SMALL CLAIMS
within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA
(1) Neypes v. CA
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
By: Arid, Hannah Mhae G.
Doctrine: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. The
raison d’être for the “fresh period rule” is to standardize the appeal period
provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-
day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is
no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting
the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution
Facts: Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of
land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction
before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial
court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had
already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of
dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March
18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial
court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3,
1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding
that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July
31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was
denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari
and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the
notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed
that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the
15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998
since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court
denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of
1
appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well
dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should
have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the
appellate court, the order was the “final order” appealable under the Rules.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the receipt of a final order that triggers the start of the
15-day reglementary period to appeal is the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the Motion
for Reconsideration.
2. Whether or not petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time.
Held:
1. The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration
should be deemed as the final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF
Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner non-suited and
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal,
he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was
filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later
on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He
then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for having
been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have
appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was
the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the
trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted
the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This
pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v.
Haldeman et al. where the SC again considered the order denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally
disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned
cases, the SC sustained petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998
denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated
in the Rules.
2. YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period
rule” shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new
rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted
from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal
within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of
receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or”
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.
Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within
15 days from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to
refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129
which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the
disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18,
1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The
fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial
court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to
review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire
to deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within
15 days from receipt of the RTC’s decision or file it within 15 days from
receipt of the order (the “final order”) denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be
availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes
final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in
Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well
within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
2
NOTE:
The “FRESH PERIOD RULE” does not apply to Rule 64 (Review of
Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived from the
Constitution.
(2)Crisologo vs. Daray
By: Kathrina De Castro
DOCTRINE: A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to
him, upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time and upon payment
of the docket fees—the notice of appeal does not require the approval of
the court.
FACTS: Marina Crisologo filed a complaint to declare documents null and
void and Set Aside Auction Sale and Attorney’s Fees against Victor Callao
and the Rural Bank of Tagum, Inc. Salvador Crisologo filed an action for
Annulment of REM, documents, reconveyance, damages and Attorney’s
Fees against Marina and RBTI. Marina, Salvador, Victor and RBTI submitted
a Compromise Agreement with the RTC in which the presiding judge is
Daray. Marina, Jr. and Salvador ceded full ownership of the subject land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-22236, including all
improvements found thereon, in favor of RBTI. Upon knowledge of the
compromise agreement, JESUS CRISOLOGO and his sister moved to
intervene in the civil case, alleging that they are co-owners of the subject
property and Marina was holding it in trust for them. Meanwhile, the lawyer
of Jesus Crisologo and his sister withdrew as a counsel and was substitutes
by Atty. Jenette Crisologo which was acknowledge by the court.
Respondent Judge Daray denied the Motion for Intervention. Complainant
moved for reconsideration arguing that he is an indispensable party.
Respondent Judeg denied MR for lack of notice of hearing. However, copy
was sent to the previous counsel instead of Atty. Jenette Crisologo
who is the counsel of record. Respondent jude then granted the
compromise agreement and again a copy was sent to the previous counsel
of complainant. RBTI moved for the execution of the decision of the
compromise agreement. Complainant was informed by his brother about
the motion for execution and accompanied by his counsel, inquired about
the hearing and they learned that MR was denied and there was already a
decision on the compromise agreement.
Complainant filed urgent manifestation and Notice of Appeal on the ground (3) Villena vs Daray
of lack of notice to him. He also filed motion for voluntary inhibition of G.R. 167620, 04 April 2007
respondent judge for impartiality. Respondent judge failed to act on his By: Rhio
notice of appeal hence, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
Doctrine: The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before resort to
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals.
certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity
Respondent Judge inhibited himself and complainant charged respondent
to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-
judge with Gross Misconduct, Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision or
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.
Order and Gross Ignorance of the Law of Procedure relative to the denial of
the Motion for Intervention. Respondent judge averred that the failure
A party’s failure to pay the appellate docket fee within the reglementary
to furnish complainant, through his counsel of record, Atty. Jenette
period confers only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss
Marie Crisologo, with a copy of the Order denying his motion for
the proposed appeal.
reconsideration vis-à-vis the denial of his motion for intervention,
as well as of the decision on the compromise agreement, was
This Court, while reiterating that the payment of docket and other legal
unintentional and brought about by an honest oversight on the part
fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, in
of her court personnel, who inadvertently sent copies of the court
the same vein, recognized that the existence of persuasive and weighty
processes to complainant’s previous counsel.
reasons call for a relaxation of the rules.

ISSUE: WON respondent judge should be held administratively liable

Facts: The late Nicomedes T. Rupisan was first married to Felicidad. Their
union bore five children namely: Consuelo, Erlinda, Alejandro, Rodolfo, and
HELD: No. Complainant erroneously thought that when respondent failed
Romeo. Rodolfo and Romeo are the respondents in this petition. Upon the
to act on his notice of appeal, he lost his right to appeal the court’s order
death of Felicidad in 1949, Nicomedes married Maria Rosario on 14 October
denying his motion for intervention and that his only remedy was to file a
1964. The couple did not have any children. During the marriage of
petition for certiorari with the CA which he, in fact, filed. He failed to
Nicomedes and Maria Rosario, they acquired certain properties including:
consider that a party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as
(1) a parcel of land in Alcala, Pangasinan; (2) a residential lot in Alaminos,
to him, upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time and upon
and; (3) a parcel of land in Alaminos under TCT 1037. As to these
payment of the docket fees. The notice of appeal does not require the
properties, Nicomedes and Maria Rosario apparently executed an
approval of the court. The function of the notice of appeal is merely to
Agreement on Separation of Conjugal Properties.
notify the trial court that the appellant was availing of the right to appeal,
and not to seek the court’s permission that he be allowed to pose an
In 1981, Maria Rosario caused the annotation and registration of the said
appeal.
agreement on the TCT 1037. On 20 March 1984, Nicomedes died intestate.
On 18 May 1984, Maria Rosario executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
The trial court’s only duty with respect to a timely appeal by notice of
adjudicating to herself alone the subject properties covered by TCT 1037.
appeal is to transmit the original record of the case to the appellate court.
Maria Rosario then caused the cancellation of TCT No. 1037 and a new one,
The court is given thirty (30) days from the perfection of the appeal within
TCT No. 8177, issued in her name. Similarly, she caused the cancellation of
which to transmit the record. The SC noted, that complainant also filed a
tax declaration covering the subject properties.
motion for inhibition on the same day that he filed the notice of appeal. On
the 30th day since the notice of appeal was filed, respondent inhibited
In 1992, Maria Rosario died at the age of 83 years old allegedly leaving
herself from the case. It goes without saying that from that time on,
behind a holographic will dated 3 October 1989 wherein she devised the
respondent could no longer perform any act pertaining to the complainant’s
properties under TCT No. 8177 to her niece, petitioner Carolina Villena.
appeal. That duty would then devolve upon the judge who will replace the
Petitioner immediately took possession of the properties.
respondent. Hence, respondent should not be sanctioned for her failure to
act on the notice of appeal after she had inhibited herself from the case.

3
Respondents Romeo and Rodolfo filed Civil Case for Partition, Annulment of
title/documents and/or Recovery of possession/ownership and damages.
On the other hand, petitioner filed Special Proceedings for the probate of
the will of Maria Rosario in her capacity as devisee of the deceased, Maria
Rosario. Both cases were filed before the RTC of Alaminos. The cases were
consolidated.
RTC: Rendered a decision on the consolidated cases: (1) allowing and
granting the probate of the holographic will; (2) dismissing the civil case,
and; (3) ordering Romeo and Rodolfo to pay moral damages.
Respondents, through counsel Atty. Guillermo, filed a Notice of Appeal
which was denied by the RTC due to late payment of appellate docket fees
but allowed the appeal in Special Proceeding, subject to certain conditions.
(Condition is: Rule 141 Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from notice of judgment
or final order and in which case therefore, with respect to Special
Proceeding Case, the Notice of Appeal is deemed perfected except for the
approval of the Record on Appeal.)
Respondents filed a MR of the Order dated 22 November 2002 insofar as it
dismissed their appeal in Civil Case. Acting on this motion, the trial court in
an Order dated 16 July 2003 dismissed both appeals including that in
Special Proceedings. The Court ruled that inasmuch as respondents counsel
of record, Atty. Guillermo, already filed his Withdrawal of Appearance on 4
October 2002, the Notice of Appeal filed on 5 October 2002, signed by said
counsel, was invalid and no longer bound his clients, respondents therein.
Anent Special Proceedings, the RTC disallowed the appeal thereon on the
ground that respondents did not comply with the requirements provided by
law. It said that aside from the fact that the documents involved were not
arranged in chronological order the same also did not contained any data
that will show the court that the appeal was perfected on time. It added
that neither the Compliance dated February 11, 2003 filed by respondents
contained any data showing that the appeal was perfected on time. The
trial court said that these requirements are mandatory and non-compliance
therewith is fatal to the appeal.
4
RTC declared that since no Notice of Appeal has effectively been filed even
up to the present, its decision dated 25 September 2002, has become final
and executory.
Respondents hastily filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals which was given due course.
CA applied a liberal interpretation of the rules. It found the delay excusable
as respondents demonstrated their willingness to pay the docket fees as
manifested in their immediate compliance with the said requirement.
Petitioner filed MR which was denied by CA.
Issues: (1) Whether the filing of MR is mandatory before filing petition for
certiorari?
(2) What is the effect of the withdrawal of Atty. Guillermo as respondents’
counsel of record on the Notice of Appeal which he had filed for both Civil
Case and Special Proceeding?
(3) Whether the CA is guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction in placing the self-serving and gratuitous
explanation of respondents as regards their delay in the payment of docket
fees, within the realm of the exceptional circumstances justifying the late
payment of appellate court docket and other lawful fees
Held: (1) No. The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before resort to
certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity
to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. Respondents
actually filed a MR. It must be noted that the 16 July 2003 Order of the
trial court is in itself an order resolving the motion for reconsideration
dismissing the respondents Notice of Appeal in Civil Case. In any event, the
filing of a MR before availing of the remedy of certiorari is not always sine
qua non. The rules admit of certain exceptions. The instant case is one of
those. In this case, a motion for reconsideration would be useless in the
light of the declaration of the RTC that the Order of 16 July 2003 is final
and executory.
(2) The Rule regarding change of counsel is provided under Rule 138,
Section 26 thereat. It states: “SEC. 26. Change of attorneys. An attorney
may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the
written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time
from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client,
should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing,
determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the
name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the
court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be
given to the adverse party.”
Admittedly, Atty. Guillermo filed a Notice of Withdrawal on 4 October 2002.
The withdrawal notwithstanding, the trial court in its Order dated 22
November 2002 initially allowed the appeal of the respondents in Special
Proceedings, although it rejected the appeal in Civil Case. Be that as it
may, we are inclined to allow the Notice of Appeal for both cases inspite of
the obvious procedural lapse. When non-compliance with the Rules of
Court is not intended for delay or does not prejudice the adverse party, the
dismissal of an appeal on a mere technicality may be stayed and the court
may, in its sound discretion, exercise its equity jurisdiction. This lack of
intention to delay is shown by the fact that the Notice of Appeal was filed
on 5 October 2002, or only a difference of one day from the filing by Atty.
