NOTES
constituencies. In the second section, we
Low Levels of Electoral
Participation in Metropolitan Cities
Sanjay Kumar, Souradeep Banerjee
In successive elections, electoral
participation in India’s big,
metropolitan cities has been
lower vis-à-vis semi-urban
and rural constituencies. In
the absence of any empirical
evidence, this phenomenon is
often attributed by the media and
political commentators to
middle-class apathy and their
disdain towards electoral politics.
This article contests the popular
claim and argues that in big
cities, it is not the middle class but
the urban poor who are unable to
exercise their franchise.
Sanjay Kumar (sanjay@csds.in) is director
at the Centre for the Study of Developing
Societies, New Delhi and Souradeep Banerjee
(banerjeeakash33@gmail.com) is a researcher
with the Lokniti Programme at CSDS.
82
E
lectoral participation in India’s
big, metropolitan cities has been
observed to be comparatively lower
than that in semi-urban and rural areas.
Empirically measured in terms of voter
turnout, the percentage of voters who
participate in elections in cities like Delhi,
Mumbai, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, etc, has
been found to be way lower than the
average turnout of their respective states.
This phenomenon has puzzled the Elec-
tion Commission and social scientists
alike, especially since backward and rural
areas have reported relatively higher
electoral participation (Banerjee 2014).
The media and political commentators
often attribute this to middle-class apathy
and lack of political engagement among
India’s urban, educated voters. Is it really
so? In the absence of any empirical evi-
dence, it is difficult to explain why there
are lower levels of electoral participa-
tion in metropolitan cities and, thus,
opinion is accepted as fact.
However, empirical data gathered as a
part of our National Election Studies
(NES) indicate that metropolitan cities
have lower voter turnouts not because
the so-called middle classes do not par-
ticipate in the national elections but,
rather, because the urban poor residing
in these big cities do not exercise their
franchise in larger numbers. Further,
using data from the State Election Study
(SES) of Delhi, one of the largest urban
agglomerations in the country, we can
argue that a large share of these urban
poor are internal migrants who do not
form a part of India’s democratic upsurge
due to low enrolment rates and, hence,
are the reason behind the low urban
turnout rate. We present our argument
in this article through the following sec-
tions: In the first section, we attempt to
highlight the extent of the problem—
low voter turnouts—in India’s urban
NOVEMBER 11, 2017
address the common belief that the low
voter turnouts in cities are due to middle-
class apathy and provide our explanation
for the same. The third section takes this
argument forward and examins the po-
litical exclusion of internal migrants due
to low enrolment rates and low electoral
participation.
We wish to add a caveat here. Due to
lack of evidence from other big cities,
our claims are based on a systematic
study conducted in Delhi. However, the
study will soon be extended to five other
metropolitan cities of India.
Voter Turnout in
Metropolitan Cities
The success of Indian democracy is
largely attributed to the country’s elec-
toral vibrancy. Considered an exception
to democratic theory, India, unlike many
full-fledged democracies, is said to wit-
ness high electoral participation without
preconditions such as a certain level of
income, education, social class, or ethnic
cohesion (Varshney 2013). This demo-
cratic success is reflected in the average
voter turnout for the 15 Lok Sabha elec-
tions held till now, which has been around
60% (Figure 1, p 83), and the average
turnout for the numerous state assembly
elections, which has been much higher
at 65%. Despite this success, it still remains
a cause for concern that on average, 40%
of Indians do not exercise their franchise
in both the national and state elections
(Kumar 2009).
Looking at the aggregate data, it is
possible to infer that though voter turn-
out did increase after the 1960s, there has
been no substantial decline or increase.
However, when the data is disaggregated
by locality, an interesting pattern emerges.
Initially, India, like other Western demo-
cracies, exhibited a positive relationship
between the level of urbanisation and
electoral turnout (Monroe 1977). From
1952 till the 1980s, the urban voter turn-
out was higher than the rural voter turn-
out, but, from 1984, the rural turnout
picked up and surpassed the urban turn-
out as part of a larger change that has
been described as the “second democratic
vol lII no 45 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 NOTES

Figure 1: Electoral Turnout in India’s Lok Sabha Elections (1952–2014) on an average, it is hope of accessing material goods in ex-
61 60
64
62 62 60 58
66 14–15 percentage change for payment of taxes or perform-
57 58 58 points lower than ing civic duties (Ahuja and Chibber 2012).
