The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman Empire

Author(s): Lukas de Blois

Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 33, H. 3 (3rd Qtr., 1984), pp. 358-377
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4435894
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THE THIRD CENTURY CRISIS AND THE GREEK ELITE IN THE
ROMAN EMPIRE

When studying their sources, most ancient historians are likely to deal
some points with the interrelation of political power, social status, material
assets and literary tradition; ancient historians who delve into the history of
the Roman Empire are bound to do so. After all, many men of letters,
particularly historiographers, belonged to the educated, administratively
active, landowning upper crust of Italy and the cultured central provinces of
the Roman Empire. Inevitably, this influenced their concept of political deeds
and social groups. Another determining factor was certainly the literary
tradition of which they were a part, a tradition that was itself old and
characterized by a wide variety of phrases and commonplaces that could serve
as so many labels for movements and forms of behaviour.
This interaction between actual interests and literary traditions is also to be
found in Greek authors of the end of the second and first half of the third
centuries A. D., who witnessed the beginnings of the third century crisis.
Foremost among these were Cassius Dio, a senator of Greek extraction from
Asia Minor, more specifically, from Nicaea in Bithynia; Herodian, very likely
a Greek from Western Asia Minor, a freedman or a freedman's son, who
served in the imperial bureaucracy; Philostratus, a sophist frequenting the
literary "salons" of Rome and Athens; Dexippus, an Athenian notable and
historiographer; and the author of the speech "Eis Basilea" ("To the
Emperor") which is erroneously ascribed to Aelius Aristides. The author was
probably an Athenian orator belonging to the same circle as Philostratus and
Dexippus.'

N. B. This article is the English version of my inaugural lecture as professor of Greek and
Roman History at the Catholic University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 1981, 22 May.
I owe thanks to Mrs. Marion van Assendelft, who translated my lecture into English.
' Cassius Dio 52 and 71-80, ed. Cary, Dio's Roman History VI and IX (Loeb Cl. Libr.);
F. Millar, A Study of Cassius Dio (Oxford 1964); Herodianus, ed. Whittaker (Loeb Cl. Libr.
1969-1970), with a valuable "Introduction", from now on quoted as Whittaker, o.c.; G. Alfoldy,
"Herodians Person" in Anc. Soc. 2 (1971) 204 ff.; Philostratus, The Life of Apollonius of Tyana,
ed. Conybeare (Loeb Cl. Libr. 1912); F. Solmsen, "Philostratos" in RE XX (1941), 124 ff.;
Dexippus, in Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker II A, 100; F. Millar, "P.
Herennius Dexippus" in JRS 59 (1969) 12 ff. See J. Palm, Rom, Romertum und Imperium (Lund
1959) 77-83. Sources from later times are: Scriptores Historiae Augustae, ed. Magie, I-III (Loeb
Cl. Libr. 1921-1932); Eutropius, Breviarium ab urbe condita, ed. Riihl, 1887 (NP 1975), VIII-IX;
Aurelius Victor, Caesares, ed. Pichlmayr-Grundel, 1966 (NP 1970); Zosimus, Historia Nova I,
ed. Paschoud, Paris 1971, with an "Introduction" and a historical commentary; Zonaras, Epitome
Historiarum, ed. Dindorf (Leipzig 1870) XI-XII.

Historia, Band XXXIII/3 (1984) ? Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Stuttgart

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 The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman Empire 359

Around the middle of the second century, the Roman Empire experienced a
time of relative peace and prosperity and the Greek-speaking elite of the
Eastern provinces of the Empire felt increasingly at home.2 There were three
levels of administration within the empire. At the top stood the emperor with
his advisers and the senate. The provincial governors formed the second, the
notables (decuriones, curiales) of the local administration the third level. The
emperor and the governors had at their disposal burgeoning bureaucratic
organisations and commanded armies that were stationed mainly in permanent
camps along the borders, as a ring of steel around the cultured world.
Administrative tasks of a more specialized nature were performed by fiscal,
judicial or military experts from the order of the knights (equites), the second-
highest social class in the empire, from which officers were also often
recruited. The highest class was the senatorial one (ordo senatorius).3 No
technocrats, these senators, but all-round gentlemen who familiarized them-
selves with the aspects of administration in the course of their career. And this
was as it should be: they were meant to occupy the highest positions, leaving
the details to lesser gods, for their social prestige was such as to raise them
above the richest and most distinguished of the local notables.
As a political entity, the Roman Senate had lost its force. Traditional
senatorial functions continued to lend prestige, the ex-consuls still forming the
aristocracy within the senate, but they had little practical scope. As a group,
however, the senators formed a formidable economic and social power. Next
to the emperor they were the largest landowners, and by means of various ties
of patronage, they controlled entire cities and rural districts. Because senatorial

2 On the Roman Empire in the second century A. D. see M. Hammond, The Antonine
Monarchy (Rome 1959); F. W. Walbank, The Awful Revolution (Liverpool 1969) 19 ff.; T. Frank,
Economic Survey of Ancient Rome IV-V (Baltimore 1940); J. Bleicken, Verfassungs- und
Sozialgeschichte des romischen Kaiserreiches (Paderborn 1978); M. Stahl, Imperiale Herrschaft und
provinziale Stadt (Gottingen 1978); G. Alfoldy, Romische Sozialgeschichte (Wiesbaden 1975)
83 ff.; H. W. Pleket, "Sociale stratificatie en sociale mobiliteit in de Romeinse keizertijd" in TvG
84 (1971) 215 ff.; A. R. Birley, Mark Aurel, Kaiser und Philosoph (Munchen 1968); Id., Septimius
Severus. The African Emperor (London 1971).
3 See J. Gage, Les classes sociales dans l'empire romain (Paris 1964) 82 ff.; M. T. N. Arnheim,
The Senatorial Aristocracy in the Later Roman Empire (Oxford 1972) 18 ff., 31 f.; W. Eck,
"Beforderungskriterien innerhalb der senatorischen Laufbahn, dargestellt an der Zeit von 69 bis
138 n. Chr." in ANRW II 1 (1974) 158 ff.; G. Barbieri, L'Albo senatorio da Settimio Severo a
Carino (193-285) (Rome 1952); G. Alfoldy, "Consuls and Consulars under the Antonines;
Prosopography and History" in Anc. Soc. 7 (1976) 263-299; Id., Konsulat und Senatorenstand
unter den Antoninen, Bonn 1977; H. Halfmann, Die Senatoren aus dem ostlichen Ted des
Imperium Romanum bis zum Ende des 2. Jhs. n. Chr., Gottingen 1979; E. Birley, "Senators in the
Emperor's Service" in PBA 39 (1953) 199ff.; K. Dietz, Senatus contra princpem. Untersuchungen
zur senatorischen Opposition gegen Kaiser Maximinus Thrax, Munchen 1980. On this kind of
gentlemen see e. g. P. Veyne, Le pain et le cirque. Sociologie historique d'un pluralisme politique
(Paris 1976) 110ff. and J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Romans and Aliens (London 1979) 18ff.