Guillermo of his Notice of Withdrawal. The emerging trend in our
jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of
technicalities. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and
even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about
procedural lapses that do not really impair the administration of justice
especially when such strict compliance was apparently relaxed by the trial
court itself when it initially gave due course to the Notice of Appeal. If the
rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigation it is because of
the higher objective they seek which is the protection of the substantive
rights of the parties. Under the circumstances we find that the notice of
appeal signed by Atty. Guillermo should be considered valid.
(3) No. The records show that on 2 October 2002, the respondents
received a copy of the decision. They had up to 17 October 2002 to file a
Notice of Appeal and to pay the appropriate docket fees. It is not disputed
that said docket fees were paid only 23 October 2002, or six days after the
lapse of the period within which to pay the said docket fees. The reason
advanced by respondents for the delayed payment is poverty and
ignorance of legal procedures.
5
Rule 41, Section 4, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, states: “SEC. 4.
Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking
an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the
record on appeal.”
The failure of the appellant to pay the docket fees is a ground for the
dismissal of the appeal under Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the same rule which
states: “Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as
provided in section 5 of Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule 41.”
In all the cases mentioned by the SC (in this case), what emerges from all
of the above is that the rules of procedure in the matter of paying the
docket fees must be followed. However, there are exceptions to the
stringent requirement as to call for a relaxation of the application of the
rules, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a
litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with
the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default;
(4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of
the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence without appellants fault; (10) peculiar legal and
equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved;
and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the
attendant circumstances. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the
rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. Anyone
seeking exemption from the application of the Rule has the burden of
proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant such
departure.
In the case at bar, respondents were delayed in the payment of docket
fees for six (6) days only. The reason advanced by them was because of
poverty. Evidently, in the cases where the Supreme Court disallowed the
late payment of docket fees, the tardiness was for a significant period of
time. Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, it will be
extremely harsh for the Court to take a lackadaisical attitude towards the
cause of the respondents. We are convinced of the fastidiousness of the
Court of Appeals decision.
(4) Badillo vs. Tayag;
By: Lapuz, Jesus Jr. Ros
Doctrine: Insofar as appeals from the MTC to the RTC are concerned, the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure do not mandate the dismissal of an appeal as
a consequence of the nonpayment of the required fee. The State is not
required to file a bond for the obvious reason that it is capable of paying its
obligation.
Facts: A parcel of land, claimed to be owned by the petitioners, was part
of the Bagong Silang Resettlement Project (BSRP) of the NHA pursuant to
Presidential Proclamation No. 843 issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on April 26, 1971. NHA then developed and subdivided the land
into smaller lots that were allocated, awarded and distributed to qualified
beneficiaries.
Petitioners are plaintiffs in the case where MTC of San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan ordered the NHA to vacate the disputed land; to return possession
thereof to petitioners; to pay rental for its use and occupation at the rate of
P10 per square meter per month; and to shoulder the attorney’s fees, the
litigation expenses and the costs of suit.
Thereafter, the Writ of Execution was actually issued by the MTC on May
30, 2000. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff served a Notice of Garnishment of
NHA’s funds in the Landbank of the Philippines. The bank, however,
refused to release the garnished amount.
On June 9, 2000, the NHA filed a Motion to set aside the Writ of Execution
and the Notice of Garnishment. The Motion was, however, denied by the
MTC in its June 23, 2000 Order. Acting on the NHA Petition, RTC Executive
Judge Danio A. Manalastas issued a 72-hour Temporary Restraining Order.
Thereafter, the case was assigned to RTC Branch 79, which issued the first
assailed July 19, 2000 Order annulling the Writ. Upon transmittal of the
records from the MTC, the case was raffled to RTC Branch 11, which issued
the second assailed October 23, 2000 Decision.
Two consolidated petitions for review seek to set aside two rulings of the
RTC Malolos, Bulacan.
6
Issues:
1. Whether the failure of the NHA to pay the appellate docket fee
within the fifteen-day reglementary period is a ground to dismiss
its appeal?
Held: No. Although NHA is a GOCC that is required to pay legal fees under
Sec 21 of Rule 141 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it contends that it
is exempt from paying all kinds of fees and charges, because it performs
governmental functions. It cites Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico, which
holds that the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a GOCC, is exempt from
paying docket fees whenever it files a suit in relation to its governmental
functions
Insofar as appeals from the MTC to the RTC are concerned, the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure do not mandate the dismissal of an appeal as a
consequence of the nonpayment of the required fee.
In this case, upon filing of NHA of its appeal, the MTC then and there lost
its jurisdiction. The MTC therefore acted without jurisdiction in issuing the
May 23, 2000 Order and the May 30, 2000 Writ of Execution.
2. Whether it was proper for RTC Branch 11 to delete the rentals
awarded by the MTC?
Held: Such bond is required to assure the payment of damages to the
winning party in case the appeal is found frivolous. When a case involves
provable rents or damages incurred by a government-owned or controlled
corporation, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines.
When the State litigates, it is not required to put up a bond for damages or
even an appeal bond -- either directly or indirectly through its authorized
officers -- because it is presumed to be always solvent.
Again, the State is not required to file a bond for the obvious reason that it
is capable of paying its obligation; therefore, in any event, the NHA has
already paid the appellate docket fees and filed the supersedeas bond as
ordered by the RTC, albeit late.
 (5) Universal Far East Corp vs. CA;
By: Radovan
D:Where a motion for execution pending appeal was filed before the
perfection of an appeal by the other party, the trial court still has
jurisdiction to grant the motion for execution.
F: This case is about an execution pending appeal under the Interim Rules
and the Judiciary Reorganization Law. The lower court rendered a decision
dated December 28, 1982, ordering Ching to pay Universal Far East
Corporation P162,978.12 plus 14% interest per annum from November,
1977 and P10,000 as attorney’s fees.
the corporation received a copy of the decision on January 14, 1983. Three
days later, or on January 17, it filed a motion for execution pending appeal
on the ground that Ching was insolvent. The motion was served on Ching
on January 17. It was set for hearing on January 19, 1983 but it was not
then heard because on that date the Presiding Judge and other Judges
were in conference with the Chief Justice regarding the judiciary revamp
(p. 230, Record). It was reset for March 4, 1983. Ching asked for 15 days
extension from January 19 to file his opposition.
In the meantime, Ching, who received a copy of the decision on January
12, 1983, filed his notice of appeal on January 27 or on the 15th day. He
mailed his opposition on February 3, 1983. On March 4, the motion was
heard. Ching was given five days to file a rejoinder to the corporation’s
reply but he did not file any rejoinder. Instead, he filed on March 23 a
manifestation wherein he contended that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the
rules of Court the trial court had no more jurisdiction to grant execution
pending appeal because his appeal had long been perfected.
The trial court granted the execution pending appeal on May 30, 1983, or
more than four months after Ching’s appeal was perfected, on the ground
of Ching’s insolvency. It required the corporation to post a bond in the sum
of P280,866.72.
CA: Set aside the order of execution issued by the RTC, on the ground
that its was issued after the perfection of the appeal, thus the trial court
had no more jurisdiction over the case.
I: Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the order of execution
pending appeal?
7
H: YES. The Trial court had jurisdiction to issue the order of execution
pending appeal because the motion for execution was filed before Ching
had perfected his appeal and it was resolved before the trial court had
acted on Ching’s appeal and elevated the record to the Appellate Court
(See sec. 23, Interim Rules). The execution pending appeal has to be a
part of the records to be elevated to the Appellate Court. Said motion could
not have been dispatched by the trial court within the reglementary fifteen-
day period for appeal because respondent Ching himself asked for an
extension of fifteen days to file his opposition. As already noted, he filed
his opposition on February 3, 1984 after the perfection of his appeal. He
did not question the trial court’s jurisdiction.
Moreover, the revamp law and its Interim Rules do not require that the
motion for execution be resolved within the fifteen-day period. It should be
noted that under the Rules of Court, where appeal is by record on appeal,
the trial court loses jurisdiction upon approval of the record on appeal and
appeal bond (Sec. 9, Rule 41, Rules of Court). That may take place long
after the expiration of the thirty- day reglementary period for appeal.
(6) PEDRO M. ESTELLA and FE K. ESTELLA vs. CA and SPOUSES
RICARDO M. PEREZ and LOLITA DIAZ
By: Kaye
D: The rule that it is the duty of the appellant to prosecute his appeal with
reasonable diligence is still a sound rule. He cannot simply "fold his hands"
and say that it is the duty of the clerk of court to have his case promptly
submitted to the appellate court for the disposition of his appeal.
F: Rosario N. Concepcion (Concepcion), the original owner of the disputed
residential land with a three-door apartment thereon, sold the property to
petitioner spouses Estella who registered the sale with the Register of
Deeds of Manila which then issued TCT No. 100990 in their favor. However,
petitioners failed to secure a new tax declaration or assessment in their
name, for which reason said property remained for taxation purposes in
the name of vendor Concepcion. Seven years after, the City Treasurer of
Manila, sent to the Concepcion, notices of tax delinquency. No payment
was made. Consequently, the property was sold at a public auction, where
private respondent Ricardo Perez (Ricardo) was the highest bidder. The
one-year period having lapsed without any redemption, Ricardo registered
the certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds of Manila and had it
annotated at the back of TCT No. 100990.
The Register of Deeds of Manila advised petitioner Fe Estella to surrender
their TCT No. 100990 for the purpose of annotating the certificate of sale in
favor of Perez. Petitioner spouses replied that the tax sale was without
legal basis and that they were never delinquent in the payment of the
realty taxes. Petitioners subsequently paid the real estate taxes.
Meanwhile, the final deed of sale in favor of Ricardo was executed.
Petitioners then sued private respondents, City Treasurer, the members of
the Auction Bidding Committee and the Register of Deeds of Manila for
quieting of title, annulment of public auction sale, certificate of bill
of sale, transfer certificate of title, damages, with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order.
RTC: Ruled in favor of respondents and declared that the auction tax sale
and the final deed of sale was valid.
Petitioners received a copy of the decision on March 25, 1985 and filed a
notice of appeal on March 29, 1985. On April 1, 1985, the RTC ordered
the records of the case forwarded to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
After a period of 1 year, no records were received by the appellate court.
Ricardo then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.
CA: Granted the motion to dismiss for failure of the appellants (petitioners)
to prosecute, specifically on the ground that the record on appeal was not
received within 30 days. The CA anchored its ruling on the following
provisions of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1, Rule 50. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be
dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the ground of…c) Failure of the appellant to prosecute his
appeal under Section 3 of Rule 46…
Section 3, Rule 46. Order of transmittal of record. — If the record on
appeal is not received by the Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days after
the approval thereof, the appellee may, upon notice to the appellant, move
the court to grant an order directing the clerk of the lower court forthwith
to transmit such record on appeal or to declare the same abandoned for
failure to prosecute.
I: Whether the CA is correct in disallowing the petitioners’ appeal?
8
H: YES. Although record on appeal as a requisite for the perfection
of an appeal has been eliminated under Section 39 of BP Blg. 129,
petitioners, nonetheless, failed to prosecute their appeal with
reasonable diligence.
The CA’s outright dismissal of petitioners' appeal based on the non-
transmittal of the record on appeal pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46
of the Revised Rules of Court, was erroneous.
The record on appeal as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal has
been eliminated under Section 39 of BP Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980) and the Interim Rules and Guidelines which were already in
force when respondent appellate court handed down its dismissal
resolution on September 12, 1986.
Sec. 39. Appeals- .... No record on appeal shall be required to take an
appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted, ... (BP Blg.
