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26 March 2009
Table of contents
Nickel overview 3
Australian nickel stocks 6
Valuation and sensitivities 10
Nickel price optionality 10
Short-term leverage – using PERs and DCF valuations 12
Long-term leverage – using DCF valuations 12
Global nickel market – demand 14
Economic factors 14
Uses of nickel 15
Stainless steel production 16
China’s stainless steel production 20
Nickel content changes in stainless steel 23
Nickel demand for non-stainless steel uses 29
Credit Suisse forecast nickel demand 31
Nickel supply 32
Notes on nickel projects 34
Balances 34
Upside risk – scenario testing 35
Downside risk 37
Nickel prices 37
Appendix 41
Stainless steel 41
Nickel overview
After several years of exceptional returns for producers, we expect the nickel market to be
a tough environment for the next few years. The high prices of the past few years
increased supply (with new producers such as nickel-in-pig appearing) and simultaneously
attacked demand, driving consumers away from nickel-bearing stainless steel. With the
developed world no longer able to use rising asset prices to fuel consumption, nickel
stocks at very high levels and idled nickel projects waiting on the side lines, we cannot
foresee demand again outstripping supply, even when the global economy is restarted;
hence prices well above marginal production costs are unlikely to occur again within the
forecast period.
The recent nickel price drop has to date cut around 22% of existing and potential nickel
supply from the market, but we consider an additional 15% cut is needed to achieve a
balance between supply and demand. Excluding closures, production cuts and expansions
likely to be put on hold, the trajectory of nickel supply growth still reflects the price-driven
expansionary environment of the past few years, with a CAGR of 6.4% from 2009–12, due
to projects that started construction several years ago now entering production.
Figure 3: Price forecast (2008 real terms) & visible stocks Figure 4: Nickel supply vs demand
kt nickel (LHS); US$/lb (RHS) kt nickel
200.0 25.00 1,600
180.0
1,500
160.0 20.00
140.0 1,400
120.0 15.00
100.0 1,300
80.0 10.00
1,200
60.0
40.0 5.00 1,100
20.0
1,000
0.0 0.00
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
09
10
11
12
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Visible Stocks (LHS) Nominal Prices (RHS) Global Consumption Primary Nickel Base Production Prim. Ni
Real Prices (2008 terms) Real Prices Forecast Onca Puma Goro
Forward Stock Build (LHS) Jinchuan Expansion
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates Source: Credit Suisse estimates
We forecast a 2009 nickel price of US$5.00/lb, with a lower price of US$4.70 in the first
half. We expect the nickel cost curve to flatten in 2009, and the mean cash cost to be
US$3.00/lb. Our forecast 2009 price will intersect the curve at the 75th percentile. Given
the rate of closures to date, we believe this price will be sufficient to drive the required
closure of 15% of supply. Our forecast prices gradually increase to US$6.0/lb over the
forecast period, forcing cost discipline on producers and discouraging expansions. Our
long-term price is US$6.50/lb in real terms.
Nickel’s woes are demand-driven. The critical market for nickel is stainless steel, which
accounts for 61% of nickel consumption. A large proportion of stainless steel use is
cosmetic and consumer driven – 59% in automotive sector, construction, and domestic
appliances & utensils. Spending in these sectors depends on income and sentiment, with
domestic construction also influencing the purchase of stainless steel appliances that
occupy the premium end of retail price points. The hardest hit sectors of economies
globally are automotive and residential construction, the latter oversupplied in the US,
Europe and China.
The stainless steel market collapsed in 4Q08, with global production falling 30%. There has
been no significant improvement in 2009 to date, with production by European producers
standing at around 50% capacity in line with orders. Production picked up in China in the first
two months of 2009 in anticipation of stimulus-driven demand, but increased orders have not
eventuated so there was an inventory build and production has dried up.
Between 2000 and 2007, China was the dynamo of stainless steel, with production
growing at a CAGR of 47% between 2002 and 2007. However, apparent consumption was
much lower, 19%, with the higher stainless production growth reflecting a ‘catch up’ rate
from a low start, displacing imports into China. Consequentially, the 2002–07 CAGR of
global production ex-China was a weak 1.9%, while the global CAGR was 7.1%. In 2008,
China switched from a net importer of stainless steel to being self sufficient.
85% of China’s stainless steel consumption is used internally, and the balance is used in
manufactured exports. The 2002–07 CAGR of stainless used domestically in China was
16%. We forecast a growth rate of 10% post-2009, with urbanization continuing, but at a
more modest and sustainable rate as the manufacturing industry matures. China’s CAGR
of stainless used in manufactured exports was 16%. We expect a reduced rate of 7%
post-2011, as consumer spending tightens in developed nations following the end of
borrowing against rising asset prices.
Our stainless steel production forecast is for a global CAGR of 4.7% between 2009 and
2012, with 9.7% in China. We expect a very weak 2009, with production falling 13.5%
globally YoY, recovering in 4Q.
The nickel content of stainless steel declined at a CAGR of -4.2% between 2002 and
2008. The reduction was driven by the high price of nickel-bearing stainless steel, with the
nickel price passed to the consumer via an alloy surcharge. The reduction was achieved
by cutting the proportion of high-nickel austenitic stainless produced in favour of nickel-
free ferritic, and low-nickel duplex and 200 series austenitic stainless steel. Both stainless
steel producers and consumers have actively sought to reduce the effects of nickel price
volatility, and now that ferritic grades have a firm foothold, we expect the move away from
high nickel stainless to continue. The substitution is permanent because once consumers
have switched to a suitable alternative stainless grade, there is little reason to change
back. High-nickel stainless provides improved malleability and workability than ferritic
grades, but the corrosion resistance may be little different as that characteristic is provided
by the chromium content, not nickel. High-nickel grades have been over-specified in the
past – used in applications where malleability is not important.
The largest non-stainless steel use for nickel is in alloys – in machine tools for
manufacturing and super-alloys used for turbines. We expect a 10% decline in non-
stainless nickel use in 2009, as aircraft manufacturing eases on airline credit difficulties,
and tool steel use in the auto industry sags, but we expect demand to recover from 2010.
