USE OF FORCE

While it is unfortunate that the situation escalated to the point that force was used, Plaintiff
cannot prevail on this claim. In situations such as this, "[prison officials] are entitled to wide-
ranging deference." See Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that the
use of mace to quell a disturbance caused by inmates on a bus did not constitute excessive force).
"The amount of force that is constitutionally permissible ... must be judged by the context in
which that force is deployed." Id. (quoting Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1996)). The
use of force does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment when reasonably necessary to
subdue a recalcitrant prisoner. Clemmons v. Greggs, 509 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir. 1975); see
Williams v. Hoyt, 556 F.2d 1336, 1339-40 (5th Cir. 1977) (affirming jury verdict for
the [*8] defendants where evidence was sufficient to show that mace was used only for the
control of unruly prisoners and was, therefore, not excessive).

Funari v. Warden, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37541, *7-8 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2014)

Evidentiary – Credibility Standard – Weighing the Evidence by the Court

In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) the Supreme
Court held that "[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt
that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 380.
The court could instead rely on the videotape of the events in evaluating the motion for summary
judgment rather than the "visible fiction" offered by the non-moving party. Id. at 381. The same
evidentiary weight applies when the court is determining whether the plaintiff can overcome a
plea of qualified immunity by a correction officer at the pleading stage before discovery or other
court proceedings or if the court is evaluating [*6] the case for frivolousness under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

Funari v. Warden, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37541, *5-6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2014)

Arceneaux's claims that he did not cause a disturbance while in his cell; he did not refuse orders
given to him by prison officials; the use of chemical spray was unjustified; the cell-entry was
unprovoked; and that the disciplinary reports were fabricated are barred by Edwards v. Balisok,
520 U.S. 641, 648-49, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 137 L. Ed. 2d 906 (1997) (applying [*878] Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994) to prison disciplinary
proceedings). Arceneaux's claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary
convictions, and he has not shown that the disciplinary convictions were reversed or expunged.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in holding that Heck barred these claims.

Finally, Arceneaux argues that the district court erred in determining that the prison officials did
not use excessive force during the forced cell-entry. HN3 Summary judgment is appropriate
if [**4] the evidence shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). HN4 The
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Whittaker, 206 F.3d
at 534. The core judicial inquiry in determining whether prison officials used excessive physical
force is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously or sadistically cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S. Ct. 995,
117 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1992).

Competent summary judgment evidence established that the force used by the prison officials
was necessary in order to maintain order and restore discipline. In addition, the medical evidence
relative to Arceneaux's wrist injury does not support a finding that the defendants used malicious
and sadistic force to cause harm to Arceneaux. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 6-7.

Arceneaux v. Leger, 251 Fed. Appx. 876, 877-878, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 24393, *3-4 (5th Cir.
La. 2007)