PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

NOCUM
G.R. No. 179041 April 1, 2013

DECISION
This is an appeal from the January 31, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00930, which dismissed the appeal of appellant Reynaldo Mallari (Mallari) and affirmed with modification the
December 15, 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276, Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No.
00-551 finding Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with homicide.
Factual Antecedents
On May 25, 2000, an Information3 was filed charging Mallari and co-accused Arne! Nocum (Nocum ), Rey Johnny
Ramos (Ramos), Carlos Jun Posadas (Posadas) and Pandao Poling Pangandag alias Rex Pangandag
(Pangandag) with violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as
amended by RA 7659.4 The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about September 12, 1998 in Muntinlupa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain for
themselves and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and
carry away one motor vehicle more particularly described as follows:

Make/Type : - Toyota Tamaraw FX

Motor No. : - 7K-0157101

Chassis No. : - KF52-011609

Plate No. : - PXT- 143

Color : - Med. Grey Net

valued at more or less Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of its owner,
Lourdes Eleccion, in the aforestated amount and in the course of the commission thereof, Erico Medel, the driver of
the said vehicle, was killed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
When the case was called for arraignment on November 10, 2000, only Mallari appeared as his co-accused remain
at-large. He pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.6 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Prosecution's Version
The prosecution’s lone witness was Chris Mahilac (Mahilac), a self-confessed member of "FX gang," a syndicate
notorious for carjacking Toyota FX vehicles. The modus operandi of the gang is to carnap Toyota FX vehicles,
transport them to Mindanao, and have them registered and sold to prospective buyers there. Together with Mallari
and several others, Mahilac was previously charged with carnapping7 before the RTC of Parañaque City but was
later on discharged to be a state witness.8 Consequently, Mahilac was placed under the Witness Protection
Program of the Department of Justice (DOJ).9
Mahilac testified that the "FX gang" was active in Metro Manila and Mindanao. 10 Nocum led the syndicate’s criminal
activities in Metro Manila while Pangandag, who was the head of the Land Transportation Office in Lanao Del
Norte,11 led the Mindanao operations.12 Ramos, Posadas and Mallari were members of the gang.13
On September 6, 1998, while in Calamba, Laguna, Mahilac received a call from Nocum 14 informing him of
Pangandag’s arrival in Manila on September 12, 1998. 15 Subsequently, Mahilac, Nocum, Pangandag, Ramos,
Posadas and Mallari met in Chowking fastfood restaurant in Poblacion, Muntinlupa City.16 During the said meeting,
Pangandag demanded that their group deliver two Toyota FX vehicles to him in Lanao Del Norte by Monday or
Tuesday of the following week.17 Nocum agreed and gave Mallari ₱20,000.00 for operating expenses. Mahilac
received ₱3,500.00 and was instructed to meet the group in Cagayan de Oro City.18
As the group was departing from the restaurant, a Toyota FX taxi with plate number PXT-143 passed-by.19 Mallari
flagged it down, talked to the driver, and boarded the same together with Ramos and Posadas. 20 They proceeded
south.21
On September 14, 1998, Mahilac arrived in Cagayan de Oro City and proceeded to McDonald’s Restaurant on
Limketkai Street.22 Mallari, Ramos and Posadas arrived at around 4:14 p.m. on board the same Toyota FX taxi that
Mallari flagged down in Muntinlupa City.23 They agreed to proceed to Iligan City en route to Tubod, Lanao del
Norte, where said vehicle was to be delivered to Pangandag.24 Medel (Medel), who was stabbed to death while
resisting the group.Mallari told Mahilac not to board the said vehicle because its back portion reeked of the dried
blood of the FX taxi driver, Erico25 Mallari also informed Mahilac that Medel’s corpse was dumped somewhere in
Atimonan, Quezon.26 Mahilac thus took a taxi to Iligan City.27
Upon their arrival in Iligan City, Pangandag instructed them to take the vehicle to his residence in Tubod, Lanao del
Norte.28 They arrived at Pangandag’s residence and were given ₱250,000.00 as consideration for the
vehicle.29Mahilac received ₱20,000.00 as his share.
The gang continued to engage in this nefarious activity until Mahilac’s arrest by law enforcement officers. 30
In the meantime, on September 27, 1999, a cadaver in advance state of decomposition was found along Zigzag
Road, Barangay Malinao Ilaya, Atimonan, Quezon. It was interred in the municipal cemetery of Atimonan, Quezon
but was later on exhumed for identification.31 Based on the four extracted teeth and a piece of white "FILA"
shoe,32the mother and the wife of the victim positively identified the cadaver to be that of Medel.
Appellant's Version
Mallari denied any knowledge of the carnapping incident.33 He also denied knowing Nocum, Ramos and
Posadas.34 He testified that he was with his wife and two children in their home in Tunasan, Muntinlupa City at the
time the alleged carnapping occurred.35 He claimed that on June 25, 1999, four men in civilian clothes came to his
house and forced him to board a van36 where he was blindfolded. He was then taken to Camp Crame, Quezon
City.37
According to Mallari, Mahilac was his employer.38 He was unaware of Mahilac’s reason for implicating him in the
case.39
Mallari further testified that while in detention, he was made to sign a document which he cannot remember.40 He
was taken to the DOJ and told that his case would be studied if he signs a document the contents of which were
duly explained to him.41 Should he not sign the same, he will be charged immediately with carnapping with
homicide.42 He therefore decided to sign the documents without the assistance of a lawyer, but continued to be
detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City.43
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On December 15, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision44 finding Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
carnapping with homicide. The trial court ruled that the testimony of Mahilac that Mallari participated in the theft of
the FX taxi and the killing of its driver, Medel, cannot be negated by Mallari’s denial and uncorroborated alibi. It also
found that the commission of the crime was a result of a planned operation with Mallari and all the accused doing
their assigned tasks to ensure the consummation of their common criminal objective. 45
The trial court further held that Mahilac would not have known about the killing of Medel if he had not been informed
by Mallari. He had no reason to falsely accuse Mallari and even implicated himself by: (1) admitting his presence
during the planned theft of the FX taxi; (2) admitting his presence in Cagayan De Oro City together with Mallari; (3)
directing Mallari and his co-accused to proceed with him to Pangandag in Lanao Del Norte; and (4) receiving the
sum of ₱20,000.00 as his share in the criminal operation.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, Accused Reynaldo Mallari is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE and is hereby sentenced to die by lethal injection.
The Jail Warden of Muntinlupa City is hereby directed to bring Reynaldo Mallari to the New Bilibid Prison where he
may serve his sentence.
It Is SO ORDERED.46
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision47 affirming with modification the ruling of the trial court. The
appellate court held that Mahilac’s positive identification of Mallari as a member of the "FX gang" and his
participation in the theft of the FX taxi and killing of its driver, Medel, sufficiently established his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The discovery of the remains of Medel in the vicinity mentioned by Mallari
to Mahilac also gave credence to the latter’s testimony.
The CA further held that the trial court’s determination on the credibility of Mahilac must be given great respect and,
as a rule, will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of cogent reason. The CA also found no ill-motive on the
part of Mahilac to testify falsely against Mallari.
According to the CA, the fact that the prosecution presented Mahilac as its sole witness is of no moment. His
positive and credible testimony is sufficient to convict Mallari,48 whose defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail
over the straightforward testimony of the former.49
However, the CA modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 9346 50 which prohibited the
imposition of the death penalty.51
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed December 15, 2003 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, in Criminal Case No. 00-551, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346, which did away with the imposition of death penalty.
SO ORDERED.52
Mallari filed a Notice of Appeal.53 On October 15, 2007,54 we accepted the appeal and notified the parties to file
their supplemental briefs. However, Mallari opted not to file a supplemental brief in the absence of new issues to be
raised. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is likewise adopting the Appellee’s Brief it
filed with the CA as its Supplemental Brief.55
The Assignment of Errors
The errors assigned in the Appellant’s Brief are as follows:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE LACK OF
MATERIAL EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY HIS CONVICTION; and
II. GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT COMMITTED THE CRIME
CHARGED, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH DESPITE THE LACK OF EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE MERE ALLEGATION BY THE LONE
PROSECUTION WITNESS CHRIS MAHILAC THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT PARTICIPATED IN
THE KILLING OF ERIC MEDEL.56
Mallari assails the credibility of Mahilac. He contends that as a state witness under the Witness Protection Program
of the DOJ, Mahilac would implicate just any person as his cohort to justify his inclusion in the program. 57 Mallari
also argues that the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.58
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict
Mallari.59Finally, the prosecution sought civil indemnity and moral damages of ₱50,000.00 each. 60
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Carnapping defined; Burden of the prosecution in a case for Carnapping with Homicide.
Section 2 of RA 6539 defines carnapping as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things." The crime of carnapping with homicide is punishable under Section 1461 of the said law, as amended by
Section 20 of RA 7659. To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not
only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the
killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Thus, the
prosecution in this case has the burden of proving that: (1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2) his original criminal
design was carnapping; (3) he killed the driver, Medel; and (4) the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."62
The trial and appellate courts held that the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of proving that Mallari was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide. These courts ruled that Mallari stole the FX taxi driven
by Medel after he agreed to illegally supply his co-accused with this type of vehicle. The trial and appellate courts
found that Mallari killed Medel in the course of the commission of the carnapping.
We find no reason to deviate from these courts’ evaluation as to Mallari’s culpability.
The crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the
crime, is duly established by circumstantial evidence.
The culpability of Mallari for the complex crime of carnapping with homicide is duly established by the confluence of
circumstantial evidence. Mahilac testified that he was present when Mallari and his co-accused, all members of the
"FX Gang," gathered in Muntinlupa City to plan and conspire to steal vehicles and sell them to unscrupulous buyers
in Mindanao. Immediately after said meeting, Mahilac saw Mallari hail the FX taxi driven by Medel, talk to him,
board it together with two other conspirators, and head south towards the direction of Quezon province. A few days
later, Mallari and his companions met Mahilac in Cagayan De Oro City on board the same FX taxi they rode in
Muntinlupa City. All these show that Mallari’s original criminal design was to carnap the taxi and that he
accomplished his purpose without the consent of its owner. In addition, when the vehicle was brought to Cagayan
de Oro City, its driver, Medel, was no longer with them. The vehicle also reeked of dried human blood. Upon inquiry
by Mahilac, Mallari admitted that the dried blood belonged to Medel who had to be killed for resisting the group.
Mallari also told him that Medel’s body was dumped along Zigzag Road in Atimonan, Quezon. Mallari and his co-
accused received ₱250,000.00 upon delivery of the FX taxi to its final destination. These prove that Medel was
killed in the course of the commission of the carnapping.
The identity of Medel as the driver of the taxi was established by his mother and wife who both stated that he was
the driver of the taxi on the day it was stolen by Mallari and his co-conspirators.63 The two later on identified his
corpse when it was discovered in the same vicinity which Mallari told Mahilac to be the place where they dumped
the dead body of Medel.64
In fine, all the elements of the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari
as one of the perpetrators of the crime, were all proved beyond reasonable doubt. The foregoing circumstances
inevitably lead to the lone, fair and reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in stealing the FX taxi driven by
Medel and in killing him.
Mallari’s defense of alibi deserves no credence.
Mallari’s claim that he was helping his wife with household chores at the time the crime was committed does not
deserve credence. This defense of alibi cannot prevail over the testimony of Mahilac which, taken in its entirety,
leads to the reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in the commission of the crime.
Moreover, alibi is inherently weak, unreliable, and can be easily fabricated.65 Hence, it must be supported by
credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused. 66 Here, Mallari could have
presented evidence to support his alibi, but oddly, he did not. Thus, such a defense fails.
The Penalty
Under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner or driver of the vehicle is killed in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 67 In this case, the trial court considered as
aggravating circumstance the commission of the offense by a member of an organized or syndicated crime group
under Article 62 of the RPC as amended by RA 765968 and, hence, imposed upon Mallari the death penalty.
However, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, all aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be
alleged in the Information. This new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, but applies retroactively to pending
cases since it is favorable to the appellant.69 Here, there is no allegation in the Information that Mallari was a
member of a syndicate or that he and his companions "had formed part of a group organized for the general
purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group."70 Hence,
the same cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against Mallari. Thus, in consonance with Article
63(2) of the RPC, which provides that in the absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
offense, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Mallari must, therefore, suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua.71 Mallari is also not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 372 of RA 9346.
The Damages
For the killing of Medel, we award to his heirs the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.73 Said heirs are also entitled to an award of moral damages in the sum of ₱50,000.00 as in all cases
of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. 74 We cannot,
however, award actual damages due to the absence of receipts to substantiate the expenses incurred for Medel’s
funeral. The rule is that only duly receipted expenses can be the basis of actual damages. 75 "Nonetheless, under
Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the
victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved."76 We therefore award the sum of
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages to the heirs of Medel.. "In addition, and in conformity
with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6o/o
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid." 77
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00930
finding appellant Reynaldo Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide is AFFIRMED with the following modifications: ( 1) appellant Reynaldo Mallari is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; and, (2) appellant Reynaldo Mallari is ordered to pay the
heirs of Erico Medel the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, and interest on all these damages assessed at the legal rate of 6%
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LAGAT