We expect nickel in non-stainless use to return to previous regional growth rates from
2011, as it is driven by industrial and commercial activity, not consumer sentiment.
Nickel production is forecast to ease in 2009 with closures and deferrals cutting actual and
potential production by 22%, but that is insufficient. Projects that commenced construction
following the nickel price rise in 2004 are entering production. Of particular note are two
large nickel laterites owned by Vale that with horrible timing, have just reached
commissioning stage – Onca Puma in Brazil with 52ktpa contained Ni capacity, and the
Goro JV in New Caledonia at 60ktpa. Vale has slowed the commissioning of the projects,
and our forecasts include a very slow ramp-up with neither project reaching capacity within
the forecast period.
Production supply may not be cut sufficiently in China putting pressure on other countries
production: Jinchuan Group intends to continue expansion, with a 120kt 2009 production
target, a 13kt increase on 2008 and an ultimate target of 150ktpa. As top quartile
producers, China’s Ni-in-pig iron producers reduced production in late-2008, but remain a
threat to rational economic behaviour because some new NPI projects that were under
construction in 2008 are affiliated with stainless steel producers and may be kept
operating to reduce exposure to LME Ni price volatility.
Figure 9: Long-term nickel price assumptions and weightings Figure 10: Mirabela – a call option on the LT nickel price?
30.0% 10.00 9.48
9.00
25.0%
25.0% 6.94
8.00
7.00
20.0%
17.5% 17.5% 6.00 4.39
DCF valuation
Weighting
15.0% 5.00
4.00
10.0% 10.0% 2.70
10.0% 3.00 2.27
7.0% 7.0% 1.85
2.00
5.0% 0.15
3.0% 3.0% 1.00 - -
-
0.0%
2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 6.50 7.00 9.00 12.00 15.00
2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 6.50 7.00 9.00 12.00 15.00
LT nickel price - US$/lb
LT Nickel Price - US$/LB DCF Valuation
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
10.00
9.00
8.00
7.00
DCF Valuation - A$/sh
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
-
2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 6.50 7.00 9.00 12.00 15.00
LT Nickel Price - US$/lb
Figure 13: Sensitivity to changes in short-term nickel prices, assuming a US$6.50/lb long-term nickel price
Independence (IGO) 2010 PER 2011 PER 2012 PER 2013 PER DCF (A$)
@ US$2.00/lb nickel <0 <0 <0 <0 1.77
@ US$3.00/lb nickel 177.6 <0 <0 <0 2.09
@ US$4.00/lb nickel 31.5 52.1 51.9 55.9 2.41
@ US$6.00/lb nickel 11.9 11.1 11.0 11.1 3.06
@ US$6.50/lb nickel 10.3 9.2 9.2 9.3 3.22
@ US$7.00/lb nickel 9.1 9.2 7.9 7.9 3.38
@ US$9.00/lb nickel 6.2 7.9 5.0 5.1 4.03
@ US$12.00/lb nickel 4.2 5.1 3.3 3.3 5.00
@ US$15.00/lb nickel 3.1 3.3 2.4 2.4 5.97
Mirabela Nickel (MBN) 2010 PER 2011 PER 2012 PER 2013 PER DCF
@ US$2.00/lb nickel <0 <0 <0 <0 1.16
@ US$3.00/lb nickel 88.4 26.9 205.7 128.2 1.42
@ US$4.00/lb nickel 32.4 9.6 12.6 11.2 1.69
@ US$6.00/lb nickel 14.3 4.2 4.4 3.9 2.22
@ US$6.50/lb nickel 12.5 3.7 3.8 3.4 2.35
@ US$7.00/lb nickel 11.2 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.48
@ US$9.00/lb nickel 7.8 3.3 2.2 2.0 3.01
@ US$12.00/lb nickel 5.3 2.3 1.5 1.3 3.81
@ US$15.00/lb nickel 4.1 1.6 1.1 1.0 4.61
Panoramic (PAN) 2010 PER 2011 PER 2012 PER 2013 PER DCF
@ US$2.00/lb nickel <0 <0 <0 <0 <0
@ US$3.00/lb nickel <0 <0 <0 <0 <0
@ US$4.00/lb nickel <0 <0 <0 <0 <0
@ US$6.00/lb nickel 3.6 4.6 <0 <0 1.43
@ US$6.50/lb nickel 3.1 3.6 4.0 4.8 1.64
@ US$7.00/lb nickel 2.7 3.6 3.3 3.8 1.85
@ US$9.00/lb nickel 1.7 3.0 1.9 2.1 2.67
@ US$12.00/lb nickel 1.1 1.8 1.2 1.2 3.90
@ US$15.00/lb nickel 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.9 5.14
Western Areas (WSA) 2010 PER 2011 PER 2012 PER 2013 PER DCF
@ US$2.00/lb nickel <0 <0 <0 <0 1.84
@ US$3.00/lb nickel <0 <0 <0 <0 2.40
@ US$4.00/lb nickel <0 109.1 156.8 47.3 2.96
@ US$6.00/lb nickel 13.1 8.9 9.7 7.7 4.07
@ US$6.50/lb nickel 10.2 7.2 7.9 6.4 4.35
@ US$7.00/lb nickel 8.4 7.2 6.6 5.4 4.63
@ US$9.00/lb nickel 4.9 6.1 4.0 3.4 5.75
@ US$12.00/lb nickel 3.0 3.7 2.5 2.2 7.43
@ US$15.00/lb nickel 2.1 2.4 1.9 1.6 9.10
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
■ Credit Suisse Asian Research supported the stabilisation thesis, noting on 4 February
a 7.7% jump in China’s January’s PMI suggests that the slowdown is bottoming out;
although the PMI remained in contraction territory, there is no pick-up in orders for
finished goods, and exports remain weak. The improvements are in infrastructure-
related areas suggesting that the government-funded investment impacted order
flows. However, our China Basic Materials analysts reported back from a road trip on
11 March (‘Demand from Stimulus – Are we there yet?’) that three months after the
stimulus plan was announced, the majority of the projects are yet to materialise with
the only visible outcomes being railway projects and the Sichuan earthquake recovery.
