42 Usc 1983 Conspiracy Authorities

42 USC 1983 Conspiracy
Distinction between conspiracy under 1983, and under 1985(3)

To establish conspiracy under 1983, the plaintiff must show an agreement or meeting of
minds to violate his or her constitutional rights and an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy
To establish conspiracy under under Section 1985(3) plaintiff must show all the elements
of (1) a conspiracy (2) for the purpose of directly or indirectly depriving the
plaintiff or class of plaintiff equal protection of the laws or equal privileges, and
immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) where
the plaintiff is injured in his or her property, or is deprived of any right or
privilege of a United States Citizen…
Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 45 Fed.R.Serv.3d

114, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7912, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,033 (9th Cir.(Cal.),Sep
24, 1999)
[20] Conspiracy 91 7.5(1)
91 Conspiracy
91I Civil Liability
91I(A) Acts Constituting Conspiracy and Liability Therefor
91k7.5 Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights
91k7.5(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
To establish the defendants' liability for a conspiracy to violate civil rights, a
plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds to
violate constitutional rights; the defendants must have, by some concerted action,
intended to accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another which
results in damage, but such an agreement need not be overt, and may be inferred on the
basis of circumstantial evidence such as the actions of the defendants.
b. The Conspiracy Claim
[20][21] To establish the defendants' liability for a conspiracy, a plaintiff must

demonstrate the existence of “ **‘an agreement or **‘meeting of the minds' to violate
constitutional rights.’ ” United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865
F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc) (quoting Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438
(9th Cir.1983)). The defendants must have, “by some concerted action, intend[ed] to
accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another which results in
damage.” FN33 Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting
Vieux v. East Bay Reg'l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330, 1343 (9th Cir.1990)). Such an
agreement need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis of circumstantial evidence
such as the actions of the defendants. See id. at 856. **For example, a showing that
the alleged conspirators have committed acts that “are unlikely to have been undertaken
without an agreement” may allow a jury to infer the existence of a conspiracy. Kunik v.
Racine County, 946 F.2d 1574, 1580 (7th Cir.1991). Whether defendants were involved in
an unlawful conspiracy is generally a factual issue and should be resolved by the jury,
“so long as there is a possibility that the jury can ‘infer from the circumstances (that
the alleged conspirators) had a ‘meeting of the minds' and thus reached *1302 a
understanding’ to achieve the conspiracy's objectives.” Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d
600, 621 (7th Cir.1979), reversed in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754, 100 S.Ct.
1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980)) (quoting Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90
S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). “To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy
need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share
the common objective of the conspiracy.” Phelps Dodge, 865 F.2d at 1541.
FN33. The plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants intended to “ ‘expose,
disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise neutralize’ and otherwise suppress,
punish and chill the protected activities of the plaintiffs, Earth First! and
Redwood Summer,” and defined the object of the conspiracy as follows:
[T]o ‘expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise neutralize’ and

otherwise suppress, punish and chill the protected activities of the
plaintiffs, Earth First! and Redwood Summer.
. . . . .
+ to endeavor to cause Redwood Summer to be seen and branded in the public mind
as likely to involve lawless conflict and violence, so that its meaning and
non-violent premise would be hidden and people would be frightened and
discouraged from coming to participate;
+ to nurture the atmosphere of conflict, danger and division in the communities

of the logging district and among the people there, so as to impede the
organizing work of plaintiffs and their associates directed at the logging
companies and their responsibility for the destruction of the forest and
impoverishment of the forest workers; and,
+ to falsely portray plaintiffs and Earth First!, and cause them to be

portrayed, as dangerous extremists, involved with bombs and guns and tree-
spiking, willing to resort to violence, power-hungry and without conscience in
the pursuit of their ends, etc.
Plaintiffs' Seventh Amended Complaint at 15-16.
2. The District Court's Conclusions
The district court found that the appellees had demonstrated that their First Amendment
“advocacy was disrupted” by the actions of the appellants and the other defendants. It
then held that the appellees had produced sufficient evidence that FBI agents had
intended to inhibit their First Amendment activities, citing the showing that the FBI
had previously investigated Earth First! and had misrepresented the nature of these
prior investigations, had provided false or misleading information about the appellees
to the Oakland police, and continued to investigate them even after the Alameda County
District Attorney declined to pursue charges. However, the court reasoned that, because
the appellees could not establish that the Oakland police had previously investigated
Earth First!, had “engage[d] in any coverup,” or had any animus toward them, they could
not as a matter of law demonstrate that “the unlawful arrests and searches ... [were]
motivated by an intent to chill plaintiffs' speech.”
The district court's reasoning on the appellees' conspiracy allegation paralleled that
relating to their First Amendment claims: it held that the appellees had presented
circumstantial evidence suggesting animus and agreement among the FBI agents, but had
failed to show that the appellants had any animus, intended to chill appellees' speech,
or were part of the agreement to falsely accuse appellees of responsibility for the
explosion.
3. Sufficiency of the Evidence Presented by the Appellees
[22] Direct evidence of improper motive or an agreement among the parties to violate a
plaintiff's constitutional rights will only rarely be available. Instead, it will
almost always be necessary to infer such agreements from circumstantial evidence or the
existence of joint action. See Magana, 107 F.3d at 1447; Kunik, 946 F.2d at 1580;
Hampton, 600 F.2d at 620-21. Moreover, “[q]uestions involving a person's state of
mind ... are generally factual issues inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment.”
Braxton-Secret v. Robins Co., 769 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir.1985).
[23] In the instant case, the appellees have presented sufficient circumstantial
evidence that the appellants intended to inhibit their First Amendment activities, and
that they entered a conspiracy to further this goal, to survive a motion for summary
judgment. **First, the fact that the appellants had themselves viewed the crime scene
and the physical evidence raises a question as to whether they would have relied upon
the FBI agents' questionable characterization of the evidence absent an improper motive
or conspiracy. See Phelps Dodge, 865 F.2d at 1541 **(police failure to exercise
independent judgment may help demonstrate involvement in conspiracy). **Second, some of
the misinformation included in, and some of the material omissions from the search
warrant affidavits were directly attributable to the appellants, which permits the
inference of an improper motive for such conduct. Third, the appellants actively
publicized the inaccurate information to the media, an act which is consistent with a
desire to create a negative impression of Earth First! among the public. Fourth, the
Oakland police department had a division that had monitored the activities of Earth
First! and cooperated with the FBI prior to the bombing incident. Fifth, the Oakland
police, in the search warrant affidavit, stated their belief that appellees were
“members of a violent terrorist group.” Such a statement strongly suggests that the
officers *1303 might have wanted to inhibit both the group's operations and the
activities of its members. And finally, given the district court's findings of a factual
dispute on the point, we must assume for purposes of this opinion that a conspiracy
existed among FBI agents Doyle, Reikes, Sena, Buck, Hemje and Conway. The fact that the
appellants acted in close cooperation with these “conspirators” in planning and
conducting their investigation, and that both the FBI agents and the appellants
contributed misinformation to the probable cause showings that allowed the appellants to
obtain the search warrants, is highly probative as to the existence of an agreement,
implicit or explicit, among the appellants and the FBI “conspirators”. See Phelps
Dodge, 865 F.2d at 1545, 1547 (characterizing the existence of a conspiracy as a
“smoking gun” with regard to a plaintiff's attempt to prove that a particular defendant
was part of that conspiracy).FN34
FN34. The fact that the Oakland police officers held meetings with and conducted
a joint investigation with the FBI agents renders such evidence even more
probative on the question of the involvement of the Oakland police officers. “The
ability and opportunity to conspire, while insufficient alone, constitute
circumstantial evidence of actual participation in the conspiracy.” Id. at 1547.
[24] The possibility that other inferences could be drawn that would provide an
alternate explanation for the appellants' actions does not entitle them to summary
judgment. See Phelps Dodge, 865 F.2d at 1542 (inference need not be most likely but
merely a “rational” or “reasonable” one); Hampton, 600 F.2d at 621 (“The fact that ‘all
of the evidence ... does not point in one direction and different inferences might
reasonably be drawn from it’ does not justify judicial intrusion into the jury's role in
determining whether a civil conspiracy existed.”) (quoting Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 700-01, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962)). In
other cases, we have allowed similar circumstantial showings to withstand summary
judgment motions. See Phelps Dodge, 865 F.2d at 1543, 1547 (company's powerful position
and close relationship with law enforcement, meeting at which company urged police to
treat plaintiffs harshly, inequitable treatment of plaintiffs by police, and active
cooperation between company and police during strike was sufficient evidence of
company's participation in conspiracy to withstand summary judgment).FN35 See also Bell
v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1257-58 (7th Cir.1984) (defendants' adoption of
modified version of events justifying police shooting without noting discrepancies with
earlier story provided sufficient evidence of participation in conspiracy, despite
absence of any evidence that defendants knew new version was false); Myatt v. City of
Chicago, 816 F.Supp. 1259, 1268 (N.D.Ill.1992) (officer's presence during fellow
officer's use of excessive force, warning to others to stay away, and retrieval of
fellow officer's gun after it fell out of ankle holster raised inference of conspiracy
that defeated summary judgment).
FN35. Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435 (9th Cir.1983), is not to the contrary. In
that case, we held that a bank's acquiescence to the FBI's investigation request
was insufficient to prove its participation in the conspiracy. 707 F.2d at 438.
However, the fact that the appellants in this case are law enforcement officials
who were involved in a joint investigation with conspirator law enforcement
officers clearly distinguishes it from Fonda, in which the defendants whose
participation in the conspiracy was at issue were bank employees who demonstrated
that they knew absolutely nothing about the nature of the FBI investigation. Id.
We therefore hold that the evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to
whether the appellants intended to interfere with the appellees' political activities
and whether they did so by acting together with the FBI agents to falsely portray Bari
and Cherney as being responsible for the explosion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court's denial of summary judgment to appellants on the issue of *1304
qualified immunity is AFFIRMED; its grant of summary judgment to appellants on the
appellees' claims of First Amendment violations and conspiracy is REVERSED; and the case
is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge, concurring:
United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 57 USLW 2467,
130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2353, 110 Lab.Cas. P 56,017 (9th Cir.(Ariz.), Jan 18, 1989)
[Cited 98 times for this legal issue]

United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539
91 CONSPIRACY
91I Civil Liability
91I(B) Actions
91k19 k. Evidence.
C.A.9.Ariz.,1989
Evidence that police failed to exercise independent judgment will support inference of
conspiracy with private party, for purpose of establishing § 1983 liability. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983 .
Marshall v. Odom, 156 F.Supp.2d 525
D.Md.S.Div.,2001
To establish a civil conspiracy under § 1983, plaintiff must present evidence that
defendants acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of
the conspiracy, which resulted in deprivation of a constitutional right, by presenting
specific circumstantial evidence that each member of the alleged conspiracy shared same
conspiratorial objective, such as would reasonably lead to the inference that defendants
positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and
unlawful plan. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .

Venegas v. Wagner, 831 F.2d 1514
C.A.9.Cal.,1987
Evidence supported jury's conclusions that police officers procured false testimony from
witness and denied plaintiff a fair trial in a murder prosecution and that officers
violated civil rights statutes. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983 , 1985(3) .

Stone v. City of Chicago, 738 F.2d 896
C.A.7.Ill.,1984
Evidence in civil rights action alleging, inter alia, that police officers conspired to
hinder due course of justice by engaging in cover-up of involvement of officers in
accident involving plaintiff or by engaging in cover-up of use of excessive force in
effecting arrest of plaintiff and his wife following the accident, including fact that
officers were huddled together at intersection conversing, that several made racial
slurs against plaintiffs, that official police reports omitted reference to police car
involved in accident, that officers failed to report hit-and-run allegations to
appropriate authority, and that none of the officers took names of witnesses who might
have seen application of excessive force, was sufficient to support verdict for the
plaintiffs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 .

Calcutt v. Gerig, 271 F. 220
C.A.6.Tenn.,1921
In a civil action for conspiracy, plaintiff need not prove preliminary meeting of the
defendants, or a definite plan or agreement by them to injure his person or property;
but it is sufficient if the proof shows a concert of action in the commission of the
unlawful acts, from which the natural inference arises that they were in furtherance of
a common design of the alleged conspirators.

Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339
C.A.8.Minn.,1997
To establish conspiracy to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), plaintiff need establish only a tacit understanding between parties, and can
rely wholly on circumstantial evidence of each defendant's actions. 18 U.S.C.A. §
1962(c, d) .

Neibel v. Trans World Assur. Co., 108 F.3d 1123
C.A.9.Cal.,1997
Substantial evidence supported jury's finding that insurance company agreed to have some
part in directing agent's affairs concerning tax avoidance scheme, which thus supported
verdict against insurance company for civil violation of conspiracy provision of
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); president of insurance
company and agent discussed tax scheme involving sales of insurance and how they would
profit from it, insurance company hired agent's agents as independent contractors to
sell policies, president of insurance company appeared at agent's tax seminar and
approved of agent's tax form scheme, and insurance company deviated from standard policy
to destroy microfilm records while litigation was pending. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(d) .

Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985
C.A.7.Ill.,1988
Evidence was sufficient to support determination that police officers had acted in
common scheme to “railroad” former murder and rape defendant, now civil plaintiff, in
violation of his rights; basis for arrest of plaintiff on momentary identification of
him by child with head injury during suggestive circumstances, officers' threats to
another officer to prevent exculpatory evidence from being presented to prosecutor,
issuance of fraudulent evidence report to prosecuting attorney, and lab report which
failed to present exculpatory evidence was sufficient. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .

Martinez v. Winner, 548 F.Supp. 278
D.Colo.,1982
Conspiracy may be implied by a course of conduct and other circumstantial evidence, but
the circumstantial facts relied upon must at least point in some minimal way to an
actionable conspiracy, and there must be some indicia of agreement in unlawful means or
end.

Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985
C.A.5.Miss.,1979
Finding that defendant city officials had conspired to deprive plaintiff alderman of his
civil rights was supported by evidence, including evidence that defendants had
participated in private meetings at which plaintiff was discussed, as well as evidence
of defendants' course of conduct. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .

City of Omaha Employees Betterment Ass'n v. City of Omaha, 883 F.2d 650
C.A.8.Neb.,1989
Plaintiff alleging civil rights conspiracy must allege with particularity and
specifically demonstrate with material facts that defendants reached an agreement, and
plaintiff can satisfy that burden by pointing to at least some facts which would suggest
that defendants reached understanding to violate the rights. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3) .

In re Managed Care Litigation, 430 F.Supp.2d 1336
S.D.Fla.,2006
To establish conspiratorial agreement element of their civil conspiracy claim against
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), which was based on alleged scheme to defraud physicians
through use of HMOs' automated claims processing systems to systematically underpay for
services, physicians had to present evidence tending to exclude possibility of
independent conduct and tending to show conspiratorial behavior, notwithstanding
physicians' contention that HMOs' alleged parallel conduct of mail and wire fraud,
being itself unlawful, sufficed to create inference of conspiracy, inasmuch as alleged
proof that HMOs engaged in predicate acts of mail and wire fraud was as consistent with
independent behavior as with industry-wide conspiracy to manipulate claims processing
systems. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341 , 1343 , 1962(d) .

Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406
C.A.9.Cal.,2010
To establish liability for a conspiracy in a § 1983 case, a plaintiff must demonstrate
the existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights;
such an agreement need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis of circumstantial
evidence such as the actions of the defendants. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .

Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d 661
C.A.7.Ill.,2002
Agreement among alleged conspirators, for purpose of statute governing action for
conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, may be inferred from circumstantial evidence,
but only if it is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that a meeting of
the minds had occurred and that the parties had an understanding to achieve the
conspiracy's objectives. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3) .

Exchange Bank v. Moss, 149 F. 340
C.A.8.Mo.,1906
Where the petition in an action to recover money, alleged to have been obtained from
plaintiff by means of a conspiracy between defendant bank and others, alleged that such
conspiracy covered an extended period of time, both before and after the transaction in
suit, and was organized for the purpose of swindling all strangers who could be induced
to enter into similar transactions, evidence of acts of the cashier of defendant bank in
respect to similar transactions while conducting the business of the bank, or
declarations made by him to other persons similarly defrauded tending to show the bank's
complicity, whether such acts and declarations were before or after the transaction in
issue, are admissible to establish the guilty intent and motive of the bank in the
transaction involved in the case on trial.

Hernandez v. Joliet Police Dept., 197 F.3d 256
C.A.7.Ill.,1999
The agreement upon which a civil rights conspiracy claim is based may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence, but only if there is sufficient evidence that would permit a
reasonable jury to conclude that a meeting of the minds had occurred and that the
parties had an understanding to achieve the conspiracy's objectives. 42 U.S.C.A. §
1985(3) .

