In that instant case, the finding of the voluntary arbitrator that Rodito
Nasayao was an employee of the petitioner corporation is not supported by
the evidence or by the law.
The decisions of the voluntary arbitrators must be given the highest respect
and as a general rule must be accorded a certain measure of finality. This is
especially true where the arbitrator chosen by the parties enjoys first rate
credentials. It is not correct however, that this respect precludes the
exercise of judicial review over their decisions.
In spite of statutory provisions making final the decisions of certain
administrative agencies, the SC may take cognizance of petitions
questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of
discretion, violation of due process, denial of substantial justice, or
erroneous interpretation of the law are brought to its attention.
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. St. Francis Square Realty, G.R Nos. 198916-
17, 198920-21, 11 January 2016
Bases Conversion Development Authority, et al., v. DMCI Project
Developers, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 173137, 11 January 2016
 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. World Interactive Network Systems
Japan Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 169332, February 11, 2008
Facts: Petitioner ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation entered into a licensing
agreement with respondent World Interactive Network Systems (WINS)
Japan Co., Ltd., a foreign corporation licensed under the laws of Japan, in that
the former granted respondent the exclusive license to distribute and
sublicense the distribution of the television service known as “The Filipino
Channel” (TFC) in Japan. By virtue thereof, petitioner undertook to transmit
the TFC programming signals to respondent which the latter received through
its decoders and distributed to its subscribers. A dispute arose between the
parties when petitioner accused respondent of inserting nine episodes of
WINS WEEKLY, a weekly 35-minute community news program for Filipinos in
Japan, into the TFC programming. Petitioner claimed that these were
“unauthorized insertions” constituting a material breach of their agreement.
Consequently, petitioner notified respondent of its intention to terminate the
agreement. Thereafter, respondent filed an arbitration suit pursuant to the
arbitration clause of its agreement with petitioner. The parties appointed
Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar to act as sole arbitrator who then rendered a
decision in favor of respondent holding that petitioner gave its approval for
the airing of WINS WEEKLY as shown by a series of written exchanges
between the parties and that petitioner threatened to terminate the
agreement due to its desire to compel respondent to re-negotiate the terms
thereof for higher fees. He then allowed respondent to recover temperate
damages, attorney’s fees and one-half of the amount it paid as arbitrator’s
fee. Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court or, in the alternative, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
same Rules, with application for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondent, on the other hand, filed a petition for
confirmation of arbitral award. The CA rendered the assailed decision
dismissing ABS-CBN’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied.
Issue: The issue before us is whether or not an aggrieved party in a voluntary
arbitration dispute may avail of, directly in the CA, a petition for review under
Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, instead
of filing a petition to vacate the award in the RTC when the grounds invoked
to overturn the arbitrator’s decision are other than those for a petition to
vacate an arbitral award enumerated under RA 876.
Ruling: RA 876 itself mandates that it is the Court of First Instance, now the
RTC, which has jurisdiction over questions relating to arbitration, such as a
petition to vacate an arbitral award. As RA 876 did not expressly provide for
errors of fact and/or law and grave abuse of discretion (proper grounds for a
petition for review under Rule 43 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
respectively) as grounds for maintaining a petition to vacate an arbitral award
in the RTC, it necessarily follows that a party may not avail of the latter
remedy on the grounds of errors of fact and/or law or grave abuse of
discretion to overturn an arbitral award. Adamson v. Court of Appeals gave
ample warning that a petition to vacate filed in the RTC which is not based on
the grounds enumerated in Section 24 of RA 876 should be dismissed.
In cases not falling under any of the aforementioned grounds to vacate an
award, the Court has already made several pronouncements that a petition
for review under Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be
availed of in the CA. Which one would depend on the grounds relied upon by
petitioner.
Nevertheless, although petitioner’s position on the judicial remedies
available to it was correct, we sustain the dismissal of its petition by the CA.
The remedy petitioner availed of, entitled “alternative petition for review
under Rule 43 or petition for certiorari under Rule 65,” was wrong. Time and
again, we have ruled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive.
A careful reading of the assigned errors reveals that the real issues calling for
the CA’s resolution were less the alleged grave abuse of discretion exercised
by the arbitrator and more about the arbitrator’s appreciation of the issues
and evidence presented by the parties. Therefore, the issues clearly fall under
the classification of errors of fact and law — questions which may be passed
upon by the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43. Petitioner cleverly
crafted its assignment of errors in such a way as to straddle both judicial
remedies, that is, by alleging serious errors of fact and law (in which case a
petition for review under Rule 43 would be proper) and grave abuse of
discretion (because of which a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 would be
permissible).
Wherefore, the petition is hereby denied. The decision and resolution of the
CA directing the RTC to proceed with the trial of the petition for confirmation
of arbitral award is affirmed.