Steel prices and production picked up in January and February, perhaps anticipating
stimulus demand, but we calculate that China overproduced by 6mt in these months
and steel prices have subsequently sagged (‘Rebound in China’s steel production may
not be sustainable in the long term’ – 16 March).
We have used the Global IP scorecard data and forecasts to construct our IP forecast for
2009. From 2010, we revert to our Metals and Mining global IP forecast of 1.3% for 2010
and 2.8% for 2011 and 2012 (Figure 14).
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
% Yr
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
Global (LHS) Developed (LHS)
-12
Global F/C Developing (RHS)
-14
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
Uses of nickel
The major first use of nickel is in stainless steel, consuming around 61% of production.
61% of nickel in stainless
Other uses include alloys, consuming 19% – including non-ferrous or superalloys – 8%
steel
used for nickel plating and 12% in chemicals and other uses including nickel metal hydride
batteries.
As the dominant use of nickel, the stainless steel market is critical for understanding Jet engines also important
primary nickel demand. The other major use, non-ferrous alloys with 14% of primary nickel for nickel alloys
consumption is dominantly used in turbines, particularly aircraft engines, so the state of
the international airline industry is important.
Foundry 8%
4%
Plating
8%
Non-ferrous Alloy s
14% Stainless Steel
61%
Given these factors, the near-term outlook for stainless steel demand is poor. The majority of
the developed world is in recession, and the residential construction is at the root of the global
malaise. Consensus estimates for 2009 housing starts in the US are one-third of the 2005 total
(Figure 17). Monthly starts in January at an annualised rate of 477k were the lowest since Near-term stainless demand
records began to be kept in 1959 and permits for future building starts were also a record low. outlook poor – residential
While annualised building starts in February rebounded to 583k and permits rose 3%, both construction depressed in
were still down 47% and 44%, respectively, YoY. In 2009, consensus forecasts are for private US, Europe & China
consumption in the US and the Eurozone to fall by over 1% from the already low figures of
2008, and be flat in Japan (Figure 18). These are striking changes from the boom years of
2005–2007 when demand for stainless steel was strong.
Figure 17: Consensus forecasts for housing starts Figure 18: Consensus forecasts for private consumption
millions % change on previous year
4 3.5%
3.5 3.0%
2.5%
3
2.0%
2.5 1.5%
2 1.0%
1.5 0.5%
0.0%
1
-0.5% 2005 2006 2007 2008E 2009F 2010F
0.5
-1.0%
0 -1.5%
2005 2006 2007 2008E 2009F 2010F -2.0%
US Housing Starts Japan Housing starts Canada Housing Starts US Japan Eurozone
Source: Consensus Economics 12 Jan 2009 Source: Consensus Economics 12 Jan 2009
6.00
5.00
4.00
US$/lb Cr
3.00
2.00
1.00
-
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
HCFeCr 60% Cr US LCFeCr 65% Cr EU LCFeCr 65% Cr
40% 10%
0% 0%
Q1-93
Q1-94
Q1-95
Q1-96
Q1-97
Q1-98
Q1-99
Q1-00
Q1-01
Q1-02
Q1-03
Q1-04
Q1-05
Q1-06
Q1-07
Q1-08
Q1-09
Q1-10
Q1-11
Q1-12
-2%
-10%
-4%
-20%
-6%
-30%
-8%
-40% -10%
100% 24%
75% 18%
50% 12%
25% 6%
0% 0%
Q1-93
Q1-94
Q1-95
Q1-96
Q1-97
Q1-98
Q1-99
Q1-00
Q1-01
Q1-02
Q1-03
Q1-04
Q1-05
Q1-06
Q1-07
Q1-08
Q1-09
Q1-10
Q1-11
Q1-12
-25% -6%
-50% -12%
In 4Q 2009 and first quarter of 2010, we forecast a large YoY increase in stainless steel
production in all regions reaching a maximum of 29% globally. This is a result of a
moderate recovery in production being measured against the highly depressed production
levels of the previous year. Thus, while we forecast resurgence in production, it is not as
abrupt as YoY graphs indicate. In 2011 and 2012 we forecast further steady recovery to
production rates lower than previous levels in developed nations, but approaching
previous highs in the BRICs (Figure 23). Previous stainless steel production in developed
nations included material for export to countries including China. China became self-
sufficient in stainless steel production in 2008, so the market for this production is gone.
Figure 23: Actual & forecast global stainless steel production Developed nations’ stainless
millions of tonnes production lower than
35,000 previous due to loss of
China export market
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009F 2010F 2011F 2012F
Figure 24: China’s Stainless Steel Import & Exports Figure 25: Stainless Steel Production Changes YoY
thousands of tonnes Thousands of Tonnes of Stainless Steel
3,500 3,000
2,500
3,000
2,000
2,500 1,500
2,000 1,000
500
1,500
0
-500 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1,000
-1,000
500
-1,500
0 -2,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008E -2,500
Ex ports Imports Net Imports China SS y-o-y change (kt) World ex China SS y-o-y change (kt)
The effect of diminishing net imports is evident in the global stainless steel production data
(Figure 25): in the three years from 2005 to 2007, China’s stainless production grew at a China’s huge stainless
rate of 44%–56% YoY, but for the World ex-China, production fell in two of those years by production growth 2005-07
almost the same amount as China increased. World ex China 2007 production was 1mt was “catch up” rate,
less than 2004 due to displacement of imports by Chinese production. China’s explosive displacing imports &
production growth rate for stainless steel in these years did not reflect the rate of demand production in Rest of World
growth, but was a ‘catch-up’ rate, racing from low production of a few hundred thousand
tonnes in the late-1990s to catch up with demand.