Liquidation Com'n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339
C.A.11.Fla.,2008
The existence of an agreement to participate in a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy, as well as its objective, may be inferred from
circumstantial evidence demonstrating that each defendant must necessarily have known
that the others were also conspiring to participate in the same enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c).

Johnson v. Branch, 242 F.Supp. 721
E.D.N.C.,1965
To prove conspiracy in civil action, plaintiff was not required to prove date and place
of defendants' meeting and summary of their conversation, but was bound to show
something more than facts which would as well justify defendants' conduct as to lead to
inference of conspiracy.

Campbell v. Johnson, 167 F. 102
C.A.9.Wash.,1909
Evidence considered, and held to sustain a verdict and judgment for damages in favor of
a member of a typographical union against other members for a conspiracy to cause his
suspension as a member unlawfully and contrary to the rules of the union.

Cefalu v. Village of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416
C.A.7.Ill.,2000
Evidence regarding village's alleged efforts to evade liability in connection with
arrests was not relevant to arrestees' claim that village and officers conspired to
cover up purported violations of arrestees' constitutional rights, even if evidence
would have shown that village was more concerned about damage control than it was about
justice, when such evidence did not show that village or officers suppressed or
withheld information, or took any action, which hampered arrestees in resorting to court
to vindicate their constitutional rights. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1 , 14 ; 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983 .
42_usc_1983_conspiracy_civil_liability_actions_evidence_fed_all_digest_5_27_2014.doc
**S.L. ex rel. Lenderman v. St. Louis Metropolitan Police Dept. Bd. of Police Com'rs,
725 F.3d 843
C.A.8.Mo,2013
Evidence was sufficient to support arrestee's claim that police lieutenant colonel and
sergeant conspired to violate her constitutional rights so as to give rise to § 1983
conspiracy claim; reasonable jury could find that defendants deliberately falsified
arrest records to protect the department's reputation following arresting officers'
abusive misconduct, **that arresting officers, who were also conspiracy members,
engaged in overt acts by submitting the falsified arrest report and misleading the
investigators during the internal affairs investigation, and that arrestee's physical
and economic injuries were linked to arresting officer's overt acts, which were in turn
related to lieutenant colonel's acts of providing officer with information about the
internal affairs investigation so she could protect her own interests. 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983
**In re Cowin, 2013 WL 1786026

Bankr.S.D.Tex.Houston.Div.,2013
Meeting of minds between participants in alleged conspiracy to use tax lien foreclosure
sale process in order to strip deed of trust liens from property and to abscond with
excess foreclosure sale proceeds could be inferred, for purposes of establishing
existence of civil conspiracy and holding alleged conspirator liable for overt, illegal
acts committed, not only by himself, but by other conspirators, **from repeated pattern
of conduct among parties in acquiring real property subject to deed of trust liens,
shortly thereafter borrowing funds from confederate or company that he controlled for
purpose of paying real property taxes assessed against property, and immediately
defaulting on these loans in order to enable confederate to foreclose and to strip off
any junior liens.
Koch v. Royal Wine Merchants, Ltd., 23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 385

S.D.Fla.,2012
In the context of a conspiracy, under Florida law, mere evidence of knowledge of the
crime or association with conspirators is insufficient to establish an agreement, but
**proof that the defendant committed an act which furthered the purpose of the
conspiracy is circumstantial evidence that can prove the existence of an agreement.
Harrington v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, 902 F.Supp.2d 1195

**S.D.Iowa.C.Div.,2012
Evidence showing that police officers pledged silence to one another for purpose of
wrongfully convicting arrestees was admissible in arrestees' § 1983 action alleging that
their civil rights were violated during murder prosecution, inasmuch as it was relevant
to conspiracy claim and would not be unduly prejudicial. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .
**Harrington v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, 902 F.Supp.2d 1195

S.D.Iowa.C.Div.,2012
Evidence showing that police officers pledged silence to one another for purpose of
wrongfully convicting arrestees was admissible in arrestees' § 1983 action alleging that
their civil rights were violated during murder prosecution, inasmuch as it was relevant
to conspiracy claim and would not be unduly prejudicial. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .
Harrington v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, 902 F.Supp.2d 1186

S.D.Iowa.C.Div.,2012
Evidence of how non-disclosure of exculpatory reports occurred during murder prosecution
would not be admissible, in arrestees' subsequent § 1983 action alleging that their
civil rights were violated during murder prosecution, to show that Brady violations
themselves violated any particular constitutional right of arrestees, since defendant
police officers were immune from such claim, but arrestees would be permitted to offer
fact of the violations and evidence as to how violations occurred as support for their
claim that officers conspired with prosecutors to intentionally deprive them of
constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .
****Poel v. Webber, 899 F.Supp.2d 1155

D.N.M.,2012
Absent evidence of an agreement between client's former attorneys and the state-court
judge who had dismissed his state-court action against them, or of any concerted action
between attorneys and judge, other than evidence that they “communicated directly and
continuously through pleadings and motions,” client failed to establish that attorneys
conspired with judge to deprive him of his constitutional rights in violation of § 1983.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .
****Keywords:
judge found to be conspiring with attorneys to deprive citizen party litigant of his
constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 to prove a conspiracy between the
state and private parties under section 1983, the plaintiff must allege an agreement or
meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights; each participant in the
conspiracy, an official act of the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt
conspiracy involving bribery of the judge
westnext_search_jud_fnd_consp_w_attys_depriv_const_rights_viol_42_usc_1983_to_prov_consp
_betw_state_priv_parties_plaint_allege_agreem_or_meet_of_minds_to_viol_const_rights_act_
of_deft_jud_prod_corrupt_consp_involv_brib_of_jud_results
The Court did note that “merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of
a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge [;]”
but, the Court continued, the allegations brought by the plaintiff in Dennis were that
“an official act of the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy
involving bribery of the judge.” ...
... **The case primarily stands for the proposition that private parties who are alleged
to have conspired with a government official to deprive a person of his or her
constitutional rights, may maintain the claim against the private parties even when the
government official’s actions are protected by judicial immunity....
Minimum notice pleading requirements to factually allege a judge found to be conspiring

with attorneys to deprive citizen party litigant of his constitutional rights in
violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 to prove a conspiracy between the state and private parties
under section 1983, the plaintiff must allege an agreement or meeting of the minds to
violate constitutional rights; each participant in the conspiracy, an official act of
the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the
judge
F.R.C.P. Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading
Construction with other rules
Construction with other rules - Generally
**The liberal notice pleading requirements of the procedural rules apply to a

constitutional rights violation claim under § 1983, with the heightened pleading
requirements of the rules inapplicable. McLaughlin v. Rose Tree Media School Dist.,
E.D.Pa.1998, 1 F.Supp.2d 476 . Civil Rights 1394
** 2. Dennis v. Sparks
Supreme Court of the United States November 17, 1980 449 U.S. 24 66 L.Ed.2d 185
Civil rights action was brought against state court judge and others who were alleged to
have conspired to bribe the judge to obtain an injunction. The district court dismissed. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 588 F.2d 124, affirmed. On rehearing en banc, the
Court of Appeals, 604 F.2d 976, reversed and certiorari was granted. The...
...Allegation that an official act of a state court judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy
involving bribery of the judge was sufficient to assert that the private parties who conspired with the
judge were acting...
... The United States Supreme Court, Justice White, held that: (1) fact that the action was properly
dismissed as to the immune state court judge did not require dismissal of the action against the
remaining private parties accused of conspiring with the judge, and (2) allegations that an official
act of the state court judge was the product...
** 5. Crowe v. County of San Diego

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. June 18, 2010 608 F.3d 406 2010 WL 2431842
CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Confessions. Interrogations of juvenile suspects in murder case violated
their due process rights.
...Establishing liability under § 1983 for a conspiracy between a private actor and a state actor is no
different from establishing liability for a conspiracy between two state actors; the plaintiff must show
an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional...
...The plaintiff must show “an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights,”
and “[ t]o be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan,
but each participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy...
** 8. United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. January 18, 1989 865 F.2d 1539 1989 WL 2191
Unions brought civil rights action against employer and local law enforcement officials for
conspiracy to deprive striking employees of constitutional rights. The United States
District Court for the District of Arizona, Alfredo C. Marquez, J., granted summary judgment
for employer, and unions appealed. After affirming, 833 F.2d 804, the Court of...
...To prove conspiracy between state and private parties under § 1983, claimant must show agreement or
a meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights; participants in conspiracy need not know
exact details of plan but, to...
...Under similar circumstances, the shared unlawful intent requirement was emphasized in Adickes v. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970): Although this is a lawsuit against a private
party, not the State or one of its officials, our cases make clear that petitioner will have made out a
violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights and will be entitled to relief under § 1983 if she can
prove that a Kress employee, in the course of employment, and a Hattiesburg policeman somehow reached an
understanding...
** 9. DuBose v. Kelly
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. August 17, 1999 187 F.3d 999 1999 WL 619063
After bringing unsuccessful malpractice suit against former attorney, former client brought §
1983 action against his former lawyer, the lawyer’s attorneys, and state trial judge who
heard the malpractice action, alleging that they conspired to deprive former client of his
right to due process. The United States District Court for the District of...
... Upon affiant entering the courtroom from waiting as stated above; affiant witnessed that Judge David
S. Bouschor, John D. Kelly, Jennifer L. Crook and Newton S. Friedman had entered Judge Bouschor’s
chambers and closed the chambers door, this chambers door was left opened during the pre-trial conference;
Since affiant had witnessed some form of celebration as stated ․ above; affiant listened at the chambers
door of Judge Bouschor and witnessed the following: Judge David S. Bouschor, John D. Kelly, Jennifer L.
Crook and Newton S. Friedman conspiring...
...Material fact questions existed as to whether there was mutual understanding among state trial judge
who presided over legal malpractice trial, defendant in legal malpractice action, and defendant’s
attorneys to “fix” the trial in favor of defendant, and thus as to whether the attorneys, as private
citizens, could be held liable under § 1983, thus precluding summary judgment on former client’s §...
** 10. Dossett v. First State Bank

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. February 28, 2005 399 F.3d 940 2005 WL 443813
LITIGATION - Damages. A new trial was warranted in a §1983 action based on a finding that
jury verdict was a product of passion and prejudice.
...) (emphasis added); id. at 1548–50 (Trott, J., dissenting); Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438–39 (9th
Cir. 1983) ( “To prove a conspiracy between private parties and the government under § 1983, an
agreement or ‘ meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional rights...
...[11] We see no reason why a private actor may not be liable under § 1983 for conspiring with state
officials to violate a private citizen’s right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment, just as it
may be held liable for conspiring to violate other constitutional rights....
**11. Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division. September 17, 2013 972 F.Supp.2d 1018 2013 WL
5234224
LITIGATION - Jurisdiction. Rooker–Feldman doctrine did not bar action alleging racketeering
and conspiracy claims arising out of state court suit.
...The Supreme Court has specifically ruled that where a plaintiff alleges “that an official act of the
defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge ․ private
parties conspiring with the judge...
...In general, a plaintiff cannot assert a claim under § 1983 against a private party based on private
conduct no matter how discriminatory or wrongful the party’s conduct may have been; however, if a private
party has conspired with state officials to violate constitutional rights, then that party...
**14. Mikhail v. Kahn

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania. January 13, 2014 991 F.Supp.2d 596 2014 WL 114340
CIVIL RIGHTS - Jurisdiction. Rooker-Feldman precluded consideration of §1983 claims arising
from issuance of protection from abuse orders.
... See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 178–79 ( “Great Western has failed to allege except in
general terms the approximate time when the agreement was made, the specific parties to the agreement
(i.e., which judges), the period of the conspiracy, or the object of the conspiracy.”); see also, e.g.,
Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d Cir.1989) ( “To plead conspiracy adequately,
a plaintiff...
...The Rooker–Feldman dismissal is with prejudice as to all harms resulting from the protection from abuse
orders themselves, and without prejudice as to harms resulting from an alleged conspiracy in which the
defendant judges participated; 2.the Younger abstention dismissal is without prejudice; 3.all claims
purportedly brought under 18 U.S.C. §242 are dismissed with prejudice because Mr. Mikhail, as a private
individual, cannot initiate a criminal action or compel the state or federal authorities to bring one;...
**17. Sparkman v. McFarlin

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. May 02, 1979 601 F.2d 261
https://www.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?query=fi
%3A&transitionType=Search&contextData=%28sc.Default%29&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0
Woman, who had been sterilized by order of Indiana circuit court when she was 15 years old,
and her husband brought civil rights action against her mother, her mother’s attorney, the
medical practitioners who performed the sterilization and the judge who ordered it. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Jesse E....
...The question of the judge’s motivation vis-a-vis Linda Kay Sparkman, however, is, at this point in the
litigation, irrelevant. All plaintiffs need allege is an agreement, either express or implied, between
the immune judge and the remaining defendants resulting in the deprivation of plaintiffs’ rights. Such
an agreement could exist whether or not the immune judge acted corruptly. For example, within the
context of the facts as alleged...
...is not made out by the allegations of fact in the complaint with respect to a conspiracy between Judge
Stump and the other parties. Those allegations are, in effect, that the judge, in the exercise of what
the Supreme Court has held to be judicial authority, “approved” a petition presented to him; that the
mother and her attorney invoked the exercise of that authority by presenting the petition; and that the
physicians and the hospital carried out the tubal ligation after Judge...
** 23. McFadyen v. Duke University

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina. March 31, 2011 786 F.Supp.2d 887 2011 WL 1260207
EDUCATION - Civil Rights. Former member of Duke University lacrosse team adequately stated
Fourth Amendment claim.
...In the present suit, Plaintiffs now assert the following claims: Count 1: Search and Seizure in
Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Conspiracy; Count 2: Search and Seizure in Violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and Conspiracy; Count 3: Abuse of Process and Conspiracy in Violation...
...General, conclusory allegations that various university officials and police officers, city police
officers, and other related parties conspired and entered into express and/or implied agreements,
understandings, or meetings of the minds among themselves and others to deprive three university
students, who were members of university lacrosse team, of their constitutional rights by retaliating
against students for exercising their First and Fifth Amendment rights, publicly excoriating their
character and that of their teammates, falsely claiming they and their teammates had history of deplorable
conduct, and by charging and prosecuting the players on charges of rape, sexual assault, and kidnapping,
which these defendants...
** 24. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO v.
Scott
Supreme Court of the United States July 05, 1983 463 U.S. 825 103 S.Ct. 3352
Construction company and two of its employees brought action against trades council, its
unions and individual union members, alleging that they conspired to deprive plaintiffs of
equal protection and equal privileges and immunities by planning and executing attack on
construction site, assaulting workers and destroying property. The United States...
...U.S., 1983....
... 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) (Supp.1981), in its entirety, provides as follows: “(3) Depriving persons of
rights or privileges If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State...
** 27. Katz v. Morgenthau

United States District Court, S.D. New York. March 17, 1989 709 F.Supp. 1219 1989 WL 32155
Former criminal defendant convicted of second-degree aggravated harassment brought action
alleging conspiracy to violate his civil rights, and various state law causes of action,
against 23 persons and entities who participated in criminal proceeding. Former criminal
defendant moved for default judgment and for order compelling police officer...
...Even if acts of witnesses, counsel, and party who participated in criminal proceeding constituted
state action, former criminal defendant’s allegations of conspiracy to deprive him of his
constitutional rights in civil rights action were vague and conclusory, and thus participants were not
liable to former criminal defendant; former criminal defendant...
...To support complaint for conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights, plaintiff must prove
that defendants acted in willful manner, culminating in agreement, understanding, or meeting of minds,
that violated plaintiff’s rights, privileges, or immunities secured by Constitution or federal courts. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983....
** 28. Avalos v. Baca

United States District Court, C.D. California. August 24, 2007 517 F.Supp.2d 1156 2007 WL 2827502
CIVIL RIGHTS - Municipal Liability. County sheriff’s department was not liable under §1983
for jail inmate’s 73-day over-detention.
...There are three ways to meet the policy, practice, or custom requirement for municipal liability under
§ 1983: (1) the plaintiff may prove that a public entity employee committed the alleged constitutional
violation pursuant to a formal policy or a longstanding practice or custom, which constitutes the
standard operating procedure of the local government entity, (2) the plaintiff may establish that the
individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority and
that the challenged action itself thus constituted an act...
...To prevail on a claim for conspiracy to violate one’s constitutional rights under § 1983, the
plaintiff must show specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy. 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983....
**30. Mirbeau of Geneva Lake, LLC v. City of Lake Geneva