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 360 LUKAS DE BLOIS

families died out or were degraded, the ordo was continually being sup-
plemented. Criteria for admittance were wealth, way of life and zealousness in
service of the emperor, rather than national descent.
In the second century, rich, well-educated and loyal gentlemen from
cultured and economically flourishing provinces were hardly less likely to be
admitted to the senate than the curiales from Italy. As Alf6ldy points out, the
stagnant economy of Italy offered the latter little opportunity of building up
the kind of fortune that was in accordance with a senator's expensive life-
style.4 A true senator maintained an entire court in several houses and villa's
and contributed in a lordly manner to the maintenance and amusement of the
masses of Rome and of those cities with which he had special ties.
The richest and most distinguished of the Greek-speaking populace of the
Eastern Empire entered the senate, but a far larger part penetrated into the
careers of the equites or into the provincial and central officia (offices,
services). Among the latter were a fair number of intellectuals. Some were
ashamed of their post. The writer Lucian acquired a lucrative post late in life
and wrote an Apology having himself at one time attacked such people with
vehemence.5 Those Greeks who gained admittance to the elite of the empire
retained their ties with their own cities and acquired ties with others who
wished to have them as their patrons.6
Assimilation of the Greek elite into the imperial administration did not
result in a loss of their Greek cultural identity. On the contrary, typically
Roman affairs of the past held little interest for these prominent men and
frequently they sharply criticized the way of life of the high society in the urbs
Roma. Some second century Greek authors were annoyed with the superficial-
ity and downright materialism of the Roman drawing-rooms.'

Alf6ldy, "Consuls", o.c. 287f.

5 See Plutarchus, De tranquill. animi 10. Cp. H.-G. Pflaum, Abrege desprocurateurs equestres
(Paris 1974) 6ff.; 45ff.; Id., Les carrieresprocuratoriennes II-III, Paris 1960; Gage, o.c. 117ff. On
the officia see R. McMullen, "Imperial Bureaucrats in the Roman Provinces" in HSPh 68 (1964)
305-312. On Lucianus see A. Lesky, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur (Bern/Munich2 1963)
897 and Palm, o.c. 52ff. On the positions of Greek intellectuals in the offices in Rome see e. g.
Birley, Sept. Sev. o.c. 207f. (on the sophist Antipater, ab epistulis graecis); Philostratus, Vitae
sophistarum, ed. Wright (Loeb Cl. Libr.) 568, 576, 590, 596f., 607, 625, 627f. Cp. G. W. Bower-
sock, Greek sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford 1969) 43ff. On the selection of senators and
knights see Cassius Dio 52, 19 and Aelius Aristides, Eis Rhomen (26 K) 58ff. Cp. Halfmann, o.c.
28ff., 52ff., 71ff., Alf6ldy, "Consuls",o.c. 297ff.
6 Cp. Philostr. V. S. 530ff., 537, 546ff., 605, 516ff., 529, 603f. and 613 on a. o. Polemo, Herodes
Atticus and Damianus. Cp. Dio Chrysostomus, or. 41 and 44, 6. On these activities on imperial
and local levels see Halfmann, O.c. 34ff.
7 See Balsdon, O.c. 186f. (on Lucian's Nigrinus and on or. 13 of Dio Chrysostomus); cp.
G. J. D. Aalders, "Grieks zelfbewustzijn in de Romeinse keizertijd" in Handelingen van het 34e
Nederlandse Filologencongres (Amsterdam 1976) 3ff.; cp. Id., Plutarch's Political Thought,
Amsterdam/New York 1982.

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 The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman Empire 361

From the beginning of the second century, as it happened, Greek culture

was experiencing a period of resurgence that lasted well into the late Empire.
In literature, philosophy, the sciences and rhetoric, an axiomatic veneration of
the great fifth and fourth century Greek classics went hand in hand with a
certain measure of originality which found expression in new genres and ways
of thought, and this did hold true even for Christians.
Above all, the second century was the period of the second Sophistic.8
Sophists, viz. specialists in a popular philosophically tinged type of oratory,
made grand-stand appearances that filled the stadia to capacity and won them
rich rewards. Their themes derived mainly from the field of ethics and history:
the battle of Marathon , Demosthenes vs. Philip, the rich king and the poor
sage, and a variety of examples of self-control. The influence of the cult of
rhetoric is to be found in all the literary genres of the times, even down to the
very wording of official letters and laws. Some writers dismissed it with
disgust. Lucian who started off as one of them, later ridiculed the Sophists in
his "Rhetorum praeceptor" and "Pseudosophista", and in "De historia
scribenda" he comments severely on the exaggerated rhetorics of historio-
graphers. It omits, diminishes, enhances and stereotypes events.9 Some
scholars consider such historiae to be utterly worthless as a source of historical
fact, but this is going too far. The entire complex of rhetorical commonplace
was not merely a matter of book-learning, devoid of reality. Events were
enhanced or disparaged and tailored to suit a specific mould, they were not
invented. Rhetorical commonplace was a way of discussing actual facts
indirectly, within a familiar and classical frame of reference.'0
In spite of assimilating, the Greek elite did not regard the empire as
belonging to the ancient Roman nation, and even less so as falling under the
supremacy of Italy. In his book, Cassius Dio recommended dividing up Italy
into provinces, just as the other parts of the empire. He did, however, regard
Rome as the major capital, a back-drop for the emperor, the urban center of a
universal polis."
These Greeks regarded the empire as a commonwealth of cultured peoples,
governed by a sovereign who had to display the characteristics of the ideal king
and who cooperated with the flower of the nations within the realm:
aristocracy pure and simple. Palm speaks of the deromanisation of the empire.
Just as the cosmos and nature, the empire had to be based on a fixed hierarchy

8 See Philostratus, V. S. passim; Bowersock, o.c.; Palm, o.c. 16-113; E. L. Bowie, "Greeks and
their Past in the Second Sophistic" in P. & P. 46 (1970) 3ff.; G. J. D. Aalders, Echt Grieks, Vrije
Univ., Amsterdam 1981.
9 Cp. Whittaker, o.c. XIVff. and LIIff.
10 Cp. A. B. Breebaart, "Het Hellenisme van de vierde eeuw en het nieuwe Rome" in TvG91
(1978) 2.
11 See Cassius Dio, 52,22,1f.; 19,6; 30,4ff. Cp. Aelius Aristides, Eis Rhomen 61.

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 362 LuKAS DE BLOIS

of class and rank, each with their

the individual nations. Romans w
Pannonians were none too brigh
embodied spirituality and ingenuit
certainly on paper, affairs of the m
the mind; he who masters himself
Athenian power of the fifth cen
the truly great Athenian domini
When local notables moved into
unmixed blessing for their cities
new clients were acquired so that t
as administrators nor as benefact
the very men with the best connec
less influential and timidly pass
procuratores and the emperor. P
Notably, the administration of
almost entirely to the body pol
course of the second century. This
by the extension of Roman citiz
curiales were not particularly afflu
municipal level was still being paid
the wealthy (prestigious building
also had to collect and at times
second century, cities kept gett
Sometimes the central governme
bring affairs to order. This woul

12 Palm, o.c. 133. Cp. Appianus, Hist. R

Aelius Aristides, E. R. 58ff. and Panathenaikos 225ff. See J. H. Oliver, "The Ruling Power" in
TAPhS 43 (1953) 874ff., Id. "The Civilizing Power" in TAPhS 58 (1968) 9ff.; J. Bleicken, "Der
Preis des Aelius Aristides auf das romische Weltreich" in Nachr. der Akad. der Wissensch. in
Gottingen, philol-hist. Klasse, 1966,7,225ff. Ethnic generalizations were very popular in those
days. Cp. Herod. II 9,11 (with Whittaker's note); III 2,7f. (Greeks); III 14 (Britons); IV 8,7
(Alexandrians); Cassius Dio 78,6,1a; Philostratus, vita Apoll. IV 21; 27; III passim.
13 Aelius Aristides, Panath. 225ff. (on the Athenian empire). On the primacy of the mind and
on self-control see Epictetus, Diss. I 29,9; IV 3,9f.; Philostratus, vit. Apoll. III 10 and 26ff., where
he discusses the primacy of Indian wise men over their king; Arrianus, Anab. Alex. IV 8f.; Dio
Chr. or. 4 and or. 44,1If.; Marcus Aurelius, Ta eis heauton V 17 and X 10; ps. Aelius Aristides
35 K (Eis Basilea) 29; Dexippus, FGrHist II A, 100, 31b.
14 See A. H. M. Jones, "The Cities of the Roman Empire" in The Roman Economy (Oxford
1974) 17; Stahl, o.c. 25ff., 47ff., 105ff., 159ff., and 178ff.
15 Cp. Plutarchus, Praecepta rei publicae gerendae (Mor. X) 814 F. Cf. F. Millar, "The
Development of Jurisdiction by Imperial Procurators" in Historia 14 (1965) 362-367; Id., The
Emperor in the Roman World (London 1977) 533ff.; Stahl, o.c. 99ff.; Bleicken, Verfassungsge-
schzchte, o.c. 188ff.; McMullen, 'Bureaucrats", o.c. 305ff.