Future growth rate should
With China’s stainless steel production capacity now sufficient to meet its demand we be slower to match internal
predict that future production growth will slow from the ‘catch-up’ rate, to a rate matching demand growth
its demand growth. Any excess production will have to compete with other countries for a
share of the export market. Our model has China’s net exports being zero, so that
production matches demand. If China’s production continues at a high rate and impacts Stainless consumption
the export markets, global production is unlikely to change – output elsewhere would be growth for manufactured
scaled back on lost market share. exports to slow to 7% from
We calculate that 85% of China’s apparent consumption of stainless steel is used for 15% on subdued consumer
domestic consumption – including urbanisation, and 15% in manufactured exports. From spending in US & Europe
2002–07, the CAGR of stainless steel used in manufactured exports was 16%. Once we
have passed through the current period of economic turmoil, we expect stainless steel
consumption for manufactured exports to resume growth, but at a reduced rate of 7% p.a.
(Figure 26). The forecast rate is slower than previously due to our expectation of weaker
consumption of goods worldwide: the residential construction sector has been devastated
in the US and Europe and is likely to remain subdued in the forecast period. With regard to
household spending, we expect tighter wallets in the future, particularly in the US, where
the days of borrowing cash against rising asset values to spend on luxury consumer goods
has ended.
Figure 26: China’s stainless use in manufactured exports Figure 27: China’s domestic consumption of stainless
kt stainless steel kt stainless steel
1,400 8,000
1,200 7,000
6,000
1,000
5,000
800
4,000
600
3,000
400
2,000
200 1,000
0 0
2002 2004 2006 2008E 2010F 2012F 2002 2004 2006 2008E 2010F 2012F
SS in Manufactured Exports SS for Domestic Consumption
Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates
From 2002 to 2007, the CAGR of stainless steel consumed domestically in China was
19%, compared to 16% growth in carbon steel production. Following the economic turmoil,
we expect China’s domestic stainless steel consumption will resume as the country
continues to urbanise, but at a slower growth rate of 10% for 2010 to 2012 (Figure 27,
Figure 28). Our forecast lower rate is based on per capita consumption of carbon steel and
nickel (Figure 29; Figure 30), but also reflects our view that urbanisation will continue at a
more sustainable rate as the manufacturing industry matures.
Figure 28: China’s apparent consumption of stainless steel – source and use China’s domestic
Thousands of tonnes consumption growth of
10,000 stainless expected to slow
to 10%... still a rapid clip
9,000
due to urbanisation
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008E 2009F 2010F 2011F 2012F
China’s estimated per capita carbon steel consumption for the urban population has Per capita steel
exceeded that of the US. It is unlikely to follow the steep trajectory of smaller nations that consumption growth to ease
are steel exporters, due to a lack of countries with sufficient import potential, hence, we
expect its trajectory to flatten, to a lower growth rate closer to global GDP.
Figure 29: Carbon steel consumption per capita vs. GDP Figure 30: Nickel consumption per capita vs. GDP
kg per capita vs. GDP USD kg per capita vs. GDP USD
1200 4.0
1000
3.5
Steel consumption, kg
3.0
Ni consumption, kg
800
2.5
600 2.0
400 1.5
1.0
200
0.5
0 0.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
GDP, USDk, 1990 base
GDP, USDk 1990 base
US China S. Korea Japan Germany China urban
US China S. Korea Japan Germany China urban Taiw an
Nickel consumption in China has not reached the per capita consumption levels seen in Per capita nickel
the US. If we use nickel as a proxy for stainless steel, it would seem there is considerable consumption has
consumption growth available in China. However, given a large portion of stainless steel considerable growth
use is for cosmetic purposes, Chinese consumption may never reach Western levels if remaining
stainless steel goods are not considered fashionable and apartments are not furnished
according to the western model. Considering the expected flattening of the steel
consumption and the apparent growth available to stainless steel, we consider that
stainless steel consumption per capita rise will rise but at a moderated rate compared to
previous growth.
For 2009, and 2010, we expect to see the effects of the current economic turmoil. China stainless
Anecdotal evidence suggests that urbanisation has slowed drastically due to the global consumption for
demand slump. Thousands of factories have closed and floods of unemployed workers are manufactured exports and
heading back to rural provinces. Construction of apartment blocks and offices with no domestic uses falling in
prospective tenants has halted, but there remains over-capacity in the property market. 2008 and 2009
Property sales fell 19.7% YoY in 2008 and inventories may take one to two years to clear
in some regions. We estimate domestic consumption of stainless steel fell 15% in 2008
and we forecast a further reduction of approximately 11% in 2009. For 2010, we expect
domestic demand to stabilise and begin its growth at 10% p.a. With the downturn in
western economies, we estimate that stainless steel use in manufactured exports
collapsed by 30% in 2008. We forecast a further fall of 14% in 2009 before growth
resumes with a 5% rise in 2010.
Combining our forecasts for domestic consumption and manufactured exports with our
prediction of zero net exports we obtain stainless steel production growth rates of negative
8% in 2009 and positive 10% p.a. from 2010–2012. Thus our forecast represents a large
decrease from the rapid growth of 2000–2007 when the country’s production grew by 30–
60% p.a.
Stainless steel intensity of use to IP has been flat since 2004 (Figure 31). We expect a
rather flat IOU to continue from 2009 after a step-down during the global financial crisis. IOU for stainless expected
The step-down combines the effects of the global slump, and the end of China’s ‘catch-up’ to stay flat after step-down
phase of stainless steel production growth. during global crisis and end
of China’s ‘catch-up’
Figure 31: China’s stainless steel consumption intensity based on IP stainless phase
30 80.0%
25 60.0%
20 40.0%
15 20.0%
10 0.0%
5 -20.0%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008E 2009F 2010F 2011F 2012F
IOU (Ap. Consum/Unit IP) IP % Chg y -o-y SS Ap. Consumption Chg y -o-y
Decreasing intensity of
Figure 32: Intensity of primary nickel use in stainless steel by region
% of primary Ni per tonne in stainless steel
nickel use in stainless due
to higher ‘no-nickel’ and
7% ‘low-nickel’ stainless use
Actual Forecast
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008E 2009F 2010F 2011F 2012F
Total World Europe North America China
In 2007, nickel comprised approximately 80% of the raw material costs of stainless steel
(Figure 34). The cost was fully passed on to customers via a nickel price alloy surcharge
(Figure 35), but continued to adversely affect steel producers through higher working
capital and the warehouse costs required to manage production given extreme volatility in
demand – demand rises with nickel price, as consumers attempt to beat the price peak,
but halts and destocking begins as the nickel price falls, as customers await floor prices.