G.R. No. 187044 September 14, 2011

DECISION
This appeal was filed by accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan (Lagat), also known as Renat Gawan, and
James Palalay y Villarosa (Palalay) to challenge the Court of Appeals’ October 8, 2008 Decision1 in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 02869, for affirming with modification the March 19, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 21, Santiago City, wherein they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Carnapping in
Criminal Case No. 21-4949.
Accused-appellants Lagat and Palalay were charged with the crime of Carnapping as defined under Section 2 and
penalized under Section 143 of Republic Act No. 6539. The accusatory portion of the Information,4 reads:
That on or about the 12th day of April 2005, at Santiago City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, conniving with each other, and mutually helping one
another and with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) unit YASUKI tricycle bearing Engine No. 161FMJ41535420 and
Motor No. LX8PCK0034D002243 then driven and owned by JOSE BIAG, valued at ₱ 70,000.00, to the damage
and prejudice of the owner thereof.
That in the course of the commission of carnapping, or on occasion thereof, the above-named accused, conspiring,
conniving confederating and helping each other, and with intent to kill, did then and there assault, attack and wound
the said JOSE BIAG with sharp and pointed instrument directing blows against the vital parts of the body of the
latter thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab and hacking wounds which directly caused the death of the said
JOSE BIAG.
Lagat pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on June 16, 2005.5 Palalay, on the other hand, did not enter any plea;
hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the RTC for him.6
On August 1, 2005, both accused proposed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. 7 In their plea-bargaining
proposal,8they asked that they be allowed to plead guilty to the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code and that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and/or no intention to commit so grave a wrong
be considered in their favor. They also asked that damages be fixed at ₱ 120,000.00. This proposal was
rejected9 by the prosecution; thus, the pre-trial conference proceeded. The pre-trial Order contained the following
facts as admitted by the parties:
1. That the cadaver of Jose Biag was recovered along Angadanan and Sn. Guillermo road by members of
the police together with Barangay Captain Heherson Dulay and Chief Tanod Rumbaoa, Sr.
2. That the two accused were arrested in possession of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
3. That the cause of death of Jose Biag was multiple stab and hack wounds as described in the Autopsy
Report and death certificate which shall be submitted during trial.10
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution first presented Florida Biag (Florida), the wife of the victim Jose Biag (Biag), to testify on the
circumstances leading to Biag’s disappearance and the discovery of his body, the recovery of Biag’s tricycle, and
the expenses she incurred and the income she had lost as a result of her husband’s death. Florida testified that her
husband was a farmer, a barangay tanod, and a tricycle driver. 11 On April 12, 2005, at around two o’clock in the
morning, her husband left to operate his tricycle for public use. It was around 11:00 a.m. of April 13, 2005, when
news reached her that their tricycle was with the Philippine National Police (PNP) of the Municipality of Alicia and
that her husband had figured in an accident. After learning of the incident, Florida sought the help of their Barangay
(Brgy.) Captain, Heherson Dulay, who immediately left for Angadanan without her. At around 2:00 p.m., Brgy.
Captain Dulay informed12 Florida of what had happened to her husband.13 Florida then presented in court the
receipts14 evidencing the expenses she had incurred for her husband’s wake and funeral and for the repair of their
tricycle, which was recovered with missing parts. She also testified as to the income Biag was earning as a farmer,
a tanod, and a tricycle driver, and claimed that his death had caused her sleepless nights.15
The second witness for the prosecution was the Chief Tanod of Barangay Rizal, Poe Rumbaoa, Sr. (Rumbaoa). He
testified that on April 13, 2005, after he and Brgy. Captain Dulay received Florida’s report, they immediately went to
the Alicia Police Station, wherein they found Biag’s tricycle. The PNP of Alicia showed them the identification card
recovered in the tricycle and told them that the tricycle was used in stealing palay from a store in Angadanan,
Isabela that belonged to a certain Jimmy Esteban (Esteban). Rumbaoa and Brgy. Captain Dulay were also told that
the owner of the tricycle was killed and dumped along the Angadanan and San Guillermo Road. They were
thereafter shown the two suspects and the place where Biag’s body was dumped. Rumbaoa said that he was able
to identify the body as Biag’s, which was almost unrecognizable because it was bloated all over, only because Biag
had a mark on his right shoulder, which Rumbaoa knew of.16
Police Officer 2 (PO2) Arthur Salvador, a member of the PNP in Alicia, took the witness stand next. He testified that
on April 13, 2005, he was on duty along with other colleagues at the Alicia PNP Station, when they received a
report from Esteban that the cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at Alice Palay Buying Station in Alicia,
Isabela, in a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male persons. PO2 Salvador said that upon receipt of this
report, their Chief of Police composed a team, which included him, PO2 Bernard Ignacio, and PO2 Nathan Abuan,
to verify the veracity of the report. At Alice Palay Buying Station, they saw the tricycle described to them by their
chief, with the cavans of palay, and the two accused, Lagat and Palalay. PO2 Salvador averred that he and his
team were about to approach the tricycle when the two accused "scampered" 17 to different directions. After
"collaring" the two accused, they brought them to the Alicia PNP Station together with the tricycle and its contents.
PO2 Salvador asseverated that when they reached the station, they asked the two accused if they had any papers
to show for both the tricycle and the palay, to which the two accused did not answer. They allegedly kept silent
even after they were informed of their rights not only to remain as such, but also to have counsel, either of their own
choosing, or to be assigned to them if they cannot afford one. PO2 Salvador then continued that when they
unloaded the tricycle, they discovered bloodstains inside and outside the sidecar. He also personally found a wallet
containing the tricycle’s Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt 18 issued by the Land Transportation Office in
the name of Jose Biag. When they asked the two accused about their discoveries, Lagat and Palalay voluntarily
answered that the name in the papers is that of the owner of the tricycle, whom they killed and dumped along
Angadanan and San Guillermo Road, when they carnapped his tricyle. PO2 Salvador alleged that upon hearing this
revelation, they again informed Lagat and Palalay that anything they say would be used against them, and that they
had a right to counsel. Thereafter, they coordinated with the PNP of Angadanan Police Station, and together with
the two accused, they proceeded to Angadanan-San Guillermo Road, where they found Biag’s body in a ravine just
after the bridge near the road.19
The prosecution’s last witness, PO2 Ignacio corroborated PO2 Salvador’s testimony on the events that led them to
the tricycle, the palay, the two accused, and the body of Biag. He also confirmed PO2 Salvador’s claim that they
had informed the two accused of their rights but the latter just ignored them; hence, they continued with their
investigation.20 PO2 Ignacio added that the two accused also told them how they killed Biag, to wit:
A- They rented a tricycle from Santiago to Alicia but they proceeded to Angadanan. And upon arrival at the site,
they poked a knife to the driver and the driver ran away. They chased him and stabbed him, sir.21
Upon cross-examination, PO2 Ignacio averred that they were not able to recover the murder weapon despite
diligent efforts to look for it and that they had questioned the people at Alice Palay Buying Station and were told that
the two accused had no other companion. PO2 Ignacio also admitted that while they informed Lagat and Palalay of
their constitutional rights, the two were never assisted by counsel at any time during the custodial investigation. 22
The prosecution also submitted the Post-Mortem Autopsy Report23 on Biag of Dr. Edgar Romanchito P. Bayang,
the Assistant City Health and Medico-Legal Officer of Santiago City. The Report showed that Biag was likely killed
between 12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m. of April 12, 2004, and that he had sustained three stab wounds, an incise
wound, two hack wounds and an "avulsion of the skin extending towards the abdomen." 24
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence 25 without
leave of court26 on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Lagat and
Palalay averred that their constitutional rights on custodial investigation were grossly violated as they were
interrogated for hours without counsel, relatives, or any disinterested third person to assist them. Moreover, the
admissions they allegedly made were not supported by documentary evidence. Palalay further claimed that
Rumbaoa’s testimony showed that he had a "swelling above his right eye" and "a knife wound in his left arm," which
suggests that he was maltreated while under police custody. 27
The accused also claimed that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was not sufficient to
convict them. They averred that aside from the alleged admissions they had made, the prosecution had nothing
else: they had no object evidence for the bloodstains allegedly found in the tricycle; the murder weapon was never
found; and no eyewitness aside from the police officers was presented to show that they were in possession of the
tricycle at the time they were arrested. Lagat and Palalay argued that the prosecution failed to establish an
unbroken chain of events that showed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, thus, they were entitled to enjoy the
constitutional presumption of innocence absent proof that they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt.28
As the accused filed their Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court, they in effect waived their right to present
evidence, and submitted the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. 29
On March 19, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing considerations the Court finds the accused Renato Lagat y Gawan and
James Palalay y Villarosa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of qualified carnapping and hereby sentences each of
them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also ORDERED TO PAY Florida Biag the sum of Twelve
thousand three hundred pesos (₱ 12,300.00) as actual damages plus Fifty thousand pesos (₱ 50,000.00) for death
indemnity and another Fifty thousand pesos (₱ 50,000.00) for moral damages.30
After evaluating the evidence the prosecution presented, the RTC agreed with the accused that their rights were
violated during their custodial investigation as they had no counsel to assist them. Thus, whatever admissions they
had made, whether voluntarily or not, could not be used against them and were inadmissible in evidence. 31
However, the RTC held that despite the absence of an eyewitness, the prosecution was able to establish enough
circumstantial evidence to prove that Lagat and Palalay committed the crime, to wit:
1. The accused were caught by the Alicia PNP in possession of Biag’s tricycle, loaded with stolen palay;
2. The accused ran immediately when they saw the Alicia PNP approaching them;
3. The Alicia PNP found bloodstains on the tricycle and Biag’s wallet with documents to prove that Biag
owned the tricycle;
4. The Alicia PNP contacted the PNP of Santiago City to inquire about a Jose Biag, and this was how the
barangay officials of Santiago City and Florida found out that Biag’s tricycle was with the Alicia PNP;
5. Biag left early morning on April 12, 2005 and never returned home;
6. The accused themselves led the Alicia PNP and Barangay Captain Dulay and Rumbaoa to where they
dumped Biag’s body.32