129)
20. Procedure for taking appeal. — An appeal ... from the regional trial
courts to the Intermediate Appellate Court in actions or proceedings
originally filed in the former shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the court that rendered the judgment or order appealed from. (Interim
Rules and Guidelines)
Be that as it may, the appeal by petitioners should have been
disallowed for a different reason: petitioners' gross inaction for a
period which exceeded one year.
Records show that the trial court had ordered the records of the case
forwarded to the appellate court. Conceding to the point that it is the clerk
of court who is primarily responsible for seeing to it that the records of
appealed cases are properly sent to the appellate court without delay (and
having failed to do so subjects him to administrative liability), it behooves
the litigants to be more vigilant of their rights. They should take it upon
themselves to call the attention of the trial court as to any delay in action
over their cases. The rule that it is the duty of the appellant to prosecute
his appeal with reasonable diligence is still a sound rule. He cannot simply
"fold his hands" and say that it is the duty of the clerk of court to have his
case promptly submitted to the appellate court for the disposition of his
appeal.
The instant petition is DENIED. Considering the branch clerk of court's
apparent contributory role in the delay in the transmittal of the records to
the Court of Appeals, Atty. (now Judge) Cesar P. Javier is ordered to SHOW
CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him for such delay.
(7) Jimmy Banting v. Spouses Maglapuz
By: Apol Pen
Doctrine: Appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 filed with the CA is
the appropriate remedy from decisions or final orders issued by the RTC in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. A memorandum on appeal or an
appeal brief is vital to an appeal for only errors specifically assigned and
properly argued in the brief or memorandum will be considered in the
decision on the merits, except those affecting jurisdiction over the subject
matter as well as plain and clerical errors. Hence, the lack of a
memorandum on appeal is ground for the dismissal of an appeal.
The requirement under Section 412 of the Local Government Code that a
case be referred for conciliation before the Lupon as a precondition to its
filing in court applies only to those cases where the real parties-in-interest
actually reside in the same city or municipality.
Facts: Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. An
ejectment complaint was filed with the MeTC entitled, “Sps. Jose Maglapuz
& Raymunda Maglapuz v. Jimmy Banting”. It involved the right to
possession of a parcel of land registered in the name of the heirs of
Victoriana Ramos. Raymunda Maglapuz is purportedly one of the heirs. The
complaint alleged that Spouses Reyes paid rent to the Spouses Maglapuz
for the use of the property. Spouses Reyes stopped paying rent; that
spouses Maglapuz served a letter on Spouses Reyes demanding that the
latter pay their rentals and vacate the Property, that when no payment was
made, Spouses Maglapuz filed said Civil Case against Spouses Reyes
impleading Jimmy Banting with whom Spouses Reyes entered into a
partnership for the operation of a grocery store on the subject property.
MeTC rendered judgment in favor of Spouses Maglapuz. Spouses Reyes
and Banting appealed to the RTC which issued an order directing the
parties to file their respective memoranda on appeal within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof. The records reveal that defendants Spouses Reyes
and Banting received copy of the order on October 7, 2002. Plaintiffs
9
Spouses Maglapuz filed a Memorandum on Appeal. Spouses Reyes and
Banting did not file any memorandum. RTC dismissed the Appeal. Atty.
Dionisio Landero, collaborating counsel of the counsel of record, Atty. Jose
Espinas, filed an Entry of Appearance with Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Late Memorandum for Defendants, he
attached thereto a “Memorandum for Defendant Spouses Alfred Reyes and
Maxima Arceno Reyes.” Counsel explained that the delay in filing the
memorandum on appeal was due to excusable negligence attributable to
his clients who called his attention to the need to file a memorandum on
appeal only on November 27, 2002. He asked that the memorandum on
appeal be admitted for it is meritorious in substance. The RTC rebuffed the
motion for reconsideration. It held in its order that the delay in filing the
memorandum on appeal was due to the inexcusable negligence of both
counsel and clients who were given sufficient notice to file memorandum
but, for lack of coordination, failed to do so. Spouses Reyes and Banting
received copy of this order on January 20, 2003. On that same day, they
filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal. The RTC, in an order, disapproved
the Notice of Appeal for failure of Spouses Reyes and Banting to pay
appellate court docket fees. On the next day, it filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that appellate court docket fees were
actually paid on January 21, 2003 as shown by copies of receipts attached
to the motion. The RTC granted said Motion for Reconsideration, in effect
giving due course to the Notice of Appeal to the CA. They filed on February
24, 2003 a Petition for Review with the CA and paid on the same day the
corresponding appellate docket fees. They also served copies of the
petition on the RTC and the adverse parties. The CA dismissed the petition.
Petitioners Spouses Reyes and Banting filed a Motion for Reconsideration
from the foregoing resolution but this was denied by the CA. Undaunted,
petitioners’ newly appointed counsel filed an Urgent Motion to Admit
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a Motion for Reconsideration
attached thereto. The CA merely took note of this Motion.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing
the Petition for Review of petitioners; and
(2) Whether or not MeTC had no jurisdiction to issue the August 13, 2002
Decision for respondents failed to comply with the requirement of barangay
conciliation; and that the case was actually one of accion publiciana
cognizable by the RTC.
Held: (1) YES. The Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing the Petition
for Review of the Petitioners. Appeal by petition for review under Rule 42
filed with the CA is the appropriate remedy from decisions or final orders
issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. An order of
the RTC dismissing an appeal from a decision of the MeTC for failure of
appellant to file a memorandum on appeal is one such final order. It is
appealable by petition for review under Rule 42.
In the instant case, the November 21, 2002 and January 7, 2003 RTC
orders dismissed petitioners’ Appeal from the August 13, 2002 MeTC
Decision for their failure to file a memorandum on appeal. These orders
were therefore appealable by petition for review with the CA. The Notice of
Appeal petitioners initially filed was clearly erroneous. Petitioners sought to
rectify their error by filing the Petition for Review with the CA on February
24, 2003.
Specifically, we set the period to appeal at 15 days from notice of the
decision or final order appealed from or, where a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is seasonably filed from the said decision or final order,
within a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial or reconsideration. Applying the foregoing rule to the
present case, petitioners should have filed the Petition for Review on
February 5, 2003. To recall, petitioners received notice of the November
21, 2002 RTC Order on December 4, 2002. Even before that, however,
they were able to file an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration on December
2, 2002. This was denied by the RTC in its January 7, 2003 Order. Notice
of said Order was received by petitioners on January 20, 2003. Hence, they
had a fresh period of 15 days or until February 5, 2003 to file a petition for
review.
Petitioners filed instead a Notice of Appeal on January 20, 2003. Such
mode of appeal under Section 2 (a) of Rule 41 was faulty. Recourse to it
did not toll the running of the period within which to file a petition for
review. It is axiomatic that a fatally defective or erroneous appeal or
motion will not toll the running of a period to appeal. A detour from the
proper course of an appeal will not earn for the errant party a fresh start.
The Petition for Review they filed with the CA on February 24, 2003 was
out of time. Moreover, the said Petition for Review was fatally defective.
The appeal was deemed abandoned when petitioners failed to file their
memorandum on appeal despite sufficient time given to them by the court.
A memorandum on appeal or an appeal brief is vital to an appeal for only
errors specifically assigned and properly argued in the brief or
memorandum will be considered in the decision on the merits, except those
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter as well as plain and clerical
errors. Hence, the lack of a memorandum on appeal is ground for the
dismissal of an appeal.
(2) NO. It is settled that the requirement under Section 412 of the Local
Government Code that a case be referred for conciliation before the Lupon
as a precondition to its filing in court applies only to those cases where the
real parties-in-interest actually reside in the same city or municipality.
Here, the complaint filed with the MeTC specifically alleged that the parties
reside in different barangays and cities. As to the jurisdiction of the MeTC,
this can be determined from the complaint itself. It plainly states that the
last demand was made by respondents upon petitioners on August 9,
1999. The complaint for ejectment was filed on September 21, 1999 or
before the lapse of the one-year period. It was therefore properly filed with
the MeTC.
(8) Gonzales vs. Gonzales
By: Roma
DOCTRINE: It is obligatory on the part of respondent, being the appellant
in the court a quo, to submit or file a memorandum of appeal within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the order enjoining the filing of said pleading.
FACTS:
In a case for ejectment filed by petitioner against respondent, respondent
moved to suspend the proceedings before the MTC on the ground that
there is a pending case of annulment of title in the RTC against the
petitioner which she filed. MTC denied the aforementioned motion as suits
for annulment of sale and title does not abate ejectment actions respecting
the same property.
MTC rendered a judgment in favor of petitioner ordering respondent to
vacate and surrender the property, and pay rentals until she has vacated.
Respondent appealed to the RTC, which directed her to submit a
memorandum, warning her that failing to do so shall be a cause to dismiss
the appeal.

10
Instead of filing the same, she moved to consolidate the present case with
the annulment of title case pending. Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution,
alleging respondent's failure to file a supersedeas bond and deposit rentals.
The motion to consolidate was denied, and the writ of execution was
issued. The appeal was then dismissed for failing to file the memorandum
of appeal. Two Motions for Reconsideration by the respondent was denied
by the RTC, prompting her to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari before
the CA. She argued that court a quo erred in dismissing her appeal
considering that she has opted to adopt her position paper filed before the
MTC as her memorandum of appeal. This was granted by the CA. Petitioner
filed in the SC a Rule 45 Petition for Review.
ISSUE: WON the CA committed reversible error in reversing and setting
aside the order of the court a quo dismissing respondents appeal for failure
to file the memorandum of appeal.
HELD: Yes. Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provide:
SEC. 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the
appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors
imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to
the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellants
Memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the
appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the
appeal.
The raison d'tre for such necessity was made clear in Enriquez v. Court of
Appeals:
[I]n appeals from inferior courts to the RTC, the appellants brief is
mandatory for the assignment of errors is vital to the decision of the
appeal on the merits. This is because on appeal only errors specifically
assigned and properly argued in the brief or memorandum will be
considered except those affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter as
well as plain and clerical errors. Otherwise stated, an appellate court has
no power to resolve an unassigned error, which does not affect the court’s
jurisdiction over the subject matter, save for a plain or clerical error.
11
It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of
substantial justice due to legal technicalities should be avoided (citation
omitted). But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely statutory
right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down
in the Rules of Court (citation omitted). In other words, he who seeks to
avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules (citation omitted). This
the petitioner failed to do when she did not submit her memorandum of
appeal x x x. That she lost her case is not the trial courts fault but her own.
Though, as pointed out by the CA in its decision, nothing in the aforecited
provision prohibits the adoption of a party’s position paper earlier filed,
such option must be manifested to the court a quo during the period within
which to file the required memorandum of appeal. In the case at bar, the
records of the case bear out the fact that when respondent manifested her
desire to adopt her position paper in the MTC, the dismissal of the appeal
had already been ordered.
(9) Eddie Herrera vs. Teodora Bollos
GR 138258 January 18, 2002
Digest by Valencia, Emmanuelle Nicole
Doctrines: Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.
The concept of damages in an action for forcible entry and detainer cases
mean “rents” or “reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the premises,” “fair rental value of the property.”
Before taking judicial notice, the court must “allow the parties to be heard
thereon.” Hence, there can be no judicial notice on rental value of the
premises in question without supporting evidence.
Facts: Teodora Bollos filed a complaint before the MTC for forcible detainer
against Eddie Herrera, alleging that he entered and occupied her
sugarland, through stealth and strategy, taking advantage of here absence.