■ After high demand in early 2007 while nickel prices were peaking, Acerinox reported
that demand for its nickel-bearing stainless steel plummeted in the second half of
2007, while nickel prices fell, but there was no reduction in demand for nickel-free
ferritic stainless steel.
Figure 34: Proportion of nickel cost to total material inputs in grade 304 stainless steel
US$/t; %
Nickel ~80% of raw material
costs in 2007
6000 90%
5000 80%
4000 70%
US$/t
3000 60%
2000 50%
1000 40%
0 30%
May-97
May-98
May-99
May-00
May-01
May-02
May-03
May-04
May-05
May-06
May-07
May-08
Steel Billet Cost (LHS) FeCr Cost (LHS)
Ni Cost (LHS) % Ni/Total cost (RHS)
Stainless steel producers have been attempting to reduce the effects of nickel price Stainless producers keen to
volatility, mainly by increasing production and development of ‘low-nickel’ and ‘no-nickel’ end nickel price induced
stainless steel: volatility on their business
by increasing production
■ ArcelorMittal has developed new ferritic grades, increased R&D into new ferritic ‘no-nickel’ and ‘low-nickel’
applications and developed new 200-series austenitic with only 4.5% Ni, but similar grades
corrosion resistance to grade 304.
■ Outokumpu has developed a duplex grade with 21.5% Cr, and 1.5% Ni, which is
intended as a replacement for grade 304 austenitic stainless and has licensed Italian
steel maker, Valbruner, as a producer to increase market penetration. Over two years,
the market has grown to 3mtpa, mainly in Europe. Outokumpu has also begun scaling
up production capacity in ferritic grades to reduce earnings cyclicity.
■ Ferritic specialist, JFE has released a new high-Cr grade 443 to compete with 304 on
the corrosion resistance stakes.
■ POSCO has taken a different route to reduce exposure to volatile nickel prices, by
building a 30ktpa ferronickel plant at Gwangyang, sufficient for just under half its
requirements, fed by lateritic ore from New Caledonia.
End-use manufacturers also increased demands for low-nickel grades due to the price
End users also migrating
(Figure 35). The nickel price surcharge squeezes margins at the end of the manufacturing
away from nickel bearing
chain as it cannot be fully passed on to consumers in the intensely competitive retail space.
stainless due to surcharge
We are aware of barbeque manufacturers that switched from traditional 304 grade
stainless steel, containing around 8% nickel, to the nickel-free 400-series to relieve margin
squeeze. Brook Hunt has reported North American food equipment manufacturers moving
to low-nickel or no-nickel grades.
Figure 35: European price of cold-rolled grade 304 stainless steel 2mm
US$/tonne
7,000
6,000
5,000
US$/tonne
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
Oct-03 Apr-04 Oct-04 Apr-05 Oct-05 Apr-06 Oct-06 Apr-07 Oct-07 Apr-08 Oct-08
Europe Base price Europe Alloy Surcharge
Globally the migration to ferritic grades began around 2003. At this time, the ratio of
austenitic production to ferritic was about 79%, falling to 76% in 2005–06 as elevated Ni
prices began to impact, and to 72% in 2007 when nickel prices peaked at over
US$50,000/t (Figure 36, Figure 37). Stainless steel producers have reported to us a 10%
switch to ferritic within the two-year period from 2006–2008. The migration to ferritic
grades seems to have little elasticity with nickel price. Once consumers make the change
to ferritic grades with suitable corrosion resistance, there is little incentive to change back
to austenite. With the consumers actively seeking lower prices and producers keen
promote no-nickel or low-nickel grades, the days of an order for stainless steel implying
grade 304 are over.
Migration to ferritic grades
Figure 36: Production austenitic vs. ferritic production began around 2003,
LHS:’000t, RHS: % increasing with nickel price
35,000 85% rise in 2004
30,000
80%
25,000
20,000 75%
15,000 70%
10,000
65%
5,000
0 60%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009F 2010F 2011F 2012F
Within the overall austenitic population, the proportion of low nickel 200-series has also
been increasing at the expense of 300-series (Figure 38). 200-series compositions are
most commonly used in India, particularly for cookware, and small, private producers of
the series have arisen in China. According to Brook Hunt, the global proportion of 200-
series increased from 15% to 23% from 2006–2007.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009F 2010F 2011F 2012F
Global Europe North America China
India Japan South Korea Taiwan
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009F 2010F 2011F 2012F
We forecast that nickel use in stainless steel will continue to grow at a slower rate than
stainless steel production (Figure 39). Nickel use in stainless to
Figure 39: Nickel use in stainless steel vs. global stainless production grow at a slower rate than
thousands of tonnes stainless production due to
increasing use of low-nickel
2000 35,000 and no-nickel grades
1800
30,000
1600
1400 25,000
1200 20,000
1000
800 15,000
600 10,000
400
5,000
200
0 0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009F 2010F 2011F 2012F
Primary Nickel (LHS) Nickel in Scrap (LHS) World Stainless Steel Production (RHS)
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009F 2010F 2011F 2012F
Figure 41: 18/8 solids scrap price vs. cost of materials in stainless steel
US$/t & % 18/8 solids scrap price is
7000 100%
around 70% of cost of
primary ingredients
6000 80% providing a financial
incentive to maximise use
5000 60%
4000 40%
US$/t
3000 20%
2000 0%
1000 -20%
0 -40%
May-97
May-98
May-99
May-00
May-01
May-02
May-03
May-04
May-05
May-06
May-07
May-08
With regards to Boeing’s new 787 Dreamliner, the company recently stated that it intended
to stick to its recent production schedule. 31 aircraft orders have been cancelled so far, but
it has a backlog of over 850 aircraft. Airbus also has a hefty backlog of orders for its
widebody A380, with 175 aircraft to be built. The backlogs suggest there will be little
reduction in the construction of these models, which are well behind original delivery
schedules, but we expect the cancellations will affect demand for smaller, single-aisle
aircraft which do not offer efficiency savings.