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin. October 27, 2010 746 F.Supp.2d 1000 2010 WL 4260085
CIVIL RIGHTS - Equal Protection. Prospective purchaser failed to state §1983 conspiracy
claim against private citizens opposed to development of property.
...Vague and conclusory allegations of the existence of a conspiracy are not enough to sustain a
plaintiff’s burden for a § 1983 conspiracy claim; a complaint must contain factual allegations
suggesting that the defendants reached a meeting of the minds with respect to violating the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. 42...
... Here, as discussed above, the plaintiff has failed to allege facts, if assumed to be true, that
indicate the non-city defendants conspired with City officials to violate Mirbeau’s constitutional
rights....
** 38. Clark v. Conahan
United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania. August 25, 2010 737 F.Supp.2d 239 2010 WL 3398888
CIVIL RIGHTS - Immunity. Juvenile court judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity in
§1983 action.
...(Doc. 1.) The Complaint asserted causes of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating
the Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution against Mr. Conahan, Mr. Ciavarella, Juvenile Probation, and Ms. Brulo (Count I), violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating...
...A private party who willfully participates in a joint conspiracy with state officials to deprive a
person of a constitutional right acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983...
** 39. Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. September 07, 2010 618 F.3d 1240 2010 WL 3464717
CIVIL RIGHTS - Arrest and Detention. Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on a bar
owner’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution action under §1983.
...Police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on bar owner’s Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution action under § 1983 arising out of allegedly false bribery charges filed by officer against
owner; assuming owner’s version of events, owner had demonstrated a Fourth Amendment constitutional
violation since officer knew no bribery occurred, knew he had no arguable probable cause to arrest owner,
and acted intentionally and maliciously in an effort to close owner’s bar, the facts, when viewed in the
light most favorable to officer, also showed the required elements of common-law tort of malicious
prosecution, since bribery...
...A plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights by showing a
conspiracy existed that resulted in the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983....
** 41. Shaffer v. Cook

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. November 05, 1980 634 F.2d 1259
Action was instituted on civil rights complaint. The United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma, Luther B. Eubanks, J., entered order dismissing complaint, and
plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) the state trial judge named as a
defendant was absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts, and (2)...
...Amended complaint against attorneys who were involved in a state case brought by plaintiff was
insufficient to allege the kind of conspiratorial nexus between the attorneys and absolutely immune state
trial judge that would support a cognizable nonimmune conspiracy intended to deprive plaintiff of his
constitutional rights...
...State trial judge, who was named as a defendant along with attorneys who were involved in a state
case brought by plaintiff and who was alleged to have conspired with those attorneys to deprive
defendant of his civil rights, specifically a fair trial, was absolutely immune from liability for his
judicial acts **in absence of allegation...
**43. Celano v. Celano

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. April 13, 1982 537 F.Supp. 690
Former wife filed a civil rights action against her former husband and his attorney alleging
that they were responsible for a series of misrepresentations made to a state court judge,
as a result of which the former wife was incarcerated. The attorney filed a motion to
dismiss. Treating the motion as a motion for summary judgment, the District...
...In Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980), the Supreme Court determined
held that a private citizen who conspires with a state court judge to deprive a citizen of his
constitutional rights may be held liable under section 1983 notwithstanding the judge’s absolute
immunity from suit....
...Amended complaint charging former husband and his attorney with conspiracy to mislead state court
judge as to former wife’s conduct and location, as result of which former wife was incarcerated, was
insufficient to allege conspiracy between state court judge and either defendant so as to state cause
of action. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983...
**44. Harrison v. New York

United States District Court, E.D. New York. March 20, 2015 95 F.Supp.3d 293 2015 WL 1413359
Background: Arrestee, litigating pro se, brought action against state, store owner and its
employees, Secret Service and its agent, arrestee’s former retained counsel and former
assigned counsel, and other defendants, relating to plaintiff’s arrest and prosecution in
state court for criminal possession of forged instrument, i.e., counterfeit...
...Holdings: The District Court, Joseph F. Bianco, J., adopting the report and recommendation of A.
Kathleen Tomlinson, United States Magistrate Judge, held that: (1) New York State had not waived its
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from § 1983 suits; (2) Secret Service had sovereign immunity from
Bivens claims; 42(3) arrestee would be granted extension of time to serve complaint on Secret Service
Agent in his individual capacity; (4) arrestee failed to sufficiently allege that store owner acted...
...Arrestee’s allegations were not sufficient to invoke the continuing violation doctrine, as basis for
delaying the commencement of limitations period for arrestee’s § 1983 claim alleging that his false
arrest for giving counterfeit currency to store’s cashier arose from joint action or conspiracy between
store’s investigator and county detective; arrestee’s conclusory allegation that store owner fostered an
environment that encouraged its employees to racially profile black males in its stores did not
legitimately challenge a custom or policy, and arrestee did not allege...
** 45. Caldeira v. County of Kauai

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. February 02, 1989 866 F.2d 1175 1989 WL 6882
County employee filed civil rights action, alleging the county violated his constitutional
rights when it terminated his employment and that his former union was liable as a
coconspirator. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, Harold M. Fong,
Chief Judge, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the employee...
...To prove a §1985 conspiracy between a private party and government under § 1983, plaintiff must
show an agreement or “ meeting of the minds ” by defendants to violate his constitutional rights.
42...
...[2] First, to prove a section 1985 conspiracy between a private party and the government under
section 1983, the plaintiff must show an agreement or “ meeting of the minds ” by the defendants to
violate his constitutional rights....
*46. Eriksen v. Nunemaker

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. July 27, 2006 193 Fed.Appx. 686 2006 WL 2088177
CIVIL RIGHTS - Immunity. State court judge enjoyed absolute immunity from liability in §1983
action for judicial actions taken within his jurisdiction.
...Plaintiff who claimed private defendants conspired to violate her constitutional rights when
plaintiff was jailed for ten months for civil contempt failed to establish that the defendants acted
under color of state law, as required to state § 1983 claim; plaintiff failed to allege...
...Background: Plaintiff brought § 1983 action alleging that various individuals involved in a state
trust proceeding conspired to violate her constitutional rights when she was jailed for ten months for
civil contempt....
** 47. Fisk v. Letterman

United States District Court, S.D. New York. November 17, 2005 401 F.Supp.2d 362 2005 WL 3098721
HEALTH - Mental Health. Television network officials did not engage in conspiracy to commit
alleged stalker.
... Newman v. Bloomingdale’s, 543 F.Supp. 1029, 1029 (S.D.N.Y.1982); see also Alexis v. McDonald’s
Restaurants of Massachusetts, Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 345, 352 (1st Cir.1995)(restaurant manager not a state
actor, although manager told police officer she “would like [an unruly customer] to leave” and officer
thereafter forcibly removed customer from restaurant, because there was no evidence that officer
substituted manager’s judgment for his own); Benavidez v. Gunnell, 722 F.2d 615, 618 (10th Cir. 1983)
( “mere furnishing of information to police officers does not constitute joint action under color of
state law which renders a private citizen...
...Unless a court-appointed attorney conspires with a state official to violate the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, that attorney cannot be liable under § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983....
*48. Davis v. Self

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northwestern Division. February 25, 2013 960 F.Supp.2d 1276
2013 WL 754853
CIVIL RIGHTS - Jurisdiction. Younger abstention was appropriate with respect to §1983 due
process claims for injunctive relief.
...Younger abstention was appropriate with respect to father’s claims for injunctive relief, in his §
1983 action against his former wife, former mother-in-law, state court judges, county officials, and
private attorneys, alleging that those individuals violated his due process rights in connection with
state court child custody and support proceedings in which he was involved; proceedings were ongoing in
state...
... See, e.g., Cox v. Mills, 465 Fed.Appx. 885, 888 (11th Cir.2012) (affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of
§ 1983 and §1985 claims when the complaint lacked “a sufficient factual basis for the court to proceed
toward a finding that [ defendant] and the state court judges agreed to violate [plaintiff’s] civil
rights,” and “merely point[ed] to instances where” plaintiff believed that the judges favorably disposed
of defendant’s...
* 49. Fonda v. Gray

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. June 03, 1983 707 F.2d 435
Plaintiff brought suit against government officials and two banks alleging a wide-ranging
conspiracy designed to suppress her outspoken political views. The United States District
Court for the Central District of California, Malcolm M. Lucas, J., granted summary judgment
in favor of banks, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, J. Blaine...
...C.A.Cal., 1983....
...[2][3][4] To prove a conspiracy between private parties and the government under § 1983, an
agreement or “ meeting of the minds ” to violate constitutional rights must be shown....
** 50. Smith v. Wambaugh

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania. December 08, 1998 29 F.Supp.2d 222 1998 WL 864434
Inmate, who had been convicted of murder, brought § 1983 action against crime author, who
paid lead investigator for personal depiction waiver, which would release author from
liability for manner in which investigator was portrayed in book, alleging he conspired with
police and prosecutors to deprive inmate of constitutional rights. On author’s...
...Crime author’s payment to murder investigator for personal depiction waiver, which released author from
liability for manner in which investigator was portrayed in book, did not constitute state action in
murderer’s § 1983 suit against author, absent showing that author engaged in joint activity with police
and prosecutors, or that author conspired with state officials to violate murderer’s constitutional
rights; author was in California during most of time activities complained of occurred, alleged...
...Private party may be liable under § 1983 when: (1) party actually participates with state officials
in activity which is constitutionally prohibited, or (2) private party conspires with state officials
to violate Constitution. 42...
*52. Johnson v. City of New York

United States District Court, S.D. New York. November 12, 2009 669 F.Supp.2d 444 2009 WL 3786594
EDUCATION - Civil Rights. Student’s complaint failed to state civil rights claim against
university defendants.
...Student’s complaint, which alleged that private university employee falsely accused him of larceny and
that he and other university defendants then conspired with city defendants to have student wrongfully
arrested, prosecuted, and dismissed as a student, failed to state claim under § 1983 since complaint
lacked allegation of “ state action”; complaint contained no factual allegations to support a finding...
...A merely conclusory allegation that a private entity acted in concert with a state actor does not
suffice to state a § 1983 claim against the private entity; rather, a plaintiff must allege that the
private entity and state actors carried out a deliberate, previously agreed upon plan, or that their
activity constituted a conspiracy or meeting of the minds...
*56. Parent v. New York

United States District Court, N.D. New York. May 24, 2011 786 F.Supp.2d 516 2011 WL 2020767
FAMILY LAW - Child Support. County child support enforcement officials were entitled to
qualified immunity.
...State of NEW YORK; Jonathan Lippman, individually and as Chief Administrative Officer of the New York
Unified Court System; Unified Court System of the State of New York; John W. Grow, individually and as
State Court Judge; Charles C. Merrell, individually and as Family Court Judge; George S. Getman,
individually and as Support Magistrate; Michael Daley, individually and as Acting Judge for the State of
New York; Justices of the Appellate Division...
...To succeed on § 1983 conspiracy claim, plaintiff must prove: (1) agreement between state actor and
private party; (2) to act in concert to inflict unconstitutional injury; and (3) overt act done in
furtherance of that goal causing damages. 42 U.S.C.A. §...
**62. Hammond v. Creative Financial Planning Organization, Inc.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania. February 28, 1992 800 F.Supp. 1244 1992 WL 189259
Former employee and her alleged attorney brought § 1983 action against former employer, its
attorneys, and state court judge who presided over former employee’s wrongful discharge
action alleging conspiracy to tamper with state court record to deprive former employee and
her alleged attorney of their constitutional rights. The District Court,...
...(b) Conspiracy...
...Alleged attorney who brought § 1983 claim alleging that he represented client in state court
wrongful discharge action pursuant to contingent fee agreement and that actions of client’s former
employer, its attorneys, and state court judge deprived him of his fee, thereby depriving him of
protected property interest without due process of law, had no standing to bring suit; court had reason to
doubt that alleged...
**63. Able Security and Patrol, LLC. v. Louisiana

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana. July 24, 2008 569 F.Supp.2d 617 2008 WL 2906624
CIVIL RIGHTS - Constitutional Torts. Allegations that defendants acted in concert to
deprive company of constitutional rights sufficiently stated §1983 claim.
...Holdings: The District Court, Ivan L.R. Lemelle, J., held that: (1) company insufficiently alleged
that defendants constituted an enterprise or a continuing unit under RICO; (2) allegations that
defendants acted in concert with LSBPSE to deprive company of equal protection and due process were
sufficient to state § 1983 claim; (3) allegations that defendants...
...In order to state a cause of action under statute prohibiting conspiracy to interfere with civil
rights, plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendants conspired; (2) for the purposes of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) one or more of the conspirators committed some act in
furtherance of the conspiracy...
*64. Gottschalk v. Litt

United States District Court, C.D. California, Western Division. June 15, 2009 Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
2009 WL 1704991
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the Court has reviewed the complaint, the motion to
dismiss, and all of the records and files herein and has conducted a de novo review of that
portion of the Report and Recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge to which
objections were filed. The Court accepts and adopts the findings and...
...For example, in addition to money damages and attorney fees, Plaintiff seeks the following relief,
which, if granted, would require this Court to stay or overturn decisions of the California state courts:
For the issuance of an Order to Show Cause ordering Judge Vargas and the Superior Court why all
proceedings against Plaintiff should not be stayed pending a full and fair hearing on the merits of the
allegations against Plaintiff; ․ For a TRO and Preliminary Injunction preventing Judge Vargas and the
Superior Court from making any rulings with respect to Plaintiff until this Court can determine the
merits; ․...
...Rather, “[t]o state a claim for a conspiracy to violate one’s constitutional rights under section
1983, the plaintiff must state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.”...
**77. Carvel v. New York State (bribery by loans on terms unavailable to the public)
United States District Court, S.D. New York. April 06, 2010 Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 2010 WL 1404154
Plaintiff Pamela Carvel, proceeding pro se, brought suit against the above named defendants
pursuant to, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”), alleging various constitutional
violations including the denial of due process and equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Carvel also asserts a number of state law claims. The...
...But here the allegations were that an official act of the defendant judge was the product of a
corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge ....
...NEW YORK STATE; Office of Court Administration of the Unified Court System of New York; Thomas J.
Cahill, individually and in his official capacity; Sherry M. Cohen, individually and in her official
capacity; Gary L. Casella, individually and in his official capacity; Eve Markewich, individually and as
a partner of Blank Rome LLP; Frank Streng, individually and as a partner of McCarthy Fingar LLP; deborah
McCarthy; Joel Aurnou; William Griffin, individually and as a co-owner of Hudson Valley Bank; Laura
Werner, individually and in her official capacity; Anthony Scarpino, individually and in his official...
** 79. Benavidez v. Gunnell (prosecutor has only qualified immunity in role of

investigator or administrator)
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. December 08, 1983 722 F.2d 615
Civil rights action was brought against prosecutor, police officers, and various private
parties. The United States District Court for the District of Utah, Bruce S. Jenkins, J.,
entered judgment in favor of defendants, and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Breitenstein, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) prosecutor did not have absolute...
...C.A.Utah, 1983....
...[4][5] Plaintiffs further contend that the private parties, Campbell, Wright, and Sharp, conspired
with the prosecutor and police officers to deprive the plaintiffs of their constitutional rights in
violation of §§ 1983 and 1985....
** 80. Iqbal v. Hasty

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. June 14, 2007 490 F.3d 143 2007 WL 1717803
CIVIL RIGHTS - Prisons. Exigent circumstances of post–9/11 context did not diminish Muslim
detainee’s right not to be mistreated.
...A civil rights plaintiff is not required to meet heightened pleading rule in order to survive a motion
to dismiss in the face of a qualified immunity defense, however, in order to survive a motion to dismiss
under the plausibility standard of Bell Atlantic, a conclusory allegation concerning some elements of a
plaintiff’s claims might need to be fleshed out by a plaintiff’s response to a defendant’s motion for a
more definite statement; in addition, even though a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a district
court, while mindful of the need to vindicate the purpose of the qualified immunity defense by dismissing
non-meritorious claims against public officials...
...For example, the Court required “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement
was made,” id. at 1965; “enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
of illegal agreement,” id.; “facts that are suggestive enough to render a §1 conspiracy plausible,” id.;
“ allegations of parallel conduct ․ placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding
agreement,” id. at 1966; “ allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement...
**82. Plaisance v. Reese