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 The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman Empire 363

the city or cities concerned. This was no bid for power by the central
authorities, but a means of bringing the local self-government - one of the
corner-stones of the Roman system - back into the picture. After all, who
could collect taxes, maintain order, and provide the needs at the local level
more efficiently and inexpensively than the local unsalaried prominents who
often shared in the costs at that ?i6 There were other drawbacks. A. H. M.
Jones has suspected for some time that the distribution of people over the
agricultural processes of production was deteriorating. Soldiers, administrators
and the urban proletariat increased in numbers while the rural populace and
agricultural techniques remained unchanged at best. Boak even thinks that
during the second half of the second century there was an absolute decline in
the population, but this is unverifiable. His thesis could hold true for regions
that were devastated by the plague and by wars, and for Italy. For as long as
Italians served in those armies that were permanently quartered along the
borders, there was a constant leakage of young men to the outer provinces as
well as to Rome (viz. to the imperial guard). Among the free-born of Italy this
resulted in a permanently unfavourable balance of the sexes during the fertile
years. Demographically, this can have longlasting and radical consequences.
Possibly there is a linkage with the relatively large number of freedmen found
in the burial fields of Italy throughout the principate. Specifically the more
affluent from the Italian cities continued to serve in large numbers as military
and civilian personnel in the provinces. In the prosopographical work by
Devijver we come upon them by the dozen.'7 Research into this matter should
really start anew; at this point we cannot go beyond some tentative premises.
Beginning with the reign of Marcus Aurelius (161-180), the Roman world
was faced with serious problems. The enemies at the northern and eastern
frontiers had become stronger, partly by learning from the Romans, and were
growing increasingly aggressive. At the same time, discipline in the Roman
armies diminished, causing a perpetual dread of mutiny, sack, and struggle for
imperial power. Towns and villages were reduced to poverty and from 166 on,
famine and pestilence scourged the empire with discouraging regularity.
Cassius Dio and Herodian may have found the age following the death of
Marcus Aurelius one of iron and full of commotion,'8 only after 230 were the
problems to reach their apex. Nowadays we speak of the third century crisis
but contemporaries did not view it in the same light. At least until 250 there

16 Cp. Hammond, oc. 446; Gage, o.c. 182ff. and 279ff.; Stahl, o.c. 105-130; D. Norr,
Imperium und Polis in der hohen Prinzipatszeit (Munich 1969) 35ff. Functions like "curator" and
"corrector" appeared more frequently in senatorial careers. See e. g. ILS (Dessau) 1015-1214.
17 A. H. M. Jones, Ancient Economic History (1948) 14ff.; A. E. R. Boak, Manpower Shortage
and the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West (Michigan 1955) 3-20; 22ff.; H. Devijver,
Prosographia militiarum equestrium quae fuerunt ab Augusto ad Gallienum I-II, Leiden 1976/7.
18 Cassius Dio 72,36,4; Herod. I 1,4.

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 364 LUKAS DE BLOIS

was no realization of a general,

individual and reparable, to be s
and social frameworks. Only aroun
had incurred the wrath of the god
the end of time was approaching
Such problems caused a majorit
with the empire. Specifically du
frontiers (161-166) they began
Even Christian writers came to
chaos and appreciate the pax Roma
Gospel.
Writers such as Herodian and C
problems; failing emperors, gree
such as Commodus (180-192),
(235-238) were portrayed with all
since the fifth and fourth cent
always said of tyrants that they s
rob the rich, that they sacrificed
of their bodyguard and favourit
veneration, that they were crue
they preferred low lust to tru
mentioned above, the masses of
the high-handedness of the prae

19 On the crisis of the third century A

Marc Aurele a Anastase (Paris2 1970) 74ff
seen by Contemporaries" in GRBS 15 (197
to Crisis A. D. 235-337, New Haven 1976. Authors who lived just before or after 250 A. D.:
Cyprianus, Ad Demetrianum 3 in CSEL III, 1 (1868) 351ff.; cp. G. Alfoldy, "Der Heilige
Cyprian und die Krise des romischen Reiches" in Historia 22 (1973) 479ff.; see Oracula Sibyllina
XIII, ed. Geffcken, Leipzig 1902, and Herodianus, who may have written just before or after
A. D. 250, according to G. Alfoldy, "Herodians Person", Anc. Soc. 2 (1971) 204ff.
20 Lucianus, Alexandros 48. Polyaenus spoke in his Strategemata with commitment on the
wars of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. Cp. Palm, o.c. 54 and 62f. See Justinus Martyr, Apol. I
11-12; Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. IV 30,3; Origenes, Contra Celsum II 30 and Comment. in Joh. Ev.
6,3; Hippolytus, In Danielem 4; Tertullianus, De pallio 2. Cf. L. de Blois, "Het christelijke rijk"
in L. de Blois & A. H. Bredero, Kerk en vrede in de Oudheid en de Middeleeuwen (Kampen 1980)
41f.
21 Such commonplaces are to be found in Herodotus III 80-82; Isocrates, Evagoras 19ff. and
Nicocl. 5ff.; Xenophon, Agesilaus 9,1ff.; Plato's Third and Seventh Epistles; Aristotle, Pol. V 8
and III 9,3. Cp. Dio Chr. or. 1-4 and 62 (esp. or. 1,49ff.); Plutarchus, Ad principem ineruditum
779 E ff., esp. 781 C-E; Plinius jr., Panegyricus, passim; Cassius Dio 52,2-13. On the emperors
Commodus, Caracalla and Maximinus see Herod. I 5-17 (esp. 15-17); IV 1-13 (esp. 3; 6-8);
VII-VIII (esp. VII 1-4, 1); Cassius Dio 73 and 78-79 (esp. 73,1 and 10-16; 78,4-12; 15-23); SHA,
vit. Comm.; vit. Antonini Caracalli; Eutropius, Brev. VIII 15 and 20; IX 1-2; Aurelius Victor,
Caes. 20-26; Zosimus 1 13.