55 55 56
46 48 the state’s aggregate Others have also contested the idea of
voter turnout. middle-class apathy and have empha-
This is a cause for sised the need to look beyond caste or
concern as India’s class behaviours. But none of them pro-
urban population vide any new arguments (Aiyer 2009).
1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1985 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014
has increased from What does our evidence say?
Source: CSDS Data Unit.
28.6% (2001 Cen-
upsurge” (Yadav 2000). Since then, the sus) to 37.7% (2011 Census) over the Is It Really the Middle Class?
rural turnout has been consistently past decade, and due to the accelerating Based on our data collected as a part of
higher than the urban turnout, despite pace of urbanisation, India’s urban pop- the NES on the 2009 and the 2014 Lok
the saturation of the second democratic ulation is projected to be 60% by 2050 Sabha elections, we argue that the as-
upsurge (Palshikar and Kumar 2004; (Ministry of Urban Development, Govern- sumption of middle-class apathy is basi-
Kumar 2009); this trend has continued ment of India). Thus, in the context of cally fallacious. Evidence shows that
till the last general election, which wit- growing urbanisation, the low voter contrary to popular claims, there is a
nessed the highest ever electoral turn- turnouts in India’s big cities remain a positive relationship between electoral
out of 66.4% (IndiaSpend 2014). Inter- point of bafflement for policymakers and participation and economic class. Voter
estingly, even within urban areas, there the Election Commission. turnout levels among the middle class
is a wide gap in turnout levels between During the past two or three general and the richer sections residing in big
small towns/cities and big cities, with elections, the media has been flooded cities are much higher than among the
voters in small towns/cities participat- with commentaries on how the low voter economically lower and poorer sections.
ing more than voters in India’s big, met- turnouts in big cities are the result of the In fact, the voter turnout among the eco-
ropolitan cities (Table 1). However, re- negligence of India’s well-off, educated nomically lower and poorer sections is
cently, Chandra and Potter (2016) have middle-class voters. The political en- lower than the average turnout in big
questioned the empirical basis of such a gagement of the middle classes in big cities (Table 3).
claim and have argued that this cities is presumed to have declined with Table 3: Class-wise Electoral Participation
hypothesis extends only to voters resi- changing political and economic changes in India’s Big Cities
Economic Class 2009 Lok Sabha 2014 Lok Sabha
ding in big, metropolitan cities, and in India’s big cities: the eclipse of work- Elections (%) Elections (%)
that the electoral participation of voters ing class movements which once charac- Poor 43.7 50.4
from semi-urban constituencies is as terised India’s industrial cities and the Lower class 50.4 55.9
high as that of voters from India’s rural rise of finance capital (Mukherji 2014). Middle class 52.1 57.4
constituencies. Other reports argue that for the middle Rich 57.1 69.2
Table 1: Voter Turnout by Locality (%) class, the main cause of disengagement Average turnout 48.9 57.3
Locality 2009 Lok 2014 Lok with politics is that unlike the economi- Source: NES (2009, 2014).