Teodora claims to have inherited the subject land as the sole heir of her
deceased father, Alfonso Bollos.
Eddie Herrera denied the allegations against him, affirming that he entered
and occupied the land, but that the land was owned by Conrado Bollos, the
brother of Alfonso. He further asserted that his occupation was by virtue of
a contract of lease between Conrado Bollos and Ernesto Tijing - Herrera is
Tijing’s overseer on the land.
The complaint was amended twice, to include both Tijing and Conrado
Bollos as parties.
The MTC dismissed the case. The RTC reversed the MTC, ruling in favour of
Teodora and ordering Herrera, Tijing and Conrado to solidarity pay
damages and rent. The CA affirmed the RTC, but struck out the award of
actual and moral damages.
Issues:
(1) Does the MTC have jurisdiction over a forcible entry case, wherein
the second amended complaint, impleading a new defendant, was filed
beyond one year from dispossession?
(2) May the RTC award moral and exemplary damages against the
defendants in an appeal from the dismissal of a forcible entry case by the
MTC?
Ruling / Ratio:
(1) Yes. The basic rule that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint at
the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
In this case, Teodora’s complaint, both original and amended, contains
sufficient allegations constituting an action for forcible entry. The complaint
alleged prior physical possession de facto, which Hererra disturbed by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, against the will or without
the consent of Teodora, sufficient to constitute an action for forcible entry.
(2) No. The concept of damages in an action for forcible entry and
detainer cases means rents or reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises, or the fair rental value of the property.
12
In this case, the MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, and the
RTC reversed the decision, and awarded damages. In case of reversal, the
case should be remanded to the MTC for further proceedings.
A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy.
The court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which
are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions. Before taking such judicial
notice, the court must “allow the parties to be heard thereon.” Hence,
there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in
question without supporting evidence.
RULE 41 RTC to CA
(1) Miranda v. Ca; Arid
By: Arid, Hannah Mhae G.
Doctrine: The pertinent rule accordingly recognizes that in actions
involving the rendition of an accounting (as in the case at bar), an appeal
may be taken from the judgment ordering the accounting and directs that
during the pendency of the appeal or even before the appeal is taken, the
rendition of the accounting shall not be stayed, unless otherwise ordered
by the trial court. Thus, if the judgment directing an accounting is upheld
on appeal, there would be no time lost and the accounting as rendered
could be passed upon by the trial court at the stage of execution of
judgment; and if the judgment were reversed on appeal, reimbursement of
the actual expenses incurred by the successful appellant in rendering the
accounting could be awarded.
Facts: Petitioner Vicente Miranda was appointed as the administrator of
the deceased Dydongco. In 1962, petitioner filed in the CFI Cebu a Civil
Case against the private respondents (or their predecessors) for recovery
of properties of the decedent alleged to have been fraudulently and in bad
faith and in breach of their fiduciary trust, concealed, appropriated and
converted as their own by respondents. The suit for recovery had been
filed by petitioner-administrator after the principal respondents pursuant to
Rule 88, section 6 had been cited by the intestate court to appear and to
be examined as to documents, papers, properties, funds and other
valuables deposited and left in trust with them by the decedent before his
death. petitioner-administrator alleged that "prior to and at the time of his
death in China sometime in 1941, Hilarion Dydongco, who resided in the
Philippines since the beginning of the century, had, in Butuan, Agusan and
Cebu City, well-developed and established business and commercial
enterprises with substantial bank deposits and about 127 parcels of land or
property; that Hilarion Dydongco went to China, in 1934, and, thereafter,
became seriously ill; that, at that time, his children, Dy Chun and Dy Suat
Hong (both defendants in said case R-7793) as well as Dy Sick Lee (who
died subsequently and is not a defendant in case No. R-7793) and his
protegees Dy Bee and Dy Seko were working as his Manager and/or
employees in the aforementioned business establishments; that taking
advantage of the absence and bad condition of the health of Hilarion
Dydongco, particularly of his subsequent death, the defendants therein
took over said business, including its assets, goods, merchandise, chattels,
machinery, stock-in-trade, cash on hand and in banks, amounts receivable
and other properties of the deceased, as well as his store known as
"Dydongco Store," and its branches, and organized first, a fake partnership
with the business name of "Agusan Commercial Company," and then the
East Mindanao Lumber Co., which operated and did business, with the
capital, assets, stock-in-trade, merchandise, funds and other property of
said deceased; that with funds belonging to the latter, the defendants
therein moreover purchased several parcels of land, on one of which a 20-
door apartment building was constructed, with funds of the same nature,
and let to Chinese tenants and other lessees; that the defendants therein
had received and are receiving the rentals, earnings and profits derived
from said business and property of the deceased; and that said defendants
hold, manage and operate the aforementioned business, properties and
income in trust for the Intestate Estate of Hilarion Dydongco but have not
rendered any accounting thereof." Petitioner-administrator prayed that
"judgment be rendered declaring that said business, assets, income and
other property, are in the possession and under the management and
control of said defendants as mere trustees thereof, and sentencing them
to turnover and deliver the same to him, as Administrator of the Intestate
Estate of Hilarion Dydongco as well as to render accounts and to execute
the corresponding deeds of conveyance, in addition to paying damages and
the costs."
RTC: After trial, Hon. Jose M. Mendoza (as presiding judge in whose court
the intestate proceedings for settlement of the decedent's estate were
likewise pending) rendered a sixty-nine page decision on July 26, 1965
finding that most of petitioner- administrator's allegations had been duly
proven and sentenced respondents (as defendants) to deliver to petitioner-
administrator "all properties found by the court to belong to the estate,"
"to render full, accurate and correct accounting of all the fuits and proceeds
of (such) properties" during their period of possession ("from 1935 until
13
the present date") and to pay P60,000 exemplary damages to the two
heiresses found to have been defrauded and P30,000 attorney's fees and
costs.
Respondents, After submitting their record on appeal, however, they filed a
motion for reconsideration and new trial which was heard and denied per
Judge Mendoza's order of October 18, 1965, Respondents thereafter
sought to revive their record on appeal and submit additional pages thereof
but Judge Mendoza held that their filing of their motion for reconsideration
was an abandonment of their proposed earlier appeal and that his decision
had become final and executory.
Reconsideration having been denied, herein respondents then filed on
December 21, 1965 a petition with this Court for the issuance of writ of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul Judge Mendoza's orders
disallowing their appeal with mandatory injunction to give due course to
their appeal and this Court meanwhile enjoined the enforcement and
execution of the challenged orders. The case was docketed as Dy Chun et
al. vs. Mendoza. The Court in that case ruled that "(A)lthough declaring
that most of the properties involved in the litigation belong to the estate of
Hilarion Dydongco, the decision of respondent Judge, dated July 30, 1965,
moreover, required petitioners herein to render a full, accurate and
complete accounting of all the fruits and proceeds' of said properties. That
such decision is interlocutory in character, because it does not dispose of
the action in its entirety and leaves something to be done to complete the
relief sought and that, accordingly, it is not appealable, until after the
adjudications necessity the completion of said relief shall have been mad.
Indeed, the very counsel for petitioners herein now accept this view and
concede that petitioners' appeal had been taken prematurely."
The case was remanded to the Cebu court of first instance as the court of
origin — for the rendition of "a full, accurate and complete of all the fruits
and proceeds" of the properties declared in Judge Mendoza's July 26, 1965
decision to belong to the decedent's estate, i.e. for "the adjudications
necessary for the completion of said relief (as granted in the decision)".
Judge Mendoza was succeeded by Judge Tantuico because the former was
promoted as associate justice of CA and thereafter retired at the age of
70). Respondent judge Mendoza thereafter altered and changed his
predecessor Judge Mendoza's original decision of July 26, 1965 in his
amended decision of October 4, 1969 by excluding certain valuable
properties from the estate of the decedent and absolving certain
respondents from the obligation of turning. owner the possession to
petitioner, reversing Judge Mendoza's judgment holding respondent Dy
Suat Hong to be a builder in bad faith, and reducing the P60,000
exemplary damages to P30,000. Acting on petitioner's motion for rendition
of the accounting, he ordered respondents to submit "the written inventory
and accounting [of the remaining properties held to belong to the estate of
the decedent] to this court within sixty (60) days from receipt of this
judgment for approval." (see paragraph 5 of his amended decision). He
further fixed a period of forty-five (45) days from receipt of judgment for
respondents to deliver to petitioner "all the other properties not affected by
the herein amendments and found by the court in the July 26, 1965
judgment to belong to the estate of Hilarion Dydongco."
Issues:
1. Whether or not the decision of Judge Mendoza in the original case
granting petitioner administrator the recovery of the properties which were
adjudged to rightfully belong to the decedent's estate and for accounting of
the fruits and proceeds thereof was "interlocutory in character" and was
"not appealable, until after the adjudications necessary for the completion
of said relief shall have been made".
2. Whether or not respondent Judge Tantuico as Judge Mendoza's
successor had the authority, four years later and beyond the thirty-day
reglementary period and for as long as the final accounts have not been
rendered and approved by him, to review, revise or reverse the original
decision on the merits or to "promulgate another decision" as if it were a
mere interlocutory order which affects preliminary or incidental matters
and does not determine the dispute between the parties on its merits.
Held:
1. No, the decision rendered by Judge Mendoza is final and not
interlocutory, hence, appealable.
The original decision of July 26, 1965 of Judge Mendoza is manifestly a
judgment determining the merits of the case, in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of court
— as defined in and required by Rule 36, section 1. This Court in thus
remanding the case for the rendition of the accounting "for the completion
of said relief" awarded in Judge Mendoza's judgment on the merits could
14
not conceivably be misconstrued, as did appellate court, to give respondent
judge or whoever presides the lower court carte blanche to exercise
reviewing if not supervisory authority over the judicial determination and
findings on the merits of his predecessor and to "promulgate another
decision" in lieu thereof as if Judge Mendoza's basic decision on the merits
were a mere interlocutory order dealing with postponements, extensions,
temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions, or deferring action
on, or denying, motions to dismiss or provisional remedies applied for,
instead of a definitive determination, of the main dispute between the
parties. No case or precedent can be cited where the trial court, as did
respondent judge in the case at bar as sustained by respondent appellate
court, departed from the purpose of the remand to receive and act on the
accounting as ordered in the basic judgment so that both could be the
subject of a single appeal (and instead altered and revised the judgment
itself and the bases for the accounting ordered).
2. No, respondent judge exceeded and went beyond his authority and
Jurisdiction when he amended his predecessor's judgment on the merits in
major particulars and issued an amended decision, and notwithstanding
that the case involves properties undisputedly (as far as both judges were
concerned) fraudtlently concealed, misappropriated and absconded from
the decedent's estate (as a consequence of which P60,000-exemplary
damages were awarded in Judge Mendoza's original decision and retained
in half the amount by respondent judge in his amended decision), ordered
the exclusion of several valuable properties from those ordered delivered to
the estate on the basis of his own substituted impression (from his reading
of the record) of the credibility of witnesses seen, heard and observed by
Judge Mendoza as the trial judge and found by the latter to be totally
discredited (having shown in the record "their utter disregard and
disrespect not only to truth but also to the meaning and value of the oath
required of witnesses" and their being "sadly wanting ... in their sense of
truth, probity and sacredness of an oath. To commit a lie is but human,
this court realizes, but to lie brazenly and knowingly is humanly
unforgivable".