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 The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman Empire 365

guard. We read that these emperors would do anything for money, threatening
the senators with bogus trials and confiscations, and stealing left and right in
order to shower largesse on the soldiers. According to Herodian (VII 3, 6),
soldiers under Maximinus (235-238) even picked quarrels with their own
relations who also had to retrench. Tyrannical emperors such as these three
also associated with the wrong people. Commodus became a tool in the hands
of his lackeys and sent packing the friends of his father, the excellent emperor
Marcus Aurelius; Caracalla slept with his soldiers on the ground and
Maximinus entrenched himself within his army, according to Herodian (VII
l ,3).22

Neither was the situation a healthy one culturally speaking. Commodus

Caracalla were far too deeply engrossed in the games, forgetting all the good
things they had learned, and Maximinus was a trainer of soldiers, almost
illiterate.23 They did no better in matters of war. Commodus neglected the
struggle against the barbarians; Caracalla payed off one enemy and, according
to Herodian, deceived another; Maximinus' campaigns may have been
successful, but they were foolhardy, risking as they did the safety of entire
armies.24
Actually, such platitudes could be reversed with ease. When speaking of
Septimius Severus whom he did not consider a bad emperor, Herodian calls it
"decisive speed" instead of "foolhardiness". And much later (end of the fourth
century), when writing to emperor Arcadius, Synesius recommends him to
march along with the soldiers, as did the fighting emperors of the third
century, rather than hiding among the gold and brocade of his palace.25
Obviously all the platitudes on behaviour (both public and private), on
appearance and way of thinking of the tyrants were also applied to the
emperors concerned.
Marcus Aurelius, the prototype of the good sovereign, served by way of
contrast. He restrained the soldiers, giving them only what they deserved, he
sold the trappings of the court rather than increase the taxes, he paid full
tribute to senators and sophists, he was lenient and approachable. He came of
good stock and his paideta was unimpeachable. He was a good working
partner in the administration of justice and during heavy campaigns in which

22 On the clashes of the soldiers with the urban population of Rome in A. D. 190, 193, 213 and
238 see Herod. I 12, 5ff.; II 4,1; II 6; IV 6,4f.; VII 11; Cassius Dio 74,13, 3-5; 80,2,3. Cp. Cassius
Dio 80,1,1 (threatening pillage of Antioch A. D. 218, which had to be bought off with a handsome
donativum) and 78,22 (slaughter in Alexandria by Caracalla's soldiers). See on Caracalla's soldierly
behaviour Herod. IV 3,4; 7,4ff.; Cassius Dio 78,13,lff.
23 Cassius Dio 72,36,4; 78,11,2f.; Herod. I 6f.; 13,8; III 15,4; IV 3,3f.; VI 8,1f.
24 Herod. I 6; IV 10f.; VII 2; Cassius Dio 73,1,2f.; 78,14,2f.; 78,12f. Cp. Aurelius Victor,
Caes. 25-26; SHA, vit. Maximin. 12.
25 Herod. II 11-12; Cp. Cassius Dio 74, 16f.; Synesius, De regno 16 and 21.

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366 LUKAS DE BLOIS

he engaged sensibly and with caution. What was more: in all of this Marcus
was successful, proving that governing in this manner was possible !26
Not only bad emperors were blamed for the problems, but also malevolent
upstarts in their entourage. Cassius Dio wishes the emperor to firmly restrain
his freedmen and other lackeys and not to appoint former centuriones to the
senate; Philostratus recommends the emperor to appoint Greek-speaking
governors to the cultured Greek provinces in order to prevent the assessores
from selling justice with impunity. Some mushrooms came a long way. The
freedman Cleander governed the empire for several years as Commodus'
favourite and he put himself in command of the guard under the title "a
pugione", a title that was modelled on the title typical for a freedman from the
palace (a cubiculo), which he also carried.27
Equites also at times overreached themselves. Plautianus, the prefect of the
guard of Septimius Severus, considered exceptional veneration his due and
longed to take control; Macrinus, the prefect of Caracalla's guard, became his
successor through conspiracy. In the opinion of Cassius Dio (79, 41, 2-3), he
should never have become emperor himself but should rather have looked for a
suitable senator, and he ascribes the man's failure for a large part to his obscure
birth. Both the masses and the soldiers despised him for it and, upstart that he
was, he missed the constantia that proceeds from a good background and
education.28
Particularly black is the picture that is painted of the soldiers, more
specifically of the praetorians in Rome, but also of the troops along the
borders. Time and again they demanded pay and presents, they maltreated
their own people, rebelled against strict commanders for wanting to make
them work without granting them more than their due, and they hardly
exercised. At one point (79, 29, 2), Cassius Dio considers the soldiers to be
more detrimental to the empire than the Parthian enemy, and he feels that the
enemy along the eastern frontier would have been negligible in 230 if the
soldiers had just done their job in a disciplined way (80, 4, 1-2). Herodian uses
harsh colours to depict the tyrannical behaviour of the soldiers, their greed and

26 See Cassius Dio 71-72, esp. 72,3,3f.; 6,1f.; 24; 31f.; 34,2ff.; Herod. 1-4; SHA, vit. Marc.
Ant., esp. 22-26. Cf. Birley, Mark Aurel, o.c. 241ff. and Whittaker, O.c. LXXIIf.
t7 On the type of the ostentatious upstart see Philostr., vit. Apoll. V 22. See Cassius Dio
52,37,5f.; 25,6; 74,8,1; Philostr., vit. Apoll. V 36. On Cleander see Birley, Sept. Sev., o.c. 126f.; AE
1952,6 and AE 1961,280. Cp. F. Grosso, La lotta politica al tempo di Commodo, Turin 1964
(Memorie dell' Accademia delle Scienze di Torino 4,7), and Id., "Ricerche su Plauziano e gli
avvenimenti del suo tempo" in Rendiconti dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei VIII 23 (1968) 7ff.
Birley's views are mainly based on the latter work of F. Grosso.
28 Cassius Dio, 76,14,Iff.; 77,2-5; 79,11,1 and 13-15 (esp. 15,3ff.); 79,19f. and 40f.; Herod. III
10,5-8 and Il,lff.; V 1,5ff. Cp. Aristotle, Pol. V 7,20ff.; Plutarchus, Ad princ. inerud. 782 E.

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 The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman Empire 367

increasing social isolation.29 Rome's urban dwellers usually fare better.

Philostratus does consider them rather spoiled with bread and games, but in
197, as we can read, they rebelled against the civil strife; they despised
worthless pretenders and emperors, they detested the rapacious soldiers and
were pleased with good emperors such as Pertinax and the senatorial emperors
of 238. Their hatred of the soldiers is understandable: they were their closest
competitors for the imperial liberalitas (largesse). Perhaps some Greek writers
felt that this was due more to the masses of the Roman metropolis than to a
semi-barbaric soldiery. Cassius Dio (72, 3, 3f.) is obviously pleased with the
emperor Marcus Aurelius' strict economy towards the soldiers and mentions
without a single critical note the emperor's liberality and leniency towards the
urban population of Rome (72, 32, 1).3?
The one problem that runs through all the sources of the times is the
exceedingly heavy burden of taxation. Without exception the Greek writers
say that the bad emperors feasted on the money wrung from the poor, and that
they robbed the rich to satisfy the soldiers. As a matter of fact, several writers
realized very well the difficulties of containing the demands of the soldiers in
times of war, when the empire was dependent on the armies. The "Eis Basilea"
- orator regarded it virtually as a superhuman achievement, and Cassius Dio
(79, 36, 2f.) mentions a letter by Macrinus in which the latter wrote the senate
that his predecessors had undermined discipline and exhausted the treasury; as
a result, it was financially impossible to give the soldiers their full pay in
addition to many payments on the spot, but it was politically impossible to
disappoint the troops.3" Are these really all "mythistoriae" made up of
stereotypes in black and white? At times such ungraded depictions are
verifiably exaggerated and incorrect. Commodus had enjoyed good teachers
and he retained some of his father's important advisers in high positions. He
continued to appreciate the paideia with which he had been educated for quite
some time. He once apologized to a good sophist for not noticing him sooner
and for his tardiness in appointing him to the post of imperial secretary.32

29 See Cassius Dio 72,3,3f.; 71,1,3; 8,1; 9f.; 13,3-5; 16f.; 78,4,1; 3,2ff.; 9,lff.; 79,12; 17,2f.;
28-32; 36,2f.; 80,1,1; 4,3; 7,lff.; 18,4; Herod. I 17,2; II 4,1; 4,4f.; 6,10 and 13; III 8,4f.; 15,5; IV
4,7 and 5,1; 13,7 (the soldier's anger after the murder of Caracalla); V 2-4; VI 4,7; 6,4; 7,3; 7,9f.;
VI 8-9; VII 1-3; 11-12; VIII 7-8; ps. Aelius Aristides, Eis basilea 30f. Later Latin authors use the
same commonplaces when they are speaking of the soldiery of the third century A. D. Aurelius
Victor, Caes. 26,6, calls the soldiers: Genus hominum pecuniae cupidiusfidumque ac bonum solo
quaestu.