Sabha Sabha
Election Election
cally lower classes and the poor, the Popular and scholarly accounts often
Rural constituencies 59.1 69.4 middle class tends to be a beneficiary of emphasise the disdain of the middle
Small cities/towns (semi-urban) 52.5 62.5 the state system by payment of taxes and class for electoral politics and their in-
Metros (urban) 48.9 57.3 does not have to face the consequences creasing participation in associational
Source: NES 2009 and 2014 (post-poll). of the dysfunctional nature of the state activities as an exertion of their citizen-
Table 2 shows that electoral participa- in India (Parth 2014; Nanda 2014). This ship rights (Fernandes 2006). Even the
tion has been substantially lower across line of reasoning can be traced to the recent association of the middle class with
the big, metropolitan cities of India, in difference in the relationships between the Anna Hazare–led Anti-Corruption
successive rounds of Lok Sabha elections; the entity called the “state” and the poor Movement or the Nirbhaya protests have
Table 2: Voter Turnout in India’s and non-poor citizenry and, consequent- highlighted the positioning of social
Metropolitan Cities ly, the different motivations for voting movement–based activism among the
Cities 2009 Lok Sabha 2014 Lok Sabha
Election (%) Election (%) that exist between these two economic middle classes in opposition to electoral
Mumbai 41.2 53.0 categories. The state largely remains in- politics (Sitapati 2011). Electoral politics
Maharashtra 50.7 60.4 accessible and is known to misgovern and in urban spaces is often relegated to the
Chennai 62.0 61.1 ignore the poorer masses. Thus, on the one domain of the poor for whom political
Tamil Nadu 73.9 73.7 hand, democracy in the form of electoral expression through electoral means is a
Bengaluru 56.0 48.0
engagement is a source of empowerment way of accessing patronage benefits
Karnataka 67.17 58.8
Hyderabad 53.0 52.7
for the urban poor and lower economic (Chatterjee 2004). However, our evidence
Andhra Pradesh 74.47 72.6 classes, and on the other hand, for the compels us to rethink such arguments
Source: Election Commission of India. middle class, it is a quid pro quo in the and argue on the contrary.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW NOVEMBER 11, 2017 vol lII no 45 83
NOTES
There is no reason to believe that the
middle class has become disengaged
from electoral politics. The middle class,
as a socio-economic category, has wit-
nessed substantial expansion with the
onset of liberalisation and privatisation,
breaking the dichotomy of a small elite
and the impoverished masses (Srid-
haran 2004; Jodhka and Prakash 2011).
Given urbanisation trends, according to
the National Council of Applied Eco-
nomic Research (NCAER report), the size
of the Indian middle class has swelled to
267 million individuals currently, and it
is projected to increase to 547 million by
2025–26. In addition to its size, the middle
class has a strong opinion-shaping voice,
adding to its political salience in elector-
al politics (Sridharan 2014). Therefore, in
urban politics, the middle class in India’s
big cities is said to be gradually replacing
slum residents as voters who can be mobi-
lised for electoral purposes. This increased
engagement with electoral politics has
become a platform for the middle class
to demand the effective delivery of pub-
lic goods and services such as better
roads, cleaner water, etc, by the local
state, which is otherwise characterised
as dysfunctional (Chakrabarti 2016).
This political expression of the middle
class has also become electorally salient
due to an increasing intersection of as-
sociational structures and formal poli-
tics. Recent literature points to numer-
ous examples where local resident wel-
fare associations (RWAs) contested in
municipal elections—or backed specific
candidates or organisations—to mobi-
lise voters at the local level and to
enhance the local electoral turnout
(Chakrabarti 2016; Helene 2007).
Having dispelled the myth that middle-
class apathy is the cause of the low voter
turnout in India’s big cities, we return to
our problem. Our surveys (Table 4) have
highlighted that it is the economically
lower and poorer sections whose partici-
pation is substantially lower. This leads us
to investigate the incidence of low elec-
toral participation among the urban poor.
A Study of Delhi
Middle-class apathy does not seem to be
a plausible explanation for low electoral
participation in India’s big metropolitan
84
cities. The previous section has clearly drawn from the Lokniti–CSDS Delhi
shown that the true reason is tied to the State Assembly Election Studies (SES) and
urban poor—the lower economic class CSDS–Delhi Election Commission Study.
and the poor residing in cities—whose The rationale behind selecting Delhi is
electoral participation is considerably that the urban agglomeration of Delhi,
lesser than that of the rich and the middle including the National Capital Region
class. But one wonders who these urban (NCR), has had one of the highest positive
poor are and why their electoral partici- net migration rate1 (242) (Chandrasekhar
pation is lower than that of others? and Sharma 2014); and Delhi, histori-
Evidence from our surveys in Delhi cally, does not have a native popula-
indicates that the urban poor are essen- tion—no group or community which
tially internal migrants. Though migrants can claim to be the “sons of the soil”—
in India’s cities may come from different and it is largely constituted of people
economic classes, in big cities, internal who came in from other parts of the
migrants are more likely to be poor than country and settled there at different
non-migrants (Kundu and Sarangi 2007). periods of time (Weiner 1978).