The RTC convicted Lagat and Palalay of the crime of carnapping, qualified by the killing of Biag, which, according
to the RTC, appeared to have been done in the course of the carnapping. 33
Lagat and Palalay asked the RTC to reconsider its Decision on the grounds that it erred in giving full credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses and in relying on the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution.34
On May 29, 2007, the RTC denied35 this motion, holding that the testimonies of the witnesses were credible and
supported by the attending facts and circumstances, and that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict
the accused.
Lagat and Palalay went36 to the Court of Appeals, asserting that their guilt was not established beyond reasonable
doubt.37 They averred that circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient for a judgment of conviction, "must exclude each
and every hypothesis consistent with innocence,"38 which was allegedly not the case in their situation. They
elaborated on why the circumstantial evidence the RTC enumerated could not be taken against them:
1. The accused’s possession of the tricycle cannot prove that they killed its owner;
 2. Their act of fleeing may be due to the stolen palay (which is not the subject of this case), and not the
tricycle;
3. No evidence was given that would link the bloodstains found in the tricycle to Biag himself. They could
have easily been Palalay’s, who was shown to have a knife wound; and
4. The accused’s act of pointing to the police and the barangay officials the ravine where Biag’s body was
dumped was part of their interrogation without counsel, which the RTC itself declared as inadmissible in
evidence.39
On October 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 19, 2007 of the RTC, Branch 21, Santiago City, in Criminal Case No. 21-
4949, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y
Villarosa are ordered to pay to private complainant the increased amount of ₱ 14,900.00 as actual damages. 40
In affirming the conviction of the accused, the Court of Appeals held that the elements of carnapping were all
present in this case. The Court of Appeals pointed out that Lagat and Palalay were in possession of the missing
tricycle when they were apprehended by the Alicia PNP. Moreover, they failed to offer any explanation as to how
they came to be in possession of the tricycle. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the RTC that whatever
confession or admission the Alicia PNP extracted out of the accused could not be used in evidence for having been
done without the assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals nonetheless affirmed the RTC’s judgment as it was
"convinced" that the following circumstantial evidence supported the conviction of the accused for qualified
carnapping:
1. Biag and his tricycle went missing on April 12, 2005;
2. Lagat and Palalay were found in unauthorized possession of the tricycle on April 13, 2005;
3. The Alicia PNP, upon inspection of the tricycle, found traces of blood inside it, together with the original
receipt and certificate of registration of the vehicle in the name of Jose Biag;
4. Palalay had a stab wound on his left arm when the Alicia PNP presented him and Lagat to Brgy. Capt.
Dulay and prosecution witness Rumbaoa;
5. Biag bore five (5) hack wounds on his body when the Alicia PNP recovered his corpse in a ravine; and
6. Lagat and Palalay failed to account for their possession of the bloodstained tricycle immediately after
their arrest.41
The accused are now before us with the same lone assignment of error they posited before the Court of Appeals, to
wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.42
Ruling of the Court
Lagat and Palalay have been charged and convicted of the crime of qualified carnapping under Republic Act. No.
653943 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. Section 2 of the Act defines "carnapping" and "motor vehicle" as follows:
"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public highways, but
excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts,
amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any
number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified
as separate motor vehicle with no power rating.44
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 are the following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and
 4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.45
The records of this case show that all the elements of carnapping are present and were proven during trial.
The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced by the registration papers, was
found in Lagat and Palalay’s possession. Aside from this, the prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat and
Palalay fled the scene when the Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat
and Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biag’s tricycle. Their unexplained possession raises the
presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court states that:
[A] person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.
In Litton Mills, Inc. v. Sales,46 we said that for such presumption to arise, it must be proven that: (a) the property
was stolen; (b) it was committed recently; (c) that the stolen property was found in the possession of the accused;
and (d) the accused is unable to explain his possession satisfactorily. 47 As mentioned above, all these were proven
by the prosecution during trial. Thus, it is presumed that Lagat and Palalay had unlawfully taken Biag’s tricycle. In
People v. Bustinera,48 this Court defined "unlawful taking," as follows:
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. 49
Lagat and Palalay’s intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was also proven as they were caught in a palay
buying station, on board the stolen tricycle, which they obviously used to transport the cavans of palay they had
stolen and were going to sell at the station. In Bustinera, we elucidated on the concept of "intent to gain" and said:
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act
which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes
gain.50
Having established that the elements of carnapping are present in this case, we now go to the argument of the two
accused that they cannot be convicted based on the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.
In People v. Mansueto,51 we said:
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference. Such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences
establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.52
Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. 53
A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented, excluding those that are inadmissible, show that
the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a whole, effectively establishes the guilt of Lagat and Palalay beyond
reasonable doubt. We considered the following pieces of evidence as convincing:
First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle the same day that it, together with its owner Biag,
was reported missing.
Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying station, with the stolen tricycle packed with cavans of
palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the tricycle, jumped and ran the moment they saw the Alicia PNP
approaching them.
Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia PNP why they were in possession of Biag’s tricycle.
Fifth, Biag’s wallet and his tricycle’s registration papers were found in the tricycle upon its inspection by the Alicia
PNP.
Sixth, Biag’s body bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem autopsy done on him, while his tricycle had
traces of blood in it.
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the conclusion that Lagat and Palalay conspired to kill Biag in
order to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two accused conspired is not essential as it may be inferred from
their conduct before, during, and after their commission of the crime that they acted with a common purpose and
design.54 The pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution are consistent with one another and the only
rational proposition that can be drawn therefrom is that the accused are guilty of killing Biag to carnap his tricycle.
When a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the occasion of the carnapping, the crime of carnapping is
qualified and the penalty is increased pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended:
Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in
Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not
less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for
not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed
by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or
raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (As amended by R.A. No.
7659.) (Emphasis ours)
As there was no aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the RTC properly imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of ₱ 50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto for the
death of Jose Biag and ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages for the proven mental suffering of his wife as a result of his
untimely death. However, when actual damages proven by receipts during trial amount to less than ₱ 25,000.00, as
in this case, the award of temperate damages for ₱ 25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser
amount.55 Thus, an award of ₱ 25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the amount of ₱ 14,900.00 that the
Court of Appeals awarded as actual damages is proper in this case.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the accused are
also jointly and severally liable for the loss of the earning capacity of Biag and such indemnity should be paid to his
heirs.56 In People v. Jadap,57 this Court said:
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, in which case judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws. In this case, no documentary evidence was presented to prove the claim
of the victim’s heirs for damages by reason of loss of earning capacity. However, the victim’s father testified that at
the time of his son’s death, he was only 20 years old and was working as a mason with a monthly income of ₱
3,000.00. We find the father’s testimony sufficient to justify the award of damages for loss of earning capacity.58
Biag’s widow, Florida, testified that Biag worked as a farmer, tanod, and tricycle driver, and that his income
amounted to ₱ 40,000.00 per cropping season as a farmer, ₱ 2,000.00 per month as a tanod, and ₱ 300.00 per
day as a tricycle driver. However, since the prosecution failed to present any document pertaining to Biag’s
appointment as a tanod, or that he actually worked as a farmer, we shall consider only his earnings as a tricycle
driver. According to the death certificate59 submitted by the prosecution, Biag was 56 years old at the time of his
death.1âwphi1
The amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is based on two factors: 1)
the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed; and 2) the rate at which the losses
sustained by the heirs of the deceased should be fixed. The first factor is based on the formula (2/3 x 80 – age of
the deceased at the time of his death = life expectancy) which is adopted from the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality.60 Net income is computed by deducting from the amount of the victim’s gross income the amount of his
living expenses. As there is no proof of Biag’s living expenses, the net income is estimated to be 50% of the gross
annual income.61 Thus, the loss of earning capacity of the deceased is computed as follows:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income – living expenses]62
= 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income - 50% of gross annual income]
= 2/3 [80-56] x [₱ 109,500.00 - ₱ 54,750.00]
= 16 x ₱ 54,750.00
= ₱ 876,000.00
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the October 8, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 02869. Accused-appellants Renato Lagat y Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED CARNAPPING and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. They are hereby ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Jose Biag the following: (a) ₱
50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱ 50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱ 25,000.00 as temperate damages; (d) ₱
876,000.00 as loss of earning capacity; and (e) interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ASAMUDDIN