Rule 39, section 4 which specifically governs actions for accounting
expressly provides that "unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment
or order directing an accounting in an action, shall not be stayed after its
rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an
appeal," as follows:
Section 4. Injunction, receivership and accounting, not stayed. — Unless
otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an action for injunction or in
a receivership action, or a judgment or order directing an accounting in an
action, shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken
or during the pendency of an appeal. The trial court, however, in its
discretion, when an appeal is taken from a judgment granting, dissolving
or denying an injunction, may make an order suspending, modifying,
restoring, or granting such injunction during the pendency of the appeal,
upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it may consider proper for the
security of the rights of the adverse party."(Rule 39)
The pertinent rule accordingly recognizes that in actions involving the
rendition of an accounting (as in the case at bar), an appeal may be taken
from the judgment ordering the accounting and directs that during the
pendency of the appeal or even before the appeal is taken, the rendition of
the accounting shall not be stayed, unless otherwise ordered by the trial
court. Thus, if the judgment directing an accounting is upheld on appeal,
there would be no time lost and the accounting as rendered could be
passed upon by the trial court at the stage of execution of judgment; and if
the judgment were reversed on appeal, reimbursement of the actual
expenses incurred by the successful appellant in rendering the accounting
could be awarded.
Here, the rendition of the accounting as a consequence and incident of
Judge Mendoza's judgment declaring the properties to belong to the
decedent's estate and ordering their delivery to petitioner-administrator
was not ordered stayed during the pendency of the appeal taken by
respondents. In fact, Judge Mendoza had ruled that the proposed appeal
was filed out of time and that his judgment had become final and
executory, and the accounting that his judgment had become final and
executory, and the accounting that he ordered would have been rendered
at the stage of execution of judgment
The Supreme Court further explained that if we upheld respondent judge's
authority to change and alter the basic and original judgment at will for as
long as the accounting ordered has not been rendered, then as there is
now another judge presiding the trial court since respondent Judge
Tantuico's promotion in 1973 to the Court of Appeals, such successor
judge of respondent Judge Tantuico must likewise be deemed to have the
authority at will to review, revise, change, alter and reverse both the
original decision of Judge Mendoza of July 26, 1965 and the amended
decision of October 4, 1969 of respondent judge and "promulgate another
15
decision" as per his own criterion of the evidence (and applying respondent
judge's same yardstick that it is only "fit and proper" that the presiding
judge "believe in every part of the judgment lie is to execute") including or
excluding certain properties from those ordered returned to the estate,
with the frightening consequence that the accounting would never be
rendered, the judgment would never be final for purposes of appeal and
the litigation would never end (Witness this case commenced 14 years ago
in 1962 for recovery of properties found by both Judge Mendoza and
respondent judge to have been fraudulently concealed, misappropriated
and absconded from the estate of the decedent who died 35 years ago in
1941!)
As it is now, if the accounting ever got done, there would be two decisions,
the original decision of Judge Mendoza and the amended decision of
respondent judge, that would be brought up on appeal with the party
favored by one decision assailing the other decision. If respondent judge's
successors in the lower court were to be permitted also to promulgate still
one decision after another as if such decisions on the merits were mere
interlocutory orders subject to the judge's control and amendment, there
would be as many decisions to be taken up on appeal as there were
successor judges inclined to review, revise, and reverse his predecessor's
judgment on the evidence and on the law with none of the parties
adversely affected able to appeal from any of the fluctuating decisions for
as long as the accounting has not been terminated.
Note: This case is one of definitive judgment on the merits rendered after
trial ordering the recovery of properties as prayed for in petitioner's
complaint with payment of exemplary damages and attorney's fees as well
as the accounting of the fruits of the properties wrongfully possessed for so
long by respondents. The mere incident that accounting since 1941 of the
fruits of the properties adjudged to rightfully belong to the decedent's
estate has been ordered as a necessary consequence of the judgment on
the merits — which is merely to implement the judgment, by no means
makes the judgment an interlocutory one subject to change, alteration and
reversion at the discretion and will of the trial judge!
(2) Kho vs. Camacho;
By: Kathrina De Castro
DOCTRINE: whether an appeal involves only question of law or both
questions of fact and law, this question should be left for the determination
of an appellate court and not by the court which rendered the subject
decision appealed from
FACTS: Petitioner Kho issued postdated Manila Bank checks on favor of
Atty. Camacho as payment of attorney’s fees. One of the checks was lost
and Atty. Camacho notified Kho. Atty. Camacho negotiated the 5 checks
with PH Amanah Bank but was returned because Manila Bank was ordered
closed by the Central Bank. Kho refused to replace the checks therefore;
Atty. Camacho filed an action for sum of money. Kho alleged that he was
no obligation to replace the lost check because Atty. Camacho failed to
execute a sworn statement that he lost the check and that the closure of
Manila Bank affecting the 5 remaining checks was beyond his control.
Contending that petitioner’s answer failed to tender a genuine issue,
Camacho moved for a judgment on the pleadings which respondent Judge
Leviste granted in his order. Kho filed a notice of appeal and was granted
by respondent judge. Atty. Camacho filed motion praying that the notice of
appeal be stricken off the record. Respondent judge issued order setting
aside his previous order granting the notice of appeal. Hence the petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge Leviste committed grave abuse of
discretion when he issued order cancelling his previous order approving a
notice of appeal
HELD: The Court has readily observed two very glaring errors committed
by respondent Judge Leviste. First, he listened to Camacho who could not
even distinguish between a petition for certiorari and a petition for review
on certiorari. Secondly, he pre-empted a prerogative that legally pertains
to the Court of Appeals when he disapproved petitioner’s notice of appeal
“believing that only questions of law are involved.”
Concededly, issues that involve pure questions of law are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of this Court, However, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
does not authorize the Trial Court to disallow an appeal’ on the ground that
there is no question of fact, but only a question of law, involved.”
According to the SC there was error committed by Judge Leviste, he should
have sustained the approval of notice of appeal and leave it to the
16
determination of the CA to certify the case to the proper tribunal if
warranted. He has no authority to disapprove the notice of appeal. Under
the present rules, his role is to approve or disapprove the record on appeal
(when required) and the appeal bond, but not a notice of appeal. A notice
of appeal does not require the approval of the trial court.
HOWEVER, the SC ruled that the records before us are sufficient to enable
us to rule on the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings and to
terminate this case once and for all.
The obligation to pay P57,349.00 in attorney’s fees is admitted. The
appropriate checks in payment therefor have been issued. However, one
check was misplaced through the creditor’s fault while the other five were
dishonored because the drawee bank has ceased to operate. A perusal of
petitioner’s answer convinces us that the judgment on the pleadings was
proper. In that pleading, petitioner disavowed any obligation to replace the
useless checks and gratuitously advanced the reason that the bank where
he had deposited his lifetime savings had been closed through no fault of
his. In effect, what petitioner was saying was that Camacho should wait
until he (petitioner) was in a position to pay. This is not a sufficient
controversion of the material allegations in the complaint. Finding no
reversible error in the judgment on the pleadings rendered by respondent
Judge Leviste, the Court considers the same as the final adjudication on
the respective rights of the parties.
(3) Sevilleno vs Carilo
G.R. 146454, 14 September 2007
By: Rhio
Doctrine: The SC summarized the rule on appeals as follows: (1) In all
cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal
may be made to the Court of Appeals by mere notice of appeal where the
appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law; (2) In
all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
where the appellant raises only questions of law, the appeal must be taken
to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
(3) All appeals from judgments rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, regardless of whether the appellant raises questions
of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law, shall be
brought to the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review under Rule
42.
Facts: Pamela and Purita, both surnamed Sevilleno, petitioners, filed with
the RTC a complaint for damages against spouses Carilo (respondents).
Respondents seasonably filed their answer with compulsory counterclaim.
They prayed that the trial court dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of
action.
RTC motu prioprio issued an Order dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC
in an Order. Then, petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
but it was dismissed for being the wrong mode of appeal.
CA: The appellate court held that since the issue being raised is whether
the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, which is a
question of law, the appeal should have been elevated to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the appeal of the petitioners
questioning RTC’s jurisidiction
Held: No. In Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, we summarized the rule on appeals as follows:
(1) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, appeal may be made to the Court of Appeals by mere notice of
appeal where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law;
(2) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
where the appellant raises only questions of law, the appeal must be taken
to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
(3) All appeals from judgments rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, regardless of whether the appellant raises questions
of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law, shall be
brought to the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review under Rule
42.
17
It is not disputed that the issue brought by petitioners to the Court of
Appeals involves the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the
case. We have a long standing rule that a courts jurisdiction over the
subject matter of an action is conferred only by the Constitution or by
statute. Otherwise put, jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of
the action is a matter of law. Consequently, issues which deal with the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a case are pure questions
of law. As petitioners appeal solely involves a question of law, they should
have directly taken their appeal to this Court by filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45, not an ordinary appeal with the Court of
Appeals under Rule 41. Clearly, the appellate court did not err in holding
that petitioners pursued the wrong mode of appeal.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing petitioners appeal.
Section 2, Rule 50 of the same Rules provides that an appeal from the RTC
to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed;
and that an appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall be
dismissed outright.
(4) Foster-Gallego vs. Sps.Galang
By: Lapuz, Jesus Jr. Ros
Doctrine: An appeal from a courts judgment or final order is a statutory
right, subject to the law and the rules of procedure. The perfection of an
appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional. Failure to interpose a timely appeal renders the
assailed decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment or to entertain the appeal.
Facts: VRC acquired several properties at a public auction held by the
Municipal Treasurer of Paranaque. Among these properties was a parcel of
land (Property) in Paranaque. Spouses Galang purchased the Property from
VRC through a Deed of Absolute Sale. The Register of Deeds later issued a
new title over the Property in the name of the Spouses Galang. The
Spouses Galang took possession of the Property and had it declared in
their name for taxation purposes. They diligently paid the corresponding
real property taxes
In April 1989, Romeo Galang came home from Saudi Arabia and discovered
a hollow block fence along the perimeter of the Property which Gallego
built.
Spouses Galang then filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages
against Gallego with RTC Makati.
As Gallego subsequently failed to appear at the pre-trial conference and to
submit his pre-trial brief, RTC issued an Order declaring Gallego in default
and allowing the Spouses Galang to present their evidence ex parte.
However, petitioner Foster-Gallego filed a motion for intervention in an
attempt to adduce his own claim against the same property.
The trial court eventually decided the original case in favor of the Spouses
Galang, and denied petitioners intervention and third-party complaint.
Instead of appealing the order of the trial court denying the intervention,
he instead joined the appeal of Gallegos.
Appellate court affirmed the order of RTC.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
petitioner’s appeal from the trial court’s order disallowing
petitioner’s intervention?
Held: No. Where the lower court's denial of a motion for intervention
amounts to a final order, an appeal is the proper remedy as when the
denial leaves the intervenor without further remedy or resort to judicial
relief. However, the issue of whether petitioner correctly appealed the
assailed orders of the trial court to the Court of Appeals is beside the point
since petitioner did not interpose his own appeal. Petitioner merely joined
Gallegos appeal from the trial court's decision.
A prospective intervenors right to appeal applies only to the denial of his
intervention. Not being a party to the case, a person whose intervention
the court denied has no standing to question the decision of the court.
Petitioner thus had no legal personality to join Gallego in assailing the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner could question only the trial courts
orders denying his intervention and striking off from the records his
answer-in-intervention, not the decision itself.