We find that a large share of the urban What is the level of electoral partici-
poor in Delhi are migrants who migrated pation among these internal migrants?
to the city in the last 5–10 years or in the Evidence from Delhi shows that the voter
last 10 years (Table 4). Even among turnout among recent migrants (1–5 years
slum-dwellers (a large part of the urban and 6–10 years) is considerably lower than
poor reside in slum settlements), a large that of migrants who have been in the
number among them are migrants (IIPS city for longer (11–20 years or 20 years
2009). There is a historic relationship and above) and those who have been liv-
between urbanisation and migration. ing in Delhi since their birth (Table 5).
Big cities have always been dynamos of Further, it is possible to observe a similar
economic growth and attract domestic pattern among migrants hailing from
migrants from smaller cities/towns or Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, two states which
rural areas, who seek a better livelihood. account for the maximum number of
In India, 35.4% of residents in urban migrants in Delhi—45.16% and 19.9%,
areas have been classified as internal respectively (TISS Election Commission
migrants by last place of residence (NSSO Report 2015) (Table 6). Known popularly
2007–08). Within urban migration, rural– as Poorvanchali voters, migrants from
urban migration far exceeds urban– these two states are said to constitute a
urban migration and is the real contrib- Table 5: Electoral Participation of Migrants
utor to urban population growth (Bha- in Delhi (%)
gat 2015). Apart from relatively longer Number of Years Living Turnout in 2013 Turnout in 2015
in Delhi Assembly Election Assembly Election
periods of migration, urban areas also (%) (%)
witness shorter migration periods such 1–5 years 44 62
as seasonal and temporary migration or 6–10 years 52 64
commuting migration, which are not 11–20 years 67 64
easily accounted for in large-scale sur- More than 20 years 73 64
veys (Chandrasekhar and Sharma 2014; Since birth 66 71
Overall 66 67
Bhagat 2015).
Source: State Assembly Election Study (Delhi), 2013 and 2015.
Table 4: Migrants Constitute a Large Share of the Table 6: Migrants from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh
Urban Poor in Delhi (%) in Delhi (%)
Living in Delhi Rich Middle Urban Poor Numbers of Years Living in Delhi Voter Turnout
(No of Years) in 2015
1–5 years 29.4 23.5 47.1 Assembly Election
6–10 years 27.8 20.0 52.2 Recent migrants from Bihar
(1–10 years) 61
Source: State Assembly Election Study, Delhi (2015).
Older migrants from Bihar
We further argue that India’s big, met- (more than 10 years) 68
ropolitan cities witness low electoral Recent migrants from Uttar Pradesh
(1–10 years) 65
participation due to internal migrants’
Older migrants from Uttar Pradesh
low voter turnouts and low enrolment (more than 10 years) 67
rates. The evidence in support of this is Source: State Assembly Election Study, 2015.
NOVEMBER 11, 2017 vol lII no 45 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

“vote bloc” for political parties in Delhi.
Therefore, we can infer that the formal
political participation of domestic mi-
grants is lower than that of others, and
this is more marked among recent and
short-term migrants who are likely to
face greater political exclusion.
It is now clear that migrants, especially
short-term or so-called recent migrants,
are unable to exercise their franchise.
The possible reason as to why this happens
can be attributed to two factors: low
enrolment rates among internal migrants
and the nature of the occupational
engagement of short-term migrants.
Migrants who face social and insti-
tutional forms of exclusion due to non-
possession of identity-based documents
such as PAN cards, ration cards, bank
accounts, and Aadhar cards also face
similar problems while exercising their
franchise (Sahoo 2016). Denied their
citizenship rights, migrants are subject to
a double discrimination—a lower enrol-
ment rate and, among those who are
enrolled, a lower level of electoral partici-
pation. Evidence shows that the rate of
enrolment (registration as a voter in a
particular constituency) among this group
is substantially lower than the average
rate of enrolment and, similarly, posses-
sion of voter identity cards is also much
more limited among migrants compared
to the total citizenry (Table 7).