30 Philostr., vit. Apoll. V 36; cp. Cassius Dio 76,4,5; 79,19f.; 73,13,1ff.; 74,13,3ff.; Herod. 1 12;
II 4 and 6; IV 6,4f.; VII 11.
31 Cassius Dio 72,3,3f.; 73,16,2f.; 75,8,4f.; 77,15f.; 78,9f. and 12-14; Herod. II 3,9;VI 1,8 and
8-9; III 8,7; VII 3; Philostr., vit. Apoll. V 36; ps. Aelius Aristides, Eis basilea 16 and 30f. CP. P.
Lond. inv. 2565 and P. Fay. 20.
32 Herod. I 2,1; cp. Birley, Mark Aurel, o.c. 375f.; Philostr. V. S. 590.

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 368 LuKAS DE BLOIS

Caracalla was certainly no semi-bar

"salons" like the one of his mother, J
the themes of the sophists, at time
achievements. He did at one point c
from public services in his home-tow
deprive the cities of public services f
the circumstances, his attitude was
the narrowminded extreme champi
into. In his appointments he continue
predecessor, the "good emperor", A
ance, it may be remarked that even t
proceeded to appoint experienced so
and that in 170 he suffered a severe d
of a mistaken assessment of the force
All the same, information on emp
plentiful and concrete to be relegat
writer such as Cassius Dio is reasona
can be verified from other sources.36
in inscriptions or papyri, give amp
soldiers37; and in the prosopograph
the past few decades, real changes in
From the time of Septimius Severus
commissioned officers and desk cle
rhetorical historiographers it is a mat
than of true or false.

3
See Whittaker, o.c. 385 n.2 on Herod. IV
34 See R. Syme, Emperors and Biography
ann&es de la grande crise du Ille siecle: de l'
Gordien III (244)" in ANRWII 2 (1975) 657 ff.
35 See Birley, Mark Aurel, o.c. 260ff., 283ff., 293ff., 328, 344ff.; Alfoldy, "Consuls" o.c. 299;
Id., "P. Helvius Pertinax und M. Valerius Maximianus" in Situla 14-15 (1974) 199ff.; Devijver,
o.c. II P89 and S78; G. Alfoldy, "Les Equites Romani et I'histoire sociale des provinces
germaniques de l'empire romain" in Corsi di cultura sull'arte ravennate e bizantina (1977) 7ff. On
the military setbacks of the emperor Marcus in A. D. 170 see Birley, Mark Aurel, o.c. 229ff.
36 See Millar, Dio o.c.
37 See OGIS 519 ( CIL III 14191); Dittenberger, Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum II' (1960)
888 (Scaptopare), from now on to be quoted as Sylloge II 888. Cp. I. Stoian, "De nouveau sur la
plainte des paysans du territoire d'Historia" in Dacia 3 (1959) 369 ff. See P. Graux 4 (= Hunt-
Edgar, Select Papyri II 291). See Alfoldy, "Crisis", o.c. 94f. and M. I. Rostovtzeff, Social and
Economic History of the Roman Empire (Oxford2, 1957) I, 495ff.
38 See M. Clauss, Untersuchungen zu den principales des romischen Heeres von Augustus bis
Diokletian (Bochum 1973) 17-117 and 118ff.; E. Smith, "The Army Reforms of Septimius
Severus" in Historia 21 (1972) 494ff. Cp. G. Alfoldy, "Septimius Severus und der Senat" in BJ168
(1968) 112 ff.

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 The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman Empire 369

What might have been the remedies for the problems? Most Greek writers
did not go beyond suggesting an exemplary behaviour, both in public and in
private, of the emperor and his retinue, in particular regarding a just and severe
economy towards the soldiers and a sober court. Such conduct would allow
for moderate taxes and better taxation ethics. Other recommendations were
the elimination of tale-bearers, the selection of suitable helpers from good
families, and the personal participation by the emperor in the administration of
justice.39 Cassius Dio was among those favouring such measures, but he added
some well-considered proposals of his own. He realized that the fiscal system
stood in need of drastic reforms if it was to meet the needs of the government,
and he came with some interesting, if optimistic, suggestions. He also wished
to ease the burdens of the governors by diminishing the provinces in size and
giving the military responsibility to a second in command. He wished to
recruit the centuriones from people of social standing and link them more
closely with the emperor and the senate so as to avoid their differences with
governors leading straight away to a rebellion that was also directed against the
emperor. Obviously, Dio understood that these subalterns formed a pivot in
the armies and in the officia that were swiftly growing both in importance and
in scope. He was also well aware of the significant part they played in the
conduct of the manifold affairs of the central and provincial authorities (e. g. as
bailiffs, heading a detention team, as spies or as arbiters in local conflicts).
Associating middle-class personnel such as these with the emperor was soon to
become topical under Valerian and Gallienus; during the late Empire it was to
become a means to counteract centrifugal tendencies and to check up on local
notables. For Dio the preservation of the existing system of social orders and
positions was essential. This is particularly evident from his sections dealing
with the senate and the senators. Dio was in favour of reform, provided it
strengthened the position of the senators, or at least did not detract from it. He
argued in favour of physical training for the sons of senators so as to make
them better fitted for military service.40
Platitudes on kings and tyrants did not turn the contents of Greek literature
dealing with current affairs into sheer fiction, but they did leave their mark.

3 Cassius Dio 52,19-40, esp. 19,25,27,29,33ff.; Herod. 1 1-4; VIII 7-8; VI 1; ps. Aelius
Aristides, Eis basilea, passim; Philostr., vit. Apoll. V 36; Dexippus, ap. SHA 21,16,4 and 25,12,5f.
( FGrHist II A, 100, 21 and 23); P. Fay. 20.
40 Cassius Dio 52,19ff., esp. 28,22,25. See J. Bleicken, "Der politische Standpunkt Dios
gegenuber der Monarchie" in Hermes 90 (1962) 444 ff. On the middle ranks of the bureaucracy in
the later Roman empire see W. G. Sinnigen, "Chiefs of Staff and Chiefs of the Secret Service" in
BZ 57 (1964) 78ff. and A. Giardina, Aspetti della burocrazia nel Basso Impero (Rome 1977) 13ff.
Just before A. D. 260 Valerianus and Gallienus probably began to grant the title "protector" to the
military and bureaucratic personnel which served in the medium levels of the army and the civil
service (the officia). This may be interpreted as an effort to maintain the loyalty of these important
officers and bureaucrats. See H.-J. Diesner, "Protector" in REsuppl. XI (1968) 1113ff., esp. 1115.