Moreover, petitioner filed his notice of appeal out of time
18
As petitioner himself admits, he still filed his appeal a day beyond the 25
January 1993 deadline.
An appeal from a courts judgment or final order is a statutory right, subject
to the law and the rules of procedure. The perfection of an appeal within
the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional. Failure to interpose a timely appeal renders the assailed
decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment or to entertain the appeal.
Petitioner lost his right to appeal when he exceeded the fifteen-day period
granted by law. Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on the
thirteenth day of his fifteen-day period to appeal. The filing of a motion for
reconsideration merely suspends the running of the period to appeal. Once
the court denies the motion, the aggrieved party has only the remaining
period from receipt of the order of denial to file his appeal. Petitioner thus
had only two days from his receipt on 23 January 1995 of the trial courts
order denying the reconsideration, or up to 25 January 1995, to perfect his
appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner argues that his tardiness of one day is excusable, and cannot
defeat his property rights. Although the Court, under exceptional
circumstances, has allowed late appeals in the interest of justice and
equity, this only applies to highly meritorious cases to prevent a grave
injustice. That is not the case here.
The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court hearing the case. This discretion, once
exercised, is not reviewable by certiorari or mandamus save in instances
where such discretion is exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
(5) Franco-Cruz vs. CA;
By: Radovan
D: The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is thus not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional
F: A Franco Transit bus collided with a bus and truck wrecker both owned
by respondent Victory Liner, Inc. (Victory Liner).
The collision damaged both vehicles of Victory Liner and killed 5 people.On
February 11, 1998, Victory Liner and respondents (sps. Of the 5 people
who died) filed a complaint, for damages against Maria Liza Franco-Cruz
(petitioner), alleged to be “the registered owner and operator of Franco
Transit.
Petitioner and her counsel failed to appear during the pre-trial scheduled
on June 5, 1998 despite due notice thereof, albeit her counsel filed on even
date an urgent motion to postpone. The motion was denied, however, and
petitioner was declared “as in default” . Respondents at once started
presenting evidence ex parte.
On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June
5, 1998 order declaring her “as in default,” alleging that, inter alia, she had
meritorious defenses that included her not being the real party-in-interest
as she is not the registered owner of the Franco Transit bus but Felicisima
R. Franco.
Petitioner thereafter filed an Omnibus Motion alleging that it was error to
declare her “as in default” for the declaration “as in default” of a defendant
who fails to attend pre-trial had been eliminated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The Omnibus Motion was denied for failure of petitioner’s counsel to appear
at the hearing thereon. Thereafter the RTC rendered a judgment in favor
of respondents. However, one of the respondents filed a motion for Partial
Reconsideration and Clarification, while Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.
RTC: The trial court denied the same for having been filed beyond the 15-
day reglementary period, it having been filed only on the 18th day (May
17, 1999) following the receipt by petitioner’s counsel of a copy of the
decision on April 29, 1999.
CA: On petitioner’s appeal,the Court of Appeals, by Decision of September
22, 2005, dismissed the same after noting that her motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s decision was filed only on the 18th day
following receipt by her counsel of a copy of the decision. The appellate
court thus held that the trial court’s decision had become final and
executory.
Her Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s Decision having
been denied, petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari.
I: Whether Petitioner has lost her right to appeal?
19
H: YES, petitioner has lost her right to appeal, however in the interest of
justice, this Court resolves to remand the case to the trial court to afford
petitioner her right to due process.
1. As a general rule, the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the
reglementary period specified in law must be strictly followed, appeal not
being a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege. The perfection of
an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is thus not
only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. The records show that petitioner’s
counsel indeed received notice of the trial court’s decision on April 29,
1999. Following Rule 37, Section 1 vis-à-vis Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court, petitioner had 15 days or until May 14, 1999 to file a motion for
reconsideration or notice of appeal. She filed a motion for reconsideration
on May 17, 1999, thus rendering the trial court’s decision as to her final
and executory.
In addition, the filing of a motion for reconsideration by respondent Ma.
Theresa within the reglementary period prevented, with respect to her, the
decision from becoming final, but not with respect to petitioner.Filing of a
motion for reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other or
another party’s period of appeal. In petitioner’s case, her Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial court’s decision was filed three days after the
expiration of the reglementary period for the purpose, hence, the Court of
Appeals’ dismissal of her appeal was in order.
2. The faux pas or negligence of petitioner’s counsel, however, in failing to
file a timely motion for reconsideration should not be taken against her.
Ordinarily, the negligence of counsel binds the client.
However, this Court has recognized the following exceptions to this rule:
(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law;
(2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s
liberty or property; or
(3) where the interests of justice require.
In the case at bar, the application of the rule would result in petitioner
being held liable for the damages suffered by respondents even without
them having established the basis of her liability, thus depriving her of due
process of law.Compounding petitioner’s plight is the trial court’s
procedural error which precluded petitioner from presenting evidence in
her behalf. Respondents having failed to discharge the onus of proving that
petitioner was, at the time of the accident, the registered owner of the bus,
it was error for the trial court to credit respondents’ evidence. The trial
court’s decision in favor of respondents must thus be set aside.
Given the attendant facts and circumstances, in the interest of justice, this
Court resolves to remand the case to the trial court to afford petitioner her
right to due process.
(6) ARNULFO EDA vs. CA and REYNALDO SANTOS
By: Kaye
D: An appeal is not perfected merely by the payment of the appeal fee. An
appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of
the notice of appeal in due time. In other words, an appeal filed out of time
cannot be perfected. Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the
reglementary period for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the
existence of exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such deviation.
F: Respondent Santos filed a complaint for sum of money against the
petitioner with the Manila RTC, alleging that he and the petitioner Eda had
entered into a business arrangement wherein it was agreed upon that
Santos would provide money which would be loaned out by Eda to is
officemates. Eda would then collect the payments of the loans together
with the interest, and, in return, he would be entitled to a commission of
1% of the payments collected, while the rest would be turned over to
Santos. According to Santos, he gave the total amount of P500,000 to the
petitioner in accordance with their agreement. However, from 1995 to
1998, the petitioner failed to turn over the payments collected. Instead,
the petitioner informed him that such payments were again loaned out to
other borrowers. The petitioner then handed over to the respondent
several promissory notes evidencing the amounts the latter had loaned out
to his officemates from November 1998 to December 1998, amounting to
P1,200,000. However, despite demands, the petitioner failed to remit the
said amount to the respondent.
In his answer, the petitioner averred that the total amount invested by the
respondent was only P100,000. The petitioner claimed that he was not able
to collect payments from the borrowers and that some of them absconded.
20
RTC: Ruled in favor of Santos and ordered Eda to pay the sum of
P1,185,030.
The petitioner received a copy of the decision on May 28, 2001. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision on June
11, 2001 (14 days after receipt), which the RTC denied for lack of merit.
The petitioner received a copy of the order on July 17, 2001. On July 27,
2001 (10 days after receipt), the petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On
July 30, 2001, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal on the
ground that it was filed well beyond the reglementary period (Neypes was
decided in 2005)
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
CA: Dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding that the RTC did not
commit any grave abuse of its discretion in denying the petitioner’s notice
of appeal. The CA ruled that the notice of appeal was filed beyond the
reglementary period therefore . It further held that certiorari cannot be a
substitute for a lost appeal; that the period of appeal is mandatory and
jurisdictional; and that failure to appeal within the said period makes the
questioned decision final and executory and deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal.
The petitioner filed an MR of the said decision, which was denied. Hence,
this petition for review.
I: Whether petitioner’s appeal should be allowed despite filing of
beyond the reglementary period, considering that petitioner paid
the appeal fee.
H: NO.
An appeal is not perfected merely by the payment of the appeal fee.
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure categorically states that
an appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing
of the notice of appeal in due time. In other words, an appeal filed out of
time cannot be perfected.
Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary period
for filing an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally
meritorious instances warranting such deviation. In this case, the petitioner
failed to show any compelling reason to exempt him from the application of
the prescriptive period for filing an appeal.
(7) The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v. Court of Appeals
By: Apol Pen
Doctrine: The general rule is that failure to file the appellant’s brief within
the prescribed period would result in the dismissal of the appeal, and any
exemption from the rule must be for the most compelling reasons and the
delay must be for a reasonable period. The expiration of the time to file
brief, unlike lateness in filing the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on
appeal is not a jurisdictional matter and may be waived by the parties.
Even after the expiration of the time fixed for the filing of the brief, the
reviewing court may grant an extension of time, at least where no motion
to dismiss has been made. Late filing or service of briefs may be excused
where no material injury has been suffered by the appellee be reason of
the delay or where there is no contention that the appellee’s cause was
prejudiced. Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for
failure to file appellant’s brief on time. However, the dismissal is directory,
not mandatory. It is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss the
appeal. The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the time
prescribed does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically.
The court has discretion to dismiss an appellant’s appeal.
Facts: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. A Complaint for
specific performance of contract with damages was filed by petitioner
against respondents UFC, Marilyn Ong, Victoria Ang, Edna Alfuerte, Mark
Dennis Ang, and Alvin Ang, with the RTC of Makati. Petitioner avers that it
entered into a Contract of Lease with respondent UFC, by virtue of the said
contract, petitioner leased from UFC Units “B” and “D,” and six parking
lots, at the Chatham House Condominium, located at the corner of Valero
and Herrera Streets, Salcedo Village, Makati City for a maximum term of
four (4) years. The Contract provided for the pre-termination option that
may be exercised by the lessee. Three months prior to the expiration of the
third year of the lease, petitioner, through counsel, served by personal
service upon respondent UFC, through its President and co-respondent,
Marilyn Ong, a letter informing the corporation that petitioner was pre-
terminating the Lease Contract. Considering that under the Contract of
Lease, it could pre-terminate the lease after the expiry of the second-year
term without having to pay pre-termination penalties, petitioner also
requested the return or delivery of its unused two months advance rentals,
and the security deposit, within forty-five days after the pre-termination of
21
the lease contract. Petitioner vacated and surrendered the leased premises
to respondent UFC free of any outstanding bills. However, respondents UFC
totally ignored the demands made by petitioner in its letter, and failed to
return or deliver the P1,093,600.00 sought by petitioner. Respondents filed
their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. Thereafter, pre-trial was set.
However, respondents failed to appear and, worse, failed to file their pre-
trial brief, as required by the Rules of Court. They were therefore declared
to have waived their right to adduce evidence on their behalf. Respondents
did not seek for a reconsideration of the aforesaid order; hence, petitioner
was allowed to present its evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered its decision
in favor of the Petitioner. Respondents elevated the case on appeal to the
CA. They received a Notice to File Brief from the CA. Respondents were
unable to comply with this directive. Petitioner thus filed with the CA a
Motion to Dismiss Appeal of the respondents on the ground that
respondents’ counsel received the Notice to File Brief on 16 July 2003 as
shown by the Registry Return Receipt and had forty-five (45) days or until
1 September 2003 to file their appellants’ brief, but failed to do so. No
opposition to the said Motion to Dismiss Appeal was filed by respondents.
Neither did they file a motion for extension of time to file appellants’ brief.