Table 7: Lower Enrolment among Migrants
in Delhi (%)
Registration and Possession Overall Recent Migrants
of Voter ID Cards Who Migrated in
the Past Five Years
(2003–08)
Enrolled as a voter 86 64
Has voter identity card 85 65
Source: CSDS—Delhi Election Commission Study, 2013.
This form of political exclusion gets
pronounced among migrants from vul-
nerable communities, who are also
subjected to various forms of spatial and
socio-economic discrimination in India’s
Table 8: Lower Enrolment among Muslim
Migrants vis-à-vis Other Muslims
Category of Voters Enrolled as a Voter (%)
Overall 86
All Muslims 80
Muslim poor 74
Muslim women 78
Muslim migrants who migrated
to Delhi (2003–08) 50
Source: CSDS–Delhi Election Commission Study, 2013.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW NOVEMBER 11, 2017
big cities (Sahoo 2016). Thus, even among
Muslims who are subject to lesser political
engagement, it is Muslim migrants who
are found to face greater political exclu-
sion than other vulnerable categories
such as Muslim women or economically
poorer Muslims (Table 8).
The second reason is the informal
nature of the work that migrants are
usually engaged in. Internal migrants,
especially short-term migrants, are en-
gaged in the informal sector as construc-
tion workers, domestic servants, and
security personnel; these jobs tend to be
seasonal and temporary in nature (Bhagat
2015). Despite the Election Commission’s
diktat that voting day be declared a public
holiday, the nature of work prevents many
from taking leave. It is difficult for a
migrant labour to forego a day’s earnings
and exercise their political right. Thus, a
process of disenfranchisement begins,
owing to the nature of their occupational
engagement (Bhagat 2015).
Lastly, the high mobility of short-term
migrants within cities owing to the nature
of their occupation and their economic
status can lead to inaccurate voter lists;
this is also a reason for why many mig-
rant voters fail to cast their vote even if
they are enrolled as voters. Studies con-
ducted in Delhi and other cities also con-
firm such inaccuracies in the voter list
(Janaagraha 2015).
Conclusions
Through this article, we have attempted
to understand why India’s big, metro-
politan cities witness low levels of electoral
participation in comparison to rural areas
and even smaller cities and towns. The
myth of middle-class apathy and disdain
for politics, perpetuated by the media
and political commentators, does not hold
much ground, as empirical evidence
EPW Index
An author-title index for EPW has been prepared for the years from 1968 to 2012. The PDFs of
the Index have been uploaded, year-wise, on the EPW website. Visitors can download the Index
for all the years from the site. (The Index for a few years is yet to be prepared and will be uploaded
when ready.)
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Tata Trust.
vol lII no 45
NOTES
points to the contrary. Despite the so-
called second democratic upsurge, elec-
toral participation among the poorer
economic classes is lower than that
among the rich and the middle class.
Based on our case study of Delhi, one
of the largest urban agglomerations in
India, we were also able to identify that
voter turnout is particularly low among
the urban poor who are domestic mig-
rants and who often migrate from either
rural areas or other urban areas to big
cities in search of a better livelihood.
Evidence from Delhi seems to suggest
that this problem is more pronounced in
the case of short-term migrants or people
who have migrated to the city in recent
times. Beset by a lack of identity due to
non-possession of requisite documents
and the informal nature of their work,
they are unable to exercise their fran-
chise. Therefore, big cities witness low
electoral participation among the urban
poor, not just due to low levels of elec-
toral turnout but low enrolment rates
as well. Measures such as the Election
Commission’s focused registration drives
in migrant-dominated areas, regularly
updating electoral rolls, setting up spe-
cial electoral booths for migrant voters,
and a better identification system for mi-
grants would serve as policy prescrip-
tion to address the problem. However,
the larger political issue related to the
“domicile status” of migrant voters (a
prerequisite for someone to get registered
as voter in a particular area), which is
often a source of conflict among the
“natives” and “migrants,” remains unad-
dressed. However, amidst the celebra-
tion of India’s electoral democracy, we
must contemplate and find ways and
means to include sections of the popula-
tion that are excluded from the formal
political process.
85
NOTES
Note
1 Net migration rate is the difference between
out-migration and in-migration. For further
details, refer to NSSO Reports.
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vol lII no 45 EPW Economic & Political Weekly