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana. September 13, 2004 353 F.Supp.2d 735 2004 WL 3143585
CIVIL RIGHTS - Conspiracy. Judge could not be held liable under civil rights statute for
failing to prevent alleged conspiracy.
...Holdings: The District Court, Lemmon, J., held that: (1) judge was not state actor, for § 1983
purposes, when he acted in his capacity as attorney; (2) allegations did not support § 1983 claim that
defendant judge conspired with judge who heard underlying custody case; (3)...
...Allegations that judge serving as attorney for mother in custody proceeding had interest in outcome
of case and had influence over judge hearing case, that judge- attorney influenced or prejudiced
proceedings, and that damages were sought against judge- attorney for conspiring to or aiding and
abetting or contributing to kidnap of child did not support § 1983 claim that judge...
** 84. Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. October 18, 1993 7 F.3d 1085 1993 WL 414252
Investor brought civil rights action against securities firms for allegedly discriminating
against him on basis of race during arbitration proceeding. The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, Louis L. Stanton, J., dismissed complaint. Investor
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) three-year limitations period...
...Elements of § 1985(3) claim are: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws; (3) act in furtherance of conspiracy; (4) whereby person is either injured in
his person or property or deprived of any right of citizen of United States. 42 U.S.C.A. §...
...[7][8] Finally, § 1986 provides a cause of action against anyone who “having knowledge that any of the
wrongs conspired to be done and mentioned in section 1985 are about to be committed and having power to
prevent or aid, neglects to do so.” ...
** 84. Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. October 18, 1993 7 F.3d 1085 1993 WL 414252
Investor brought civil rights action against securities firms for allegedly discriminating
against him on basis of race during arbitration proceeding. The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, Louis L. Stanton, J., dismissed complaint. Investor
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) three-year limitations period...
...Elements of § 1985(3) claim are: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws; (3) act in furtherance of conspiracy; (4) whereby person is either injured in
his person or property or deprived of any right of citizen of United States. 42 U.S.C.A. §...
...[7][8] Finally, § 1986 provides a cause of action against anyone who “having knowledge that any of the
wrongs conspired to be done and mentioned in section 1985 are about to be committed and having power to
prevent or aid, neglects to do so.” ...
** 89. Slotnick v. Staviskey

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit. July 28, 1977 560 F.2d 31
Appeal was taken from an order of the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., J., which dismissed a civil rights action wherein
plaintiff alleged that various defendants including certain state officials had conspired
to deprive him of his civil rights in connection with a collection suit in state...
...Complaint alleging that various defendants including state officials had conspired to deprive
plaintiff of his civil rights failed to state a claim for relief where conspiracy allegations were based
on supposedly improper procedures in connection with state court suit against plaintiff and where none of
the alleged procedural defects violated...
...The Court of Appeals, Coffin, Chief Judge, held that: (1) the state court judge and his clerk who
were named defendants enjoyed absolute immunity from suit under the Civil Rights Act; (2) conclusory
allegations concerning conspiracy were insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, and (3) none of the
procedural defects that lay at the heart of the alleged conspiracy violated the plaintiff’s...
** 92. Sykes v. State of Cal. (Dept. of Motor Vehicles)

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. May 01, 1974 497 F.2d 197
Former automobile retailer brought civil rights action against Department of Motor Vehicles,
a representative of that Department, district attorney and deputy district attorney, and
others for actions which resulted in loss of license to sell automobiles, prosecution for
violation of injunction against sale of automobiles and certain bankruptcy...
...In order for private persons to be held liable under the civil rights statutes, plaintiff must show
that private defendants were willful participants in joint activity with the State or its agents. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983....
...When conspiracy to violate civil rights is alleged, there must be a showing that defendants
conspired or acted jointly or in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of a conspiracy
which resulted in plaintiff being deprived, under color of state law, of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States...
** 97. Herrmann v. Moore

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. May 10, 1978 576 F.2d 453 17 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA)
1523
In a civil rights action brought by a tenured professor at law school seeking restoration to
position as tenured law professor, to declare invalid the school’s resolution removing
plaintiff from office and to recover damages. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, George C. Pratt, J., granted defendants’ motion for...
...The Court of Appeals, Wyzanski, Senior District Judge, held that: (1) plaintiff failed to show, as
required by civil rights statute proscribing a deprivation of rights, that under color of law he had
actually been subjected to deprivation of any constitutional rights when particular person, with whom
defendants allegedly had conspired, while allegedly acting as state judge...
...Plaintiff failed to show, as required by federal civil rights statute proscribing a deprivation of
rights, that under color of law he had actually been subjected to deprivation of any constitutional
rights when particular person, with whom defendants allegedly had conspired, while allegedly acting as
state judge had adversely affected a suit involving plaintiff, since after judge’s...
Sparkman v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261, 268 (1979)
**or more specifically, by having “reached an understanding” with the judge to engage in
a course of action that would deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights. See
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. at 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598.
The complaint contained 33 numbered paragraphs. One paragraph alleged that the actions
of the defendants “in concert and with the common goal and result of sterilizing” the
plaintiff, deprived her of her constitutional rights.8 Two other paragraphs alleged that
the doctor who performed the sterilization operation did so “with the knowledge,
approval, acquiescence, aid and assistance of each of the other defendants.”9
Under the cases discussed in Part II, this was insufficient. It is not sufficient to
allege that the defendants merely acted in concert or with a common goal. There must be
allegations that the defendants had directed themselves toward an unconstitutional
action by virtue of a mutual understanding. **Even were such allegations to be made,
they must further be supported by some factual allegations suggesting such a “meeting of
the minds.” The complaint here obviously does not meet these requirements.
**Johnson v. Dossey, 878 F.Supp.2d 905

N.D.Ill.E.Div.,2012
Phone calls and meetings involving law enforcement personnel investigating arson case
and personnel associated with investigation conducted by suspect's insurer did not
indicate conspiracy under § 1983; communication between parties investigating same case
seemed to be not only routine, but authorized and encouraged by Illinois law. 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983 .
**White v. City of Atlanta, 449 Fed.Appx. 804

C.A.11.Ga.,2011
Plaintiff failed to show that city police officer was aware of alleged conspiracy to coerce
him to conceal illegal search of home that resulted in death of homeowner, so as to support
civil rights conspiracy claim; viewed in light most favorable to plaintiff, record
established that corrupt supervisor dispatched officer to interview plaintiff, that corrupt
officers prepared plaintiff to meet with officer, and that officer questioned plaintiff and
then pursued a material witness to complete his investigation. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(2).
**In re USA Commercial Mortg. Co., 802 F.Supp.2d 1147

D.Nev.,2011
Substantial evidence of motivations that drove financer and loan servicer to conspire to
place their interests in the proceeds from the loans in priority to those of the direct
lenders supported defendants' liability under Nevada law for civil conspiracy.
**Hernandez v. City of Napa, 2011 WL 996791 (officers denied qualified immunity)

N.D.Cal.N.Div.,2011
To constitute a civil rights conspiracy, the agreement to violate constitutional rights
need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis of circumstantial evidence such as
the actions of the defendants.
**SigmaPharm, Inc. v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 772 F.Supp.2d 660

E.D.Pa.,2011
Parallel conduct that indicates the sort of restricted freedom of action and sense of
obligation that one generally associates with agreement may be sufficient to state a claim of
tacit conspiracy.
In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & Erisa Litigation, 2010 WL 5100809

S.D.Tex.Houston.Div.,2010
**Under Texas law, a changing cast of characters does nothing to lessen the fact of one
conspiracy; once the existence of a common scheme of conspiracy is shown, slight
evidence is all that is required to connect a particular defendant with the conspiracy.
Bergin Financial, Inc. v. First American Title Co., 397 Fed.Appx. 119
C.A.6.Mich.,2010
Mortgage company argued that title company's independent agent had notified title
company that it was under investigation for its involvement in alleged scam as closer of
various “flipping” real estate transactions for which title company was title insurer,
but presented nothing to indicate that agent notified title company that it had actually
participated in such scheme, rather than merely failing to detect and prevent it, thus
precluding mortgage company's claim to hold title company directly liable for civil
conspiracy to defraud mortgage company.
**Green v. Missouri, 734 F.Supp.2d 814
E.D.Mo.E.Div.,2010
To avoid summary judgment on a civil rights conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must allege
with particularity and demonstrate with specific material facts that the defendants
reached an agreement; while those allegations may include circumstantial evidence, the
plaintiff must point to at least some facts that would suggest that defendants reached
an understanding to violate his rights. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3).
Green v. Missouri, 734 F.Supp.2d 814

E.D.Mo.E.Div.,2010
The question of the existence of a conspiracy to deprive a plaintiff of his or her
constitutional rights should not be taken from the jury if there is a possibility the
jury could infer from the circumstances a meeting of the minds or understanding among
the conspirators to achieve the conspiracy's aims; because the elements of a conspiracy
are rarely established through means other than circumstantial evidence, and summary
judgment is only warranted when the evidence is so one-sided as to leave no room for any
reasonable difference of opinion as to how the case should be decided, a court must be
convinced that the evidence presented is insufficient to support any reasonable
inference of a conspiracy. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 .
Green v. Missouri, 734 F.Supp.2d 814

E.D.Mo.E.Div.,2010
Speculation and conjecture are not enough to prove that a civil rights conspiracy
existed. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983 , 1985(3).
**Steel v. City of San Diego, 726 F.Supp.2d 1172

S.D.Cal.,2010
For purposes of conspiracy under § 1983, agreement or meeting of minds may be inferred
on basis of circumstantial evidence, such as actions of defendants. 42 U.S.C.A. §
1983 .
**Steel v. City of San Diego, 726 F.Supp.2d 1172

S.D.Cal.,2010
Showing that defendants committed acts that are unlikely to have been undertaken without
an agreement may support inference of conspiracy under § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .
**Crowe v. County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406 (officer’s lacked qualified immunity)
C.A.9.Cal.,2010
To establish liability for a conspiracy in a § 1983 case, a plaintiff must demonstrate
the existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights;
such an agreement need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis of circumstantial
evidence such as the actions of the defendants. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .
**Wackman v. Rubsamen, 602 F.3d 391

C.A.5.Tex.,2010
Evidence of a meeting of the minds was sufficient to support finding, in action under
Texas law, that hospice patient's caretaker conspired to cause her death, even though
there was no direct evidence that the conspirators discussed the details of that death
in advance; conspirators had a longstanding, close relationship, there was evidence they
went to the funeral home to discuss arrangements before death occurred, and it was
reasonable to infer that since caretaker stood to gain control of all of patient's
assets upon her death, coconspirator stood to benefit based on their long-time, close
relationship.
.Betancourt v. Rhodes, 2010 WL 672756 West KeySummary[1] D.Idaho,2010Evidence did not

support a murder defendant's civil rights conspiracy claims against the coroner who
investigated the victim's body. There was no evidence that the coroner conspired to destroy
the victim's body fluids and samples, or that he acted with bad faith when he failed to
preserve the evidence or failed to perform certain tests.1 91k192
100k232021438012001012021438012001
**Mills v. City of Harrisburg, 350 Fed.Appx. 770

C.A.3.Pa.,2009
Police officers who conducted undercover prostitution sting operation did not unlawfully
conspire to deprive arrestee of his equal protection rights, where there was no
indication that officers acted with discriminatory intent or otherwise targeted
arrestee and his co-defendant because of their race. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14 ; 42
U.S.C.A. § 1985(3).
**U.S. v. Santiago-Mendez, 2009 WL 1767666 West KeySummary[1] D.C.P.R.,2009Sufficient

evidence supported police officer's conviction for conspiracy to violate civil rights of
innocent citizens via violation of due process by the fabrication of a narcotics case. Police
officer participated in the fabrication of cases against innocent individuals. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend 5 , 14F
**Roy v. Board of County Com'rs, 607 F.Supp.2d 1297,

N.D.Fla.,2009
Intentional discrimination, for purposes of a claim under § 1981, § 1982, or § 1985, may be
proven through (1) direct evidence, (2) circumstantial evidence, or (3) statistical proof. 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 1981 , 1982 , 1985 .
Roy v. Board of County Com'rs, 607 F.Supp.2d 1297, 1305, (N.D.Fla., Mar 31, 2009)
[1][2][3] To prevail on a claim under § 1981, § 1982, or § 1985, a plaintiff must

prove intentional discrimination on the basis of race. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n
v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 3150, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982) (§
1981); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir.1994) (§ 1982);
Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir.1996) (§§ 1981 and 1982);
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971)
(§ 1985). Because intentional discrimination is required, a mere “showing of disparate
impact through a neutral practice is insufficient”; rather, the plaintiff must show
“purposeful discrimination.” Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th
Cir.1999). To establish purposeful discrimination under § 1981 and § 1982 a plaintiff
must show that, under similar circumstances, the defendant treated a white individual
differently than it treated him. See Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 404
(7th Cir.2007), aff'd on other grounds, ––– U.S. ––––, 128 S.Ct. 1951, 170 L.Ed.2d 864
(2008) (§ 1981); Burke–Fowler v. Orange County, Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1324–26 (11th
Cir.2006) (§ 1981); Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood Ass'n, Inc., 318 F.Supp.2d 1133,
1148 (S.D.Fla.2004) (§ 1982). Intentional discrimination may be proven through **(1)
direct evidence, **(2) circumstantial evidence, or **(3) statistical proof. Rioux v.
City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.2008).
[4] The court has thoroughly reviewed the record in this case for any evidence of
purposeful racial discrimination on the part of any defendant in this case. There is
none. In fact, the record is crystal clear *1306 that as of July 2005, when the Roys'
plat application was approved, nothing the County or the individual defendants had done
interfered with, hampered, impeded, or delayed the Roys' ability to develop and market
their property to whomever they wished. Furthermore, subsequent to July 2005 the only
thing the Roys were prevented from constructing was the front privacy wall, a
prohibition which did not implicate a civil right, much less the violation of a civil
right. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to suggest that issuance of the May 11,
2005, stop-work order and removal of the plat application from the May 2005 BOA agenda
was racially motivated. The Roys have not shown that, under circumstances similar to
those alleged in this case, the County treated a white developer differently than it
treated them, i.e., the Roys have come forward with nothing that shows a white
developer who built in the scenic corridor setback zone received more favorable
treatment by the County than did the Roys. Here, there is absolutely no credible
comparator evidence.FN21
FN21. To satisfy their burden of introducing a comparator, the Roys might have produced
evidence of a white developer who sought and received a variance of the type denied to
them, evidence of a white developer who was permitted to build in the scenic corridor
setback zone despite arguable code violations, or other plausible evidence of disparate
treatment, but they did not. In fact, they have identified no other property owner or
developer for comparison at all.
Even if the plaintiffs were not required to come forward with evidence of a white
comparator on their § 1981 and § 1982 claims, they have failed to rebut the defendants'
articulated non-discriminatory reason for issuing the stop-work orders and removing
their plat from the May 24, 2005, meeting agenda. FN22 More specifically, the Roys'
construction of the front privacy wall violated the specific setback and vegetation
protection requirements of the Land Development Code. Plaintiffs' fanciful arguments
notwithstanding, the front privacy wall construction unquestionably violated these
requirements. FN23 Nonetheless, even if Webb, Goldberg, and the County were incorrect in
their determination that the wall violated the buffer and vegetation requirements their
error does not equate to intentional discrimination. Cf. E & T Realty v. Strickland,
830 F.2d 1107, 1114 (11th Cir.1987) (“[m]ere error or mistake” or “[e]ven arbitrary
administration” of a *1307 statute does not amount to intentional discrimination).
There is simply not one shred of evidence of pretext on the record before the court.
Indeed, the Roys have come forward with absolutely no credible direct or circumstantial
evidence, or statistical proof, of any intentional discrimination whatsoever. Rioux,
520 F.3d at 1274. The Roys' claims pursuant to § 1981 and § 1982 therefore are
completely without merit.
FN22. To show intentional discrimination through circumstantial evidence, the Roys may
use the familiar burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d
668 (1973). EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1272–73 (11th Cir.2000)
(per curiam ). Under this framework, a plaintiff must first present sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. If a prima facie case is established, the burden
then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions. Id. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that the reason was merely pretextual. Id., 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817.
FN23. According to the Roys, there are multiple “prima facie cases” under which
intentional discrimination may be established. Some of the Roys' theories are not
applicable—for example, disparate impact does not prove an intentional discrimination
claim under §§ 1981, 1982, or 1985—and others are puzzling to the court, such as the
Roys' distinction between “denial of benefit” and “imposition of penalty” outcomes or
their complaint that defendants have proven no “violation of rule.”
Additionally, the Roys argue at length about procedural irregularities in the County's
processes. In fact the court initially had concerns about some of these irregularities;
however, on review of the record it is obvious that any such procedural irregularities
operated only to the Roys' benefit.
Likewise, there is no proof of a conspiracy in this case. Section 1985 protects only
“the right to be free from being a victim of independent illegality,” but the Roys
cannot show that defendants are liable under § 1981 or § 1982 and there can be no
conspiracy without an underlying illegal act. See Poirier v. Hodges, 445 F.Supp. 838,
845 (M.D.Fla.1978). Moreover, § 1985 requires proof of a conspiracy, or agreement,
between the defendants. Dickerson v. Alachua County Comm'n, 200 F.3d 761, 767 (11th
Cir.2000). The Roys have presented no credible factual evidence of an agreement, only
allegations which are insufficient to rebut the defendants' denials.FN24 Thus the Roys' §
1985 claim also is without merit. FN25
FN24. The Roys' conspiracy allegations are based on the following. When Goldberg was a
defendant in this case he submitted an affidavit in which he denied representing “any
other party” than Webb. The Roys insist this contradicts a statement contained in a
truncated, 10–second video clip purportedly showing Goldberg at the September 22, 2005,
BOA meeting. In the video, an unidentifiable man is filmed from behind saying, “My name
is Ken Goldberg, I represent several homeowners in Tranquility Shores and Gulf Vista,
which are the neighboring subdivisions to this particular project—.” The Roys insists
Goldberg must have been referring to Nelson and Vogel because they live in Gulf Vista;
thus, at oral argument, Roy's counsel claimed that Goldberg must have been “lying”
either in the affidavit or at the BOA meeting. Second, Roy asserts there is evidence of
a conspiracy because Goldberg and Nelson both attended this meeting, where they sat
together, and they also attended the February 2, 2006, final meeting at the County's
offices.
The court cannot consider the video clip purportedly depicting Goldberg; it is
inadmissible because there is no testimony in the record to authenticate it and it is
not self-authenticating. Fed.R.Evid. 901, 902. Even if the evidence were admissible,
however, the court finds it is utterly insufficient to give rise to an inference that
Goldberg lied, thus casting doubt on his credibility. Goldberg's “several homeowners”
could have been any number of people other than Nelson and Vogel. Moreover, in his
affidavit Goldberg avers that in connection with this matter he represented no party
other than Webb. There is simply no contradiction, as the Roys claim, between Goldberg's
denial that he represented any other party in this lawsuit and any statement that he
represents several other homeowners. Additionally, there is nothing nefarious in Nelson
and Goldberg's appearance at the BOA meeting; Roy himself sent the notice of the
meeting to Nelson and Webb, Goldberg's client, because they were nearby landowners
affected by Roy's variance petition.
**Vodak v. City of Chicago, 624 F.Supp.2d 933

N.D.Ill.E.Div.,2009
Evidence was insufficient to support protestors' claim that police officers conspired to
arrest them during mass demonstration in violation of the First Amendment rights;
evidence that officers discussed making arrests did not support finding that there was a
meeting of the minds between officers to violate protestors' rights. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1 .