G.R. No. 213913 September 02, 2015

DECISION
On appeal is the Decision1 dated May 22, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05870, which
affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated October 15, 2012 of the Regional Trial Comt (RTC) of Mandaluyong
City, Branch 212, in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11421 and MC08-11422.

The consolidated cases for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as
amended, and Qualified Theft were filed on January 16, 2008 against accused Julkipli Asamuddin ySalapudin
(appellant). The accusatory portions of the Informations alleged as follow:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Criminal Case No. MCOS-11421:
For Violation of R.A. No. 6539

That on or about the 11th day of July 2007, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, ste[a]l and carry away a motorcycle,
Honda XRM with plate no. UU-9142 amounting to P49,000.00 belonging to EMELINA GLORIA Y UMAL[I] without
the latter's consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned sum ofP49,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3cralawrednad

Criminal Case No. MCOS-11422:

For Qualified Theft

That on or about the 11th day of July 2007, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then employed as a messenger of E. Gloria's Money Changer
owned by Emelina Gloria y Umali, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of the trust reposed upon
him, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money of various denominations P800,000.00, Yen
660,000.00, Pounds 50.00, Dirham 530.00, Brunei Dollar 100.00 and Singapore Dollar 467.00 with an aggregate
amount of P1,077,995.00, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant in the aforementioned amount of
P1,077,995.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The criminal cases were temporarily archived, but were revived with the arrest of appellant in Zamboanga City on
February 25, 2009.
Assisted by a counsel de oficio at his arraignment on August 19, 2009, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both
charges.5cralawrednad

In the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented Emelina Gloria y Umali (Emelina), proprietor of E. Gloria Money
Changer where appellant works as a messenger; and fmee Gerbon6 (Imee), domestic helper of Emelina. Among
the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution were (1) the list of currencies Emelina entrusted to
appellant that fateful day of July 11, 2007 (Exhibit "F"7); and (2) Sales Invoice Retail No. 16607 (Exhibit "I"8), Official
Receipt (Exhibit "J''9), and certification (Exhibit "K"10), all issued by Triumph JT Marketing Corporation, which show
that the Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number UU-9142 was purchased by Emelina's husband.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He denied the charges against him.
THE FACTS

Emelina hired appellant as messenger in E. Gloria Money Changer, Mandaluyong City, sometime in 2006, with the
main function of delivering local or foreign currencies to clients or other money changers. 11Assigned to appellant to
be used in the performance of his work is a blue Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number UU-
9142.12cralawrednad

At 12:30 in the afternoon of July 11, 2007, Emelina handed to appellant the cash amount of P800,000.00, and
various foreign denominations consisting of 66 pieces of lapad,13 50 pounds, 530 dirhams, 467 Singaporean
dollars, and 100 Brunei dollars,14 with a peso value of P277,995.00.15 She instructed appellant to bring the
currencies to her friend Rina Rosalial, a money changer in Mabini, Manila. 16 After receiving the monies from
Emelina, appellant left aboard his service motorcycle on his way to Manila.17cralawrednad

Imee, the domestic helper of Emelina, was then inside E. Gloria Money Changer, and saw Emelina hand to
appellant currencies of various denominations,18 and as appellant left his service motorcycle.19cralawrednad

By 1:30 p.m. of the same day, Emelina received a call from Rina Rosalial informing her that appellant has yet to
arrive in her shop.20 Emelina's calls to the cellular phones of appellant and his wife were at naught, 21 prompting her
to lodge a complaint against appellant at the Philippine National Police, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(PNP-CIDG), Camp Crame.22cralawrednad

In August 2007, the blue Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number UU-9142 was found abandoned in Silang,
Cavite, and was returned to Emelina.23cralawrednad

Appellant vehemently denied asporting currency totaling P1,077,995.00, and the subject motorcycle. He admitted
working as a Messenger/Runner at the E. Gloria Money Changer starting October 2006 but he resigned from his
job on July 10, 2007. Appellant asserted that the money he received from Emelina on July 11, 2007 was his last
salary for the period July 1 to 10, 2007. His family's return to Zamboanga City on September 7, 2007 was due to
the high cost of living in Metro Manila which he could no longer afford.24cralawrednad

Relying on the categorical and straightforward testimony of Emelina, and rejecting the defense of denial advanced
by appellant, the RTC rendered a guilty verdict in both criminal cases, thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds the accused JULKIPILI ASAMUDDIN Y
SALAPUDIN @ ''Jul" and "Rey" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972)[,] as amended[,] and he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment of fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum.
Likewise[,] the court finds JULKIPLI ASAMUDDIN Y SALAPUDIN @ "Jul" @ "Rey" GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Qualified Theft and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua but with all the
accessories of the penalty imposed under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is also condemned to pay
the offended party, EMELINA GLORIA Y UMALI[,] the sum of Php1,877,995.00, as actual damages representing
the total amount of the money entrusted to him by the said offended party.

Further, let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused JULKlPLI ASAMUDDIN Y
SALAPUDIN @ "Jul" @ "Rey" from Mandaluyong City Jail to the BBureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.

SO ORDERED.25cralawred
On November 6, 2012, appellant timely tiled his Notice of Appeal. 26 The consolidated cases were subsequently
elevated to the CA, and was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05870. Before the CA, appellant ascribed to the
RTC the following errors:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING [APPELLANT'S] TESTIMONY.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [APPELLANT] OF QUALIFIED THEFT AND
CARNAPPING DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.27

In the Decision dated May 22, 2014, the appellate court dismissed the appeal but modified appellant's civil liability
in Criminal Case No. MC08-11422 by reducing the awarded actual damages from P1,877,995.00 to
P1,077,995.00.28 The appellate court emphasized that the amount alleged in the Information for Qualified Theft,
and established by Exhibit "F" was only PI,077,995.00.29cralawrednad

Appellant perfected his appeal to this Court with the timely filing of a Notice of Appeal on June 16, 2014. 30 The
Solicitor General and appellant separately manifested to adopt their respective briefs filed before the CA as their
supplemental briefs.31cralawrednad

The main issue for resolution is whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of the appellant for Qualified Theft
and Carnapping.

The Court rules in the affirmative and finds the appeal without merit.