Production of specialty steels alloys containing nickel have been cut back. Demand for tool
steels in particular has been affected, with the global auto industry malaise contributing to
the fall in demand.
Despite these immediate cuts, non-stainless steel nickel use is an industrial input with
demand driven by industrial and commercial activity rather than consumer sentiment. We
expect demand to rebound as global industrial activity picks up. Our model of primary
nickel demand for non-stainless steel applications has a cutback of 10% YoY for all
regions in 2009, with an 8% rebound in 2010. For 2011 and 2012, we return to average
trend growth observed for each region in the period 2004–2007, but excluding outliers if
there have been major changes. This model has global growth of 6.9% per year from 2011
Non-stainless steel demand
(Figure 42).
driven by industrial &
Figure 42: Non-stainless steel demand for primary nickel commercial activity – 10%
kt cutback in 2009 then return
700 to long-term growth.
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009F 2010F 2011F 2012F
For Stainless 682 704 784 847 872 805 910 871 786 652 685 700 727
% change 0.9% 3.2% 11.3% 8.0% 3.0% -7.7% 13.1% -4.3% -9.7% -17.1% 5.2% 2.1% 3.8%
For Non-Stainless 435 414 386 383 407 454 486 502 525 472 510 545 583
% change 11.7% -4.7% -6.8% -0.9% 6.4% 11.5% 7.2% 3.2% 4.5% -10.0% 8.0% 6.9% 6.9%
Source: Credit Suisse estimates, Brook Hunt
For 2009 we forecast nickel consumption will fall 14% YoY, including a 17% fall for primary
nickel in stainless steel. We forecast a 6% recovery in 2010 and 4%–5% in following years,
but 2012 consumption will remain well below 2006 peak nickel usage. The greater growth
rate of nickel use in non-stainless applications implies that stainless steel will gradually
become a less dominant market for nickel, in our forecast reducing from a 60% market
share of nickel use in 2008 to 55% in 2012.
Nickel supply
Shutdowns
In recent periods there have been frequent announcements of nickel mine closures and
cutbacks as the low nickel price takes its toll.
We have updated refined nickel and ferronickel production for 2008 and 2009F compared
to Brook Hunt’s estimate of December 2007. The major changes are listed in Figure 44.
The nickel metal losses have been matched by a wave of mine closures and cutbacks
world wide. The nickel output cutback of 374kt for 2009 is 22% of the nickel supply, but
remains insufficient to return the market to balance.
Figure 44: Changes to forecast nickel metal output since December 2007
in thousands of tonnes
Recent cutbacks have
Refinery Company 2008F 2009F slashed Ni supply relative to
Copper Cliff Vale 10 -23 December 2007 forecasts
Goro Vale 0 -17
Onca Puma Vale 0 -7
Falcondo Xstrata -11 -30
Jinchuan JNMC -8 -5
Ni-pig Iron (BF) -17 -39
Ni-pig Iron (EAF) -11 -48
Norilsk NGMK -18 -16
SLN SLN -9 -18
Others -34 -125
R’thorpe/Yabulu BHPB -7 -29
Loma de Niquel Anglo American 0 -17
-105 -374
Source: Brook Hunt, Credit Suisse estimates
Given the state of the industry, we have removed from our supply model all projects which
have been approved, but are some years away from completion. All of these are laterite
projects intended to produce ferronickel and include a standalone refinery for Anglo
American’s Barro Alto in Brazil, for which a 12-month delay to 2011 was announced on
17 December to ease capex pressure, and SMSP-Xstrata’s US$3.8bn Koniambo project in
New Caledonia, which was approved in October 2007. The supply balance in the nickel
market has drastically changed since these projects were approved and we consider it highly
likely that strategic delays will push any significant production outside the forecast period.
Our forecasts include expected production losses of 2.2% of global output per year,
equating to 29kt of nickel in 2009, to take account breakdowns, strikes and other
stoppages. Our balances will not be affected by daily metal newsflow as unforeseen
output shortages are built in.
After adjustments for shutdowns and projects we consider unlikely to start during the
forecast period, supply shows an acceleration of growth relative to previous years – 6.4%
CAGR for 2009–2012 compared to 5.3% for 2005–2007 (Figure 45, Figure 46). The
production growth reflects the high nickel price environment that was in place since 2004.
Projects that were started several years ago have now reached commissioning stage, and
the price spike encouraged existing producers to announce expansions.
Capacity Utilisation % 79% 80% 80% 81% 79% 70% 66% 71% 75% 76%
Source: Credit Suisse estimates, Brook Hunt
1,300
1,200
1,100
1,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009F 2010F 2011F 2012F
Balances
Nickel stock balances are opaque. Visible stocks – such as refined nickel registered for
warranting on the LME and producer stocks – are only a portion of actual nickel available. Stocks greater than LME –
Smelter and furnace output of nickel matte and ferronickel constitute a large portion of ferronickel and nickel matte
supply used by stainless steel producers, but have no terminal market. Accordingly, our not included on LME
annual balances are higher than LME stocks as we include all the nickel supply including
ferronickel.
Our base case supply-demand balance returns an aggregate surplus of 835kt for the
period 2009 to 2012, driving the stock ratio to 48 weeks of consumption. Clearly this
enormous surplus will not actually occur. At the end of 2008, stocks were already at a 13-
year high with almost 80kt on the LME, after the abrupt slowdowns in 2H07 and 2H08
created a wall of nickel (Figure 33), and stocks should not rise much above this level if a
reasonable market is to be maintained.
Our balances suggest that under our base case consumption scenario, supply must fall by
about 200ktpa over the period to 2012 to maintain a balanced market. The price drop has
so far cut 25% of potential supply from the market, but we need to see another 15% cut.