**Venegas v. Wagner, 831 F.2d 1514
C.A.9.Cal.,1987
Evidence supported jury's conclusions that police officers procured false testimony from
witness and denied plaintiff a fair trial in a murder prosecution and that officers
violated civil rights statutes. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983 , 1985(3) .

**Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839
C.A.9.Cal.,1999
Jury's finding that mayor and city council members conspired to retaliate against
firefighters due to firefighters' protected First Amendment activities was supported by
evidence that mayor and council members attended closed-door city council meetings in
which fire chief discussed what disciplinary actions should be taken against
firefighters and that mayor and council members each made hostile statements about
firefighters, including threats of political retribution and accusations of criminal
conduct. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1 .
**Gibbons v. Lambert, 358 F.Supp.2d 1048

D.Utah.C.Div.,2005
Lack of evidence that any police or judicial officers, involved in search of home for
presence of drug activities, knew that owner was prominent banker, or that they had
taken concerted actions, precluded § 1983 claim that officers conspired to “bring down”
homeowner through filing of false charges that homeowner possessed controlled substances
and dealt in harmful material to minor. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .
**Burrell v. Anderson, 353 F.Supp.2d 55

D.Me.,2005
Absent any evidentiary support for allegations that employees of police department and
employees of district attorney's office falsified evidence in assault case involving
child, or suppressed evidence in order to avoid finding probable cause to arrest child's
mother and her boyfriend, employees did not engage in any conspiracy to discriminate
against child's father, on the basis of his gender, although they prosecuted him for
alleged domestic violence against mother. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4 ; 42 U.S.C.A. §
1985 .
**Heartland Academy Community Church v. Waddle, 317 F.Supp.2d 984

E.D.Mo.N.Div.,2004
A conspiracy existed between two juvenile officers to deprive students at a private
school of their Fourth Amendment rights, by illegally seizing them and removing them
from the school; there were various meetings, correspondences, and discussions between
the officers in which they discussed removal of the children and methods to discourage
parents or guardians from returning their children to the school. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4 .
**Drug Mart Pharmacy Corp. v. American Home Products Corp., 288 F.Supp.2d 325
E.D.N.Y.,2003
A defendant must take an affirmative action to disavow or defeat the purpose of the
conspiracy, to make sure that a withdrawal did occur and is not simply being invented ex
post; until affirmative evidence of withdrawal has been produced, a defendant's
participation in the conspiracy is presumed to continue until the last overt act by any
of the conspirators.
**Williams v. County of Santa Barbara, 272 F.Supp.2d 995

C.D.Cal.,2003
Each alleged participant in civil conspiracy need not know the exact details of the
plan, but must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy; plaintiffs need
not provide direct evidence of the agreement between the conspirators, but must show
circumstantial evidence sufficient for a jury to infer from the circumstances that the
alleged conspirators reached an understanding to achieve the conspiracy's objectives.
Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565 (5th Cir.(Miss.), Jul 26, 1991)
Plaintiff brought federal civil rights action alleging that numerous defendants
conspired to frame him for armed robbery. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi, L.T. Senter, Jr., Chief Judge, granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appealed. On rehearing, the Court of Appeals,
King, Circuit Judge, superseded earlier opinion at 917 F.2d 873, and held that: (1)
prosecuting assistant district attorney was absolutely immune from liability for his
actions in initiating prosecution and could not be held liable for alleged acts outside
scope of prosecutorial duties where such allegations were wholly unsupported and
conclusory; (2) prosecution witness in armed robbery trial and juror were entitled to
absolute immunity; (3) conclusory allegations against attorneys and banker were
insufficient to plead requisite operative facts to tie them to conspiracy with state
actors; and **(4) allegations against police chief and detective stated claim.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.

[9] Conspiracy 91 18
91 Conspiracy
91I Civil Liability
91I(B) Actions
91k18 k. Pleading. Most Cited Cases
Federal civil rights plaintiff's conclusory allegations that two attorneys and banker
conspired to rig jury and deprive him of fair trial as part of conspiracy, with state
actors, to convict plaintiff of armed robbery were insufficient to show conspiracy where
operative facts were not pled. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
[10] Civil Rights 78 1398
78 Civil Rights
78III Federal Remedies in General
78k1392 Pleading
78k1398 k. Defenses; immunity and good faith. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 78k238)
**Plaintiff stated federal civil rights claim against police chief and detective for
their role in alleged conspiracy to frame him for armed robbery where his complaint
alleged specific, operative facts which, if proved, would not permit officers to avoid
liability under their defense of qualified immunity; plaintiff alleged that officers
**harbored animosity against him, **harassed him, and **persuaded his two alleged
accomplices in armed robbery to implicate him, and **that police chief also persuaded
chief prosecution witness to falsely identify him. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
73 ALR Fed 78
When is eviction of tenant by private landlord conducted "under color of state law" for
purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
§ 9[a] Private party's conspiracy or joint action with state official as placing
eviction under color of state law—Held under color of state law
[Cumulative Supplement]
The allegations and evidence in the following cases demonstrated or supported a
finding that a private landlord had participated in joint action with a state official
in attempting to obtain a tenant's eviction, and that the eviction was therefore
conducted under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
Reasoning that a set of facts might be proven which would demonstrate that a
landlord and a process server had conspired, under color of state law, to evict a tenant
without due process, the court in Carrasco v Klein (1974, ED NY) 381 F Supp 782,
refused to dismiss the tenant's action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 The court found it well
established that private persons come within the ambit of § 1983 when they are willful
participants in joint activity with the state or its agents. However, the court observed
that in this case, the alleged conspiracy was not between a private person and a state
official, such as a policeman, but rather between one private person and another, where
only the process server was initially brought within the scope of the § 1983 state
action requirement under the public function theory. The court acknowledged that a
problem of the remoteness of the state's participation was present under these facts,
but found no logical reason to distinguish between a conspiracy with an official state
actor, such as a policeman, and a conspiracy with a private party clothed with state
authority, such as the process server, when the latter is sufficiently public. The
court, therefore, declined to dismiss the case pending a fuller development of the
record.
Where a landlord sought and received the intervention of town police to effectuate
the allegedly illegal eviction of tenants from a rented trailer, the court in Howerton
v Gabica (1983, CA9 Idaho) 708 F2d 380, 73 ALR Fed 70, ruled that the eviction had
taken place under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 The landlord
initially told the tenants to move from the trailer after their rent payment was late,
and the tenant threatened to harm the landlord if she returned. An eviction notice was
subsequently served with a police officer present. When the tenants continued to remain
in the trailer, the landlord returned with a police officer, who was in uniform and on
duty, to warn the tenants that utilities would be cut off if they stayed. This police
officer later returned alone, told the tenants that proper eviction procedures were
being used, and advised them to leave. Subsequently, the officer accompanied the
landlord when the utilities were disconnected, but the tenants continued to spend some
nights in the trailer. On one occasion, three police officers visited the trailer in
response to the landlord's call regarding a family disturbance, and one officer asked if
the tenants were still looking for a new rental. The District Court dismissed the
tenants' § 1983 complaint, finding that the police officers had taken no affirmative
action in the eviction, but merely stood by to keep the peace. The tenants argued on
appeal that they were denied Fourteenth Amendment rights when the landlords, with police
aid, used self-help to evict them without proper notice and a prior judicial hearing.
Recounting the various tests employed by the Supreme Court to determine the existence of
state action, and finding a similarity between the present case and cases considering
police involvement in the repossession of personal property, the court stated that at
some point, as police involvement becomes increasingly important, repossession by
private individuals assumes the character of state action. The court observed that the
eviction had involved more than one incident of police consent to "stand by" in case of
trouble. Rather, the police participation had given the tenants the impression that the
landlord acted legally in cutting off the utilities. Furthermore, the court stated that
the police officer had actively intervened in recommending that the tenants leave the
trailer. The court found the record replete with evidence that the landlords
deliberately cloaked themselves with the authority of the state in effecting the
repossession. While a single request for police peace-keeping assistance might not make
a landlord a "joint actor" with the state for § 1983 purposes, the court concluded, the
landlords acted under color of state law where they repeatedly requested the aid of the
police to evict the tenants, and where the police intervened at every step.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more
than one of the Federal Constitution's commands; where such multiple violations are
alleged, the courts will not identify as a preliminary matter the claim's "dominant"
character, but will examine each constitutional provision in turn; thus, in an action
under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 by the owner of a trailer home—which action alleges that the
Constitution's Fourth Amendment was violated when the home was forcibly removed from a
private mobile home park by employees of the park owner, while county sheriff's
deputies, aware that the park owner did not have a legal eviction order, watched the
removal, informed the trailer home owner that they were there to see that he did not
interfere, and refused to accept his complaint for criminal trespass—the owner's Fourth
Amendment claim is not properly barred on the theory that the owner's claim is more akin
to a challenge against deprivation of property without due process. Soldal v. Cook
County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 113 S. Ct. 538, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992).
In § 1983 action by tenants against their former landlord and county sheriff for
allegedly evicting plaintiffs from their home without lawful process, forcing them to
live on street and suffer loss of their children, sheriff was potentially liable in both
official and personal capacity, and landlord was liable for acting in concert with
sheriff under color of state law. Quinones v Durkis (1986, SD Fla) 638 F Supp 856.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
73 ALR FED 78; When is eviction of tenant by private landlord conducted "under color of
state law" for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
§ 9[a] Private party's conspiracy or joint action with state official as placing
eviction under color of state law—Held under color of state law
The allegations and evidence in the following cases demonstrated or supported a finding
that a private landlord had participated in joint action with a state official in
attempting to obtain a tenant's eviction, and that the eviction was therefore conducted
under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
Reasoning that a set of facts might be proven which would demonstrate that a landlord
and a process server had conspired, under color of state law, to evict a tenant without
due process, the court in Carrasco v Klein (1974, ED NY) 381 F Supp 782, refused to
dismiss the tenant's action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 The court found it well
established that private persons come within the ambit of § 1983 when they are willful
participants in joint activity with the state or its agents. However, the court
observed that in this case, the alleged conspiracy was not between a private person and
a state official, such as a policeman, but rather between one private person and
another, where only the process server was initially brought within the scope of the §
1983 state action requirement under the public function theory. The court acknowledged
that a problem of the remoteness of the state's participation was present under these
facts, but found no logical reason to distinguish between a conspiracy with an official
state actor, such as a policeman, and a conspiracy with a private party clothed with
state authority, such as the process server, when the latter is sufficiently public. The
court, therefore, declined to dismiss the case pending a fuller development of the
record.
**Where a landlord sought and received the intervention of town police to effectuate
the allegedly illegal eviction of tenants from a rented trailer, the court in Howerton
v Gabica (1983, CA9 Idaho) 708 F2d 380, 73 ALR Fed 70, ruled that the eviction had
taken place under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 The landlord
initially told the tenants to move from the trailer after their rent payment was late,
and the tenant threatened to harm the landlord if she returned. An eviction notice was
subsequently served with a police officer present. When the tenants continued to remain
in the trailer, the landlord returned with a police officer, who was in uniform and on
duty, to warn the tenants that utilities would be cut off if they stayed. This police
officer later returned alone, told the tenants that proper eviction procedures were
being used, and advised them to leave. Subsequently, the officer accompanied the
landlord when the utilities were disconnected, but the tenants continued to spend some
nights in the trailer. On one occasion, three police officers visited the trailer in
response to the landlord's call regarding a family disturbance, and one officer asked if
the tenants were still looking for a new rental. The District Court dismissed the
tenants' § 1983 complaint, finding that the police officers had taken no affirmative
action in the eviction, but merely stood by to keep the peace. The tenants argued on
appeal that they were denied Fourteenth Amendment rights when the landlords, with police
aid, used self-help to evict them without proper notice and a prior judicial hearing.
Recounting the various tests employed by the Supreme Court to determine the existence of
state action, and finding a similarity between the present case and cases considering
police involvement in the repossession of personal property, the court stated that at
some point, as police involvement becomes increasingly important, repossession by
private individuals assumes the character of state action. The court observed that the
eviction had involved more than one incident of police consent to "stand by" in case of
trouble. Rather, the police participation had given the tenants the impression that the
landlord acted legally in cutting off the utilities. Furthermore, the court stated that
the police officer had actively intervened in recommending that the tenants leave the
trailer. The court found the record replete with evidence that the landlords
deliberately cloaked themselves with the authority of the state in effecting the
repossession. While a single request for police peace-keeping assistance might not make
a landlord a "joint actor" with the state for § 1983 purposes, the court concluded, the
landlords acted under color of state law where they repeatedly requested the aid of the
police to evict the tenants, and where the police intervened at every step.
Cases:
Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than
one of the Federal Constitution's commands; where such multiple violations are alleged,
the courts will not identify as a preliminary matter the claim's "dominant" character,
but will examine each constitutional provision in turn; thus, in an action under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983 by the owner of a trailer home—which action alleges that the
Constitution's Fourth Amendment was violated when the home was forcibly removed from a
private mobile home park by employees of the park owner, while county sheriff's
deputies, aware that the park owner did not have a legal eviction order, watched the
removal, informed the trailer home owner that they were there to see that he did not
interfere, and refused to accept his complaint for criminal trespass—the owner's Fourth
Amendment claim is not properly barred on the theory that the owner's claim is more akin
to a challenge against deprivation of property without due process. Soldal v. Cook
County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 113 S. Ct. 538, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992).
In § 1983 action by tenants against their former landlord and county sheriff for
allegedly evicting plaintiffs from their home without lawful process, forcing them to
live on street and suffer loss of their children, sheriff was potentially liable in both
official and personal capacity, and landlord was liable for acting in concert with
sheriff under color of state law. Quinones v Durkis (1986, SD Fla) 638 F Supp 856.
Real estate broker’s salesperson’s evidence of participation in conspiracy, actively

participated in the fraud, by marketing and selling a property that the purported seller
did not own, by selling a property that the purported seller did not own,
39 amjur pof3d 309 real estate brokers misrepresentation or nondisclosure as to

condition or value of realty.
Evid of conspiracy judge hearing a case despite having stock in bank,
127 Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. s 1233, Statement of Particular
Matters-Conspiracy (2014) HN: 4 (F.2d)
** 12 Construction and Application of "Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine" as