Appellant primarily assails the testimony of Emelina to be inadequate to anchor his conviction for the crimes
charged. Branding Emelina's testimony to be self-serving, unsubstantiated, and uncorroborated by documentary
and credible testimonial evidence, appellant asserted that no credible proof was presented by the prosecution to
establish that he actually received from Emelina the subject peso and foreign currencies and that he used and
unlawfully took away the service motorcycle.

When the credibility of the witness is in issue, the settled rule is that the trial court's assessment thereof is accorded
great weight by appellate courts absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain matters which, if taken
into consideration, would have materially affected the outcome of the case.32 And where the trial court's findings
have been affirmed by the CA, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court. 33 The determination of
the credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court judge because of his untrammeled opportunity to observe
directly the demeanor of a witness on the stand and, thus, to determine whether he or she is telling the truth. 34 After
a circumspect scrutiny of the records of the case, we find no reason to modify, alter or reverse the factual finding of
the lower court and affirmed by the CA that in the afternoon of July 11, 2007, appellant received money from
Emelina; used his service motorcycle; and disappeared with the money and the motorcycle.

Moreover, appellant failed to establish the alleged ill-motive of Emelina in implicating him in the present case. No
evidence was presented to show that the business of Emelina incurred losses that needed to be concealed from
her business partners. Absent any improper motive to falsely testify against the appellant, Emelina's declarations
are worthy of full faith and credence.35 In like manner, Imee's employment as the domestic servant of Emelina is not
a ground to disregard her testimony. Relationship alone is not enough reason to discredit and label Imee's
testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. It is settled that the witness' relationship to the victim does not
automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.36cralawrednad

We now resolve the criminal liability of the appellant for the unlawful taking of the service motorcycle, and the peso
and foreign currencies amounting to a total of P1,077,995.00.

I. Criminal Case No. MCOS-11421 (For Violation of R.A. No. 6539)

The elements of Carnapping as defined under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended,
are:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another;

(2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by
using force upon things; and

(3) the taking is done with intent to gain.37cralawrednad

All these elements were established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

Exhibits "I"38 "J"39 and "K",40 proved that the blue Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number UU-9142 used as a
service vehicle by appellant was acquired from Triumph JT Marketing Corporation by Manolito, Emelina's spouse,
establishing the first element.

It is the second element that the appellant claimed was not proven because the prosecution's evidence failed to
show that he took the motorcycle without the consent of Emelina. Indeed, Emelina herself tasked the appellant to
proceed to Mabini, Manila, and permitted him to use the service motorcycle.

Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the
same.41 In Roque v. People,42 the Court ruled that qualified theft may be committed even when the personal
property is in the lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the felony. The concept of unlawful
taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same,43the holding in Roque v. People44 equally applies to
carnapping. Henee, in People v. Bustinera,45 appellant, who was hired as taxi driver, was found guilty of carnapping
under R.A. No. 6539 after he failed to return the Daewoo Racer taxi assigned to him by the cab company where he
was employed.

In the present case, the Solicitor General aptly argued that appellant's failure to return the motorcycle to Emelina
after his working hours from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.46 constitutes "unlawful taking". Emelina lodged a complaint
against appellant with the PNP-CIDG for the loss of the service motorcycle47confirming that appellant's continued
possession thereof is without her authority.

The subsequent recovery of the stolen motorcycle will not preclude the presence of the third element. Actual gain
is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain or animus lucrandi.48 Intent to gain is an internal act
presumed from the unlawful taking49 of the motor vehicle which the appellant failed to overcome with evidence to
the contrary. Verily, the mere use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain. 50cralawrednad

Appellant is thus guilty of the crime of carnapping under R.A. No. 6539.

II. Criminal Case No. MCOS-11422 (For Qualified Theft)

Appellant asserted that he cannot be convicted of Qualified Theft because his employment as messenger did not
create a fiduciary relationship that will qualify the crime of theft. He also insisted that Exhibit "F" is self-serving and
is incompetent to establish the amount of money handed to him by Emelina.

For the successful prosecution for Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence, the prosecution must
establish beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) taking of personal property; (2) that the said property
belongs to another; (3) that the said taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that it be done without the owner's
consent; (5) that it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; and (6) that it be done with grave abuse of confidence.51cralawrednad

All these elements are present in the instant case. Emelina positively and credibly testified that she entrusted to
appellant the amount of P800,000.00 and foreign currencies valued at P277,995.00. Instead of delivering the
money to the designated money changer as directed by Emelina, appellant breached the trust reposed in him and
disappeared with the cash bills.

We agree with the RTC and the CA that a fiduciary relationship between appellant and Emelina, his employer,
existed contrary to the assertion of appellant.
In Candelaria v. People,52 petitioner Candelaria was the driver of the truck loaded with liters of diesel fuel for
delivery to a customer. Instead of delivering the fuel, petitioner Candelaria disappeared together with the truck and
its cargo. With the recovery of the truck, petitioner Candelaria was convicted of Qualified Theft for the lost fuel.

Here, the function of the appellant as a messenger of the E. Gloria Money Changer is to deliver amounts of money,
both peso and foreign currency, to the clients or to exchange the currency with another money changer. Emelina
routinely entrusts to appellant, on a daily basis, various amounts of money from P50,000.00 to
P500,000.0053 without requiring the latter to acknowledge receipt thereof. Emelina testified that she does not have
proof that he handed to appellant P800,000.00 and various foreign currency on July 11, 2007 because of her total
trust and high degree of confidence on appellant ("tiwalaan lang po").54 This exhibited the trust and confidence of
Emelina to the appellant which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of the former.

The straightforward and credible testimony55 of Emelina is adequate to establish the exact amount of money
handed to appellant. She could not have forgotten about the denominations given to appellant as the same is
subject of her transaction with a money changer in Mabini, Manila, and she counted 56 the same before handing it to
appellant. Thus, the testimony of Emelina sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt that she delivered to
appellant monies valued in the total amount of P1,077,995.00.
APPELLANT'S DEFENSE

The lame defense of denial is all that appellant could offer against the prosecution evidence. Denial is a negative
and self-serving evidence that requires to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence of nonculpability to
merit credibility.57 Otherwise, it will not overcome the testimony of the prosecution witness/es who testified on
affirmative matters.58 Except for the testimonial assertion of appellant in the present case, no credible
corroborating evidence was presented by the defense to bolster his denial. Emelina's positive assertions that she
handed to appellant the money to be delivered to a money changer in Mabini, Manila, and that he did not return the
service motorcycle, prevail over the denial of the appellant. Appellant's admission59 that he was at E. Gloria Money
Changer shop in the morning of July 11, 2007 further served to bolster the testimony of Emelina.

In the face of the overwhelming and positive evidence against the appellant, even if his return to Zamboanga City is
disregarded as an indication of his guilty conscience, his conviction should still be sustained. Unfortunately for
appellant, there is no case law holding non-flight as an indication or as conclusive proof of
innocence.60cralawrednad
THE PENALTIES

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly imposed in Criminal Case No. MCOS-11421 (for carnapping) the
penalty of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum, which is within the range
of the imposable penalty under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section
Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less
than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things x x x. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Further, appellant was correctly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua for Qualified Theft in Criminal Case No.
MCOS-11422. Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ART. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one. prescribed in this paragraph, and one year tor each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
(Emphasis supplied)
The basic penalty when the value of the stolen item exceeded P22,000.00 is the maximum period of the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods which is 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to 10 years of prision
mayor. To determine the additional years of imprisonment, the difference after deducting P22,000.00 shall be
divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00. The amount of cash stolen by appellant is
P1,077,995.00. Thus, 105 years61 shall be added to the basic penalty. However, the penalty for Simple Theft
cannot go beyond 20 years of reclusion temporal, and such will be the sentence of appellant if he committed
Simple Theft.

The penalty for Qualified Theft is two degrees higher under Article 31062 of the Revised Penal Code, thus appellant
was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. However, appellant is disqualified under R.A. No. 9346,63 in relation
to Resolution No. 24-4-1064 to avail the benefits of parole.

WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated May 22, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05870 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.65cralawrednad