This will be price driven, but we believe the price movement does not need to be
catastrophic from spot levels as the steady parade of announced cuts and closures
indicates that the current price is achieving the necessary results. Rather, we see no major
upside in prices over the forecast period. We expect to see tough prices that will force cost Massive surplus on base
discipline amongst producers and discourage new production. case will not eventuate –
nickel price will force
Figure 47: Base case nickel supply balance before anticipated closures another 15% of supply to be
thousands of tonnes
cut
250
200
150
100
50
-50
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008E 2009F 2010F 2011F 2012F
-100
Figure 48: China stainless production in expanded case Figure 49: Nickel surplus at expanded case
thousands of tonnes steel thousands of tonnes of nickel
200
18,000
16,000
150
14,000
12,000
10,000 100
8,000
6,000 50
4,000
2,000 0
0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010F 2012F -50
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010F 2012F
Source: Credit Suisse estimates, Brook Hunt Source: Credit Suisse estimates
Figure 50: China stainless steel production under base case and expanded case
in millions, unless otherwise stated
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008E 2009F 2010F 2011F 2012F
Expanded Case kt 532 738 1,140 1,778 2,365 3,400 5,300 7,850 6,900 6,900 9,315 12,575 16,976
YoY 57.4% 38.7% 54.5% 56.0% 33.0% 43.8% 55.9% 48.1% -12.1% 0.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0%
Base Case kt 532 738 1,140 1,778 2,365 3,400 5,300 7,850 6,900 6,375 6,995 7,670 8,415
YoY 57.4% 38.7% 54.5% 56.0% 33.0% 43.8% 55.9% 48.1% -12.1% -7.6% 9.7% 9.6% 9.7%
Source: Credit Suisse estimates, Brook Hunt
Figure 51: Global stainless production expanded case Figure 52: Nickel supply-demand expanded case
Kt nickel Kt nickel
1,700
40,000
1,600
35,000
1,500
30,000
25,000 1,400
20,000 1,300
15,000 1,200
10,000 1,100
5,000
1,000
0
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009F 2011F Global Consumption Primary Nickel
Jinchuan Expansion
Goro
USA Europe Japan Rest of World China Onca Puma
Base Production Prim. Ni
Source: Credit Suisse estimates, Brook Hunt Source: Credit Suisse estimates, Brook Hunt
The expanded case is extremely aggressive with China’s stainless production increasing 140%
from expected 2008 level in four years and global production increasing 41%. In the expanded
case we have maintained World ex-China’s production the same as the base case, with the
assumption that all the stainless is consumed. Global stainless steel CAGR from 2009–2012 is
18% in the expanded case, in comparison to 8.9% in the period 2005–2007.
Despite the huge stainless steel increase in our expanded case, nickel surpluses total
430kt in the period 2009–2012 and weeks’ consumption peaks at 29 weeks in 2011.
However, by 2012, nickel consumption approaches supply, although the surplus built up in
prior years remains. The key period is 2009 where surpluses rise 150kt–200kt in almost
any scenario that factors in weak 2009 consumption without massive supply cuts. Our
modelling suggests there will need to be supply cutbacks to bring the market into balance
irrespective of whether China’s massive stainless consumption resumes or not, hence we
maintain our view of a weak outlook for nickel prices over the forecast period.
Downside risk
We see greater risk on the downside than the upside. As noted at the start of our report, High risk to the downside
as at March, most of the European stainless steel producers are operating at about 50% of
capacity, matching orders. Chinese steel production including stainless jumped in January
and February in anticipation of stimulus demand, but has now died, as the anticipated
orders for the stainless did not materialize and it ended up as inventory.
If the low capacity utilisation rates continue well into the second quarter, as now looks
50% stainless capacity rates
likely, the northern hemisphere summer hiatus will be approaching and steel producers
continuing into 2Q, with
are unlikely to make any moves to increase production at that stage. This will push any
summer slowdown
possible upsurge in stainless production and nickel demand late into 3Q09, with no time
approaching could see
left for significant production. Under this scenario, stainless steel production for 2009 could
stainless production fall to
drop to 21.5mt, a 19% decline on 2008 production which would increase the 2009 forecast
21.5mt, 19% down on 2008
nickel surplus by an additional 40kt. This scenario would increase the surplus by 24% and
increase the pressure for production cuts.
Nickel prices
After several years of phenomenal returns for producers, we expect the nickel market to
be a very harsh environment for the next few years.
Figure 54: Quarterly price forecast (2008 real terms) vs. total visible stocks
LHS: ‘000 t refined Nickel; RHS: US$/lb
200.0 25.00
180.0
160.0 20.00
140.0
120.0 15.00
100.0
80.0 10.00
60.0
40.0 5.00
20.0
0.0 0.00
Mar-95 Mar-97 Mar-99 Mar-01 Mar-03 Mar-05 Mar-07 Mar-09 Mar-11 Mar-13
Figure 55: 2009 flexed nickel C1 cost curve overlain by 2008 cost curve (outline)
US$/lb Ni (vertical). v. Mlb Ni
2009 F’cast
US$5.00/lb
The 2008 mean C1 cost was US$3.30. In 2009, flexing the cost curve for Credit Suisse
estimated prices, the cost curve flattens and lowers with the mean cost falling to US$3.00/lb
(Figure 55). The flattening is caused by a reduction in the value of by-product credits at the
low end of the curve, and a lowering of input costs such as fuel and sulphide flocculants at
the high end. The stronger US$ reduces costs for operations lowering the curve.
Norilsk sits at the bottom of the cost curve with negative costs due to copper and PGM by-
products, followed by other large sulphide producers – Sudbury, Voiseys Bay and
Jinchuan. The efficient and well-established laterite projects dominate the middle of the
curve, while the high cost end of the curve is occupied by a mixture of laterite projects and
smaller sulphide mines, or those without significant by-products. Lower energy prices have
lowered the costs of China’s NPI projects, but they remain near the top of the cost curve.
BHP’s Ravensthorpe was the highest cost producer prior to its closure.
Our forecast price for 2009 of US$5.00/lb cuts the cost curve at the 75th percentile, with
25% of mines being higher cost. In the short term, further production needs to be driven
out of the market so we forecast a lower price in 1H 2009 of US$4.70/lb. We expect this
price to be sufficiently low to ultimately force the closure of the 15% of supply that we
consider needs to be cut to balance the nickel market.
Nickel exhibits a classic exponential curve ratio diagram, with the pinch point causing
prices to rocket lying just below two weeks’ consumption of visible stocks. At greater stock
levels, the price trend is rather flat sitting below US$5.00/lb (Figure 56).