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370 LUKAS DE BLOIS

Not only in recommending reme

the Greek writers made the emp
was to keep everyone from going
the soldiers and the up and coming
had to protect the social and political system from outside threats. The
overrating of the effects of a sovereign's behaviour and actions that is
contained in this train of thought went back a long way for the Greeks (it is to
be found e. g. in Plato's Laws and in his seventh letter) and had permeated the
lower layers of society, both Greek and otherwise, imperial coin propaganda,
titles, and official correspondence.4' Platitudes on kings and tyrants had their
roots in this way of thinking and were its rhetorical expression, in inscriptions
and on coins the emperor was presented as the saviour and benefactor whose
very presence could bring welfare. He restored the world and refounded the
empire like some Jupiter, Hercules or the invincible Sun. In petitions from
agricultural villages, we come across the artless belief that all will be well once
the emperor is acquainted with the facts and gives them his attention.
Alexander Severus says in a letter that his handpicked governors and
procuratores will be moderate in their financial demands and lenient in their
demeanor, once they see that the emperor himself remits debts and reigns with
all the benevolence, sedateness and self restraint of a philanthropic benefactor.42
This put them under obligations. Emperors were blamed for disasters and
defeats; armies in endangered borderlands were resentful when the emperor
paid no attention to them, at times proclaiming a popular general anti-
emperor.
Because the influence of the emperor's deeds were overrated, the education
of future sovereigns was greatly emphasized. Under Antonine Pius (138-161),

41 See Plato, Laws 709-711; Ep. VII 326 c ff., 331 d ff.; Isocrates, Evag. 44f.; Xenophon, Ages.
7,2; Plinius jr., Paneg. 44f. and 80; Aelius Aristides, E. R. (26 K) 31f.; 90 and 107; Plutarchus, Ad
princ. inerud. 780 B-782 D; Dio Chr., or. 1,37-45 and or. 3,7f. and 51ff., Cassius Dio 52,29,3 and
34,1f. On this way of thinking in the lower levels of society see Suetonius, Div. Aug. 98,2; OGIS
519; Sylloge II 888. On the propagandistic titles of the emperors in inscriptions, on coins, and in
their letters see P. Bureth, Les titulatures imperiales dans les payrus, les ostraca et les inscriptions
d'Egypte, Paris 1964; M. Amit, "Propagande de succes et d'euphorie dans l'empire romain" in
Iura 16 (1965) 52-75; J. Moreau, Scripta Minora (Heidelberg 1964) 26ff., with some notes on ps.
Aelius Aristides' Eis basilea, P. Fay. 20 (= a letter from Alexander Severus), and P. Lond. inv.
2565; McMullen, Response o.c., 28ff. and 71ff. Cp. Dexippus, FGrHist IIA, 100 fr. 26.
42 See P. Fay. 20; OGIS 519 (a petition from the village of Aragoe) and Sylloge 1I 888 (a
petition from the village of Scaptopare). Cp. Eusebius, Hist. eccl. VII 11-23, a long quotation from
a letter of the christian bishop of Alexandria to Hermammon (a colleague). In the first chapters the
times are bleak and the prospects dark, but when Gallienus gains power and turns Out to be
tolerant toward the christians, the atmosphere changes abruptly: in ch. 23 the emperor Gallienus
and his saeculum aureum are praised in phrases, which had already become traditional. On P. Fay.
20 see J. H. Oliver, "On the edict of Severus Alexander" in A. J. Ph. 99 (1978) 474ff.

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 The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman Empire 371

Cornelius Fronto owed quite a bit to his position as the pedagogue of Marcus
and Lucius Verus. It was this that raised him to the high aristocracy of the ex-
consuls and the amicz Caesaris, according to Alfdldy.43 It must be noted that
this overrating did not lead the Greeks to give a metaphysical meaning to the
emperorship. The writers of the second Sophistic had their doubts about
experiments with divine emperorship and emperorship by the grace of god.
They were concerned with actual behaviour, exemplary behaviour according
to the standards set by Greek prototypes in classical times (e. g. Isocrates'
Evagoras and Xenophon's Agesilaos) and in Hellenistic times (as in the
writings of the neo-Pythagoreans Ekphantos, Diotogenes and Sthenidas and in
the letter by ps.-Aristeas)." The vehemence with which authors such as
Cassius Dio, Herodian and the "Eis Basilea"-orator come down on soldiers,
upstarts and bad emperors should also be seen as a primary and immediate
reaction to the threat to their own property, to their position, only just
attained, high up along the social and political ladder, and to Greek culture of
which they were proud.
Let us begin with the latter. Now that the burdens of the defense system and
the growing bureaucracy became increasingly heavier, the authorities began to
economize on grants, professorial chairs and fiscal privileges for Greek
intellectuals. Moreover, men of the stamp of a sergeant-major who rose to high
positions in the course of the third century considered Greek paideia of no
account, a nice pasttime for a devotee like Hadrian in times of peace; an
emperor now had other matters to keep him occupied.
The "Eis Basilea"-orator states explicitly that a good emperor is graced by
the advancement of Hellenic paideia. In doing so he uses expressions that call
to mind passages in Xenophon's Agesilaos and Isocrates' Evagoras, both
heroic champions of Hellenism, restraining and repulsing barbarisation of
ancient Greek territories.45 Next we come to the association between the
soldiers, tyrannical emperors and the deprivation of the rich, an association
that posed a real threat to many distinguished Greeks. Since the last decades of
the first century A. D., there had been a gradual but unremitting rise in the
cost of living while the soldier's pay had not sufficiently been raised. Hence,

43 Alf6ldy, "Consuls", o.c. 279. Cp. Herod. V. 7,5f.; Cassius Dio 72,35,1f.; 78,11,2;
Plutarchus, Ad princ. inerud. 779 E ff. Some ancient writers had the originally cynic opinion that
Zeus grants the art of governing to rulers, and that the best man is the best ruler as well. See Dio
Chr. or. 1,61; or 4,l5ff. and 27ff.; Philostr., vit. Apoll. V 36. These writers stood in an ancient
tradition. Plato wrote a lot about the education of rulers in his State and in his Laws. Cp. Aristotle,
Pol. VIII 1-7; Isocrates, Nicocl. 4 and lOff.
14 See n. 41. See A. Pelletier, La lettre d'Aristee a Philocrate, Paris 1962; L. Delatte, Les traites
de la royaute d'Ecphante, Diotogeine et Sthenidas (Liege 1942) 123-163.
'5 See SHA vit. Gall. 1,3f.; ps. Aelius Aristides, Eis basilea 20; Xenophon, Ages. 7,4;
Isocrates, Evag. 49f.

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372 LuKAS DE BLOIS

their buying power deteriorated. By the second half of the second century
military service was attractive to the very poor only.' Cassius Dio is familiar
with the situation, for in book 52 he states that soldiers must be recruited from
the energetic poor of all the civitates of the empire; in that way they serve a use
and will not turn into brigands. This is not the only time Cassius Dio mentions
soldiers and brigands in one breath. He criticizes Septimius Severus for
manning the guard in Rome with Pannonians instead of Italians: now the
Italian poor lacked a safety-valve and turned to brigandage. From his own
writings, however, and from other sources we know that Septimius Severus
stationed a new legion in Italy and materially enlarged the urban cohorts: there
was certainly employment for Italian recruits. The increase in brigandange is
more easily expained by the increasing economic and fiscal pressure on the
rural population, as property was increasingly being concentrated.47 Another
enticement to military service, next to pay and spoils, at least for provincials,
was Roman citizenship. As veterans of the auxiliaries they could obtain it after
25 years of service. In the second half of the second century, however, the
difference between honestiores and humiliores grew to be more important than
the difference between citizens and non-citizens. Moreover, in the areas of
recruitment immediately beyond the armies many were already Roman citizen
because an ancestor had served in the Roman army. To retain some of the
enticement, Antonine Pius decided that henceforth only the veterans of the
auxiliaries themselves would obtain citizenship, not their family as well.48
Because the campaigns were onerous and lengthy and the plague took a
heavy toll, from 166 on in particular among soldiers, military service became
more dangerous and unattractive without there being financial compensations
under Marcus.49 Under such circumstances it became difficult to find enough
recruits. In 167/68 Marcus could still recruit two legions in Italy, but when the
Germans appeared in the Po valley in 170 he had to press slaves, gladiators and
village policemen into service.50 There were also many deserters who formed
bands of robbers together with other desperadoes, such as fugitive slaves,
barbarians who had stayed behind, insolvent leaseholders and farmers, and this
at a time when many of the local police were being incorporated in the army.