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BUSTINERA

G. R. No. 148233 June 8, 2004

DECISION
From the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft2 for the unlawful taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal.
In an information3 dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows:
The undersigned accuses LUISITO D. BUSTINERA of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of December up to the 9th day of January, 1997, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused being then employed as one [of] the taxi Drivers of Elias S. Cipriano,
an Operator of several taxi cabs with business address at corner 44 Commonwealth Avenue,
iliman (sic), this City, and as such has free access to the taxi he being driven, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence reposed upon
him by his employer and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and
carry away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-266 worth ₱303,000.00, Philippine
Currency, belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in
the amount of ₱303,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment4 on March 27, 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is established.
Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his father,
hired appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer with plate number PWH-266. It was
agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to ESC
Transport’s garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of ₱780.00 per day. 5
On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the
same day as he was supposed to.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, on December 25, 1996, did you report for work?
A: Yes, sir.
 Q: Now, since you reported for work, what are your duties and responsibilities as taxi driver of the taxi
company?
A: That we have to bring back the taxi at night with the boundary.
Q: How much is your boundary?
A: ₱780.00, sir.
Q: On December 25, 1996, did you bring out any taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when ever (sic) you bring out a taxi, what procedure [do] you follow with that company?
A: That we have to bring back the taxi to the company and before we leave we also sign something, sir.
Q: What is that something you mentioned?
A: On the record book and on the daily trip ticket, sir.
Q: You said that you have to return your taxi at the end of the day, what is then the procedure reflect (sic)
by your company when you return a taxi?
A: To remit the boundary and to sign the record book and daily trip ticket.
Q: So, when you return the taxi, you sign the record book?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You mentioned that on December 25, 1996, you brought out a taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of taxi?
A: Daewoo taxi, sir.
Q: Now did you return the taxi on December 25, 1996?
A: I was not able to bring back the taxi because I was short of my boundary, sir. 6
The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to appellant’s house to ascertain why the taxi was not
returned.7 Arriving at appellant’s house, he did not find the taxi there, appellant’s wife telling him that her husband
had not yet arrived.8 Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth Avenue police station and
reported that his taxi was missing.9
On January 9, 1997, appellant’s wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had been
abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City.10 Cipriano lost no time in repairing to Regalado Street where
he recovered the taxi.11
Upon the other hand, while appellant does not deny that he did not return the taxi on December 25, 1996 as he was
short of the boundary fee, he claims that he did not abandon the taxi but actually returned it on January 5,
1997;12and that on December 27, 1996, he gave the amount of ₱2,000.00 13 to his wife whom he instructed to remit
the same to Cipriano as payment of the boundary fee14 and to tell the latter that he could not return the taxi as he
still had a balance thereof.15
Appellant, however, admits that his wife informed him that when she went to the garage to remit the boundary fee
on the very same day (December 27, 1996),16 Cipriano was already demanding the return of the taxi.17
Appellant maintains though that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and signed the record book, 18 which was
company procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and gave his employer ₱2,500.00 19 as partial payment for
the boundary fee covering the period from December 25, 1996 to January 5, 1997.
Continuing, appellant claims that as he still had a balance in the boundary fee, he left his driver’s license with
Cipriano;20 that as he could not drive, which was the only work he had ever known, without his driver’s license, and
with the obligation to pay the balance of the boundary fee still lingering, his wife started working on February 18,
1997 as a stay-in maid for Cipriano, with a monthly salary of ₱1,300.00,21 until March 26, 1997 when Cipriano told
her that she had worked off the balance of his obligation;22 and that with his obligation extinguished, his driver’s
license was returned to him.23
Brushing aside appellant’s claim that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and that he had in fact paid the total
amount of ₱4,500.00, the trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft by Decision of May
17, 2001, the dispositive portion of which is quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged,
and he is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, accused is ordered credited with four-fifths (4/5) of the preventive
imprisonment undergone by him there being no showing that he agreed in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following assigned errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING WITHOUT CONCRETE BASIS THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS INTENT TO GAIN WHEN HE FAILED TO RETURN THE TAXI TO ITS
GARAGE.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT.25
It is settled that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty
of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment even if they have not been specifically
assigned.26
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles,27 by
Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING
CARNAPPING."
When statutes are in pari materia28 or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of
persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter,29 or have the same purpose or
object,30 the rule dictates that they should be construed together – interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est
optimus interpretandi modus.31 Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence,32 as this Court explained in City of Naga v. Agna,33 viz:
. . . When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be
construed together. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the
earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing
legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. Having thus in mind
the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is
deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in those
prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be construed together. In
construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be compared with the
new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so construed that effect
may be given to every provision of each. However, when the new provision and the old relating to
the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the
legislative will . . .34(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be
taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.35
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic
servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5)
the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. 36
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent
to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a
motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. 37
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle,38 the concept of unlawful taking in theft,
robbery and carnapping being the same.39
In the 2000 case of People v. Tan40 where the accused took a Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later case of People v.
Lobitania41 which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized tricycle, this Court held that the unlawful taking of
motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery
and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of
a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law with the
crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful
taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the latter's
consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor
vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to
gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of force upon
things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the
purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said
statute.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted.)
It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it
excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers,
amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and
tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By implication, the
theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
and the provisions on robbery, respectively.43
From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-
carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall
within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as one for qualified theft notwithstanding,
appellant may still be convicted of the crime of carnapping. For while it is necessary that the statutory designation
be stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense
is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information which
determines the real nature of the crime.44
In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain, took the taxi owned by Cipriano without
the latter’s consent.45 Thus, the indictment alleges every element of the crime of carnapping, 46 and the prosecution
proved the same.
Appellant’s appeal is thus bereft of merit.
That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it on the same day as he was
supposed to is admitted.47
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.48
While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and was
entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and
against the owner’s consent transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful one. 49 Appellant himself
admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi was no longer with Cipriano’s consent as the latter was
already demanding its return.
Q: Also you said that during your direct testimony that when you gave your wife the ₱2,500.00, you also
told her to go to the company to ask the company for permission for you to use the taxi since you were then
still short of the boundary. Alright, after telling that to your wife and after seeing your wife between
 December 27, 1996 and January 5, 1997, did you ask your wife what was the answer of the company to
that request of yours?
A: He did not allow me, sir, and he even [got] angry with me.
Q: So, when did you learn that the company was not agreeable to your making use of the taxicab without
first returning it to the company?
A: Before the new year, sir.
Q: When you said new year, you were referring to January 1, 1997?
A: Either December 29 or December 30, 1996, sir.
Q: So, are you telling us that even if you knew already that the company was not agreeable to your making
use of the taxicab continually (sic) without returning the same to the company, you still went ahead and
make (sic) use of it and returned it only on January 5, 1997.
A: Yes, sir.50 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Appellant assails the trial court’s conclusion that there was intent to gain with the mere taking of the taxi without the
owner’s consent. He maintains that his reason for failing to return the taxi was his inability to remit the boundary
fee, his earnings that day not having permitted it; and that there was no intent to gain since the taking of the taxi
was not permanent in character, he having returned it.
Appellant’s position does not persuade.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. 51 Actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. 52 The term "gain" is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act
which is performed.53 Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes
gain.54
In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission55 which was reiterated in Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc.
v. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co, Inc.,56 Justice Claudio Teehankee (later Chief Justice), interpreting the theft clause of
an insurance policy, explained that, when one takes the motor vehicle of another without the latter’s consent even
if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft, there being intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully
taken constitutes gain:
Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was "temporary" and for a "joy ride",
the Court sustains as the better view57 that which holds that when a person, either with the object of going
to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle belonging
to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking possession of the
personal property belonging to another and using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives
therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites in his work
Groizard who holds that the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon who calls it "hurt de
uso."58 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
Besides, the trial court did not believe appellant’s claim that he in fact returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.
The Court can not (sic) believe accused’s assertion that he returned the subject vehicle on January 5, 1997 to the
garage and that he had in fact paid the amount of ₱4,500.00 in partial payment of his unremitted "boundary" for ten
(10) days. He could not even be certain of the exact amount he allegedly paid the taxicab owner. On direct-
examination, he claimed that he paid Edwin Cipriano on December 27, 1996 the amount of ₱2,000.00 and it was
his wife who handed said amount to Cipriano, yet on cross-examination, he claimed that he gave ₱2,500.00 to his
wife on that date for payment to the taxicab owner.59
The rule is well-entrenched that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and significance which, if considered, would alter the result of the
case.60 The reason for the rule being that trial courts have the distinct advantage of having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying or their conduct and behavior during the trial.61
Other than his bare and self-serving allegations, appellant has not shown any scintilla of evidence that he indeed
returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.
Q: You said that you returned the taxi on January 5, 1997, correct?
 A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, did you sign any record when you returned the taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you have any copy of that record?
A: They were the one (sic) in-charge of the record book and I even voluntarily left my driver’s license with
them, sir.
Q: You said that you did not return the taxi because you were short of (sic) boundary, did you turn over any
money to your employer when you returned the taxi?
A: I gave them [an] additional ₱2,500.00, sir.
Q: At the time when you returned the taxi, how much was your short indebtedness (sic) or short boundary
(sic)?
A: I was short for ten (10) days, and I was able to pay ₱4,500.00.
Q: Do you have any receipt to show receipt of payment for this ₱4,500.00?
A: They were the ones having the record of my payment, and our agreement was that I have to pay
the balance in installment.62 (Emphasis supplied)
While appellant maintains that he signed on January 5, 1997 the record book indicating that he returned the taxi on
the said date and paid Cipriano the amount of ₱4,500.00 as partial payment for the boundary fee, appellant did not
produce the documentary evidence alluded to, to substantiate his claim. That such alleged record book is in the
possession of Cipriano did not prevent him from producing it as appellant has the right to have compulsory process
issued to secure the production of evidence on his behalf.63
The trial court having convicted appellant of qualified theft instead of carnapping, it erred in the imposition of the
penalty. While the information alleges that the crime was attended with grave abuse of confidence, the same
cannot be appreciated as the suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10
of said Code, cannot be invoked when there is a legal impossibility of application, either by express provision or by
necessary implication.64
Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation to those
under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules, for the application of penalties under
the said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions are based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies
under the Code.65
Thus, in People v. Panida66 which involved the crime of carnapping and the penalty imposed was the indeterminate
sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum, this Court did not apply
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-carnapping law provides for its own penalties
which are distinct and without reference to the said Code.
The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and
8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months. There can be no suppletory effect of the rules for
the application of penalties under the Revised Penal Code or by other relevant statutory provisions
based on, or applicable only to, the rules for felonies under the Code. While it is true that the
penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of
the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not
given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the
qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on
penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the
same formulation. For this reason, we hold that the proper penalty to be imposed on each of accused-
appellants is an indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months,
as maximum.67(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the first clause of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months, not more than 17 years
and 4 months,68 for, as discussed above, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied suppletorily
and, therefore, the alleged aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence cannot be appreciated.
Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,69 as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the
offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not be less
than the minimum prescribed by the same – the penalty imposed being a range.70
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Crim Case No. Q-97-
71956, finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another judgment entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539, as amended and sentencing him to an
indeterminate penalty of Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) Months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four
(4) Months, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANTOS

G.R. No. 127500 June 8, 2000

Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, 1 convicting
accused-appellant of violation of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, also known as the Anti-Carnapping Act, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, on the basis of an Information the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 18th day of June, 1995, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, and by means of violence employed against RUEL
VALENTINO MORALES, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and drive away from
the latter a Toyota Tamaraw, bearing Plate No. UAM 540, Engine No. 2-C 2928663 and Chassis No. CF50-
0012454 valued at P387,000.00 and belonging to TEODULO NATIVIDAD y DELA CRUZ, to the damage
and prejudice of said owner in the amount of P387,000.00; that as a result of the violence employed on the
person of RUEL VALENTINO MORALES, the latter sustained injuries which caused his death. 2
The above Information, which named as accused Noel Santos and one John Doe, was amended on July 31, 1995
to cancel the designation of John Doe and substitute in its place the name of Feliciano Funcion, alias Jon-jon.3 Up
to the time of the rendition of the assailed decision, however, accused Funcion remained at large.
The prosecution presented ten witnesses during trial, consisting of the apprehending and investigating officers of
the Pasay City and Magalang, Pampanga police stations, the medico-legal officer, and the family and friends of the
victim. Also submitted in evidence were the articles recovered at the scene of the crime, including the murder
weapon and personal belongings of both the victim and accused-appellant.
PO3 Alfredo Galang was manning the traffic at the intersection in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at around 2:30 in
the morning of June 19, 1995 when he noticed an "overspeeding" Toyota Tamaraw FX. He signaled for the vehicle
to pull over to the side of the road, approached the vehicle then asked the driver for his license. The driver, who
turned out to be accused-at-large Jon-jon Funcion, handed him an expired driver's license without plastic cover
issued in the name of the victim, Ruel Morales.4 Observing that the driver and his companion, herein accused-
appellant, were acting suspiciously, PO3 Galang asked them to turn on the lights inside the vehicle, to which
accused-appellant complied. He then borrowed the key to the rear door of the FX from the driver. While PO3
Galang was opening the rear door, the driver fled unpursued towards a nearby sugarcane field. The rear portion of
the FX, as PO3 Galang found out shortly thereafter, contained the dead body of victim Ruel Morales wrapped in the
seat cover and curtains of the vehicle.
This account was corroborated by Ernesto Gonzales, one of two traffic aides then stationed at the traffic outpost in
Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, and who assisted PO3 Galang in the inspection of the FX and the apprehension of
accused-appellant.
PO3 Galang took custody of accused-appellant, who all through out the incident remained seated in the front
passenger seat of the FX. He called a funeral parlor to collect the corpse, brought the FX and accused-appellant to
the Magalang police station, and immediately executed an affidavit of arrest 5 against accused-appellant.
The next day, accused-appellant was brought by one SPO2 Nuqui of the Magalang police station to the Pasay City
police station and indorsed to the officer on duty, SPO2 Renato Guzman. It was SPO2 Guzman who interviewed
accused-appellant, who in turn denied responsibility for the death of Morales and pointed all the blame at accused-
at-large Jon-jon Funcion.
Also delivered to the Pasay City police were an autopsy report of the body of the victim, a gray Toyota Tamaraw FX
with Plate No. UAM 540, and the items recovered therein. SPO1 Manuel Abenoja, the evidence custodian of the
Pasay City police station, identified in open court the articles recovered from inside the FX, namely: a deformed and
blood-stained kitchen knife, a stone measuring about 3 to 4 inches across, a Certificate of Registration pertaining to
the Toyota Tamaraw FX issued in the name of Teodulo C. Natividad, a pair of checkered short pants, a wrist watch,
a brown scapular necklace, two leather wallets, a PCIBank card in the name of Ruel Valentine Morales, a Makati
Public Safety Office badge, three pictures of Ruel Morales, a pair of denim long pants, a leather belt, three pairs of
shoes, and assorted identification papers in the name of Ruel Morales.6
Dr. Ma. Lourdes Natividad, rural health physician of Magalang, Pampanga, conducted the post-
mortem examination of the body of the victim. Based on her findings, the cause of death was hemorrhage as a
result of the victim's fractured skull. Dr. Natividad testified to the presence of the following injuries on the victim's
body: fracture of the frontonasal bone (between the victim's eyes7 ); multiple lacerations, incisions and hematoma
on the face and arms, abrasions on the face and lower extremities, and ligature extending horizontally from right to
left and covering almost two-thirds of the neck.8 In her testimony, the doctor stated that the fracture between the
victim's eyes and the contusions were likely caused by a blunt instrument, while the lacerated and incised wounds
were inflicted by a sharp instrument. The ligature across the neck could have been caused by strangling with a
rope.9
Three of the victim's friends who last saw him alive were also presented as prosecution witnesses. Elizalde
Claridad declared that at around 11:00 in the evening of June 18, 1995, he was drinking with his friends at the
corner of Lim and M. Reyes Streets in Makati City when Ruel Morales drove by in a Toyota Tamaraw FX. Morales
called to him and asked that he accompany him in looking for his (Morales's) brother, Hoppy. Morales was wearing
a T-shirt, shorts, slippers and a lady's Rolex wrist watch with gemstones. They drove around Barangay Bangkal in
Makati then proceeded to Padi's Point, a restaurant-bar at Pasay Road, also in Makati; unable to locate the brother,
Morales dropped him off at the corner of Lim and M. Reyes Streets and drove back to Pasay Road. The next time
he saw Morales was the next day, when they fetched his body in the morgue in Pampanga.
Meanwhile, Arnie Bordeos testified that on the night of June 18, 1995, between 10:00 to 11:00, he saw Ruel
Morales in a Toyota Tamaraw FX along M. Reyes and General Luna Streets in Makati conversing with two persons
by the side of the road. Earlier to this conversation, these two persons approached him and his friends and talked
to them in a drunken and rude manner. One of them, whom he identified as herein accused-appellant, even
bragged that he was the nephew of a city mayor. He then saw Morales opening the passenger doors to let the two
persons in, then Morales drove away with the two on board. Leo Soriba, who was with Arnie Bordeos at the time,
corroborated this account.
Teodulo Natividad testified that he was the owner of the Toyota Tamaraw FX where the victim's body was found.
He stated that on June 18, 1995 he lent the FX to the victim, Ruel Morales, who was a good friend of his and who
often borrowed the FX from him. The vehicle was recovered and restored to him by the Pasay City police. It had a
dent on the roof and the seat covers and curtains were missing, but it was in otherwise good condition. 10
Antonio Morales, Jr. presented receipts covering the expenses incurred by his family for the wake and burial of his
brother. The total costs reflected in the receipts amounted to P56,319.30. He also stated that his brother worked as
an entertainer in Japan, earning US$1,000.00 a month. 11 He was, however, unable to submit documentary
evidence to support this.
In contrast to the ten witnesses presented by the prosecution, defense presented as its sole witness accused-
appellant himself. In his version of the story, accused-appellant was at the Malvar Sports Complex in Bangkal,
Makati City on June 18, 1995 at around 10:00 in the evening. He was playing darts with accused-at-large Jon-jon
Funcion and two other friends, when Jon-jon told them that he was in need of money as he needed to go to Tarlac
to see his girlfriend. Because no one among them could lend him money, Jon-jon asked accused-appellant to
accompany him to the house of one Councilor Ferdie Eusebio from whom he intended to borrow money. Upon
reaching Eusebio's house, however, Jon-jon decided against it because it was already late at night and it seemed
as if the occupants of the house were already asleep. They returned to the Malvar Sports Complex where one of
their friends, Jeffrey Abigabel, suggested they try borrowing money from his friend, Joel. Jon-jon left with Funcion to
go to Joel, but they returned shortly after. Jeffrey then said he was going home, and as Jeffrey was walking away
from them a Toyota Tamaraw FX stopped beside him. Accused-appellant saw Jeffrey converse with the driver of
the FX, then Jeffrey went on his way and the FX went towards Mabolo Street. Accused-appellant then said that
Jon-jon asked him who the driver of the FX was, but he answered that he did not know. Then Jon-jon left towards
the direction of Mabolo Street, saying "didiskarte raw siya ng pera." 12
At this point, accused-appellant decided to go home. While walking along Macabolos Street he met the FX, being
driven by Jon-jon, which stopped beside him. The person on the front passenger seat opened his window, and he
observed that the person was "gay". Jon-jon asked him where he was going, and when he said he was on his way
home, he and the "gay" passenger invited him to ride with them and that they will drop him off at his house. He
identified the passenger as "Sharon", or the victim Ruel Morales in the instant case. Accused-appellant accepted
the offer and boarded the FX.
However, instead of dropping him off at his house in Malibay, Pasay City, Jon-jon drove to PICC, where they
parked in a dark area where the trees screened off the light of the electric lamps. Jon-jon then asked accused-
appellant to step out of the FX, saying that he and "Sharon" had matters to discuss. He consented, walking about 8
meters away from the vehicle. Because it was dark, he could not see the interior of the FX but he observed that it
was "umuuga", or rocking lightly, for about 10 to 15 minutes. He came to the conclusion that the two were having
sex.
Then Jon-jon called him and alighted from the middle right-side door of the FX. When accused-appellant
approached, Jon-jon placed his right arm on the right shoulder of accused-appellant, and the latter noticed from the
open car door that someone was lying inside the FX. He asked Jon-jon what happened and he reportedly replied,
"Don't ask anymore, you might be the next one." 13 Then he felt something poke him sharply on the neck, and Jon-
jon said in an angry voice, "Just follow what I instructed (sic), if not, I will kill you." 14 Jon-jon then told him to remove
the seat covers of the FX and as he did so, Jon-jon went behind him leveling the knife on accused-appellant's neck
with one hand while holding to the waistband of accused-appellant' pants with the other. 15 Jon-jon made him cover
the dead body, with the seat covers; then Jon-jon tied both of accused-appellant's hands behind his back, took his
wallet and made him sit on the front passenger seat of the FX. He then placed a seat belt around him, locked the
door at his side, started the engine and drove to Buendia Avenue and north to Pampanga. All the while Jon-jon
reportedly threatened to kill him if he attempted to escape or to alert anyone, such as the toll booth personnel, of
what was happening. 16 Throughout his testimony, which ran the course of four hearings, accused-appellant
insisted that he had no opportunity to escape and that he was overcome by fear of accused-at-large Jon-jon
Funcion.
When they were accosted at the intersection in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga, accused-appellant testified to the
following chain of events: Jon-jon pulled over to the side of the road, unfastened the seat belt around accused-
appellant, untied accused-appellant's hands, threw something at the back of the vehicle, turned on the light, told