Applied to Corporation and Its Employees--State Cases, 2 A.L.R.6th 387 (2005)
§ 7. View that intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply to corporate

employees acting outside scope of employment
While the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine by implication does not apply to corporate
employees acting outside the scope of their employment, the courts in the following
cases explicitly stated or recognized this principle.
Cal.
Black v. Bank of America, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 725 (1st Dist. 1994)
§ 8. View that intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply to corporate

employees with independent personal stake in achieving object of conspiracy
While the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine by implication does not apply to corporate
employees with a personal stake, independent of that of the corporation, in achieving
the object of the conspiracy, the courts in the following cases explicitly stated or
recognized this principle.
Cal.
Black v. Bank of America, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 725 (1st Dist. 1994)
§ 9. View that corporate officers and directors can conspire through direct
participation
The courts in the following cases held or recognized that, unlike subordinate employees,
corporate directors and officers who directly order, authorize or participate in the
corporation's tortious conduct may be held liable as conspirators for violation of their
own duties toward persons injured by the corporate tort. Cal.
Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 3d 39, 260 Cal. Rptr. 183, 775 P.2d 508 (1989)
Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 598 P.2d 45 (1979)
Yoon v. Stern, 2003 WL 22792325 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2003) , unpublished/noncitable
PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1368, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (2d Dist. 2000) , as
modified on denial of reh'g, (Apr. 7, 2000)
Golden v. Anderson, 256 Cal. App. 2d 714, 64 Cal. Rptr. 404 (2d Dist. 1967)
Price v. Hibbs, 225 Cal. App. 2d 209, 37 Cal. Rptr. 270 (5th Dist. 1964)
The court in Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 3d 39, 260 Cal. Rptr. 183, 775
P.2d 508 (1989), held that the liability of corporate directors and officers who
directly order, authorize or participate in the corporation's tortious conduct is
outside the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, and such persons may be held liable, as
conspirators or otherwise, for violation of their own duties toward persons injured by
the corporate tort. The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, the court explained,
precludes only claims against the principal's subordinate employees and against agents
retained by the principal to act as independent contractors for conspiring to violate a
duty peculiar to the principal.
III. APPLICATION OF INTRACORPORATE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE TO CORPORATION AND ITS EMPLOYEES

UNDER PARTICULAR FACTS
§ 10. Where there is no claim of employees' acting outside scope of employment or for
personal interest—Conspiracy claim supportable
**Applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in an action against a corporation
and one or more of its employees, or against multiple employees of the same corporation,
in which there was no claim that the corporate employees were acting outside the scope
of their employment, or in furtherance of their own personal interests, the courts in
the following cases held that, under the circumstances, a finding of a conspiracy by the
defendants was supportable where two or more separate corporations were allegedly
involved in the conspiracy.
§ 11. Where there is no claim of employees' acting outside scope of employment or for
personal interest—Conspiracy claim not established
Applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in an action against a corporation and
one or more of its employees, or against multiple employees of the same corporation, in
which there was no claim that the corporate employees were acting outside the scope of
their employment, or in furtherance of their own personal interests, the courts in the
following cases held that, under the circumstances, a finding of a conspiracy by the
defendants was not supportable.
See Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1st Dist. 1963)
(disapproved of on other grounds by, Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia
Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th 503, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475, 869 P.2d 454 (1994)), an action by a
terminated railroad employee against the railroad, the railroad workers' union, and
employees of the railroad and the union, in which the court held that, while a
conspiracy between the railroad and the union was supportable, the employees could not
take part in any conspiracy. The court noted that there was no allegation that the
employees were acting in any capacity other than within the course and scope of their
employment. Nor was there any allegation, the court continued, expressly stating or from
which it could reasonably be inferred that the employees were acting for their
individual advantage.
Comment
The disapproval of the Wise case by Applied Equipment was not on the matter of
intracorporate conspiracy, but rather on the question whether a party to a contract can
be liable for the tort of interference with a contractual relationship.
See also the following cases, in which there was no claim that the defendant corporate
employees were acting outside the scope of their employment, or in furtherance of their
own personal interests, and in which the courts held that, under the circumstances, the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine precluded the finding of a conspiracy, where—
—an insurance adjusting firm, its employee, a law firm, and its employee allegedly
conspired with insurance companies to deprive the plaintiff of benefits to which he was
entitled under his fire insurance policies. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032 (1973) .
—the owners of a group of businesses sued a bank and certain of its employees for civil
conspiracy, fraud, and related claims when the bank failed to renew loans or grant new
loans to the companies. Black v. Bank of America, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d
725 (1st Dist. 1994) .
—a laid-off employee claimed that his former employer, and certain of its officers,
conspired to defraud him regarding his layoff. Kerr v. Rose, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1551, 265
Cal. Rptr. 597, 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 32, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56546 (6th Dist. 1990) .
—a bank and its employees allegedly conspired to require the plaintiff to return funds
he had received when he cashed two checks that were subsequently dishonored. Lawrence
v. Bank of America, 163 Cal. App. 3d 431, 209 Cal. Rptr. 541, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 201
(1st Dist. 1985) .
—a university and its faculty members allegedly conspired to deprive the plaintiff, a
student at the university, of her education when the university's faculty went on strike
to protest the Vietnam War. Zumbrun v. University of Southern California, 25 Cal. App.
3d 1, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 51 A.L.R.3d 991 (2d Dist. 1972) .
§ 12. Where there is claim of employees' acting outside scope of employment or for
personal interest—Conspiracy claim supportable
Applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in an action against a corporation and
one or more of its employees, or against multiple employees of the same corporation, the
courts in the following cases held supportable, under the circumstances, the plaintiff's
claim that the corporate employees were acting outside the scope of their employment, or
in furtherance of their own personal interests, so as to permit a finding of a
conspiracy by the defendants.
Cases:
State correctional officers were not acting within scope of their employment when they
allegedly forced inmate to fight fellow inmate, and threatened to beat inmate with baton
and engage in joint cover-up if inmate did not finish fight with fellow inmate, and thus
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine did not preclude inmate's § 1983 conspiracy claim
against officers. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Randle v. Alexander, 960 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.
N.Y. 2013).
Intra-enterprise doctrine did not bar former city firefighter's claim that her former
co-workers and supervisors conspired to subject her to harassment because of her gender
and her exercise of her First Amendment free speech rights, where firefighter alleged
that she was subjected to verbal abuse, denied opportunity to respond to emergency
calls, and terminated, and that alleged sexual harassment by deputy fire chief and
taunting from co-worker fell outside scope of their employment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends.
1, 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3). Wyatt v. City of Barre, 885 F. Supp. 2d 682 (D. Vt.
2012).
Mortgagors' allegations that two corporate employees used the corporate entity as their
alter ego and as a conduit through which they defrauded the mortgagors, who had been
facing mortgage foreclosure, were sufficient to meet the requirement, for pleading a
claim of civil conspiracy between a corporation and its employees, of alleging that the
employees were acting outside the scope of their authority or other than in the normal
course of their corporate duties. Eicher v. Mid America Financial Inv. Corp., 275 Neb.
462, 748 N.W.2d 1 (2008).
**Developer's civil conspiracy claim against county council members was not precluded by
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine that prevents a conspiracy between persons acting within
the scope of their employment, where developer asserted civil conspiracy claim against
council members in their individual capacities, rather than their official capacities as
council members. Cricket Cove Ventures, LLC v. Gilland, 701 S.E.2d 39 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010).
Black v. Bank of America, 30 Cal.App.4th 1, 6, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 725 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. Nov

15, 1994)
A corporation is, of course, a legal fiction that cannot act at all except through its
employees and agents. (See Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 25, 276 Cal.Rptr.
303, 801 P.2d 1054.) When a corporate employee acts in the course of his or her
employment, on behalf of the corporation, there is no entity apart from the employee
with whom the employee can conspire. FN3 “ ‘ “[I]t is basic in the law of conspiracy
that you must have two persons or entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot
conspire with itself any more than a private individual can, and it is the general rule
that the acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation....” ’ ” (Kerr v. Rose
(1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1551, 1564, 265 Cal.Rptr. 597, quoting Shasta Douglas Oil Co. v.
Work (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 618, 624, 28 Cal.Rptr. 190; **729Zumbrun v. University of
Southern California (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1, 12–13, 101 Cal.Rptr. 499.) To hold that a
subordinate employee of a corporation can be liable for conspiring with the corporate
principal would destroy what has heretofore been the settled rule that a corporation
cannot conspire with itself.FN4 In the absence of a clear statement from the Supreme
Court that this change in the law is intended, we will not so impair the agent's
immunity rule.
FN3. **Appellants cannot rely upon the exception to the rule of agent's immunity
allowing corporate employees to be held liable for conspiracy with their principal when
they act for their own individual advantage and not solely on behalf of the
corporation, or act beyond the scope of their authority. (See, e.g., Doctors' Co. v.
Superior Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 47, 260 Cal.Rptr. 183, 775 P.2d 508; Wise v.
Southern Pacific Co., supra, 223 Cal.App.2d at p. 72, 35 Cal.Rptr. 652; Pink Supply
Corp. v. Hiebert, Inc. (8th Cir.1986) 788 F.2d 1313, 1317; Buschi v. Kirven (4th
Cir.1985) 775 F.2d 1240, 1252.) In the verified first amended cross-complaint
appellants filed in their previous case (case no. 857395) they alleged the individual
defendants committed the assertedly wrongful acts “in the course and scope of their
respective employment and agency for the Bank.” They cannot now, in a desperate attempt
to state a claim for conspiracy, directly contradict these allegations and assert that
the same officers were acting beyond the scope of their authority. (Cantu v.
Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877–878, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 [plaintiff
may not avoid demurrer by pleading facts that contradict facts pleaded in earlier
actions].)
FN4. The individual defendants in this case were Bank employees who carried out but did
not create Bank policies. Liability therefore cannot attach to these defendants under
the rule that directors and officers of a corporation may become liable for the
corporation's tortious conduct if they “directly ordered, authorized or participated in
the tortious conduct.” (Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 785, 157
Cal.Rptr. 392, 598 P.2d 45.)
Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal.App.2d 50, 72, 35 Cal.Rptr. 652, 49 Lab.Cas. P
51,051 (Cal.App. 1 Dist., Dec 06, 1963)
We hold that a cause of action for conspiracy will lie against the defendant Company.
2. Corporate agents as conspirators.

[24][25] Defendants assert that the defendants Hitke and Smith cannot be joined as
conspirators. We think this point is well taken. Agents and employees of a corporation
cannot conspire with their corporate principal or employer where they act in their
official capacities on behalf of the corporation and not as individuals for their
individual advantage. ( Bliss v. Southern Pacific Company (1958) 212 Or. 634, 321 P.2d
324, 328–329; May v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., supra, 370 P.2d 390, 395.) This
rule derives from the principle that ordinarily corporate agents and employees acting
for and on behalf of the corporation cannot be held liable for inducing a breach of the
corporation's contract*73 since being in a confidential relationship to the corporation
their action in this respect is privileged. The inducement of the breach to be
actionable must be both wrongful and unprivileged. ( Imperial Ice Co. v. rossier (1941)
18 Cal.2d 33, 38, 112 P.2d 631; Lawless v. Brotherhood of Painters (1956) 143
Cal.App.2d 474, 478, 300 P.2d 159; May v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., supra; 30
Am.Jur. 82; 26 A.L.R.2d 1270–1271.)
[26] In the instant case, it is alleged in the second count that at all times mentioned
defendants Hitke and Smith were ‘employees, agents and representatives' of their
respective corporations and ‘were acting within the course and scope of their said
employment * * *.’ **There is no allegation that they were acting in any other
capacity. **There is no allegation expressly stating or from which it can be reasonably
inferred that they were acting for their individual advantage. The allegation that the
acts of these defendants were motivated by malice and were intentional would not impose
liability. (Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, supra.)
We hold that the second count fails to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against defendants Hitke and Smith.
**666 3. Causal connection between conspiracy and discharge.

[27] Defendants' contention that plaintiff has failed to allege a causal connection
between the conspiracy and his discharge must succumb to a fair reading of the
allegations of the second count already set forth by us. They allege a conspiracy for
the purpose of securing plaintiff's discharge, the performance of certain acts pursuant
thereto and finally that the defendant Company ‘in furtherance of said agreement did on
March 2, 1960, without cause, wrongfully discharge plaintiff * * *.’ This is a plain and
clear statement that the discharge resulted from the conspiracy.
And the court stated at p. 74,
5. Sufficiency of allegations of second count.

Defendants' contention that the second count by realleging all but two paragraphs of
the first count is ‘subject to all of the insufficiencies' of the first count must fail
in view of the conclusions which we have reached as to the sufficiency of the first
count.
[29][30] We therefore turn to the question of the sufficiency of the conspiracy
allegations themselves. To state such a cause of action, as already pointed out, the
complaint must allege (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) the
wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto and (3) the resulting damage. We have
heretofore set forth and need not here repeat the allegations of the second count to
the effect that prior to January 21, 1960, the defendant Company conspired with its
codefendants to bring false charges against plaintiff and to deprive plaintiff of a fair
hearing on such charges for the purpose of securing his discharge in violation of the
union agreement. This is a sufficient statement of the first element of the cause of
action. (See California Auto Court Ass'n v. Cohn, supra, 98 Cal.App.2d 145, 147, 149,
219 P.2d 511; Greenwood v. Mooradian (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 532, 537–538, 290 P.2d 955.)
The second count thereafter alleges that the defendant Association (for reasons already
stated we omit reference to defendant Smith and other agents) pursuant to the agreement
induced certain persons to give false statements and to appear and testify falsely about
plaintiff; and that the defendant Company, pursuant to the agreement, made false
charges against plaintiff, knowingly received such false statements and testimony,
deprived plaintiff of a fair hearing and finally discharged him without cause. It is
clear that these are wrongful acts which work an invasion of *75 plaintiff's right to
continue in employment according to the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement. It is also clear that each participant in such acts is responsible as a joint
tort feasor **667 whether or not it was a direct actor in respect to each of them. (See
Mox, Incorporated v. Woods, supra, 202 Cal. 675, 677–678, 262 P. 302; Greenwood v.
Mooradian, supra.) Thus, there is also a sufficient allegation of the second element of
the cause of action. No question is raised as to the allegation of the third element of
damage.
We conclude that the second count states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against defendants Company and Association.
From Collins v. Womancare 878 F.2d 1145
a “prearranged plan, customary procedure, or policy that substituted the judgment of a

private party for that of the police
that there was any prearrangement*1156 between” the citizen and police officer
that state agents failed to use independent judgment or in any way coerced or
encouraged Womancare employees to effect the citizen's arrest
** [Cited 6 times for this legal issue]

Dietrich v. John Ascuaga's Nugget, 548 F.3d 892
C.A.9.Nev.,2008
Neither private business that had obtained special event permit from city to host cook-
off in public area that included sidewalk location where political organization
volunteer was gathering signatures for recall petition and registering voters, nor vice-
president and employee of business, were liable under § 1983 as willful participants in
joint action with the police for the violation of the volunteer's First Amendment right
to free speech that occurred when police officer removed volunteer, under threat of
arrest, from her sidewalk location, since there was no showing that business, vice-
president, or employee did anything more than summon police to the location. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1 ; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .

Rimac v. Duncan, 319 Fed.Appx. 535
C.A.9.Cal.,2009
Landowner's allegation that neighboring landowner and fire chief agreed or planned to
cut down trees on landowner's property was sufficient to allege joint action between
state and private actors, for purposes of holding neighboring landowner liable under §
1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .

Soffer v. City of Costa Mesa, 607 F.Supp. 975
C.D.Cal.,1985
Private towing company, which acted at behest of police officer and pursuant to a
municipal ordinance, acted under color of state law, for purposes of section 1983, in
towing plaintiff's allegedly abandoned vehicle. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F.Supp.2d 1060
C.D.Cal.W.Div.,2009
A private individual may be liable under § 1983 if he conspired or entered joint action
with a state actor; such a conspiracy requires the existence of an agreement or a
meeting of minds among the private individual and state agents to violate the
plaintiff's constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .

Vonderplanitz v. City of Los Angeles, 43 Fed.Appx. 60
C.A.9.Cal.,2002
Private citizen who allegedly supplied information upon which police relied to make
arrest could not be held liable to arrestee under § 1983, absent evidence he had acted
in concert with police. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 .
Keywords: **Joint action giving rise to § 1983 liability of private entity with regard
to citizen's arrest requires substantial degree of cooperative action between state
officials and private person. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Liability of private person entity with regard to citizen’s arrest between state public
official police officer and private person entity under 42 u.s.c. 1983
Westnext_search_liab_priv_person_entity_w_regard_to_citizens_arrest_between_state_public
_offical_police_officer_&_priv_person_entity_under_42_usc_1983_ca9_81_results.doc
** 6. Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. September 03, 2008 541 F.3d 950 2008 WL 4058566 05-15725
CIVIL RIGHTS - Free Speech. Garlic festival association’s expulsion of motorcycle club
members from festival in city park was not state action.
...We have previously considered the circumstances in which a police officer’s involvement in a private
enforcement action constitutes state action such that the private entity is liable in a line of cases
involving police presence at private vehicle repossessions and evictions....
...Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974) (courts must consider whether there
is a “sufficiently close nexus between the [s]tate and the challenged action of the regulated entity so
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the [s]tate itself”); (2) the public or
governmental function test, see id. at 352, 95 S.Ct. 449 (state action is present when a private entity
exercises functions traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state); (3) the state compulsion test,
see Blum v. Yaretsky,...
... Before the 2000 festival, City police officers attended briefings as to the parameters of the dress
code and were instructed to exclude persons wearing “group clothing that could inspire conflict,” as
Gilroy City police officer Brenda Bergman testified....
... As we noted in Harris, “police intervention and aid [in private enforcement actions] does constitute
state action,” and “there may be a deprivation within the meaning of §1983 ․ when [an] officer assists in
effectuating [the private enforcement action] ․ or so intimidates [the plaintiff] as to cause him to
refrain from exercising his legal right[s]․...
** 13. Fraser v. County of Maui
United States District Court, D. Hawai‘i. June 07, 1994 855 F.Supp. 1167 1994 WL 268117 CIV. 92-00635 ACK
Resident of condominium complex sued county, county police officer, resident manager of
condominium complex, and condominium association alleging federal cause of action under §1983
and §1985 and state cause of action for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress...
... In Collins itself, the Ninth Circuit concluded that no state action existed where the impetus for the
arrest came from the private entity and not the police officer, the police officer discouraged the
arrest by warning about potential civil liability for false arrest, the police officer refused to make
the arrest on his own authority after conducting an independent investigation, and the police...
... The Ninth Circuit however recently held in a non-citizen’s arrest case that, for the purposes of
imposing §1983 liability on defendant-private citizens, genuine issues of fact existed regarding state
action where the private citizens filled out the citizen’s complaint that formed a basis of the arrest
upon the advice of police officers...
... In Zimmerman, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence there created genuine issues of fact regarding
state action because it suggested the private persons making the citizen’s arrest did so upon the advice
of police officers....
... If however a private person, by statutory authority or otherwise, is permitted to make a citizen’s
arrest only when the offense is actually being committed in that person’s presence, cases generally hold
that probable cause is not a defense to a false imprisonment action against the person....
** 17. Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. September 16, 1999 192 F.3d 826 1999 WL 718466 99-55050
Prospective employee sued hospital, alleging that hospital’s refusal to hire him, after he
failed to provide social security number as required by federal law, violated Title VII,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), First Amendment free speech clause, Privacy Act,
and the Paperwork Reduction Act. The United States District Court for the...
... Typically, the nexus has consisted of participation by the state in an action ostensibly taken by the
private entity, through conspiratorial agreement (Adickes), official cooperation with the private entity
to achieve the private entity’s goal (Lugar), or enforcement and ratification of the private entity’s
chosen action (Moose Lodge)....
...The existence of a conspiracy between the private entity and state officials to pursue a joint and
unconstitutional end distinguishes Adickes from this case; recall, here, that Defendant offered Plaintiff
a position and would have hired him but for the government’s social-security-number requirement....
...Lugar, 457 U.S. at 955–56, 102 S.Ct. 2744 (Powell, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Rehnquist and
O’Connor) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); see also David Lagos, Damned If You Do ․ The Supreme
Court Denies Qualified Immunity to Section 1983 Private Party Defendants in Wyatt v. Cole, 71 N.C. L.Rev.
849, 864 (1993) (“[T]he private party’s culpability in using state power was central to a finding of
liability under Adickes.”)....
... According to the Supreme Court, “a private person who discriminates on the basis of race with the
knowledge of and pursuant to a state-enforced custom requiring such discrimination, is a participant in
joint activity with the State, and is acting under color of that custom for purposes of §1983.” ...
Bailey v. Kenney, 791 F.Supp. 1511 (D.Kan., Apr 16, 1992)
Kenney's reliance on these citizen's arrest cases is misplaced. The actions of Kenney
were not simply those of a private citizen unilaterally taking action or reporting
suspected criminal activity to the police. Rather, the undisputed evidence establishes
that Kenney and the police officers acted in a concerted manner to enter the house and
restrain plaintiff of his liberty. Moreover, there are allegations allowing the
inference that the police officers actually acted under the direction of Kenney, who
informed Haynes and Wiley that they *1523 could enter and search for bond forfeitures
and that this was done all the time. **See Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d
1423, 1430 (10th Cir.1984) (jury could find that security guard acted under color of
state law where local police followed custom allowing guard to substitute his judgment
for that of police), cert. denied in part, granted in part as to other party, 474 U.S.
818 & 805, 106 S.Ct. 65 & 40, 88 L.Ed.2d 53 & 33 (1985).
For purposes of this summary judgment motion,FN4 the court finds the second prong of
Lugar to be satisfied. In contrast to Ouzts, no party in this case contends that Kenney
acted ultra vires the law of Kansas, which grants bondsmen the full extent of their
broad common law powers of arrest. Moreover, Kenney's attempts to minimize the
assistance given by the police officers in this case are unpersuasive. Together with
Kenney, Lt. Haynes and Officer Wiley used their show of authority in an attempt to bring
plaintiff to the door; they jointly forced their entry into the house with guns drawn;
they pointed their weapons at plaintiff when he appeared; and they jointly restrained
plaintiff of his freedom while questioning him. The active, concerted action of the
police with Kenney belies Kenney's assertion that the police officers only “stood by” to
assist a private action.
FN4. Plaintiff does not argue as a matter of law that Kenney acted under color of state
law. Accordingly, the court expresses no view at this time whether “material facts exist
without substantial controversy” that would remove this matter from the jury's
consideration. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d).
Accordingly, the court finds sufficient facts from which a jury could find that Kenney
acted under color of state law for § 1983 purposes.
Watson v. Haverford Tp. Police Dept., 2011 WL 2200306, 5, (E.D.Pa. Jun 06, 2011)
*5 In contrast, Ms. Watson has alleged a previous connection between Defendant and
local officials via his employment with the Township, identified a phone conversation
during which Defendant allegedly instructed local police to harass her, and averred that
police engaged in unprompted verbal and physical abuse immediately after the first
officer on the scene stated that he was there as a result of Ms. Watson's problems with
Defendant Pili. Drawing all inferences in favor of Ms. Watson, the Court finds that she
has alleged a sufficient degree of joint action or improper influence on the part of
Defendant Pili to properly plead a conspiracy between himself and local authorities to
violate her constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Ms.
Watson's civil rights claims against Defendant Pili.
Walker v. City of Hayward, 2008 WL 2357249, 3, (N.D.Cal., Jun 06, 2008)
I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
First, Defendants again move to dismiss the § 1983 claims against them on grounds that
Plaintiff has failed to allege that they acted under color of law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(applying to conduct by persons acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia”). When the Court
dismissed the § 1983 claims against Defendants in the original complaint, it found that
Plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts to support a joint action theory. Under that
theory, a private party may be held liable under § 1983 if he or she “is a willful
participant in joint action with the State or its agents.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-
28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). A “bare allegation” of joint action is insufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss, and a plaintiff must instead allege “facts tending to show
that [the private defendants] acted under color of state law or authority.” Degrassi v. City
of Glendora, 207 F.3d 636, 647 (9th Cir.2000) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Based on the allegations in the original complaint, the Court concluded that:
Plaintiff here has failed to [allege such facts]. The Ninth Circuit has held that “merely
complaining to the police does not convert a private party into a state actor. Nor is
execution by a private party of a sworn complaint which forms the basis of an arrest enough
to convert the private party's acts into state action.” Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.
2d 1145, 1155 ( 9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Thus, Plaintiff's allegation that
Wardak signed a written statement that he was making a citizen's arrest for trespassing is
insufficient to allege state action on Wardak's behalf. Compl. ¶ 28. Similarly, it is
insufficient for Plaintiff to allege that the police officers “wrongfully arrested Plaintiff
on the basis of a false report” made by Wardak. Id. ¶ 1. Nowhere does the complaint allege
that Plaintiff was ever arrested for or charged with trespassing, nor does it allege that
Wardak made any statements regarding the three charges that were actually brought against
Plaintiff. **Additionally, the complaint does not allege any facts supporting a conspiracy
between Wardak and the Defendant officers in the case; Wardak is only alleged to have signed
a statement prepared by Officer Snell, who is not named as a defendant in this case and is
not alleged to have participated in the alleged unlawful use of force against Plaintiff.
*4 Put simply, Plaintiff has failed to allege the “substantial degree of cooperative action”
required to allege § 1983 liability by a private actor under a joint action theory.
Collins, 878 F. 2d at 1154.
Mar. 4, 2008 Order at 4.
Plaintiff has cured this deficiency in the FAC. Although Defendants correctly observe that
Plaintiff does not allege that he was ultimately charged with trespassing, **Plaintiff does
allege that the officers initially arrested him based solely on Wardak's complaints of
trespassing and without conducting any independent investigation. FAC ¶ 22. Unlike in
Collins, the officers in this case are alleged to have failed to use independent judgment and
failed to maintain a position of neutrality; instead, they are alleged to have followed a
customary policy whereby they arrest individuals based on reports made by Jack in the Box or
ADS employees. Compare FAC ¶¶ 22, 28 with Collins, 878 F. 2d at 1155-56; also compare,
e.g., Carey v. Continental Airlines, Inc. ., 823 F.2d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir.1987) (dismissing
§ 1983 claim against private party who made a citizen's arrest where police arrested
plaintiff after questioning him and there were no factual allegations from which the court
“might conclude that his arrest resulted from **any concerted action, whether **conspiracy,
**prearranged plan, **customary procedure, or **policy that substituted the judgment of a
private party for that of the police or allowed a private party to exercise state power”);
Sims v. Jefferson Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc., 778 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir.1985) (rejecting
joint action theory where the plaintiff “has not alleged a preconceived plan between [private
party and the police], nor has he shown that the arresting officer did not make an
independent determination whether there was cause to arrest”). Thus, the FAC's allegations
adequately allege Defendants' § 1983 liability under a joint action theory. See Murray v.
Wal-Mart, Inc., 874 F.2d 555, 559 (8th Cir.1989) (noting that “a store and its employees may
be considered to be acting jointly with police when the police will detain accused
shoplifters without making an independent investigation, or pursuant to a customary plan
between the store and the police department” (citations omitted)). The Court therefore DENIES
Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's first and third causes of action under § 1983.
Keywords: conspiracy between police public official and private party actor resulted
from any concerted action, whether conspiracy, prearranged plan, customary procedure, or
policy that substituted the judgment of a private party for that of the police or
allowed a private party to exercise state power
**51. Steel v. City of San Diego

United States District Court, S.D. California. June 30, 2010 726 F.Supp.2d 1172 2010 WL 2635759 09CV1743-
MMA
CIVIL RIGHTS - Arrest and Detention. Former spouse alleged §1983 civil rights conspiracy as
to city.
...Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action against
Hasbrouck: (1) unlawful seizure and imprisonment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, (2) excessive force
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, (3) civil conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. §1983, (4) assault, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) negligent
infliction of emotional distress, and (7) negligence....
...Former spouse alleged that private investigator hired by ex-wife’s divorce attorney formed agreement
with city officials to have him arrested in order to obtain incriminating child custody evidence, as
required to state civil conspiracy claim under §1983; complaint averred that investigator directed
official to have police arrange “hot stop” of spouse’s vehicle for alleged driving while under influence.
42 U.S.C.A. §1983....
...Holdings: The District Court, Michael M. Anello, J., held that: (1)spouse alleged civil rights
conspiracy as to city; (2)California statute requiring plaintiffs to obtain court orders before asserting
attorney conspiracy was procedural; (3)spouse failed to allege civil rights conspiracy as to ex-wife’s
divorce attorneys; (4)spouse alleged civil rights claims as to private investigator; and (5)spouse failed
to allege civil rights conspiracy and tort claims as to private process server....
...Former spouse alleged that city officials formed agreement to have him arrested in order to obtain
incriminating child custody evidence, as required to state civil conspiracy claim under §1983; complaint
averred telephone conversations between officials at time of events in question, two of whom were
allegedly communicating during pursuit, arrest, and subsequent transport of spouse to police
headquarters. 42 U.S.C.A. §1983....
** 55. Arnold v. International Business Machines Corp.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. February 05, 1981 637 F.2d 1350
%3A&transitionType=Search&contextData=%28sc.Default%29&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0 78-3458
Action was brought against corporation and various of its employees for alleged violations of
plaintiff’s civil rights. The United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Francis C. Whelan, J., entered summary judgment in favor of the corporation and
the employees, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wallace, Circuit...
...In Smith, the defendant department store and the local police department had a prearranged plan
whereby the police would take shoplifting suspects to the police station and book them solely on the
basis of the store employees’ statements that the suspects had taken something without paying for it....
...The court, analyzing these facts under the rubric of state action, affirmed the section 1983 judgment
for the plaintiffs, holding that the department store was liable for the improper arrests when those
arrests were made pursuant to a preconceived plan....
...It is clear, however, that he was charged in the arrest warrant with receiving stolen property and
conspiracy to receive stolen property, and was subsequently indicted for conspiracy to receive stolen
property....
...The police detained the suspects “without independently establishing that there was probable cause to
do so-they took the (suspects) into custody without a valid complaint having been filed and without
knowing the facts to believe that a crime had been committed.”...
**72. Wright v. City of Reno

United States District Court, D. Nevada. October 28, 1981 533 F.Supp. 58
%3A&transitionType=Search&contextData=%28sc.Default%29&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0 CIV-R-80-277-ECR
In a civil rights action, and on motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under which
relief could be granted, the District Court, Edward C. Reed, Jr., J., held that: (1) for
purposes of motion to dismiss, amended complaint under 1871 civil rights statute contained
sufficient allegations to demonstrate that defendant towing company, which...
...If municipality has policy or custom of refusing or neglecting to prevent Ku Klux Klan violations by
its agents or employee, municipality can be held liable under provision for liability for neglect to
prevent Ku Klux Klan Act violations, but indispensable prerequisite of such claim is existence of
conspiracy actionable under the Ku Klux Klan Act. 42 U.S.C.A. §§1985, 1985(3), 1986....
...In view of alleged wrongful participation of automobile towing company in joint activity with public
officials, allegations of complaint counts against towing company were sufficient to withstand motion to
dismiss for failure to state claim, despite towing company’s argument that it had no control over police
and had no part in making decision whether vehicle should be towed and that its conduct in threatening to
tow away plaintiff’s automobile, unless it was paid $22, was not cause of any deprivation of plaintiff’s
rights. 42 U.S.C.A. §1983....
...The test of whether a joint participation, or conspiracy, existed is whether the facts alleged
demonstrate that the private party and the public official acted with a common understanding, or meeting
of the minds, to deprive the plaintiff of his federal rights....
...The Arnold court itself, at page 1358, recognized the possibility of liability in the private party
where it and the police acted pursuant to a preconceived plan which violated the plaintiffs’ rights....
**76. Rimac v. Duncan
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. March 10, 2009 319 Fed.Appx. 535 2009 WL 631616 07-15962
CIVIL RIGHTS - State Action. Landowner’s allegation that neighboring landowner and fire chief
agreed to cut down landowner’s trees was sufficient to allege state action.
... Rimac’s complaint does not sufficiently allege a municipal custom or policy that would subject the
FDFPD or the County to municipal liability under §1983....
... Rimac’s allegation of inadequate policies and programs regarding training of employees are
insufficiently pled....
... Only if a plaintiff shows that his injury resulted from a ‘permanent and well-settled’ practice may
liability attach for injury resulting from a local government custom.”...
...The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and REMANDED with respect to the §1983 claims against
Crawford and Duncan....
**82. Ennis v. City of Daly City

United States District Court, N.D. California. November 22, 2010 756 F.Supp.2d 1170 2010 WL 4916400 C 09-
05318 MHP
CIVIL RIGHTS - Free Speech. Under California law, allegations were sufficient to plead circus
attempted to prevent protestor from engaging in speech rights.
... Indeed, from plaintiff’s very limited assertion of facts related to any alleged joint action or
alleged conspiracy between Carson and the City and/or the Cow Palace, the court is unable “to draw the
reasonable inference” that joint action was involved in the placement of the barricades and the
subsequent alleged violation of plaintiff’s constitutional right to free speech....
...In Jones, the California Supreme Court provides the following example or facts that could allege a
section 52.1 violation based on a Fourth Amendment violation: “For example, if a burglary victim,
suspecting that his stolen property lay hidden in a nearby house, stood at the door with the police and
threatened to injure the homeowner if she did not change her mind and consent to an official and
warrantless search of her premises, the homeowner might, under section 52.1, be able to sue her neighbor
for interfering with her Fourth Amendment rights, assuming for purposes of this example that the Fourth
Amendment protected her against warrantless searches by the state without her consent under the
circumstances.”...
...“Under the joint action test, courts examine whether state officials and private parties have acted
in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights....
...[4]Paragraph 29 of the Second Amended Complaint states, “The decision to keep the configuration of
barricades which Griggs had advised needed to be changed to protect plaintiff’s first amendment rights was
made by defendants Eric Wollman, acting on behalf of the Daly City police department, Walter Haub and
Diana Colvin, acting on behalf of [the Cow Palace] and Gustav Parra–Bello, acting on behalf of Carson &
Barnes Circus.” ...
**84. Pleasant v. Turner