46 See Th. Pekiry, "Studien zur romischen Wahrungs- und Finanzgeschichte von 161 bis 235
n. Chr." in Historia 8 (1959) 443ff.; A. H. M. Jones, "Inflation under the Roman Empire" in The
Roman Economy (Oxford 1974) 187ff.
47 Cassius Dio 52,27; 75,2,4f. On the augmentation of the army in the Italian peninsula see
Birley, Sept. Sev., o.c. 287. On banditry see R. McMullen, Enemies of the Roman Order
(Cambridge, Mass. 1966) app. B, "Brigandage", 255ff.; A. J. L. van Hooff, "Latrones famosi;
bandieten tussen rovers en rebellen in het Romeinse keizerrijk" in Lampas 15,3 (1982) 171ff. (with
an English summary).
48 See Smith, o.c. 489f.
49 See Birley, Mark Aurel, o.c. 290ff.
50 Birley, Mark Aurel, o.c. 261; 291.

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 The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman Empire 373

Large rural areas where there was something to be had, which means beyond
the areas of wars, were rendered unsafe, and under Commodus and Septimius
Severus regular troops had to be launched against the robbers time and again.51
After 250 the situation became even worse: rebellious farmers, robbers, local
emergency militia, the troops of conflicting pretenders and bands of Germans
were going about just anyhow and were even hard to distinguish the one from
the other at times.52
The difficult wars under Marcus Aurelius brought more problems to light.
Rome had insufficient general reserves behind the lines and it lacked
experienced officers and commanders, a shortage that was made worse by the
high mortality rate in the army as a result of illness and acts of war. As early as
during the reign of emperor Marcus one could discern the rise of a series of
military experts of obscure birth. The aristocracy acquiesced, but only just,
and with much grumbling. It was just the way things went during protracted
wars, so Marcus appointed novices to the senate that they might get used to the
life of a gentleman and the social system remain intact.53
Septimius Severus tried to solve the problems of strategy and make the
service more attractive. As we saw, he strengthened the army in Italy which
was meant to form the reserves. He raised the pay substantially and added
benefits in kind to be provided for by the annona, extra levies in kind. He also
granted them in advance some privileges that used to be given to soldiers only
upon dismissal from the services: a piece of land and permission to wed
according to law. Septimius speeded up the career of a subaltern so that a
soldier might become centurio more quickly, and he gave subalterns and
centuriones a better chance at the career of a knight either in the army or in the
officia. In this way it did become easier to find recruits, but the regional ties of
the troops along the borders were strengthened, forming a source of strife for
the throne, and of struggle between the individual armies.54
Septimius was able to finance these measures by rigorously collecting his
dues, but also by means of confiscations directed against those senators and
other wealthy peoply who had supported his competitors in the struggles for
the throne of 193 and 197, and by means of devaluating the coins.5

51 See n. 47. See Herod. I 10 (Maternus and his bandits); SHA vit. Comm. 16,2; vit. Pescenn.
Nigr. 3,4; AE 1956,90; ILS (Dessau) 429f.; Cassius Dio 77,10; Barbieri, Albo o.c. 38 nr. 143;
Pflaum, Carr. o.c. nr. 196; Devijver, o.c. II, V 23 and 1 136.
52 Gage, o.c. 294-300.
5 Cassius Dio 72,22,1f.; Birley, Sept. Sev.,o.c. 113. On the assimilation of new men in the
senate to the way of life of senatores see e.g. Arnheim, o.c. 31f.
" See Smith, o.c. 492ff.; Remondon, o.c. 74ff.; E. Sander, "Zur Rangordnung des romischen
Heeres; die gradus ex caliga" in Historia 3 (1954/5) 87-105; Clauss, o.c.l18ff.; Birley, Sept. Sec.,
oc. 283ff.
5 See Birley, Sept. Sev., o.c.286; Th. Pekary, o.c. 443ff.; M. Crawford, "Finance, Coinage and
Money from the Severans to Constantine" in ANRWII 2 (1975) 560ff. See Herod. III 8,8f.; 13,4;

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374 LuKAS DE BLOIS

The latter measure did not turn out well after the death of Septimius as a
fatal interaction developed of devaluation and soldiers' rebellions. As a
preventive measure, Caracalla gave the soldiers large gifts of sound metals
apart from their pay, resulting in a further deterioration of the common coins.
Cassius Dio has a nasty remark to make on the matter. The emperor Gallienus
(253-268) did the same to such an extent that the Roman monetary system
collapsed in inflationary confusion.56 This alternate leap frogging of devalua-
tion and financial demands gives us the key to the much-deprecated greed of
the soldiers, a greed that became the more difficult to cope with as the financial
range of the empire was diminished by the depredations of war, the insecurity
and rising costs of local defeiise, and the ever-growing bureaucracy. The
situation had reached the point where emperors who wished to do battle
successfully against the barbarians in their own country, had to engineer a
financial tour de force against the rich. According to Crawford, private means
were, in fact, transferred from rich landowners, which included the large
leaseholders of imperial property, to the military during the reigns of Caracalla
and Maximinus.5' The imperial domains in particular seem to have been under
heavy pressure. The rebellion of 238 against Maximinus was started by the
main conductores of the African domains, swiftly spreading to other landown-
ers, and it was taken over by the senate.58 Thus we have one of the key causes
of the notables' hatred of these two emperors; at the same time we see the
effects when stronger, more aggressive enemies coincided with a deteriorating
taxation field. It is also more readily understandable why several authors at
that time preferred a strategy of restraint and cunning prudence, andreja
coupled with euboulia.59

15,3; Cassius Dio 75,8,4f. On the depreciation of the coinage already during the reign of Marcus
Aurelius see Birley, Mark Aurel, o.c. 293.
56 Cassius Dio 78,14,3f. See Crawford, o.c. 563ff.; Pekary, o.c. See J.-P. Callu, La politique
monttaire des empereurs romains de 238a 311 (Paris 1969) 197ff.; 248; 432; 477f.; L. de Blois, The
Policy of The Emperor Gallienus (Leiden 1976) 87 ff.; W. Kuhoff, Herrschertum undReichskrise;
die Regierungszeit der romischen Kaiser Valerianus und Gallienus, Bochum 1979 (Kleine Hefte der
Munzsammlung an der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum 4/5).
57 Crawford, O.c. 568.
58 F. Kolb, "Der Aufstand der Provinz Africa Proconsularis im J. 238 n. Chr." in Historia 26
(1977) 476ff.; cp. G. Alfoldy, in Gnomon 54 (1982) 478ff. against K. Dietz, Senatus contra
principem o.c., 300ff. Dietz seems to think that Maximinus' harsh treatment of the consilium of
Alexander Severus, was the seedbed of the revolt of 238, but not on good grounds, as Alfoldy
points out.