accused-appellant to remove his (accused-appellant's) sweatshirt, wore the sweatshirt to cover the blood stains on
his arms, turned off the light, threatened him some more, took money from accused-appellant's wallet, then
alighted. 17 All of this presumably transpired during the interim that it took for PO3 Galang, who was at a distance of
about 30 meters away, 18 to approach the FX.
At some point in his testimony, accused-appellant said that while the policeman and Jon-jon were talking, he called
to one of the traffic aides and said that there was a dead body at the back of the car. 19 This, however, was not in
the testimony of Ernesto Gonzales, one of the traffic aides present at the time.
After Jon-jon Funcion fled and the police officer found the dead body at the back of the FX, they approached
accused-appellant who remained seated at the front passenger seat and led him to the nearby police outpost. He
was then brought to a police station where he was placed under investigation.
The trial court viewed with disbelief the version of accused-appellant. In its decision rendered on October 25, 1996,
it declared:
The Court believes that Jon-jon alone could not inflict all the wounds on Morales alias Sharon which
caused his death. So that the claim of Santos that he had no participation in the killing of Morales is not
credible. Santos himself testified that his friend Jon-jon was in need of money as he was to go to his
girlfriend in Tarlac. When they were not able to borrow money from Councilor Eusebio, Morales came
along and invited them to PICC. Morales alias Sharon being a gay wanted to use Jon-jon and Santos who
were teenagers. While there is no direct evidence in the killing of Morales, the presumption is that the
person found in the unexplained possession of the stolen effects is the author of the aggression and death
of the victim and the robbery committed on him. (People vs. Prado, G.R. No. 95260, March 8, 1996) At the
time they were committing the crime, their action impliedly showed a unity of purpose between them and a
concerted effort to bring about the death of Morales. (People vs. Ferrer, et. al., G.R. Nos. 114931-33,
November 16, 1995) 20
Thus, the trial court made a finding of implied conspiracy and meted out a judgment of conviction. The dispositive
portion of the assailed decision is quoted as follows:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Noel Santos y Crispino GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended (Anti-Carnapping Act). There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the Court sentences him to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of Ruel Valentino Morales in the amount of P50,000.00; the amount of
P56,319.30 as damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 21
On appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
1. The trial court gravely erred in finding that Noel Santos is guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended (the "Anti-Carnapping Act"), considering that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of Noel
Santos beyond reasonable doubt.
1a. The trial court gravely erred in finding that there was conspiracy between Funcion and Noel
Santos, and that their actions showed unity of purpose and a concerted effort to bring about the
death of victim Morales.
1b. The trial court gravely erred in finding that Noel Santos participated in the forcible taking of the
Tamaraw FX and the killing of victim Morales.
1c. The trial court erred in finding that Funcion alone could not inflict all the wounds victim Morales
sustained.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the presence
of Noel Santos in the vehicle when the crime was committed by Funcion.
2a. The trial court gravely erred in finding Noel Santos guilty based on a presumption that the person found
in the unexplained possession of the stolen effects is the author of the aggression and death of the victim
and of the robbery committed on him, considering that Noel Santos was able to fully explain his presence in
said vehicle where the body of the victim Morales was found. 22
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things: the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of
all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator
of the crime. In the instant case we find the prosecution unable to discharge on both aspects, leaving us with no
option but to acquit on reasonable doubt.
"Carnapping", as defined by Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended, is the taking, with
intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. 23 By the amendment in Section 20 of Republic Act No.
7659, Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in
Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more that seventeen years and
four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty
years, what the carnapping is committed by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or force upon
things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall; be imposed when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
On the last clause, three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act: (1)
the change of the penalty from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change
of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof." 24 This third amendment makes clear the intention of the law to make the offense a special
complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons. 25 Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the
prosecution not only has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of Ruel
Morales 26 but more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that
the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
Needless to say, where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would
cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
In the herein case, we find the charge of carnapping unsubstantiated for failure of the prosecution to prove an
unlawful taking. The application of the presumption that a person found in possession of the personal effects
belonging to a person robbed or killed is considered the author of the aggression, the death of the person, as well
as the robbery committed, has been invariably limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that
the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. 27 The
rebuttal of such presumption, invariably employed in cases of robbery and theft under the Revised Penal Code,
validly applies to a case of carnapping, for indeed the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping is
the same, and had it not been for the enactment of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle
would certainly fall within the purview of either theft or robbery. 28
However incriminating the circumstances of accused-appellant were — having been apprehended in an
"overspeeding" Toyota Tamaraw FX, which later turned out to be owned by the victim's friend, and where the
victim's body and a blood-stained knife were found — he did in fact set up a defense of duress on which, as the
records plainly show, he had been subjected to exhaustive cross-examination by the prosecution. During cross-
examination, accused-appellant adhered to his version of the story, insisting that his presence in the FX was for no
reason other than as a captive of accused-at-large.1awphi1 While we are not prepared to say that the explanation
of accused-appellant is seamless, the point we want to make at this juncture is that once an explanation is offered
for the possession of the stolen effects, the presumption arising from unexplained possession may not anymore be
invoked and the burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that would render the defense of
accused improbable. On this burden we find the prosecution in the instant case unable to discharge.
The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of Ruel Morales may not be treated as an incident of carnapping.
Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide and murder under the Revised Penal Code, we find that the
guilt of accused-appellant was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
The trial court itself admits that there is no direct evidence indicating the guilt of accused-appellant for the killing of
Ruel Morales. Following are the circumstantial evidence relied upon for his conviction: first, accused-appellant was
in the Toyota Tamaraw FX containing the victim's body and a blood-stained knife; second, the FX was caught
"overspeeding" at 2:30 in the morning at a provincial intersection, and the occupants were acting suspiciously; third,
earlier accused-appellant was seen with accused-at-large in Pasay City, appearing drunk and behaving rudely; and
fourth, he was seen with accused-at-large boarding an FX being driven by the victim, the same FX where the
victim's body was subsequently found.
For circumstantial evidence to convict, the Rules of Court require that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 29 On the latter, decided cases expound that the
circumstancial evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. 30
The circumstances abovementioned do not lead to an inference exclusively consistent with the guilt of accused-
appellant. Quite to the contrary, we observe that while the arresting officer was preoccupied with opening the rear
door of the FX, at which time accused-at-large took the opportunity to flee, accused-appellant remained seated on
the front passenger seat, a behavior quite uncommon for a guilty man faced with the inevitability of arrest. Although
no one corroborated accused-appellant's allegation that he volunteered the information that there was a dead body
at the back of the car, his demeanor all throughout the search of the FX and during his arrest was, to say the least,
not inconsistent with the hypothesis of innocence. He did not resist arrest, and during his testimony he did not
waver in insisting that it was accused-at-large alone who was responsible for the crime.
Thus, even if we accept as credible all the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, it does not rule out the
probability of accused-appellant's story — that it was accused-at-large who killed Morales then threatened him at
knife-point — having taken place, for there were no eyewitnesses to the killing itself, and all the prosecution was
able to show were the events before and after the killing of Morales.
A situation as this calls for the application of the equipoise rule, which requires that where the inculpatory
circumstances are capable of two inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the
other compatible with a finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and therefore is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction. 31
Our ruling to acquit does not hold a corollary upholding of the credibility of the testimony of accused-appellant. The
basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the evidence of the prosecution was not
sufficient to sustain the guilt of accused-appellant beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt, however, is a burden particular to the prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised
by the defense; the accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable
doubt, nor is he required to establish the truth of such matters by a preponderance of the evidence, or even to a
reasonable probability. 32 An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused's
innocence may be doubted, 33 for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and
not on the weakness of the defense. 34
Having resolved against the individual culpability of accused-appellant in this manner, the theory of implied
conspiracy of the trial court must likewise fail.
WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 95-7258 of Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
is hereby REVERSED. Accused-appellant Noel Santos y Crispino is ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. His immediate release from detention is hereby ordered, unless other
lawful and valid grounds for his further detention exist. No costs.
SO ORDERED.