There is downside risk to our prices. If 1Q09 turns out not to be the trough of the downturn
or global recovery is anaemic, the production surplus will likely be worse than our forecast
and greater price pain may be needed to force more shutdowns. Brook Hunt examined its
cost curves versus prices and found that during extreme recessions, such as 1982, the
nickel price can hit the 50th percentile of the cost curve, which would be US$3.00/lb.
Figure 56: Nickel price vs. weeks consumption visible stocks (2008 real terms)
25.00
20.00
15.00
US$/lb
10.00
5.00
0.00
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
Weeks Consumption
Other Asia 189 161 149 133 138 142 146 1,400
Other World 95 96 89 74 81 86 90
1,200
Total consumption 1,396 1,373 1,311 1,124 1,196 1,245 1,310
% change 11% -2% -5% -14% 6% 4% 5% 1,000
For Stainless 910 871 786 652 685 700 727 800
% change 13% -4% -10% -17% 5% 2% 4%
600
For Non-Stainless 486 502 525 472 510 545 583
% change 7% 3% 5% -10% 8% 7% 7% 400
26 March 2009
Source: Credit Suisse estimates, Brook Hunt
40
26 March 2009
Appendix
Stainless steel
Stainless steel is defined as steel containing greater than 10.5% chromium (Cr) although
most varieties have contents between 13%–26%. The Cr is critical, providing the corrosion
resistance of stainless steel. Cr fits readily into the steel molecular structure, substituting
for iron atoms. The Cr rapidly oxidises, forming a passive surface film of molecular
thickness which then protects the steel from further corrosion. 10.5% is the minimum Cr
content that will allow the chromium oxide layer to form reliably. A higher Cr content will
provide a stronger passive layer and therefore greater corrosion resistance.
Cr-bearing stainless steel which retains the original steel molecular structure is known as
‘Ferrite’ and is magnetic. Ferritic ‘no-nickel’ stainless steels make up the 400-series and
comprise about 25% of the stainless steel market. Major uses of ferritic stainless steel are
automotive exhaust pipe silencers, typically made of grade 409 with 11% Cr, and washing
machine drums made of grade 430 with 17% Cr. Ferritic stainless steel generally has
similar formability characteristics to carbon steel. Japan has been a major developer of the
400-series, with some dedicated producers such as JFE. Ferrites now hold a market share
of about 45% in Japan.
Stainless steel can be made more malleable and easier to weld by adding elements that
do not fit readily into the native steel molecular structure, but instead change the molecular
structure from a cube with an atom in the centre (body centred cubic), to a cube with one
atom in the centre of each face (face centred cubic). Stainless steel with this molecular
structure is known as ‘austenite’. It has different properties from ferrite, including being
non-magnetic. Over 70% of stainless steel production is austentic due to the combination
of good formability and weldability.
When nickel is used to create the austenitic structure, the stainless steel is known as the
300-series, which has a stainless steel market share of around 55%. Grade 304, also
known as 18/8 for the percentages of Cr/Ni, is the most widely developed and readily
available stainless steel due to the broad spectrum of applications for which it is suitable. It
comprises 50% of all stainless steel. 8% is the minimum amount of nickel that will convert
all the steel to austenite when the Cr composition is 18%.
Figure 58: Stainless steel series, compositions, common forms & applications
in millions, unless otherwise stated
Families Series Cr % Ni % Mo % Mn % N % Corrosion Resistance Applications
Ferritic 400 series 17-25
409 11 Low Auto exhaust
430 17 Mod-high Washing Machine Cylinders
Austenitic 300 series 17-24
304 18 8 High Most Common Grade
316 17 10 2 Very High Marine Grade
200 series
201 17 4 6 0.25 Mod-High Cookware
Duplex 21-25 1-7 0.3-4 0.1-0.25 High-Very High
Source: Company data, ISSF
Nickel is not the only element that can change the steel structure to austenite, with
nitrogen and manganese also being effective. Nitrogen is a particularly powerful austenite
former, but can only be added in limited amounts as problems arise. Adding Mn allows
nitrogen to be used, but normally a small amount of nickel needs to also be added to
change all the ferrite to austenite. The resulting ‘CrMn’ austenites are known as the 200-
series of stainless steels and comprise the ‘low-nickel’ group. The market share of the
200-series is now around 15%, having doubled in recent years. The corrosion resistance
of the 200-series is typically less than the 300 series as the content of chromium – a ferrite
former – often has to be lowered to allow austenite to fully develop when the nickel content
is low, because Mn is less effective at austenising than Ni.
A major user of 200-series is India where the stainless steel is used for cookware.
Consumers believe that magnetic stainless is low quality so 400-series ferrites have been
commercially unsuccessful. CrMn austenites, being non-magnetic, satisfied consumers,
but avoided the cost of nickel for the manufacturers. Proprietary stainless (such as J1 and
J2) with 200-series style compositions comprise about 75% of India’s market for austenitic
stainless steel, hence, the country has a lower nickel content in its austenitic stainless
steel than any other country – typically around 3% versus 9% in Europe.
Apart from Austenitc and Ferritic, there are other types of stainless known as Martensitic
(hard grades used for knives in high quality cutlery and turbine blades), and Duplex, but
these remain volumetrically minor, about 4% in total in 2006 The duplex type has a mixed
microstructure of austenite and ferrite and is a relatively recent development, being
researched in the 1970s, Production is now growing rapidly, hitting 3mtpa globally or 10%
of the market share, due to a push by Outokumpu. It is a ‘low-nickel’ stainless, but
Outokumpu grades have been developed to compete with grade 304 on corrosion
resistance.
Disclosure Appendix
Important Global Disclosures
I, Paul McTaggart, certify that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect my personal views about all of the subject companies and
securities and (2) no part of my compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in
this report.
See the Companies Mentioned section for full company names.
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-Ju
-Ju
-Ju
a
-Ja
-Ja
-Ja
-M
-M
-M
-M
-M
-M
-N
-N
-N
-S
-S
-S
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
Closing Price Target Price Initiation/Assumption Rating
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