59 Cp. ps. Aelius Aristides, Eis Basilea 32ff.; Dexippus, FGrHist. IIA 100,26,4; 7f.; 2
33 b-d; Both authors wrote their works in the middle of the third century A.D. In a for
article I hope to prove that Eis basilea was not written by Aelius Aristides, but by s
rhetor who lived in the m-iddle of the third century A.D., against C. P. Jones, "Aelius
Eis basilea" in JRS62 (1972) 134 ff. and S. A. Stertz, "Pseudo-Aristides, Eis basilea" in

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 The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman Empire 375

The increase in costs, requisitions and confiscations did not threaten the
possessions only of the senators, but also the social system with which they
were familiar. As for Greek senators, this was the very system in which they
had just reached the top and with which they began to identify.
As we saw, the emperor Marcus was forced to allow a variety of vin
militares of obscure birth to make a career, while Septimius Severus stimulated
the social mobility of subalterns and centuniones. These facts have often been
pointed out and in antiquity it was said that the senators had themselves to
blame for this competition. Their training was insufficient for them to
command army units and organize the provisions under tricky conditions of
war. That was a job for old campaigners and experts in communications.60
However, the intrinsic changes in the business of the officia that became
apparent in the second century and the first part of the third have rarely been
pointed out. Because of the war situation and the measures taken by Septimius
Severus, the administration at all levels was intensified. The total of the tax
levies had to be realized now, order had to be restored to devastated and unsafe
districts, the provisioning of the army entailed requisitions in impoverished
areas. All this came on top of a long since continuing shift of activities from the
local self-government to the provincial and central authorities. This develop-
ment which took place especially in the administration of fiscal and criminal
justice, as sketched above, resulted in a marked increase in the number of
procurators, and in the expansion of the officia with their clerks and their civil
and military specialists. Septimius Severus did not yet wish to yield to extreme
officialism in the administration and tried to find a solution in tightening the
meshes of self-governing communities. Wherever there were no municipia and
poleis with their curiales, they were now introduced, if need be with cura/es
whose possessions and life-style did not make them worthy of the title.61
It failed to solve the problem. The load of specialist work continued to grow
for the provincial governors and their assistants, and they went on taking over
more activities from the curiales as these enjoyed less corporate prestige,
money and know-how due to the departure of their superior and more
distinguished colleagues to the imperial elite. Actually, governors now had to
be fiscal and military experts and no longer all-round gentlemen of good social
standing. In fact, the kind of administrator was found not in the senate, but
from among the knights who had served for many years in the field and had

29 (1979), 172 ff. Cp. L. J. Swift, "The Anonymous Encomium of Philip the Arab" in GRBS 7
(1966) 267 ff.
60 See Cassius Dio 76,8,1ff.; 52,26; Aurelius Victor, Caes. 37,5f. Cp. Syme, o.c. 179 and 181; L.
de Blois, "The Reign of the Emperor Philip the Arabian" in Talanta X-XI (1978/9) 24ff.
61 See the works of McMullen, Millar, Pflaum and Stahl quoted in nn. 5,14 and 15. See Gage,
o.c. 279. On the officia see A. H. M. Jones, "The Roman Civil Service" in Studies in Roman
Government and Law (Oxford 1968) 153 ff.

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 376 LUKAS DE BLOIS

subsequently made a career as procurator. In the course of the third century

knights such as these were increasingly given senatorial tasks and positions.
This might happen by appointing a knight as vice-governor in a province
which formed the hinterland of an important military expedition.62 From the
end of the second century on, there was a growing number of specialists
among the knights who were suited to such positions. Starting low on the
social ladder, their very specific expertise had helped them penetrate into the
upper levels of administration. In the first half of the third century the number
still included quite a few North Africans and Greeks who had been schooled in
rhetoric and the administration of justice. After 250, there was a full
complement of unlettered and none too rich officers and subalterns from the
northern borderline provinces who had been trained in military matters only.63
These new knights could not fittingly be incorporated in the senatorial class;
they arrogated the positions of the senators without joining their ordo or
adapting to their life-style.
Former barriers between the honorary offices of the prominents and salaried
posts of lower officials of necessity became blurred. As far as the senators were
concerned, this was tantamount to a political and cultural revolution.64 A new
system of administration became discernable hand in hand with a more
differentiated social system that offered greater social mobility and a more
varied set of status symbols. Already the reign of Marcus Aurelius offered new
ranks and titles in accordance with this greater differentiation; procurators also
began to mention their salary level, which points to a detailed bureaucracy
with a fixed pattern of promotion rather than to the unsalaried gentlemen's
elite.65
Distinguished Greeks certainly had good grounds for feeling threatened.
Their cultural ideals were dismissed as just so much daydreaming by the rising
soldiers, their possessions were impaired by confiscations and requisitions, the
system within which they had acquired important posts began to change under
the stress of circumstances in favour of soldiers and officials of obscure birth.
All of this was happening at the very time when the Greek elite had begun to
identify with the empire, feeling inferior in no respect, not even in military

62 Such equestrian careers are mentioned by Pflaum, Carr., o.c. II-III, 811ff.; Clauss, o.c.
17-117; Devijver, OC. On the "vicariat independant" see Pflaum, Abrege, o.c. 38f., Cp. Birley,
Sept. Sev., o.c. 221, 252; Id., Mark Aurel, o.c. 321. Devijver, O.c. I, A 27, p. 104 concerns a knight
who is boasting he has been the first eques Romanus to hold a census (in the three Gauls, at the end
of the second cent. A.D.).
63 See Pflaum, Abrege o.c. 45ff.; Birley Sept. Sev., o.c. 327ff.; De Blois, Gallienus, o.c. 55ff.
64 On the wealth, culture and origin of the new knights from the border regions in the North
see G. Alfoldy. "Equites romani", o.c., esp. 13-15.
65 See Birley, Mark Aurel, o.c. 252.

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 The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman Empire 377

matters, thanks to their own advantageous positions and to outside threats

from along the borders. Greek emergency militia proved a good match for
foreign invaders, and at times even against the troops of pretenders to the
throne, as they fought on city walls and in ambush. Well then, why make place
for uneducated and impoverished upstarts from frontier armies ?66 See here the
raw materials for the sharp and committed reaction that is to be found in the
contemporary Greek writers. They inveighed against the more obvious and
spectacular threats such as posed by bad emperors, soldiers and upstarts; these
fitted in well in the traditional frame of references consisting of platitudes on
kings and tyrants. Such platitudes were associated with the long since generally
accepted exaggeration of the effects of the behaviour and deeds of the
sovereign.
The Greek authors were well aware of the facts and passed them on, but
they interpreted them in the light of old commonplaces which they superim-
posed as a matrix. Hence, they remained blind to structural and contiguous
shifts of moment against which moralizing and conservative reforms within
the existing social patterns were powerless. This is clearly shown by the tragic
failures of emperors after the end of the second century who applied the
remedies proffered by the Greek authors.6' The unceasing wars against strong
enemies simply made the empire dependent on military and organizational
experts, leading inevitably to better working conditions for the soldiers. A
universal empire at war cannot do without dependable recruits. The deteriora-
tion of the local administration and the stepping up of the levy of taxes
increased both the importance and the number of the lower and middle class
officials in the officia in Rome and the provinces and resulted in more
specialized work in the upper levels of administration. A different kind of
administrators from the army camps and the growing officia stood waiting.
Actually, this caused the highest social levels in the empire to fall apart. Apart
from the old social classes, an official military administration apparatus
appeared with its own political culture.

Catholic University, Nijmegen, Nederland Lukas de Blois

6 See Dexippus, FGrHist. IIA 100 fr. 26 and 28; Herod. III 1; Cassius Dio 75,6ff. Cp. SHA
vit. Gall. 4,2; 13,6; Syncellus 716-717 (CSHB); Zonaras XII 21. Cf. Gage, o.c. 294ff.
67 See Zosimus I 21,1; De Blois, "Philip the Arabian", o.C. 31f.; 34; 39ff.

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