The CA issued a Resolution stating that for failure of the respondents to file
their brief within the reglementary period, this appeal is hereby considered
abandoned and accordingly dismissed. Respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution stating that their failure to file
their appellants’ brief was due to their counsel’s inadvertence, attaching
their brief thereto and praying for its admission. The CA granted the
respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the CA denied.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting
Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Held: YES. In this case, the Court cannot say that the issues being raised
by respondents are of such importance that would justify the appellate
court to exempt them from the general rule and give due course to their
appeal despite the late filing of their appellant’s brief. It is starkly clear that
respondents do not deny that they owe petitioner the amount it is
demanding, as borne out in the Answer they filed before the RTC, save to
say that petitioner refused and failed to accept the payment thereof. Even
the claim of refusal by petitioner to accept the check payment is contrary
to ordinary human character and cannot be given even half a life. For, why
would the petitioner go to this length in collecting the amount due him
after allegedly refusing and failing to accept the respondents’ payment?
Our attention is riveted to respondents’ repeated laxity and indolence as
regards this case even when it was still pending before the RTC.
Respondents evidently continued with their lack of care even when they
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals as shown by their not having filed
an appellants’ brief under the reglementary period. The purported
inadvertence of their counsel cannot justify a relaxation of the rules. It is
the counsel’s responsibility to see to it that he has established an efficient
system to monitor the receipt of important notices and orders from the
courts. While the omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it
does not amount to gross negligence to call for the exception to the oft-
repeated rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Respondents
are, thus, bound by their counsel’s negligence.
Finally, it appears that respondents finally “attached” their Brief only in
their Motion for Reconsideration filed on 27 October 2003 in the Court of
Appeals seeking a reconsideration of the appellate court’s Resolution of 30
September 2003, dismissing their appeal. The delay in the filing thereof,
57 days after the expiration of the period to file the same on 1 September
2003, was, indeed, unreasonably long.
Summary of the rules lay down by the court in the number of cases being
cited as to the filing of a pre-trial brief:
(1) The general rule is for the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal when
no appellant’s brief is filed within the reglementary period prescribed by
the rules;
(2) The power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal is
discretionary and directory and not ministerial or mandatory;
(3) The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the reglementary
period does not have the effect of causing the automatic dismissal of the
appeal;
(4) In case of late filing, the appellate court has the power to still allow the
appeal; however, for the proper exercise of the court’s leniency it is
imperative that:
(a) The circumstances obtaining warrant the court’s liberality;
(b) That strong considerations of equity justify an exception to the
procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice;
(c) No material injury has been suffered by the appellee by the
delay;
22
(d) There is no contention that the appellees’ cause was
prejudiced;
(e) At least there is no motion to dismiss filed.
(5) In case of delay, the lapse must be for a reasonable period; and
(6) Inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse
as to call for the appellate court’s indulgence except:
(a) Where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law;
(b) When application of the rule will result in outright deprivation
of the client’s liberty or property; or
(c) Where the interests of justice so require.
The Court finds no sufficient and compelling reasons to justify the exercise
of the Court’s leniency and sound discretion. Under the facts of the case,
the Court is constrained to adhere strictly to the procedural rules.
(8) Tereso Tan vs. Manuel Link
GR 172849 December 10, 2008
by: Valencia, Emmanuelle Nicole
Doctrines: Payment of docket fees is a requirement in filing an ordinary
appeal from the decision or final order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now require that appellate docket and
other lawful fees must be paid within the same period for taking an appeal;
The use of the word “shall” underscores the mandatory character of the
Rule.
Payment of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional—
without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be
appealed from becomes final and executory.
Common exception to the general rule is an exceptionally meritorious
reason.
Facts: Tan filed a complaint for action reinvindicatoria, damages,
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for preliminary
prohibitory injunction and restraining order against Link in the RTC in
Cebu.
Tan claimed that Link sold his eight parcels of land in various barangays in
Cebu to FBMPC and Almocera (co-petitioners), evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale. The certificates of title, however, remained in the name of
Link.
Unknown to Tan, Link had voluntarily offered the properties for sale under
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. In
accordance with the CAR Law, the properties were valued by the Valuation
Office of Land Bank, in order to determine the just compensation for them.
The Notice of Valuation, stating the amounts at which the properties were
valued, and giving notice that the amounts had already been deposited
with Land Bank in Cebu City were sent to Link.
The properties were initially valued at 2M. Link filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board an application for valuation. The
petitions were docketed by DARAB and assigned to Kintana, a Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator.
When Tan, et al discovered what Link had done, they wrote a letter to the
DARAB, addressed to Kintanar, copy furnished to Yuro, a Land Bank officer.
Tan claimed in the letter that the subject properties had already been sold
to them by Link, and requested that any claim, request or undertaking
involving the subject properties by other individuals or entities be set
aside.
Kintanar ordered both sides to submit their position papers, and on this
basis issued an Order directing Land Bank to pay Link the just
compensation for the properties in question. Upon hearing from Land Bank
officials that payment to Link was imminent, Tan filed his suit, seeking a
restraining order or injunction.
The RTC ruled in favour of Link. Tan filed a Notice of Appeal via registered
mail. He later went to Bogo, Cebu to pay for the docket fees. Unable to find
an employee of the RTC, he instead left the amount of payment of the
docket fees for the appeal with an employee of the MTC.
The RTC dismissed the appeal for failure to pay within the reglementary
period (was due on August 30, Tan went on September 1, payment was
made on September 2).
Issue: Was the RTC correct in denying Tan’s appeal on the ground of late
payment of docket fees?
Ruling / Ratio: Yes.
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The dismissal of an appeal as the inevitable aftermath of the late payment
of the appellate docket fee has been mandated since the effectivity of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure under Section 4 of Rule 41.
The payment of docket fees is a requirement in filing an ordinary appeal
from the decision or final order of the RTC, as provided in Rule 41, Section
4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Rules now require that appellate docket and other lawful fees must be
paid within the same period for taking an appeal. This is clear from the
opening sentence of Section 4, Rule 41 of the same Rules that, “[w]ithin
the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.”
The use of the word “shall” underscores the mandatory character of the
Rule. The term “shall” is a word of command, one which has always been
or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally
imperative or mandatory.
The right to appeal is purely a statutory right. Not being a natural right or
a part of due process, the right to appeal may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the rules provided therefor. For this
reason, payment of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional.
There are, admittedly, exceptions to the general rule on the timely
payment of appellate docket fees which are also embodied in
jurisprudence, yet a common thread in all of said cases is an exceptionally
meritorious reason why the appellate docket fees in the cases were not
timely paid. The exception does not lie for Tan - Tan’s late arrival at Bogo,
Cebu was not unpreventable for he could have left much, much earlier for
his destination, considering that the traffic congestion is almost infamous in
Cebu, a fact certainly known to Tan. Their failure to pay the docket fees on
time manifested their lack of foresight and planning. Petitioner Tan having
arrived after office hours, he cannot expect any RTC employee to have
stayed behind.
In cases where the Court upheld the liberal application of the rules, the
appellants therein hinged their arguments on exceptionally meritorious
circumstances peculiar to their particular situations that would convince the
Court that they were entitled to a lax application of the Rules. Petitioners
herein did not show such meritorious circumstance.
Additional Notes: What emerges from all of the above is that the rules of
procedure in the matter of paying the docket fees must be followed.
However, there are exceptions to the stringent requirement as to call for a
relaxation of the application of the rules, such as: (1) most persuasive and
weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure;
(3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances
attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair
play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound
discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.
Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be
an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain
his failure to abide by the rules. Anyone seeking exemption from the
application of the Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally
meritorious instances exist which warrant such departure.
(9) De Leon vs. CA
By: Roma
DOCTRINE: Several judgment is proper only when the liability of
each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-
parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been
the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of
them will not necessarily affect the other—where a common cause
of action exists against the defendants, as in actions against
solidary debtors, a several judgment is not proper.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent
spouses Estelita and Avelino. Estelita admitted the obligation but Avelino
denied the same, alleging that his wife is not the administrator and the
debt was contracted without his knowledge and consent. On May 14, 1996,
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upon petitioner's motion, the TC granted a motion for partial judgment on
the pleadings ordering Estelita to pay petitioner. A writ of execution was
issued and the sheriff executed the same through the paraphernal property
of Estelita and conjugal properties of the spouses. Respondents did not
interpose any objection.
After pre-trial and trial, the TC rendered judgment on June 2, 1996
ordering Avelino to pay the amount of the loan. It was received by counsel
of record on June 6, 1997 and by Estelita on June 10, 1997. On June 19,
1997 Avelino filed a notice of appeal to the TC. This was denied by the TC
for being filed beyond the reglementary period to appeal. Petitioner then
filed with the CA a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal with Motion to Suspend
period to file Appellee’s Brief. He argued: that the brief do not have page
references to the record; that the authorities relied in the arguments were
not cited; there was no attachment of the appealed decision of the TC; and
that the notice of appeal was beyond the reglementary period.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the CA, which accepted the
appellant’s brief and required the petitioner to submit his appellee’s brief.
Petitioner instead moved for reconsideration, which was denied. The CA
also ordered that the case be submitted for decision without the appellee’s
brief of petitioner since the same was not submitted on time. Hence, this
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed with the SC.
ISSUES:
1) WON the CA erred in taking cognizance of the appeal; and
2) WON the appellate court erred or committed grave abuse of discretion
when it considered the appeal as submitted for decision without petitioner’s
brief.
HELD:
1. No, the CA did not err in taking cognizance of the appeal. Contrary to
petitioner’s apparent position, the judgments rendered by the TC in this
case are not several judgments under the Rules of Court so that there
would be multiple periods of finality.
A several judgment is proper only when the liability of each party is clearly
separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims
against each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and
judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other.
Where a common cause of action exists against the defendants, as in
actions against solidary debtors, a several judgment is not proper. In this
case, private respondents are sued together under a common cause of
action and are sought to be held liable as solidary debtors for a loan
contracted by Estelita. This is the clear import of the allegation in the
complaint that the proceeds of the loan benefited the conjugal partnership
Thus, between the two judgments rendered by the trial court, there could
only be one judgment that finally disposes of the case on the merits.
Receipt of notice of this final judgment marks the point when the
reglementary period is to begin running. In this case, that judgment is the
decision rendered by the TC on June 2, 1997 and it is only from the date of
notice of this decision that the reglementary period began to run. The
partial judgment dated May 14, 1996 was rendered only with respect to
one issue in the case and is not the final and appealable order or judgment
that finally disposes of the case on the merits. It must, therefore, only be
appealed together with the decision dated June 2, 1997.
Private respondents’ appeal had been taken within the reglementary period
since Avelino had filed a notice of appeal on June 19, 1997 or 13 days from
their counsel’s receipt of the decision on June 6, 1997. Respondent spouses
having been jointly sued under a common cause of action, an appeal made
by the husband inures to the benefit of the wife. The notice of appeal filed
by Estelita was a superfluity, the appeal having been perfected earlier by
her husband.
The grounds for dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 of Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court are discretionary upon the Court of Appeals. This can be
seen from the very wording of the Rules which uses the word ‘may’ instead
of ‘shall.’ The CA rightly exercised its discretion when, in denying
petitioner’s motion to dismiss, it ruled that the citations contained in the
appellants’ brief were in substantial compliance with the rules. Where the
citations found in the appellants’ brief could sufficiently enable the
appellate court to locate expeditiously the portions of the record referred
to, there is substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 13(c)
and (d), Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Nothing in the records indicate that
25
it was exercised capriciously, whimsically, or with a view of permitting
injury upon a party litigant.
