Are the United Nations an efficient world governing

body?

Yes:

 1. Support for UN Peace Keeping Operations, also known as

PKOs, is bolstered by the finding that UN PKOs are the most
cost-effective instrument in preventing the recurrence of
violence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). For example, a US
Government Accountability Office report estimates that the
cost of the recent UN mission in Haiti would double if it were
conducted unilaterally by the US (USGAO, 2006).

 2. There are additional savings resulting from the fact that the
cost of deploying a UN peacekeeper is, on average,
significantly lower than the cost of deploying a soldier from a
developed country, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), or even other regional organizations (UN, 2010). For
example, a US soldier deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan is
estimated to cost up to US$1 million annually, according to
US Congressional Research (Drew, 2009). This is up to four
times more than the cost of a UN-deployed soldier.

 3. As we all know, America’s resources and influence are not

limitless. That’s why the United Nations is so important to our
national security. It allows us to share the costs and burdens
of tackling global problems, rather than leaving those
problems to fester or the world to look to America alone.
(Susan Rice, US Ambassador to the United Nations, cited in
Kelemen, 2011)

 4. While states sometimes do act unilaterally, doing so means

that the intervening state is solely responsible for shouldering
all the cost and risks of such operations, from the financial
expenditures to exposing its own soldiers to deadly danger. A
practical and cost-effective alternative that can assuage such
concerns is a UN PKO.
  5. Since the financial burden of a PKO can be spread across
several UN members, the material expenses of UN operations
are significantly lower on a per-state basis than the costs of a
unilateral intervention.

 This is true because UN peacekeepers are often financed by a

multilateral effort even if a single state covers the majority of the
cost.

 Indeed, the UN mission to Haiti is estimated to cost less than half

of what a US-led mission of equal size and scope would cost
(USGAO, 2006).9 In sum, relying on UN PKOs instead of ‘going it
alone’ has clear financial advantages for the states interested in
putting a stop to a civil war.

1 minute 50 seconds.

No:

 1. Peacekeeping operations have been identified as the most

effective and efficient solution to the highly intractable
problem of civil war recurrence; yet, only about 38% of civil
wars receive peacekeeping assistance.

 2. Focusing on the United Nations and its peacekeeping

operations, it is argued that because a relatively small group
of states decides about (and funds) possible deployments,
the supply of United Nations peacekeeping operations likely
reflects the interests of these states.

 3. Specifically, it can be argued that trade ties between the

five permanent members of the Security Council and civil war
states are among the factors that influence the decision to
authorize United Nations peacekeeping operations.
 4. The top five contributors pay 63% of the total UN PKO
budget (UN, 2010). Based on their financial contributions and
institutional power to authorize UN PKO missions, the five
permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council which
include China, France, Russia, UK and the US. However, it has
recently become the P5+1, as Germany has joined.

 5. Upon the cessation of major hostilities, civil war states that

engage in significant economic exchange with the P5 are,
ceteris paribus, more likely to receive UN PKO assistance
than states that are not as economically connected to the P5.

 6. Furthermore, civil wars reduce the international trade of

afflicted states by 30% on average (Bayer and Rupert, 2004;
Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Therefore, a decrease in
economic exchange with the civil war state is a clear negative
externality of civil war that is felt internationally. This explains
why P5 states will have a bias to countries that they have a lot
of trade activity with.

 7. A classic example is in the Sierra Leone civil war where

Human Rights Watch estimated deaths of over 50,000. After
the July 1999 Lome Agreement, UN peacekeepers were sent
to Sierra Leone as a part of the 17,000-strong UNAMSIL
mission. Near the end of the war in 1999, the volume of Sierra
Leone–P5 trade was US$100 million. Yet, by 2000, a year after
UNAMSIL was established, trade with P5 members reached
US$194 million, of which 92% were P5 exports (compared to
51% before the war).

 8. While the UN did deploy a relatively small peacekeeping

contingent to monitor the implementation of the Arusha
Accords (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda),
intended to end the 1991– 1993 civil war, it did little to prevent
the 1994 genocide. Despite a major public outcry and
pressure on the UN to send reinforcements and strengthen
the mandate of its forces, no serious effort to prevent the
slaughter of an estimated 80,000 people took place. In fact,
the UN’s response was actually the withdrawal of troops, in
the end leaving only about 270 soldiers on the ground.
Looking at Rwanda’s trade figures reveals that the country
was of marginal economic importance to P5 countries; the
1993 trade figures stood at only US$49 million. The economic
 motivation to respond seriously to the genocide was simply
not there, adding an important explanation for inaction to the
familiar stories of intervention fatigue and bureaucratic
ineptness.

3 minutes 30

Conclusion:

Of course, significant economic interests are not always a sufficient condition

for UN PKO authorization. Examples of UN PKO missions in Somalia, Bosnia,
and Haiti illustrate the import of humanitarian and strategic factors in the
absence of clear economic interests.

Finally, we note that while economic arguments may seem overly simplistic
and ethically murky, increasing economic interdependence has a positive
externality of placing the stability of important trade partners on the agenda of
major powers. Markets may not be humanitarian, but when humanitarian
efforts are in line with the market interest, we can expect more trade, more
peacekeeping, and, if peacekeeping research is correct, more peace.