United States District Court, E.D. California. October 28, 2013 Slip Copy 2013 WL 5798994 1:13-CV-00329
LJO-GS
Plaintiff Terry Pleasant (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this
malicious prosecution action based on a prior criminal proceeding against him in Merced
County Superior court. Plaintiff’s instant complaint alleges malicious prosecution claims
against three individual defendants who were connected to the prior...
...Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980) (under § 1983, a claim may
lie against a private party who “is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its
agents”); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir.2002) (“[a] private individual may be liable under §
1983 if she conspired or entered joint action with a state actor”); Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 437 (9th
Cir.1983) (“A private party...
...Rather, a private party acts under color of state law where authorities, in accordance with a
preconceived plan, rely on the private party’s judgment in effecting an arrest and obtaining an
indictment....
...In contrast, a private party acts under color of state law where the private party conspires with
state officials to deprive others of constitutional rights....
...Finally, Plaintiff is advised that “merely complaining to the police does not convert a private party
into a state actor.”...
** 85. Doe v. Unocal Corp.
United States District Court, C.D. California. August 31, 2000 110 F.Supp.2d 1294 2000 WL 1239935 CV 96-
6959 RSWL BQRX, CV 96-6112 RSWL BQRX
INTERNATIONAL LAW - Human Rights. Oil company could not be held liable for Myanmar
government’s use of forced labor.
... Id. The Ninth Circuit, citing Arnold, stated that “absent some showing that a private party had some
control over state officials’ decision [to commit the challenged act], the private party did not
proximately cause the injuries stemming from [the act]....
... Under the joint action test, state action is present if a private party is a “willful participant in
joint action with the State or its agents.” ...
...“Courts examine whether state officials and private parties have acted in concert in effecting a
particular deprivation of constitutional rights.” ...
... Under this conspiracy approach, state action may be found if a state actor has participated in or
influenced the challenged decision or action....
**86. Giulio v. BV CenterCal, LLC

United States District Court, D. Oregon. August 10, 2011 Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 2011 WL 3860443 3:09-
CV-482-AC
This action revolves around a physical confrontation which occurred at Bridgeport Village, a
shopping mall located in Tigard, Oregon. The plaintiff, Keri Giulio (“Keri”), alleges that
defendants BV CenterCal, LLC (“BV CenterCal”), the owner of Bridgeport Village, and CenterCal
Properties (“CenterCal”), the...
...On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has held that where a private party repeatedly seeks police
assistance with a “self-help” eviction in the absence of proper notice or a prior judicial hearing, the
private party could be held liable for constitutional violations resulting from police actions....
...In so holding, the court specifically acknowledged that a single request for police assistance in
peacekeeping functions may not be sufficient to support a 1983 action against the private party....
...Or, as explained by the Ninth Circuit in Phelps Dodge, “[e]vidence that police failed to exercise
independent judgment will support an inference of conspiracy with a private party.”...
...“[A]bsent some showing that a private party had some control over state officials’ decision [to
commit the challenged act], the private party did not proximately cause the injuries stemming from [the
act]....
** 87. Price v. State of Hawaii

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. July 11, 1991 939 F.2d 702 1991 WL 122418 90-15117, 90-
15863
Section 1983 action was brought against private landowners, State of Hawaii, and state
officials to eject landowners from land that allegedly was no longer used as sailors home as
required by conveyance of provisional Hawaii government and to require State to begin
receiving income from land. The United States District Court for the...
...No party was entitled to attorney fees on appeal in action arising out of landowners’ alleged failure
to use land as sailors home as required by condition of grantor, provisional Hawaii government, and
arising out of alleged reversion of land to State and state officials’ alleged failure to collect income
from land; although state action claim against private landowners was frivolous, landowners and officials
raised arguments on issues which had previously been settled. 42 U.S.C.A. §§1983, 1988; Act March 18,
1959, §5(f), 73 Stat. 4....
...[8]A person may become a state actor by conspiring with a state official, id., or by engaging in joint
activity with state officials, Sable Communications v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 890 F.2d 184, 189 (9th
Cir.1989) (defendant sought the aid of law enforcement officials in order to use further procedures that
would violate the plaintiff’s first amendment rights)....
... As pertinent here, section 5(f) reads as follows, and we have emphasized the part most pertinent to
our discussion: The lands ․ together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any such
lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said State as a public trust for the support of the
public schools and other public educational institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of native
Hawaiians ․, for the development of farm and home ownership on as widespread a basis as possible for the
making of public improvements, and for the provision of lands for public use....
...Section 1983 claim against private owners of land that allegedly was no longer used as sailors home and
allegedly reverted to State of Hawaii pursuant to conveyance by provisional government of Hawaii could be
found to be meritless and frivolous and could be found to justify award of attorney fees under civil
rights statute and Rule 11, even though state action concept can be murky. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 11, 28
U.S.C.A.; 42 U.S.C.A. §§1983, 1988; Act March 18, 1959, §5(f), 73 Stat. 4....
**92. Sierzega v. Ashcroft

United States District Court, D. Oregon. July 21, 2006 440 F.Supp.2d 1198 2006 WL 2061362 CV-05-1338-HU
CIVIL RIGHTS - Privacy. Dentist seeking stalking protection was state actor under §1983.
... The Court did note that “merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit
does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge [;]” but, the Court continued,
****the allegations brought by the plaintiff in Dennis were that “an official act of the defendant judge
was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge.” ...
... **The case primarily stands for the proposition that private parties who are alleged to have
conspired with a government official to deprive a person of his or her constitutional rights, may
maintain the claim against the private parties even when the government official’s actions are protected
by judicial immunity....
...It is clear that merely complaining to the police does not convert a private party into a state
actor....
...“Private parties involved in such a conspiracy may be liable under section 1983.” ...
**92. Sierzega v. Ashcroft

United States District Court, D. Oregon. July 21, 2006 440 F.Supp.2d 1198 2006 WL 2061362 CV-05-1338-HU
CIVIL RIGHTS - Privacy. Dentist seeking stalking protection was state actor under §1983.
... The Court did note that “merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit
does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge [;]” but, the Court continued, the
allegations brought by the plaintiff in Dennis were that “an official act of the defendant judge was the
product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge.” ...
... The case primarily stands for the proposition that private parties who are alleged to have conspired
with a government official to deprive a person of his or her constitutional rights, may maintain the
claim against the private parties even when the government official’s actions are protected by judicial
immunity....
...It is clear that merely complaining to the police does not convert a private party into a state
actor....
...“Private parties involved in such a conspiracy may be liable under section 1983.” ...
**94. Constable v. California

United States District Court, E.D. California. December 13, 2007 Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 2007 WL 4404435
107-CV-995-OWW-SMS
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an action for damages and other
relief concerning alleged civil rights violations. The matter has been referred to the
Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and 72-304. Pending
before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (FAC), filed on December...
...A conspiracy between a private party and a state official to deprive others of constitutional rights
may result in action by a private party under color of state law, but ****to prove a conspiracy between
the state and private parties under section 1983, the Plaintiff must allege an agreement or meeting of
the minds to violate constitutional rights; each participant in the conspiracy...
...Id. The mere operation of a statutory enforcement scheme that is used or invoked by a private party is
generally not sufficient; rather, there must be something more with respect to the otherwise private
action, either performance of a public function, state compulsion, nexus with the state, **joint action
constituting wilful participation in joint activity the state or its agents, or other facts....
...However, this holding extended only to a claim challenging the constitutionality of the entire
statutory mechanism, and not to a claim concerning private misuse of abuse of the statute; if the
allegation was only that the conduct was unlawful under state law (i .e., that the law was improperly
applied to the Plaintiffs), then it could not be relied upon to demonstrate that the injury resulted from
the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority because it could not be said
that the private parties were acting pursuant to relevant state policy....
...The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides: Every person who, under color of
[state law] ․ subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ․ to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ․ shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. §
1983....
Keywords: Police officers procured false testimony from witness
police officers conspired with witnesses in concert agreement participation, joint

action, plan, mutual understanding with principal corporation company through bribery to
procure false testimony and suborn perjury, bribed to falsely testify
People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 446, 119 P. 901, 39 L.R.A.N.S. 704 (Cal., Dec 01,
1911)
Whenever the co-operation of the parties is a corrupt co-operation, then always those
agents are accomplices,
P.C. § 127. Subornation of perjury; definition; punishment
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY. Every person who willfully procures another person to commit
perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and is punishable in the same manner as he
would be if personally guilty of the perjury so procured.
2. Elements of offense
6. Conspiracy
Admission of telephone recording of defendant's conversation with his former legal

secretary, in prosecution for conspiring to commit perjury in two civil suits,
subornation of perjury and offering false evidence, did not constitute a violation of
defendant's constitutional rights as recording was made by secretary before she had been
contacted by any law enforcement agents and was accomplished without assistance of any
public official or employee. People v. Jones (App. 4 Dist. 1967) 62 Cal.Rptr. 304, 254
Cal.App.2d 200, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 1101, 390 U.S. 980, 19 L.Ed.2d 1278.
Criminal Law 392.21; Criminal Law 392.36
1. Generally
Subornation of witnesses to swear falsely against a defendant in a criminal
prosecution does not give rise to a cause of action for damages. Taylor v. Bidwell
(1884) 65 Cal 489, 4 P 491, 1884 Cal LEXIS 603.
**Conviction of conspiracy to commit subornation of perjury is sustained by evidence
that defendant and codefendant collaborated in securing third person to testify
falsely. People v. Woodard (1956, Cal App 4th Dist) 145 Cal App 2d 529, 302 P2d 834,
1956 Cal App LEXIS 1372.
**An attorney who attempts to benefit his client through the use of perjured
testimony may be subject to criminal prosecution as well as severe disciplinary action.
In re Branch (1969) 70 Cal 2d 200, 74 Cal Rptr 238, 449 P2d 174, 1969 Cal LEXIS 325.
**The crime of subornation of perjury, described in Pen C § 127, involves moral

turpitude. In re Jones (1971) 5 Cal 3d 390, 96 Cal Rptr 448, 487 P2d 1016, 1971 Cal
LEXIS 261.
**Actual commission of perjury by a person solicited to commit perjury is

unnecessary to constitute solicitation of perjury. People v. Gray (1942, Cal App) 52
Cal App 2d 620, 127 P2d 72, 1942 Cal App LEXIS 656.
5. Evidence
**The evidence supported a finding that the defendant procured a witness to give
false testimony in a civil action growing out of an automobile collision, where it
appeared that prior to the trial of the civil action the defendant took the witness to
the scene of the accident and they concocted the story to be given, and the witness'
testimony in the criminal prosecution concerning his false testimony and his
transactions with the defendant was supported by corroborating circumstances. People v.
Nickell (1937, Cal App) 22 Cal App 2d 117, 70 P2d 659, 1937 Cal App LEXIS 78.
westnext_search_police_sheriff_deputy_law_enf_investig_detect_w_witness_conspir_partic_j
oint_act_plan_mut_understand_w_princ_corp_company_thru_bribery_to_procure_false_testimon
y_suborn_perjury_ca_fed_all_64_results.doc
** 5. Anilao v. Spota
United States District Court, E.D. New York. March 31, 2011 774 F.Supp.2d 457 2011 WL
1226966 10-CV-00032 JFB WDW
TORTS - Malicious Prosecution. Nurses stated malicious prosecution claim against
operator of skilled nursing facility under New York law.
...The Court notes that, although plaintiffs’ allegations regarding false testimony
before the Grand Jury only mention Philipson and other unidentified Sentosa witnesses,
(Am. Compl. ¶¶82, 84), plaintiffs plainly allege that all of “the Sentosa defendants”
met with defendant Spota and entered into an agreement with the County defendants to
procure the indictment of plaintiffs through false testimony (id. ¶¶64, 113–14), and
that the County defendants were acting “for the sole benefit of the Sentosa
defendants.”...
...”); id. ¶82 (noting that the allegations in the indictment were “based upon the
false testimony of Philipson, and/or other Sentosa employees or principals, before the
Grand Jury”); id. ¶83 (“[T]he presentation of evidence to the Grand Jury was improper,
in that ․ the Grand Jury was falsely informed that one or more of the nurses had
resigned and left the facility before completing his or her shift.”); id. ¶¶84–85
(“[T]he indictment was further based upon knowingly false testimony...
... Instead, plaintiffs have alleged that the Sentosa defendants incited the exercise of
state authority by pressuring the County defendants to take action to satisfy the
Sentosa defendants’ goals and for the Sentosa defendants’ sole benefit, and then joined
and participated in the exercise of that authority by agreeing with the County
defendants to present false testimony and thereafter giving such false testimony30
before the Grand Jury.31...
...Pursuant to this alleged agreement, Philipson, and possibly other Sentosa employees
or principals, allegedly provided false testimony before the Grand Jury, including
that nurses had walked off a shift, that shifts were inadequately covered, or that
patients were endangered, all of which the Sentosa witnesses allegedly knew was not
true....
** 7. Limone v. Condon
Officers lack qualified immunity for fabricating charges

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit. June 10, 2004 372 F.3d 39 2004 WL 1299980
03-2130, 03-2212
CIVIL RIGHTS - Immunity. Officers who allegedly suborned perjury did not have qualified
immunity in subsequent civil action.
...Federal and state law enforcement officers, who allegedly cultivated witnesses in
murder investigation from whom they suborned perjury, resulting in the conviction of
three innocent individuals, did not have qualified immunity from subsequent civil
action brought by those individuals under §1983 and Bivens; officers did not commit
perjury themselves, but engaged in a variety of actions that were directly tied to
immunized trial testimony...
... An examination of the Pyle record disclosed to the Third Circuit’s satisfaction
“that the prosecuting officer was in no wise a party to or cognizant of the perjured
testimony given by certain witnesses of the State of Kansas or of the fact that the law
enforcement officers had taken steps to procure false testimony favorable to the
prosecution.” ...
...For purposes of federal and state law enforcement officers’ defense of qualified
immunity in §1983 and Bivens lawsuit alleging that officers participated in plot to
secure murder convictions of innocent persons by cultivating witnesses from whom they
suborned perjury and by suppressing exculpatory evidence, no reasonable law
enforcement officer would have thought it was permissible to frame somebody for a crime
he or she did not commit. 42 U.S.C.A. §1983....
...On interlocutory appeal of denial of defense of qualified immunity, federal and state
law enforcement officers were not entitled to raise issue of who was a proper plaintiff
in action alleging that officers cultivated witnesses in murder investigation from
whom they suborned perjury; qualified immunity issue focused on officers’ conduct
leading up to plaintiffs’ convictions and issue of who was a proper party entailed an
examination of post-conviction events. 42 U.S.C.A. §1983....

42 Usc 1983 Conspiracy Authorities

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42 Usc 1983 Conspiracy Authorities

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42 USC 1983 Conspiracy

Distinction between conspiracy under 1983, and under 1985(3)

Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 45 Fed.R.Serv.3d

b. The Conspiracy Claim

[20][21] To establish the defendants' liability for a conspiracy, a plaintiff must

[T]o ‘expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise neutralize’ and

+ to nurture the atmosphere of conflict, danger and division in the communities

+ to falsely portray plaintiffs and Earth First!, and cause them to be

Plaintiffs' Seventh Amended Complaint at 15-16.

2. The District Court's Conclusions

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence Presented by the Appellees

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

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**In re Cowin, 2013 WL 1786026

Koch v. Royal Wine Merchants, Ltd., 23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 385

Harrington v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, 902 F.Supp.2d 1195

**Harrington v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, 902 F.Supp.2d 1195

Harrington v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, 902 F.Supp.2d 1186

****Poel v. Webber, 899 F.Supp.2d 1155

Minimum notice pleading requirements to factually allege a judge found to be conspiring

F.R.C.P. Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading

Construction with other rules

Construction with other rules - Generally

**The liberal notice pleading requirements of the procedural rules apply to a

** 5. Crowe v. County of San Diego

** 8. United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp.

** 10. Dossett v. First State Bank

**11. Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp.

**14. Mikhail v. Kahn

**17. Sparkman v. McFarlin

** 23. McFadyen v. Duke University

** 27. Katz v. Morgenthau

** 28. Avalos v. Baca

**30. Mirbeau of Geneva Lake, LLC v. City of Lake Geneva

** 39. Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala.

** 41. Shaffer v. Cook

**43. Celano v. Celano

**44. Harrison v. New York

** 45. Caldeira v. County of Kauai

*46. Eriksen v. Nunemaker

** 47. Fisk v. Letterman

*48. Davis v. Self

* 49. Fonda v. Gray

** 50. Smith v. Wambaugh

*52. Johnson v. City of New York

*56. Parent v. New York