However, the CA erred in requiring petitioner to file the appellee’s brief in
response to the amended appellants’ brief. Note that the amended brief
was filed without the proper motion for leave to do so and corresponding
order from the respondent court. Even more significant, it was filed beyond
the extensions of time granted to appellants. The discretion in accepting
late briefs conferred upon respondent court which this Court applied some
cases finds no application under the present circumstances because, unlike
in these two cases, here no valid reason was advanced for the late filing of
the amended brief.
2. No. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in considering the
appeal submitted for decision. The proper remedy in case of denial of the
motion to dismiss is to file the appellee’s brief and proceed with the appeal.
Instead, petitioner opted to file a motion for reconsideration which,
unfortunately, was pro forma. A cursory perusal of the motion would
readily show that it was a near verbatim repetition of the grounds stated in
the motion to dismiss; hence, the filing of the motion for reconsideration
did not suspend the period for filing the appellee’s brief. Petitioner was
therefore properly deemed to have waived his right to file appellee’s brief.
(10) Sps.Campos v. Republic;
By: Arid, Hannah Mhae G.
Doctrine: The general rule that an assignment of error is essential to
appellate review and only those errors assigned will be considered applies
in the absence of certain exceptional circumstances. As exceptions to the
rule, the Court has considered grounds not raised or assigned as errors in
instances where: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of
the law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal, whose consideration
is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the
case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised
in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the
issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court
ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are closely
related to the assigned error/s; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal, whose determination is necessary to rule on the question/s
properly assigned as errors.
Facts: On November 17, 2003, the petitioners applied for the registration
of a 6,904 square meter-parcel of land situated in Baccuit, Bauang, La
Union, particularly described as Lot No. 3876, Cad-474-D, Case 17, Bauang
Cadastre. The petitioners bought the subject land from Roberto Laigo, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the parties on July 26,
1990. On December 29, 2004, the MTC rendered a decision granting the
petitioners‘ application for registration. The Republic appealed to the CA on
the ground that the MTC erred in granting the petitioners‘ application for
registration because of discrepancies in the area of the subject land as
applied for and indicated in the tax declarations and the parties‘ deed of
sale. Also, discrepancies in the description of the subject land appeared in
the tax declarations, as the land was sometimes described as “swampy”
and, in others, “sandy.” The CA, in its assailed April 30, 2007 decision,
reversed and set aside the MTC‘s decision and dismissed the petitioners‘
application for registration of title. It ruled that, contrary to the MTC‘s
findings, the evidence failed to prove the nature and duration of the
petitioners‘ possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest; that the
petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession of
Lot 3876 since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The CA further held that the
petitioners failed to establish when the subject land became alienable; that
while the DENRCENRO La Union certified that “Lot 3876 falls within the
Alienable and Disposable land of the Public Domain as per Project No. 9,
L.C. Map No. 3330 of Bauang Cadastre as certified on January 21, 1987,”
such certification (as annotated in the lot‘s Advance Plan) was inadequate
to prove that the subject land was classified as alienable and disposable on
said date. Lastly, the CA noted the discrepancies in the area of the subject
land indicated in the tax declarations and deed of sale presented by the
petitioners, which put in doubt the lot‘s identity.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling on issues not raised on
appeal. (Note: Republic’s issue raised on its appeal on CA is that MTC
erred in granting petitioner’s application for registration because of
discrepancies in the area of the subject land as applied for and indicated in
the tax declarations and the parties’ deed of sale/ Also, discrepancies
appeared in the tax declarations, as the land was sometimes described as
“swampy” and in others, “sandy”. Petitioners then questions the ruling of
CA because according to them Republic did not raise in issue the nature
and duration of petitioners’ possession and on the alienable character of
26
the land hence, according to them when CA ruled based on that, the
appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion.)
Held: No. Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
expressly provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. – No error which does not affect
the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment
appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated
in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an
assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass
upon plain errors and clerical errors.
The general rule that an assignment of error is essential to appellate
review and only those errors assigned will be considered applies in the
absence of certain exceptional circumstances. As exceptions to the rule,
the Court has considered grounds not raised or assigned as errors in
instances where: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of
the law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal, whose consideration
is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the
case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised
in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the
issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court
ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are closely
related to the assigned error/s; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal, whose determination is necessary to rule on the question/s
properly assigned as errors. The present case falls into the exceptions.
No error by the CA in resolving the issues on the nature and duration of the
petitioners‘ possession and on the alienable character of the subject land.
These issues were apparently not raised by the Republic in its appeal
before the CA, but are crucial in determining whether the petitioners have
registrable title over the subject land. In Mendoza v. Bautista, the Court
held that the appellate court reserves the right, resting on its public duty,
to take cognizance of palpable error on the face of the record and
proceedings, and to notice errors that are obvious upon inspection and are
of a controlling character, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice due
to oversight.
Persons applying for registration of title under Section 14( 1) of
Presidential Decree No. 152911must prove: (1) that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As the CA did, the Supreme
Court find that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide
claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Since the effectivity of
P.D. No. 1073 on January 25, 1977, it must be shown that possession and
occupation of the land sought to be registered by the applicant himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
which totally conforms to the requirement under Section 14(1) of P.D. No
1529. A mere showing of possession and occupation for thirty (30) years or
more is no longer sufficient.
(11) De Liano vs Court of Appeals
By: Kathrina De Castro
DOCTRINE: The premise that underlies all appeals is that they are merely
rights which arise from statute—therefore, they must be exercised in the
manner prescribed by law.
The Rules of Court prescribe two (2) modes of appeal from decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals. When the trial court decides
a case in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the mode of review is by
an ordinary appeal in accordance with Section 2(a) of Rule 41. In contrast,
where the assailed decision was rendered by the trial court in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, the mode of appeal is via a petition for review
pursuant to Rule 42.
FACTS: The case involved the cancellation of two REM in favor of the
petitioner San Miguel Corp executed by private respondent Tango over his
house and lot in QC. The mortgages were third party or accommodation
mortgages on behalf of the spouses Bernardino and Carmelita Ibarra who
were dealers of SMC products in Aparri, Cagayan. Other defendants in the
case were Francisco A.G. De Liano and Alberto O. Villa-Abrille, Jr., who are
senior executives of petitioner SMC. SMC, De Liano and Abrille appealed
the decision to the CA. Their counsel, filed Appellants Brief which failed to
comply with the ROC, appellee filed a motion to dismiss. Appellant averred
that the brief had substantially complied with the rules. Appellate court
27
issued resolution dismissing the appeal. Appellants, despite having been
notified of such defects, still failed to amend their brief to conform to the
Rules, and instead, argue that these are mere “harmless errors”. The
appellants (herein petitioners) sought to have the foregoing resolution
reconsidered. Simultaneously, through the same counsel, they filed a
“Motion to Admit Amended Defendants-Appellants’ Brief.”
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal base on mere
technicalities without considering its merits
HELD: The premise that underlies all appeals is that they are merely rights
which arise from statute; therefore, they must be exercised in the manner
prescribed by law. It is to this end that rules governing pleadings and
practice before appellate courts were imposed. These rules were designed
to assist the appellate court in the accomplishment of its tasks, and overall,
to enhance the orderly administration of justice.
It has been held that a general assignment of errors is unacceptable under
the rules. Thus, a statement of the following tenor: that “the Court of First
Instance of this City incurred error in rendering the judgment appealed
from, for it is contrary to law and the weight of the evidence,” was deemed
insufficient. The appellant has to specify in what aspect of the law or the
facts that the trial court erred. The conclusion, therefore, is that the
appellant must carefully formulate his assignment of errors.
(I DON’T KNOW IF RELEVANT! Pero baka itanong..)
The rules then require that an appellant’s brief must contain both a “statement of the case” and a
“statement of facts.” A statement of the case gives the appellate tribunal an overview of the judicial
antecedents of the case, providing material information regarding the nature of the controversy, the
proceedings before the trial court, the orders and rulings elevated on appeal, and the judgment
itself. These data enable the appellate court to have a better grasp of the matter entrusted to it for
its appraisal. In turn, the statement of facts comprises the very heart of the appellant’s brief. The
facts constitute the backbone of a legal argument; they are determinative of the law and
jurisprudence applicable to the case, and consequently, will govern the appropriate relief. Appellants
should remember that the Court of Appeals is empowered to review both questions of law and of
facts. Otherwise, where only a pure question of law is involved, appeal would pertain to this Court.
An appellant, therefore, should take care to state the facts accurately though it is permissible to
present them in a manner favorable to one party. The brief must state the facts admitted by the
parties, as well as the facts in controversy.
An additional circumstance impels us to deny the reinstatement of
petitioner’s appeal. We observed that petitioner submitted an “Amended
Appellant’s Brief” to cure the infirmities of the one first filed on its behalf by
its lawyer. All things being equal, we would have been inclined to grant the
petition until we realized that the attempt at compliance was, at most, only
a cosmetic procedure. On closer scrutiny, the amended brief was as
defective as the first. Where the first brief lacked an assignment of errors
but included a statement of issues, the amended brief suffered a complete
reversal: it had an assignment of errors but no statement of issues. We
remind members of the bar that their first duty is to comply with
the rules, not to seek exceptions.
IMPORTANT PART!
The Rules of Court prescribe two (2) modes of appeal from decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals. When the trial court decides
a case in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the mode of review is by
an ordinary appeal in accordance with Section 2(a) of Rule 41. In contrast,
where the assailed decision was rendered by the trial court in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, the mode of appeal is via a petition for review
pursuant to Rule 42. The court is more concerned on the first mode since
the case at bar involves a decision rendered by the RTC exercising its
original jurisdiction.
At each stage, a separate raffle is held. Thus, a preliminary raffle is held at
which time an appealed case is assigned to a Justice for completion. After
completion, when the case is deemed ripe for judgment, a second raffle is
conducted to determine the Justice to whom the case will be assigned for
study and report. Each stage is distinct; it may happen that the Justice to
whom the case was initially raffled for completion may not be the same
Justice who will write the decision thereon. The aforesaid distinction has a
bearing on the case at bar. It becomes apparent that the merits of the
appeal can only be looked into during the second stage. The Justice in-
charge of completion exceeds his province should he examine the merits of
the case since his function is to oversee completion only. The prerogative
of determining the merits of an appeal pertains properly to the Justice to
whom the case is raffled for study and report. The case at bar did not
reach the second stage; it was dismissed during completion stage pursuant
to Section 1(f) of Rule 50. Consequently, petitioner’s contention that the
appellate court should have considered the substance of the appeal prior to
dismissing it due to technicalities does not gain our favor. Generally, the
negligence of counsel binds his client.

Cases elevated to the Court of Appeals are treated differently depending

upon their classification into one of three (3) categories: appealed civil
cases, appealed criminal cases, and special cases. Be it noted that all cases
are under the supervision and control of the members of the Court of
Appeals in all stages, from the time of filing until the remand of the cases
to the courts or agencies of origin. Ordinary appealed civil cases undergo
two (2) stages. The first stage consists of completion of the records. The
second stage is for study and report, which follows when an appealed case
is deemed submitted for decision, thus:

When case deemed submitted for judgment.—A case shall be deemed

submitted for judgment:

A. In ordinary appeals.—

1. Where no hearing on the merits of the main case is held, upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules or by the
court itself, or the expiration of the period for its filing;

2. Where such a hearing is held, upon its termination or upon the filing of
the last pleading or memorandum as may be required or permitted to be
filed by the court, or the expiration of the period for its filing.

28